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1. MFA OFFICIAL CALLED EMBASSY TO SAY " HIGHEST LEVELS"
GOS VERY CONCERNED OVER PRESS REPORTS ON "USS LIBERTY"
INCIDENT FROM US SOURCES STATING VARIOUSLY THAT SHIP DEPARTED
ROTA JUNE 2; SHIP ATTACHED TO JOINT SPANISH-US BASE OF ROTAS
AND SHIP'S USUAL BASE IS ROTA. MADRID EVENING DAILY EL
ALCAZAR CARRIED MOST EXTENSIVE ARTICLE ON INCIDENT IN JUNE
9 ISSUE BYLINED ROSS MARK FROM WASHINGTON.

2. MFA OFFICIAL EXPLAINED THAT GOS PREOCCUPATION STEMMED
FROM CONCERN THAT SPAIN WOULD BE ASSOCIATED IN PUBLIC
OPINION WITH OPERATIONS ANY US UNIT BASED JOINT USE BASE
SPAIN. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF NEWS REPORTS ON THIS SCORE
CORRECT. AFTER CHECKING WITH ROTA, EMBOFF TOLD HIM USS LIBERTY
NOT BASED ROTA, HAD CALLED THERE FOR ABOUT ONE DAY EARLY
JUNE MERELY TO REFUEL AND THAT TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE THIS
FIRST AND ONLY VISIT OF SHIP TO ROTA. MFA GRATIFIED WITH REPLY
AND INTENDS ASK EL ALCAZAR CARRY CORRECTION ATTRIBUTED TO
"OFFICIAL SOURCES".

3. REQUEST DEPT CAUTION OFFICIAL USG SPOKESMEN OBSERVE
GREATEST CARE IN ANY REFERENCES TO SPAIN DURING
CURRENT M. E. CRISIS. WALKER

BT NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 10:34 AM 6/10/67
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, USIA AT 11:00 AM 6/10/67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/OC/MR
REVIEWED BY _____ DATE _____
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CONFIDENTIAL

DOC # 141
ISRAELI NOTE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DENIED
IN FULL ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC SECTIONS
OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REFER TO
FADRC MICROFILM OF FOI CASES.

SEE FOI CASE NO. 620039

BUT IT WAS SENT!

NO DELETIONS!

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(141)

release per ant-horowitz
of Israeli Memo. Nakhshon
10/9/79

Release

6/12/67

The Ambassador of Israel presents his cordial-
greetings to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has
the honor to refer to the Secretary of State's Note
of June 10, 1967, concerning the attack by Israeli
aircraft and torpedo boats on the United States naval
vessel U.S.S. Liberty.

The Government of Israel feels that the state-
ment that "there is every reason to believe that the
U.S.S. Liberty was identified, or at least her nationality
determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour
before the attack" is unfounded.

Nor can the Government of Israel accept the
statement that "the attack must be categorized as an act
of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard
for human life."

The Government of Israel is of the view that
the drawing of such conclusions before a full investi-
gation has been made is unwarranted.

The Government of Israel has already announced
the establishment by the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel
Defense Forces of a Commission of Enquiry to take a
full investigation of all the facts and circumstances.
The Government of Israel will make available to the
Government of the United States the findings of this
investigation, and, for its part, would hope that the
Government of the United States will make available to
the Government of Israel the findings of its own
investigation.

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2.

The Government of Israel recalls that as soon as this tragic error occurred it immediately informed the Government of the United States of what had taken place. The Government of Israel immediately assumed responsibility for this error and conveyed its apologies and deep regret for what had occurred and for the grievous loss of life.

Subsequently, as mentioned in the Secretary of State's Note of June 10, 1967, the Government of Israel took the initiative to offer to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. Further, all assistance was offered by the personnel of the Israel Defense Forces to the U.S.S. Liberty, but these personnel were informed by the U.S.S. Liberty that such help was not needed. The area around the U.S.S. Liberty was immediately searched by Israel Defense Forces personnel, by plane and boat, and subsequently search efforts were renewed.

The Government of Israel has standard instructions of the most stringent nature to all its military personnel that the personnel and property of the United States as of all countries not involved in hostilities, shall not be endangered. These instructions have been renewed.

The Government of Israel regrets that it was not given prior information by the Government of the

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושייכות

3.

United States of the presence of a United States vessel in an area which the United Arab Republic had warned neutral vessels to avoid, as it was an area of hostilities. The area was in fact being used by the United Arab Republic for purposes of hostilities against Israel. It would be appreciated if the Government of Israel could be given timely information of the approach by United States vessels to shores where the Israeli Defense Forces are in authority.

The Government of Israel renews its offer to make amends and has instructed the Ambassador of Israel to reiterate its profound regret for the consequences of what was admittedly a tragic error.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurance of his highest regard.

A.H.

Washington, D.C.
June 12, 1967.

ACTION SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

10205

TO NLA - Mr. Michaud

DATE June 13, 1967

SUBJECT Note to S from ISRAEL/Hayman to S reply to 6/10/67 note fm US
on the attack of the USS LIBERTY.**ACTION**

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

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For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required _____

Prepare reply. A response for signature by the _____
Clear with _____

Prepare a _____ to _____

Refer to White House request of _____

Due in S S by _____

For your information.

REMARKS

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 M - Mr. Grey (w/att)
 G - Mr. Low (w/att)
 L - Mr. Bushong (w/att)
 IO - Mr. Dawson (w/att)
 S/S - Mr. Walsh (w/att)
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Robert L. Bruce
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DOC # 143
MEMO FOR ROSTOW


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FADRC MICROFILM OF FOI CASES.

SEE FOI CASE NO. 620039

But IT CASE
WITH NO DELETIONS!

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

RS/R FILES
Attention W. Mullin
Keep this study together.

10411

June 15, 1967

SECRET Attachments

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Attached herewith is a chronology and collection of documents pertaining to "Diplomatic Activity Resulting from the Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty".

This report is submitted at the request of Mr. Goyne for Mr. Clifford.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin W. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Chronology
Collection of
Documents

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/HR REVIEWED BY <u>W. Ray</u> DATE <u>6/20/67</u> RDS <input type="checkbox"/> or XDS <input type="checkbox"/> EXT. DATA AUTH. _____ ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFIED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE DENIED <input type="checkbox"/> PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____	DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/HR REVIEWED BY _____ DATE _____ RDS <input type="checkbox"/> or XDS <input type="checkbox"/> EXT. DATA AUTH. _____ ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE DENIED <input type="checkbox"/> PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____
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Diplomatic Activity in Connection with S.S. Liberty Incident

- June 8 - A Foreign Liaison Officer of the Israel Defense Forces called in our Navy Attache (ALUSNA) to inform him of the accidental Israeli attack on the Liberty and offer what ALUSNA reported as "abject apologies". Embassy Tel Aviv counseled avoidance of publicity.
- June 8 - Secretary Rusk called in Israeli Ambassador Harman to state he had just spoken with the President and was instructed to express in very strong terms U.S. dismay at the incident, and amazement that it had occurred. The Secretary also expressed appreciation for Israel's speed in notifying us, which may have avoided very serious consequences in many respects.
- June 8 - In a letter to the President, Foreign Minister Eban said he was "deeply mortified and grieved" by the incident.
- June 9 - Prime Minister Eshkol asked Embassy Tel Aviv to inform us that GOI is willing to make retribution and asked that a message be transmitted to the President conveying his "deep condolences."
- June 10 - A diplomatic note from the Israeli Embassy in Washington renewed the Israeli Government's "sincere expression of deep regret", expressed condolences and sympathy for the bereaved families, and stated that the Israeli Government is prepared to make amends for the "tragic loss of life and material damage".
- June 10 - Under Secretary Katzenbach informed Ambassador Harman of great U.S. concern over the incident for which we can find no satisfactory explanation.
- June 10 - Under Secretary Rostow handed Ambassador Harman a strong note of protest, describing the attack as "quite literally incomprehensible", "an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life." It conveyed our official expectation that the Government of Israel will provide compensation and take appropriate disciplinary measures in accordance with international law. It stated the Department of State will, in the near future, present the Government of Israel a full monetary statement of its claim.
- June 10 - The Spanish Foreign Ministry expressed concern on behalf of the "highest levels" of the Spanish Government over possible association of Spain in public opinion with operations of U.S. naval craft based in the joint Spanish-U.S. base of Rota. A Madrid Embassy officer, after checking with Rota, informed the Foreign Ministry that this ship is not based in Rota. The official was gratified by the reply.

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- June 12 - Ambassador Harman handed Under Secretary Rostow a note strongly rejecting the charges set forth in our note of June 10 and renewing the GOI offer to make amends.
- June 13 - The Assistant Spokesman of the Israel Defense Forces called ALUSNA in Tel Aviv to report that Chief of Staff Rabin has appointed an official Court of Inquiry to investigate the incident.
- June 14 - The Department of Defense announced that a U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry has been convened in Valletta, Malta. It is expected to be in session for approximately one week and to make a comprehensive statement public when its report is completed.

(Reference documents attached.)

✓

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's Note of June 10, 1967 concerning the attack by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats on the United States naval vessel U.S.S. Liberty, which was carried out at 1603 and 1625 hours local time, respectively, on June 8, 1967 while the U.S.S. Liberty was engaged in peaceful activities in international waters.

At the time of the attack, the U.S.S. Liberty was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. It was broad daylight and the weather conditions were excellent. Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air. At 1450 hours local time on June 8, 1967, two Israeli aircraft circled the U.S.S. Liberty three times, with the evident purpose of identifying the vessel. Accordingly there is every reason to believe that the U.S.S. Liberty was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack. In these circumstances, the later military attack by Israeli aircraft on the U.S.S. Liberty is quite literally incomprehensible. As a minimum, the attack must be condemned as an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life.

The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life. The silhouette and conduct of the U.S.S. Liberty readily distinguished it from any vessel that could have been considered as hostile. The U.S.S. Liberty was peacefully engaged, posed no threat whatsoever to the torpedo boats, and obviously carried no armament affording it a combat capability. It could and should have been scrutinized visually at close range before torpedoes were fired.

While the Ambassador of Israel has informed the Secretary of State that "the Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage," the Secretary of State wishes to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel also to take the disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of a State. He wishes also to make clear that the United States Government expects the Government of Israel to issue instructions necessary to ensure that United States personnel and property will not again be endangered by the wrongful actions of Israeli military personnel.

The United States Government expects that the Government of Israel will provide compensation in accordance with

international law to the extent that it is possible to compensate for the losses sustained in this tragic event. The Department of State will, in the near future, present to the Government of Israel a full monetary statement of its claim.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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ALUSVA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT. ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

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APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
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James A. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

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REF: CONF. 0825

ATTACK BY ISRAELI NAVAL AND AIR UNITS ON AN ALLEGED US
FLAG VESSEL REPORTED BY REFTEL. ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY
SHOCKED BY ERROR AND TENDER SINCERE APLOGIES.
INVESTIGATION NOW UNDER WAY TO OBTAIN MORE INFO
ABOUT VESSEL. ISRAELIS DO NOT INTEND GIVE ANY PUBLICITY
TO INCIDENT. URGE STRONGLY THAT WE TOO AVOID PUBLICITY.
IF IT IS US FLAG VESSEL ITS PROXIMITY TO SCENE CONFLICT
COULD FEED ARAB SUSPICIONS OF US-ISRAEL COLLUSION.

GP-3. BARBOUR
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NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 6/8/67 1:35 PM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 6/8/67 1:50 PM

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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JUN 8 1967

STATE: 209253

June 8,

- Secretary called in Israeli Ambassador Herman Harman. Said he had just spoken with President and was instructed express in very strong terms USG dismay at today's attack on US naval vessel by Israeli naval unit. Said 4 are dead, 53 are injured at latest report. Ship badly listing. Requested Harman convey at once to Prime Minister our real dismay at this very serious matter. Said we consider so amazing that GOI motor torpedo commander could be unable to identify U.S. naval vessel. We want GOI to issue very explicit instructions in this regard to Israeli naval commanders for we cannot accept attacks on our vessels on high seas.
- Secretary said we appreciate speed with which GOI informed us this action had been done by one of its craft. This speed of notification in itself may have avoided very serious consequences in many respects.
- Harman promised inform his government immediately. Noted he had no information yet from GOI on this occurrence but had learned of it within the hour during call on Assistant Secretary Battle to whom he had expressed his great sorrow.

Drafted by: [Signature] NEA/EA: [Signature]:pas:6/8/67 Clearance:	Tel. No. 4422	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Lucius D. Battle [Signature]
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S/S - Mr. Kelly [Signature]

S - [Signature]
Mr. Slaughter

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

7100 70

June 8, 1967

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

Dear Mr. President:

The few days that I have been here have been spent mostly at the United Nations in an effort to explain ourselves to America and the world. But I have kept in touch with your thinking through Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Bundy and others.

We have passed through many dangers. But even victory has many problems which we would like to face in frank consultation with the United States. I cannot leave without saying how deeply we have understood your own reactions and policies during this crucial week. Mr. Ashkol and I believe that your

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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personal statesmanship is destined to contribute much to the building of a new future for Israel and other nations in the Middle East. This impression has been greatly strengthened by your own forward looking statements and by our contacts with those who speak for you.

I am deeply mortified and grieved by the tragic accident involving the lives and safety of Americans in Middle Eastern waters.

With respectful wishes,

Yours sincerely,

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Abba Eban

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PRIME MINISTER ASKS THAT USG BE INFORMED THAT GOI
WILLING TO MAKE RETRIBUTION TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS
OF THE LIBERTY NAVAL INCIDENT AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER SUCH
RETRIBUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. PLEASE ADVISE. BARBCLR
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1. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL ASKS THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT:

RSR

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I WAS DEEPLY GRIEVED BY THE TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE ON THE U. S. NAVAL SHIP LIBERTY. PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEP CONDOLENCES AND CONVEY MY SYMPATHY TO ALL THE BEREAVED FAMILIES.

3. MAY ALL BLOODSHED COME TO AN END AND MAY OUR GOD GRANT US PEACE EVERMORE. SINCERELY, LEVI ESHKOL. UNQUOTE
EXEMPT. BARDOUR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S O 5:22 AM, JUN 9.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, LDD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD,
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D C

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The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that he has been requested by the Government of Israel to renew its sincere expression of deep regret for the tragic accident in which, at the height of hostilities in the area, the USS Liberty was hit by Israeli fire. The Government of Israel deeply regrets this tragic accident.

ACTION
assigned to
[]

The Ambassador of Israel has been instructed to inform the Honorable the Secretary of State that the Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage.

②
6-1267

The Ambassador of Israel expresses once again in the name of the Government of Israel its deep condolences to the Government of the United States and its sympathy to all the bereaved families.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the expression of his highest consideration.

100-21113-101
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Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1967.

James M. Ennes, Jr.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy TBL AVIV PRIORITY

210130

1. Congressional and public opinion incensed over Israeli attack on USS LIBERTY and resultant loss of life.
2. Ambassador Harman handed us note this morning confirming in writing GOI willingness compensate and apologize for accident for which they expressed great regret. We plan give firm note protest and expressing view incident grew out of gross negligence and indicating our expectation disciplinary action will be taken by GOI as well as preventive action taken assure no repetition such incident.
3. In conversation with Under Secretary this morning, Ambassador ^{was} Harman/informed great U.S. concern over incident for which we can find no satisfactory explanation and our intention submit firm note as indicated above.
4. In conversations in Tel Aviv, suggest you take consistent line informing them in your discretion that note will be forthcoming through GOI Embassy Washington.
5. Text both notes will be sent separately.

68-3

END RUSK

NEA:LDBattle:lab 6/10/67 4265 The Under Secretary

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Bromley Smith S/S - Mr. Walsh

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1. MFA OFFICIAL CALLED EMBASSY TO SAY "HIGHEST LEVELS" GOES VERY CONCERNED OVER PRESS REPORTS ON "USS LIBERTY" INCIDENT FROM US SOURCES STATING VARIOUSLY THAT SHIP DEPARTED ROTA JUNE 2; SHIP ATTACHED TO JOINT SPANISH-USA BASE AT ROTA AND SHIP'S USUAL BASE IS ROTA. MADRID EVENING EDITION EL ALCAZAR CARRIED MOST EXTENSIVE ARTICLE OF INCIDENT IN 9 ISSUE DYNED ROSS MARK FROM WASHINGTON.

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2. MFA OFFICIAL EXPLAINED THAT GO'S PREOCCUPATION STEMMED FROM CONCERN THAT SPAIN WOULD BE ASSOCIATED IN PUBLIC OPINION WITH OPERATIONS ANY US UNIT BASED JOINT USE BASE SPAIN. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF NEWS REPORTS WITHIN SCORE CORRECT. AFTER CHECKING WITH ROTA, EMOFF TOLD HIM USS LIBERTY NOT BASED ROTA, HAD CALLED THERE FOR ABOUT ONE DAY EARLY JUNE MERELY TO REFUEL AND THAT TO BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE THIS FIRST AND ONLY VISIT OF SHIP TO ROTA. MFA GRATIFIED WITH REPLY AND INTENDS ASK EL ALCAZAR CARRY CORRECTION ATTRIBUTED TO "OFFICIAL SOURCES".

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Nor can the Government of Israel accept the statement that "the attack must be condemned as an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life."

The Government of Israel is of the view that the drawing of such conclusions before a full investigation has been made is unwarranted.

The Government of Israel has already announced the establishment by the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Forces of a Commission of Enquiry to make a full investigation of all the facts and circumstances. The Government of Israel will make available to the Government of the United States the findings of this investigation, and, for its part, would hope that the Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Israel the findings of its own

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Appendix
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Enclosure

1967

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The Government of Israel recalls that as soon as this tragic error occurred it immediately informed the Government of the United States of what had taken place. The Government of Israel immediately assumed responsibility for this error and conveyed its apologies and deep regret for what had occurred and for the grievous loss of life.

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The Government of Israel has standard instructions of the most stringent nature to all its military personnel that the personnel and property of the United States as of all countries not involved in hostilities, shall not be endangered. These instructions have been renewed.

The Government of Israel regrets that it was not given prior information by the Government of the

United States of the presence of a United States vessel in an area which the United Arab Republic had warned neutral vessels to avoid, as it was an area of hostilities. The area was in fact being used by the United Arab Republic for purposes of hostilities against Israel. It would be appreciated if the Government of Israel could be given timely information of the approach by United States vessels to shores where the Israel Defense Forces are in authority.

The Government of Israel renews its offer to make amends and has instructed the Ambassador of Israel to reiterate its profound regret for the consequences of what was admittedly a tragic error.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest regard.

At.

Washington, D.C.
June 12, 1967.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

52
Action

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Info 2
SS-2
GRN 3
WR-1
RSR-1
43

VCZCCIA207W VLA552
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O P 151839Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV
TO RUEPWW/KITE HOUSE
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RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUEKOF/COMSINTFLT
RUEPDM/CINCSYRIE
RUELD/CINCUSNAEUR
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RUEPDM/CTG SIX ZERO FT TWO
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RUEPAC/CINCUSNAEUR
RUEPDM/CTG SIX ZERO
BT

1967 JUN 13 AM 10 10

SECRET 0806 JUN 67.
LCC BLUCH ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN CALLED ALUSNA AT 131255Z
TO REPORT THAT IDF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL RABIN HAS APPOINTED
AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
USS LIBERTY. GP-3.

PASSED S/S--O 6/13/67; 10:26 AM.

SECRET

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Defense 7890; Statement from OASD

A U.S. Navy court of inquiry is in session at Valletta, Malta, where the U.S.S. Liberty has arrived. The court, under Read Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, USN, is inquiring into all aspects of the attack. The court is expected to be in session approximately one week. A comprehensive statement will be made public when its completed report is ready.

Many rumors and reports about the attack have been circulating. The Department of Defense has no evidence to support some of these rumors and reports. Others appear to be based on partial evidence. Some appear to be accurate on the basis of present information here, which is incomplete. Until the court has had an opportunity to obtain the full facts, the Department of Defense will have no further comment.

CLEARANCE: NEA/IAI - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

DRAFT: NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:ef:6/14/67

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL 27 ARAB-ISR

NR DEF 12 US

52
Action

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Info
SS-2
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VCZCGIA207VV VLA902
OO RUEHC RUEMDT
DE RUEMVL 0886 1641340
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O P 131535Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV 2
TO RUEPWW/HITE HOUSE DIA
RUEPJS/CSD
RUEPHAA/CHD
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUGKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUOLND/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEMDT/USUN
RUFPIK/CINCEUR/USEUCOM
RUTRIY/CTG SIX ZERO FT TWO
RUEPBY/USAF

1967 JUN 13 AM 10 10

DEFENSE DEPT
6-13-67

MICROFILMED BY BR/R

0886 JUN 67.
LCQ BLOCH ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN CALLED ALUSNA AT 131255Z
TO REPORT THAT IDF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL PABIN HAS APPOINTED
AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
USS LIBERTY.

PASSED S/S--O 6/13/67; 10:26 AM.

2

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Review June 1987

POL 27 AFAS-125

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

15 DEC 12 1967

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DE RUEWVL 0052 101149

NEA-7
Info

ZNY 0000
P 121130Z JUN 67

FM USDAO TEL AVIV
TO RUEWVA/STATE 0002

1967 JUN 13 11 08 19

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RUEWVA/STATE 0002
RUEWVA/CHGO
RUEWVA/STATE
RUEWVA/CINCUSMFLT
RUEWVA/CINCUSNAV
RUEWVA/CINCUSNAV
RUEWVA/CS
INFO RUEWVA/DIA
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RUEWVA/USAF
RUEWVA/CINCUSNAV
RUEWVA/CS

64

ET 239Z JUN 67.
REF DAO TEL AVIV 0006 JUN 67. SUBJECT LIBERTY INCIDENT.

PAGE 2 RUEWVL 0052

1. COMMANDER SCHLOMO ERELL, COMMANDER IN CHIEF IDF NAVY, ASKED ALUSNA TO CALL UPON HIM EARLY EVENING 14 JUNE. COMMANDER PRESENTED APOLOGIES AND EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET IN REGARD LIBERTY INCIDENT TO THE U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF ISRAELI NAVY AND SAID HE WAS PREPARING LETTER TO CNO USN. HE SAID INCIDENT WAS GREAT MISTAKE; THAT IDF NAVY PERSONNEL INVOLVED FELT QUOTE TERRIBLE UNQUOTE AND THAT THE INCIDENT IN FACT

SPOILED ALL FEELING OF

VICTORY FOR IDF NAVY IN RECENT HOSTILITIES.

2. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF INCIDENT UNTIL THE ISRAELI COURT OF ENQUIRY HAD RENDERED FINDINGS. WHEN ASKED IF THOSE FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES THE COMMANDER SAID HE PRESUMED THEY WOULD BE.

3. AS IN EVERY CASE WHEN ISRAELI OFFICERS MENTION THE INCIDENT COMMANDER ERELL REMARKED ON HOW CLOSE LIBERTY WAS TO SHORE LINE. ALUSNA REPLIED THAT LIBERTY WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

4. COMMENT A. COMMANDER ERELL WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY DISCOMFORTED BY NEED FOR AND FACT OF MEETING WITH ALUSNA WHICH MIGHT BE PART OF EXPLANATION WHY THERE WAS SO LONG A DELAY BETWEEN EVENT AND FIRST OFFICIAL IDF NAVY PRESENTATION OF APOLOGIES.

5. THE U.S. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN INFORMED IN OTHER CHANNELS

2

REFERENCE DEPT 6-15-67

James M. Jones Research Papers

-2- USDAO TEL AVIV 151100Z JUN 67 (0392).

PAGE 3 RUCIVL 0392 [REDACTED]
THAT ISRAEL COURT OF ENQUIRY WILL PROBABLY COMPLETE ITS ACTIONS
ON 16 JUNE.
5. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. [REDACTED]

PASSED S/S-O 6/15/67; 8:27 AM.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3

POL 27 ARAB-ISR

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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UNCLASSIFIED

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SECDEF

14A-7 TO RUFPPBK/USCINCEUR

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Info RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

1967 JUN 16 AM 3 37

SS-25 RUCIJUA/CTF SIX ZERO

ATI-3 RUCIJUA/CTF SIX ZERO

L-1 RUCIJUA/CTF SIX THREE

CTF ONE ZEROZERO

EUR-8 RTIC/AMEMB VALLETTA

INR-7 RUQMAT/AMEMB ATHENS

RUKKE/CHMAAG ATHENS

P-3 RUCIJUA/USS TIDEWATER

RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY

HUEHC/STATE DEPT

RSR-1 RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RSC-1 RUENAAA/CNO

BT

56

UNCLAS DEF 7898 FROM OASD(PA)

SUBJECT: DOD STATEMENT ON COURT OF INQUIRY, USS LIBERTY
FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED BYDOD ON MORNING OF

PAGE 2 RUEPJS 049A UNCLAS
14 JUNE: QUOTE A U.S. NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY IS IN SESSION AT
VALLETTA, MALTA, WHERE THE USS LIBERTY HAS ARRIVED. THE COURT,
UNDER REAR ADMIRAL ISAAC C. KIDD, USN, IS INQUIRING INTO ALL
ASPECTS OF THE ATTACK. THE COURT IS EXPECTED TO BE IN SESSION
APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT WILL BE MADE
PUBLIC WHEN ITS COMPLETED REPORT IS READY. PARA MANY RUMORS
AND REPORTS ABOUT THE ATTACK HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING. THE DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE HAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SOME OF THESE RUMORS
AND REPORTS. OTHERS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON PARTIAL EVIDENCE. SOME
APPEAR TO BE ACCURATE ON THE BASIS OF PRESENT INFORMATION HERE,
WHICH IS INCOMPLETE. UNTIL THE COURT HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
OBTAIN THE FULL FACTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL HAVE NO
FURTHER COMMENT. UNQUOTE
BT

2

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 4:29 A.M. JUNE 16.

UNCLASSIFIED

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DEFENSE DEPT. 14-67

James M. Ennes Research Papers

MING TELEGRAM Department of State *Pal 77 Arab. Ser*
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CONFIDENTIAL

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RR RUEHC RUEKDA RUQMVL
DE RUDTCR 556 1071930
ZNY CCCCC
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FM AMEMBASSY VALLETTA < STATE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUDLKD/CINCSNAVEUR
RUFHRO/USDOCOSOUTH
RUFPEK/USCINCEUR
RUEKDA/OSD
STATE GRNC

01421
1967 JUN 16 PM 5 22

*ok - may
rephrase*

*Valletta 5-5-67
6/16/67*

CONFIDENTIAL VALLETTA 556

DECLASSIFICATION DATE *5/2/78*

USDOCOSOUTH FOR FREEMAN

PER *Surg* *NEI*
FADRC FOI CASE NO. *620037*

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY

1. LIBERTY REACHED MALTA 0630 JUNE 14 UNDER OWN POWER TO MINIMIZE IMMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN VIEW PUBLIC INTEREST SHIP INITIALLY BERTHED ROYAL NAVAL BASE WHILE DIVERS EXAMINED UNDERWATER DAMAGE. SHIP MOVED TO DRYDOCK 1430 AND PUMPED DRY BY 1915. SEARCH FOR AND RECOVERY OF MISSING BODIES BEGAN IMMEDIATELY. MEDICAL TEAM REMOVED AND TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED BODIES ON SPOT AND BAGGED THEM FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT NAPLES. WORK COMPLETE ABOUT 0300 JUNE 15 WITH TOTAL TWENTY

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 556 **CONFIDENTIAL**
BODIES DISCOVERED. FIVE MISSING AND PRESUMED LOST AT SEA. MISCELLANEOUS AS YET UNIDENTIFIABLE REMAINS MAY ELIMINATE DOUBTS. MASSIVE CLEANUP AND REPAIR WORK NOW UNDERWAY. LOWER RESEARCH COMPARTMENTS HAVE EQUIPMENT MIXED WITH MASS OF TWISTED WRECKAGE MAKING RECOVERY CLASSIFIED MATTER SLOW PROCESS. REMOTE POSSIBILITY FINAL CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS MAY UNCOVER ADDITIONAL HUMAN REMAINS. MAJOR DAMAGE TO SHIP IS (1) 24 BY 39 FOOT TENDROP HOLE IN STARBOARD SIDE FROM TORPEDO EXPLOSION (2) 82 SHELL AND FRAGMENT HOLES IN HULL OF WHICH ABOUT 250 CAUSED BY AIRCRAFT CANNON. REPAIR TIME ESTIMATED THREE WEEKS.

2. COMMENT: GOM INITIAL REACTION LIBERTY RESTRAINED. GOM GRANTED DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS WHILE DOCKYARD AND NAVY MADE OWN DIRECT ARRANGEMENTS. EMBASSY REQUESTED GOM MINIMIZE PUELCITY FOR SANE FAMILIES OF DEAD AND

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REVIEW June 1987 *(4)*

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-VALLETTA 556 JUNE 16, 1967

WOUNDED. NO MENTION SECURITY ASPECT. AT EMBASSY'S REQUEST GOM ALLOWED WHOLE MATTER OF SEARCH, RECOVERY AND REMOVAL OF BODIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE HANDLED AS INTRA-NAVY AFFAIR.

3. TWO NAVY PAO'S HANDLED NEWSMEN. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL

PAGE 3 RUDICR 556 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PRESS INTEREST STRONG. PRESS COOPERATIVE AND FACTUAL.
ONLY ATTEMPT DISTORTION WAS ON PART PAUL CARACHI (MLP) FORMER
EDITOR MALTA NEWS. CARACHI CALLED ME TO SUGGEST ONLY REASON
LIBERTY IN MALTA WAS NO OTHER COUNTRY WOULD HAVE HER. I
STRONGLY DENIED STATEMENT AND ASSERTED SHIP CAME AT US GOVERN-
MENT REQUEST ON ACCOUNT CAPABILITY DRYDOCKS AND FACT GOOD
BUSINESS FOR MALTA. PAPER CARRIED MY STATEMENT JUNE
15.

4. NBC, CBS AND AP REPORTERS AND CAMERAMEN HERE FOR ARRIVAL.
INITIAL PHOTOGRAPHS ALLOWED ONLY FROM DISTANCE UNTIL VESSEL
DRYDOCKED AND CLEARED OF BODIES. TO PREVENT LENDING CREDENCE
TO HORTON (AP) "SPY SHIP" STORY, NAVY PAO ARRANGED TOUR OF
SHIP JUNE 15. NEWSMEN ALLOWED SEE DAMAGED AREAS AND PHOTO-
GRAPH FREELY. RESTRICTION ON INTERVIEWS SINCE COURT OF IN-
QUIRY IN SESSION. FORTUNATELY VISIT PERMITTED BEFORE NEWS-
WEEK "PERISCOPE" STORY ON LIBERTY SPY-MISSION REACHED MALTA.
SO FAR ONLY MALTA NEWS HAS PICKED UP AND PUBLISHED UNDER
HEADLINE "ATTACK ON LIBERTY WAS NO MISTAKE". HOWEVER, NO
INQUIRIES RECEIVED HERE ABOUT LIBERTY'S MISSION.
FELDMAN
BT

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POL 27 ARAB-ISR

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

XR DEF 12 US

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148

47
 NEII-7
 Info
 SS-25
 GM-3
 L-7
 H-1
 IO-3
 EVR-8
 INR-7
 SS
 RSR

NNNVZ CZ CMA 296
 PP RUEHC RUEHDT RUEHCF
 DE RUCMVL 0928/1 1691059
 ZNY CCCC
 P 181030Z JUN 67
 FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
 TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
 RUEPJS/OSD
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 RUAKCF/CO SIXTHFLT
 RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
 RUCLND/CINCPAC
 RUEKDA/JCS
 INFO RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEHDT/USUN
 RUFPEK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
 RUTMVCIG SIX ZERO PT TWO
 RUFPA/USAFE
 RUFPA/CINCUSAREUR
 RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
 RUCLND/USDAO LONDON
 RUFJC/USDAO PARIS
 RUEHCR/USDAO MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL

014976
1967 JUN 18 AM 8 22

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ML

REVIEWED BY G. M. Razi DATE Apr 19, 1980

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASABLE)

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

DEFENSE DEPT. 0-18-67

PAGE 2 RUCMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67
SECTION I OF II.

SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTJ: EFRAT, ADJUTANT TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAU MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHINGAR, THE IDF JAG.

C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TA DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRAT'S ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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-3-USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL 928, 181030Z JUNE 67 SECTION I OF II

PAGE 5 RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE
MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.
THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK
OF LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP
EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY
WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER
ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS
WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS
AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO
ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT WAS
BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C. Q. OF THE DIV THAT THE
DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY
OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. Q. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT
TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A
SUPPLY OR MECHANIC SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS
IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL PON) MUST
STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF
IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 9:07 A.M. 6/18/67

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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 P 181030Z JUN 57
 FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
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 RUEPJS/OSD
 /CNO
 RUEHC/DEPT STATE
 RUMKCF/KOM SIXTHFLT
 RUEPSSA/UNCOMSTRIKE
 RUDLW/INCOMAVEM
 RUEKDA/KCS
 INFO RUEPJS/DIA
 RUEHDT/USUN
 RUFPEK/KINCEUR - USEUCOM
 RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
 RUFPEW/SAFE
 RUEPAR/CINCSAREUR
 RUTKFE/CTG SIX ZERO
 RUDLW/USDAO LONDON
 RUFJC/USDAO PARIS
 RUEHCR/USDAO MOSCOW

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0924/2C CONFIDENTIAL
 FINAL SECTION OF UI.

(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORE-CASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL GUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL GUSEIR. THE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN CDR RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (CDR RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (CDR RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAO

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3-USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL 928, 181030Z JUNE 67 SECTION II OF II

PAGE 5 RUMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER
COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOT SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO
ACCEPT.

D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO
IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN
RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK
MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE
TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY
OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA
WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 9:31 A.M. 6/18/67

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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PRIORITY

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TO: Department of State, WASH DC

RECEIVED

HANDLING INDICATOR

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149
enc. with copy of original sent direct to h 5-31-68

RELEASE

AGR COM FRB

FROM: Amembassy Tel Aviv

DATE: May 23, 1968

INT LAB TAR

SUBJECT: U.S.S. Liberty Death Claims; Transmittal of Notes Exchanged and GOI Check.

TR RMB AIR

REF: Tel Aviv's 3877

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

For the Attention of the Assistant Legal Advisor for International Claims:

There are enclosed: (a) The original of Ministry for Foreign Affairs unnumbered Note of May 27, 1968, transmitting Treasury of the State of Israel check for \$3,323,500 in settlement of the U.S.S. Liberty death claims. (b) The aforementioned check. (c) A copy of the Embassy's response to the Foreign Ministry Note.

Barbour
BARBOUR

MAY 31 4 10 10

COMPL-D-TER

DECON: May 1970

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FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by: POL:HHStackhouse:emp 5/28/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Cleances:

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure E, Page 1 of
Tel Aviv A- 898

No. 71

The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Israel and has the honor to acknowledge
receipt of the Ministry's unnumbered Note of May 27,
1968, together with a check in the amount of \$5,323,500.00,
which is in full settlement of the thirty-four USS LIBERTY
death claims presented in Embassy Notes numbers
twenty-seven through sixty of December 29, 1967.

Embassy of the United States of America,

Tel Aviv, May 27, 1968

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DOC # 149

TEL A010 A-898

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DENIED
IN FULL ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC SECTIONS
OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REFER TO
FADRC MICROFILM OF FOI CASES.

SEE FOI CASE NO. 620039

James M. E. Research Papers

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150

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *PS 8-4*
 REVEREND BY *A. W. Rad*
Department of State
 RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____
 TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____
 ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
 DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE
 RELEASE DENIED
 PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS OFFICIAL USE

US-ISR

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03877 2715424

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ACTION L 03

INFO NEA 13, SAH 03, TRSY 08, RSK 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIF 00, CIAE 00,
 JODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 27, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 01, SSC 01, SP 02,
 SS 20, CCU 00, /078 W

O 271505Z MAY 68
 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3921

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 3877

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY CLAIMS

REF: STATE 1705581 169872

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 5/7/76
 REF Guy NEA
 FADRC FOI CASE NO. 620039

1. WE COMPLETED EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH GOI TODAY FOR FULL PAYMENT OF DEATH CLAIMS RESULTING FROM IDF FIRING ON USS LIBERTY. ORIGINAL OF EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND GOI CHECK MADE OUT TO TREASURER OF US FOR \$3,323,500 ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM.

2. TEXT OF EXCHANGE OF NOTES FOLLOWS: QUOTE: THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE EMBASSY'S NOTE NO. 26 OF 27 DECEMBER 1967, CONCERNING THE USS LIBERTY, AND TO NOTES NO. 27 THROUGH NO. 6 OF EVEN DATE, DETAILING INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS. FOLLOWING VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS THE PLEASURE TO TRANSMIT HERewith A CHEQUE IN THE SUM OF THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS, IN FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THOSE SUFFERING LOSS AS A RESULT OF THE DEATHS OF THIRTY-FOUR MEMBERS OF THE CREW OF THE USS LIBERTY, THESE CLAIMS COVERING THE FIRST CATEGORY OF CLAIMS AS SET OUT IN THE EMBASSY'S NOTE NO. 26 REFERRED TO ABOVE.

1

RECEIVED 5/7/68

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers
TEL AVIV 3877
5-27-68

37



PS 8-4 US-ISR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

Department of State DATE *11/2/76*

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01478 221010Z

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INFO NEA 13, SS 20, NSC 10, RSR 31, JPM 04, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00,

USIA 12, TRSY 11, F 15, /101 W 004074

22 APR 69
TEL AVIV
WASHDC 5997

TEL AVIV 1478
SUBJECT: LIBERTY CLAIMS
REF: TEL AVIV 1187

DECLASSIFIED DATE 5/7/76
PER Berry BY NEA
FADRC FC: 620039

1418
41-22-69

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY APRIL 21 HANDED EMBASSY NOTE
READING AS FOLLOWS:

THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS
ITS COMPLAINTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND REFERS TO EMBASSY'S NOTES NOS. 172
AND 173 OF 28 MARCH 1969 CONCERNING MEDICAL TREATMENT
OF THE CREW OF THE USS LIBERTY AND DESTRUCTION OF THEIR
PROPERTY, AS WELL AS TO THE 164 NOTES OF THE SAME
DATE TO CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
STATES NAVY FORCES WHO WERE INJURED WHILE SERVING
ABOARD THE USS LIBERTY.

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE LEGAL POSITION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AND WITHOUT EXPRESSING HEREBY
THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE
EFFECTS WHICH HAVE GUIDED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE CALCULATION OF THE CLAIMS, THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS THE HONOUR TO INFORM THE EMBASSY THAT THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO FORWARD TO
THE UNITED STATES TREASURY THE AMOUNT OF THREE MILLION,
SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-NINE US DOLLARS IN FULL AND FINAL PAYMENT OF THE
ATTACHED CLAIMS.

1

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE COLLECT CHARGE TO

152

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Classification

124812

26 JUL 69 17 46 Z

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Israel Dept - to [unclear]

released in short case in Feb 1977

Copy to: Navy Dept Cmdr R.E. Smith

STATE:

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY CLAIMS

REFERENCE: Tel Aviv 2159

1. We appreciate your thoughtful comments contained reftel which have been carefully considered here. We continue believe, however, that we should stand on position that GOI has obligation to pay ship damage claim as we submitted it. This position appears to Department also to reflect opinion held in rest USG and generally in Congress and public which continue evince interest in this matter.

2. We recognize GOI probably not presently disposed to make prompt and full payment of ship claim in same manner as it responded to personal injury claims, and that extended negotiations may be involved. As you know, we contemplate that those negotiations would involve discussions between naval construction experts of both countries to establish validity of amount claimed.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY J.M. Razi DATE Sept. 19, 1969
J. Sisco
Salans
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Classification

Dated by: L:L/C:ELKerley;NEA/IAI:MLassfelt
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
H - Mr. Leahy - Dept of Navy -

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

3. While argumentation described para 2 reftel will probably be raised by GOI, Dept does not believe it applicable to question of liability. Suggest it be countered as follows:

(a) Claim is for damage actually incurred by USG in attack. GOI has acknowledged responsibility and undertaken to make payment for QT material damage UNQT.

(b) Failure of USS Liberty to receive order to move farther from shore is not causally related to attack or damage incurred. GOI forces sought out and attacked USS Liberty because it erroneously identified as hostile vessel. Attack could therefore have occurred any place within operational range Israeli air and naval units. Unreceived orders would have moved USS Liberty eighty rpt eighty miles off coast, which well within attack range.

(c) USS Liberty presently mothballed because funds lacking for reconstruction. Funds for reconstruction were unsuccessfully sought in 1970 Dept Defense budget and present plans are to seek funds for reconstruction in 1971 budget. No intent scrap vessel.

4. While Dept recognizes death claims paid in full, and gratified by promptness of full payment personal injury claims, it believes GOI should understand USG expects GOI fully to satisfy its responsibilities for damages caused.

RICHARD SC

5. Embassy comments invited.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 41000/MR

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PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS	

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE:

SUBJECT: U.S.S. Liberty claims

1. Dept prepared issue following press statement after receipt of payment. Embassy requested invite comment from GOI.

QT On (date) USG received \$3,566,457 from GOI in settlement certain claims arising out of attack on USS Liberty by Israeli naval and air units June 8, 1967. Amount received represents payment in full of following US claims:

(a) 164 claims totalling \$3,452,275 on behalf members of crew of USS Liberty who were injured in attack;

(b) Claim for \$92,437 for expenses incurred by USG in providing medical treatment to injured men;

(c) Claim for \$21,745 for expenses incurred by USG in reimbursing members of crew of USS Liberty for personal property damaged or destroyed in attack.

Distribution to injured men of funds received in settlement their claims now in process, and be completed in few weeks.

Drawn by: <i>ELK</i>	Tel. No. 5896	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>ELK</i>
L:L/C:ELKerley:ams 4/24/69		L:L/C:ELKerley

Clearance: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lissfelt P - Mr. McClosky *ML*

(1)
FORM 12-69
6-65 DS-322

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

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Classification

GOI paid claims totalling \$3,323,500 on behalf of families of 34 men killed in attack on May 31, 1968.

Only unsettled claim arising out of the attack on USS Liberty is claim for damage to ship, which presented July 3, 1968. UNQTE.

'ROGERS'

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Classification

AIRGRAM

PS 8-4 45-ISR

NEA-10

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NSA	NSA	CIA	
	3	16	

(35) Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

CONFIDENTIAL

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

(B4)

APR 17 5 36 PM '70

FROM: Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT: USS Liberty claim

REF: Tel Aviv A-41, Feb 7, 1970
 Dept A-14, Jan 24, 1970
 Tel Aviv A-630, Dec 3, 1969
 Dept CA-5749, Oct 22, 1969
 Tel Aviv 3456, Sep 8, 1969
 Dept 138790, Aug 18, 1969
 Tel Aviv 3095, Aug 13, 1969

R No. 77 (Show case)

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

Copy to:
Navy JAG,
Capt. R.C.
Smith

In view of the failure of the Government of Israel to respond to our note of July 3, 1968 presenting claim for damage to ship despite repeated approaches by Embassy discussed in references, the Embassy is requested to remind the GOI that the USG still is awaiting a reply to our note, and ask when the GOI expects to respond. We believe it is important that our dialogue on this subject be maintained.

ROGERS

POST ROUTING			
TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY G.M. Razi DATE Sept. 10 1970

RDS or RDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDOR'S EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

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In Out

Drafted by: L:L/C:K. Kerley:ams
NEA/IAI M. Clissfelt W

Drafting Date: 4/17/70

Phone No.: 21366/
22294

Contents and Classification Approved by: NEA/IAI - Mr. Stackhouse

James M. Ennes Jr.

PAGE 01 STATE 001093

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101

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JAN 11 1973

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

156

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AT WASH 111442Z

SECTION 09-01

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P 111442Z JAN 78
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TO SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY 0911

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIY 0911

EXDIS

FOR ATHERTON FROM LEWIS

ENCLOSURE 003
TAGS MILIT IS EC US
SUBJ SS LIBERTY CASE

130
241
412
1-12-78

REC'D 11 JAN 12 1978

REF STATE STAFF

I RANDED TO E GLENNON WITH [redacted] JANUARY 11 AND
OBTAINED ED STANTON IN REPTED HE FROM GED TO PROVIDE
AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR INQUIRY AND WE WOULD
THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A PERSONAL APPROACH TO THE
NEXT OFFICE AS WE DO NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY
PAGE LEAD TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

USE OF THIS INFORMATION IS RESTRICTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS

(1511)

Release

4/c

December 23, 1977

Dear Senator Abourezk:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of December 7 concerning your questions regarding the attack on the USS Liberty by the Government of Israel on June 8, 1967.

While the USS Liberty was engaged in peaceful activities in international waters off the coast of Egypt on June 8, 1967, it was attacked by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats. The Government of the United States protested the attack and demanded the payment of appropriate compensation, the taking of disciplinary measures which international law requires in the event of wrongful conduct by the military personnel of the state, and a guarantee that U.S. personnel and property would not be damaged or endangered by wrongful actions of the military forces of the Government of Israel. In reply the Ambassador of Israel informed the Secretary of State "that the Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage."

On December 29, 1967, our Embassy in Tel Aviv presented to the Government of Israel claims totaling \$3,323,500 on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. After negotiations, the Government of Israel paid the full amount on May 27, 1968. On March 28, 1969, our Embassy presented claims totaling \$3,452,275 on behalf of the 164 injured members of the crew. The Government of Israel paid the full amount claimed on April 23, 1969. All of the claims which were presented to the Government of Israel were premised on the fact that the action of the Government of Israel violated international law.

The Honorable
James Abourezk,
United States Senate.

You are correct in stating that under the laws and customs of war a neutral residing or found on the territory of a belligerent is not entitled, as a matter of legal right, to recover compensation for the destruction of his property arising from lawful operations of war. The ownership of property by a neutral subject in a belligerent state is subject to the same limitation as that of nationals of that state and neutral property may be requisitioned or ~~destroyed whenever necessary~~. However, the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on the USS Liberty were not, in the view of the Department, applicable to the laws and customs of war as stated prior hereto.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

cc: S/S-I

Drafted by: L/C:FAKwiatek:mb
12/16/77 x21365

Clearances:
L:JABoyd
NEA/IAI:AAHoug..ton
H:

Control Nos. P770189-0826
S/S 1731231

P770062-1274

RETURN TO L/C

(159)

Release

April 29, 1977.

Dear Senator Allen:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of April 19 concerning the payment of compensation by the Government of Israel for injuries sustained by personnel of the U.S.S. Liberty as a result of an attack on June 8, 1967.

Your understanding about the payment of compensation is correct.

Promptly following the attack, the Government of Israel informed the United States Government that it assumed responsibility for the attack and was prepared to make amends for the tragic losses which occurred.

On December 29, 1967, our Embassy in Tel Aviv presented to the Government of Israel claims totaling \$3,323,500 on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. After negotiations, the Government of Israel paid the full amount claimed on May 27, 1968. On March 28, 1969, our Embassy presented claims totaling \$3,452,275 on behalf of the 164 injured members of the crew. The Government of Israel paid the full amount claimed on April 28, 1969. In both cases, United States Treasury checks drawn on the funds received from the Government of Israel were sent to the claimants within a month after the Israeli payment was received.

I hope the above information will be helpful in replying to your constituent.

Sincerely,

W
Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
James B. Allen,
United States Senate.

Clearances:
L: JABoyd
NEA/IAI: WBSmith II WBS
H: ~~SECRET~~
R. Flater

FAK
L/C: FAKwiatek:mb 4/26/77
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MARK O. MATFIELD, OHIO
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, MICH.
HOWARD W. BAKER, JR., TENN.

P770059-0998

United States Senate

WILLIAM MCWHORTER COCHRAN, STAFF DIRECTOR
CHESTER H. SMITH, CHIEF COUNSEL
LARRY F. SMITH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

COMMITTEE ON
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 19, 1977

67 ACTION
is assigned to
LJC

APR 22 1977

Hon. Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Secretary Vance:

I have been contacted by a constituent who is a relative of a sailor killed in the attack on the U.S.S. LIBERTY by the Israeli Navy and Air Force. My constituent asserts that reparations have not been paid as was initially promised in the aftermath of the incident.

Although it is my understanding that reparations have been paid, I would appreciate very much your confirming that fact to me and providing a brief breakdown of the payments received.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very truly yours,
James B. Allen
James B. Allen

JRA/emc

SECRETARY GENERAL

① 17 APR 22 1977

LEGAL ADVISER
APR 25 1977
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

James M. Ennes

160

has been reviewed in R with S

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY J. W. Rye DATE 6-19-1980 / C
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

March 25, 1977

EXCISE

Dear Mrs. Smith:

Thank you for your letter of March 16, with enclosures, concerning the amount of compensation received by [redacted] from the Government of Israel for the injuries he sustained in the attack on the "USS Liberty" by armed forces of that Government on June 17, 1967. [redacted] seeks an increase of the amount obtained in settlement of his claim.

Based on information furnished, it appears that [redacted] is of the view that he was given insufficient time in which to evaluate and consider fully the extent and impact of his injuries before accepting the amount of the proposed settlement stated in the Department's letter of September 3, 1968, and that subsequent personal medical problems establish a basis for revising the amount of his claim against the Government of Israel. In support of this view, reference was made to the upward revisions of his disability and disability compensation by the Veterans Administration after the settlement was received from the Government of Israel.

Notwithstanding such changes as may have taken place in [redacted] medical history subsequent to the settlement of his claim by the Government of Israel, the evidence establishes clearly that careful consideration was given to all factors having a bearing on the amount of his claim. Accordingly, the Department can add nothing of substance to the views previously stated in its letters of September 3, 1968, and April 2 and September 9, 1974, about the claim.

Although a timely reply to an acceptance or rejection of the amount proposed by the Department for settlement was encouraged by the Department's letter of September 3, 1968, the Department also

The Honorable
Virginia Smith,
House of Representatives.

James M. Ennes

Research Papers

encouraged the claimants, prior to accepting the offer, to submit additional evidence showing that a larger amount should be claimed. While some claimants furnished additional evidence which was considered and, in certain cases, established a valid basis for increasing the amount of their claims, no such additional evidence was furnished the Department in connection with [redacted] claim. On the contrary, [redacted] accepted the amount proposed by the Department for settlement without comment.

The Department regrets the change in circumstances experienced by [redacted] as indicated by the several Veterans Administration reevaluations of his disability and disability compensation. However, the Department cannot properly reevaluate this claim or any other claim against the Government of Israel at this late date as the Government of Israel paid the amount proposed by the Department in each claim in full and final settlement of the claims.

The Department regrets that it cannot take any action to be of assistance to [redacted]

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures

Correspondence Returned

I. C. DR Henderson, Jr. :mb
#22131 P770040-1723

3/22/77

Clearances:
L/C: FAKwiatek
L: JABoyd
NEA/IAI: HENDERSON, II
H:



Department of State

Liberty Claims file

TELEGRAM

JUL 1971

161
Amm 102

CONFIDENTIAL 606

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03945 761306Z

ACTION COPY

42
ACTION L-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-13 CIAE-20 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-08

NSAE-20 NSC-12 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 RSO-01

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1844

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 3945

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY CLAIM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DURING CALLS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY JULY 5 BY DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISOR BOYD AND EMBOFF, DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT ELIZUR SAID GOI STANDS BY ITS PREVIOUS COMMITMENT REGARDING ITS LIABILITY IN LIBERTY CASE. ELIZUR SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY HOPES VERY SOON, POSSIBLY WITHIN FEW DAYS, TO COME FORWARD WITH AN APPROACH TO USG WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT A "MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT" OF USG'S CLAIM IN REGARD TO DAMAGE DONE TO VESSEL. ELIZUR SEEMED TO BE HINTING THAT AMOUNT GOI WOULD PROPOSE MAY BE LESS THAN THAT SOUGHT BY USG BUT WHEN ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THIS BY EMBOFF ELIZUR SAID HE WOULD PREFER NOT TO SAY ANYTHING MORE UNTIL FORMAL GOI PRESENTATION IS READY. ADDED THAT HE HOPED LIBERTY CLAIMS CASE WILL "SOON ALL BE BEHIND US." GP-3.
BRADDER

*released as
U.S. 73 in the
Shant case
015897*

*DLH
memo*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/WR

REVIEWED BY G. M. Razi DATE Sept. 19, 1981

IDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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ARMY	NAVY
NSA	CIA

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102 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE REVIEWED BY W. RAY DATE 4/14/69

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____ NO. _____
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 PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

TO : Amembassy TEL AVIV
Registered 12591

FROM : Department of State DATE: MAR 19 6 20 PM '69

SUBJECT : U.S.S. Liberty claims for medical expenses and reimbursement for damaged personal property
 REF : Department's A-209, December 19, 1967
 Department's A-437, June 19, 1968
 Department's A-56, March 18, 1969

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

The Embassy is requested to present to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the enclosed notes concerning the claims of the US Government for the cost of providing medical treatment to the personnel of the U.S.S. Liberty injured in the June 8, 1967 attack and the cost of reimbursing personnel of the U.S.S. Liberty for personal property damaged or destroyed in the attack.

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The Embassy may inform the Ministry that no claim will be presented by the US Government for the value of the lost services of the injured personnel. The enclosed claims, together with the claim for damage to the vessel (second reference) and the personal injury claims (third reference), accordingly constitute all the claims the US Government intends to submit in connection with the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty.

- Enclosures:
- Draft note on Claim for Medical Expenses.
 - Draft note on Claim for Costs of Reimbursement for Damaged Personal Property.

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Routing Slip: L:L/C:ELKerley:ams 3/18/69 Phone 5896 Contents and Classification Approved by L - Murray J. Belman

NEA/LAI - Mr. Asherton Dept of the Navy - S/S - Mc. Brown
 Cmdr R. Smith (phone)

Enclosure No. 1
D R A F T - Claim for Medical Expenses

A- 59
Tel Aviv

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel and has the honor to present in accordance with accepted principles of international law a claim for \$92,437 arising out of the costs of providing medical treatment to personnel of the U.S.S. Liberty who were injured in the attack on that vessel by Israeli air and naval units on June 8, 1967.

The cost of medical treatment has been computed at the statutorily established rates for reimbursement to the United States Department of Defense of the costs of treatment of personnel of other Government agencies at Department of Defense medical installations. The rates accordingly represent the most accurate available estimate of the cost of treatment at a Department of Defense medical installation.

The Embassy of the United States confidently anticipates on the basis of assurances previously given by the Government of Israel that the Government of Israel will promptly compensate the United States Government in the amount claimed.

Enclosure No. 2
D R A F T - Claim for Costs of Reimbursement
for Damaged Personal Property

A- 59
Tel Aviv

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel and has the honor to present in accordance with accepted principles of international law a claim for ~~the sum of~~ \$21,745 arising out of damage to or destruction of personal property belonging to personnel of the U.S.S. Liberty as a result of the attack on that vessel by Israeli air and naval units on June 8, 1967.

The damage to or destruction of personal property from which this claim arises could have been the subject of separate claims presented to the Government of Israel by the United States Government on behalf of each of its nationals who suffered pecuniary loss. The United States Government has instead compensated its nationals for such losses suffered, pursuant to the provisions of the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 767, 31 U.S.C. §240-242. The amount of compensation claimed herein is the actual amount expended by the United States Government in compensating its nationals for damage to or destruction of their personal property in the attack.

Enclosure No. 2 (continued)

A-59
Tel Aviv

The Embassy of the United States confidently anticipates on the basis of assurances previously given by the Government of Israel that the Government of Israel will promptly compensate the United States Government in the amount claimed.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

163

March 17, 1969

TO : H - Mr. William B. Macomber, Jr.

FROM : L - Murray J. Belman

SUBJECT: Informing Members of Congress about the Presentation of the U.S.S. Liberty Personal Injury Claims

~~Claims on behalf of 164 members of the crew of the U.S.S. Liberty injured in the Israeli attack of June 8, 1967 have been sent to Embassy Tel Aviv for presentation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel. The Embassy has been instructed to inform the Department telegraphically as soon as the claims have been presented.~~

As soon as the claims have been presented, you may wish to inform the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. In addition, you may wish to inform the members of Congress who have corresponded with the Department about the U.S.S. Liberty claims. A list of those members is attached.

A talking paper for informing members of Congress is attached. While the Department will not issue a press release concerning the presentation of the claims, it will answer inquiries from the press in the same terms.

Attachments:

1. List of members of Congress who have corresponded about Liberty.
2. Talking paper.

L:L/C:ELKerley:ams

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ASR 10 06 00

REVIEWED BY J. W. Razi DATE Apr 19 1969

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS

DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

Following Members of Congress have corresponded with
the Department concerning the U.S.S. Liberty claims

<u>Name of Member</u>	<u>Department's Last Letter</u>
Edward J. Gurney, USS (claim of Calvin Bostic)	(reply drafted 3/19; in H for signature)
Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman House Committee on Foreign Affairs	Jan 14, 1969
Edwin D. Eshleman (claim of Richard L. Weaver)	Apr 3, 1968
H. R. Gross	Jan 18, 1969
Barber B. Conable, Jr.	Jan 4, 1968
Thomas N. Downing	Jan 4, 1968
Craig Hosmer	Jan 4, 1968
Carleton J. King	Jan 4, 1968
Claiborne Pell, USS	Jan 4, 1968
Richard B. Russell, USS	Jan 4, 1968
Margaret Chase Smith, USS (claim of David Shaw)	Jan 3, 1968
John G. Tower, USS	Jan 3, 1968
Charles W. Sandman, Jr.	Jul 25, 1967
Glenn K. Davis	Jul 25, 1967
Clarence D. Long	Jul 25, 1967

Presentation of U.S.S. Liberty
Personal Injury Claims to the Government of Israel

1. The United States Embassy in Tel Aviv, has presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel 164 claims for compensation on behalf of the members of the crew of the U.S.S. Liberty who were injured in the June 8, 1967 attack by Israeli air and naval units.
2. The total compensation claimed is approximately \$3.4 million.
3. In calculating the amount of compensation in individual claims, the nature and severity of the injuries, the pain and suffering and the impairment of earning capacity have been considered. The amounts claimed are in accordance with international law and domestic legal precedents.
4. The Government of Israel paid \$3.3 million in full settlement of the death claims in May, 1968. The remaining claims, all of which have been presented to the Government of Israel, are as follows:

Personal injury claims	-	\$3.4 million
Damage to the ship	-	\$7.6 million
Other US Government expenses	-	\$120,000



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N9427

27 OCT 1980

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Your letter addressed to the Department of State dated 17 December 1977, was referred to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) and received in this office on 2 October 1980. The Department of State referred your letter to NSA/CSS because in their search pursuant to your request, they located a document originated by this Agency which they believed fell within the scope of your request. However, after carefully examining the document in question, we have determined that it does not fall within the scope of your request.

Sincerely,

Gerald L. Everett

GERALD L. EVERETT
Acting Chief
Information Policy Division

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332

IN REPLY REFER TO
JAG:FOIA:GWR/
CF-49-79
21/7816-67
01 APR 1982

James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request
Incident : Attack on USS LIBERTY
Date : June 8, 1967

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in response to your letter dated February 3, 1982 (postmarked February 5, 1982) and to confirm a telephone conversation between you and LT D. J. Mnaghan, JAGC, USNR, of this Office, on March 24, 1982. Your letter is considered a request for an initial determination of the releasability of the requested material under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (i) (1976)].

The Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy is the custodian of reports of investigation made in accordance with the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAG Manual) concerning incidents of this type.

In accordance with your request, please find enclosed a copy of page 174 of the transcript of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry pertinent to the above-captioned incident. As you can see from the enclosed photocopy, Captain Lauff signed the original transcript.

With regard to your request for documents which discuss "apparent discrepancies between the evidence and the Findings," please find enclosed a copy of the endorsements to the record of proceedings. Your attention is invited to the Third Endorsement where the Judge Advocate General indicates that the proceedings were "conducted in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General and are therefore legal."

Section 0.110 of the JAG Manual describes the action(s) to be effected by the convening and reviewing authorities upon receipt of the record of proceedings of a fact-finding body. For your convenience we have enclosed a photocopy of that section.

It is hoped that this material is of assistance to you.

Sincerely,

G. A. ZITANI
G. A. ZITANI
Captain, JAGC, U. S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Investigations)

Enclosure

18 October 1976

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Sir:

On 25 August 1976 I requested certain information from your office under the Freedom of Information Act. Mr. Charles W. Hinkle kindly supplied some material of interest (see his letter of September 20, 1976 Ref: 76 DFOI-662). However, he denied access to:

The Court of Inquiry Report by the Government of Israel into the circumstances surrounding the 1967 attack by Israeli forces upon USS LIBERTY.

The material I requested has apparently been identified in the files of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is captioned "Israel Defense Forces, Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67." Access is denied to me because the material is classified, is of foreign origin, and is therefore not subject to unilateral declassification by the United States. According to Mr. Hinkle's letter, the Initial Denial Authority is Major General Phillip D. Shutler, USMC, Vice Director, Joint Staff.

I hereby appeal that decision and request release of the document to me on the grounds that the document itself is not classified or, if classified, that the government of Israel has or would agree to its release and that, in any case, the document has previously been released to reporters and others. The document I request is probably dated 18 June 1967 and details Israel's reasons for attacking the ship. Since the contents of the report have been discussed at length in the press, the release of the document to me cannot reasonably be expected to cause damage to the foreign policy of the nation. Further, I have reason to believe that the document has previously been released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act.

If you do not act upon my appeal within twenty working days I will deem my request denied. If you deny my request, please advise what steps I may take to further appeal the denial.

Very truly yours,

John D. Scott
2210 Beverly Drive
Charlotte, North Carolina 28207



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 DEC 1976

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Mr. John D. Scott
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Scott:

This is in response to your October 18, 1976, appeal for release of the document "Israeli Defense Forces, Preliminary Inquiry Files 1/67" denied you by Major General Phillip D. Shutler, USMC, Vice Director, Joint Staff, in our letter of September 20, 1976. Your letter of appeal was received on October 26, 1976.

In response to your appeal, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at my request, has reexamined the denied document and advises that:

- The document has been reviewed and is determined to be properly classified.
- That office is not aware of any release of the document to reporters or others, either under the Freedom of Information Act or otherwise.
- The document does not bear a June 1967 date as suggested in your letter of appeal.

It is my determination as the Appellate Authority that the denial of the appealed document be affirmed for the reasons stated in the initial denial.

You are advised that you have the right of judicial review in a United States District Court in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).

Sincerely,


Alan Woods





OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

September 20, 1976
Ref: 76 DFOI-662

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Mr. John D. Scott
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Scott:

This is in response to your August 25, 1976 Freedom of Information request for a copy of:

- (1) The Court of Inquiry Report by the Government of Israel into the circumstances surrounding the 1967 attack by Israeli forces upon USS LIBERTY.
- (2) A list of other documents and photographs in your files (including the files of the National Security Agency) pertaining to the attack upon USS LIBERTY and subsequent events.

Your request was received on September 3, 1976.

A search of the files of the Directorate for Defense Information revealed the following material: ten photographs, News Releases 542-67 and 544-68, and Memoranda for the Press dated June 10, 1967 and June 12, 1967. This material is provided.

I am advised by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a document believed to be the report in item (1) above was located. It is captioned "Israel Defense Forces, Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67." The transmitting memorandum shows that the report is classified and of foreign origin. Accordingly, the report is not subject to unilateral declassification by the United States. The report is denied under the provisions of 5 USC 552(b)(1), in that unauthorized disclosure of the information to the public could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the foreign policy of the nation in that such release would fail to honor agreements with other sovereign nations to safeguard information that they consider to impact upon their national security.

I am further advised by the Offices of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence, and Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) that a list requested in item (2) above does not exist.




Requests for files of the National Security Agency should be directed to that Agency (address attached).

Direct costs for search and reproduction incurred by the Office of the Secretary of Defense amount to \$4.40; however, in this instance payment of this fee is waived.

For that portion of your request which was denied, the Initial Denial Authority is Major General Phillip D. Shutler, USMC, Vice Director, Joint Staff.

You are advised of the right to appeal the denial of item (1) of your request. Any appeal should offer justification for reversal of the initial denial and should be received by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, no later than 45 working days after the date you receive this notification.

Sincerely,



Charles W. Hinkle

Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Attachments

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

National Security Agency
ATTN: Mr. Ron Sobel
D4 FOIA Office
Fort George G. Meade, Md. 20755

NOTE: ALTHOUGH REPORTEDLY DENIED,
THE REPORT WAS EVENTUALLY FOUND IN
AN UNCLASSIFIED FILE IN THE OFFICE
OF THE NAVY CHIEF OF INFORMATION AND
SENT TO ME BY A SYMPATHETIC
NAVY CAPTAIN.

THAT REPORT AND THE OFFICIAL
STATE DEPT STUDY WHICH REFUTES
IT, CAN BE FOUND ELSEWHERE
IN THIS COLLECTION

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8 October 1976

Dear John;

Here is another attempt at prying some information out of the Pentagon. They really are required by law to respond within ten days, but I understand there is a huge backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests.

But if they have not responded by the 18th, would you kindly send them this letter by registered mail this time, so we will know for sure that they received it. If you let me know the charges, I'll reimburse you. Also, if you have access to a copy machine, it might be helpful if you send a copy to your representative in Congress, as he might ping on them for not responding (or they might be afraid that he will ping on them).

It looks like old General Assem is simply not going to respond. And we have no way to pressure him. Isn't it frustrating trying to get people to answer letters?

Thanks for your help, John.

Yours truly,

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

18 October 1976

Freedom of Information Office
Department of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

Six weeks ago I requested the following material pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552,

- (1) The Court of Inquiry Report by the government of Israel into the circumstances surrounding the 1967 attack by Israeli forces upon USS LIBERTY.
- (2) A list of documents and photographs in your files (including the files of the National Security Agency) pertaining to the attack upon USS LIBERTY and subsequent events.

Since I have had no response from your office, I hereby renew my request. If my request has been denied, would you please inform me of the grounds for denial and the steps I may take to appeal the denial?

Sincerely,

John D. Scott


85A August 1976

Dear John,

I haven't heard from you for some time now so I hope all is well with you and yours, but I do know that you are now exactly a prolific letter writer.

Dick Kieffer told me last night that he saw a copy of the report by Israel on the LIBERTY attack. It has been requested, apparently, from the DOC Freedom of Information office by one of Dick's patients who knew there was such a report because he had seen it while working at NSA. But he declined to give Dick a copy as he found it "too interesting to give away."

If you will sign and mail the letter, perhaps this will pry a copy loose along with some knowledge of what else is held. Actually, I know three offices at NSA that have files on LIBERTY and at least one office in the COMNAVSECGRU Headquarters. I could mention those offices in my letter, but hate to unless it is necessary as it might get things stirred up.

Also, here is another attempt with General Assem. If you feel like it, you might pen your phone number in under your address. Just possibly he would telephone you where he won't write a letter.

T
The manuscript is coming along well. I just got it back from the publisher with some editorial suggestions which I am working on. The editor does not like the last chapter which suggests that they might have palmed it off as having been done by Egypt but, as you know, he is quite enthusiastic about the rest. I wish I had a few weeks to devote full time to wrapping up the whole task--not only writing, but some more research (like Gen'l Assem).

Too bad you can't be here this weekend. Lloyd and Ingrid will arrive here Sunday to spend a few days checking out their new homesite. Lloyd will be working in Gettysburg where he will be guarding Mamie Eisenhower, and is now having a house build in Gettysburg. He will not doubt phone you while they are here.

If we don't phone in a couple of days, please do drop me a line to acknowledge receipt of this letter (and enclosures).

Yours truly,

25 August 1976

Freedom of Information Office
Department of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, I hereby request a copy of

- (1) The Court of Inquiry Report by the government of Israel into the circumstances surrounding the 1967 attack by Israeli forces upon USS LIBERTY.
- (2) A list of other documents and photographs in your files (including the files of the National Security Agency) pertaining to the attack upon USS LIBERTY and subsequent events.

If any expenses in excess of ten dollars are incurred in connection with this request, please inform me of all such charges for my approval prior to their being incurred. If you do not grant my request within ten working days, I will deem my request denied; in such case, please inform me as to your appeal procedure.

Sincerely,

John D. Scott

2280 Bever

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

25 August 1976

Brigadier General Mohamed Assem
Armed Forces Attache
Embassy of Egypt
2308 Tracy Place NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear General Assem:

Several months ago I wrote to you requesting some information concerning the location of the Egyptian ship El Quseir during the 1967 war. You did not acknowledge my letter.

I wonder if you would reconsider answering my question? I was an officer aboard USS LIBERTY during the Israeli attack of June 8, 1967. I have always been intrigued by Israel's claim that LIBERTY was mistaken for "El Quseir which was known to be in the area."

I was not aware of El Quseir or any other ship being anywhere near us at the time of the attack and suspect that the story was a fabrication. Could you kindly answer this question for me by telling me whether El Quseir was in the area of El Arish during the morning or afternoon of 8 June 1967? Could you tell me where she was at that time?

Yours truly,

John D. Scott


605
29 January 1976

Dear John,

I have another small research project that you might like to undertake for me. I have been able to get copies of all of the citations for bravery that were written on the LIBERTY crew except for the one given to ICN David (N) Skolak. Skolak died in the forward gunmount after leaving a repair party to relieve Payan. I understand that McGonagle at one time wanted to single out Skolak as the principal hero of the whole affair and give him a Medal of Honor, but a strong enough case couldn't be made, so they settled for a Bronze Star. It was apparently because of this special effort that his award was delayed. Notes were run in the POD for a while asking anyone who had seen him to report what he had done. It was apparently the delay that caused his writeup to not be among the collection that I have.

I found an old newspaper clipping that listed Skolak as the son of Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph J. Skolak of Gary, Indiana. No street address was given. Well, the information operator in Gary has no Rudolph Skolak. But Skolak is not, I think, a common name, and there are three other Skolaks in Gary. One has an unlisted number, one is Edward A. Skolak whose phone is 219-887-3504, and the other is John Skolak at 219-838-1404. I wonder if you could call those people, ask them if they are related to the David Skolak who was killed on the LIBERTY, and see if you can get them to send you a copy of the citation that came with his Bronze Star.

I think if you told them that you are preparing an article (or book) on the attack and have been told that he was a hero of the incident, that they might cooperate. Even if they cannot send a copy, they might read it to you over the phone. What I need is the key part that describes exactly what he did, like "Ensign Scott, serving as Damage Control Assistant, was in Damage Control Central during the attack, coordinating..."

I think telephone is likely to be more fruitful than going out cold by mail, as I am discouraged with mail response. Mail just doesn't get much response (although I have not tried on Skolak before). But it would be helpful if I had Skolak's citation, as I have all the rest, and would like to have the complete set.

Also, I would like to hear from you that you did receive my letter of three weeks ago concerning the El Quseir. I suppose it will be a while before we hear from Egypt, but I would like to be sure that you did receive my letter (and whether you forwarded the one I enclosed).

All is well here. Mark (my son) has his security clearance now and is in CT school at Pensacola. And I am looking for orders soon to a job as Deputy Director, Personnel Security Division, of the Naval Security Group Headquarters. That is just upstairs from where I am now, which will mean eight years in the same building. When I retire in July, 1976, I will have had sixteen years commissioned service of which ten years was in the same building. Who says you have to move around a lot in the service?

9 January 1976

Dear John,

Remembering your offer to assist with research, enclosed is a letter for you to kindly sign and mail to the Egyptian Armed Forces Attache which may answer the long-nagging question: Liberty was mistaken for what? I suspect that the ship El Quseir was nowhere near El Arish at any time. I am hoping she was in the yard or something like that. If we are lucky, they will tell us and settle it once and for all, blowing yet another hole in the official story.

If you prefer to put the question in your own words, please feel free to do so. But I thought I would save you the trouble by drafting the letter for you.

I hope all is well with you and yours. Not much has changed here. Maury Bennett is now Assistant Commander for Communications to the Commander, Naval Security Group, which is a fancy title for Communications Department Head which is the same thing I am for the Naval Security Station. Maybe I told you that in my last letter. He is up for orders this summer. I, too, am due for rotation this summer and will be going to the COMNAVSECGRU Headquarters Staff, which means I will be in the same building that I am in right now. I will be Deputy Director, Personnel Security Division, which is the section that decides who gets and who doesn't get security clearances. It should be a good job, and it will mean that I get to stay in Washington and with an easy commute until I retire from the Navy in summer of 1978.

Little seems to be happening regarding the reporter's inquiry of some weeks ago. Lucas, Painter, O'Connor, Bennett, McGonagle, and you and I all received letters and all refused to talk. Dick Kiepfer did not hear from CHINFO this time. Perhaps they avoided him because he gave them a bad time a few weeks earlier: "What happened to the Bill of Rights? Why must I clear my answers with you in advance? Why must I hold the interview in front of a Public Affairs Officer?"

I may ask you to write to CHINFO eventually to ask for a copy of the story that was written, and for a copy of the picture of the ship which is supposedly at anchor in the James River. Did I tell you that? The CHINFO man told me LIBERTY is still afloat and in mothballs in the James River, and that he got a picture of her for the reporter.

Thanks for your help. I'll be looking forward to the reply, if any.

Yours truly,

13 January 1976

Brigadier General Mohamed Assem
Armed Forces Attache
Embassy of Egypt
2309 Tracy Place NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear General Assem:

As a student of Middle Eastern History, I have been reading of the 1967 war and of the Israeli attack upon the United States Ship LIBERTY on June 8, 1967. I have read that the ship was attacked because of its "great similarity to the Egyptian ship El Quseir which was known to be in the area."

The question which occurs to me is: was El Quseir really in the area of El Arish on or about June 8, 1967? Could you kindly tell me what was the location of El Quseir during the morning of June 8, 1967? Was El Quseir anywhere near El Arish at all in the days preceding the attack upon USS LIBERTY And, if so, when?

I realize that this question can not be answered immediately, as it will require some research. However, I would be most grateful if you could find the time to obtain the answer for me.

Sincerely,

John D. Scott



15

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CASUALTY LISTS

CITATIONS FOR HEROISM

AWARD CEREMONIES

CONDOLENCE MESSAGES

HONORS

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FOLDER 15

Annex

A
REPORT ON
THE
MEDICAL ASPECTS
OF
THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT

By

Commander John J. Gordon, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Peter A. Flynn, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant John A. Peck, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy

PREPARED ABOARD

USS AMERICA (YA 66)

August 1967

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

At 1500 8 June 1967 AMERICA received a message that USS LIBERTY was under attack by aircraft and torpedo boats. At 1600 word was received that there were four dead, three seriously wounded and fifty injured. Later this was revised to nine dead, fifteen seriously wounded and a total of seventy five casualties. Initially it was not known whether LIBERTY had a Medical Officer. The Flag immediately detached two destroyers to go to LIBERTY's assistance: USS DAVIS with the DESDIV Medical Officer embarked and USS MASSEY, to which a Medical Officer, two Hospital Corpsmen and additional supplies were airlifted by helicopter from AMERICA. An early morning rendezvous was planned. Later it was determined that LIBERTY had a Medical Officer aboard and a message was sent inquiring about the types and numbers of injuries and whether they would need blood aboard LIBERTY. The reply stated that the injuries were of blast and shrapnel type, not burns, and that blood was not required prior to evacuation of the casualties to AMERICA.

Since it was planned that all casualties would be evacuated from LIBERTY to AMERICA, a meeting of all doctors, dentists, Hospital Corpsmen and Dental Technicians was held outlining the present situation and the planned evacuation. AMERICA's mass casualty plan was reviewed and no major changes or modifications were required. It was anticipated that all patients would be received by helicopter beginning about 1000 9 June 1967. Specific plans were then made which will be detailed shortly. On the morning of the 9th a final review of preparations was made, a few minor adjustments effected, and all was in readiness for receipt of the casualties.

PREPARATIONS IN LIBERTY

8 June 1967:

1910: The following personnel departed AMERICA's flight deck via helicopter:

LCDR Peter A. FLYNN MC USN - General Surgeon
HM2 Dale D. DAVIS - General duty Hospital Corpsman
HM3 Steven R. EBAUGH - Operating Room Technician

1930: The above personnel were lowered by sling to the deck of USS MASSEY, underway to rendezvous with LIBERTY at 30 knots. Doctor FLYNN met with MASSEY's Commanding Officer, was advised of the ship's plans, the ETA with LIBERTY and was given the revised casualty figures.

2000: Doctor FLYNN called a meeting of all Hospital Corpsmen aboard MASSEY and formulated plans for the next day to insure that all supplies and equipment were ready. The general plan was to take only limited supplies, the remainder to be called for as necessary after the situation aboard LIBERTY had been surveyed.

9 June 1967:

0705: LIBERTY was sighted proceeding under her own power with a starboard list.

0730: The Medical team arrived LIBERTY via a motor whale boat from MASSEY and proceeded directly to the mess deck which was being used as an emergency treatment center due to the large number of casualties in-

volved. Sick Bay was without regular power and the emergency lighting there had been exhausted. Considering all they had experienced, the long anxious night many had spent, and that all were nearly exhausted, their calmness and excellent morale was remarkable. A rapid survey revealed that almost all had suffered missile and shrapnel wounds with or without underlying injuries depending on the area, angle and force of penetration. There were only two burn cases, both in men who had been in the immediate area of the torpedo detonation, and involved the face only. After this rapid survey had been completed it was evident that there was nothing major that needed to be done before the casualties could be evacuated to AMERICA. The first helicopter was to be overhead at about 1000. A second survey was then made of the most seriously injured and an evacuation precedence list was prepared by name for the first fifteen men. The rest were to be evacuated in the order of convenience. In the remaining time the corpsmen of the LIBERTY, MASSEY and AMERICA, under the doctors' direction, prepared the casualties for evacuation: dressing wounds, placing Foley catheters, starting IV's on those requiring them, substituting Ringer's Lactate for dextrose ~~has~~ ~~was presently being used on those in shock, and giving Tetanus boosters~~ to every casualty. All the injured had received 1,200,000 units of procaine penicillin during the night.

0845: Doctor FLYNN evaluated the Commanding Officer's condition. He had received a shrapnel wound of the superior medial left thigh with probable laceration of the greater saphenous vein with considerable blood loss. His leg was extremely edematous since he had been on his feet continuously with a tight pressure dressing over the wound for eighteen hours. This was the only treatment that he had permitted. After consultation among Doctor FLYNN, LIBERTY's senior uninjured line officer and Medical Officer, and the Destroyer Division Commodore, the decision was made to permit him to remain aboard in command. While, medically speaking, his evacuation was indicated, other considerations dictated that he remain and he readily accepted the increased risk that this entailed. This is typical of his outstanding performance during the entire incident.

0945: An evacuation route to the fore deck was selected for ease of Stokes litter handling. The remaining men, under the supervision of DAVIS and EBAUGH, were instructed in proper casualty handling and transport. All patients were to be evacuated because medical personnel and supplies were exhausted aboard LIBERTY.

1010: The first evacuees were brought on deck.

1030: Helicopters arrived overhead with extra Stokes stretchers. This was of great help as many with relatively minor wounds were unable to use the regular sling hoist.

1045: The first patient (HEROLD) and Doctor FLYNN boarded the helicopter and were enroute to AMERICA. DAVIS and EBAUGH remained on board and coordinated movement of injured to the deck via phone talker until all the injured and dead were removed from LIBERTY.

1115: First helicopter arrived on AMERICA's flight deck.

PREPARATIONS IN AMERICA

The mass casualty handling of the fifty wounded and nine dead from LIBERTY evolved smoothly, however, any operation can be improved upon. Having had the rare opportunity to observe such a mass casualty first hand it is considered beneficial to set forth lessons learned and recommendations for future planning. This incident was unusual in that a twenty four hour notice was received, allowing for extra planning and preparation. Preparations are categorized as follows:

1. Triage
2. Communication
3. Personnel assignments
4. Ward preparations
5. Specific departmental preparations
6. Training

TRIAGE: It was anticipated that triage would take place at three levels. The first would be aboard LIBERTY where priority for evacuation would be established by the Medical Officers there, including preparation for transportation. The next level, to be of emergency nature only, would be on the flight deck of AMERICA for any patient that arrived in need of immediate treatment after the helicopter flight. The third and final level would be in the Medical Department where patients would be sorted according to severity of injury and precedence established for receipt of resuscitation, surgery, laboratory and X-ray examinations and bed assignment. The details of these arrangements are best brought out in the descriptive narrative which follows.

COMMUNICATION: A special self-powered telephone line was run from flight deck control to the Medical Department office. The airborne helicopters passed word of numbers and types of casualties to primary flight control, who in turn passed the word to flight deck control and thence to the Sick Bay talker. At no time during the three hours that the fifty casualties and nine dead were brought aboard did an overflow situation develop, nor were there any delays. The Executive Officer in flight deck control served as overall coordinator of these activities.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS: It was obvious from the outset that there would be a severely increased demand for Hospital Corpsmen for intensive care. Both wards would be filled to capacity with ward II serving as an intensive care unit. To meet these demands all routine medical care was suspended and all personnel assigned in non-patient care areas were reassigned to direct patient care. The ship's Dental Technicians were assigned, under supervision, on the same basis as Hospital Corpsmen. The Supply Department assumed the task of feeding the patients from the ward galley, freeing the ward and galley corpsmen for full time patient care. Weapons Department personnel were assigned to our trash detail. The flight deck Hospital Corpsmen remained at their post to properly cover the air operations conducted during this time. A minimum number of Medical Department administrative personnel were utilized to assure proper record keeping and medical supply readiness. The Marines and Master-at-Arms force were used to seal off the Medical Department from curiosity seekers as

well as the well intentioned volunteers who would only impede movement of patients and personnel. Men from other divisions were assigned to stretcher bearer teams on the flight and second decks.

WARD PREPARATIONS: Ward II was opened, all bunks made up including the Stryker frame and hospital bed with the Balkan frame, and hospital charts made up. After word of approximate wound types and numbers had been received the ward was roughly divided into areas so that like cases, i.e. fracture or abdominal, could be grouped for efficient use of personnel and equipment. Anticipated additional equipment and supplies were gathered on the wards where they would be readily available. On the morning of the 9th all patients already on ward I were screened and as many as possible discharged to free more beds. After ward II filled it was planned to place the more lightly wounded on ward I, primarily using the upper bunks. A total of seventy five beds were prepared.

SPECIFIC DEPARTMENTAL PREPARATIONS:

Operating Room: The Flight Surgeon trained in anesthesia went over all equipment and supplies to be ready for as many as thirty cases. All sterile gear was checked and a portion of the major packs usually kept in Battle Dressing Stations were brought to main Sic. Bay to be used as necessary.

X-ray: Both the portable and regular units were checked out and extra film and cassettes prepared. Fresh developing solutions were made. See appendix for number and type of X-rays taken.

Laboratory: The laboratory was responsible for setting up a blood donor center. The physical Therapy room was used for this purpose. On the night of the 8th, ten units of O-negative blood were drawn and refrigerated and thirty more O-negative donors from the walking blood bank were typed, confirmed and placed on an "on-call" basis. The laboratory was made ready for other studies that might be expected. See appendix for number and types of procedures performed.

Medical Supply: Working in conjunction with other departments large quantities of necessary supplies were brought to the triage, treatment and ward areas.

Pharmacy: In general adequate supplies were on hand but additional quantities of antibiotics, sedatives and analgesics were issued to the wards.

TRAINING: In the fall of 1966 a training program for Hospital Corpomen and Dental Technicians was begun to provide depth of experience in dealing with casualties both in and out of General Quarters situations. After lecture material had been completely covered by the Medical Officers the use of moulages was begun in Main and Auxiliary Battle Dressing Stations to give realism in examination, diagnosis and treatment of casualties by the corpomen. Increasing numbers of casualties were presented until ten to twelve casualties could be received, distributed,

triated and treated within a reasonable period of time. Laboratory and X-ray technicians were also called into use to test and train them when time was of the essence. The mock casualties would then be transported to ward II and put to bed. At each level the expenditure of fluids and dressings was encouraged so that all would be familiar with their use. Simulated dead and hysterical casualties were introduced so the corpsmen would be familiar with special arrangements for these casualties. The Chaplain assigned to the Main Battle Dressing Station was instructed in directing casualty flow as each area filled and emptied as triage progressed. This in turn gave him a better view of where his services would be required. These casualty drills were executed so frequently that all dispaired of the repetition; however, the value of this repetition became immediately apparent when the actual casualties were received.

At the same time a comprehensive first aid training program was started for the Dental Officers. Lectures in detail were given in First Aid, stressing the philosophy and practice of mass casualty handling, triage and treatment. Detailed instruction in the physical diagnosis of injury was emphasized. Splinting, dressing and suturing were taught with practical demonstrations and exercises for them alone. Principles of IV fluid administration were stressed along with the actual mechanics of starting IV's by the simple expedient of having them practice on each other. As well, they were encouraged to do venipunctures when large numbers of blood specimens were to be drawn. As a result of this practice each dentist had done at least fifty venipunctures. As with the corpsmen, practical experience with equipment and techniques was paramount.

TRIAGE

As it turned out the initial screening on the flight deck of AMERICA was unnecessary as all patients arrived in satisfactory condition and were able to be taken directly to the forward bomb elevator by the first team of stretcher bearers. All litter patients were then taken below to the second deck where a pre-arranged route was selected and sealed off. A second group of stretcher bearers carried them aft through the forward mess deck to the starboard passageway to Sick Bay. In Sick Bay two Medical Officers and one Dental Officer were in the main treatment room and an identical team in the Aviation Examining Room and the patients were routed to these areas in an orderly fashion. There the patients were rapidly examined, diagnosed, identified, appropriate laboratory or X-ray procedures selected where indicated and paper work begun on each patient. The Dental Officers were often required to carry out immediate treatment and follow patients to the ward. The Senior Medical Officer and Ship's Surgeon moved about freely as the patients began to build up, to establish final priorities for resuscitation and surgery. Those patients requiring X-ray were taken to the ward but left in their stretchers and taken in an orderly manner to X-ray to avoid congestion at that point. As increasing numbers of patients came to the ward the attention of the Medical Officers shifted to that focus. The walking wounded followed the same route to Sick Bay where many were seen and treated by the Dental Officers. Medical consultation was obtained

only when necessary. These ambulatory casualties were seen primarily in the Physical Therapy Room and did not conflict with its function as a blood donor center. As the final patients were being treated and put to bed the first surgical patient was on the operating table ready for surgery and the surgical team commenced definitive treatment. By this time enough had been accomplished to allow the remaining Medical and Dental Officers to turn their attention to the other patients. As surgery began, blood was being administered to other patients, chest tubes placed, naso-gastric tubes inserted and other necessary procedures carried out. Between cases members of the surgical team re-evaluated both pre and post operative cases and saw such other patients as requested by the other Medical and Dental Officers. As time progressed sorting continued at progressively lower levels of wound seriousness.

The dead were received last, following the same route to the second deck, where they were taken to the forward reefers for preservation. The reefers had previously been prepared to receive the bodies. A Dental Officer made immediate identification of the remains.

TREATMENT PHASE

In terms of treatment the stay of the LIBERTY casualties aboard AMERICA can be divided into three broad categories: 1. Emergency, 2. Urgent, 3. Convalescent.

EMERGENCY: This period, which lasted approximately eighteen hours, began with the receipt of the patients, moved through triage and the initial treatment of all cases and was completed with termination of surgery on the four most serious cases. Essential laboratory and X-ray procedures were carried out and blood was obtained and given where necessary (As usual during a crisis many more donors volunteered than could possibly be used.) During this time the Intensive Care Unit of ward II functioned in an outstanding manner and provided pre and postoperative care to the serious cases. Late in this period priority was assigned for the next day's operative cases.

URGENT: This embraced the next forty eight hours, during which time operative procedures on six orthopedic cases were performed. Three were done each day as well as an open reduction of a compound fracture of the mandible, which was done in the Dental Clinic by the Oral Surgeon. During this time two minor wounded were returned to duty and three cases, two neurosurgical and one ophthalmological, were air evacuated to Germany as they exceeded our treatment capabilities. Regular care of the rest of the patients continued.

CONVALESCENT: This period began with the completion of the operative cases and terminated with the orderly transfer of the patients either to duty or shore based hospitals for further treatment. All patients left the ship with typed clinical records as well as operation reports in the surgical cases. Once the surgical team was free, patients were assigned to doctors by groups so that specific responsibility was fixed for treatment, follow-up and preparation for transfer. This had not been possible before this time. The surgeon, obviously, had responsibility at all

times for those cases which he had treated. The burden of nursing care during this period was heavy, and it is a tribute to the industry and capabilities of the Hospital Corpsmen that they did such a fine job. As has been pointed out previously, this was expedited by the contributions of the Dental Technicians and other ship's departments. It should be noted that the standard bunk used in Sick Bay makes prolonged nursing care very difficult when dealing with a seriously ill patient. The patients were appreciative of the care they received and we were proud of the job the corpsmen did. About two days into this period it became obvious that all of the serious cases would survive and this bolstered the morale of the entire LIBERTY group.

One of our major problems during this period was the care of the huge number of superficial wounds. This was handled in two ways. As the corpsmen were already experienced in suturing and minor surgery they were permitted, under supervision, to do much of the required wound debridement. This was done in the main Dressing Room and the Aviation Examining Room. Next the patients were instructed in small groups in the technique of wet-to-dry dressings and then took care of each other under corpsmen supervision. This helped our work load, gave the patients something to do and in turn helped their morale. Four days following the arrival of LIBERTY wounded we were able to resume regular medical services to AMERICA.

OPERATING ROOM

The first four cases were unusual in several respects. First of all, their injuries were at least twenty four hours old when they received definitive treatment. Their injuries were multiple, three men being returned to the operating room for treatment of their less serious wounds. The first four cases were all gravely injured and in shock or borderline shock, and yet were stable after an unavoidable twenty four hour delay in definitive treatment. A minimum amount of time was spent getting the first man ready for surgery, that time being used to obtain essential studies, cross-matching blood, and beginning resuscitation. Intensive resuscitation was started on all patients prior to surgery, the amount accomplished being proportional to the time available before his surgery began. In each case the surgery was considered a part of the resuscitation. The priority of cases was based on gravity of clinical condition and assumed underlying wounds. As has been indicated above, treatment of less serious wounds was further delayed to expedite treatment of all critical cases. As is expected from shrapnel injuries, there were often multiple serious injuries. The following cases are listed in sequence, the time being that of the start of anesthesia:

9 June: 1320 LEMAY Exploratory laparotomy and small bowel resection.
1830 HEROLD Exploratory laparotomy.
2110 WEAVER Exploratory laparotomy and exteriorizing loop colostomy.
10 June: 0320 WARD Exploratory laparotomy.

Two of the explorations were negative but they both had multiple wounds

over the abdomen with clinical findings suggestive of visceral perforation. X-ray was of little help even with contrasting views since there were multiple metallic foreign bodies in each case and it was impossible to determine their locations or courses. LEMAY and HEROLD both had hemothoraces in excess of 1000 cc's and WARD had a tension pneumothorax. To have survived so long before definitive care could be initiated was miraculous indeed. There was at least a one hour turn-over time in the operating room for cleaning up, re-sterilizing instruments and moving the patients. This was greatly facilitated by the loan of two Operating Room Technicians from LITTLE ROCK CG4. They assumed all Central Supply Room functions for the operating room, freeing our own technicians for work in the operating room only. They were: HM2 Ronald P. BIEDENBAK and HM2 Ralph P. SHELLEY. They were with us for a period of two and a half days.

The second group of cases were all orthopedic and were at least forty eight hours post injury when they were received for treatment.

10 June: 1430 LENTINI Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, left tibia and fibula.
1630 TIMMERMAN Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, left radius.
1910 WILSON Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, left first metacarpal.

The third group of patients was again all orthopedic and in each case represented the second trip to the operating room for each individual. They were, at this time, reasonably stable following their first procedure.

11 June: 1230 HEROLD Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, right second metacarpal.
1720 LEMAY Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, left scapella.
2140 WARD Debridement, fracture, compound, comminuted, left fibula and left second, third and fourth metatarsals.

Although most of these cases were types not encountered previously during the tour of the present surgeon and Operating Room Technicians, the work went smoothly and efficiently. This was the result of regular use of the operating room for all cases on board and from attending ships which fell within the skills of the personnel of the Medical Department. The surgical team was used to working together and the nature of the present cases presented no undue difficulties. LT Donald P. GRIFFITH MC USNR, an Air Group Flight Surgeon, did an outstanding job with these very difficult general anesthetics and is unquestionably to be credited with the survival of HEROLD, who was an extremely poor anesthetic risk on several counts. Doctor GRIFFITH left the ship two weeks later, and was not replaced by anyone with comparable anesthesia training. Had his services not been available the outcome of these cases might have been very different. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough, that if a trained General Surgeon is to be assigned to the attack carriers, he be provided at all times with someone to give anesthesia or much of his potential is wasted.

CHEST CASES

Special mention should be made of the chest cases since they represent an important group, even though these particular injuries did not require operating room treatment as such. One man, HAZEL, arrived with a chest tube which had been placed aboard LIBERTY for a tension hemothorax. He was transferred with his tube clamped without incident. LENTINI had a right pneumothorax secondary to rib fractures and was successfully treated with a tube thoracostomy. BENNETT had a minimal left hemothorax secondary to a chest wall contusion and presumed rib fractures not demonstrable by X-ray. This resolved with two simple thoracenteses. WARD had a right tension pneumothorax from missile wounds which was treated with a Claggett needle. He re-expanded and there was no further air leak. The remaining three cases were all from missiles and or shrapnel. LEMAY had a left hemothorax treated with tube thoracostomy and three units of whole blood with uneventful recovery. He also incurred an iatrogenic right thirty percent pneumothorax which responded to thoracentesis and Claggett needle. HEROLD had a right hemothorax which was successfully treated with a tube thoracostomy, but later developed an esophagopleural fistula and his tube was left in place for transfer.

These patients were all drained into pre-packed sterile drainage sets (see equipment section) with only sparing use of suction. We simply did not have that many suction machines and most of the patients expanded satisfactorily with underwater seal only. In the hemothorax cases suction was avoided as it was feared that too rapid re-expansion would precipitate shock or renewed bleeding. As it turned out there were more serious chest injuries than abdominal injuries.

EVACUATION

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Several criteria were established before a patient was considered for evacuation. In general it was our intention to get the patients through the initial phase of their treatment with transfer to shore based hospitals for convalescence or prolonged treatment. In the case of the minor wounded they were kept aboard a few extra days if it meant that they could be returned to duty rather than having to be transferred to a hospital.

All patients who had sustained any blood loss were checked and transfused to a hematocrit level of forty before transfer. All those with abdominal injuries or ileus were on full oral intake, excepting the esophagopleural fistula case, and had normal bladder and bowel function. All Foley catheters had been out at least four days. All those with chest tubes, again with the exception of HEROLD, had them removed, were fully expanded and stable by X-ray for at least forty eight hours before evacuation. HEROLD was transferred with his chest tube to underwater seal. All patients were afebrile at the time of transfer. It was directed that all evacuation aircraft fly below five thousand feet. Physician attendants were aboard all air evacuation flights as requested by message through MALCOEURREP. The aircraft were flown by VR-24 with most of the Medical Officers coming from the Athens U.S. Air Force Dispensary. The evacuation proceeded very smoothly and all of the patients were transferred without complications developing.

Special mention should be made of the three cases transferred directly to Germany for specialised neurosurgical and ophthalmological care. These went by an emergency flight of the regular U.S. Air Force European MedEvac System. One was a case of an intraocular metallic foreign body. The second man was in coma from extensive intracranial metallic foreign bodies. At first it was felt he would succumb but with time he stabilised and improved enough to be evacuated. The last man was relatively asymptomatic but was found to have a single shrapnel fragment in the mid cerebrum.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS: Requests for air evacuation of all patients were made in accordance with existing Sixth Fleet Instructions. All patients were air lifted to the Station Hospital, Naples as they were considered fit for evacuation. Clinical write-ups were prepared and placed in the health record which accompanied the patient along with X-rays. Because of the large number of shrapnel cases it was found advantageous to add SF 600's with printed anatomical position outlines, both anterior and posterior, to indicate location of shrapnel wounds. Patients discharged from the sick list fit for duty were air evacuated to the Naval Support Activity, Naples for further transfer to LIBERTY.

All casualties were evacuated on the dates indicated in the following chart:

Date (June)	10	12	13	16	17	19	TOTAL
TO HOSPITAL	3	2		15	2	6	28
TO DUTY	2		1	9	4	6	22

GRAND TOTAL- 50

Critical and Serious list patients were reported in accordance with the BUPERS Manual. Handling of the dead was limited to preservation of remains in the ship's reefer, identification by dental examination, fingerprinting of Navy Death Certificate and air evacuation to Station Hospital, Naples for further transfer to the United States.

PATIENT MORALE

When the patients first arrived aboard AMERICA they were understandably depressed and let down after their ordeal. This lasted for a few days and then rapidly lifted when it became apparent that all would survive as the critical cases recovered. This was aided by the continuing efforts of the Supply Department which provided warm food at all times. They were also provided with toilet articles and writing material, because all had arrived with no personal possessions. Letters were written for those who were unable to write. Amputatory patients were fitted with uniforms. A memorial service was held on the flight deck for the dead of LIBERTY and this was a very meaningful experience for the men of both ships. As men recovered they were given tours about the AMERICA to help pass the time. Many friendships sprang up, particularly between the men and the corpsmen. As they left the ship they went with the well-earned admiration and respect of the men of AMERICA.

IN RETROSPECT

From the vantage point of hindsight there are certain things we noted which could have gone better or could have been improved upon. Fortunately there were no serious complications.

While we had stressed repeatedly in our training that all previously applied dressings should be removed and wounds examined, this was not uniformly done. In the press of activity of the first three days there were some dressings that simply were skipped and we were chagrined to find wounds that should have received more prompt treatment. We feel this could have been averted by earlier specific responsibility of a doctor for a given group of patients. As it was the minor cases were often being followed by a different doctor each of the first three days, so that things on occasion slipped by. Fortunately all of those wounds were superficial but they should have been treated sooner.

The second problem was in regard to the interpretation of flat AP chest X-rays which were taken that way of necessity in two men who were in borderline shock upon arrival. The pneumothoraces were no problem but where there was blood in the chest the meaning of the increased density on the involved side was not appreciated. In one instance the difference in penetration was interpreted as a pneumothorax on the uninvolved side with a resultant iatrogenic thirty percent pneumothorax when a tap was done on that side. With the multiplicity of metal fragments over the chest the assumed presence of bilateral chest involvement was plausible enough, but in error. One man went through surgery with his hemothorax and it wasn't until he went back into shock for no apparent reason post-operatively that the true nature of his problem became clear and a thoracostomy tube released about 1300 cc's of blood and his course was smooth thereafter. This discovery led to the proper diagnosis in the second case and again a tube released almost 2000 cc's of blood. In this second case an upright film had been taken also but extreme hypoventilation secondary to obesity and abdominal distention along with traumatic pneumonitis masked the fluid level. However a diagnostic tap soon resolved the dilemma. There was a further complication in this case which was not appreciated until his nasogastric tube was removed and he was begun on oral alimentation. He had an esophagopleural fistula but had had no signs of findings of mediastinitis.

These delays were all avoidable and the old tools of careful and complete physical examination, which were in some cases neglected in the rush, could have prevented them.

EQUIPMENT

Beyond our standard stock and IOL supplies we have utilized or stocked several non-standard items for mass casualty treatment which we recommend to others for their consideration, as they facilitate rapid treatment. The first is a group of inter-related items: sterile prepackaged chest tubes, drainage bottles and tubing (Clinical Products #261-4, 217-4) which we found very useful in the six cases requiring chest drainage. The second is a finely calibrated and valved urine collecting chamber (Davol uri-

meter #3580) which simplified the taking of hourly urine outputs in the four critical patients. The third item is the intracath, either Rochester or outdowntype, both of which we used. They are available in a variety of sizes to suit individual preferences. The fourth item is the central venous pressure catheter and manometer set (Fenwall Lab #HB-12.) While this particular item was not used it is considered an integral part of an intensive care supply setup. The fifth item is a completely self contained Foley catheterisation set (Bardexpax #8464) which provides everything necessary for catheterisation. This permits a large number of Foley's to be placed rapidly without reliance on the operating room's sterilisation facilities which are already likely strained by work in the operating room itself. All of these items are relatively compact and inexpensive and have much to recommend them in ease and rapidity of use as might be expected in a major combatant ship.

We would also like to recommend consideration of further use of Ringer's lactate solution, so-called "white blood." We have used it widely in treating injured patients with good results. It could also be used on smaller ships as it appeared that LIBERTY was without fluids that we would consider adequate for the short term treatment of shock as several shocky patients there were receiving five percent dextrose in water. It also avoids the later blood cross-matching problems attendant with the use of Dextran.

Betadine spray was used extensively in the operating room, ward and treatment areas with great success in preventing and controlling wound infections. All patients left afebrile and were without postoperative wound infections. We find the agent to be clinically excellent.

CASUALTY LISTING

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>
ADDINGTON, Reginald	OT1	Fracture, simple, 5th metatarsal, right foot; Contusion, left hip; Sprain, right ankle.
BAKER, Richard K.	OT1	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
BENNETT, Lee R.	OTSN	Hemothorax, left; Contusion, left hemithorax.
BLALOCK, Donald L.	OS7	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue; Burns, 1st & 2nd degree, left forearm.
BROWNFIELD, Virgil	YN3	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
CARLSON, Richard G.	OT1	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
CARPENTER, Jeffrey P.	OT1	Sprain, cervical
CASPER, William E.	SN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
CONCEPTION, Rodney C.	SN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
COOK, Eddie L.	SN	Wound, shrapnel, penetrating, posterior chamber, right eye.
DAVID, Russell O.	SM2	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
DAVIDSON, James R.	CT2	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
EAKINS, Kenneth B.	CTSN	Contusion, left knee; Abrasions, back.
ECKER, Kenneth P.	CTSN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
ENNIS, James M.	LT	Fracture, compound, comminuted, left femur.
FOLLIN, Donald F.	SN	Wound, shrapnel, left upper leg.
HAWKINS, David W.	CT3	Wound, corneal, non-penetrating, right eye.
HAZEN, David C.	OMG3	Wound, penetrating, right anterior, with hemopneumothorax.
HENDRICKS, Charles W.	CT2	Wound, lacerated, right hand; Wound, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
HEROLD, Donald	SH2	Hemothorax, right; Pneumonitis, traumatic, bilateral; Fistula, esophagopleural, right; Fracture, compound, comminuted, right second metacarpal; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
JACKSON, Thomas F.	SN	Fracture, linear, skull; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
JOHNS, Fredrick K.	CT2	Strain, traumatic, low back.
JOHNSON, Melvin P.	CT3	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
KREUN, Loren W.	CT3	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue; Contusion, 5th toe, right foot; Contusion, lumbosacral area.
KAVANAGH, James P.	CTSN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
LAMAR, John B.	SN	Wound, shrapnel, deep soft tissue.
LEHMAN, Terry W.	CTSN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
LEMAY, William M.	EM2	Hemopneumothorax, left; Pneumothorax, right; Gangrene, distal ilium; Fracture, compound, comminuted, left patella; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
LENTINI, Joseph C.	OT1	Fracture, compound, right 2nd & 3rd posterior ribs, with right pneumothorax; Fracture, compound, comminuted, right frontal-parietal skull; Fracture, compound, comminuted, left tibia; Fracture, compound, left fibula; Wound, lacerated, left thigh.

APPENDIX I

LEWIS, David E.	LCDR	Abrasions, corneal, bilateral; Wounds, punctured, bilateral, tympanic membranes; Burns, 1st degree, face, forearms and hands; Concussion, brain.
LOCKWOOD, Bryce F.	S/SOT	Wound, shrapnel, frontal scalp; Burns, flash, 1st & 2nd degree, face and scalp.
MARFIL, Sofronio	TN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
MATHEWS, Jimmie L.	SN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
MC FEOGAN, David L.	CT2	Concussion, brain; Wound, lacerated, left eyebrow area.
O'CONNOR, James O.	LT	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue; Contusion, right kidney, with hematuria; Edema, L-2 and L-3 nerve roots.
PAYAN, Salvadore	SN	Fracture, compound, skull, with foreign body in brain; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue; Amputation, distal phalanx tip, left thumb.
PIERSON, Gerald	CMOSN	Wounds, shrapnel, superficial, right forearm.
POLLARD, Floyd H.	CM3	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
RANDALL, John R.	IC1	Fracture, chip, olecranon process.
REILLY, Thomas J.	SN	Fracture, compound, skull; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
ROWLEY, Charles L.	CT1	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
SHAW, David A.	CMEN	Wounds, shrapnel, soft tissue, scalp and right leg.
SIX, Harold E.	CT3	Wounds, shrapnel, soft tissue, anterior right leg and right elbow; Wound, lacerated, third digit, right hand.
SLAVENS, Larry J.	SN	Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue; Amputation, 2nd & 3rd digits, right 2nd toe.
SOPER, Larry L.	SN	Fracture, compound, comminuted, mandible; Wounds, shrapnel, soft tissue, left neck.
TAYLOR, Richard P.	ENS	Wound, shrapnel, left thumb, with nerve involvement; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
TIMMERMAN, Barry R.	ETR3	Fracture, compound, comminuted, left radius.
WARD, Jerry W.	EM3	Pneumothorax, right; Fracture, compound, comminuted, left 2nd, 3rd and 4th metatarsals; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
WEAVER, Richard L.	SN	Perforation, colon, hepatic flexure; Wounds, shrapnel, multiple, soft tissue.
WILSON, George W.	SN	Fracture, compound, comminuted, left 1st metacarpal; Wounds, shrapnel, left thigh and shoulder.

James M. [unclear] Research Papers

X-RAY FILM EXPOSED - BY ANATOMICAL PART

Skull	48
Mandible	15
Shoulder	10
Humerus	8
Elbow	6
Forearm	10
Hand	13
Cervical	7
Lumbar	10
Pelvis	7
Femur	15
Knee	16
Lower leg	10
Ankle	9
Foot	11
Abdomen	18
KUB	5
Chest	78
IVP	15 (two studies)
	<u>311</u> - Total

----- APPENDIX II -----

LABORATORY STUDIES CONDUCTED

Units of blood drawn from donors	35
*Donor processing procedures	35
Crossmatches performed	57
Hematocrits	16
CBC's	100
Urinalysis	40
Typing of donors not actually drawn	15
Serum electrolytes	7
Liver batteries	8
	<u>313</u> - Total

* Twenty two pints of blood were administered. There were no reactions.

----- APPENDIX III -----

The following texts have been used as standard items in the Battle Dressing Stations and in Main Sick Bay aboard AMERICA. They are recommended reading and useful in mass-casualty planning.

THE MANAGEMENT OF FRACTURES AND SOFT TISSUE INJURIES: W. B. Saunders Company
EMERGENCY WAR SURGERY: U. S. Government Printing Office
SURGICAL PHILOSOPHY IN MASS CASUALTY MANAGEMENT: Charles C. Thomas
IMMEDIATE CARE AND TRANSPORT OF THE INJURED: Charles C. Thomas

----- APPENDIX IV -----

O.A. Papers Cite Israelis in Attack On U.S. Navy Ship

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (AP)—Palestinian sympathizers today released three Central Intelligence Agency documents they said showed that the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, deliberately ordered an attack on a United States Navy ship during the 1967 Middle East War.

The attack by Israeli planes and torpedo boats on the research vessel Liberty killed 34 Americans.

However, it was learned that the C.I.A. also has a staff summary of the Liberty intelligence data that concludes the Israelis did not learn the Liberty was an American ship until after the attack.

The American Palestine Committee, described as "a nationwide committee of Americans trying to help the Palestinians to get back into their homeland," said it would publish parts of the three documents in an advertisement in today's editions of The New York Times. [The advertisement appears on Page 26.]

Called 'Unevaluated Information'

The publication coincided with Mr. Dayan's arrival in the United States for talks with President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

A C.I.A. spokesman, Dennis Berend, said the three documents, obtained by the Palestinian group through the Freedom of Information Act, contained "unevaluated information."

He said the agency could not judge "the possible merits and demerits of the material," but said it "receives and handles intelligence material of varying degrees of veracity, some of it unsubstantiated."

Avi Pazner, a spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington, said the Palestinian group was trying to smear Israel over a "regrettable accident." He denied that Mr. Dayan, then Israel's military commander, had deliberately ordered an attack on an American ship.

The Liberty, strafed by jet aircraft and hit by torpedo boats, was heavily damaged. Israel apologized, called the attack accidental and offered to pay compensation to the families of the victims.

According to one of the documents based on information supplied by an unidentified source, Mr. Dayan ordered the attack over the opposition of an Israeli general and an admiral.

A second document suggested Israel knew the ship's identity at least 48 hours before the attack. The third says the Turkish General Staff concluded the Israeli attack was carried out deliberately because the ship was jamming Israeli military communications.



—United Press International.

MOVED BY MEDAL

Capt. William L. McGonagle, former commander of the U.S. intelligence ship Liberty, was awarded the Medal of Honor for "saving the lives of many of his crew and for saving his ship" during a surprise attack by Israeli jets and torpedo boats in the Mediterranean a year ago. The presentation was made yesterday by Navy Secretary Paul R. Ignatius at the Washington Navy Yard.

Pictures In the News



UPI Photo

MEDAL—Navy Capt. William I. McGonagle of Coachella, Calif., wipes tears from eyes after receiving Medal of Honor from Navy Secretary Paul Ignatius in Washington. McGonagle, former commander of intelligence ship *Liberty*, was cited for saving men after his vessel was involved in surprise attack last year.

FT/6/rcp
1652
Ser 1100 /13

FIRST EMPLOYMENT on CO, USS LIBERTY (AGTR5) ltr ser 329 of 5 Jul 1967

From: Commander Sixth Fleet
To: Secretary of the Navy (Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals)
Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
(2) Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: Navy Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Navy Commendation Medals; recommendations for
Incl: (3) Specific recommendations concerning CO, USS LIBERTY's awards citations

1. As the Commander exercising operational control over USS LIBERTY (AGTR5) on 8 June 1967 when the individual heroic/meritorious achievements cited in enclosure (2) took place, enforcement of those recommendations is made with fullest professional and personal pride. Concurrence is entered herein with an overriding conviction that the upgrading of most of the awards recommended is a matter for closest consideration.
2. Both as an eyewitness during the immediate post-incident time frame, and as one intimately knowledgeable of the historic proportions of the gallantry, selflessness and sheer professionalism demonstrated, I believe the individual citations as written could support upgrading action in almost all of the cases.
3. Accordingly, and with the advice of an informal review board composed of three senior officers of the Staff, COMSIXFLT, upgrading actions considered reasonable and just are forwarded. Enclosure (3) to this endorsement reflects specific recommendations regarding citations.
4. If practicable at the time, it is strongly urged that Presidential bestowal of the awards to a representative group be considered and invited. A national tribute is in consonance with the calibre of performance detailed herein.

W. I. MARTIN

Copy to:
CINCPACFLT
BUPERS
COMSIXFLT
COMSIXFON LIGHT
CO, USS LIBERTY (AGTR5)

1. It is recommended that the following changes be made for the purpose of presenting awards which are compatible with the cited personal achievements.

a. Lieutenant Commander Philip H. AMERSON Jr., USN: Navy Cross vice Bronze Star Medal.

b. Lieutenant George H. COLLEN, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

c. Lieutenant Maurice H. FENNER Jr., USN: Navy Cross vice Bronze Star Medal.

d. Lieutenant Stephen S. TULL, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

e. Lieutenant Richard F. KILPAT, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

f. Ensign John D. TULL, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

g. Machinist Mate Chief Richard J. DEWON, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

h. Quartermaster Third Class Francis BROWN, USN: Navy Cross vice Bronze Star Medal.

i. Boilerman Third Class Frank J. BROWN, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

j. Communication Technician First Class Jeffery R. CAMPBELL, USN: Bronze Star vice Navy Commendation Medal.

k. Seaman Dale D. LARKINS, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

l. Staff Sergeant Fred F. BURWOOD, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

m. Seaman Thomas J. MOULIN, USN: Navy Commendation vice Bronze Star Medal.

n. Hospital Foreman Third Class Samuel L. SCHULMAN, USN: Silver Star vice Navy Commendation Medal.

o. Gunner's Mate Third Class Alexander H. HURPSON, USN: Silver Star vice Bronze Star Medal.

p. I am in agreement with recommendations of the Commanding Officer, USN [REDACTED], in the cases of citess not named in this enclosure.

ENCLOSURE (3)

LIEUTENANT RECOMMENDATIONS WHEN ACCOMPANIED WRITERS LIA LTR 349 of 5 JUL 67
AVAIL CHANGES BELOW ARE FROM CGF LTR SER 145 of 11 AUG 67 (1st ENDORSEMENT)
* LTR COLUMN FROM SHIP'S OFFICIAL HISTORY SER 145 11 MAR 68

- ✓ LCDR Philip Gordon ARMSTRONG, Jr., (Deceased), USN, 569825/1100, BRONZE STAR MEDAL (Posthumously). (Wife: Mrs. Philip M. ARMSTRONG, 131 Cayuga Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia) CGF REC NAVY CROSS
- ✓ LT George Houston COLDEN, USN, 574328/6302, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: American Campaign Medal, European Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Navy Occupation Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Korean Service Medal, China Service Medal, United Nations Service Medal, Good Conduct Medal (Sixth Award) CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ LT Maurice Hoque FLETCHER, Jr., USN, 629125/1610, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal CGF REC NAVY CROSS 14 MAY 68
- ✓ LT Stephen Spencer TOTTE, (Deceased), USN, 669613/1100, BRONZE STAR MEDAL (Posthumously). (Wife: Capt & Mrs. J. C. TOTTE, USN (Ret), 301 53rd Street, Virginia Beach, Virginia) CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ LT Richard Francis KIEFER, MC, USNR, 710107/2105, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. CGF REC SILVER STAR

- ✓ INS David George LUCAS, USNR, 710515/1105, SILVER STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓ INS John Deaderick SCOTT, USNR, 700158/1105, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ CTC Joseph Arthur BENNETT, Jr., USN, 530 81 70, NAVY COOPERATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown. Detached: 19 June 1967
- ✓ MC Richard John BROOKS, USN, 454 62 63, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Third Award), National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ (P) Francis (P) BROWN, (Deceased), USN, 778 76 70, BRONZE STAR MEDAL (Posthumously). (Wife: Mado BROWN, 3323 6th Avenue, Troy, New York) CGF REC NAVY CROSS
- ✓ ST3 Frank Johnson BROWN, USN, 106 69 55, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ YN3 Virgil Louie BROWNFIELD, USNR, 794 23 49, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.

- ✓ CT1 Jeffrey Robert CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05, NAVY COOPERATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown. CGF REC SILVER STAR
- ✓ SN "J" "C" COLSTON, USN, 771 04 56, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. RED BRONZE STAR 14 MAY 68

ENCLOSURE (1)

- ✓ *CTSN Rodney L. DALLY, USN, B20 04 91, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Detached: 19 June 1967
- ✓ S12 Russel O'Neal DAVID, USN, 403 33 65, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Transferred to U. S. Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina
- ✓ SF13 Duilio (NPN) DEIORI, USN, 713 46 75, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *REC BRONZE STAR 14 MAY 68*
- ✓ SH3 Henry Edward DURZEMSKI, Jr., USN, 546 83 16, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and National Defense Service Medal. *REC BRONZE STAR 14 MAY 68*
- ✓ SD3 Troy Lawrence GREEN, USN, 451 50 06, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Third Award) and National Defense Service Medal. *REC BRONZE STAR 14 MAY 68*
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- ✓ YN3 Steven Charles GURCHIK, Jr., USN, 697 82 42, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *REC BRONZE STAR 14 MAY 68*
- ✓ S12 Donald (NPN) HEROLD, USN, 609 22 48, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Detached: 09 June 1967
- ✓ *CTSN Ronald A. HURST, USN, B81 88 16, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Detached: 19 June 1967
- ✓ *CTC Carlyle Francis LARKIN, USN, 518 69 45, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Third Award), National Defense Service Medal.
Detached: 21 June 1967
- ✓ SN Dale Duane LARKINS, USN, 912 48 93, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *CGF REC SILVER STAR*
- ✓ SSGT Bryce F. LOCKOOD, USN, 485 98 56, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Detached: 17 June 1967. *CGF REC SILVER STAR*
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- ✓ M1 Charles Monroe MARTIN, USN, 497 49 88, NAVY COMBATATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Third Award) and National Defense Service Medal. *REC NEW 14 MAY 68*
- ✓ *CTSN Frank (NPN) McINTURFF, III, USN, B61 44 71, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown
Detached: 19 June 1967

ENCLOSURE (1)

- ✓CT3 Garvin Lee Douglas MCKIN, USN, 595 81 92, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓SN Thomas Robert DULIN, USN, 697 77 29, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *CGF REC NAVY COMMEMORATION*
- ✓CT3 James Leonard MEDWIN, USN, 915 09 65, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓SP1 Richard Dale HENSE, USN, 430 77 24, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Second Award) and National Defense Service Medal (Second Award)
- ✓SN Statistic (SP) PAHIDES, USN, 793 34 78, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓YN2 Martin Don POWLEDGE, USN, 775 78 26, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *CGF REC NAVY COMMEMORATION*

- ✓CT3 Paddy "P" REDDERS, USN, 793 84 81, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓CT2 Robert James SCHEFFL, USN, 542 55 84, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: Unknown. Detached: 19 June 1967

DATE TO COMPLETION

- ✓CT3 Samuel Leonard SCHUPEN, USN, 353 96 33, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *CGF REC SILVER STAR*
- ✓CT3 Maurice Bryan SIEFER, USN, 695 94 86, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal.
- ✓ICFN DAVID (N) GAGAN, USN, 850 17 83, SILVER STAR
- ✓DC3 James Clayton SMITH, USN, 777 19 71, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal. *CGF REC SILVER STAR*

- ✓GVE3 Alexander Neil THOMPSON, USN, 770 42 21, (Deceased), BRONZE STAR MEDAL. (Posthumously). (MOM: Mrs. Gail E. THOMPSON, 4 Crystal Drive, Warwick, R. I.). *CGF REC SILVER STAR*

- ✓CAC Harold Jesse THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Good Conduct Medal (Third Award), National Defense Service Medal.

- ✓SFP3 Phillip Francis TOURNEY, USN, 773 22 60, BRONZE STAR MEDAL. Previous Awards: Special Forces Expeditionary Medal for Viet Nam and National Defense Service Medal.

- ✓H41 Thomas Lee VAN CLEVE, USN, 298 39 72, NAVY COMMEMORATION MEDAL. Previous Awards: National Defense Service Medal, Viet Nam Campaign Medal, Navy Expeditionary Medal for Cuba, Good Conduct Medal (Third Award), and Viet Nam Service Medal. *CGF REC NAVY COMMEMORATION*

ENCLOSURE (1)

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the DEWEY STAR TAPL with Combat Distinguishing Device posthumously to

Lieutenant Commander Philip McEnteehon AR 379010 J., U. S. Navy
for service as set forth in the following

DEWEY STAR CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected aerial attack on USS LIBERTY (AGOR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on June 1957. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three rotor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Lieutenant Commander AR 379010, serving as Executive Officer, was on the bridge when the first strafing attack occurred. A large fire erupted in the vicinity of two 55 gallon gasoline drums stored near the bridge and there was grave danger that the drums might explode and cause a widespread uncontrollable conflagration. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire while proceeding to jettison the gasoline drums and organize a party of men to extinguish the blazing lifeboats nearby. At this time he received multiple injuries which proved to be fatal a few hours after the attack terminated. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Lieutenant Commander AR 379010's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

ENCLOSURE (2)

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

GEORGE HOUSTON GOLDEN

LIEUTENANT U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Lieutenant GOLDEN, serving as Engineering Officer, was in main control during the attack coordinating the operation of machinery for propulsion and power under battle conditions. Three times when told to 'standby for torpedo attack to starboard', Lieutenant GOLDEN unhesitatingly and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, and although wounded by rocket fire, relieved the phone talker and throttlemans on the starboard side of the engine room at the waterline assumed their duties and ordered all others away from the area of imminent danger. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Lieutenant GOLDEN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Lieutenant GOLDEN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

MAURICE HOGUE BENNETT, JR.

LIEUTENANT, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Lieutenant BENNETT, serving as Assistant Research Officer was in the research spaces during the attack. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety he entered a compartment which seconds before was demolished by a torpedo explosion and brought to safety one officer who had been severely burned and temporarily blinded. Though wounded himself and in spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being, he supervised evacuation of undamaged research spaces and devoted many hours in providing for the comfort, safety and welfare of his shipmates. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Lieutenant BENNETT's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Lieutenant BENNETT is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRONIZO STAR MEDAL, with Combat Distinguishing Device posthumously to

Lieutenant Stephen Spencer TOTH U. S. Navy

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGF-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 5 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Lieutenant TOTH, serving as Intelligence Officer, was on the starboard wing of the flying bridge, 04 level, when the first strafing attack occurred. It became a vital matter to quickly establish the national identity of the aircraft that had initiated the vicious attack in order to inform higher authority. With complete disregard for his own personal safety he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to obtain this data. While engaged in this task a violent explosion on the starboard side of the bridge inflicted fatal injuries and hurled him to the 01 level of the ship, starboard side. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Lieutenant TOTH's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

RICHARD FRANCIS KIEFER

LIEUTENANT (MEDICAL CORPS), U. S. NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Lieutenant KIEFER, serving as Medical Officer, was in sick bay during the initial phases of the air attack. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire by going to different stations and compartments to administer first aid after sick bay became untenable and evacuated following a rocket hit. He treated men for pain, shock and took emergency measures to control hemorrhage and later performed a chest operation. After the torpedo hit, he organized personnel for removing the wounded in case of an order to abandon ship. He again went to different General Quarters stations to administer first aid and made trips through some of the damaged areas to the medical storeroom for needed supplies. He organized teams of men to wash wounds and instructed less seriously wounded personnel in preparation of antibiotics for injection. He conducted a major surgical operation giving the anesthesia (spinal) himself, with a Hospital Corpsman as his assistant and a seaman and fireman as circulating assistants. Although wounded himself, Lieutenant KIEFER treated patients in excess of thirty hours without relief or rest. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional in an hour of awesome peril, thereby saving many lives and easing the pain and suffering of many others. His initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Lieutenant KIEFER is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the SILVER STAR MEDAL to

David George LUCAS

Ensign, U. S. Navy

For service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action during the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Ensign LUCAS, serving as Gunnery Officer, arrived on the bridge within moments of the initial strafing attack. A brief period of time before he reached the gun control station a large explosion occurred on the starboard wing of the bridge which incapacitated the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Deck, the sound powered telephone talker, and lookout, and caused the instantaneous demise of the Intelligence Officer. The need to assist the Commanding Officer was immediately apparent to him. With complete disregard for his own personal safety and though already wounded he continued to fearlessly expose himself to intense overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to assist the Commanding Officer in maintaining ship control and communications with other vital battle stations throughout the attack. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional for a young junior officer with limited afloat experience and inspired his seniors and subordinates alike in an hour of awesome peril. By his daring actions and loyal devotion to duty in the face of personal risk, Ensign LUCAS upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Ensign LUCAS is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

JOHN DEADERICK SCOTT

ENSIGN U. S. NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Ensign SCOTT, serving as Damage Control Assistant, was in Damage Control Central during the attack, coordinating the setting of material conditions, actions of fire parties and other damage control teams. He remained in D. C. Central on the Starboard side of the ship when notified to "Standby for torpedo attack starboard side". Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety immediately following the torpedo attack, he courageously remained in his time and smoke filled General Quarters station to direct and coordinate the emergency measures taken by the repair parties to extinguish fires, minimize and control flooding of spaces. He personally directed and supervised the emergency plugging and shoring of the ruptured deck in the compartment just aft of his General Quarters station immediately above where the torpedo had exploded. This prompt action prevented progressive flooding and spread of fuel oil on the second deck, thus preserving the watertight integrity of the ship's second deck. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional, and his leadership and initiative throughout the next few days on shoring and damage control was an inspiration to all personnel aboard. ENSIGN SCOTT's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

ENSIGN SCOTT is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

JOSEPH ARTHUR BENKERT, JR.

CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked, without warning, by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. In spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being, Chief Petty Officer BENKERT devoted incalculable hours to assist in assuring the comfort, safety, and welfare of his shipmates. While the ship was enroute to and after the ship was placed in drydock at Malta, Chief Petty Officer BENKERT volunteered to assist in the removal of remains and classified material from the formerly flooded compartments. Working under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, again without regard to his own comfort and well-being, Chief Petty Officer BENKERT would work until ordered to cease for food and rest only to reappear again shortly thereafter, eager and insistent to continue his labors. Chief Petty Officer BENKERT's devotion to duty and to his shipmates during a time of great trial and strain served as an inspiring example for all -- seniors and shipmates -- to follow, exemplifying the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the **PROVIZO STARBUCK** to

RICHARD JOHN BROOKS

CHIEF MACHINIST RATE U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROVISED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unexpected and unexpected aerial attack on USS LIBERTY (AGOR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by 19 fighter aircraft and three rotor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Chief Petty Officer BROOKS, serving as Chief Petty Officer in charge of the main machinery spaces, was in main control during the attack. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety he fearlessly proceeded throughout the main machinery space to check machinery and equipment to try to keep the ship going at maximum speed possible. Twice he was knocked from one deck to the other by vibration from rocket fire and torpedo explosion. Although wounded himself, he continued restarting equipment and talking to his men to keep up their morale during the period of time that the machinery space was filled with smoke, steam and illuminated by battle lanterns only. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptionally effective and inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. His initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Chief Petty Officer BROOKS is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL with Combat Distinguishing Device posthumously to

FRANCIS BROWN

QUARTERMASTER THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following:

PROPOSED CITATION:

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer BROWN, serving as Quartermaster was on the bridge during the initial phase of the air attack. When the helmsman became incapacitated, without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire while he assumed this responsibility. Petty Officer BROWN steadfastly maintained the ordered course while many men in the immediate proximity received serious and fatal injuries. He remained on his post until felled by strafing fire from the torpedo boats at the moment the torpedo struck the ship. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exemplary in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer BROWN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

FRAN JOHNSON BROWN

BOILERMAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research Compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer BROWN was assigned to Repair III A during the attack. Without hesitation and complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to intensely accurate rocket and machine gun fire to fight raging fires above decks. The oxygen breathing apparatus strapped to his chest was completely shot away during the air attack. Having completed his mission above decks, he proceeded to the smoke and steam filled fire room to relieve and render assistance to personnel overcome by smoke. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer BROWN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer BROWN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

VIRGIL LOUIE BROWNFIELD

YEOMAN THIRD CLASS, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer BROWNFIELD, serving as the Captain's Battle Circuit Sound Powered Telephone Talker, was on the bridge shortly after the initial strafing attack, although it was obvious that the bridge and its personnel were prime targets. Although many bridge personnel received serious and fatal injuries, with complete disregard for his own personal safety Petty Officer BROWNFIELD fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to remain beside the Commanding Officer relaying and receiving crucial orders and information, and continued to do so even after being grievously and painfully wounded. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer BROWNFIELD's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer BROWNFIELD is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

JIMMY B. CARPENTER

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN FIFTH CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following PROPOSED CITATION:

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected aerial attack on USS LIBERTY (AGOR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 4 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. After the Research spaces had been evacuated following the torpedo attack, Petty Officer CARPENTER immediately proceeded to the bridge, where he began rendering first aid to the Commanding Officer and assisting him in relaying crucial orders and directions. Despite painful injuries, his calm, alert actions and initiative assisted the Commanding Officer to remain on the bridge while commanding the ship clear of further danger. With complete disregard for his own comfort and well being, Petty Officer CARPENTER remained on his feet, assisting many wounded throughout the ship as required during the remainder of the night. Petty Officer CARPENTER's courage and initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer CARPENTER is authorized to wear the COMMAT "V".

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

"J" "C" COLSTON

SEAMAN U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman COLSTON was running forward to his general quarters station at Machine Gun 52 when he stopped to help a wounded shipmate to safety. He continued forward while still exposing himself to extremely heavy rocket and machine gun fire and helped another wounded man to safety. He then answered the call for help to extinguish the burning gasoline cans on the O1 level port side. With complete disregard for his own personal safety he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire while rescuing wounded and fighting fires. He also warned his shipmates when the aircraft started making repeated strafing attacks. He then helped carry several more of his wounded shipmates to safety. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire undoubtedly saved the lives of several of his shipmates and was exemplary in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman COLSTON's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman COLSTON is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

RODNEY L. DALLY

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN SEAMAN U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman DALLY, serving as a member of Repair Party #3, was topside fighting numerous fires while the ship was under an intense air attack. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelming accurate rocket and machine gun fire in accomplishing this task. He was responsible for the control of numerous fires and the evacuation of many wounded personnel from topside spaces. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was inspirational in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman DALLY's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman DALLY is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

RUSSEL O'NEAL DAVID

SIGNALMAN SECOND CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer DAVID, serving as bridge signalman was on the bridge during the initial phases of the air attack. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, in spite of the fact that he had been painfully wounded in the back, shoulder, and leg, he fearlessly continued to expose himself to intensely accurate rocket and machine gun fire to aid the wounded and executive signal hoists directed. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer DAVID's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer DAVID is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

JULIO DEMORI

SHIPFITTER (METAL) THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION.

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer DEMORI, serving as On Scene Leader in the Forward Repair Party, without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety fearlessly exposed himself to intense rocket and machine gun fire while assisting in the evacuation of wounded personnel from the exposed forecabin and adjacent weather decks. After insuring that no more wounded were still exposed, he unhesitatingly went below deck to direct maintenance of damage control conditions of compartments below the waterline. He willingly remained below deck during the torpedo attack and immediately afterward directed and assisted the emergency repair teams in minimizing further damage and flooding. His initiative and aggressiveness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer DEMORI's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer DEMORI is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

HENRY EDWARD DURZENSKI JR.

SHIPS SERVICEMAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for the service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer DURZENSKI, first demonstrated exceptional coolness and ability as he unhesitatingly assumed the duties of damage control plotter in addition to his assigned responsibilities. His ability to assimilate, retain, and plot reports, as well as pass that information promptly and accurately to Damage Control Central while intense rocket and machine gun fire penetrated decks and bulkheads around him was exemplary. When the officer in Charge of the repair party was called to the bridge, Petty Officer DURZENSKI, realizing that the on scene leaders were below decks immediately took charge of the repair party and maintained discipline and organization. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer DURZENSKI's actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer DURZENSKI is authorized to wear the CO. BAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

TROY LAWRENCE GREEN

STEWARD THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service and heroism in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer GREEN, serving as an assistant to the corpsman in the forward battle dressing station, rendered invaluable assistance. By alleviating suffering and minimizing casualties with complete disregard for his own personal safety he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to rescue wounded personnel and carried them to the battle dressing station for treatment. When the torpedo boats raked the starboard side of the ship with cannon and machine gun fire, he carried the wounded out of the forward battle dressing station to a safer location in the passageway. Throughout the night he not only cared for the wounded, but prepared food, made accurate casualty reports, and in general, seized every opportunity to assist or direct work of any nature. Because of his exceptional industry and gentle humor, the spirits of all on board were enhanced during a time of great trial and strain. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer GREEN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer GREEN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

STEVEN CHARLES GURCHIK JR.

YEOMAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer GURCHIK, serving as a phone talker in Damage Control Central first demonstrated exceptional coolness and ability in relaying promptly and accurately vital information between Damage Control Central and both repair parties. His ability to organize and maintain constant circuit discipline and coordination, as well as to ensure that all vital communications and orders were quickly and accurately delivered, while intense rocket and machine gun fire penetrated decks and bulkheads around him was exemplary. Remaining at his below deck battle station during and after the torpedo attack, he continued to perform his vital duties, even as fuel oil fumes and smoke filled his station. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was inspirational in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer GURCHIK's initiative and courageous actions under fire were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer GURCHIK is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

DONALD HEROLD

SHIP'S SERVICEMAN SECOND CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Although he sustained painful shrapnel wounds on the first strafing attack, Petty Officer HEROLD immediately ran to his Battle Station on machine gun 52. However, the machine gun had been destroyed prior to his arrival. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to evacuate wounded from the forecastle and other unsheltered areas and continued until he was wounded again. The wounds were critical and required that he be evacuated to a battle dressing station. Petty Officer HEROLD's conduct while waiting to be moved for treatment to battle dressing stations was exemplary and enhanced the morale of other wounded persons nearby. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. His initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer HEROLD is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

RONALD A. HURST

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN SEAMAN U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman HURST, served as a member of the Forward Repair Party during the attack and post-attack recovery phases. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire while aiding and removing wounded personnel from the forecastle and other unprotected areas. After the wounded were placed in a position of safety, he volunteered to assist a fire party fighting a fire on the bridge at the height of the air attack. When the fire on the O1 level port side was brought under control, he returned to the forward repair locker to give assistance in damage control below decks forward. He was below decks when the torpedo exploded. He immediately began to plug holes and assist in installing shoring to minimize damage and control flooding. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exemplary in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman HURST's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman HURST is authorized to wear the CORPUS "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

CARYLE FRANCIS LATHE

CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For the heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected attack on USS LIBERTY (AGC-13) in the Eastern Mediterranean on June 1, 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three torpedoes. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Chief Petty Officer LATHE, serving as Assistant Repair Party #3 officer, was personally responsible for the supervision and organization of Repair Party #3 fire fighting teams combating topside fires during the air attack. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to effectively accomplish these tasks. With fires under control and wounded evacuated from topside spaces, he returned to Repair Party #3 and began to assist in the shoring and plugging operations. He also worked throughout the night assisting in surgical operations, helping save several lives. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Chief Petty Officer LATHE's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Chief Petty Officer LATHE is authorized to wear the COMBAT STAR.

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

DALE DUANE LARKINS

SEAMAN U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman LARKINS, serving as loader and telephone talker on machine gun 54, arrived on station shortly after the initial strafing attack. The station was untenable due to intense flames coming from burning gasoline cans on the deck below. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire from the attacking aircraft and proceeded to machine gun 53 to assist. Machine gun 53 was soon enveloped in flames from the burning motor whale boat. Seaman LARKINS then courageously helped extinguish fires while the aircraft were still attacking. Still with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he single-handedly manned mount 51 and fired on the attacking torpedo boats until he received the order to "cease fire". He then helped carry several of his wounded shipmates to where they could be given medical aid. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire undoubtedly saved the lives of many of his shipmates and was exemplary in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman LARKIN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Seaman LARKINS is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

BRYCE F. LOCKWOOD

STAFF SERGEANT, U. S. MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION.

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. SSGT LOCKWOOD, serving with USS LIBERTY on temporary additional duty, was in the Research Operations spaces at the time of the attack. After the torpedo attack, SSGT LOCKWOOD, despite severe burns, the rapid rise of water, heavy smoke and complete darkness, was instrumental in the rescue of personnel from the flooded compartments, thus averting even further loss of life. Without regard for his personal safety or his injuries, he assisted in the rescue until ordered to leave. His calm, rational thinking and actions evidenced a high degree of professional competence and moral fibre. After the attack and again without regard for his own injuries and comfort, SSGT LOCKWOOD spent long tedious hours assisting in the care of the wounded and in whatever duties were required. SSGT LOCKWOOD's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SSGT LOCKWOOD is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting
the NAVY COMBAT ACTION MEDAL to

CHARLES CLYDE WELLS

70011151 N1E FIRST CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGOS-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three rotor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer WELLS was in main engine control when the first attack occurred. Without hesitation, he immediately started all standby equipment to ensure that the ship was prepared for any speed requests from the bridge. With complete disregard for his own life and personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to machine gun and rocket fire that was entering the machinery space to ensure that all machinery and equipment was in operating condition, and made essential emergency repairs to the fire main pump during the first moments of the attack. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional in an hour of extreme peril. His initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer WELLS is authorized to wear the COMBAT ACTION MEDAL.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

FRANK McINTURFF, III

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN SEAMAN, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman McINTURFF, serving as a stretcher bearer in the Forward Repair Party, first exposed himself fearlessly to intense rocket and machine gun fire while assisting in removing the wounded personnel from the weather decks to the forward battle dressing station. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he once again exposed himself to overwhelmingly intense and accurate aircraft fire when he courageously joined the fire fighting team on the bridge. After the fires in the vicinity of the bridge were out, he again took up his stretcher and carried two more wounded men from the bridge to the battle dressing station. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire undoubtedly saved several injured men from receiving further wounds and was inspirational in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman McINTURFF's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman McINTURFF is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

GARVIN LEE DOUGLAS McIAKIN

COMMUNICATION TECHNICIAN THIRD CLASS, U.S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attack without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer McIAKIN, serving as a repair party #3 phone talker, was personally responsible for maintaining communications between repair #3, the bridge, and damage control central. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he remained at his post even though the intense fumes, smoke, and heat twice caused him to lose consciousness. Both times he was able to regain consciousness and continue to relay information, as well as help the wounded. When the ship was struck by a torpedo, Petty Officer McIAKIN made certain all the wounded had life jackets and would not leave the mess decks until all the wounded had been made ready for being placed in lifeboats. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exemplary in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer McIAKIN's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer McIAKIN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

THOMAS ROBERT MOULIN

SEAMAN U. S. NAVAL RESERVE

for the service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman MOULIN, serving as a phone talker in Damage Control Central, first demonstrated exceptional skill and coolness in relaying promptly and accurately vital information to and from the bridge, damage control central, and main engine control. His ability to organize and maintain constant circuit discipline and coordination, as well as to insure that all essential message traffic was quickly and accurately delivered, while overhead rocket and machine gun fire penetrated decks and bulkheads around him was exemplary. Remaining at his below deck battle station during and after the torpedo attack, he continued to perform his vital duties as well, as give encouragement to a wounded bridge phone talker even as fuel oil fumes and smoke filled his station. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was inspirational in an hour of awesome peril. Seaman MOULIN's initiative and courageous actions under fire were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman MOULIN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

JAMES LEONARD NEEDHAM

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. In spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being Petty Officer NEEDHAM devoted incalculable hours to assist in assuring the comfort, safety, and welfare of his shipmates. While the ship was enroute to and after the ship was placed in drydock at Malta Petty Officer NEEDHAM volunteered to assist in the removal of remains and classified material from the formerly flooded compartments. Working under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, again without regard to his own comfort and well-being, Petty Officer NEEDHAM would work until ordered to cease for food and rest only to reappear again shortly thereafter, eager and insistent to continue his labors. Petty Officer NEEDHAM's devotion to duty and to his shipmates during a time of great trial and strain served as an inspiring example for all - seniors and shipmates - to follow, exemplifying the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

RICHARD DALE NEESE

SHIPFITTER FIRST CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer NEESE, serving as Repair Party #3 "on the scene leader", was directly and personally responsible for the control of numerous fires topside during the air attack. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to accomplish this task. After the ship sustained a torpedo hit, he was immediately on the scene to commence shoring and plugging to control flooding. This accomplished he assisted with the care of the wounded throughout the night. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer NEESE's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer NEESE is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

STANATIE PAHIDES

SEAMAN, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 3 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Seaman PAHIDES, serving as a Messenger in the Forward Repair Party, first exposed himself fearlessly to intense rocket and machine gun fire while assisting in carrying wounded personnel from the weather decks to the Forward Battle Dressing Station. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he continued to expose himself to overwhelming accurate rocket and machine gun fire when he courageously volunteered for and joined the fire fighting team on the bridge. As soon as the fire on the bridge was out, he returned to his battle station and then, though painfully wounded, assisted in making emergency repairs below deck. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exemplary in an hour of awesome need. Seaman PAHIDE's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Seaman PAHIDES is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

MARTIN DENNY POWLEDGE

YEOMAN SECOND CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer POWLEDGE, serving as a bridge sound powered telephone talker, arrived on the bridge during the initial phase of the air attack. Aware that the bridge and its personnel were prime targets, without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelming accurate rocket and machine gun fire as he aided and comforted the injured and assumed their duties. Vital orders and information was relayed to and received from various battle control stations throughout the air and torpedo attack and post-attack recovery phase. He remained on station throughout the night performing his essential functions without relief. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer POWLEDGE's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer POWLEDGE is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting
the Navy Commendation Medal to

PADDY E. RHODES

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN THIRD CLASS, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. In spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being, Petty Officer RHODES devoted incalculable hours to assist in assuring the comfort, safety, and welfare of his shipmates. While the ship was en route to and after the ship was placed in drydock at Malta Petty Officer RHODES volunteered to assist in the removal of remains and classified material from the formerly flooded compartments. Working under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, again without regard to his own comfort and well-being, Petty Officer RHODES would work until ordered to cease for food and rest only to reappear again shortly thereafter, eager and insistent to continue his labors. Petty Officer RHODES' devotion to duty and to his shipmates during a time of great trial and strain served as an inspiring example for all seniors and shipmates -- to follow, exemplifying the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

ROBERT JAMES SCHNELL

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research Compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. In spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being Petty Officer SCHNELL devoted incalculable hours to assist in assuring the comfort, safety, and welfare of his shipmates. While the ship was enroute to and after the ship was placed in drydock at Malta Petty Officer SCHNELL volunteered to assist in the removal of remains and classified material from the formerly flooded compartments. Working under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, again without regard to his own comfort and well-being, Petty Officer SCHNELL would work until ordered to cease for food and rest only to reappear again shortly thereafter, eager and insistent to continue his labors. Petty Officer SCHNELL's devotion to duty and to his shipmates during a time of great trial and strain served as an inspiring example for all - seniors and shipmates - to follow, exemplifying the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

SAMUEL LEONARD SCHULMAN

HOSPITAL CORPSMAN THIRD CLASS, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGF-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer SCHULMAN, serving as medical corpsman in charge of the forward battle dressing station, rendered first aid to the wounded throughout the attack. When the station was struck by several rockets, knocking him to the floor, and momentarily stunning him, he made the decision to abandon the station, and began to treat the many wounded who were in the fore and aft passageway on the main deck. It was necessary to perform a tracheostomy, a hazardous surgical procedure which in most hospitals must be performed by a surgeon in an effort to ease the breathing of one man and he saved the life of at least one seaman by administering artificial respiration. Many others received treatment under his supervision which eased their pain and sustained their strength until moved to another ship for further treatment. Without this care, several might have perished. His duties had prevented him from getting adequate sleep the previous night, and after almost forty hours of continuous work, he was overcome by fatigue on the mess deck. After only two hours of sleep, he was awake again and pressed to the limit of his abilities for an additional twelve hours. After the last of the wounded had been evacuated, he was again overtaken by physical exhaustion. His actions were in the highest traditions of the Hospital Corps and the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer SCHULMAN is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal to

MAURICE BRYAN SHAFER

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research Compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. In spite of great personal fatigue and without regard for his own personal comfort and well-being Petty Officer SHAFER devoted incalculable hours to assist in assuring the comfort, safety, and welfare of his shipmates. While the ship was enroute to and after the ship was placed in drydock at Malta Petty Officer SHAFER volunteered to assist in the removal of remains and classified material from the formerly flooded compartments. Working under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, again without regard to his own comfort and well-being, Petty Officer SHAFER would work until ordered to cease for food and rest only to reappear again shortly thereafter, eager and insistent to continue his labors. Petty Officer SHAFER's devotion to duty and to his shipmates during a time of great trial and strain served as an inspiring example for all - seniors and shipmates - to follow, exemplifying the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

JAMES CLAYTON SMITH

DAMAGE CONTROLMAN THIRD CLASS U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following:

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by two fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer SMITH, serving as a member of Repair Party #3 was personally responsible for controlling a large fire on the 01 level port side. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, Petty Officer SMITH fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire in accomplishing this task. At one point, his fire hose was shot to pieces and the man helping him lost his life. Petty Officer SMITH rigged another hose and extinguished the fire. Petty Officer SMITH without hesitation went on to fight other fires, risking his life to help others. After the torpedo hit, Petty Officer SMITH began snoring and plugging operations to assist in controlling flooding. Upon completion, he returned to the mess decks and helped care for the wounded the rest of the night. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer SMITH's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer SMITH is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

5

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL with Combat Distinguishing Device posthumously to:

ALEXANDER NEIL THOMPSON

GUNNER'S MATE (GUNS) THIRD CLASS, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 25 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer THOMPSON, serving as gunner's mate petty officer, was at machine gun 51 conducting an inspection when the first strafing attack occurred. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire from the attacking aircraft and opened fire on them in accordance with the ship's gunnery doctrine. Although all of the other men at the station had been killed or seriously wounded during the first pass of aircraft, Petty Officer THOMPSON courageously and single handedly operated machine gun 51 and continued to fire on the aircraft in the defense of his ship and shipmates until he was fatally wounded by a rocket blast. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer THOMPSON's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

HAROLD JESSE THOMPSON

CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN, U. S. NAVY

For service as set forth in the following:

PROPOSED CITATION:

For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy when a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Chief Petty Officer THOMPSON, initially serving as Assistant Repair Officer in the Forward Repair Party, was on the main deck forward when the first strafing attack wounded the Forward Repair Officer. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire as he assumed the duties of Officer in Charge of the Repair Party, and promptly organized and supervised the evacuation of the exposed wounded personnel and directed the fire fighting teams to the bridge area. Later in the attack, though painfully wounded himself, he courageously volunteered in response to an urgent call from the bridge, to assist the signalman. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Chief Petty Officer THOMPSON's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Chief Petty Officer THOMPSON is authorized to wear the COMBAT V.

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes's Research Papers

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the BRONZE STAR MEDAL to

PHILLIP FRANCIS TOURNEY

SHIPFITTER (PIPE) THIRD CLASS, U.S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer TOURNEY, serving as Assistant on Scene Leader in the Forward Repair Party, first assisted in organizing the evacuation of wounded personnel from the exposed weather decks. With complete disregard for his own personal safety he continued to fearlessly expose himself to intense rocket and machine gun fire to move a fire fighting team to the bridge. He then returned to the forward weather decks to insure that no more wounded were still exposed before going below to maintain damage control conditions of compartments below the waterline. He remained below decks during the torpedo attack and immediately afterward assisted and directed emergency repairs to minimize further flooding and damage. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional inspirational leadership in an hour of awesome peril. Petty Officer TOURNEY's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service."

Petty Officer TOURNEY is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".

For the President,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in presenting
the Navy Commendation Medal to

THOMAS LEE VAN CLEAVE

HOSPITAL CORPSMAN FIRST CLASS, U. S. NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION

For exceptional meritorious service in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Petty Officer VAN CLEAVE, serving as medical corpsman in charge of the main battle dressing station, administered initial care, stopped major bleeding, splinted fractures, administered medications to relieve pain, cared for burned men, started infusions, and assisted with the major surgical procedures that were done throughout the attack and post-attack recovery phase. When the ship was struck by a torpedo, he organized and led a party to the mess deck to take the wounded to safety should it be necessary to abandon ship. During the night that followed, Petty Officer VAN CLEAVE continued to work without relief, making several trips to the medical storeroom, which was separated from the flooded compartment by a bulkhead which later required extensive shoring to prevent buckling. He always seemed to have time to do something more for the wounded, whether that was procuring a cup of water, wiping a perspiring forehead, giving a word of encouragement or merely a hand on a shoulder in assurance that the man was not facing his ordeal alone. His devotion to duty and effectiveness materially contributed to the rapid recovery of the many patients he treated. His actions were in the highest traditions of the Hospital Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Petty Officer VAN CLEAVE is authorized to wear the COLONET "V".

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

9



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the
NAVY CROSS posthumously to

FRANCIS BROWN
QUARTERMASTER THIRD CLASS
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism on 8 June 1967 in connection with an armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the early afternoon hours, LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. Subjected to intense incendiary, machine-gun, and rocket fire, and placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side, LIBERTY sustained numerous personnel casualties and severe structural damage. Serving as Quartermaster, Petty Officer Brown was on the bridge during the initial phase of the air attack. When the helmsman became incapacitated, Petty Officer Brown fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine-gun fire while assuming the helmsman's duties. He steadfastly maintained the ordered course while many men in the immediate proximity received serious and fatal injuries, remaining on his post until felled by strafing fire from the torpedo boats at the moment the torpedo struck the ship. By his aggressiveness, composure under fire, and courageous actions, Petty Officer Brown upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

For the President,

Paul R. Ignatius

Secretary of the Navy

Enlisted 6 Aug 64 Albany, N.Y.
Birth date 6 May 47 Albany, N.Y.
Died 8 Jun 67
Caucasian

Comdr. X. Zander Tamm
4861 North Park Avenue, A-7
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20912

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the
NAVY CROSS posthumously to

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER PHILIP M. ARMSTRONG, JR.
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism on 8 June 1967 in connection with an armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the early afternoon hours, LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. Subjected to intense incendiary, machine-gun, and rocket fire, and placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side, LIBERTY sustained numerous personnel casualties and severe structural damage. Serving as Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong was on the bridge when the first strafing attack occurred. A large fire erupted in the vicinity of two 55-gallon gasoline drums, creating the grave danger that the drums might explode and cause a widespread conflagration. Lieutenant Commander Armstrong fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine-gun fire while proceeding to jettison the gasoline drums and organizing a party of men to extinguish the blazing lifeboats nearby. At this time, he received multiple injuries which proved to be fatal a few hours after the attack terminated. By his aggressiveness, composure under fire, and inspiring leadership, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

For the President,


Secretary of the Navy

Enlisted 14 Jul 47 Detroit, Michigan
Birth date 4 Jul 29 Detroit, Michigan
Died 8 June 1967
Caucasian



Comdr. X. Bader Team
466 North Park Avenue
Cherry Chase, Maryland 21

11



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
HAS AWARDED THE**

SILVER STAR MEDAL

**TO
DAVID SKOLAK
INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRICIAN FIREMAN, USN
FOR
GALLANTRY IN ACTION**

**IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARMED ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ON 8 JUNE 1967**

GIVEN THIS 27th DAY OF September 1968



Paul R. Inoué
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

12



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the SILVER STAR MEDAL posthumously to

DAVID SKOLAK
INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRICIAN FIREMAN
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in connection with the armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary, machine-gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Fireman Skolak was performing routine repairs to interior communications when the first strafing attack occurred. Several shipmates in the near vicinity were immediately wounded by the hostile fire. Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety, Fireman Skolak fearlessly exposed himself to overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine-gun fire in an attempt to evacuate the wounded men from the forecastle. While performing these vallant acts, he was fatally wounded. Fireman Skolak's initiative, aggressiveness, courageous actions, and coolness under heavy fire served to inspire all who observed him and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

For the President,

T. H. Moorer
Admiral, United States Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

"WHILE ENGAGED IN PEACEFUL OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS,"
"INSERTED NAME "USS LIBERTY"

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the ~~BRONZE~~ STAR MEDAL to

~~SILVER~~

JOHN DEADERICK SCOTT

ENSIGN U. S. NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

PROPOSED CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS LIBERTY (AGOR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS LIBERTY was attack without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The LIBERTY was subjected to intense incendiary machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Ensign SCOTT, serving as Damage Control Assistant, was in Damage Control Central during the attack, coordinating the setting of material conditions, actions of fire parties and other damage control teams. He remained in D. C. Central on the Starboard side of the ship when notified to "Standby for torpedo attack starboard side". Without hesitation and with complete disregard for his own personal safety immediately following the torpedo attack, he courageously remained in his fume and smoke filled General Quarters station to direct and coordinate the emergency measures taken by the repair parties to extinguish fires, minimize and control flooding of spaces. He personally directed and supervised the emergency plugging and shoring of the ruptured deck in the compartment just aft of his General Quarters station immediately above where the torpedo had exploded. This prompt action prevented progressive flooding and spread of fuel oil on the second deck, thus preserving the water tight integrity of the ship's second deck. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional, and his leadership and initiative throughout the next few days on shoring and damage control was an inspiration to all personnel aboard. ENSIGN SCOTT's initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

~~ENSIGN SCOTT is authorized to wear the COMBAT "V".~~

For the President

signed by

~~SECRETARY OF THE NAVY~~

JOHN S. McCAIN, JR.

ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE

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The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
SILVER STAR MEDAL to

ENSIGN DAVID GEORGE LUCAS


UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS Liberty, while engaged in peaceful operations in international waters, was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The Liberty was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Ensign Lucas, serving as Gunnery Officer arrived on the bridge within moments of the initial strafing attack. A brief period of time before he reached the gun control station a large explosion occurred on the starboard wing of the bridge which incapacitated the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Deck, the sound powered telephone talkers and lookouts, and caused the instantaneous demise of the Intelligence Officer. The need to assist the Commanding Officer was immediately apparent to him. With complete disregard for his own personal safety and though already wounded he continued to fearlessly expose himself to intense, overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to assist the Commanding Officer in maintaining ship control and communications with other vital battle stations throughout the attack. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional for a young junior officer with limited afloat experience and inspired his seniors and subordinates alike in an hour of awesome peril. By his daring actions and loyal devotion to duty in the face of personal risk, Ensign Lucas upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President


JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe

The following information is being furnished in accordance with the provisions of the War Relocation Authority Act, 1942, and the War Relocation Authority Regulations, 1942.


GENERAL INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

and to be set forth in the following:

GENERAL:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected aerial attack on U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-51) in the Bay of Biscay on 4 June 1942. During the early afternoon hours, U.S.S. Liberty, while engaged in successful operations in international waters, was attacked with a combination of jet fighters, aircraft and three rotor toy bombers. The Liberty was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the forward compartment. Several aircraft were shot down and extensive material casualties were incurred. Lieutenant Kiefer, serving as Medical Officer, was in sick bay during the initial phases of the air attack. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, he exposed himself to enemy fire and accurately directed rocket and machine gun fire by going to different stations and compartments to administer first aid to the sick and wounded and to coordinate following rocket hits. He treated men for pain, shock and took emergency measures to control hemorrhage and later performed a chest operation. After the torpedo hit, he organized personnel for repairs and worked in case of an order to abandon ship. He again went to different general quarters stations to administer first aid and maintain through some of the most critical moments for needed supplies. He organized teams of men to search for and instructed lower deck medical personnel in preparation of antibiotics for the wounded. He conducted a major surgical operation, giving the spinal anesthesia (spinal) himself, with the Hospital Corpsman as his assistant and a seaman and three other crew members as circulating assistants. Although wounded himself, Lieutenant Kiefer treated patients in excess of thirty hours without relief or rest. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional in an hour of awesome peril, thereby saving many lives and easing the pain and suffering of many others. His initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President



Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IN MEMORY OF THE MEN WHO GAVE THEIR
LIVES ON JUNE 3, 1965 IN SUPPORT OF
OUR FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS WHILE
SERVING ABOARD THE U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| LTJG J. C. SMITH, USN | DM1 F. BROWN, USN |
| LTJG J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 W. B. ALLENBAUGH, USN |
| LTJG J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 J. L. GORDON, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 A. HESSING, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 D. R. MORGAN, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 P. C. THORNTON, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 T. R. THORNTON, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CT3 J. L. CONVERSE, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | DC1 E. E. PENNEYER, USMC |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 W. J. LENAULT, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 N. C. NYGREN, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 H. D. KILGUS, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 G. R. BLANCHARD, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | ST3 C. L. HARR, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CTSA L. P. HAYDEN, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | CTSA D. W. MARLBOROUGH, USN |
| CTI J. C. SMITH, USN | A. M. BLUE - CIVILIAN |

MAY THEY REST IN PEACE


THE FAMILY OF
CTI J. C. SMITH, JR., USN

17

RAYMOND EUGENE LINN
OPERATIONS CENTER



Chief Communication Technician
Raymond Eugene Linn



DEDICATION
1000 HOURS
15 FEBRUARY 1978

INVOCATION

Father Richard Hite, Pastor
Saint Elizabeth Seton Catholic Community
Franklin, West Virginia

INTRODUCTION OF GUEST SPEAKER

Lieutenant Commander R. A. Cavaluchi
United States Navy
Officer in Charge

DEDICATION

Rear Admiral George Patrick March
United States Navy
Commander, Naval Security Group Command

BENEDICTION

Reverend Dale T. Stanton
Pastor, Calvary Lutheran Church
Brandywine, West Virginia

OPEN HOUSE

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
CHIEF COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN

RAYMOND EUGENE LINN

30 JUNE 1928 - 8 JUNE 1967

A CAREER COMMUNICATOR WHO JOINED THE NAVY

FROM ADAMSVILLE, OHIO, IN SEPTEMBER 1946,

CHIEF LINN GAVE HIS LIFE IN

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) ON 8 JUNE 1967



20 THE NAVY NEWS Friday, March 12, 1976

A History of the Medal of Honor

The Medal of Honor is the highest award for bravery that can be given to any individual in the United States. In giving honor for receipt of the medal, each service has established its own regulations. The deed must be proved by indisputable evidence of at least two eye witnesses; it must be so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes the recipient's gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of bravery; it must involve the risk of his life and it

must be the type of deed which, if he had not done it, would not subject him to any justified criticism.

The idea for the Medal of Honor was born during the Civil War as men fought gallantly and oftentimes displayed great heroism. George Washington originated the Purple Heart in 1792 to honor brave soldiers, sailors and marines. From that time until the Civil War, Certificates of Merit and a "brevet" system of promotions were used as military awards. The first military decoration formally authorized by the American government as a badge of valor was the Medal of Honor for enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps. It was authorized by Congress, and approved by President Abraham Lincoln on Dec. 21, 1861. The medal for the

Army and Voluntary Forces was authorized on July 12, 1862.

The medal is awarded "in the name of the Congress of the United States" and for this reason, it is often called the Congressional Medal of Honor. It is only on rare occasions, however, that Congress awards special Medals of Honor.

An Executive Order, signed by President Theodore Roosevelt on Sept. 20, 1917, directed that ceremonies of award "will always be made with formal and impressive ceremonial" and that the recipient "will, when practicable, be ordered to Washington, D.C., and the presentation will be made by the President, as Commander in Chief, or by such representative as the President may designate."



Man — The only animal that blushes — or needs to.

21


The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious and heroic achievement on 8 June 1967 during an armed attack by foreign aircraft and motor torpedo boats while sailing on an assigned mission in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. Very shortly after noon, LIBERTY was attacked without warning by foreign jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats, and suffered major topside damage from strafing aircraft, serious damage amidships from a direct torpedo hit, and heavy casualties to the crew. The ship's radar, most of the external communications capability, all of the life rafts, and most of the ship's boats were lost due to the severity of the damage inflicted, the resulting fires, and exploding gasoline stored topside. Although two-thirds of the crew were killed or wounded, those surviving displayed outstanding professionalism, undaunted spirit, and extraordinary heroism in their efforts to save their ship. Following the directions of their Commanding Officer, they contained and extinguished the various fires caused by the attacks, and fought to control the flooding caused by the torpedo hit. Medical teams cared for the seriously wounded, expeditiously performing a task both great and difficult. Taking a vital part in the wide variety of actions necessary to save their ship and their shipmates, all surviving crew members were instrumental in returning LIBERTY one thousand miles safely to port. Their exceptional courage, perseverance, and devotion to duty reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.





Virginian-Pilot Photo by Charles Meads

And to Ship's Serviceman 2.C. Henry E. Durzewski Jr. the Bronze Star—"He assumed the duties of damage control plotter in addition to his other duties."

Retiring 'Liberty,' But Mostly Her Men, Honored

BY JAMES HARPE

Virginian-Pilot Staff Writer

PORTSMOUTH—In the bright morning sun with the breeze blowing the cool air and a creosote smell in over the port quarter, the Navy held next-to-last rites for the Liberty here Friday. And men were honored.

Shot and torpedoed full of holes by Israeli forces in the eastern Mediterranean last June, the technical research ship will be decommissioned in two weeks.

Friday she received—her ship's company received—a Presidential Unit Citation.

The ship looked good, dressed for the occasion, with the only hint of the attack in the many patches of new paint on her superstructure, and in the rusty red patch below her waterline forward on the starboard side where the torpedo had gone in.

But it was really a day for the men. In all, 13 received individual medals, pinned on by their former skipper, Capt. William C. McGonagle. Capt. McGonagle wore around his neck the Congressional Medal of Honor, hanging from its light blue ribbon, awarded earlier by the President for his actions in keeping the ship afloat and her men

together through the air and sea attack.

The ceremony was brief, with McGonagle passing down the white lines of his former shipmates, Rear Adm. Ben W. Sarver reading the dry text of the citations behind him.

To Lt. Cmdr. Marice H. Bennett Jr., the Silver Star—"He brought to safety one officer who had been severely burned and temporarily blinded."

To Lt. (j.g.) David G. Lucas, the Silver Star—"He assisted the commanding officer in maintaining ship control and communications throughout the attack."

To Boatswain's Mate J.C.J.C.

Colston the Bronze Star—"He helped move the wounded to safety, and helped extinguish burning gas on the O1 level, port side."

To Shipfitter Metalsmith J.C. Duilio Demori the Bronze Star—"he assisted in evacuating the wounded from the foc'ste and worked in damage control below the waterline."

As McGonagle moved down the line pinning on the medals, members of the respective families moved up and stood behind him to take photographs. Later they moved onto a wide open deck area and drank punch and ate cookies, and talked with

McGonagle. Some had their pictures taken with him.

When he had spoken earlier briefly, McGonagle said, "I take great pride in these officers and these bluejackets." He was speaking not only of those present, but all of the 75 who were wounded and 34 who were killed.



After the reception, when McGonagle moved toward the quarterdeck to depart, someone asked if he would care to talk about the ship and what happened.

"What I have to say, I've already said," McGonagle responded. "If it hadn't been for these men..."

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2
5125

**MERITORIOUS AWARDS
PRESENTATION**



**USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
1000 14 JUNE 1968**

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SILVER STAR MEDAL

LCDR MAURICE H. BENNETT, JR., USN
LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN, USN
LTJG DAVID G. LUCAS, USNR
MMCS RICHARD J. BROOKS, USN

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

YN2 MARTIN D. POWLEDGE, USN
DC2 JAMES C. SMITH, USN
SH2 DONALD HEROLD, USN
SIL2 HENRY F. DURZEWSKI, USN
BM3 "J" "C" COLSTON, JR., USN
SFM3 DUILIO DEMORI, USN
SD3 TROY L. GREEN, USN

NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

MM1 CHARLES M. MARTIN, USN
HM1 THOMAS L. VAN CLEAVE, USN

PROGRAM

BAND SELECTIONS

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Band

INVOCATION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U.S. NAVY

INTRODUCTION OF GUESTS

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U.S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PRESENTATION OF AWARDS

Rear Admiral Ben W. SARVER, U.S. NAVY
Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

REMARKS

Captain William L. MCGONAGLE, U.S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS KILAUEA (AE-26)

BENEDICTION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U.S. NAVY

BAND SELECTIONS

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Band



994 Congress }
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT NO. 15

Internal Security
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Washington, D.C. 20390

**MEDAL OF HONOR
RECIPIENTS
1863-1973**

**"IN THE NAME OF THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES"**

**PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
VANCE HAFKE, Chairman**



OCTOBER 22, 1973

Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973

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Washington, D.C. 20540 - Price \$39.25

"The President may award, and present in the name of Congress, a medal of honor of appropriate design, with ribbons and appurtenances, to a person who, while a member of the [armed forces], distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty—

"(1) while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States;

"(2) while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or

"(3) while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party."

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PREFACE

MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS 1863-1973

The Medal of Honor takes its place in our country's heritage as the highest award for military valor. This recognition by the President in the name of the Congress may only be accorded an individual who "distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty."

The history of this medal, the deeds for which it has been awarded, and the men who have earned it are of great interest to the Nation they have served. For while war is ugly and tragic, there is no question that many individuals who are called to battle display outstanding courage and valor and willingness to make sacrifice. The most supreme acts of heroism are recognized with the Medal of Honor.

Every war produces those who stand out as individuals who expressed their unique abilities through acts of uncommon courage and valor. The men who served in the Armed Forces in the conflict in Southeast Asia are no exception.

Since the formation of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs there has been considerable interest expressed in the recipients of the Medal of Honor. This publication prepared by the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, records the names and deeds of those outstanding and brave individuals who have been recognized for their acts of heroism by our country's highest award: the Medal of Honor. Over 100 servicemen of the Vietnam era and their acts of courage are chronicled in this revised edition of the 1963 report. It adds the names and other appropriate information concerning those individuals who have received the Medal since 1963 and is complete through 1973. In addition, the format of the book has been rearranged and the content has been revised and brought up to date.

This document covers all recipients in all branches of the service—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The term "recipients" covers those awardees of the Medal of Honor who are now recognized as lawful holders of the Medal by order of the President. It does not include the 911 names that were stricken from the Medal of Honor Roll by the Army Medal of Honor Board on February 15, 1917, under authority of section 122 of the Army Reorganization Act of June 2, 1916. The Board ruled that these 911 individuals had not performed acts of sufficient merit to earn the award.

A number of people have assisted in the preparation of this document. The committee wishes to express its thanks to: Ms. Muriel Faddock of the Department of Defense; Ms. Jeannie Barrett, Ms.

Trellis Wright, and Ms. Isabelle Payton, of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; and Eugene V. and Dixie C. McAndrews of Baltimore, Md.

Our Nation is founded upon the proud heritage of individual heroism, large and small, public and private. This publication records the names and deeds of those who have continued this tradition in military service, and who for their gallantry and courage have earned the highest military accolade: the Medal of Honor.

VANCE HARTKE,
*Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs,
U.S. Senate.*

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PART I—HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE MEDAL OF HONOR

The Medal of Honor is the highest military award for bravery that can be given to any individual in the United States of America. Conceived in the early 1800's and first presented in 1863, the medal has a colorful and inspiring history which has culminated in the standards applied today for awarding this respected honor.

In their provisions for judging whether a man is entitled to the Medal of Honor, each of the armed services has set up regulations which permit no margin of doubt or error. The deed of the person must be proved by irrefutable evidence of at least two eyewitnesses; it must be so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes his gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of bravery; it must involve the risk of his life; and it must be the type of deed which, if he had not done it, would not subject him to any justified criticism.

A recommendation for the Army or Air Force Medal must be made within 8 years from the date of the deed upon which it depends. Award of the medal must be made within 8 years after the date of the deed. The recommendation for a Navy Medal of Honor must be made within 8 years and awarded within 5 years.

Apart from the great honor which it conveys, there are certain small privileges which accompany the Medal of Honor. Its recipients can, under certain conditions, obtain free military air transportation. A veteran who has been awarded the medal for combat in any war is eligible for a special pension of \$100 per month, starting from the date he applies for the pension.

The Medal of Honor is presented to its recipients by a high official "in the name of the Congress of the United States." For this reason it is sometimes called the Congressional Medal of Honor.

As a general rule, the Medal of Honor may be awarded for a deed of personal bravery or self-sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty only while the person is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States in action against an enemy of the United States, or while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. However, until passage of Public Law 68-77, the Navy could and did award Medals of Honor for bravery in the line of the naval profession. Such awards recognized bravery in saving life, and deeds of valor performed in submarine rescues, boiler explosions, turret fires, and other types of disaster unique to the naval profession.

Congress has often voted special medals for important victories and other contributions to the Nation, the first having been awarded to

General Washington for his success at Boston in 1776. These are truly Congressional medals to honor individuals and events. On two occasions the Army Medal of Honor has been awarded by separate acts of Congress—the first being the act of December 1927 honoring Captain Charles A. Lindbergh; the second being the act of 21 March 1935 honoring Major General Adolphus W. Greely. In each case, the medal presented was the Army Medal of Honor in use at the time, not a special medal struck for the purpose expressed in each act of Congress. In addition, five members of the Navy—Machinist Floyd Bennett, Commander Richard E. Byrd, Jr., Boatswain's Mate George R. Cholister, Ensign Henry C. Drexler, and Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson, each received the Navy Medal of Honor by acts of Congress. In peace or war, this medal is the highest decoration which can be given in any of the Armed Forces—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard.

"IN THE NAME OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES"

The Medal of Honor was not the idea of any one American. Like most of the ideas which have flowered into institutions and practices in our Nation, it was the result of group thought and action and evolved in response to a need of the times.

In the winter of 1861-62, following the beginning of hostilities in the Civil War, there was much thought in Washington concerning the necessity for recognizing the deeds of the American soldiers, sailors, and marines who were distinguishing themselves in the fighting.

The American Nation, which had given little thought to its Armed Forces during times of peace, now found them to be the focal point of attention. The serviceman, unpublicized and isolated during the preceding years, many of which were spent guarding the national frontiers against Indian raids and the coastline against smugglers, now became a great looming figure in the fight to preserve the Union. Overnight, he ceased to be a man plying some remote and mysterious trade out on the plains of Kansas or North Dakota, or on some ship at sea. He was the boy next door, or indeed the son of the household, sent out to fight for a cause that, in a very real sense, lay close to home.

His contribution was not just in fighting, but in fighting gallantly, sometimes displaying a sheer heroism which, when looked upon by the Nation in whose name it was called forth, quite naturally caused that Nation to seek some means of rewarding him.

But the thought did not stop there. For the first time since the Revolution, Americans realized not only what important citizens its soldiers, sailors, and marines were, but how important they had always been. They realized that the far-off lonely trooper, walking his post on the frontier, or the equally lonely sailor or marine standing watch from the bridge of his ship at sea along the coast, during the years of "peace," had been doing the same essential work as that of the soldier, sailor, or marine of the Civil War—protecting the Nation. And they realized that in doing this work they had very often displayed a little-known and unrecognized heroism which, by its nature, rendered them capable of being killed in action in their posts of duty, just as they could have been during the winter of 1861-62.

In looking back for a precedent for honoring our servicemen, Americans could note the "Certificate of Merit," which had been authorized for soldiers in 1847. Originally this award did not provide a medal, but rather a certificate signed by the President. Later, in 1906, a medal and ribbon bar for wear on the uniform were authorized. Congress also passed a provision that holders of the certificate who were still in the service should have extra pay of \$2 per month. But money alone could not honor the servicemen for his deed.

There also had been a method of honoring officers by means of the "brevet" system of promotions, whereby an officer mentioned for gallantry in dispatches could be granted a "brevet rank" higher than that of his actual rank, and be entitled to wear the insignia which went with the brevet. But this system had fallen victim to a series of political abuses, and by 1861 much of its honor had grown meaningless.

The best precedent for honoring servicemen—and the only precedent in our Nation's history which had involved the award of decorations—went back to 1782. On August 7 of that year, in Newburgh, N. Y., George Washington had created the Purple Heart as a decoration for "singular meritorious action." Three men had received the award in 1782. The records show no others.

The philosophy behind the Purple Heart had been that since his honor is something which no true soldier, sailor or marine likes to talk about, those who sought to honor him should give him a token of that honor which he could wear without words.

A similar philosophy and purpose characterized the American people and the Congress of the United States in 1861. Senator James W. Grimes, of Iowa, took the lead as chairman of the Senate Naval Committee. He introduced a bill to create a Navy medal. It was passed by both Houses of Congress and approved by President Abraham Lincoln on December 21, 1861. It established a Medal of Honor for enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps—the first decoration formally authorized by the American Government to be worn as a badge of honor.

Action on the Army medal was started 3 months later, when, on February 17, 1862, Senator Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, introduced a Senate resolution providing for presentation of "medals of honor" to enlisted men of the Army and Voluntary Forces who "shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldierlike qualities."

President Lincoln's approval made the resolution law on July 12, 1862. It was amended by an act approved on March 2, 1863, which extended its provision to include officers as well as enlisted men, and made the provisions retroactive to the beginning of the Civil War.

This legislation was to stand as the basis upon which the Army Medal of Honor could be awarded until July 9, 1918, when it was superseded by a completely revised statute.

As soon as the Navy Medal of Honor had been authorized, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote to James Pollock, Director of the U.S. Mint at Philadelphia, asking for his assistance in obtaining a design for the medal. Pollock had submitted five designs to the Navy by the time the Army bill had been introduced in the Senate.

When he heard that a similar medal was being considered for the Army, Fellock wrote to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, enclosing one of the designs prepared for the Navy, and pointing out that it would be appropriate for use by the Army as well. Two more designs were submitted to the Navy on May 4, 1862, and on May 9, the Navy approved one of them.

In bas-relief, on the star, the Union held a shield in her right hand against an attacker, who crouched to the left, holding forked-tongued serpents which struck at the shield. In the left hand of the Union was held the fasces, the ancient Roman symbol of unified authority, an ax bound in staves of wood—still a common symbol on many of our 10-cent pieces. The 34 stars which encircle these figures represent the number of States at the time the medal was designed. The reverse of the medal bore a blank for the name of the awardee and the date and place of his death.

On November 17, 1862, the War Department contracted with the firm of William Wilson & Son, Philadelphia, where the Navy medals were being made, for 2,000 of the same type of medals for the Army. The only difference between the Army medal and that of the Navy was that the Army medal, instead of being attached to its ribbon by an anchor, was attached by means of the American Eagle symbol, standing on crossed cannon and cannon balls.

And now the Navy and the Army had a Medal of Honor. Heroic deeds would entitle their authors to the decoration. On March 25, 1863, the first Army medals were awarded "in the name of the Congress of the United States." A few days later, on April 3, 1863, the first Navy medals were awarded sailors and marines.

PROTECTING THE MEDAL

There were some sincere men who believed that the idea of a Medal of Honor would not prove popular with Americans. By the end of the Civil War, and in succeeding years, this view was definitely proved to be incorrect. If anything, the medal was too popular, and the glory which it conferred upon its recipients had the effect of inspiring the human emotion of envy in many breasts. A flood of imitations sprang up following the Civil War, and had the effect of causing Congress, eventually, to take steps to protect the dignity of the original medal.

The abuses and confusion as to who earned and who did not earn the Medal of Honor were stated as early as 1869, when M. H. Beaumont, publisher of a magazine named *The Soldier's Friend*, wrote from New York to the War Department, indicating that he had been repeatedly requested to publish the names of all Medal of Honor recipients.

There are some who are using medals for the purpose of soliciting money," he wrote, "who obtained them surreptitiously."

Adjutant General Townsend agreed that the publication of a list would be a good idea. He pointed out that some of the awardees had never applied for their medals, and that publication might help lead to their delivery. A list was sent to Beaumont on September 29, 1869, and published in *The Soldier's Friend* shortly afterward.

The number of abuses rose—with increased applications by ex-soldiers, who, following the Civil War, began to present claims for the

Medal of Honor without any sound documentation, and after passage of an inordinate amount of time from the dates upon which they alleged to have been earned. These events led to the creation of boards of review, not only of individual acts, but of the whole policy involved in the award to the Medal of Honor.

Public interest in the history of the medal was quickened. Four editions of a book edited by Brig. Gen. Theophilus F. Rodenbaugh, himself a medal recipient, were published in rapid succession. These were entitled "Uncle Sam's Medal of Honor Men" (1886), "The Bravest Five Hundred of '61" (1891), "Fighting for Honor" (1893), and "Sabre and Bayonet" (1897).

President Harry S. Truman, in 1946, ordered the Navy and the Army to publish information on the Medal of Honor recipients in their respective services. In July 1948, the United States Army published the information in a book entitled "The Medal of Honor of the United States Army." In 1949, the Navy published a book entitled "Medal of Honor, The Navy." In compiling this report, the committee is indebted to both of these publications and has used a great deal of material from each.

Interest in perpetuating the ideals of the medal was mounting on the part of medal recipients themselves. On April 23, 1897, the Medal of Honor Legion was organized at Washington as a local society. It was made a national organization during the grand encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic in Boston, on August 14, 1890, and was incorporated by Act of Congress on August 4, 1955. Today it is known as the Legion of Valor of the United States of America. The objectives of the Legion of Valor are—

To promote true fellowship among our members;

To advance the best interests of members of the Armed Forces of the United States and to enhance their prestige and understanding by example and personal activity;

To extend all possible relief to needy members, their widows, and children; and

To stimulate patriotism in the minds of our youth and to engender a national pride and interest in the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Congressional Medal of Honor Society of the United States, was chartered by the 84th Congress under a legislative act signed into law by President Eisenhower on August 14, 1958. The purposes of the society are—

"To form a bond of friendship and comradeship among all holders of the Medal of Honor.

"To protect, uphold, and preserve the dignity and honor of the medal at all times and on all occasions.

"To protect the name of the medal, and individual holders of the medal from exploitation.

"To provide appropriate aid to all persons to whom the medal has been awarded, their widows or their children.

"To serve our country in peace as we did in war.

"To inspire and stimulate our youth to become worthy citizens of our country.

"To foster and perpetuate Americanism.

"The Society will not participate in local or national politics, nor will the Society lend its support for the purpose of obtaining special legislative considerations."

On June 26, 1897, the Secretary of War, R. A. Alger, announced that paragraph 177 of the Army regulations was revised, at the direction of President William McKinley, and that new regulations would henceforth define the award of the Medal of Honor.

The resulting regulations gave the War Department an authoritative and comprehensive system for dealing with award of the medal. Later, an act of Congress, approved on April 24, 1904, made it mandatory that all claims for the medal should be accompanied by official documents describing the deed involved.

At about the same time, the design of the Army Medal of Honor was changed. Initially, the Army and Navy Medal of Honor were the same design, except that the Navy medal was attached to its ribbon by an anchor while the Army medal was attached to its ribbon by means of the American Eagle, standing on crossed cannon and cannon balls.

Late in 1903, Brig. Gen. Horace Porter had several designs prepared by Messrs. Arthur, Bertrand & Berenger, of Paris, and sent them to the Adjutant General, recommending that one of them should be approved by the Medal of Honor Legion, which, at that time, was headed by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles. Following approval of this organization, the Secretary of War approved the new design and a rosette, fixing his signature to the plan on January 28, 1904.

Just 2 weeks earlier, Representative Cordell Hull, of Tennessee, had introduced the act of 1904, providing for the changes in issuance of the medal. It was approved on April 23, 1904, and it authorized "three thousand medals of honor prepared upon a new design."

It remained only to protect the new design from abuse. Early in 1904, a patent was applied for, and on November 22, 1904, Gen. G. L. Gillespie was awarded Patent Serial No. 197,369, covering the new Medal of Honor, specified as U.S. Patent Office Design No. 37,236. The final step for protection of the new design was taken on December 19, 1904, when General Gillespie transferred the Medal of Honor patent "to W. H. Taft and his successor or successors as Secretary of War of the United States of America."

The medal is officially described as made of silver, heavily electroplated in gold. The chief feature of the old medal, the five-pointed star, has been retained, and in its center appears the head of the heroic Minerva, the highest symbol of wisdom and righteous war. Surrounding this central feature in circular form are the words "United States of America" representing nationality. An open laurel wreath, enameled in green, encircles the star, and the oak leaves at the bases of the prongs of the star are likewise enameled in green to give them prominence.

The medal is suspended by a blue silk ribbon, spangled with 13 white stars representing the original States, and this ribbon is attached to an eagle supported upon a horizontal bar. Upon the bar, which is attached to two points of the star, appears the word "Valor," indicative of the distinguished service represented by the medal.

The reverse of the medal is plain so that the name of the recipient may be engraved thereon. On the reverse of the bar are stamped the words "The Congress Ta."

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The patent which had been taken out for protection of the design of the medal expired on November 21, 1916. When this situation was referred to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for an opinion, he stated that this method of protecting the design should be replaced by legislative action forbidding imitations on the part of Congress. A bill for this purpose was recommended by the War Department, passed Congress, and was approved by the President on February 24, 1923. Imitation of the design of the medal was now forbidden by law.

"THE PYRAMID OF HONOR"

The Medal of Honor, which had begun as an idea in the minds of a few people back in 1861, had become a reality occupying the attention and energies of many Americans by 1904. Not all of the extraordinary examples of courage or of service were of the type which would deserve the Medal of Honor. At the same time, all of them deserved recognition, and each degree of valor or service could be looked upon as a step in the direction of that extraordinary service of heroism above and beyond the call of duty which is rewarded, once it has been proved, by the award of the Medal of Honor.

The problem of recognition of these lesser deeds was solved by the creation of a system of decorations arranged in an ascending order, with the lowest awards being the most widely distributed—and the Medal of Honor as the final, supreme award, its distribution limited strictly to the handful of those meeting the most severe tests of heroism. Thus, between the medals most widely distributed—and the Medal of Honor, held by only a few, there came all the other awards of Americans in uniform—arranged as a "pyramid of honor," with the Medal of Honor being the highest point, at the very top.

The legislation of 1904 gave the medal the maximum protection it had yet achieved. Now thought began to turn to the matter of presentation of the medal as a means through which it could be further dignified.

There had been a few scattered instances in which the medal was presented by the President or other high official. The six survivors of the Mitchell Raid through Georgia were awarded the first Army Medals of Honor on March 25, 1863, by Secretary of War Stanton. After presentation of the medals in his office, Secretary Stanton then took the six to the White House for a visit with President Lincoln. A few days later, on April 3, 1863, the first Navy Medals of Honor were awarded to a number of sailors taking part in the attacks on Forts Jackson, Fisher, and St. Philip, on April 24, 1862.

When Ulysses S. Grant became President, he presented the medal in the White House on two separate occasions. While in some cases soldiers and sailors of the Civil War had been given their medals at military formations and mentioned in the orders of the day, there is only one occasion recorded in which this custom was continued after the Civil War.

In some cases, the medals had been sent to awardees by registered mail. And unfortunately, in some cases these medals had been returned to the War and Navy Departments because the recipients who had earned them had been discharged and their whereabouts were unknown.

coordinated glide-bombing and dive-bombing assault upon a Japanese battleship. Undeterred by a fateful approach glide, during which his ship was struck and set afire, he grimly pressed home his attack to an altitude of 500 feet, released his bomb to score a near miss on the stern of his target, then crashed to the sea in flames. His dauntless perseverance and unyielding devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

FLUCKEY, EUGENE BENNETT

Rank and organization: Commander, United States Navy, Commanding U.S.S. *Barb*. *Place and date:* Along coast of China, 19 December 1944 to 15 February 1945. *Entered service at:* Illinois. *Birth:* Washington, D.C. *Citation:* For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of the U.S.S. *Barb* during her 11th war patrol along the east coast of China from 19 December 1944 to 15 February 1945. After sinking a large enemy ammunition ship and damaging additional tonnage during a running 2-hour night battle on 8 January, Commander Fluckey, in an exceptional feat of brilliant deduction and bold tracking on 23 January, located a concentration of more than 30 enemy ships in the lower reaches of Mankwan Chiang (Mankwan Harbor). Fully aware that a safe retirement would necessitate an hour's run at full speed through the uncharted, mined, and rock-obstructed waters, he bravely ordered, "Battle station—torpedoes!" In a daring penetration of the heavy enemy screen, and riding in 5 fathoms of water, he launched the *Barb's* last forward torpedoes at 3,000-yard range. Quickly bringing the ship's stern tubes to bear, he turned loose four more torpedoes into the enemy, obtaining eight direct hits on six of the main targets to explode a large ammunition ship and cause incalculable damage by the resultant flying shells and other pyrotechnics. Clearing the treacherous area at high speed, he brought the *Barb* through to safety and 4 days later sank a large Japanese freighter to complete a record of heroic combat achievement, reflecting the highest credit upon Commander Fluckey, his gallant officers and men, and the United States naval service.

FOSS, JOSEPH JACOB

Rank and organization: Captain, United States Marine Corps Reserve, Marine Fighting Squadron 121, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. *Place and date:* Over Guadalcanal, 9 October to 19 November 1942, 14 and 25 January 1943. *Entered service at:* South Dakota. *Birth:* Sioux Falls, S. Dak. *Citation:* For outstanding heroism and courage above and beyond the call of duty as executive officer of Marine Fighting Squadron 121, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, at Guadalcanal. Engaging in almost daily combat with the enemy from 9 October to 19 November 1942, Captain Foss personally shot down 23 Japanese planes and damaged others so severely that their destruction was extremely probable. In addition, during this period, he successfully led a large number of escort missions, skillfully covering reconnaissance, bombing, and photographic planes as well as surface craft. On 15 January 1943, he added three more enemy planes to his already

disregard for his safety, Second Lieutenant McGinty charged through intense automatic weapons and mortar fire to their position. Finding twenty men wounded and the Medical Corpsman killed, he quickly reloaded ammunition magazines and weapons for the wounded men and directed their fire upon the enemy. Although he was painfully wounded as he moved to care for the disabled men, he continued to shout encouragement to his troops and to direct their fire so effectively that the attacking hordes were beaten off. When the enemy tried to out-flank his position, he killed five of them at point-blank range with his pistol. When they again seemed on the verge of overrunning the small force, he skillfully adjusted artillery and air strikes within fifty yards of his position. This destructive fire power routed the enemy, who left an estimated 500 bodies on the battlefield. Second Lieutenant McGinty's personal heroism, indomitable leadership, selfless devotion to duty, and bold fighting spirit inspired his men to resist the repeated attacks by a fanatical enemy, reflected great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

McGONAGLE, WILLIAM L.

Rank and organization: Captain (then Commander), United States Navy, U.S.S. *Liberty* (AGTR-5). *Place and date:* International waters, Eastern Mediterranean, 8-9 June 1967. *Entered service at:* Thermal, Calif. *Date and place of birth:* November 10, 1925, Wichita, Kans. *Citation:* For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Sailing in international waters, the *Liberty* was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats which inflicted many casualties among the crew and caused extensive damage to the ship. Although severely wounded during the first air attack, Captain (then Commander) McGonagle remained at his battle station on the badly damaged bridge and, with full knowledge of the seriousness of his wounds, subordinated his own welfare to the safety and survival of his command. Steadfastly refusing any treatment which would take him away from his post, he calmly continued to exercise firm command of his ship. Despite continuous exposure to fire, he maneuvered his ship, directed its movements, supervised the control of flooding and fire, and saw to the care of the casualties. Captain McGonagle's extraordinary valor under these conditions inspired the surviving members of the *Liberty's* crew, many of them seriously wounded, to heroic efforts to overcome the battle damage and keep the ship afloat. Subsequent to the attack, although in great pain and weak from the loss of blood, Captain McGonagle remained at his battle station and continued to command his ship for more than seventeen hours. It was only after rendezvous with a United States destroyer that he relinquished personal control of the *Liberty* and permitted himself to be removed from the bridge. Even then, he refused much needed medical attention until convinced that the seriously wounded among his crew had been treated. Captain McGonagle's superb professionalism, courageous fighting spirit, and valiant leadership saved his ship and many lives. His actions sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

McKIBBEN, RAY

Rank and organization: Sergeant, United States Army, Troop B, 7th Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry. *Place and date:* Near Song

Sept. 20, 1905—U.S. President. Executive Order. Formal presentation of Medals of Honor.

"The presentation of a Medal of Honor to an officer or enlisted man in the military service, awarded under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved July 12, 1862, and the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1863, will always be made with formal and impressive ceremonial.

"The recipient will, when practicable, be ordered to Washington, D.C., and the presentation will be made by the President, Commander-in-Chief, or by such representative as the President may designate.

"When not practicable to have the presentation at Washington, the details of time, place, and ceremony will be prescribed by the Chief of Staff for each case.

"On campaign, the presentation will be made by the Division or higher commander.

(Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 20, 1905."

Sept. 23, 1905—U.S. War Department. General Orders, No. 158. (For all supporting documents see National Archives 956103 M.S.O.)

Publishes text of the Executive Order of the President above.

Nov. 3, 1905—U.S. Department of Justice. Opinion and Decision of the Attorneys General. Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States. XXV:529-532.

War Department Order requiring surrender of old medals by applicants for the new is upheld.

Apr. 17, 1916—U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. 39 Stat. 53.

"An Act to establish in the War Department and in the Navy Department, respectively, a roll, designated as 'the Army and Navy medal of honor roll,' and for other purposes.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established in the War Department and Navy Department, respectively, a roll designated as 'the Army and Navy medal of honor roll.' Upon written application made to the Secretary of the proper department, and subject to the conditions and requirements hereinafter contained, the name of each surviving person who has served in the military or naval service of the United States in any war, who has attained or shall attain the age of sixty-five years, and who has been awarded a medal of honor for having in action involving actual conflict with an enemy distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry or intrepidity, at the risk of his life, above, and beyond the call of duty, and who was honorably discharged from service by muster out, resignation, or otherwise, shall be, by the Secretary of the proper department, entered and recorded on said roll. Applications for entry on said roll shall be made in such form and under such regulations as shall be prescribed by the War Department and Navy Department, respectively, and proper blanks and instructions shall be, by the proper Secretary, furnished without charge upon request made by any person claiming the benefits of this Act.

"Sec. 2. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War and of the Secretary of the Navy to carry this Act into effect and to decide whether each applicant, under this Act, in his department is

Sailors Honored on Liberty

Thirteen Navymen were honored on June 14 with individual medals for "heroic achievement" during a surprise attack on the technical research ship USS Liberty, while the ship was operating in international waters in the eastern Mediterranean last year. During the same ceremonies, the ship was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

The action took place on June 8, 1967, when the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli air and naval forces. The government of Israel immediately apologized for the action of its forces and has since agreed to a settlement of more than three billion dollars to be paid to the families of the Americans killed in this action.

Rear Adm. Ben W. Sarver, Atlantic Fleet Force Commander, presented the awards in a ceremony aboard the ship. Medal of Honor winner, Capt. William C. McGonagle, former commanding officer of the USS Liberty, was on hand for the presentation and accepted the Presidential Unit Citation on behalf of the crew.

Twenty-five other awards have been forwarded to Navy commands outside the Tidewater area for presentation to former Liberty crewmen. Five additional awards will be presented posthumously.

The former World War II victory ship was at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth, in preparation for decommissioning June 28.

MEDAL OF HONOR

Captain William C. McGonagle

Capt McGonagle received the Medal of Honor in Washington on May 11, three days before the awards were presented to the ship's crew.



Awards Presented to the Liberty's Crew



For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR-5) in the eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, Liberty, while engaged in peaceful operations in international waters, was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. Liberty was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred.

SILVER STAR MEDAL

Lieutenant Commander Maurice H. Bennet Jr

LCdr Bennett entered a compartment which seconds before was demolished by a torpedo explosion and brought to safety one officer who had been severely burned and temporarily blinded.



SILVER STAR MEDAL

Lieutenant George H. Golden

Three times when told to "stand by for torpedo attack to starboard" Lt Golden relieved the phonetalker and throttlemans on the starboard side of the engine room at the waterline, assumed their duties, and ordered all others away from the area of imminent danger.



SILVER STAR MEDAL

Lieutenant Junior Grade David G. Lucas

Ltjg Lucas assisted the commanding officer in maintaining ship control and communications with other vital battle stations throughout the attack.

SILVER STAR MEDAL

Senior Chief Petty Officer Richard I. Brooks

Chief Petty Officer Brooks proceeded throughout the main machinery space to check machinery and equipment to try to keep the ship going at maximum speed possible. Twice he was knocked from one deck to the other by vibration from rocket fire and torpedo explosion.



BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Second Class James C. Smith

Petty Officer Smith, serving as a member of repair party number three, was personally responsible for controlling a large fire on the O1 level portside. He went on to fight other fires and helped with shoring and plugging operations after the torpedo hit.

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Second Class Donald Herold

Although wounded on the way to his battle station, which was destroyed, Petty Officer Herold evacuated wounded personnel from the forecabin and other unsheltered areas until he was wounded again.



BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Second Class Martin D. Powledge

Petty Officer Powledge, serving as a bridge sound powered telephone talker, aided and comforted the injured, assumed some of their duties, and helped relay vital orders and information during and after the attack.

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Second Class Henry E. Durzewski

Petty Officer Durzewski assumed the duties of damage control plotter in addition to his assigned duties... while rocket and machine gun fire penetrated decks and bulkheads around him.



BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Third Class Dullio Demori

Petty Officer Demori assisted in the evacuation of wounded personnel from the fore-castle and adjacent weather decks...and then went below to direct the maintenance of damage control conditions below the waterline.



BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Third Class 'J' 'C' Colston

Petty Officer Colston helped carry several wounded shipmates to safety and then answered the call for help to extinguish the burning gasoline cans on the O1 level portside.



BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Petty Officer Third Class Troy L. Green

Petty Officer Green, serving as an assistant to the corpsman in the forward battle dressing station, rendered invaluable assistance by alleviating suffering and minimizing casualties by carrying wounded personnel to the battle station for treatment.



NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

Petty Officer First Class Thomas L. Van Cleave

Petty Officer Van Cleave, serving as medical corpsman in charge of the main battle dressing station, administered initial care, stopped bleeding, splinted fractures, cared for burned men, administered medications to relieve pain, started transfusions, and assisted with the major surgical procedures.



NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

Petty Officer First Class Charles M. Martin

When the first attack occurred, Petty Officer Martin started all standby equipment in the engine room to ensure the ship was prepared for any speed requested from the bridge. He also made essential emergency repairs to the fire main pump.





ONE HERO TO ANOTHER—CAPT William L. McGonagle, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroism while commanding USS Liberty (ATCR 5), during the attack of 8 Jun. 1967, presents the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" to Yeoman 3rd Class Virgil L. Brownfield, USNR, for his bravery as the captain's bridge talker during the attack. The ceremony took place at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

designating him as both Officer in Charge of the U.S. Naval Reserve Training Facility, Anchorage, and Commanding Officer of Naval Reserve Surface Division 17-1.

The ceremony was held in the Anchorage National Guard Armory, where the Naval Reservists will share the classrooms and drill hall. The Training Facility started operation with a staff of two petty officers on full-time active duty. Original members of the Surface Division included 12 officers and 20 enlisted Reservists.

Before the new units were established Naval Reserve activity in Alaska was restricted to a Composite Company program, which was discontinued.

Welcome Aboard

The State of Alaska now has a Naval Reserve Training Facility and a Naval Reserve Surface Division of its own.

The two additions to the Naval Reserve program were simultaneously established at Anchorage in a ceremony attended by city, state and federal dignitaries. Rear Admiral Donald M. White, Commandant of the 17th Naval District, officially activated the new organizations, and Commander Lloyd W. Olson, USNR, then read the orders

Grosse Ile Group Finds Cool AcDuTra

Seventeen Naval Reservists from Grosse Ile, Mich., beat the heat this summer with a trip to the edge of the Arctic Circle. They were assigned to AcDuTra at the Keflavik, Iceland, NATO Base.

Besides enjoying the 55-degree

NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM THE SHIP

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK 09501

PLAN OF THE DAY

Monday, 25 September 1967

CDO: ENS LUCAS
DUTY OFFICER: ENS KEKICH

DUTY SECT: 1
DUTY DEPT: OPS
DUTY MAA: HNI VAN CLEAVE

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1530 - Liberty commences for sections two, three and four to expire on board 0730 Tuesday 26 September 1967.

NOTES

1. Some Purple Heart Awards have been received. Not all of them are in yet as they are being sent as soon as they are ready. This coming Friday, after personnel inspection, the medals that have been received will be presented by the Commanding Officer. All those receiving a medal are invited to have their relatives or friends attend if they so desire. Advise your department head of any guest. To date Purple Heart medals have been received for the following personnel and will be awarded Friday 29 SEP:

E-36
D-6
S-18
O-24
R-2
48

E ANDERSON, R.F., FA	E THORN, MR2	E STOUT, BT3	E NEESE, SF1
E GUSTON, SA	E BROWN, F.J., BT3	E SIMPSON, FN	E MILLER, FN
E LARNAHAN, SN	E BOOTH, FN	E SCHALEY, EN3	E MARAIO, FN
E BROOKS, MMC	E ASHWORTH, FN	E ROSSI, SN	E MCFARLAND, CT3
E BISHOP, FN	E SWEDIG, CS2	E REILLY, SA	E MCCALLISTER, SN
E BRUMMETT,	E VICKERS, SN	E RANDALL, IC1	E ENS LUCAS
E BOTCHER, FN	E VANDERSCHUUR, ETRSH	E RAMMELSBURG, BT3	E LOSASSO, FN
E BOSTIC, FA	E VAN CLEAVE, HMI	E SQUINTERO, SN	E LEHMAN, SK3
E BYRD, SA	E VALDEZ, SK2	E SPURCELL, SK3	E KRINER, SN
E CORNISH, FN	E TRIPLETT, FN	E SPATTEN, CS3	E KRASNANAKY, FN
E KISIEL, SN	E KELLY, OT3	E KELLY, FA	E HRANKOWSKI, FN
E HEANEY, SN	E GILSON, RD3	E DURZEWSKI, SH2	E BROWNFIELD, YN3

2. Personnel inspection : 1000 Friday, 29 SEP 67. Uniform: Full Dress Blues

3. The following personnel are to report to sick bay at 0900 for verification of health records:

AISHE, B.G.	BOOTH, J.E.	COCHAVITCH, C.J.	HAZEN, D.C.	JONES, L.S.
AINETTI, A.F.	BOSTIC, C.	CORNISH, G.R.	HEANEY, W.D.	KERNER, F.W.
BAGAN, R.N.	BROWN, F.J.	EASTON, A.W.	HOLDEN, G.J.	KISIEL, D.J.
BLANTON, D.M.	BUNDY, D.W.	FISHER, J.W.	HURLEY, R.L.	LEMOND, T.W.
CASPER, W.E.	BUXTON, R.L.	GREEN, T.M.	HRANKOWSKI, J.M.	LITTLE, R.E.

LUCAS, R.W.
MARAIO, J. A.
MERCADO, R.N.
MUMFORD, R.G.
PAHIDES, S.
POWLEDGE, H.D.
RAHEY, D.
RANDALL, J.R.
SCHALEY, K.M.
SIBLEY, R.E.
SMITH, W.L.
TRACY, S.B.
WATAN, P.P.
WRIGHT, S.C.

MARTIN, C.M.
MEHAFFIE, W.D.
MOULIN, T.R.
NEWTON, R.L.
PASCALE, A.M.
PURCELL, H.L.
RAMMELSBURG, E.A.
SARNO, H.S.
SHAFFER, M.B.
SMITH, J.C.
THOMEN, R.
TRIPLETT, J.L.
WEARY, A.E.
STURMAN, R.S.

D. Lee
D.C. LEE, LTJG, USNR
COMMAND DUTY OFFICER

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



Staff Photo by S. H. King

LIBERTY EXEC REMEMBERED — A posthumous Navy Cross was awarded today to Lt. Cmdr. Philip M. Armstrong Jr., killed last year while serving as executive officer aboard the research ship USS Liberty. Back late attacked the Liberty in the Mediterranean. Looking at the medal are Armstrong's widow and children, and Rear Adm. Ben W. Sarver, who made the presentation. Sarver commands Service Force Atlantic at the Norfolk Naval Base.

Captain of 'Liberty' To Be Decorated

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Medal of Honor will be awarded to the Navy officer who commanded the communications ship Liberty when it was attacked by Israel one year ago, the Pentagon announced Monday. Capt. William L. McGonagle will receive the award in ceremonies today at the Washington Naval Yard.

Douglas Gets Cardiac

'Pacemaker'

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, a doughty explorer and mountain climber at age 64, was undergoing a new adventure Monday—learning to adjust to an implanted cardiac device which makes his heart beat faster.

A spokesman who disclosed Douglas had been equipped with the cardiac "pacemaker" at Walter Reed Army Medical Center June 4 reported the device was doing well.

His secretary summed it up this way: "He looks better sick than the rest of us look well." He may leave the hospital to recuperate at home sometime Sunday.

Navy Secretary Paul R. Ignatius will make the presentation.

The Pentagon said McGonagle is being cited "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the

risk of life, above and beyond the call of duty" in connection with the June 8, 1967, attack.

McGonagle, then a commander who has since been promoted, was directing the Liberty in sensitive operations off the Sinai coast when the communication ship was strafed and torpedoed by Israeli planes and ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

The attack, which Israel said later occurred by mistake, left 34 Liberty crewmen dead and 75 wounded. The incident came at the height of the brief Israeli-Arab war.

McGonagle, though seriously wounded, was credited with helping keep the Liberty afloat until it could reach an island port in the Mediterranean.

The Liberty was so heavily



Capt. McGonagle

damaged that it has been placed on the inactive list.

The Liberty at that time was described as a technical research ship but officials have since acknowledged that it was engaged in a type of electronic eavesdropping, monitoring radio communications in the war between Israel and Egypt.

The Pentagon said McGonagle has been named prospective commanding officer of the ammunition ship Kilaura, which is under construction at Quincy, Mass.

McGonagle and his family lived at 204 Oak Grove Road, Norfolk, Va. when he was stationed there where the Liberty was homeported. He was transferred last year to Quincy.

18 Pueblo Crewmen to Get Medals

None for Capt. Bucher; Navy Acts After 4 Years

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Navy, after weighing the recommendations for four years, yesterday awarded medals for bravery to 18 crew members of the spy ship Pueblo. Capt. Lloyd M. Bucher, skipper of the ship and now retired, was not among those decorated.

The Pueblo was captured by North Korean gunboats off the port of Wonsan on Jan. 23, 1968, and 83 of the 88 crew members were held captive for 11 months.

Fireman Duane Hodges of Creswell, Ore., was killed by a shellfire during the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo. He was one of two men on the Pueblo awarded the Silver Star for bravery.

The other is Lt. Frederick C. Schumacher Jr., formerly communications officer of the ship and now assistant vice president of the family's Hickey-Mitchell insurance firm in St. Louis.

A Pentagon press release said that Navy Secretary John W. Warner "personally reviewed" the record of the Pueblo capture before ruling on Bucher's recommendations for awards to his men.

The Navy is still weighing other recommendations for awards for the way the Pueblo men held up in captivity.

The citation that goes with Schumacher's Silver Star states that he led his men in the "destruction of all classified materials under his purview. Through his inspiring

leadership, courage and dedication in the face of hostile fire, he reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Reached in St. Louis, Schumacher said Bucher had submitted the recommendations for commendations in early 1969 and again in 1970. "They were way overdue—particularly for their performance on the day of capture since those actions had no bearing on American prisoners in Vietnam."

Schumacher said many of the Pueblo crewmen have been weighed down by guilt since the ship's capture because the Navy, by failing to act on recommendations about their performance, kept them in limbo.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedhelm said yesterday that the long delay in acting on the skipper's recommendations stemmed from the concern about jeopardizing Americans held captive in North Vietnam.

Every member of the Pueblo crew while in captivity signed propaganda statements under torture. So did many Americans held captive in Vietnam. Schumacher said those experiences dictate a review of the Code of Conduct for American servicemen, both its language and the way it is taught during training.

If Warner said the next

step, and decorates Pueblo men for their actions in captivity despite their forced signing of propaganda statements, he will signal that the Code of Conduct guidelines are not regarded as iron rules by the top Navy leadership.

One psychological burden of the code was demonstrated during the Navy's Court of Inquiry in 1969 as crewman after crewman broke down on the witness stand when the admirals of the court asked them why they could not live up to the code.

Besides the silver stars awarded to Hodges and Schumacher, the Navy yesterday gave these other medals to the following Pueblo men:

Bronze star, Ensign Timothy L. Harris, Communications

Technician Peter M. Langenberg and Signalman Wendell G. Leach; Navy commendation medal, Chief Gunner H. Lacy, Hospitalman Herman P. Baldridge, Boatswain's Mate Ronald L. Berens, Radioman Charles H. Crandell and Lee R. Hayes, Fireman Steven E. Woelk; Navy achievement medal, Enginemen R. J. Blansett and Monroe O. Goldman, Quartermaster Charles B. Law, Jr., Photographer Lawrence W. Mack, Electronics Technician Clifford C. Nolte, Commissaryman Ralph E. Reed and Communications Technician Angelo S. Strano.

Girl on Beltway Killed by Car

A 15-year-old Bethesda girl was struck by a car and killed yesterday while she was trying to run across the Capital Beltway near the Old Georgetown Road exit in Montgomery County, Maryland. State Police reported.

Police said Laura Kay Johnson, of 9501 Kingsley Ave., was pronounced dead on arrival at Suburban Hospital shortly after the 3:51 p.m. accident.

Miss Johnson was struck by a car driven by Hans H. Runow, 44, of 6810 Jerome St., Springfield, Va., when she tried to run across the westbound lanes of the highway, police said. No charges have been placed in connection with the accident, police said.

Escapee Gets 5 Years Extra

One of eight inmates who escaped last October from the D.C. jail was sentenced yesterday to the maximum term of five years on an escape charge.

The inmate, Thomas C. Reed, had pleaded guilty in July before U.S. District Judge John H. Pratt.

Also sentenced yesterday was Linda Smith, who had pleaded guilty to a charge of accessory after the fact. She received an indeterminate sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, Sept. 8, 1973

B 7

D.C. Officer Is Injured In Accident

An off-duty metropolitan police sergeant was seriously injured last night when a rear tire on his jeep blew out, causing the vehicle to overturn in the median strip of Indian Head Highway in Oxon Hill, Prince George's County, police reported.

County police said Sgt. Mitchell Charles Dudley, 35, was driving to his home in Charles County after work at 8:14 p.m. when the tire blew out, causing the jeep to skid for about 50 feet before overturning near the intersection of Indian Head Highway and Livingston Road.

A U.S. Park Police helicopter flew Dudley, who is assigned to the traffic division to the shock and trauma unit at University Hospital in Baltimore. He was admitted in serious condition with a back injury, police said.

Western and Pilots Approve 2-Year Pact

SEATTLE, Sept. 7 (AP)—

Agreement on a new two-year contract for Western Airlines pilots was reached minutes before a midnight strike deadline, the Airline Pilots Association announced early today.

The association's local vice president, Dick Welsh, said terms of the agreement were being withheld until the final language could be worked out.



Virginian-Pilot Photo by S. H. Ringo

Honors for a 'Liberty' Hero

Ret. Adm. Ben W. Sarver, commander of the Atlantic Fleet Service Force, presents the Navy Cross and the Purple Heart won by Lt. Cmdr. Philip M. Armstrong Jr., executive officer of the technical research ship Liberty, who died of wounds received when the ship was attacked June 8, 1967, by Israeli

air and naval forces. Mrs. Armstrong accepts the medals for her husband. Armstrong was fatally wounded after the first strike on the Liberty as he directed a fire-fighting party. Watching the ceremony in the background are one of Mrs. Armstrong's five children and her mother and father.

JUNE 20, 1967

NAVY TIMES

Honor Medal Awarded To Skipper of Liberty

WASHINGTON — The Medal of Honor was presented to the commanding officer of the intelligence ship Liberty, which was attacked by Israeli planes and torpedo boats on June 8, 1967.

Naval Secretary Paul S. Nitze made the presentation of the nation's highest award for valor to Capt. William L. McGonagle, 44, in ceremonies at the Washington Navy Yard.

McGonagle was credited with keeping his heavily damaged ship under control for 17 hours despite his own serious wounds.

The citation said that he displayed "exceptional gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his above and beyond the call of duty."

Ignatius said that McGonagle "was responsible for saving the lives of many of his crew and for saving the ship."

McGonagle, then a commander, and since promoted to captain, was directing the Liberty in sensitive operations off the coast of the Mediterranean when the Liberty was struck and damaged.

The attack came at the height

of the brief Arab-Israeli war and left 84 Liberty crewmen dead and 75 wounded. Israeli later said the attack occurred by mistake.

The Liberty since has been in

activated. McGonagle's next duty is that of prospective commanding officer of the ammunition ship Kilauea, under construction at Quincy, Mass.

The Citation

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer, USS Liberty (AGTR-5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8-9 June 1967. Sailing in international waters, the Liberty was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and nuclear torpedo boats which inflicted many casualties among the crew and caused extreme damage to the ship. Although severely wounded during the first air attack, Captain (then Commander) McGonagle remained at his battle station on the badly damaged bridge and, with full knowledge of the seriousness of his wounds, subordinated his own welfare to the safety and survival of his command.

Refusing any treatment which would take him away from his post, he calmly continued to exercise firm command of his ship. In spite of continuous exposure to fire, he maneuvered his ship, directed its defense, supervised the control of flooding and fire, and gave to the care of the casualties. Captain McGonagle's extraordinary valor under these conditions inspired the surviving members of the Liberty's crew, many of them seriously wounded, to heroic efforts to overcome the battle damage and keep the ship afloat.

Subsequent to the attack, although in great pain and weak from loss of blood, Captain McGonagle remained at his battle station and continued to man his ship for more than seventeen hours. It was only after rendezvous with a United States destroyer that he relinquished personal control of the Liberty and permitted himself to be removed from the bridge. Even then, he refused much needed medical attention until convinced that the seriously wounded among his crew had been treated. Captain McGonagle's superb professionalism, courageous fighting spirit, and valiant leadership saved his ship and many lives. His actions sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service.



LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Liberty Wins

James M. Felt Papers

2
sides

MERITORIOUS AWARDS PRESENTATION



USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
1000 14 JUNE 1968

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SILVER STAR MEDAL

LCDR MAURICE H. BENNETT, JR., USN
LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN, USN
LTJG DAVID G. LUCAS, USNR
MNCS RICHARD J. BROOKS, USN

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

YN2 MARTIN D. POWLEDGE, USN
DC2 JAMES C. SMITH, USN
SH2 DONALD HEROLD, USN
SHL2 HENRY E. DURZEWSKI, USN
BM3 "J" "C" COLSTON, JR., USN
SFM3 DUILIO DEMORI, USN
SD3 TROY L. GREEN, USN

NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

MM1 CHARLES M. MARTIN, USN
HM1 THOMAS L. VAN CLEAVE, USN

PROGRAM

BAND SELECTIONS

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Band

INVOCATION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U.S. NAVY

INTRODUCTION OF GUESTS

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U.S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PRESENTATION OF AWARDS

Rear Admiral Ben W. SARVER, U.S. NAVY
Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

REMARKS

Captain William L. MCGONAGLE, U.S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS KILAUEA (AE-26)

BENEDICTION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U.S. NAVY

BAND SELECTIONS

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Band



Schedule of Events
for
Congressional Medal of Honor
Awardee
Captain William E. McGonagle
United States Navy
and Family



MONDAY, 10 JUNE
through
WEDNESDAY, 12 JUNE 1968

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
for
CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR AWARDEE
CAPTAIN WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE
United States Navy
and FAMILY

Monday, 10 June through Wednesday, 12 June 1968

Monday 10 June 1968

- 1228 Arrive Washington National Airport on American Airlines Flight Number 475 from Boston, Massachusetts (meet escort officer and liaison officer).
- 1300 Arrive at quarters in Shoreham Hotel.
- 1400 Depart Shoreham Hotel for tour of:
Hall of Heroes: Pentagon
Arlington National Cemetery: visit gravesites of LCDR Armstrong and LT Pierce—the John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy gravesites—Tomb of The Unknown Soldier and observe the changing of the guard at 1500.
- 1530 Depart Arlington National Cemetery for Mount Vernon via Old Town Alexandria.
- 1600 Arrive Mount Vernon.
- 1700 Depart Mount Vernon for Shoreham Hotel.
- 2000 Dinner on the Terrace at Shoreham Hotel with entire family and shipmates. (Dinner show will be the Doodletown Pipers at 2200.)
- 2300 Secure.


Tuesday 11 June 1968

- 0730 Breakfast in quarters at Shoreham Hotel.
- 0900 Depart Shoreham Hotel for tour of The White House.
- 0930 Arrive at the east gate of The White House.
- 1115 Arrive at Tingey House in the Washington Navy Yard—Home of RADM Elliott Loughlin, USN, Commandant, Naval District Washington. Meet the Hon. Paul R. Ignatius, Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chief of Naval Operations.
- 1120 Family departs Tingey House for ceremony seating.

- 1128 Official party departs Tingey House.
- 1130 Official party arrives at quarterdeck, Leutze Park. The Secretary of the Navy receives full arrival honors. Official presentation of The Congressional Medal of Honor to Captain William L. McGonagle, USN by The Secretary of the Navy
Pass in Review Ceremony.
Secure from Leutze Park.
- 1230 Arrive in Congressman John V. Tunney's chambers. Lunch in the House Dining Room.
- 1330 Visit gallery of the United States House of Representatives—observation from the floor by the Hon. John V. Tunney.
- 1430 Depart Capitol for tour of Lincoln Memorial—Jefferson Memorial—Washington Monument and Smithsonian Institution.
- 1600 Arrive at Shoreham Hotel.
- 1715 Depart Shoreham Hotel.
- 1730 Dinner at Trader Vic's, Statler Hilton Hotel
- 1930 Arrive at D. C. Stadium for baseball game between the Washington Senators and the Baltimore Orioles. (Armed Forces night is featured.)
- 2300 Secure.

Wednesday, 12 June 1968

- 0730 Breakfast in quarters at Shoreham Hotel.
- 0900 Depart Shoreham Hotel for U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.
- 1000 Arrive at Naval Academy. Visit the gravesite of LT Toth and tour the Academy.
- 1200 Luncheon at The Harbor House.
- 1330 Depart The Harbor House for Shoreham Hotel via motor tour of Annapolis.
- 1500 Check out and depart Shoreham Hotel for Washington Navy Yard.
- 1530 Farewell call on RADM Loughlin (a press conference, if required, will be conducted at this time).
- 1630 Visit Naval Historical Display Center (Museum) and Navy Combat Art Gallery.
- 1745 Depart Washington Navy Yard for National Airport.
- 1815 Arrive at American Airlines, National Airport, to board Flight Number 548 for Boston, Massachusetts.
- 1830 Depart Washington, D. C. for further assignments.



Criteria for Award

The Medal of Honor, established by Joint Resolution of Congress 12 July 1862 (amended by Act of 9 July 1918 and Act of 25 July 1963) is awarded in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Armed Forces, distinguishes himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against any enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his comrades and must have involved risk of life. Incontestable proof of the performance of service is exacted and each recommendation for a ward of this decoration is considered on the standard of extraordinary merit. Eligibility is limited to members of the Armed Forces of the United States in active Federal military service.

PRIMARY CONTACTS FOR SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Arrival: Monday, 10 June
 Washington National Airport (F'A)
 Operations/Safety - Mr. Castner 557-2506

American Airlines
 Special Representative - Mr. Fardwell EX. 32345

Shoreham Hotel Switchboard
 Room Nos. AD. 40700

Arlington National Cemetery
 Mr. Metzler 525-2700
 Ext. 64215

Congressman John V. Tunney
 Mr. David Tunno
 Suite 1324 Longworth Building 225-2305

White House Tour Liaison
 Col. Robinson (Government Code 145) 456-1414
 Ext. 2153

Smithsonian Institution
 Col. Callen 628-1910
 Ext. 4636

Mount Vernon
 Mr. Wall 783-2000

Naval Academy: Public Affairs (Area Code 301) 268-7711
 (Govt. Code 1229) Ext. 413

Harbor House, Annapolis, Md. (Area Code 301) 268-0771

Trader Vic's, Statler Hilton Hotel
 Mr. Woodrow Chan DI. 7-7100

D.C. Stadium
 Mr. Joe Burke 544-1900
 LI. 6-2880

Departure: Wednesday, 12 June
 Washington National Airport (FAA)
 Operations/Safety - Mr. Robinson 557-2506

American Airlines
 Special Representative - Mr. George EX. 32345

Briefing Guide for Escort Officers

concerning

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

for


CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR
Awardee

CAPTAIN WILLIAM M. McGONAGLE
United States Navy

Monday 10 June
through
Wednesday 12 June 1968

Project Officer for Chief of Naval Operations Lieutenant Commander Lyle Hageman	Oxford 53530
Liaison Officers:	
Commander Larry Jenkins Bureau of Naval Personnel	Oxford 41770
Commander Jack Dawson Naval District Washington, D.C.	Oxford 32354 Oxford 32678 (Home: 260-4095)
Staff Duty Officer Naval District Washington, D.C.	Oxford 32607
Transportation Coordinator Naval District Washington, D.C. Operations Office	Oxford 32607
Armed Forces Police	Oxford 32393

The Congressional Medal of Honor



Presentation by
The Honorable Paul H. Ignatius
Secretary of the Navy
to
Captain William Loren McConry
United States Navy

★
ADMIRAL LEUTZE PARK
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
HEADQUARTERS FOR THE COMMANDANT
NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON

★
1130 Tuesday, 11 June 1968



CAPTAIN WILLIAM LOREN MCGONAGLE
UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain William L. McGonagle was born in Wichita, Kansas, on November 19, 1925. He attended high school in Coachella Valley, California; he also attended the University of Redlands and the University of Southern California. He received his commission as an Ensign in the U. S. Naval Reserve upon graduating from the University of Southern California in June 1947.

During the late 1940's and early 1950's he served at sea on board the destroyer USS FRANK SNODGRASS, the minesweeper USS KITE, the heavy cruiser USS ROCHESTER, and at the U. S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany, where he was in charge of minesweepers clearing the Baltic and North Seas of mines placed during World War II.

From 1957 to 1959 he commanded the fleet tug USS MATACO. In July 1961, after an assignment as an NROTC Instructor at the University of Idaho, he took command of the submarine rescue vessel USS RECLAIMER.

Following a tour of duty on the staff of the Commander, Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, he assumed command of the intelligence ship USS LIBERTY in April 1960. He was in command of the LIBERTY when she was attacked and damaged by jet aircraft and torpedo boats off the Sinai Peninsula on June 8, 1967. At present, Captain McGonagle is the prospective Commanding Officer of the ammunition ship KILAUEA, now under construction.

Captain McGonagle is married to the former Emma Jean Stoneham of Glendale, California. They have three children: Cindy Lou, Sandra Sue and William Loren McGonagle, Jr. Their official home address is Indio, California.

OFFICIAL PARTY

THE HONORABLE PAUL R. IGNATIUS
Secretary of the Navy

ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORE
Chief of Naval Operations

REAR ADMIRAL ELLIOTT LOUGHLIN
Commandant, Naval District Washington

CAPTAIN WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE
Recipient of The Congressional Medal of Honor

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1115 All guests please be seated.

1130 Official Party arrives.

Rendering of Arrival Honors to the
Secretary of the Navy.

The National Anthem.

Remarks by the Secretary of the Navy.

Reading of the Citation by the
Chief of Naval Operations.

Presentation of the Congressional Medal of Honor
by the Secretary of the Navy
to Captain William L. McGonagle
United States Navy.

Pass in Review.

HEROES and LEADERS


Medal of Honor for Skipper of USS LIBERTY

USS LIBERTY was in trouble and the fight to save her in the Eastern Mediterranean during the afternoon and night of 8 Jun 1967 was underway.

The technical research ship listed nine degrees to starboard as water poured into compartments through a 39-foot hole in her hull. Ammunition exploded at her .50-caliber machine gun mounts. Fire spread until her decks became so hot they buckled.

Thirty-four of Liberty's crewmembers lay dead. Another 75, including her CO, CDR (now CAPT) William L. McGonagle, were wounded.

CDR McGonagle, who had been hit by shrapnel in the right leg, began to realize the seriousness of his wounds when blood had saturated his shoes and he felt that he was losing consciousness. He lay on the deck, flat on his back, raised his bleeding leg and rested it on his bridge chair. He dictated a message to the Sixth Fleet. He saw that the ensign had been shot away and ordered a signalman to hoist another flag at the yardarm. He gave orders for repair and firefighting parties.



The captain's blood-soaked pants leg was cut away from his wound. A tourniquet stopped the flow of blood, but he was so weak he could not get up off the deck.

Liberty's gyrocompass was disabled and her magnetic compass inaccessible. Lying on his back, CDR McGonagle began to calculate in his head the probable course he should order to avoid running aground on nearby shoals.

Power which controlled the rudder had been lost. Using a telephone, he relayed maneuvering instructions to men below decks who physically pushed the heavy rudder in the direction ordered. He used the sun to verify his cerebral navigation, and controlled the ship by looking aft at the wake to determine which way his men should push the rudder.

AFTER AN HOUR and a half on his back, CDR McGonagle felt he had regained enough strength to stand and conn the ship from the wing and pilothouse. He thought that his presence on the bridge might lessen the shock the rest of the crew had received.

He was right. For every hand needed in the variety of emergency situations on board, 10 men volunteered. Men who lay wounded themselves offered their blood for transfusion to others.

CDR McGonagle refused to leave the bridge, even though he was in great pain and had lost much blood.

Finally, after 17 hours, Liberty rendezvoused with a U.S. destroyer

Captain William L. McGonagle, 42, entered the Navy as an enlisted Reservist in January 1944. He became a midshipman in September 1946, and received his commission in September 1947.

He became CO of USS Liberty (ATCR 5) in April 1966, and has been selected to command the new ammunition ship Kilauoa (AE 28). He was promoted to captain last October. CAPT McGonagle and his wife and three children reside in Cohasset, Mass.

In addition to the Medal of Honor, CAPT McGonagle holds 12 medals and awards which include the Presidential Unit Citation and the Purple Heart. The PUC, highest of unit awards, was presented



to Liberty at Norfolk last June. The ship and her crew were cited for heroic achievement at a time two-thirds of the men had been killed or wounded. The citation continued:

"Those surviving displayed outstanding professionalism, undaunted spirit, and extraordinary heroism in their efforts to save the ship.

"Following the directions of their commanding officer, they contained and extinguished fires and fought to control flooding.

"Taking a vital part in the variety of actions necessary to save their ship and their shipmates, all surviving crewmembers were instrumental in returning Liberty 1000 miles safely to port."

CDR McGonagle relinquished control of his ship. He still refused medical attention until convinced the more seriously wounded had been treated.

CDR McGonagle's command of his ship had added a new chapter to the history of leadership and valor at sea. On 11 Jun 1968, the Secretary of the Navy presented CDR McGonagle with the Medal of Honor. "A brave man may fall, but he cannot yield," SecNav said.

LT Quinn
1176, RANKS

PRIMARY CONTACTS FOR SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Arrival: Monday, 10 June
Washington National Airport (FAA)
Operations/Safety - Mr. Castner 557-2505

American Airlines
Special Representative - Mr. Fardwell EX.32345

Shoreham Hotel Switchboard AD. 40700
Room Nos.

Arlington National Cemetery 525-2700
Mr. Metzler Ext. 64215

Congressman John V. Tunney
Mr. David Tunno
Suite 1324 Longworth Building 225-2305

White House Tour Liaison 456-1414
Col. Robinson (Government Code 145) Ext. 2153

Smithsonian Institution 628-1810
Col. Callen Ext. 5636

Mount Vernon 780-2000
Mr. Wall

Naval Academy: Public Affairs (Area Code 301) 268-7711
(Govt. Code 1229) Ext. 413
Harbour House, Annapolis, Md. (Area Code 301) 268-0771

Trader Vic's, Statler Hilton Hotel DI. 7-7100
Mr. Woodrow Chan

D.C. Stadium: 544-1900
Mr. Joe Burke LI. 6-2880

Departure: Wednesday, 12 June
Washington National Airport (FAA)
Operations/Safety - Mr. Robinson 557-2506

American Airlines
Special Representative - Mr. George EX.32345

YNC SUITER OX-42904

Briefing Guide for Escort Officers

concerning

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

for

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR
Awardee

CAPTAIN WILLIAM A. MCGONAGLE
United States Navy

Monday 10 June
through
Wednesday 12 June 1968

Project Officer for Chief of Naval Operations
Lieutenant Commander Lyle Hageman Oxford 53530

Liaison Officers:
Commander Larry Jenkins
Bureau of Naval Personnel Oxford 41770

Commander Jack Dawson Oxford 32354
Naval District Washington, D.C. Oxford 32678
(Home: 360-4695)

Staff Duty Officer
Naval District Washington, D.C. Oxford 32607

Transportation Coordinator
Naval District Washington, D.C.
Operations Office Oxford 32607

Armed Forces Police Oxford 32393

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE
FPO NEW YORK 0861X 09510

FF1-3
1650
Ser
/11
26 FEB 1968

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe
To: Ensign David G. LUCAS, USN
Via: Chief of Naval Personnel

Subj: Award of the Silver Star Medal

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 1650.28
(b) CNO Message 031920Z Aug 1967

Encl: (1) Award Citation
(2) Silver Star Medal

1. In accordance with the authority delegated by references (a) and (b), Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe takes pleasure in awarding you the Silver Star Medal.

2. Enclosed is the citation and Silver Star Medal in recognition of your heroic achievement while serving on board USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5).

R. J. [Signature]

Assistant Chief of Staff
Administration

Copy to:
SECNAV (2 copies of encl (1))
CO, USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5)

Pers-G25-MB/ik

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CINCPACFOR 1tr FF1-3 1650 Ser: 537/11 of
26 Feb 1968

From: Chief of Naval Personnel
To: ENS David G. LUCAS, USN
Via: COMSERVLANT

Subj: Award of the Silver Star Medal

1. Delivered with congratulations.

M. H. BARNES
By direction

Code 00:rac
1650
Ser 731


JUN 1968

SECOND ENDORSEMENT of CINCUSNAVEUR ltr ser 537/11 of 20 Feb 1968

From: Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Ensign David G. LUCAS, USN

Subj: Award of the Silver Star Medal

1. Delivered with congratulations.



BEN W. SARVER

Copy to:
CINCUSNAVEUR

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
SILVER STAR MEDAL to

ENSIGN DAVID GEORGE LUCAS


UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For heroic achievement in connection with the unprovoked and unexpected armed attack on USS Liberty (AGTR 5) in the Eastern Mediterranean on 8 June 1967. During the early afternoon hours, USS Liberty, while engaged in peaceful operations in international waters, was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and three motor torpedo boats. The Liberty was subjected to intense incendiary, machine gun, and rocket fire and was placed in extreme jeopardy by a torpedo hit below the waterline on the starboard side in the vicinity of the Research compartment. Severe structural damage and extensive personnel casualties were incurred. Ensign Lucas, serving as Gunnery Officer arrived on the bridge within moments of the initial strafing attack. A brief period of time before he reached the gun control station a large explosion occurred on the starboard wing of the bridge which incapacitated the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Deck, the sound powered telephone talkers and lookouts, and caused the instantaneous demise of the Intelligence Officer. The need to assist the Commanding Officer was immediately apparent to him. With complete disregard for his own personal safety and though already wounded he continued to fearlessly expose himself to intense, overwhelmingly accurate rocket and machine gun fire to assist the Commanding Officer in maintaining ship control and communications with other vital battle stations throughout the attack. His aggressiveness and coolness under fire was exceptional for a young junior officer with limited afloat experience and inspired his seniors and subordinates alike in an hour of awesome peril. By his daring actions and loyal devotion to duty in the face of personal risk, Ensign Lucas upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President


JOHN S. MCCAIN, JR.
Admiral, United States Navy
Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Europe



Plan of the Day



HERITAGE

HORIZONS

3801 Nebraska Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20391

NOTE: ALL PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO NAVSECSTA ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PLAN OF THE DAY. THOSE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ABSENT FROM THE STATION SHOULD CONSULT COPIES ISSUED DURING THEIR ABSENCE.

TUESDAY 7 JUNE 1977

UNIFORM OF THE DAY: As prescribed in NAVSECSTAINST 1020.1B of 30 March 1977

CARRY OUT WORKDAY ROUTINE (NAVSECSTAINST 5400.1G, Art. 20421)

0543 - SUNRISE
2031 - SUNSET

Command Duty Officer
Officer of the Day

Junior Officer of the Day

Duty Fire Marshal
BEQ Fire & Security Watch
NAVSECGRU Duty Officer
NAVSECGRU Duty Petty Officer
CMS Duty Officer

DUTY PERSONNEL

LT L. L. KEETON
0001-0800 CTA1 T. L. WEST
1600-2400 CTAC F. L. KECK
0001-0800 CTA2 B. A. CRISMAN
1600-2400 YN2 B. A. HICKS
CTASN WHEELER
CTASN P. L. NORMAN
LCDR DADANT
CTA1 KIGHTLINGER
LTJG J. R. BROWN 301-460-1762

EMERGENCY MEDICAL NUMBER: 28-20224

Routine Medical Numbers: 28-20225/20206

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command:

Command Career Counselor:

CO'S ACTION LINE: EXT. 20316

DRUG/ALCOHOL PROGRAM: EXT. 20202

CTOCM D. E. BIERMAN, EXT. 20359

CTAC F. L. CONNOLLY, EXT. 20860

NOTICES

1. MEMORIAL TO BE DEDICATED: Personnel wearing green badges are invited to visit the RADM J. N. WENGER Museum during the afternoon of 8 June. A memorial dedicated to those who gave their lives in USS Liberty (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967 will be open to visitors. Hours of operation for the Museum that afternoon will be 1200-1500. (G14/20873)

2. ADVANCED EDUCATION PROGRAM: The Advanced Education Program provides an opportunity for active duty officers to engage in full-time, personally funded graduate education. Such education must result in qualifications for a subspecialty designation. This program is primarily designed to complement a preceding period of voluntary off-duty prerequisite and/or graduate study, and to permit completion of residence requirements. It may also be utilized to begin a graduate education program. This revises the scope of the program, which formerly provided for independent research. For further information concerning this program refer to CNET Instruction 1520.7A or contact the ESO. (S71/20860)

3. DENTAL CLINIC HOURS: The Dental Officer is available at the NAVSECSTA Dental Clinic on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. A Dental Technician

CASUALTY REPORT

DATE OF CASUALTY: 8 JUNE 1967

BRIEF REPORT OF CIRCUMSTANCES: USS LIBERTY - ACCIDENTALLY ATTACKED BY ISRAELIS DURING MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: DEAD WOUNDED
 OFFICERS (3)
 ENLISTED (28)

NEXT OF KIN NOTIFIED

CASUALTY STATUS	NAME, NUMBER, RANK OR RATE, NEXT OF KIN
DEAD	<p><u>ALLENBAUGH</u>, William Bernard 684 49 95, CT3, USN</p> <p>Wife: Sandra Lee Allenbaugh 208 Wayson's Trailer Court Lothian, Maryland</p> <p>Parents: Mr. & Mrs. William Francis Allenbaugh 5151 Benton Heights Avenue Baltimore, Maryland</p>
DEAD	<p><u>ARMSTRONG</u>, Philip McCutcheon, XII 569825/1100, LCDR, USN</p> <p>Wife: Marie Kearney Armstrong 131 Cayuga Road 5ND Virginia Beach, Virginia</p> <p>Father: Philip M. C. Armstrong 2163 Seminole Avenue 9ND Detroit, Michigan</p>
DEAD - DIED 9 JUNE 0315 on OPERATING TABLE	<p><u>BLANCHARD</u>, Gary Ray 771 77 22 SN USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. & Mrs. Earl T. Blanchard 3279 Rose Parkway 9ND Wichita, Kansas</p>
DEAD	<p><u>BROWN</u>, Francis (n), 778 76 70 SN USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. & Mrs. Wado Brown 3323 6th Avenue 3ND Troy, New York</p>

31 May
 34 JTD
 34 JTD

MISSING - TO
DEAD

CAMPBELL, Ronnie Jordan 566 13 23 CT3 USN

Wife: Elizabeth E. Campbell

5ND

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Raymond C. Campbell
Route 2, Mill Creek Road
Spartanburg, Tennessee

6ND

MISSING TO
DEAD

CONVERSE, Jerry Leroy 794 79 44 CT3 USN

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Ray Converse
516 West Third Street
Boone, Iowa

9ND

MISSING TO
DEAD

EISENBERG, Robert Burton 776 09 35 CT2 USN

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Eisenberg
730 South Lexington Parkway
St. Paul, Minnesota

9ND

MISSING TO
DEAD

GOSS, Jerry Lee 773 61 55 CT3 USNR

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Harry Herschel Goss
38 Oakwood Drive
North Vernon, Indiana

9ND

MISSING TO
DEAD

GRAVES, Curtis Alan 519 58 24 CT1 USN

Mother: Florence McCullum Graves
13211 Orange Isle
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

6ND

Father deceased

MISSING TO
DEAD

HAYDEN, Lawrence P. 070 53 70 CT5N USN

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. James H. Hayden
1411 Allston
Houston, Texas

6ND

MISSING TO
DEAD

HERSEY, Warren Edward 903 67 11 CT1 USN

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Warren O. Hersey
17 Pine Street
Stonham, Massachusetts

1ND

DEAD	<p><u>HIGGINS</u>, Alan (a) 788 62 97 CTSH USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur C. Higgins 219 Fiddlers Green Dover, Delaware 4ND</p>
DEAD	<p><u>HOAR</u>, Carl Louis 774 48 SN USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. James B. Hoar Roulet Mt. Vernon, Ohio 4ND</p>
MISSING TO DEAD	<p><u>KEENE</u>, Richard Walter, Jr. 778 82 75 CT2 USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Richard W. Keene, Sr. 18 Dublin Lane Toughkeepsie, New York 3ND</p>
MISSING TO DEAD	<p><u>LENAU</u>, James Lee 997 56 58 CTSH USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Leander J. Lenau 735 East State Street Union, Missouri 9ND</p>
MISSING - TO DEAD	<p><u>LINN</u>, Raymond Eugene 571 13 74 CTC USN DIVORCED</p> <p>Adopted Daughter: Linda Louella Linn 2230 Myrtle Avenue Zanesville, Ohio 4ND</p> <p>Daughter: Joy Marie Linn 164 East Main Street South Zanesville, Ohio</p>
MISSING TO DEAD	<p><u>LUPTON</u>, James Mahlon 511 31 28 CT1 USN</p> <p>Wife: Barbara Jean Lupton 255 Sobria Lake Taleva, Turkey</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Clyde Knot Lupton 300 East 69th Street Shreveport, Louisiana 9ND</p>
MISSING TO DEAD	<p><u>MARGGRAF</u>, Duane Rowe 773 96 50 CT3 USN</p> <p>Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Carlton H. Marggraf 370 Amory Street Fond Du Lac, Wisconsin 9ND</p>

<p>MISSING TO DEAD</p>	<p><u>MAHONEY</u>, David Walter 210 04 80 CTSN USN Parents: Mr. and Mrs. William J. Karlborough 88 Vadnais Street 1ND Springfield, Massachusetts</p>
<p>MISSING - TO DEAD BODY RECOVERED</p>	<p><u>MENDLER</u>, Anthony Peter 777 62 87 CT2 USN Parents: Mr. and Mrs. John J. Mendler 5042 West Flynn Lane 1ND Glendale, Arizona</p>
<p>MISSING TO DEAD</p>	<p><u>NYGREN</u>, Carl Christian 788 37 16 CTSN USN Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Arvid C. Nygren 620 Nimrod Court 3ND North Babylon, Long Island, New York</p>
<p>MISSING TO DEAD</p>	<p><u>PIERCE</u>, James Cecil 649005/6462 LT USN Wife: Mrs. Pauline M. Pierce 1633 Wildwood Drive 5ND Virginia Beach, Virginia Parents deceased</p>
<p>DEAD</p>	<p><u>SKOLAK</u>, David (a) 1ND, E50 17 83 USN Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph J. Skolak 2316 West 19th Avenue 9ND Gary, Indiana</p>
<p>MISSING TO DEAD</p>	<p><u>SMITH</u>, John Caleb, Jr. 237 77 94 C71 USN Wife: Sandra Ann Smith 3ND 203 Wood Street Ithaca, New York Parents: Mr. and Mrs. John Caleb Smith, Sr. 203 Wood Street 3ND Ithaca, New York</p>
<p>MISSING TO DEAD</p>	<p><u>SMITH</u>, Melvin Douglas 493 95 96 CTC USN Wife: Judith Ann Smith 6ND 304 Moreno Courts Warrington, Florida Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Carlton Melvin Smith Box 549 6ND Alamance, North Carolina</p>

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEAD

SPICHER, John Clarence, PC2, 473 41 77, USN

Wife: Linda Lee Spicher
7901 Hampton Blvd.
Norfolk, Virginia 3ND ✓

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. John E. Spicher
864 9th Avenue
Brackensridge, Pennsylvania 4ND

DEAD

THOMPSON, Alexander Neil, Jr. CMS3, 770 47 41, USN

Wife: Gail E. Thompson
4 Crystal Drive
Warwick, Rhode Island 1ND ✓

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Alexander A. Thompson
Greely, Pennsylvania 4ND

MISSING TO DEAD - BODY RECOVERED X

THORNTON, Thomas Ray 997 97 91 CT3 USS

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. William Ray Thornton
215 North Race Street
Springfield, Ohio 4ND

DEAD

TOOTH, Stephen Spencer, LT, 569313/1100 USN

Wife: Regina Chermant Tooth
Avenida Mortalha 3319
Sao Paulo, Brazil US. NAVAL MISSION TO BRAZIL

Parents: Capt. and Mrs. Joseph C. Tooth, USN (RET)
301 53rd Street
Virginia Beach, Virginia 5ND

MISSING TO DEAD - BODY RECOVERED

WALTON, Frederick James 236 31 86 CT1 USN

Wife: Audrey Jane Walton
41 Douro Drive
Niagara Falls, New York 3ND

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Horace F. Walton
2735 Military Road
Niagara Falls, New York 3ND

MISSING TO DEAD

TIEDTKE, Philippe Charles CT3 USN 914 32 84

Parents: Mr. and Mrs. Arthur L. Tiedtke
1630 Ethel Court
Modesto, California 12ND

on threatening the
n, he again volun-
f the platoon from
d, enemy gunners
n, seriously wound-
ald recovered the
accurate covering
diers were pinned
machinegun to his
sition to destroy it
repid action. Pfc.
ulted in the saving
ighest traditions of
nself, his unit, and

ten S/Sgt.), U.S.
s, 3d Marine Divi-
Vietnam, 18 July
21 January 1940,
intrepidity at the
2d Lt. McGinty's
the withdrawal of
attack for 3 days,
and mortar fire
ssive human wave
our battle. 2d Lt.
nter assault, 2 of
the platoon. With
arged through in-
sition Finding 20
quickly reloaded
unded men and
e was painfully
he continued to
fire so effective-
e enemy tried to
nk range with his
running the small
than 50 yards of
eny, who left an
Ginty's personal
duty, and bold
ed attacks by a
, and upheld the
aval Service.

MCGONAGLE, WILLIAM L.

Rank and organization: Captain (then Comdr.) U.S. Navy, U.S.S. *Liberty* (AGTR-5). *Place and date:* International waters, Eastern Mediterranean, 8-9 June 1967. *Entered service at:* Thermal, Calif. *Born:* 19 November 1925, Wichita, Kans. *Citation:* For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Sailing in international waters, the *Liberty* was attacked without warning by jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats which inflicted many casualties among the crew and caused extreme damage to the ship. Although severely wounded during the first air attack, Capt. McGonagle remained at his battle station on the badly damaged bridge and, with full knowledge of the seriousness of his wounds, subordinated his own welfare to the safety and survival of his command. Steadfastly refusing any treatment which would take him away from his post, he calmly continued to exercise full command of his ship. Despite continuous exposure to fire, he maneuvered his ship, directed its defense, supervised the control of flooding and fire, and saw to the care of the casualties. Capt. McGonagle's extraordinary valor under these conditions inspired the surviving members of the *Liberty's* crew, many of them seriously wounded, to heroic efforts to overcome the battle damage and keep the ship afloat. Subsequent to the attack, although in great pain and weak from the loss of blood, Captain McGonagle remained at his battle station and continued to command his ship for more than 17 hours. It was only after rendezvous with a U.S. destroyer that he relinquished personal control of the *Liberty* and permitted himself to be removed from the bridge. Even then, he refused much needed medical attention until convinced that the seriously wounded among his crew had been treated. Capt. McGonagle's superb professionalism, courageous fighting spirit, and valiant leadership saved his ship and many lives. His actions sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

*MCKIBBEN, RAY

Rank and organization: Sergeant, U.S. Army, Troop B, 7th Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry. *Place and date:* Near Song Mao, Republic of Vietnam, 8 December 1968. *Entered service at:* Atlanta, Ga. *Born:* 27 October 1945, Felton, Ga. *Citation:* For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, Sgt. McKibben distinguished himself in action while serving as team leader of the point element of a reconnaissance patrol of Troop B, operating in enemy territory. Sgt. McKibben was leading his point element in a movement to contact along a well-traveled trail when the lead element came under heavy automatic weapons fire from a fortified bunker position, forcing the patrol to take cover. Sgt. McKibben, appraising the situation and without regard for his own safety, charged through bamboo and heavy brush to the fortified position, killed the enemy gunner, secured the weapon and directed his patrol element forward. As the patrol moved out, Sgt. McKibben observed enemy movement to the flank of the patrol. Fire support from helicopter gunship was requested and the area was effectively neutralized. The patrol again continued its mission and as the lead element rounded the

From McGonagle was granted the Medal of Honor for actions which took place in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean rather than in Vietnam.

DIED IN RESEARCH

- ✓ 0 CT2 JERRY L. CONVERSE
- ✓ 0 CT1 CURTIS A. GRAVES -- GRAB HALL -- CORRY
- 0 ✓ * CTSN LAWRENCE P. HAYDEN (MASS GRAVE)
- ✓ 0 CT1 WARREN E. HERSEY
- M * CTSN RICHARD WALTER KEENE
(CHIEF LINN) -- SULAR GROW ~~TOP~~ OPS BLDG
- ✓ 0 ✓ CT1 JAMES M. LUTON (MASS GRAVE)
- 0 ✓ * CTSN DAVID W. MARLBOROUGH (MASS GRAVE)
- M CT3 DUANE ROWE MARLBOROUGH -- TIT ROOM
- MIT 0 CT2 ANTHONY P. MIDDLE
- MIT 0 * CTSN CARL C. NYGREN (MASS GRAVE)
- MIT 0 CT3 THOMAS R. THORNTON
- ✓ 0 CT3 PHILLIPPE C. TIEDTKE
- ✓ 0 CT1 FREDERICK J. WINTON
(CT2 RONNIE CAMPBELL) -- EDZELL BKS
- MIT 0 ✓ CT3 JERRY LEE GOSS (MASS GRAVE)
- ✓ CT1 JOHN CALVER SMITH, JR.
(CT2 MELVIN SMITH) -- PENNA. BKS

0 ✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

0VA66/1321
Code 11
11 June 1967

mc
C-2

From: Commanding Officer, USS AMERICA (CVA-66)
To: LT James M. ENNES, USNR, 555840/1015 T-999990

Subj: Temporary additional duty.

Ref: (a) BUPERSINST 130.23 (series)

1. You reported for treatment on 9 June 1967 from USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5). You are directed to report not later than 2400, 12 June 1967 to Commanding Officer, Station Hospital, Naples, Italy for temporary additional duty under treatment for a period of approximately four (04) months. Upon discharge from treatment, if found fit for full duty and unless otherwise directed or indicated by the Chief of Naval Personnel, you will return to USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) and resume your regular duties.

2. Government air, messing and lodging is authorized where available.

3. Accounting data:

APPROPRIATION	177,000,000
OBJECT CLASS	4
BUCON	1700
AUTH ACTG ACTIVITY	01755
TRANSACTION TYPE	20
PROPERTY ACTG ACT	01755
COST CODE	0350639999

The estimated cost of this temporary additional duty is:

TRANS ZERO PER DIEM ZERO MISC ZERO

U. D. ENGEN

Copy to:
BUPERS
CO USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
COMSERVRON ECHI

Finish File Pers-B1216

VZCZCFJA718

PFTF JAW RUCIYHC0817 1610618-EEEE--RUCIJFA.

DE RUTKRE 164 1682143

ZNY EEEEE

P 092143Z JUN 67

FM USS AMERICA

TO RUENAAA/SECNAV

INFO RUCIJFA/BUPERS

RUCIJIA/BUMED

RUENAAA/CNO

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEDNKACOMSERVLANT

LEDSPA/CONSERVRON EIGHT

UCILMA/COMNAVAIRLANT

ZEN/COMCARDI FOUR

RUTKXQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPRC/CONSIXTHFLT

RUTPP/USS LIBERTY

RUTPP/CONDESRON ONE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

STATUS REPORT USS LIBERTY CASUALTIES

1. COMMENCED HELO TRANSFER OF INJURED AND DEAD WHEN AMERICA CLOSED
TO WITHIN 70 MILES OF LIBERTY. FIRST PATIENT RECEIVED 090915Z

332405 File-Para 0231

PAGE TWO RUTKRE 164 UNCLAS E F T O

LALUT PATIENT ABOARD 091210Z

2. FOLLOWING CASUALTIES NOW ABOARD AMERICA

A. DECEASED

LCCR PHILIP MCCUTCHEON ARMSTRONG, 569825/1100

SN GARY RAY BLANCHARD, 771 77 22

CM3 FRANCIS BROWN, 778 76 70

CT3 ALAN HIGGINS, 788 62 97

SN CARL LEWIS H

RJDN UUR RY RI

ICFR DAVID SKOLAK, 8501783

PC2 JOHN CLARENCE SPICHER, USN, 473 41 77

CMG3 ALEXANDER NEIL THOMPSON, 778 43 21

LT STEPHEN SPENCER TOTH, 669613

B. CRITICALLY INJURED

SN SALVADOR PAYAN, USNR 796 66 15

SH2 DONALD HEROLD, 689 22 48

C. SEELY INJURED:

CTSN LEE ROY BENNETT, 998 13 79

CMG3 DAVID CARL HAZEN, 426 84 98

EM3 WILLIAM MICHAEL LEWAY, 773 35 21

CT1 JOSEPH CHARLES LENTINI, 594 8 TT

COM 8	0620	---
COM 5	0611	---
COM 4/5	PVOK 0630	SNOK 0640
COM 4	0625	---
COM ONE	0737	---
COM 5	0640	---

PAGE THREE RUTKRE 164 UNCLAS E F T O

LT JAMES GEORGE O'CONNOR, 671769

BM3 JERRY WAYEN WARD, 775 76 70

SN RICARDO LARRY WEAVER, 999 88 63

SN EDDIE LAMAR COOK, 997 59 71

D. MINOR INJURIES:

CT1 REGINALD NORWOOD ADDINGTON, 349 53 88

CT1 RICHARD KENNETH BAKER, 496 88 12

YN3 VIRGIL LOUIE BROWNFIELD, 794 23 49

CT1 RICHARD CARL CARLSON, 444 13 12

CT1 JEFFERY ROBERT CARPENTER, 535 14 05

SN WILLIAM EUGENE CASPER, 796 48 74

FN RODNEY CARL CONCEPCION, 674 38 89

SI2 RUSSELL ONEAL DAVID, 683 33 65

CT3 JAMES RAY DAVIDSON, 699 64 72

SN KENNETH PAUL ECKER, 851 36 41

LT JAMES MARQUIS ENNIS, 653 47 16T

CTSN KENNETH DURTON EAKINS, 794 04 69

CT3 DAVID WILLIAM HAWKINS, 118 73 49

CT2 CHARLES RICHARD HENDRICKS, 685 56 42

SN THOMAS FRANKLIN JACKSON, 689 15 99

COM 4

0645

COM 6

0650

WASH DC

COM 6

COM 6 0730

COM 4

COM 9

COM 2

COM 1

COM 9

COM 4

COM 12

COM 6

0730

Scotland

COM 8

by telephone and message sent by father

James M. Ennis, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE FOUR RUTKRE YR UNCLAS E F T O

CT2 FREDERICK KENNETH JOHNS, 794 91 14

CT3 MELVIN PETE JOHNSON, 997 32 29

CTSN JAMES PATRICK KAVANAUGH, 918 51 32

CT3 LOREN WILLIAM KREUN, 538 49 74

SN JOHN DWAIN LAMAR, 779 56 36

CTSN TERRY WALKER LEHMAN, 914 59 44

LCDR DAVID EDWIN LEWIS, 504572/ 85 95 56

SSGT BRYCE FRANKLIN LOCKWOOD, USMC, IT 01 TY

1N SOFRONIO PARATE MARFIL, 776 90 09

SN JIMMIE LEE LATHEWS, 998 21 92

CT2 DAVID LEE MCFEGGAN, 774 71 98

CMSGN GERALD PENSON PIERSON, 794 89 20

CT3 FLOYD HAROLD POLLARD, 353 95 47

IC JOHN RICHARD RANGALL, 517 81 45

SN THOMAS JOSEPH REILLY, 913 58 66

CT CHARLES LEROY ROGLEY, 458 48 83

CTSN DAVID ALAN SHAW, 904 39 56

CT3 HAROLD EUGENE SIX, 777 58 53

SN LARRY JAMES SLAVENS, 916 90 88

SN LARRY LOUIS SOPER, 625 39 13

PAGE FIVE RUTKRE 164 UNCLAS E F T O

ENS RICHARD PATTEN TAYLOR, 689116/

SN GEORGE WOODROW WILSON, 529 34 49

GST DONALD LESLIE BLALOCK (CIVILIAN)

SN DONALD FLETCHER FOLLIN, 917 66 74

ETR3 BARRY ROBERT TINMERMAN, 778 76 78

BT

NNNNVZCZCFJA070

PFTE JAW RUWYSC0539 1686057-EEEE--RUCIJFA.

DE RUQRM 024DLV 1671819

ZNY EEEEE

P 161819WSKUN 57

PRIORITY
DELIVERED TO BUPERS
DUTY OFFICER BY HAND
FOR ACTION

REC'D	11 20	ACTS	B1203
		INFO	B1203
	JUN 17	01 02	B1203

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUCIJFA/BUPERS

BT

QNCLAS E F T O

HOSPITALIZATION REPORT

A. BUPERS MANUAL, ART. C-5311

1. IAW REF, A, FOL IS SUBMITTED:

A. LT JAMES MARQUIS ENNES, JR., USN, 6519171615

B. ELECTRONICS MATERIAL OFFICER, RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

C. 09 JUNE 1967

D. NAVHOSP NAPLES

E. FRACTURE, SIMPLELT. FEMUR

F. PROGNOISIS AND OBTAINED FRMM THE USS AMERICA (CVA-66)


G. THREE (3) MONTHS EST LENGTH OF TREATMENT OBTAINED FROM LOCAL MEDICAL AUTHORITY

H. UPON COMPLETION OF HOSPITALIZATION REASSIGNMENT. RELIEF REQUIRED.

BT

SIGNED R

B1
B
G23
F2
F



WILL RELIEVE WHEN SHIP RETURNS TO CONUS ETA JUL

8308

MMNNVZCZC JA423

PFTE JAN RUCIYHE0345 1662106-EEEE--RUCIJFA.

DE RUPRF 4328 1661928

ZNY EEEEE

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SVC

RUCIJFA 0877 1661548 ZDK RUPRF 848 1661223 151223Z JUN 67

PP RUCIJFA

DE RUPRF 848 1661223

ZNY EEEEE

P 151223Z JUN 67

FM NAVSUPACT NAPLES

TO RUTPP/COMDESROM ONE TWO

INFO RUTPP/USS AMERICA

RUCIJFA/BUPERS

RUCIJIA/RUMED

ZEN/COMFAIRMED

RUBLKB/CINCUSMAEUR

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

Comm 5-21 15 21 13.07

PRIORITY
DELIVERED TO BUPERS
DUTY OFFICER BY HAND
FOR INFORMATION

SIGNED _____

023

*Cor
JHO*

Final File Para-428

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SECTION 12 NOT ABLE PASS TO USS LIBERTY FOR ACT
STATUS AND LOCATION OF WOUNDED PERSONNEL

A. USS LIBERTY 131190Z NOTAL

1. FOL WOUNDED PERSONNEL RETAINED STANOSP NAPLES:

(A) LT JAMES M. ENNES, JR., USNR, 653840/1615.

CONDITION GOOD. PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY. ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY

16 JUNE 67. ANTICIPATE MAE CONUS TO SUCH NAVOSP AS MAY BE SET BY
CHASING ABOUT ONE WEEK IF POST-OPERATIVE CONDITION PERMITS.

(B) ETR3 BARRY R. TIMBERMAN, USN, 7948469. CONDITION GOOD. AMBULATORY.

COMFORTABLE. ANTICIPATE MAE CONUS FOR DEFINITE SURGERY AND BDDP ON
MAE MISSION OF 29 JUN 67.

PAGE TWO RUFDF 048 UNCLAS E F T O

2. TOTAL USS LIBERTY CASUALTIES RECEIVED STANOSP TO DATE (131000Z):

(A) WOUNDED: TWO (2) PATIENTS

(B) DECEASED: TWENTY-NINE (29) DECEASED OF WHICH NINE (9) HAVE
BEEN PREPARED AND FWD CONUS IN FIRST CONSIGNMENT.

BT

PAGE TWO RUTKRE 024 UNCLAS E F T O

REQUEST FOR TRANSP OF MED PTS

1. A. LT J.M. ENNES
- B. CT1 JOSEPH C. LENTINI
- C. EHR3 BARRY TIMMERMAN

-
2. A. FRACTURE, SIMPLE LT. FEMUR - Ennes - ~~Timmerman~~
 - B. FRACTURE, COMPOUND LT. TIBIA Lentini
 - C. FRACTURE, COMPOUND LT. RADIUS Timmerman

3. ALL CHARLIE

4. REQ YOU PROVIDE ONE MED ATTEND.

5. ONE AMBULATORY, TWO LITTER

6. AVAIL ON BD AMERICA AFTER 120800Z

7. A. PTM WOUND DEBRIDED, PLASTER CAST - Ennes

C. WOUND DEBRIDED, PLASTER CAST ~~Lentini~~

BT

Timmerman

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

18 31 25



PORTRAIT OF DECEASED CHIEF -- Representatives of the Sylvania Corporation presented an oil painting to Capt. Tamburello on Feb. 6. The painting of CTC Smith who was killed in the attack on the USS Liberty was given to the CO by Robert G. Lynch, Vice President of Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. (left) and Charles G. Kunz, General Manager of the company (right).

020005Z JUN 67

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC 20315-5000--RUCIJFA

ZNY PRIORITY 200 RUCIJFA

020005Z JUN 67

TO RUCIJFA

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION ONE OF THE

ZNY PRIORITY

P 020015Z JUN 67

FM JCRC WASHINGTON DC

TO RUCIJFA/SECNAV

INFO RUCIJFA/USPERS

INFO USIA/AMERICA

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION ONE OF THE

REPORT OF WOUNDED/INJURED

1. ALFA SHIP WILLIAM MICHAEL LEWY, USN, 773 39 21 BRAVO A

STABT CHARLIE

WOUNDED DELTA 1400 9 JUN 67 AT SEA, A/C AND SUBMANT ATTACK ECHO CON-

DITION CRITICAL PROXIMOSIS GUARDED FOXTROT SANDRA LEE LEWY, WIFE,

1411 WASHINGTON ST., NEEDHAM, MASS. COLF NOX NOT NOTIFIED HOTEL TRF TO

USS AMERICA 9 JUN 67

2. ALFA SHIP DONALD HEROLD, USN, 639 22 4-1,74-49 -8:79 81-4003 0,7433

1305- -03 - 3-4- 1. ECHO CRITICAL/GUARDED FOXTROT WIFE, JANE

ELAINE HEROLD, LOT NR 19, BOX 39 RT NR 7, MEADOW VIEW, TRAILER PARK,

CHESAPEAKE, VA. COLF NOX NOT NOTIFIED. HOTEL TRF TO USS AMERICA 9

JUN 67

3. ALFA SHIP JERRY W. WARD, USN 775 76 67 BRAVO ACTDUT CHARLIE IN-D

WOUNDED DELTA 1400 9 JUN 67 - SAME AS PARA. 1 ECHO CRITICAL/GUARDED

Finish File Para-G23

PAGE FIVE RUTKRE 067 UNCLAS E F T O

BRIZ, FATHER, 921 BORDONDA ROAD, SALINAS, CALIFORNIA GOLF NOK NOT
NOTIFIED HOTEL TRF TO USS AMERICA

47. SN THOMAS FRANKLIN JACKSON, USN, 689 15 99 BRAVO ACTDUT CHARLIE
INJURED DELTA SAME AS PARA 1. ECHO FAIR/GOOD FOXTROT JANICE MARIE
JACKSON, WIFE, 1370 3RD AVE., ARNOLD, PENNSYLVANIA GOLF NOK NOT
NOTIFIED HOTEL TRF TO USS AMERICA

48. LT JAMES M. ENNES, JR., USNR, 653540/1615 BRAVO ACTDUT CHARLIE
INJURED DELTA SAME AS PARA 1. ECHO FAIR/GOOD FOXTROT TERESA B.
ENNES, WIFE, 5343 COACHWAY DR., NORFOLK, VA. GOLF NOK NOT NOTIFIED
HOTEL TRF USS AMERICA

49. SSGT BRYCE F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 1052056 BRAVO ACTDUT CHARLIE INJURED
DELTA SAME AS PARA 1. ECHO FAIR/GOOD FOXTROT MRS. BRYCE F. LOCKWOOD,

10/3 KLEINER BLINK, BREMERHAVEN, WEST GERMANY GOLF NOK NOT NOTIFIED
HOTEL TRF TO USS AMERICA

50. CDR WILLIAM LOREN MC GONAGLE, USN, 494467/1109 BRAVO ACTDUT CHARLIE
INJURED DELTA SAME AS PARA 1. ECHO GOOD/GOOD FOXTROT MRS. W.L. MC
GONAGLE, WIFE, 204 OAK GROVE RD., NORFOLK, VA. GOLF NOK NOT NOTIFIED
HOTEL RET ON BOARD

51. DONALD LESLIE BLALLOCK, CIVILIAN 657 - INJURED NOK: BARBARA
J. BLALLOCK, WIFE, 13137 LARACHDALE, RD., APT 6, LAUREL, MARYLAND

Final File Pers-G23

NAVAL HOSPITAL
PORTSMOUTH, VA.
23708

Code 60/jc
Jacket 671665
8 August 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Va.
To: LT James H. ENNES, Jr., USNR, 653840/1615
Subj: ORDERS

Ref: (a) BuPers Order Nr 069444 dtd 07/22/72 Aug 67

1. Reference (a) is quoted and paraphrased herewith for your information and compliance:

WFM BUPERS
TO NAVHOSP PORTSMOUTH VA
INFO USS LIBERTY
UNCLAS

BUPERS ORDER NR 069444. LT JAMES H. ENNES JR 653840/1615.
HEREBY DETACHED DUTY IN THE RESEARCH OPERATIONS DEPT USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5)
CONTRACT. ACCT DATA 1781453.2252 T 22 NAH8 2G
CIC 1/NAH8/2/Q/2/3840"

Paraphrase

BuPers Order Nr 069444. LT James H. ENNES, Jr., 653840/1615.
Hereby detached duty in the Research Operations Department, USS
LIBERTY (AGTR-5). Continue treatment.
Accounting data: 1781453.2252 T 22 NAH8 2G CIC 1/NAH8/2/Q/2/3840.

Certified to be a true paraphrase of the original message.

- Delivered. You were admitted to this hospital for treatment on 24 June 1967.
- Patient status changed to ID - UNDER TREATMENT as of 7 August 1967.

J. E. KEMP
By direction

Copy to:
BUPERS
CO, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
Case Jacket

Finish File Pers-B1216

Code 60/jc
Jacket 671665
8 August 1967

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, USS AMERICA (CVA-66) Orders CVA66/1311
Code 11 dated 11 June 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Va. 23708
To: LT James M. ENNES, Jr., USNR, 653840/1615

Subj: Temporary Additional Duty

Ref: (b) BuPers Order Nr 069464 dtd 07/22/62 Aug 67

1. You were admitted to this hospital for treatment on 24 June 1967 at 1110.
2. In compliance with reference (b), detached duty USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).
3. Continue treatment.

J. E. KEMP
By direction

Copy to: BuPers
CO, USS AMERICA (CVA-66)
CC, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
CONSERVATION RIGHT
Case Jacket

Finish File Pers-31218

1510E

**HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY GENERAL HOSPITAL, FRANKFURT
APO NEW YORK 09757**

SUBJECT: Evacuation Order 67-65

22 June 1967

TO : All Concerned

1. UP AR 40-20, AR 59-12, USAREUR Reg 40-353 and MM 76-1, fol pnts now awaiting evac to CONUS WP o/a 23 June 67 by Govt Air (MACS) to the hosp dsg below. All pers are rel atch/asgd MHC this hosp and atch/asgd MHC dest hosp for further obsn, trmt and or disp. Civ pers are auth and invited to tvl to the hosp indicated for further obsn, trmt and or disp as appropriate. EDGSA: 30 June 1967. PCS (MDC) 5G. CHASIRO Cite 6253.

TO: WALTER REED GENERAL HOSPITAL, WASHINGTON D.C.:			
CPT ROONEY, Luke J. Jr.	05015918	USA	XE-DA-2370
SFC BERRY, Robert E.	RA13263539	USA	XE-DA-7100
SP5 MAIER, Richard C.	RA12720438	USA	XE-DA-3885
SP5 TOTTEN, Warren H.	RA32551637	USA	XE-DA-4440
DAE MC LEOD, Brigitte E.	PP#B8322967	DAE	XDA-DD-5850
DAE CRUZ-VEGA, Martha	PP#F997566	DAE	XDE-DD-1710
PFC GUADAGANA, Phillip S.	RA13890309	USA	XE-DA-5010
DAE HUDSON, Patricia S.	PP#F521114	DAE	XE-DD-4320
DAE ALBERT, Paul	PP#G1036437	DAE	XE-DD-8530
SFC STRO, Gilbert	RA19271706	USA	XDA-DA-Y039
TO: VALLEY FORGE GENERAL HOSPITAL, PHOENIXVILLE, PA.:			
SP4 BERCHIK, John	US52600758	USA	XB-DA-3004
PFC SCHULTZ, Garry R.	RA51920290	USA	XDB-DA-9971
TO: BROOKE GENERAL HOSPITAL, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS:			
SP4 GALLEGOS, Nathan A.	RA18704967	USA	XC-DA-3003
TO: IRWIN ARMY HOSPITAL, FT RILEY, KANSAS:			
SP4 KEERAN, Raymond L.	US55814067	USA	XE-DA-7340
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, ST ALBANS, N.Y.:			
CTSN KAVANAGH, James P.	USN9185132	USN	XDB-DN-9080
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, BETHESDA, MD.:			
LCDR LEWIS, David E.	584572	USN	XE-DN-8520
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, PORTSMOUTH, VA.:			
CT1 LENTINI, Joseph G.	USN5948155	USN	XDB-DN-8600
CT1 CARLSON, Richard C.	USN4441312	USN	XE-DN-9080
LT ENNES, James M. Jr.	653840	USN	XDB-DN-8210
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, GREAT LAKES, ILL.:			
SN WILSON, George W.	USN5293449	USN	XE-DN-8900
ETR3 TIMMERMAN, Barry R.	USN7701163	USN	XE-DN-8130
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, COMFUS CHRISTI, TEXAS:			
EM3 WARD, Jerry W.	USN7757678	USN	XDB-DN-8600
TO: US NAVAL HOSPITAL, OAKLAND, CALIF.:			
SN CONCEPCION, Rodney	USN6743809	USN	XDB-DN-9880

2. Req for customs insp, shpmt of HHG, unacc bag and shpmt of POV to ZI at Govt exp for auth pers will be made to the TO of the CO of the sponsor.

3. This additional FY move is auth by the Secretary of the Army per par 18 a & e AR 614-6.

4. PCS TDN. 2172010 01-4551-4553 P1445 899999. 2172010 01-4541-4542-4543-4544-4547 P1445 899999. 2172010 01-4521-4522-4523-4524-4527 P1445 899999.

5. Trans auth "N" pers chg to Approp 1771804.1835, Obj Class 21 Bureau Control No 34001, Acc Act 18 Trans Type 2 D, Cost Code 74220.

6. Trans auth PAUL, Patricia, DAE, PP#G1036437, to acc PAUL, Colbert, DAE, PP#G1036437 as Non Med Att to the hosp of definitive trmt upon arr in CONUS. AUTH USAR EUR Reg 40-353. Sixty-six (66) lbs bag auth. AMD-FRF-ADM-XZ-8530-DD. TDN. 2172010 01-4551-4552-4553-4554-4557 P1445 899999.

U.S. NAVAL STATION HOSPITAL
U.S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK 09521

24 JUNE 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON COMMANDING OFFICER, USS AMERICA CVA-66, TAD ORDERS
OF 11 JUNE 1967.

FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, U.S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, NAPLES, ITALY

TO: LT JAMES M. ENNES JR., USNR, 653840/1615

SUBJ: TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY OFFICE SICK, ORDERS TO:

1. You reported to this Command for hospitalization and treatment at 2055 on 12 JUNE 1967.
2. Government quarters were furnished during your hospitalization.
3. Detached this date you are directed to proceed via "MEDICAL AIR EVAC" and report to the 2nd U.S. ARMY GENERAL HOSPITAL, FRANKFURT, GERMANY for further transfer to a MEDICAL FACILITY in GERMANY as assigned by CHASNERO, Washington 25, D.C.

CDR D.E. TAPSCOTT NSC USN
BY DIRECTION

Finish File Pers-81218

CVA66, 1321
Code 11
11 June 1967

From: Commanding Officer, USS AMERICA (CVA-66)
To: LT James M. ENNES, LT, USNR, 353840, 1015 1-999990

Subj: Temporary additional duty

Ref: (a) BUPERSINSI 130.23 (Series)

1. You reported for treatment on 9 June 1967 from USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5). You are directed to report not later than 2400, 12 June 1967 to Commanding Officer, Station Hospital, Naples, Italy for temporary additional duty under treatment for a period of approximately four (04) months. Upon discharge from treatment, if found fit for full duty and unless otherwise directed or indicated by the Chief of Naval Personnel, you will return to USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) and resume your regular duties.

2. Government air, messing and messing is authorized where available.

3. Accounting data:

APPROPRIATION	177,804 1810
OBJECT CLASS	212
BUCON	16001
AUTH ACTG ACTIVITY	01753
TRANSACTION TYPE	20
PROPERTY ACTG ACTI	01753
COST CODE	0330039999

The estimated cost of this temporary additional duty is:

TRANS ZERO PER DIEM ZERO MISC ZERO

D. D. ENGEN

Copy to:
BUPERS
CO USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
COMSERVRON EIGHT

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
APO, NEW YORK 09201

AGTR-5
1321
09 JUN 1967

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: LT James M. ENNES, Jr., USN, 653840/1615

Subj: Temporary Additional Duty Orders

1. You are directed to report to the Commanding Officer, USS AMERICA (CVA-66) at 0900, 09 JUN 1967 for temporary additional duty for treatment.
2. These orders are at no cost to the government. Upon completion of this temporary additional duty you will return to your parent command and resume duty.

A. P. O'Malley

Dead, Missing

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The Defense Department Friday released a partial list of casualties aboard the communications ship Liberty, the ship attacked Thursday by Israeli forces.

KNOWN DEAD

Lt. Cmdr. P. M. Armstrong Jr., husband of Mrs. Marie K. Armstrong, 131 Cayuga Road, Virginia Beach.

Quartermaster I.C. Francis Brown, son of Mr. and Mrs. Wade Brown, 3323 6th Ave., Troy, N.Y.

Communications Technician J.C. Allen Higgins, son of Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur Higgins, 219 Fiddlers Green, Dover, Del.
Fireman David Skolak, son of Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph J. Skolak of Gary, Ind.

Postal Clerk 2.C. John Clarence Spicer, husband of Mrs. Linda Lee Spicer, 7901 Hampton Blvd., Norfolk.

Lt. Stephen Spencer Tosh, son of retired Capt. Joseph Tosh, 301 3rd St., Virginia Beach.

Seaman Gary Ray Blanchard, son of Mr. Earl T. Blanchard, 5279 Rose Parkway, Wichita, Kan.

CMG 3. C. Alexander Neri Thompson Jr., relative of Gale E. Thompson, 4 Crystal Dr., Warwick, R.I.

MISSING

Communications Technician J.C. R. J. Campbell, husband of Elizabeth E. Campbell, 40A Doorwood Road, Montrose, Scotland.

Communications Technician 2.C. Robert B. Eisenberg, son of Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Eisenberg, 703 South Lexington Parkway, St. Paul, Minn.

Communications Technician I.C. Warren E. Hersey, son of Mr. and Mrs. Warren O. Hersey, 77 Pine St., Stoneham, Mass.

Communications Technician Seaman James H. Hayden, son of Mr. and Mrs. James H. Hayden, 1411 Allston, Houston, Tex.

Communications Technician I.C. Curtis A. Graves, son of Mr. and Mrs. Bertram D. Graves, 13211 Orange Isle, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Communications Technician J.C. Duane R. Margraf, son of Mr. and Mrs. Clarice H. Margraf, 370 Amory St., Fond Du Lac, Wis.

2.C. Richard W. Keane, son of Mr. Richard W. Keane Sr., 18 Dublin Lane, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.

Communications Technician Seaman James L. Lenau, son of Mr. and Mrs. Leander J. Lenau, 735 East State St., Union, Mo.

Chief Communications Technician Raymond Linn, whose closest next-of-kin (exact relationship not known) is Mrs. Joy Marie Linn, 73 Caravaggio Scala D Apt. 39 Naples, Italy.

Communications Technician Seaman David W. Marlborough, son of William J. Marlborough, 88 Vannais St., Springfield, Mass.

Communications Technician Seaman Carl C. Nygren, son of Arvid C. Nygren, 3512 Tuscala St., Seaford, N.Y.

Chief Communications Technician Melvin D. Smith, husband of Judith Smith, 304 Moreno Court, Warrington, Fla.

Communications Technician J.C. Thomas R. Thornton, son of William R. Thornton, 215 North Race St., Springfield, Ohio.

Communications Technician I.C. J. M. Lupton, husband of Barbara Jean Lupton, 21 E. Sobris Lake, Val Ova, Turkey.

Communications Technician J.C. Phillippe C. Tiedtke, son of Arthur L. Tiedtke, 1630 Ethel Court, Modesto, Calif.

Communications Technician I.C. Frederick J. Walton, husband of Audrey J. Walton, 2735 Military Road, Niagara Falls, N.Y.

Communication Technician I.C. John C. Smith Jr., husband of Sandra A. Smith, 23A Brondebury Road, N.W. 6, London, England.

Cpl. Edward E. Rehmeyer, son of Mr. and Mrs. Edward E. Rehmeyer Jr., Box 4, Railroad, Pa.

Lt. James C. Pierce, husband of Pauline M. Pierce, 1633 Wildwood Drive, Virginia Beach.

Allen M. Blue, Defense Department technical representative, husband of Patsy A. Blue, 11603 Lockwood Drive, Silver Spring, Md.

Marine St. Jack Lewis Roper, relative of Sherry S. Roper 417 West Pelieu Road, Tarawa Terrace, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Navy CT J. C. Jerry Lee Gross, whose parents live in North Vernon, Ind.

Partial List Of 'America' Dead, Missing Removes Casualties

Virginia-Post, Saturday, June 10, 1967

ABOARD THE CARRIER AMERICA (AP) — This 77,000-ton carrier was assigned Friday to the task of removing the dead and wounded from the crippled USS Liberty.

Doctors and medical corpsmen stood by awaiting helicopters scheduled to evacuate the Liberty's casualties to the America. A blood donors' room was set up. The carrier has two hospital wards with about 85 beds available.

Twenty of the injured were described as in serious condition. Plans were to keep the more seriously injured on board until the carrier reaches port.

Bodies of the Liberty's dead — killed in what Israel called an accidental attack Thursday by Israeli naval and air forces — were to be taken aboard the carrier.

Two destroyers were dispatched late Thursday to meet the Liberty, which was able to move at only eight knots because of torpedo damage. They rendezvoused with the Liberty, a Navy communications ship Friday and doctors boarded to assist.

Jack Anderson

USS Liberty: Damages Have Never Been Paid

It has been a full decade since Israeli warplanes and torpedoes struck the communications ship USS Liberty in international waters, leaving 31 Americans dead and 170 wounded.

Yet the full damages have never been paid, and the incident has never been closed. Confidential State Department documents show, moreover, that Israel has tried to renege on its public promise to pay for all "material damage."

All the while, the State Department has covered up its difficult dealings with Israel over the Liberty incident. A secret decision was made not to tell Congress or the public about Israel's refusal to make good on its pledge.

It was the former Israeli government, of course, that balked at compensating the United States. A source close to Prime Minister Menachem Begin assured us that the new Israeli leader will want to straighten out any misunderstanding.

The Liberty, with an electronic garden of antennae attuned to the Mediterranean sound waves, was monitoring the 1967 Arab-Israeli fighting when it was attacked. The apologetic Israelis said afterward that they had mistaken the ship for an Egyptian freighter and would make retribution to the families of the dead and wounded.

The Israelis made it formal in a June 10, 1967, message to Secretary of State Dean Rusk; he was assured that Israel would "make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage." A few months later, Israel laid out \$1 million to the families of the 31 men who were killed. But not a farthing was offered to pay the estimated \$7 million in "material damage."

Indeed, the Israeli Embassy notified the United States on Aug. 3, 1968, that "the government of Israel is not liable for the damage" to the ship. This not only covered the Israelis' public statement, it also outraged American diplomats in both Tel Aviv and Washington.

In Tel Aviv, the U.S. Embassy had off a classified cable to Rusk, declaring that the Israeli position was "disappointing in content and obduracy" and would not "be helpful to stand." Rusk did not have a reply, but that it virtually covered the Israeli's lying.

Rusk instructed the embassy to tell Israel that its attitude was "unacceptable." The Israeli Embassy, however, has refused to pay for the damage.

But the State Department was not so affronted that it would embarrass the Israelis in public. For the secret cable added only: "We have not made either fact of receipt or contents [of the Israeli note] known to public or to Congress."

At first, the Israelis refused to budge; they continued to disclaim financial responsibility for the full damage. This stirred Rusk into drafting a formal note, declaring that the attack was "unprovoked" and that Israel's new position was "in contravention of [its] express assurances." This was harsh diplomatic language accusing Israel of untruthfulness.

But the note was never delivered. At the last minute, the United States received signals that Israel was willing to compromise. The embassy, therefore, recommended that the Rusk rebuttal not be administered. "This will remove from [the] record any indication of the Government of Israel's disavowal of responsibility," explained the cable from Tel Aviv.

The Israelis finally offered the injury claims in April 1969. But they continued to stall on the \$7 million damage claims. There was an occasional straw in the wind. A confidential cable to Secretary of State William Rogers in August 1971 reported that the Israeli foreign ministry hoped to offer something positive "within a few days."

The Israelis said the offer "will bring about a mutually satisfactory settlement of the U.S. government's claim in regard to damage done to the vessel," according to the cable to Rogers from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv.

But, added the embassy, the Israelis "seemed to be hinting that [the] amount the government of Israel would propose may be less than that sought by the U.S. government."

But to this day, the damage payments have not been made.

The USS Liberty, meanwhile, has long since been retired from the Navy and the talks over paying for its repairs still drag on at the Pentagon.

Footnote: An Israeli embassy spokesman said the attack on the Liberty remained a matter of anguish for the Israeli people. But he added that the damage compensation "is not being pursued. We believe it is needed." The U.S. Navy, on the contrary, said damage payments will never be made.

State Department sources said they had no information on the status of the damage payments.

Washington Merry-Go-Round

Israel Still Owes U.S. for Attack

By Jack Anderson and Lee Whitten

WASHINGTON — It has been a full decade since Israeli warplanes and torpedo boats struck the communications ship USS Liberty in international waters, leaving 34 Americans dead and 170 wounded.

Yet the full damages have never been paid, and the incident has never been closed. Classified State Department documents show, moreover, that Israel has tried to weasel on its public promise to pay for all "material damage."

All the while, the State Department has covered up its difficult dealings with Israel over the Liberty incident. A secret decision was made not to tell Congress nor the public about Israel's refusal to make good on its pledge.

It was the former Israeli government, of course, that balked at compensating the United States for shooting up the ship. A source close to Prime Minister Menachem Begin assured us that the new Israeli leader will want to straighten out any misunderstanding.

The Liberty, with an electronic garden of antenna attuned to the Mediterranean sound waves, was monitoring the 1967 Arab-Israeli fighting when it was attacked. The apologetic Israelis said afterward that they had mistaken the ship for an Egyptian freighter and would make retribution to the families of the dead and wounded.

The Israelis made this formal in a June 10, 1967, message to Secretary of State Dean Rusk; he was assured that Israel would "make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage." A few months later, Israel laid out \$3,323,500 to the families of the 34 men who were killed. But not a farthing was offered to pay the estimated \$7 million "material damage."

Indeed, the Israelis secretly notified the United States on Aug. 8, 1967, that "the government of Israel is responsible for the damage" to the ship. This not only contradicted the Israelis' public statements; it also outraged American

diplomats in both Tel Aviv and Washington.

From Tel Aviv, the U.S. embassy fired off a classified cable to Rusk declaring that the Israeli position was "disappointing in negativeness and obduracy" and could not "be allowed to stand." Rusk shot back a reply so hot that it virtually accused the Israelis of lying.

Rusk instructed the embassy to tell Israel that its attitude was "totally unacceptable." The United States "cannot believe it is (Israel's) final position," declared the incredulous Rusk.

But the State Department was not so affronted that it would embarrass the Israelis in public. For the secret cable added slyly: "We have not made either fact of receipt or contents (of the Israeli note) known to public or to Congress."

At first, the Israelis refused to budge; they continued to disclaim financial responsibility for the full damage. This stirred Rusk into drafting a formal note, declaring that the attack was "unprovoked" and that Israel's new position was "in contravention of (its) express assurances." This was

harsh diplomatic language accusing Israel of untruthfulness.

But the note was never delivered. At the last minute, the United States received signals that Israel was willing to compromise. The embassy, therefore, recommended that the Rusk rebuke not be administered. "This will remove from (the) record any indication of the Government of Israel's disavowal of responsibility," explained the cable from Tel Aviv.

The Israelis finally got around to settling the injury claim in April, 1969, for \$3.3 million. But they continued to stall on the \$7 million damage claim. There was an occasional straw in the wind. A confidential cable to Secretary of State William Rogers in August, 1971, reported that the Israeli foreign ministry hoped to offer something positive "within a few days." But to this day, the damage payments have not been made.

The USS Liberty, meanwhile, has long since been retired from the Navy and the talks over paying for its repairs still drag on at the Pentagon.

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Wednesday, July 20, 1977

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10 Americans Die, 100 Wounded In Israeli Attack On U.S. Ship

U.S. Recalls Fighters After Getting Apology

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Ten Americans were killed and

about 100 wounded when Israeli jets and three Israeli torpedo boats attacked a U.S. communications ship in the eastern Mediterranean Thursday. Israel apologized and said it was a mistake.

The Defense Department said U.S. war planes and fighters were launched from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean but were recalled when the Israeli government acknowledged responsibility for the attack.

The White House disclosed that before it heard from Israel, the United States used the "hot line" teletype circuit linking Washington and Moscow to inform the Russians of the attack and to explain that U.S. planes were scrambling for a search for survivors.

"Sending In Planes"

The message, one of a series this week in the first use of the hot line in a crisis, was "an advisory that something had happened to one of our ships and we were sending planes in," a White House spokesman said.

Pentagon officials said two destroyers from the U.S. 6th Fleet were on their way to assist the USS Liberty, which was hit in the attack. They said the two vessels should reach the Liberty about midnight EDT.

The Pentagon said to sell jet fighters—it did not say how many—made about six strafing runs against the ship, which was about 15 miles north of the Sinai peninsula in international waters.



Battle Sites

Map locates five sites where Israeli forces Thursday defeated Egyptian tanks and planes, according to the Israeli army. The map also locates where a U.S. Navy ship was strafed and torpedoed by Israeli forces. Egypt, yesterday agreed to the United Nations cease-fire demand. Israel had already agreed to stop if the Arabs stopped. (AP Photofax)

About 30 minutes later, officials added, three torpedo boats approached the Liberty on her starboard or right-hand quarter and fired at least two torpedoes.

The Liberty fired its 30 machineguns at one of the torpedoes, the Pentagon said. The torpedo passed 25 feet from the ship. About a minute later, a torpedo hit the ship's hull. At least one of the torpedo boats machinegunned the Liberty.

The first jet attack, Israeli officials said, was by an American F-4 Phantom II fighter south of the ship about 400 miles from the coast. The jet attacked the Liberty, and the ship's fighters launched four Albatross fighters for cover.

Message Of Apology

While these planes were streaking toward the Liberty, a message of apology was received from Tel Aviv. The planes were directed to return to their carriers before they reached the ship, a converted World War II victory ship.

The Pentagon said about 20 of the Liberty's 100 wounded crewmen were seriously hurt. The attack occurred at 8:05 a.m. EDT, or 2:05 p.m. Middle East time.

The Liberty reported extensive but superficial damage "topside" and some lower deck spaces forward destroyed. It said the ship would require drydock and extensive refitting.

The Pentagon said the Liberty was in no danger of sinking. It was reported steaming north at eight knots to meet other 6th Fleet vessels.

The ship was flying U.S. colors when attacked. The incident produced the first American military casualties in four days of the Arab-Israeli war. Three American newsmen have been killed in the fighting.

20 Bodies Found in 'Liberty'

VALETTA, Malta (AP) — Salvage crew Thursday brought 20 bodies from the U.S. Navy communications ship Liberty, crippled by Israeli air and torpedo attacks last week.

A Navy plane flew the bodies to Naples en route to the United States. Navy spokesmen said three were too badly mutilated for prompt identification. Total death toll in the attack now stands at 31 with 29 bodies recovered and 5 missing.

The Navy believes the missing men washed out of the gaping torpedo hole in the ship's starboard side.

News men were allowed aboard the Liberty in Malta drydock for the first time. Officers and crew were under strict instructions not to discuss the attack. This security blanket, the Navy said, will last at least until the official court of inquiry into the incident has completed its report, a task likely to last a week.

From the damage above the water line, however, it was clear that the Liberty was subject to prolonged air attack. Her crew counted 821 separate hits from rockets and aircraft cannon in addition to the torpedo.

The torpedo struck the Liberty in what was once a cargo hold, but since her conversion to a communications ship it was used as an office area. It ripped a hole 20 feet wide and 25 feet high in her plating, most of it below the water line.

Inside the hold, salvage men sifted through a tangle of metal-smashed bulkheads, radio equipment, office furniture and blackened typewriters. They threw this out of the ship's side on the dock. The Navy said the emergency repair work is likely to take two weeks before the Liberty can sail home for a complete refit.

Ship On Way to Malta

Bodies of Liberty Crewmen Will Be Shipped to Norfolk

NORFOLK — Air facilities at Norfolk have been selected as a major East Coast terminal to receive bodies of crewmen from the ill-fated electronics ship Liberty.

A spokesman at Atlantic Fleet headquarters said here today that no definite time for the arrival of the first bodies has been received, but reports from the Mediterranean indicate that nine have already been flown to Athens for shipment home.

The Naval Hospital at Portsmouth is also expected to receive a large portion of the

wounded, many of whom come from this area.

Twenty-two men are still trapped and presumed dead in the flooded compartments below the second deck where an Israeli torpedo struck. These compartments were sealed to prevent the ship's sinking following the attack by Israeli fighters and PT boats off the Sinai coast Thursday.

Another 75 of the Liberty's 13 officers and 275 men were wounded. Of these, 59 hospital cases have been transferred to the Norfolk-based carrier Ameri-

ca and to the 5th Fleet flagship Little Rock.

Three of the most serious cases, with head and eye wounds, were evacuated from the carrier yesterday to a military hospital in West Germany. The other wounded men have stayed aboard the Liberty.

The Liberty left Norfolk last November for its Mediterranean deployment. She had been sent in close to the Sinai shore to serve as a communications relay for evacuation of American civilians from the Middle East.


The ship is now on her way to Malta for drydocking. She is accompanied by the destroyer Davis and the Norfolk-based fleet tug Pagago.

Cmdr. William L. McGonagle of the 200 block of Oak Grove Road, Norfolk, the ship's commanding officer, has remained with the Liberty despite a leg wound.

The Liberty was last reported southwest of Crete making 10 knots. An eight-degree list to starboard has been reduced to three or four, one report stated.

Listed as dead from Tidewater are the ship's executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Philip M. Armstrong Jr.; the ship's navigator, Lt. Steven Spencer Toth; and Petty Officer John Clarence Spicher.

Listed as Missing is Lt. James C. Pierce, security group officer.



Injured crewmen of the Liberty relax on the America. (UPI)

Israel Pledges to Make Amends for Ship Attack

WASHINGTON (UPI)—Israel promised Saturday to "make amends" for its attack on a U.S. Navy ship which may have killed as many as 33 American sailors.

Israel Ambassador Avraham Harman told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that his government is prepared "to make amends for the tragic loss of lives and material damage" resulting from the attack on the communications ship Liberty in the Eastern Mediterranean Thursday.

Just what amends would be made were not specified, but presumably it would include compensation for the damage done to the Liberty, which reported "extensive but superficial damage topside and some lower-deck spaces forward destroyed."

The latest count showed that at least nine men were killed in the air and torpedo attack, 24 missing and 75 wounded. The missing men were believed trapped in the flooded forward compartments.

United Press International correspondent Harry J. Stathos, reporting from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, said the men missing in the flooded compartments were all believed to be dead. He said they were trapped when a torpedo struck the ship.

The Pentagon said the Liberty had changed its destination from Souda Bay, Crete, where it had been due to dock late Saturday, to Malta, where it is expected to arrive Monday.

Ambassador Harman told Rusk that Israel wishes "to renew its sincere expression of deep regret for the tragic incident." Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol called President Johnson his regrets Friday.

Some U.S. military officials said Saturday they were satisfied the attack was accidental—a case of mistaken identity. But Assistant Defense Secretary Phil S. Canine said the Defense Department could not accept an attack upon a clearly marked noncombatant U.S. naval ship in international waters as "plausible" under any circumstances whatsoever.

He said that "the suggestion that the U.S. flag was not visible and the implication that the identification markings were in any way inadequate are both unrealistic and inaccurate...."

In the first apology, immediately after the attack, an Israeli spokesman said the Liberty was not flying a flag. This was denied by the Defense Department, but officials said Saturday it was possible the attackers may not have seen it. They said the Liberty was moving slowly, there was little wind, and the flag may have been hanging limp.

Nevertheless, they said, the vessel bore its name on the stern and identifying numerals on its bow.

In its first description of the

attack, about 15 miles from the Sinai coast, the Pentagon said the Liberty was strafed by an undetermined number of jet planes, then, 20 minutes later, attacked by three torpedo boats.

But Saturday, officials said there might have been less time between attacks since it was not known whether the attack was clocked from the beginning or the end of the aerial attack.

There was also the possibility the torpedo boats were some miles from the Liberty when the planes attacked, sped toward the engagement and fired their two torpedoes before they were close enough to identify the Liberty as a U.S. vessel.

One torpedo struck the converted World War II Victory ship, which was fitted with the latest electronic equipment for service as a communications ship.

The Defense Department, meanwhile, identified the last three of 33 known dead or missing. They were:

Dead—Seaman Carl L. Hoar, son of Mr. and Mrs. James B. Hoar, Rt. 3, Mount Vernon, Ohio.

Missing — Communications Technician 2.C. A.P. Mendle, son of Mr. and Mrs. John J. Mendle, 5012 Flynn Lane, Glendale, Ariz.; Communications Technician 3.C. Jerry Leroy Converse, son of Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Ray Converse, Boone, Iowa.

WASH POST
9 JUNE 67

Israel Hits U.S. Ship, 10 Killed

Envoy Here Apologizes For Attack

Officials said that men on the Liberty fired the ship's 50-caliber machine guns at one of the torpedoes as it raced through the water. One torpedo missed the mark, passing 25 yards astern of the Liberty, but the second one hit the starboard side. The ship did not sink and is

See SHIP, A20, Col. 6

'Hot Line' Informs Reds AF Planes Were Rescue-Bound

George C. Wilson
Anthony Astrucman

The U.S. sailors were killed and 100 wounded yesterday when Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked a U.S. Navy communication ship in the Mediterranean.

Israel said the attack was a mistake and apologized. The USS Liberty, a converted World War II Victory ship whose electronic equipment can also be used for



Associated Press

The USS Liberty, which was attacked by Israeli planes and torpedo boats.

SHIP—From Page A1

10 Die as Israelis Attack U.S. Ship; Envoy Here Apologizes for Mistake

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Ship Sent From Carrier
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6 Strafing Runs Made
He said an unknown number of Israeli jet fighters made strafing runs on the Liberty which was being used as a hospital ship...
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The Pentagon said that 20 of the 100 wounded men were in serious condition from the strafing and the torpedo runs...
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Two U.S. destroyers...
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Secretary of State Dean Rusk received an emergency call about the attack yesterday morning while meeting members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Capitol Hill. He told the senators a communication ship had been hit, sources said, then he left for the White House...
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Rumors flashed through Washington that a U.S. destroyer had been sunk, heightening fears that the war would spread...
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An hour and a half later, Goulding made the first announcement of the nature of the attack. He said the Israeli government informed the U.S. Capitol Hill. He told the senators a communication ship had been hit, sources said, and the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv...

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...the was in interna-

of the "terror by Israeli forces" and apologized. There was no information as to how the attack happened, but an Israeli source pointed out that Egyptian planes were operating in the east Mediterranean threatening Israeli cities...
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James M. ...

ALL SHIRTS CUSTOMER
LAUNDRY
RE 7-8

752447

4 Virginians On 'Liberty' Injured List

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Navy listed four Virginia servicemen Saturday as critically or seriously injured in the Israeli air attack on the communications ship Liberty Thursday, stationed off the Egyptian coast in the Mediterranean.

Critically injured was Ship's Serviceman 2.C. Donald Herold, husband of Mrs. Jane Elaine Herold of Chesapeake.

Gunner's Mate 3.C. David Carl Hazen, husband of Mrs. Wanda S. Hazen of Portsmouth; Communication Technician 1.C. Joseph Charles Lentini, husband of Mrs. Sandra Lentini of Norfolk; and Lt. James George O'Connor, husband of Mrs. Sandra O'Connor of Norfolk, were listed in serious condition.

USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5)
NYO, NEW YORK, 09501

PLAN OF THE DAY
SUNDAY, 25 June 1967

CDO: LING PAINTER
DUTY OFFICER: HUB BROOKS

DUTY DEPT: WASH
DUTY SECT: III

PLAN OF THE DAY
OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KIWAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNYRETS

LIBERTY UNIFORM:
OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WHITE LONG
ENLISTED: TROPICAL WHITE LONG

LIBERTY UNIFORM:
TROPICAL WASH KIWAKI
DUNYRETS

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, UNLESS AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0900 - LIBERTY COULDENCES for sections I & II.

NOTES:

1. There will be a softball game at the Varsity Sports Club today at 1400. All Hands are invited. Transportation will leave the ship at 1330. Beer will be bought by the Welfare and Recreation Fund.


2. A check for \$100.00 was donated from USS LING (SS-297) to USS LIBERTY with the following letter:

a. Officer in Charge & Crew of the USS LING (SS-297) extend our sincere sympathy to your command and the families of the men who died and/or were wounded during your ship's most recent tragedy.

b. You are requested to use enclosure (1) (\$100.00) in any manner you feel appropriate in order to give comfort and aid to the dependents of your men who died while serving their country.

3. A check for \$25.00 was donated from Mrs. A. A. FURSTEN, 5241 Pirrotte Drive, San Diego, California 92105.

a. She sends her sympathies and profound regret and as a token of her deep appreciation for the men who guarded the peace of the seas sends a check of \$25.00 to be included in a memorial fund.


G. R. GOLDEN, LT, USN
Executive Officer

★ USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) ★
FPO NEW YORK, 09501

----- P L A N O F T H E D A Y -----
----- Wednesday 21 JUNE 1967 -----

CDO. LT BENNETT
DUTY OFFICER ENS ALKICA

DUTY DEPT: ENG
DUTY SECT. II

UNIFORM OF THE DAY
OFFICERS & CPO'S
ENLISTED

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
CLEAN DUNGAREES

LIBERTY UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S
ENLISTED

TROPICAL WHITE LONG
TROPICAL WHITE LONG

MORNING UNIFORM
TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4230.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P3400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN

1530 - LIBERTY COMMENCES for sections I & III

NOTES

1. The Commanding Officer extends his congratulations to Mr. TAYLOR on his advancement to Lieutenant Junior Grade on the 10th of June.
2. The following message was received from CINCUSNAVEUR: To CDR W. L. MCGONAGLE, USN


The tragedy is beyond recall. What place there may be, however small, lies in the magnificent performance of the officers and men of LIBERTY in an action of historic stature in the face of an unprovoked attack. Under most difficult and trying circumstances not only did the ship defend itself valiantly, but through superb seamanship on the part of all hands, the ship was brought safely into port.

You your officers and men answered the call to duty with unquestioned valor. The performance of all hands stands out as an example in history of that type of courage which marks American valor as the finest in the world.

I am proud to be associated with you.

/s/ Admiral John S. MCGONAGLE, USN

3. Personal property loss/damage claims are to be turned in to ship's office on Monday, 26 June 1967.


LT C. H. GOLDER, USN
Executive Officer

Nick Thimmesch

Abourezk: Retired, But Not Retiring

WASH. POST
5
14 JAN 79

Jim Abourezk, the freshly retired South Dakota senator, reports that, on the first day in his law office, he didn't get one customer, not even a walk-in, so he's ready to draw up wills for old friends. Moreover, he now reflects that as a guest on the tony premises of W. Averell Harriman, Abourezk was once mistaken for the caterer, which only proves that all glory is fleeting.

So maybe it's fair to ask whether Abourezk will be remembered as a meteor across the black prairie sky, or as the good-natured maverick who filibustered against the energy bill, or as a lone voice for the Arabs.

Abourezk's generalship in the 14-hour filibuster (unsuccessful) against deregulation of natural gas caused President Carter to fume and Senate leader Robert Byrd to gnash his teeth. But then Abourezk, in his eight years as senator and representative of the liberal Democratic persuasion, never spared his own party or its leaders, and to hear him now, retirement hasn't changed him.

"Carter's now going through the hypocrisy of cutting welfare programs and increasing defense, just for the 1980 election," he says. "He might anger enough Democrats that [Edward] Kennedy or [Jerry] Brown will go in the primaries and beat him. Teddy won't run unless Carter has already split the party. Teddy could beat him anytime, even when Carter's strongest. Brown could beat Carter but tear up the party. Then if [Ronald] Reagan ran, he could walk in over Carter."

Abourezk's disaffection with the administration is keenest on the energy issue. "Carter and [James] Schlesinger express dismay that the OPEC nations raised oil prices, and then [Alfred] Kahn, the great inflation fighter, screams how it will cause more inflation. The hypocrisy of these bastards. What have they done in the past two years but raise gasoline and oil prices here? Schlesinger say he's going to present a new plan to deregulate gasoline at the pump, and also bring our crude oil prices up to the world level. Such hypocrisy."

He can also scathe his former colleagues. "The Senate and House are like a bunch of sheep, after Proposition 13," he says. "If there was leadership, the social programs could be saved. But politicians up there are encouraged to run forever because of the seniority system and the benefits. So they will avoid anything that will defeat them. They figure controversy is what will prevent their re-election. So they do cosmetics on our serious economic and social problems, which are really mounting."

There must be something in the water that young boys growing up in Rosebud, S.D., drink to make him talk so. But it comes out with such deceptive humor that it is sometimes hard to resist.

"In the past 30 years the military came around every spring warning about the China treaty, the yellow peril," he says. "The generals warned how China could invade the United States. That's why we got into Vietnam. Now, it turns out somebody lied because we find out that China can't even invade Taiwan, so they sure can't invade the United States, can they?"

Abourezk feels deeply about his heritage. His father, Charlie, came to South Dakota in 1895 from a farm village in Lebanon and worked as a peddler and trader with Indians. Abourezk has visited several Arab nations and Israel, partly in search of roots and partly because of his strong interest in making that region stable and peaceful. But he mostly has caught the devil from the Israeli lobby



By Harry Meitzner—The Washington Post

for his outspokenness on behalf of an "even-handed" U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Though he enjoyed liberal Jewish support on traditional Democratic issues and teamed up with one of the Senate's Jewish members, Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, for the energy filibuster, Abourezk has publicly criticized Israel many times over the years.

"I always said we ought to support Israel but not her conquests" is the way he explains it. So he voted against the \$2.2 billion arms resupply bill for Israel after the 1973 October war, and now favors a cut off of aid until Israel "gives back the land it took." He also kept a running attack on Israel for its bombing of Lebanese villages, which the Israelis call hideouts for Palestinian terrorists and which Abourezk usually argues are just residential areas for poor Arabs.

"The Israeli lobby is the most powerful in the country," he declares. "They can call on millions of American Jews to do what they want them to. Through their newsletters and synagogues, they establish a party line and denounce candidates and administration decisions, and even generate hate mail."

"They stifle dissent and press criticism, and make people fearful of being characterized as anti-Semitic. I've even been accused of being anti-Semitic. Hell, I'm a Semite myself! Arabs and Jews share the same ethnic origins."

"Some senators tell me privately they are disgusted with Israeli lobbying, but then they vote for

Israel every time. If people would write how the Israelis have confiscated land on the West Bank, how they are really after the cheap Arab labor supply and not the historic areas of Judea and Samaria, maybe there would be some changes."

Abourezk gets worked up when he talks like this, and the charge that he is a voice for the Arab lobby looms in the mind. "I am an Arab American," he protests, "but my priority is the United States, not any Arab country or Israel either."

He calms down but won't leave the subject. "When it comes to foreign aid to Israel," he says, "It is an expression of our domestic policy, not our foreign policy. Say, I like the way I said that."

Then he laughs, and admits that he really didn't have much influence on the Hill concerning the Middle East.

If Abourezk is such a man of principle, why did he cut short such a promising political career?

"Whether I am there or not doesn't make any difference to the country," he explains. "I've done enough controversy. I've always done what I thought was right. I want to be out in private life. If I thought I could make a difference anymore, I would forgo the joys of private life."

"I'm not like Nixon and some guys on the Hill whose only life is politics. All they ever do is run for office. I have other interests. I like my guitar, photography, and my friends. I go fishing once in a while. I like going home to South Dakota."

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USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

CDO: LT BENNETT
DUTY OFFICER: ENS KEKICH/BMC DRAKE

DUTY DEPT: SUPPLY
DUTY SECT: III

PLAN OF THE DAY

TUESDAY, 15 AUGUST 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER
IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION
P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Continue INSURV

1615 - LIBERTY - Sections I, II, & IV, to expire on board 0730, Wednesday, 16 Aug.

NOTES

1. Wearing of Civilian Clothes - E-6 and below are not authorized to wear or
have civilian clothing aboard. There are ample locker clubs ashore for this
purpose.

2. Funeral services for CT3 Jerry L. GOSB, CTSN Lawrence P. HAYDEN, CT1 James
M. LUPTON, CTSA David W. MARLBOROUGH and SGT Jack L. RAPER will be held at Fort
Meyer Chapel at Arlington National Cemetery at 0945, 21 Aug 1967. Arrangements
are being made for transportation to and from Washington for those desiring to go.
Departments submit to ship's office the number of persons desiring transportation.
A floral wreath will be sent from ship's company.

3. The following letter was received from Mrs. TOTH, mother of LT TOTH:

"Dear Captain McGOUGHEE,
Captain TOTH and I want to thank the Officers, Wives, and crew of the
USS LIBERTY for the beautiful red, white and blue flowers you sent to the funeral
of our son, Stephen, in Annapolis. We appreciate your thoughtfulness so much, and
wonder how you could remember to be so kind in the face of such disaster which
struck so many. We are so relieved that there were no more casualties and the ship
came safely home.

A friend, wife of R. Admiral Robert THEOBALD, wrote a poem about Stephen.
She had known him since he was fourteen years old. This poem would apply to any of
his shipmates of the LIBERTY, and we would like to share it with the members of this
gallant ship.

Thank you again for the lovely flowers. Sincerely, Margaret L. Toth"

You were born with great pride	Away on a ship,
And raised with true love,	A choice of your own-
And guided, I'm sure	And sent by your country
By the Stars up above-	To guard all alone-

You were straight as an arrow,	The ship sailed through calm waters
And bright as the sun	Internationally there
With learning behind you	But the enemy opened fire
And new doors partly sprung.	And gave not a care-

Th' your ship had no guns,
Communications your style.
The enemy fired-
And Torpedoed all the while

You all fought so valiantly
With the means that you had-
But the count of those fallen
Was desperately bad.

Today we pay you honor
And lay you gently to rest-
The boy straight as an arrow
And with joy in his breast.

June 14, 1967
Sigrid Theobald

You are free from this world,
So troubled and torn,
And we feel even greater pride
Than the day you were born.

For we saw you grow tall,
And we know that you cared-
And we know for those years
The great joy that we shared-

Sail on now, dear Stephen
Where stars brightly glow
For our pride in your sailings
Will eternally show-

M. H. Watson
M. H. WATSON, LTJG, USNR
Command Duty Officer

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

1502

PLAN OF THE DAY

THURSDAY, 13 JULY 1967

CDO: LTJG PALMER
DUTY OFFICER: ENS ADAMS

DUTY SECT: III
DUTY DEPT: DECK

UNIFORM OF THE DAY
OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

LIBERTY UNIFORMS:

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WHITE LONG
ENLISTED: TROPICAL WHITE LONG

WORKING UNIFORMS:

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P. 100.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1530 - LIBERTY CONFERENCE for Sections I & II

NOTES

1. READY FOR SEA????? Now is the time to start securing the ship for sea. There is a place for everything and everything should be in its place. Don't be fooled into thinking the ship doesn't roll. Secure everything so it doesn't end up on the deck broken.

2. Present plans are to flood the drydock tomorrow afternoon. Liberty will be controlled by the flooding schedule.

3. The ship will depart "at sea" at 0700, Sunday 16 July and arrive Norfolk at 1000, Saturday, 29 July.

4. LIBERTYINST 6240.1, Encl (1), Paragraph 1, (c) and (d).

"In order to maintain a high degree of hygiene and sanitation throughout the ship, the following measures should be strictly adhered to:

- (1) No food is to be stored in the berthing spaces.
- (2) No food is to be brought into the berthing spaces at any time."

5. Personal Loss Claims will be turned into the Ship's office prior to 1530, 13 July 1967. Any claims received after the deadline will not be processed until arrival in Norfolk.

6. Ship's office has received SUPERSNOTE 1300, Subj: U. S. Antarctic Program, 1968-1969 (Operation Deep Freeze); solicitation of volunteers for. Any personnel desiring information on this program may obtain same from Ship's Office.

7. The following card was received from the family of CT1 Frederick J. WALTON.
"Thank you sincerely for your thoughtful kindness at a time when it was deeply appreciated."

8. The personnel who participated in the weekend of rest and recreation to Naples would like to extend their appreciation to the Commanding Officer for making this possible.

USS LIBERTY (AGOS-5)
New York, NY 09501

PLAN OF THE DAY
Monday, 04 July 1967

COO: LT GOLDEN
DUTY OFFICER: ENS KIKIC

DUTY DEPT: DECK
DUTY STAFF: III

UNIFORM OF THE DAY
OFFICERS & CREW: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

LIBERTY UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CREW: TROPICAL WHITE LONG
ENLISTED: TROPICAL WHITE LONG

MARKING UNIFORM
TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0745 - Master on station
0800 - Commence Holiday Routine
0900 - LIBERTY COMEXES for sections I & II

NOTES:

1. Brunch will be served today on the Mess Decks from 0730 - 1200.

2. The following card was received from the parents and family of SN Gary R. BLANCHARD (Deceased):

The tribute you accorded
our loved one was
deeply appreciated and
is gratefully acknowledged
by the family of

/s/ Mr. & Mrs. Earl Blanchard and Family

3. Happy Fourth of July.

4. Anyone interested in running the ship's library contact Ensign ADA's. This is a paying job.

5. Ship's picnic today. Fun and games for all and/or good beer drinking and supper. WENS have graciously accepted our invitation to join the party. Transportation provided both ways. Uniform: Athletic type; dungarees, tennis shoes, ball caps. Disembark the ship at 1300. Supper about 1730.


D. L. FURSON, LTDR, USN
Executive Officer

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

PLAN OF THE DAY

-----WEDNESDAY, 12 JULY 1967-----

CDO: ENS SCOTT

DUTY OFFICER: ENS O'MALLEY

DUTY DEPT: OPS

DUTY SECT: II

UNIFORM OF THE DAY

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI

ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

LIBERTY UNIFORM:

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WHITE LONG

ENLISTED: TROPICAL WHITE LONG

WORKING UNIFORM:

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI

DUNGAREES

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1300 - Commence Rope Yarn Survey. LIBERTY OF THE OPS for Stations I & III.

NOTES

1. Telephone numbers in Norfolk to check on time of ship arrival on the 29th: 0800 - 1600 call 444-2331. Anytime call 444-7731 (recording). Recommend calls not be made before the 28th as the Naval Station will probably not be prepared to give the latest information. Current plans are to arrive in the early afternoon.

2. A ball game will be played today at 1400 with the NATO Team. Transportation will commence shuttle runs from the ship at 1300.


3. The below transcribed letters were received from the Arvid C. NYGREN family.

"Officers, Wives and Crew of the USS LIBERTY, We wish to thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending us a beautiful sympathy bouquet. We feel fortunate that Carl was associated with such a wonderful crew. Sincerely, The "NYGREN" Family."

"Dear Sir, First we hope you are well on the way to recovery. We've been following avidly everything the Navy has seen fit to release to the Press and our imagination can conjure up the rest. We appreciate your description and was glad Carl had no pain, just the ones who are left with his memory of a life loving boy -- maybe if we could understand Pentagon strategy we wouldn't have such an empty spot in our hearts. Sincerely, Laura NYGREN and Family."

4. The following card was received from the family of QM3 Francis BROWN.

"The family of Francis BROWN acknowledges with deep appreciation your kind expression of sympathy."


D. L. BURSON, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: OPS

PLAN OF THE DAY

Monday, 17 July 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY

OFFICERS & CPO'S:

ENLISTED:

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI

CLEAN DUNGAREES

WORKING UNIFORM

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI

POCKETS

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0745 - Quarters

NOTES

1. For light-line and hi-line transfers the following stations are to be manned by the normally assigned sea detail personnel:

Helms Bridge Phone Talkers Aftersteering

2. The next two weeks are to be devoted to accomplishing three main objections.

- Preparing reports for the forthcoming yard overhaul.
- Maintaining the new paint job topside.
- Returning the interior of the ship to 4.0 condition of cleanliness and neatness.

3. The following letter was received from the parents of Alan HIGGINS:

Officers, wives, & crewmen,

Your thoughtful expression of sympathy moved us deeply. We are proud knowing our son Alan served with such a courageous group of men.

Please accept our heartfelt sympathy for the loss of so many of your friends and for your wounded shipmates.

Thanking you sincerely,

/s/ Mr. & Mrs. Wilbur Higgins

4. The following letter was received from the mother of Alan GRAVES:

Officers, wives, & crew of the USS LIBERTY,

I deeply appreciate your kind expression of sympathy upon the loss of my son, Curtis Alan GRAVES and the lovely flowers you sent to my home.

Sincerely,

/s/ Florence Graves


D. L. HURON, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK 09501

PLAN OF THE DAY

Wednesday, 05 June 1967

CDO: LT NEBETT
DUTY OFFICER: ENS KEKICH

DUTY DEPT: 0534
DUTY SECT: I

UNIFORMS OF THE DAY

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

LIBERTY UNIFORM:
OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI

'TROPICAL WASH KHAKI'
TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER
IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION
P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1630 - LIBERTY CONFERENCES for sections II & III

NOTES

1. Dungaree shirts are a part of the uniform of the day and the working uniform.
Wear them.

2. Hand salutes are to be rendered as follows: a. Boarding or departing the ship.
b. Upon each meeting or passing of the Commanding Officer. c. Upon the first
meeting or passing of the day to each superior officer.

3. Mail boxes for pick-up of outgoing mail are now in use. These boxes are located
in the Operations/Engineering berthing compartment, Research berthing compartment,
Officers Country of Level and outside CPO'S lounge on main deck. Use only mail
boxes that are secured by a lock.

4. The following letter was received from Mrs. James W. Lupton, wife of CPl James W.
LUPTON.

"Dear Commander O'Connell,

Thank you very much for your words of comfort and sympathy. Your letter
answered many questions I had concerning my husband's death. Jim's death, as the
death of all the other men, was with honor. He was always proud of his country and
of his uniform, and he once told me that he wanted his death to mean something. He
died doing his duty, and that is of great value to me.

I can appreciate how difficult it must have been for you to write this letter
because you had so many of them to write. I also extend my sympathies to you because
it must be hard to lose so many members of your crew and be powerless to do anything
about it.

The newspaper stated that you were attacked because you had evidence that

Israel had started the war. Of course, there are rumors without foundation and until it is proven otherwise, I must believe that the attack was an accident. However, the apology of the Israeli Government will not bring back the men who lost their lives.

May God bless you and your crew and protect your ship from further disaster.

Sincerely,

Mr. James M. LUPTON

5. The following letter was received from the Commanding Officer of the USS AFRICA (CVR-66).

Dear Commander McConagle,

As you are aware from message traffic, the last of your men have left this ship for duty or further hospital treatment. I am pleased to be able to report that they all are making very satisfactory recoveries, even the most seriously injured, although some of them will be hospitalized for some time. They are an outstanding group of men and it was a pleasure to meet them. Their quiet fortitude and patience was evident from the outset and was a great asset throughout their stay aboard AFRICA. They quickly won the admiration of our men and many friendships rapidly formed. All shared in the pleasure of their recovery and wished them well as they left. You and the Navy have every reason to be proud of your men as they are a fine example of fortitude in a time of adversity, in the best Navy tradition.

CDR John Gordon and LCDR Pete Lynn both spent many hours in the operating room and in intensive care in the wards. The crew and the crewmen of AFRICA gave everything they had to insure a complete recovery in each case. It was a pleasure to see them work and to see the great interest they took in each man.

We all hope you and your crew are rested and that LIBERTY is being repaired expeditiously. We wish you a pleasant voyage home.

Sincerely,

D.D. JERRY

W. I. White
U.S. NAVY, LT, USN
COMMAND DUTY OFFICER



United Press International

MILITARY HONORS — Ten weeks after the Israeli attack on U.S. communications ship 'Liberty,' remains of six of the vic-

tims were buried in one casket. Families of all 34 dead attended yesterday's service at the Arlington National Cemetery.



One of USS Liberty's victims—now believed to be 31—arrives aboard carrier America. Story A13.

Associated Press.

Casualties On Bombed Ship Listed

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Defense department released Friday a partial list of casualties aboard the USS Liberty, the ship attacked Thursday by Israeli forces.

The initial list gives the names of 20 men known dead and 29 missing. More names are to be released after next of kin are notified.

KNOWN DEAD

- Lt. Cmdr. P. M. Armstrong, husband of Mrs. Marie K. Armstrong, Virginia Beach, Virginia.
- Quartermaster 2nd class Francis Brown, son of Mr. and Mrs. Wade Brown, Elmwood, New York.
- Communications technician 3rd class Allen Higgins, son of Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur Higgins, Dover, Del.
- Fireman David Sholah, son of Mr. and Mrs. Rudolph J. Sholah, Gary, Ind.
- Postal clerk 2nd class John Clarence Spicer, husband of Mrs. Linda Lee Spicer, Norfolk, Va.
- Lt. Stephen Spencer Toth, son of Capt. Joseph C. Toth, USN (ret.), Virginia Beach, Va.
- Seaman Gary Ray Blanchard, son of Earl T. Blanchard, Wichita, Kan.

MISSING

- Communications technician 2nd class R. J. Campbell, husband of Elizabeth F. Campbell, 44 A. Montrose, Scotland.
- Communications technician 2nd class Robert R. Eisenberg, son of Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin Eisenberg, St. Paul, Minn.
- Communications technician 1st class Warren E. Henson, son of Mr. and Mrs. Warren E. Henson, Stoughton, Mass.
- Communications technician 2nd class James M. Hayden, son of Mr. and Mrs. James M. Hayden, Houston, Tex.
- Communications technician 1st class Curtis A. Graves, son of Mr. and Mrs. William D. Graves, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
- Communications technician 2nd class Thomas R. Margraf, son of Mr. and Mrs. Clifton M. Margraf, Fond du Lac, Wis.
- Communications technician 2nd class Richard W. Kerne, son of Mr. Richard W. Kerne Sr., Paughkeensie, N.Y.
- Communications technician 2nd class James L. Loran, son of Mr. and Mrs. Loran L. Loran, Fond du Lac, Wis.
- Chief communications technician Raymond Lynn, son of Mrs. J. Lynn Lynn, Naples, Fla.
- Communications technician 2nd class David W. McPherson, son of William J. McPherson, Springfield, Mass.
- Communications technician seaman Carl

- Nycten, son of Arvid C. Nycten, Seabrook, N.J.
- Chief communications technician Marvin D. Smith, husband of Judith Smith, Washington, Fla.
- Communications technician 3rd class Thomas R. Thurston, son of William R. Thurston, Springfield, Ohio.
- Communications technician 1st class J. M. Lupton, husband of Barbara Jean Lupton, East Troy, Turkey.
- Communications technician 3rd class Philippe C. Tiedje, son of Arthur L. Tiedje, Modesto, Calif.
- Communications technician 1st class Frederick J. Walton, husband of Audrey J. Walton, Niagara Falls, N.Y.
- Communications technician 1st class John C. Smith Jr., husband of Sandra A. Smith, London, England.
- Cpl. Edward F. Rehmsdorfer, son of Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Rehmsdorfer Jr., Railroad, Pa.
- Lt. James C. Pierce, husband of Pauline M. Pierce, Virginia Beach, Va.
- Allen M. Rios, defense department technical representative, husband of Patrice A. Rios, Silver Spring, Md.

James M. ... Jr. Research Papers

Carillon to Honor Dead at Norfolk

NORFOLK — A carillon will be installed at the Norfolk Naval Station Chapel as a memorial to those who have lost their lives in the naval service. Some \$500 in the USS Liberty Fund is being used to start a drive for funds to pay for the carillon.

The money was presented to Chaplain D. W. Humphreys, senior chaplain of the Naval Station, by Norman Willcox, president of the Hampton Roads Council of the Navy League. The presentation took place in the office of Rear Adm. Ben W. Sarver, Commander Service Force, Atlantic Fleet on Veterans Day.

The Liberty Fund is made up of donations for the dependents of crewmen killed aboard the Liberty. Thirty-four men lost their lives when the Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces in the Mediterranean June 8, 1967. Israel has formally apologized for the incident and has paid three and one-half million dollars in compensation to survivors of the deceased.

THE MONEY in the Liberty Fund was not solicited but was contributed spontaneously by individuals following the tragedy. The money had been turned over to the Hampton Roads Council of the Navy League for disposition.

Because the amount of money in the Liberty Fund is small and the survivors have already been monetarily compensated, the decision was made to use the money to start the drive for the carillon. A new fund, the USS Liberty Carillon Fund, is being established for this purpose.

The memorial carillon will cost about \$6000. Target date for installation of the carillon is June 8, 1969, the second anniversary of the attack on the Liberty. The Norfolk Naval Station Chapel Complex serves all faiths.

The Liberty was a technical research ship in the Atlantic Service Force. She has been inactive since the attack and was decommissioned June 30th of this year and mothballed.

○
THE WASHINGTON POST
Tuesday, June 13, 1967 B5

**Service Wednesday
For Lt. Stephen Toth**

A funeral service for Navy Lt. Stephen Spench Toth, killed last Thursday in the Israeli bombardment of the USS Liberty off the Sinai Peninsula, will be held at 2:30 p.m. Wednesday in St. Andrew's Chapel at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Lt. Toth, who was 27 and lived in Virginia Beach, will be buried in the Naval Academy Cemetery.

A 1963 graduate of the Academy, he was navigator and communications officer aboard the Liberty.

He is survived by his parents, Retired Navy Capt. and Mrs. Joseph Toth, of Virginia Beach, and a sister, Mrs. James A. Linn, of Chicago.

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

The Incompleteing of U.S. Ship Partial List of 75 Wounded

By Seymour M. Hersh
Associated Press

The number of casualties aboard the Liberty climbed to 23 dead and 75 wounded yesterday when the ship, damaged by an Israeli helicopter and plane attack, drifted slowly toward port.

Defense Department spokesmen placed the official toll at 21 missing, 21 injured, 15 seriously injured, and 15 seriously injured. Other sources reported that the Navy believes the missing men are probably dead.

The carrier yesterday recounted the number of missing at 23.

The missing men apparently were trapped in flooded ward compartments after the ship was struck by a torpedo during Thursday's surprise attack by Israeli jets. The attack was described by Israeli pilots as a "surprise" attack.

President Johnson's spokesman said the attack was "deeply regretted" by the White House. Secretary of State Christian A. Tavel said the attack was "a message to Israel."

Johnson from Israeli jets. The Liberty was 10 miles west of Israel, conveying a message to Israel.

At the Pentagon, officials said the Liberty, a 450-foot-long communications ship, had been hit by two destroyers and an aircraft carrier America of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The Liberty water line was damaged.

There was a requirement to go to the Navy base at Suda Bay, Crete, where it is expected to undergo major repairs.

Earlier, the Pentagon had reported 10 men were killed and 100 wounded. Observers said that the toll of the attack were still that it is "not clear" for similar jets made at least six taken ship and the strafing runs on the Liberty nation's side made a low altitude boats fired at least two miles behind.

Information to what happened in a matter of minutes.

Defense officials said Thursday the ship's action was to be a complete success. The ship's action was to be a complete success.

Horton reported that never seen flying over the Liberty could see some of his men most of the night of the attack, and the ship's action was to be a complete success.

The ship's action was to be a complete success.

Partially Casualty List

Attack on U.S. Ship

The Defense Department released the following list of casualties resulting from the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty Thursday:

KNOWN DEAD

Lt. Comm. P. M. Amstrong, Virginia Beach, Va.
Quartermaster 3d Class Francis Brown, Troy, N.Y.
Communications Tech. 3d Class Alan

- and Mrs. Walter
- son of Mr. and
- Gary, Ind.
- John C. Silver,
- Norfolk, Va.
- son of Capt. Jo-
- Virginia Beach,
- son of Mrs.
- Kan.
- Alexander Neil
- R.I.
- remaining names
- released after the
- of kinship.
- R. J. Campbell,
- Campbell, Mich.
- Scotland.
- Robert B. Eison,
- Mrs. Genelia
- Warren E. Mc-
- Warren O.
- James H. Hay-
- Mrs. James H. Hay-
- Class Curtis A.
- Mrs. Bertram
- Quane R. Mire-
- Carroll H.
- Richard W.
- Keene Sr.,
- James L. Lenz,
- Leander J. Lenz,
- Raymond Linn,
- Caravado,
- David W. Malt,
- Mariboro,
- Carl C. Nygren,
- Seaford, N.Y.
- Irvin D. Sr.
- Warrington,
- Class Thomas R.
- Thornton,
- Class J. M. Linton,
- Yonkers, N.Y.
- Philippe C.
- Taucke, Ala-
- Frederick J.
- Wilcox,
- John C. Smith,
- London,
- son of Mr.
- Box 4, Rich-
- husband of Paul
- Beach, Va.
- Dupont
- husband of J. W.
- drive, 500
- Jersey Lee

POST
10 JUN 67
SETUP NORTH SIDE
FOR THE LAI ROUTINE

James M. Hersh

Research Papers

5/11/67 (recessed)

Officers Awarded 8 June 1967

* LCDR Philip M. ^{Command} ARMSTRONG, Jr., USN, 569825/1100 (Deceased) ^(DIED ON BOARD) ^(SILVER CROSS)

* LT Maurice H. BENNETT, USN, 628125/1610 (SILVER STAR)

* LT James M. ENNES, Jr., USNR, 653840/1615

* LT George H. GOLDEN, USN, 374328/6302 (SILVER STAR)

* LT Richard F. KIEFER, MC, USNR, 710107/2105 (SILVER STAR)

* LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610

* ENS David G. LUCAS, USNR, 710515/1105 (SILVER STAR)

* CDR William L. MCGONAGLE, USN, 494467/1200 (MEDAL OF HONOR)

* LT James G. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615

ENS Malcolm P. O'MALLEY, USNR, 703423/1105

* LTJG Lloyd C. PAINTER, USNR, 692274/1105

* LT James C. PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462 (Deceased) (DIED IN RESEARCH)

* ENS John D. ^{FABERICK} SCOTT, USNR, 700158/1105 (SILVER STAR)

* ENS Richard P. ^{ATKIN} TAYLOR, Jr., USNR, 689116/3105

* LT Stephen S. ^{OSWICK} TOBH, USN, 669613/1100 (Deceased) ^(DIED ON BOARD) (SILVER STAR)

* LTJG Malcolm M. ^{ENGIN} WATSON, USNR, 699039/1105

* Purple Heart Medal Awarded

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Enlisted Personnel aboard 8 June 1967

<u>Rate</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Service Number</u>
* CT1	ADDINGTON, Reginald Norwood	349 53 80
CTSN	AFTOORA, Gary L.	999 55 21
SFP3	AZZETTI, Americo F.	913 46 93
FN	AISHE, Benjamin G.	915 59 17
* CT3	ALLENBAUGH, William B. (Deceased)	684 49 96 died in Research
* CT2	AMEEN, Timothy Paul	774 03 93
CT3	ANDERSON, James M., Jr.	860 82 52
* CT3	ANDERSON, Joe Denny	771 76 77
* EMFA	ANDERSON, Richard Edwin	B51 81 25
QMSN	ARFSTEN, Theodore L.	B10 66 32
CT2	ARMSTRONG, Alvis L.	772 11 79
* EMFN	ASHNORTH, Joseph Wayne	699 53 18
CTSN	BACSKAY, Thomas G.	138 04 05
SD3	BAGAN, Rogelio M.	544 12 27
* CT1	BAKER, Richard K.	486 80 12
CS3	BARTON, Gary L.	795 88 68
FN	BEATTIE, John W.	779 51 68
* CTSN	BECHTEL, Edward H.	B40 15 47
* CTSN	BENEDICT, Nathan D., Jr. <small>Dow</small>	129 55 74
● CTC	BENKERT, Joseph A. <small>Arthur (NAVY 517254100 0242)</small>	530 81 79
* CTSN	BENNETT, Lee R.	998 13 79
● * CT1	BINGHAM, Lowell Thomas	521 38 68
* FN	BISHER, Gerald Robert	B10 42 43

* CIV GS-7	BLALOCK, Donald Inssie	458 74 5503	
* SN	BLANCHARD, Gary R. ^{Ray} (Deceased)	777 77 22	hit by rockets died in surgery
* CT2	BLONHAM, Glenn L.	774 27 59	
* CIV GS-7	BLUE, Allen M. (Deceased)	531 42 3327	
? CS3	BOCCELLA, Salvatore (n)	796 37 69	(probably wounded)
* MM3	BOOTH, John Edward	998 19 47	
* FN	BOSTIC, Calvin (n) II	795 71 61	
* FN	BOITCHER, Don Reuben	779 52 59	
* CT2	BOWEN, Larry L.	796 83 28	
CT2	BRADLEY, Thomas E.	794 67 41	
* CT3	BRONG, James Victor	913 41 23	
* MMC	BROOKS, Richard John (SILVER STAR)	454 62 63	
* QM3	BROWN, Francis (n) (Deceased) (MIA CASE)	778 76 70	died at helm
* BT3	BROWN, Frank J. ^{Johnson} (SILVER STAR)	796 69 65	
YN3	BROWNFIELD, Virgil L. ^{Louie} (SILVER STAR)	794 23 49	
* BT3	BRUMMETT, Gary Wayne	696 29 20	
* CT3	BUCK, Ronald D.	918 25 71	
RMSN	BUNDY, David W.	139 01 82	
CT1	BYRD, Charles E.	543 85 61	
* MFPA	BYRD, Danny R.	290 54 86	
CT2	CARRIGAN, John J.	687 01 30	
* CT2	CAMPBELL, Ronnie J. (Deceased)	586 13 23	died in Research
* CT1	CARLSON, Richard Carl	444 13 12	
* CS3	CARNAHAN, David Neal	810 42 33	
* CT1	CARPENTER, Jeffery R. ^{Robert} (SILVER STAR)	535 14 05	
CT2	CARPENTER, Joseph P.	794 84 55	

? Name "Boccella" appears on a separate casualty list.

* SN	CASPER, William E.	796 40 74
* CT2	CHADSEY, Calvin L.	686 66 82
* CT2	CLEVELAND, Fred Marsial	353 80 14
RD2	COCAVITCH, Charles J.	589 81 75
* SN	COLSTON, "J" "C", Jr. (30020 5700)	771 04 56
* SN	CONCEPCION, Rodney Carl	674 38 09
* CT2	CONVERSE, Jerry L. ^{LeRoy} (Deceased)	794 79 44 died in Research
* SN	COOK, Eddie Lamar	997 59 71
* ENFA	CORNISIL, George Robert	998 07.12
SHL3	COTTEN, James E.	795 51 95
DK3	CRAIG, Juan A.	598 02 65
* CTSN	DALLY, Rodney Lee (30020 5700)	580 04 91
* CTSN	DANIELS, Dale E.	160 44 52
* SM2	DAVID, Russell O., Jr. ^{O'Neal} (30020 5700)	683 33 65
* CT2	DAVIDSON, James Ray	699 64 72
SFM3	DEVORI, Duilio (n) (30020 5700)	913 46 75
TN	DIANA, Rodolfo A.	920 25 93
ICFN	DI GERONIMO, James P.	914 82 01
* CT2	(appears on one casualty list as CT2 Marvin Francis Dodd 599 79 51) DODD, Edward J.	918 95 37
* SHL3	DURZEWSKI, Henry E., Jr. ^{Edward} (30020 5700)	546 83 16
* MM3	DYE, Robert M. unro	599 67 51
* CTSN	EAKINS, Kenneth P. (Burton)	794 04 69
SN	EASTON, Alan W.	779 28 89
* CTSN	ECKER, Kenneth P.	851 36 48
* CT1	ECKHART, Lewis D.	932 69 34
* CT2	EIKLEBERRY, Dennis M.	914 81 10

* CT2	DISLBERG, Robert B. (Deceased)	776 09 35	
SD1	ELDER, Eddie G.	987 14 19	
MM3	FISHER, John W.	788 34 78	
* SN	FOLLIN, Donald F., Jr. ^{Fletcher}	917 66 74	
RM3	FREISE, Everett L.	689 67 45	
CT2	GALLO, Ernest A.	779 23 86	
* CT3	GAUTHIER, Kenneth R.	771 37 99	
* RD3	GILSON, Ronald Dean	794 71 33	
CT3	GOINS, Larry D.	777 78 57	
* CT3	GOSS, Jerry Lee (Deceased) died in Research	773 61 55	(DIED IN MASS GRAVE IN ARLINGTON)
* CTSN	GRANISKI, Ronald Frank	880 56 10	
* CT1	GRAVES, Curtis A. (Deceased)	528 58 24	died in Research
SD3	GREEN, Troy ^{Lawrence} (STAR)	451 50 06	
* YN3	GURCHIK, Stephen C. ^{Charles} (STAR)	697 82 42	
ET3	HALBARDIER, James T.	771 64 06	
RM2	HALMAN, James V.	692 26 14	
SN	HANDY, Edward D.	917 37 50	
MM3	HAUCK, Charles K.	999 33 02	
* CT3	HAWKINS, David William	118 73 49	
* CTSN	HAYDEN, Lawrence P. (Deceased)	870 53 70	died in Research
* GVG3	HAYEN, David Carl	696 84 98	
* SN	HEANEY, Warren Dennis	918 44 65	
* CT2	HENDRICKS, Charles Richard	685 56 42	
* SHL2	HEROLD, Donald (n) (STAR)	609 22 48	
* CT1	HERSEY, Warren E. (Deceased)	903 67 11	died in Research
* CT3	HIGGINS, Alan (n) (Deceased)	788 62 97	air attack

CT3	HILDEBRAND, Wayne L., Jr.	913 42 23	
* SN	HOAR, Carl L. ^{Lewis} (Deceased)	774 46 48	air attack
MM3	HOBSON, Jerry G.	770 94 82	
SN	HOLDEN, Glen J.	793 69 17	
* CT3	HORNE, John S., Jr.	692 96 29	
* FN	HRANKOWSKI, John Michael	B10 43 15	
CTSN	HURST, Donald A. (13,20,2020 57112)	B81 88 16	
* SN	JACKSON, Thomas Franklin	689 15 99	
* CT2	JOHNS, Frederick K.	794 91 14	
FN	JOHNSON, Duane D.	B50 62 46	
* CT3	JOHNSON, Melvin P.	997 32 29	
CTSA	JOHNSON, Perry W.	991 89 97	
CT3	JOHNS, Charles F.	138 16 69	
* CTSN	KAVANAUGH, James P.	908 51 32	
* CTSN	KEENE, Richard W. ^{Walter} (Deceased)	778 82 75	died in Research
* FA	KELLY, Glenn Douglas	B50 76 86	
* BT3	KELLY, James Frederick	773 86 89	
SN	KERNER, Frederick W.	796 40 70	
BT3	KIDD, Robert C.	789 36 89	
SH1	KIMBLE, Kenneth R.	996 47 35	
* CTSN	KUKK, Eugene Henry	918 81 30	
* SA	KISIEL, David John	998 70 04	
CT3	KRAM, William M.	713 71 21	
* FN	KRASNASKY, Stephen John	354 82 98	
* CT3	KREUN, Loren W.	538 49 74	
* SN	KRINER, Alan Francis	779 57 61	

* CT1	KUKAL, Ronald G.	539 00 34	
* SN	LA MAR, John D.	779 56 36	
* CTC	LANKIN, Carlyle F. ^{Francis} (SILVER STAR)	518 69 45	
* CT2	LANDIS, Calvin L.	777 52 31	
SA	LARKINS, Dale D. ^{Duang} (SILVER STAR)	919 48 93	
* FA	LATORRE, Steven J.	914 73 89	
* SN	LEHMAN, Joel Wayne	771 54 02	
* CTSN	LEHMAN, Terry W.	914 59 44	
* EM2	LE MAY, William Michael	773 35 21	
* SN	LEMOND, Thomas William	917 49 31	
* CTSN	LENAU, James L. (Deceased)	997 51 53	died in TTI repair shop
* CT1	LENTINI, Joseph Charles	594 81 55	
SK3	LEWIS, Claude L., Jr.	543 39 65	
* CT2	LIEFELD, Anthony J.	776 10 30	
* CTC	LINN, Raymond E. ^{Eugene} (Deceased)	571 13 74	died in comm
CTSN	LIPPLY, Ronald L.	789 51 85	
* SSGT	LOCKWOOD, Bryce F. (SILVER STAR)	185 98 56	
TN	LOMASANG, Benjamin L.	589 73 87	
* CT2	LONG, Phillip L.	692 84 63	
CTSN	LONG, Robert W.	850 92 55	
* FN	LOSASSO, Gerald Francis	796 18 83	
PNSN	LUCAS, Randy W.	778 90 60	
CT3	LUNDIN, Donald J.	774 75 69	
* CT1	LUPTON, James M. (Deceased)	511 31 28	died in Research 7/7/55
* FN	MARAIO, James Anthony	916 29 05	
* TN	MARFIL, Sofronio Parate	776 90 09	

* CT3	MARGGRAF, Duane R. ^{Rowe} (Deceased)	773 96 50	died in Research
* CTSN	MARLBOROUGH, David W. (Deceased)	B10 04 80	died in Research
MML	MARTIN, Charles M. ^{Monroe} (8/11/21/1904-1984)	497 49 88	
* CT2	MASSENGALE, John L.	695 14 21	
* CTC	MATTHEWS, James A.	345 18 52	
* SN	MATHEWS, Jimmie L.	998 21 92	
* CTSN	MC ANDREWS, Patrick H.	B11 44 21	
* SN	MC CALLISTER, Robert Lee	919 61 90	
CT3	MC CLISTER, Edward H.	697 91 03	
* CT3	MC FARLAND, Terry Lee	795 23 54	
* CT2	MC FEGGAN, David Lee	774 71 98	
* CTSN	MC INTURFF, Frank (n) ^{III} (2/2/26-1978)	B61 44 71	
CT3	MC MAKIN, Garvin L. ^{Lee Douglas} (1/1/1915-1970)	595 81 92	
* SMSN	MEADORS, Joseph Leslie	B71 04 56	
* CT2	MENDLE, Anthony P. ^{Petter (sic)} (Deceased)	777 62 87	died in Research
TN	MERCADO, Remigio M.	776 90 13	
SK1	MERRITT, James M.	282 22 24	
* CT2	MEYER, Stephen Edward	771 A2 03	
* FN	MILLER, David Bruce	354 88 36	
SHB3	MOLLEN, Thomas R. ^{Robert} (1/1/1914-1970)	697 77 29	
FN	MUMFORD, Richard G.	354 81 34	
* CCT3	MYERS, David V.	B40 65 88	
CT3	NEEDHAM, James L. ^{Leonard} (1/1/1914-1970)	915 09 65	
* SF1	NEESE, Richard D. ^{Dale} (1/1/1914-1970)	430 77 24	
* BT3	NEWELL, John Paul	776 08 93	

SK1	NEWTON, Richard L.	455 53 06
* CTSN	NYGREN, Carl C. (Deceased)	788 37 16 <small>died in Research</small>
EIN2	O'CLASSEN, Francis J.	594 41 13
ETR3	OLIPHANT, Glenn R.	918 82 61
* BT2	OWENS, Eugene (n)	549 85 64
* CT2	PAGE, David W.	904 28 51
* CTSN	PAGELER, Donald W.	860 58 17
* SN	PAHIDES, Stamatie (n) (B. 12-12-57)	793 34 78
* CTSN	PARKER, Herbert J.	138 54 18
* CS3	PATTEN, Dennis Allyn	904 30 77
* SN	PAYAN, Salvador (n)	791 66 15
* CT2	PAYNE, Garland Wray	772 94 77
* CTSN	PEETOOM, Herbert C.	797 04 76
* SK3	PERKINS, Edward George	776 42 83
* SN	PIERSON, Gerald V. (Henson)	794 07 20
CT3	PLASTERER, David T.	915 85 59
* CT1	PLEASANTS, Carl L.	535 78 10
* OM3	POLLARD, Floyd H.	353 95 47
* CT2	POPLEWSKI, John G.	778 80 00
YN2	POWERS, Martin D. (B. 12-12-57)	775 78 26
CT2	PRIGMORE, Eugene (n)	538 02 77
* SN	PURCELL, Harvey Lee	917 37 39
SN	QUINTERO, Anthony A.	779 59 90
* SN	QUINTERO, Thomas Alvarez	137 51 83
FN	RAMEY, David (r.)	796 43 22

* BT3	RAMELSBURG, Albert Edwin	119 90 36	
* IC1	RINDALL, John R.	517 81 45	
* SGT	RAPER, Jack L. ^{Lewis} (Deceased)	199 40 72	died in Research
EM3	REGER, Richard J.	697 11 63	
* CPL	REIMEYER, Edward E. (Deceased)	212 09 19	died in Research
* SA	REILLY, Robert Brian	B12 40 15	
* SA	REILLY, Thomas Joseph	913 50 66	
CT3	RICHES, Paddy "E" (A.M. 211201707 76004)	793 84 81	
SN	RICHARD, Stephen J.	B10 21 75	
* CT2	RITENBURG, Douglas C.	277 87 21	received purple heart in 1974
* SN	ROSSI, Victor John, Jr.	B40 67 53	
* CT1	ROWLEY, Charles LeRoy	458 48 03	
SN	RUSSELL, William R.	917 37 09	
TN	SARNO, Reynald S.	589 74 71	
* CTSN	SCARBOROUGH, Robert A.	788 80 10	
* EN3	SCHALEY, Kenneth Michael	694 00 58	
* FN	SCHNEIDER, Robert J. (Ronald Wilber)	B60 64 72	
* CT2	SCHNELL, Robert J. ^{James} (A.M. 211201707 76004)	642 55 84	
* HM3	SCHULMAN, Samuel J. ^(Leonard) (A.M. 211201707 76004)	353 96 33	
* CT3	SHAW, Maurice B. ^{Bryan} (A.M. 211201707 76004)	695 94 86	
* CTSN	SHAW, David Alan	904 39 56	
* FN	SIMPSON, Michael Ray	917 52 08	
* CT3	SIX, Harold Eugene	777 58 53	
* ICFN	SKOLAK, David (n) (Deceased) (A.M. 211201707 76004)	B50 17 83	died in forward gun mount
* SN	SLAVENS, Larry James	916 92 00	
* DC3	SMITH, James C. ^{Clayton} (A.M. 211201707 76004)	777 19 71	

* C1SN	SMITH, Jerry D.on	915 81 02	
* CT1	SMITH, John C., Jr. ^{Caleb} (Deceased)	237 77 94	
* CTC	SMITH, Malvin D. ^{Douglas} (Deceased)	493 95 96	
* SIL3	SMITH, Thomas Barnarde	918 04 37	
RVC	SMITH, Wayne L.	459 43 24	
* CT2	SNADER, Dennis C.	776 28 26	
* SN	SOPER, Larry Lewis	698 89 13	
* PC2	SPICHER, John C. ^{Clarence} (Deceased)	473 41 77	
* BT3	STOUDI, Joseph Daniel	B70 41 12	
RM2	STURMAN, Richard S.	75 34 94	
* CT2	SUTTER, John R.	795 24 58	
* CT3	SWEET, Ralph Brent	775 06 25	
* CT3	THOME, Charles J.	789 48 42	
* GVG3	THOMPSON, Alexander ^(SILVER STAR) (Deceased)	770 47 21	died in MT 51
* CTC	THOMPSON, Harold J. ^(SILVER STAR)	471 37 37	
* MR3	THORN, Larry Bruce	688 22 63	
* CT3	THORNTON, Thomas Ray (Deceased)	997 97 91	died in Research body recovered from wake by PAPAGO
* CT3	TIEDTKE, Phillippe C. ^{Charles} (Deceased)	914 32 84	died in Research
* ETR3	TINDELMAN, Barry R.	770 11 63	
CTSN	TOBIN, Michael J.	B10 88 97	
* SFP3	TOURNEY, Phillip F. ^{Francis} (SILVER STAR)	773 22 68	
SN	TRACY, Stephen B.	794 55 25	
CT3	TRADER, Ronald E.	521 38 68	
* FN	TRIPLETT, Jeffery Lynn	354 81 85	
* CT3	UBER, Sammy M.	917 08 36	
* SK2	VALDEZ, Donaciano (n), Jr.	370 92 58	

* FE1	VAN CLEAVE, Thomas ^{Leg} L. (1917-1972)	298 39 72	
CT3	VANDERPOOL, George R.	774 57 71	
* ETRSN	VANDERSCHUUR, Thomas Emmett	B50 34 20	
* CTSN	VANDEVENTER, Robert B.	916 69 27	
* SN	VICKERS, Carl Joseph	775 67 19	
CTSN	WAINWRIGHT, Richard W.	996 89 02	
* CT1	WALTON, Frederick J. ^{James} (Deceased)	236 31 86	died in Research body recovered through hatch
* CTSN	WALTZ, Robert M.	B40 69 13	
* BM3	WARD, Jerry W.	775 76 78	
RM2	WARD, Joseph P.	696 68 05	
CT2	WARWAS, Daniel J.	695 48 05	
TN	WATAN, Pedro P.	777 05 34	
CT3	WAY, Clyde W.	917 95 38	
* SN	WEAVER, Richard Larry	999 88 63	
* CS2	WEDIG, Gordon J.	428 92 84	
* CT2	WELCH, Gregory L.	694 46 31	
SN	WHEELER, Tommy W.	793 74 39	
CTCS	WHITE, Stanley W.	431 63 20	
* SN	WILSON, George Woodrow, Jr.	529 34 49	
CTV CS	WILSON, Robert L.	228 56 6000	
* CTSN	WOOD, Daniel B.	796 87 55	
* CTSN	ZAGAR, Robert R.	B40 63 62	

* Purple Heart Medal Awarded.

CIVILIANS AND USMC

DECEASED 8 JUNE 1967

MISSING TO DEAD BLUE, Allen M. (CIVILIAN) 531 L2 3327 637
MISSING TO DEAD RAPER, Jack Lewis, SGT USMC 199 L0 72
MISSING TO DEAD REIMYER, Edward Emory, III, CPL USMC 212 07 19

MINOR INJURIES 8 JUNE 1967

BIALOCK, Donald Leslie GS-7 (CIVILIAN)
LOCKWOOD, Bryce Franklin, SSGT USMC

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
3801 NEBRASKA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20390

5000
Ser G14/7422
8 8 DEC 1976

Mr. Leslie Paul Linn
164 East Main Street
South Zanesville, OH 43701


Dear Mr. Linn:

It is a pleasure to inform you that the Chief of Naval Operations has granted approval to name the new Naval Security Group operations building in Sugar Grove, West Virginia to honor the memory of your brother, CTC Raymond Eugene LINN.

My purpose in writing is to request your concurrence and that of your nieces in naming our building the RAYMOND E. LINN OPERATIONS CENTER. Please reply using the enclosed envelope. Further details concerning the dedication ceremony will be provided by the Officer in Charge, Naval Security Group Detachment, Sugar Grove, West Virginia.

Thank you for your assistance in helping the Navy recognize your brother's dedication and love for our country in this way.

Sincerely,


J. W. OSMER, JR.
Acting

You have my concurrence and that of my nieces in naming the new building in memory of my brother, Raymond E Linn

Sincerely
Paul Linn

5000
Ser G14/7422
8 8 DEC 1976

Mr. Leslie Paul Linn
164 East Main Street
South Zanesville, OH 43701

614/452-3609

Dear Mr. Linn:

It is a pleasure to inform you that the Chief of Naval Operations has granted approval to name the new Naval Security Group operations building in Sugar Grove, West Virginia to honor the memory of your brother, CTC Raymond Eugene LINN.

My purpose in writing is to request your concurrence and that of your nieces in naming our building the RAYMOND E. LINN OPERATIONS CENTER. Please reply using the enclosed envelope. Further details concerning the dedication ceremony will be provided by the Officer in Charge, Naval Security Group Detachment, Sugar Grove, West Virginia.

Thank you for your assistance in helping the Navy recognize your brother's dedication and love for our country in this way.

Sincerely,

J. W. OSMER, JR.
Acting

ORIG: MR. SCHMIDT, G144, X20873, 15 DEC 76
TYPE: STASH SCHOPF, G14A1, X20272, 16 DEC 76
RETYPE: STASH SCHOPF, 20 DEC 76

Ms. Linda Louville LINN
2230 Myrtle Avenue
Zanesville, Ohio 43701

Ms. Joy Marie LINN
164 East Main Street



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

G
GB
G10
G10B
G14
G144

IN REPLY REFER TO

1 DEC 1976

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Officer in Charge, Naval Security Group Detachment
Sugar Grove, West Virginia 26815

Subj: RAYMOND E. LINN OPERATIONS CENTER; naming of

Ref: (a) OINC, NAVSECGRUDET Sugar Grove ltr 00/PA-1-1-76
5030 ser 420-76 of 16 Sep 1976 with endorsements
thereto
(b) OPNAVINST 5030.12C

1. Reference (a), amended by the fourth endorsement, requested authority to name the new operations building at Sugar Grove in honor of the late Communications Technician Raymond Eugene Linn, U.S. Navy, who perished in the communication spaces of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) during the attack of 8 June 1967.
2. In accordance with reference (b), and contingent upon the approval of the appropriate next of kin, authority is granted to name the Naval Security Group Detachment Operations Building, Sugar Grove, the RAYMOND E. LINN OPERATIONS CENTER.
3. Notify the Chief of Naval Operations of the decision of the next of kin and arrange for an appropriate dedication ceremony. Copies of the program for the ceremony and photographs in connection with the dedication should be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-09BH).

JAMES W. BAUCE
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Director of Naval Administration

Copy to:

COMNAVSECGRUCMD (G144)
COMFIVE/COMNAVBASE NORVA
NAVRADSTA (R) Sugar Grove



5000
Ser 6144/353
18 NOV 1976

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on NAVSECGRUDET Sugar Grove ltr OO/RAC:jer 5030
ser 420-76 of 16 Sep 1976

From: Commander, Naval Security Group Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Naming Naval Security Group Detachment Operations Building

Ref: (b) SECNAVINST 5030.2B

1. Forwarded, with an alternate nomination.
2. Reference (b) states that names selected will honor appropriate deceased personnel. In lieu of the name proposed in the basic letter, a Communications Technician who lost his life during the USS LIBERTY incident is suggested for consideration. His close association with the Naval Security Group makes him uniquely suitable for recognition in this manner. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Special Operations Building be named in honor of CTC Raymond Eugene Linn.
3. CTC Raymond Eugene Linn was a communicator who died in the communications spaces on board USS LIBERTY. He had served in the Navy since prior to World War II and was making his last cruise. According to information from his division officer, he requested permission to remain with the ship until he completed thirty years because of his love for the Navy. He was a quiet man and a professional Navy chief petty officer, one who represents the dedication and commitment that the Navy would be proud to honor.

J. W. OSMER, JR.
Acting

Copy to:
COMFIVE/COMNAVBASE Norfolk Va
NAVCAMS LANT Norfolk Va
NAVRADSTA (R) Sugar Grove
NAVSECGRUDET Sugar Grove

ORIG: Mr. R. Schmidt, G144, X20873
TYPE: CTASN SCHOPF, 4 NOV 76
RETYPE: CTA1 HELD, 12 NOV 76
CTASN GODEFROID, 15 NOV 76

Document Control No. 624884



USA76

NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT SUGAR GROVE
SUGAR GROVE, WEST VIRGINIA 26816

Reply Refer To
OO, PAC:jer
5030
Ser 420-76
16 September 1976

From: Officer in Charge, Naval Security Group Detachment,
Sugar Grove, West Virginia
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Naval Radio Station (R),
Sugar Grove, West Virginia
(2) Commanding Officer, Naval Communications Area Master Station,
Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
(3) Commandant, Fifth Naval District
(4) Commander, Naval Security Group Command

Subj: Naming Naval Security Group Detachment Operations Building

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5030.12B

1. The United States Naval Security Group Detachment, which is a tenant command aboard the United States Naval Radio Station, Sugar Grove, West Virginia, opened its new Special Operations Building on 16 September 1976. This building houses the Detachment's operations, maintenance, communications and administrative departments, as well as various other activities associated with the Naval Security Group at Sugar Grove.

2. In recognition of the support provided to Naval Security Group activities by Navy fleet personnel, it would be fitting to name this new Operations Building in honor of an enlisted man who gave his life in support of Naval Security Group Fleet Operations. Quartermaster Third Class Francis Brown, who was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for heroic action during the attack on the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967, is the choice of this Detachment.

3. In recognition of QM3 Brown's ultimate contribution, it is requested that the Naval Security Group Special Operations Building at the Naval Radio Station, Sugar Grove, West Virginia, be named the "Francis Brown Operations Center" in his honor.

4. If desired, more information on QM3 Brown's actions may be obtained from LCDR James M. Ennes, Jr., Headquarters, Naval Security Group Command, Autovon Telephone 292-0370.

R. A. CAVALUCHI

16

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE
ATLANTIC
FIASCO

SEPT 1984 ATLANTIC
PRINTED A TOTALLY
UNDOCUMENTED CLAIM BY
2 ISRAELIS OF "NEW
EVIDENCE" THAT THE ATTACK
WAS A MISTAKE

EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEW.
IT WAS MENTIONED IN ASSAULT.
IT WAS PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED
BY DEPT OF STATE AND
DISMISSED AS CONTRARY TO
U.S. MATERIAL & EVIDENCE

Israel's attack on an American ship during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 has been the subject of controversy ever since. Now new evidence throws light on this "tragic accident"

THE ATTACK ON THE LIBERTY

BY HIRSH GOODMAN AND ZEEV SCHIFF

AT 1:59 P.M. ON JUNE 8, 1967, TWO ISRAELI MIRAGE fighters, followed by Super-Mystère jets and torpedo boats, attacked the USS *Liberty* off the coast of the Sinai peninsula. One hour and twenty minutes later the Israelis realized that the ship they had attacked with efficient ruthlessness was an American vessel. Two hours before the attack the *Liberty* had been a sophisticated intelligence-gathering ship; now it was a burning hulk with thirty-four of its crewmen dead and scores injured.

Was the *Liberty* attacked intentionally? Seventeen years later, the question remains open. Countless magazine articles and several books—one by a eyewitness to the events—have been written about the incident, but the mystery remains.

The following account of what happened to the *Liberty* on June 8 is based on unedited, previously unpublished material retrieved by the authors over the past ten years from Israeli naval and air force archives and on transcripts from two internal Israel Defense Forces (IDF) investigations into the affair which remain classified.

Since June of 1967, when the IDF reported to the United States the results of a preliminary investigation into the attack, Israel has remained silent. On June 10, 1967, Israel's ambassador in Washington sent a formal apology to the secretary of state, calling the attack a "tragic accident."

The American reply, sent the same day, was terse: "At the time of the attack the U.S.S. *Liberty* was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. It was broad daylight and the weather conditions were excellent." The reply went on to document Israeli reconnaissance missions over the ship before the attack, continuing: "Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the U.S.S. *Liberty* was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack."

The initial explanation for the attack came in a preliminary report telephoned on June 9 to Commander Ernest Carl Castle, the naval attaché at the American Embassy in

Tel Aviv. Israel claimed that the *Liberty* had not been flying the U.S. flag at the time of the attack and that it had been in waters declared closed to neutrals by Egypt, the main Arab combatant in the desperate three-front war that Israel was then engaged in.

Toward the end of June the Israeli military released to the American government, again through Castle, the findings of an IDF Commission of Inquiry into the attack, which admitted error, but at the same time decided that the attack had not been a deliberate one. The commission found that the ship had tried to hide its identity and that it had had no right to be in the war zone without having first informed the Israelis. The commission's inquiry concluded that on the basis of all available evidence, the attack on the *Liberty* was "done without malice and was an innocent mistake."

Mistakes are common in war. Indeed, just the day before the attack on the *Liberty*, Israeli aircraft had bombed an Israeli armored column south of the West Bank town of Jenin; on November 3, 1956, Israeli war planes mistakenly attacked a British ship (Britain and France were allies of Israel in the Sinai campaign) in the Red Sea; in the June, 1982, war in Lebanon more than twenty Israeli servicemen were killed by Israeli Phantom jets in the eastern sector when their tanks were mistakenly identified as Syrian. During the battle in Grenada, American jets mistakenly bombed a mental hospital. Such tragic accidents have happened to every army in the history of modern war.

But many reasonable people have not been able to accept Israel's attack on the *Liberty* as such an accident. The *Liberty's* dead have long been buried, and Israel has paid compensation to the bereaved families and the injured; but the *Liberty's* ghost will, somehow, not be given up. Bumper stickers on cars and trucks in the United States still proclaim "Remember the Liberty." And on the seventeenth anniversary of the *Liberty* incident *The New York Times* carried an advertisement, sponsored by America First, Inc., that read: "In memory of U.S.S. LIBERTY/ On this day: June 8, 1967/ 34 American sailors killed/ 171 wounded/ in a deliberate attack/ by Israeli jets/ and/ torpedo boats." Plainly, some groups, believed by Israeli intelligence to be funded by the Arabs, want to keep the issue alive.

Stephen Green's *Taking Sides*, published earlier this

Hirsh Goodman is the defense correspondent of The Jerusalem Post and the Israel correspondent of The Sunday Times of London. Zeev Schiff is the defense and military-affairs editor of the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz and a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

year, and similar books continue to propagate the theory, presented as truth, that the *Liberty* was attacked because the Israelis feared she would hamper their military goals.

Some variations on the theme have been fantastic in their inventiveness. For example, a 1976 article published in *Pravda* claims that the Israelis, worried that the *Liberty* would intercept an Israeli electronic-intelligence effort to "manipulate" phone conversations between Egypt's President Nasser and Jordan's King Hussein, decided to destroy the ship. Israeli intelligence, the article claims, had plugged into a telephone line connecting Nasser to Hussein and was distorting the Egyptian President's conversations with Hussein so as to give the impression that the war was going well for the Egyptians.

THE DECISION TO DISPATCH THE *LIBERTY*—OFFICIALLY described by the U.S. Navy as a technical-research ship, but known to one and all to be a spy ship—from off the west coast of Africa to the Mediterranean was controversial from the start. Against a backdrop of rising tension in the Middle East, the Defense Department, wanting intelligence in the imminent war, ordered the *Liberty* to leave Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast, in late May of 1967 for Rota, in Spain. After taking on supplies, three Marines, two Navy petty officers (both were killed in the attack), and three civilian specialists in the Russian language, the ship was to proceed to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. The crew was ordered to hold a course that would bring the ship to within thirteen miles of the Sinai peninsula, where Israeli and Egyptian forces were expected to be soon locked in battle.

The decision was taken against the opposition of Francis A. Raven, a senior official in the National Security Agency, who argued that the *Liberty* would be defenseless and vulnerable so close to a potential war arena. Raven was not alone. According to James M. Ennes, Jr., who was an officer assigned to cryptologic duties on board the *Liberty*, "From the beginning there was great fear among the crew that these orders were unwise, that tempers were too hot to permit a lightly armed, neutral intelligence vessel to patrol casually within sight of what could very soon develop into full-scale war. Officers tried to reassure the chiefs, chiefs tried to reassure the men, and we all tried to reassure each other, but everyone was uneasy about this assignment."

The ship's captain, Commander William L. McGonagle, was also uneasy about the assignment. Like the other officers on board, he was convinced that if war broke out, either the ship's orders should be changed or an armed escort should be provided.

When war did break out, on June 5, and neither a change in orders nor an escort materialized, McGonagle drafted an appeal to Vice Admiral William Inman Martin, the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, who had assumed operational control of the *Liberty* when the ship entered the Mediterranean, that a destroyer be sent to within five

miles of the *Liberty* to provide protection and to act as an auxiliary communications center. Martin denied the request on June 6. From then on, a tangle of errors, both American and Israeli, commenced to guide the ship toward catastrophe.

For three days, from June 5 to June 8, messages to and from the *Liberty* disappeared into a communications labyrinth—one of the world's most sophisticated communications vessels was not able to communicate with those responsible for her operation and safety. A message from Vice Admiral Martin ordering the *Liberty* to "maintain a high state of vigilance against attack or threat of attack" and to "report by flash precedence any threatening or suspicious actions" never arrived. Neither did a crucial message sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of the Defense Department, which directed the ship to remain at least twenty miles off the Egyptian coast.

"The message [did not] leave the JCS communications center for fourteen hours," according to Ennes. "When it was finally transmitted, it was sent in error to the Naval Communication Station in the Philippines."

Finally a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telephoned at 2:00 A.M. (ship's time) on the morning of June 8—exactly twelve hours before the vessel was attacked—which ordered the *Liberty* to steam at least 100 miles from the coast, was lost as well. It was delayed for four hours by a duty officer at the London headquarters of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., the commander in chief of U.S. naval forces in Europe. Another copy passed from the Joint Chiefs to the armed-forces headquarters in Europe, again to Admiral McCain's office, on to Vice Admiral Martin, and from there into oblivion. Had the message of June 8 from Vice Admiral Martin to the *Liberty*, ordering the ship "not (to) approach coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than one hundred miles, and Cyprus no closer than twenty-five miles," been received, the tragedy could have been averted.

It could also have been averted if fatal mistakes were not being made at the same time by an overworked Israeli general staff.

JUST THIRTEEN DAYS AFTER THE *LIBERTY* SAILED FROM Norfolk for the African coast, on May 2, 1967, Egypt's Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser started moving huge forces across the Suez Canal into Sinai.

On May 23 Nasser blockaded the Strait of Tiran, a route essential for all Israeli maritime traffic—including vital oil supplies from the Persian Gulf—from the Far East and Africa to the port of Eilat. A few days before, Nasser had also ordered the withdrawal of the United Nations forces that had been serving as a buffer in Sinai since the 1956 Arab-Israeli war.

A decision by the Syrians to declare a state of alert on the Golan Heights served to increase tension. King Hussein, who apparently could not afford to remain out of a concerted pan-Arab attempt to deal a death blow to Israel,

started mobilizing his forces. Even the Iraqis joined the fray, moving substantial forces toward Israel's northern border.

Israel, meanwhile, was being deserted by its friends. France, its closest ally and largest supplier of weapons, decided to cool relations and declared a partial embargo on weapons sales to Israel. America extended sympathy, but little else. Israel felt beleaguered. The pressures on its general staff were severe. The chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, later to be prime minister, broke down under the strain and had to be replaced for twenty-four hours.

It was clear to the Israeli military that to achieve victory against the numerically superior combined Arab armies, Israel would have to resort to a pre-emptive strike making maximum use of its air power.

Israel's major problem, however, was the defense of its long maritime border and of the Mediterranean ports that were its only link with the outside world. Israel's navy was the weakest link in the country's defenses. Whereas the Egyptian navy was equipped with Soviet *Osa*- and *Komar*-class missile boats, the Israelis had only one operational submarine, three Second World War destroyers, and five operational torpedo boats deployed in the Mediterranean.

More than 90 percent of Israel's population and industrial infrastructure lies along the Mediterranean coast. The general staff was convinced that the Egyptians would use the sea not only to cut off Israel's lines of supply but also to shell Israeli cities. The navy was consequently ordered to focus its attention on coastal defenses. It was into this zone of fear that the *Liberty* sailed, undefended, on June 8, 1967—patrolling thirteen miles off the coast of Sinai, its presence unknown to the protagonists.

On June fifth Yitzhak Rabin informed Commander Castle, in Tel Aviv, that "Israel intends to defend its shores from attack by the Egyptians. This will be done by combining our Air and Naval forces." The quotation, taken from Rabin's autobiography, continues: "If threatened we will not be able to delay our response. We request therefore that the United States either withdraw all its vessels from our shores, or inform us of the exact location of all vessels close to our shores."

Rabin's warning could have been prompted by a report, received earlier that day, that two Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels had been detected off Israel's northern coast. Both ships stayed well clear of Israeli territorial waters. Nonetheless, their presence caused a great deal of consternation in the Israeli military.

AT FIVE A.M. ON JUNE 7—THE DAY BEFORE THE ATTACK on the *Liberty*—Israeli naval intelligence reported sighting three Egyptian submarines off the Israeli coast. The commander of the navy, Admiral Shlomo Erel, ordered Israel's three destroyers out to locate them. At 5:37 A.M. a periscope was sighted off the coast of Tel Aviv, and at 6:50 P.M. another periscope was reported seen outside the port of Ashdod.

Adding to the general tension was a feeling of failure among the naval command: that morning members of an elite frogman commando unit had been captured by the Egyptians in Alexandria after having managed to sink several boats. The capture of the frogmen was a severe loss to the navy.

Thus June 7, the third day of the war, found the Israeli naval command frustrated and fearful, underequipped to defend Israel's shores, and dependent on the air force and human observation for long-range early warning.

June 8 began early for the Israeli navy. According to the war log, from which many details of this account have been taken, an air-force Nord aircraft took off from an unnamed airfield at 4:00 A.M. with a navy spotter on board. Its mission was to patrol Israel's shores to ensure that no enemy vessels had penetrated Israeli waters during the night. The use of the aircraft and a human spotter for early warning was necessary because of Israel's limited radar capability at the time.

At 5:45 the duty officer in the navy's war room was informed by radio that the Nord had sighted a ship some seventy miles west of Gaza. The spotter aboard the aircraft said he thought the ship was a destroyer. The duty officer immediately ordered a red marker placed on the battle-control table in the navy's war room. Red was the color used to designate an unidentified target.

At 6:03 the spotter aboard the Nord filed a supplementary report in which he identified the ship as "an American naval-supply vessel." Though the ship had now been positively identified as American, and therefore neutral, no move was made in the command bunker to change the ship's designation on the control table from red to green—the color used to designate a neutral target.

In the evidence he presented to the official IDF Commission of Inquiry, the duty officer responsible for updating the battle-control table testified that he had refrained from changing the color code because "identification had been vague and uncertain."

FROM 6:00 A.M. TO 9:00 A.M. THE *LIBERTY* WAS ALMOST forgotten. The navy's attention was diverted to a suspected enemy-submarine penetration west of the town of Adlit, where a huge oil slick had been sighted. At 8:50 the navy dispatched the destroyer *MV Haifa* to the area. The *Haifa* detonated five depth charges at 9:02, but with no success.

While the hunt for the submarine was on, Admiral Erel entered the underground war room to take personal command of the situation. As he familiarized himself with the battle-control board, he questioned the duty officer about the red marker west of the Sinai coast. Told that the marker designated an American supply ship, he ordered it changed to green. Erel then concentrated his attention on the pursuit of the submarine.

At 9:29 five more depth charges were detonated off the Adlit coast (apparently with some success: the *Haifa's* crew

reported air bubbles and oil rising to the surface). At the same time, the war room received a cable saying that an Israeli pilot reported being shot at by an "unidentified ship off the Sinai coast." Questioned after landing, the pilot said that he had ~~not~~ been fired on, but that he had seen a ship, which he described as being "gray, wider than usual, and with a bridge in the middle." The information was filed and forgotten.

Shortly before 10:00 A.M. the Nord aircraft returned to base. During debriefing the navy spotter reported that he had clearly seen GTR-5 on the side of the vessel he had sighted. The spotter's information was passed on to a Major Pinhassi at the naval-operations room at Naval Headquarters, who, after consulting *Jane's Fighting Ships*, identified the ship as the *Liberty*, an American intelligence-gathering vessel. Pinhassi's findings were double-checked by naval-intelligence officers, who reported back to the operations center that the GTR-5 was an American intelligence vessel named the *Liberty*.

This correct identification, however, came too naught. At 11:00 A.M. duty commanders in the navy war room changed shifts. Lieutenant Colonel "L" (his name remains classified), who took over temporary command, made a decision that proved fatal for the *Liberty*: he ordered the green marker designating its position removed from the battle-control table. "I wanted the battle-control table as uncluttered as possible," he explained later.

Though consistent with standard naval operating procedure—whereby officers were under instruction to keep the battle-control table as simple as possible—L's decision wiped out all reference to the presence of the *Liberty* off the Sinai coast. From 11:05 that morning the *Liberty* was no longer a known quantity for those operationally responsible for conducting the fast-moving three-front war from their underground bunker.

Nineteen minutes later, at 11:24, the *Liberty* was rediscovered, this time under tragic circumstances.

At 11:24 the air force reported to Colonel Issy Rahav, naval chief of operations, that the Sinai coastal city of El Arish, captured by Israeli forces the day before, was being shelled from the sea. Hardly had Rahav given instructions to recheck the information when, at 11:27, a second, independent, report came in, this time from Southern Command Headquarters, that El Arish was being bombarded. The report added that the shells were falling short of the shoreline.

Explosions and smoke from El Arish were also noticed by the *Liberty's* crew. In his book, *Assault on the Liberty*, Ennes, who was duty officer on the bridge that morning, reports that a few minutes after the *Liberty* had executed a right turn to new course 238 degrees, at 11:30 A.M., "a huge explosion rocked the town of El Arish."

After the war it was discovered that El Arish had not been shelled at all, but that an Egyptian ammunition depot had exploded. On the morning of June 8, however, the IDF general command assumed that the city was under attack from the sea.

THIS ASSUMPTION WAS THE SECOND ERROR SEALING the *Liberty's* fate. In response to the presumed attack, Colonel Rahav, at 12:05 P.M., ordered three torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to depart the port of Ashdod and proceed in the general direction of El Arish. At 12:15 P.M. the captain of the flagship, Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Oren, was ordered to sail to a point twenty miles north of El Arish and patrol the area. At 1:07 he was informed that upon sighting the target he was to call for an immediate air strike.

At 1:41 Second Lieutenant Aharon Yfrach, the radar operator aboard T-204, the flagship, reported that he had picked up a "target" on his scope, and that the ship was twenty nautical miles northwest of El Arish, fourteen miles off the Bardawil shore, and moving west at a speed of thirty knots.

The target's speed was a crucial factor in determining whether or not it was a ship of war. Standard operating procedure for the Israeli navy in 1967 decreed that any ship moving faster than twenty knots in a battle zone was to be presumed hostile. A second radar check was ordered. Now the target's speed was given as twenty-eight knots.

This was the third Israeli mistake. Both radar readings were incorrect, but those speeds were sent back by T-204 to Naval Headquarters, and both were registered in the command's log book.

When asked during the official hearings to explain this discrepancy, Yfrach said that "the mistake could have been caused by what is known as 'radar jump,' or by an erroneous reading by the radar operator, or by incorrect logging by the radar operator, or a combination of any of these three factors." Admiral Erel, in his evidence, said that it was not unknown for the radars of torpedo boats to be "inaccurate." At the time, however, the information reaching headquarters from T-204 led Colonel Rahav to two conclusions: that the target in question was a warship, and that it was sailing on an evasive course in the direction of Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal.

At 1:45 P.M. Rahav decided to order an attack on the ship. Since the three torpedo boats that he had at his disposal were still twenty nautical miles away from the target, and since they could develop a maximum speed of only twenty-eight knots—the same as the target—he called for an air strike.

Rahav's request reached Air Force Command at 1:48. The senior air-force battle controller, Lieutenant Colonel Shmuel Kislev, ordered two Mirage III C fighters, on their way back to Israel from an air patrol over the Suez Canal, to be diverted to the target. The Mirages reached the target a few seconds before 2:00 P.M. The lead plane dropped to an altitude of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled the target only once. On the second turn the lead pilot reported back to Air Force Headquarters that the ship was not Israeli; it was painted battle-gray and had two cannons in the fore-castle, a mast in the front, and one funnel.

Major-General Mordechai Hod, the commander of the

Israeli air force, who was in direct contact with the pilot, asked if any flag was visible. The pilot reported back, "I see no flag or other signs of identification." (The question of whether or not the *Liberty* was flying a flag remains a major point of contention. The point, however, is moot: the pilot's report left those assessing the target's status with the impression that no flag was being flown—a key factor in their decision that the ship was hostile.)

Seconds after this radio exchange the order to attack was given. By 2:06 the two pilots had each strafed the *Liberty* four times. The pilots reported that they had scored "good hits" and that a fire had broken out on "the left-hand side of the ship."

WHILE THE ATTACK BY THE MIRAGES WAS STILL IN progress, Air Force Command ordered two more aircraft diverted to the *Liberty*, this time Super-Mystère jets en route to a bombing mission over the Mitla Pass, in central Sinai. They arrived on the scene just as the second Mirage was completing its last strafing run. Though the Super-Mystères were armed with napalm bombs, which are not suitable for attacking targets at sea, it was decided to use the aircraft anyway. The planes made two bombing runs each, but only one bomb hit the ship.

There was no return fire from the *Liberty*. This lack of response puzzled the lead pilot, who did another swoop around the burning ship and noticed that *P-30*, or what he thought to be *P-30*, was painted on the hull. Still puzzled, he dropped to ninety feet above the waterline and completed a second swoop around the vessel. This time he reported seeing *CTR-5* on the hull: "The ship's identification is Charlie-Tango-Romeo-five. I see no flag," he said.

The pilot was told to report on damages and leave the target area. He radioed back that the ship was covered with heavy smoke, that the upper deck was badly damaged, and that he thought he could see men jumping into the water. At 2:16 the air-force controller in the central operations room dispatched two helicopters to the area to pick up survivors.

At 2:18 the commander of the torpedo-boat squadron ordered his crew to prepare for an attack. Two minutes later the naval-operations room ordered him to hold off "pending further clarification." The delay was ordered by Naval Headquarters after it received the news that the ship under attack had the identification markings *CTR-5* on its hull. Obviously, doubt had arisen as to the true identity of the vessel.

Though they held their fire, the three torpedo boats continued to speed toward the target. By 2:24 they could see the burning ship. Thick, acrid smoke enveloped the entire vessel, except for the hull and part of the bridge—but even this limited view convinced Lieutenant Colonel Oren that the ship was not a destroyer.

"I understood then," Oren subsequently told the Commission of Inquiry, "that it could only have been an Egyp-

tian naval-supply ship, or perhaps even a merchant vessel."

At 2:27 P.M. Oren ordered the signalman aboard T-204 to flash the message "What ship?" to the stricken vessel.

The *Liberty* replied, "AA," meaning "Identify yourselves first."

The *Liberty*'s captain could not have chosen a more unfortunate answer. Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly the same exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer, the *MV Yaffo*, and an Egyptian ship, the *Ibrahim-el-Awal*. Oren, who was a young officer on the *Yaffo*'s bridge at the time, remembered the incident well. If he still had any doubts that the burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they were now dispelled.

While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine-gun fire erupted from the ship's forecastle. The shots were fired has been confirmed by American seamen aboard the *Liberty*. It seems that one of the crew, Seaman Apprentice Dale Larkins, did not hear Captain McGonagle's "hold-fire" order, issued minutes before, and fired several volleys in the direction of the torpedoboats until he was told to stop.

Oren still hesitated. He consulted the Israeli navy's book identifying the ships of the Arab navies, and concluded that the ship in question was the Egyptian supply vessel *El Qasir*. An independent check by the captain of one of the other torpedo boats came up with the same identification.

The court later questioned both officers at length on the contradiction between their conclusion that the ship was a supply vessel and the report that the vessel was doing "twenty-eight or thirty knots" at the time it was detected. Oren replied that he had assumed that the ship was a straggler, left behind by a larger Egyptian force that may have been in the area. The radar reading could have pertained to one of the other ships, he said.

At 2:37 Lieutenant Colonel Oren gave the order to attack the *Liberty*. Covering their advance with rapid cannon fire the three torpedo boats sped toward the target. At 2:43, T-206 fired off the first torpedo, from 1,000 yards, and followed up with another, from 550 yards. At 2:44, T-203 fired two torpedos from 2,000 yards; one went wide, the second hit the right side of the ship, just below the waterline. A fifth torpedo was fired by T-204, but it went way off course and was lost to sight.

Oren followed up the first attack with a second—this time from the *Liberty*'s left side, his goal being to sink the ship. While T-204 was crossing the ship's bow, however, one of the young officers aboard noticed the letters *GTR* on the hull of the ship. Oren immediately issued a hold-fire order and transmitted the information to Naval Headquarters. The time was 2:47.

Oren was ordered "to pick up survivors and to finally and positively establish the ship's identity." At 2:51 he radioed back to headquarters that "the ship could be Russian because of the letters on its hull."

The news hit the IDF general staff like a thunderbolt.

Rabin called an emergency meeting of his advisers to discuss the possibility of large-scale Soviet military intervention on behalf of the Arabs, now that one of the Soviet Union's ships had been attacked.

It was only at 3:20 P.M.—a full half-hour later—that Oren, who had in the meantime looked the ship over closely, recontacted Naval Headquarters and said that he had been mistaken: the ship was not Russian but American.

At 3:30 the news was conveyed to Commander Castle, in Tel Aviv.

Meanwhile, the two Israeli helicopters arrived on the scene, but after circling the ship for twenty minutes and finding no men overboard they returned to base.

At 4:02 two tugs were readied for departure from Ashdod in case they were needed to tow the ship in. At the same time, Admiral Erel ordered Oren to use his bullhorn to try and make contact with the American vessel and offer help. Under no circumstances, he was told, should he try to board the ship.

At 4:40 Israel's offer of help was rejected.

At 5:04 the three torpedo boats were ordered to return to base. They turned due northeast, in the direction of Ashdod, and at 5:50 the *Liberty* disappeared from their radarscopes.

There was one more attempt to make contact with the ship. At 6:15 P.M. Commander Castle was flown to the area in an Israeli helicopter. He was able to do nothing other than circle the ship and throw down to the survivors on the burning deck a message packet containing his calling card, with a hastily scrawled message on the back: "Have you casualties?" There was no reply. Crippled, the *Liberty* then sailed for Malta.

ON JUNE 12, 1967—FIVE DAYS AFTER THE ATTACK—the Israeli chief of staff appointed a special commission of inquiry into the incident. It was headed by Colonel Ram Ron, who later became a member of the Israeli parliament.

On Colonel Ron's recommendation, the IDF's advocate-general, Colonel Meir Shamgar, today the chief justice of Israel's supreme court, decided that "due to the importance of the issue in question and the seriousness of its

repercussions" an investigative judge should be appointed to reconsider the evidence. On June 21 Lieutenant Colonel Justice Yeshayahu Yerushalmi was named to head a judicial investigation into the affair.

Yerushalmi heard thirty-four witnesses over a period of one month. While the hearings were still in progress he issued an interim judgment that Lieutenant Colonel "L"—the officer who had ordered that the green marker be taken off the battle-control board—could be charged with negligence. But in his final judgment, rendered on July 21, 1967, Yerushalmi found no grounds for the prosecution of any of the officers or men involved. Yerushalmi's decision was confirmed by Advocate General Shamgar on July 24, after the latter completed a comprehensive review of the evidence placed before the court of inquiry.

Both Ron and Yerushalmi found that "the attack on the ship was not conducted out of malice, nor independently in summing up and passing judgment was there any evidence of criminal negligence. It was a genuine mistake."


Yerushalmi noted the five crucial factors that he believed led to the mistake: the report that *El Arish* was being shelled from the sea; the report that the *Liberty* was moving at thirty knots per hour; the report from the Mirage pilots that it was a ship of war; the identification of the *Liberty* as the *El Qusair*; the ship's inexplicable closeness to hostile shores in a time of war.

On June 10, 1967, in a formal apology, the government of Israel undertook to pay compensation to the families of the men killed and to the men wounded in the attack. A year later Israel paid out a total of \$3,323,000 to the families of the thirty-four servicemen killed, and in April of 1969 it paid another \$3,566,547 to the wounded.

However, Israel refused to pay the \$7,644,116 demanded by the U.S. government, on July 1, 1968, for repairs to the vessel. The reason given by the Israeli government at the time was that Israel did not accept the contention that it alone was responsible for the circumstances leading to the attack.

The question of damages has bounced back and forth over the years with no results. Finally, in January of 1980, Israel agreed to negotiate a settlement, but none has been negotiated to this day.

To this day, as well, the wounds have not healed. The issue resurfaces periodically, and with it the pain. □



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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

ATTACK ON THE *LIBERTY*

The "new evidence" offered by Hirsh Goodman and Zeev Schiff in "The Attack on the *Liberty*" (September *Atlantic*) has been available for years. I mention it in my book *Assault on the Liberty* and show why it cannot be believed. The fact is, Goodman and Schiff's "evidence" is overwhelmingly refuted by other, more compelling material.

Why do Goodman and Schiff ignore the official State Department analysis of the official Israeli excuse? That analysis, prepared by the legal adviser to the secretary of state, discards the Israeli excuse as false.

Did Goodman and Schiff interview anyone who was aboard the ship? Had they done so, they would know that the attacking aircraft did *not* make three careful, low-level, pre-attack orbits seeking to identify the ship, and did *not* attack only after seeing "no flag or signs of identification." In fact Israel attacked a clearly marked American naval vessel and continued to attack long after examining the American flag at close range.

Did they interview the signalman who supposedly signaled "Identify yourself first" or the admiral who investigated that part of the excuse in 1967? The truth, easily verified, and documented in government files, is that no one signaled "Identify yourself first." The *Liberty's* signalman, Russell David, frantically flashed "U.S. Navy ship, USS *Liberty*" and the ship's international call sign until his signal light was shot out by the attacking boats.

Did Goodman and Schiff reconstruct the scene by plotting it on a chart of the area? Had they done so, they would know that the torpedo boats could not possibly have picked up the *Liberty* at 1:41 and made the plotting errors that Israel claims led to the attack. At 1:41 the boats were still too far away to have picked up the *Liberty* on radar.

Did Goodman and Schiff interview any member of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, which investigated the attack in 1967? Had they done so, they would know that the Israelis' decision to attack was made the day before the ship arrived. Our government learned of it almost immediately and tried to move the

ship to safety, but blundered. Politics made this bitter truth too hot for public knowledge.

These are not things "presented as truth" by bigots or extremists. These are provable facts, which have been uncovered through study of documents and interviews with principals from both the United States and Israel. Anyone studying the entire body of evidence—not restricting themselves to the official Israeli alibi—will reach the same conclusions.

JAMES M. ENNES, JR.
Woodinville, Wash.

The article "The Attack on the *Liberty*" is astonishing. Those of us who write on Middle East subjects and are familiar with the creditable work of the authors are particularly surprised.

To begin with, the article is replete with obvious historical inaccuracies. The government of Israel has not "remained silent" on the *Liberty* affair since 1967. In 1982 the Israeli Defense Forces History Department issued a long, detailed study of the matter, which states that it is "the official version of the State of Israel." Nor is it correct to say, as the authors do, that Israel has made no settlement for damages to the ship itself. Agreement was reached between the U.S. and Israeli governments shortly after Senator Adlai Stevenson threatened a public investigation of the attack. The last portion of the \$6 million settlement was received in February of 1983.

The French arms embargo on Israel did not occur before Israel started the fighting, and was not a factor in the Israeli decision to attack. It's the other way around: President de Gaulle declared the embargo *because* of the Israeli attack.

To say that Goodman and Schiff are selective in their presentation of the facts of the attack on the *Liberty* is an understatement. They seem unaware of the literally hundreds of pages of detail contained in Lieutenant Commander James Ennes's *Assault on the Liberty*, in James Bamford's *The Puzzle Palace*, in my *Taking Sides*, and in Donald Neff's *Warriors for Jerusalem*. These books draw their facts largely from hundreds of declassified documents recently made available by the U.S. Naval Security Group, the Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General, the State Department,

and the National Security File at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Had they checked these sources, Goodman and Schiff would have been obliged to change their conclusions on, *inter alia*, the frequency and closeness of Israeli air reconnaissance of the *Liberty*, the presence and size of the American flag and its visibility on a clear day in a brisk wind, and the exchange of flash signals between the Israeli torpedo boats and the ship. The authors would also have discovered that the Israeli government warned the U.S. government the night of June 7, 1967, that they would attack the ship if it was not removed from the battle zone, and that when the attack did occur, and the torpedo struck, and lifeboats were lowered from the *Liberty*, the Israeli torpedo boats at close range machine-gunned the lifeboats out of the water.

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about Goodman and Schiff's article is the absence of any reference to the proceedings and detailed report of the United States Naval Court of Inquiry on the *Liberty* attack. One would have expected the authors to at least remark on the dozens of inconsistencies between their story and the court's report, even if they preferred to accept the version of the attack given by their Israeli sources.

STEPHEN J. GREEN
Montpelier, Vt.

Goodman and Schiff assert that to this day Israel has not reached a settlement with the U.S. government concerning the latter's claim for damages.

In that regard, the Embassy of Israel in Washington wishes to state that on December 17, 1980, an exchange of notes between the governments of Israel and the United States confirmed that in full and final settlement of the U.S. claim regarding the *Liberty*, Israel would pay the U.S. government \$6 million, in annual payments of \$2 million commencing January 15, 1981.

It should be emphasized that Israel's payments to the U.S. government were made without prejudice to the legal position of the government of Israel or to the question of liability for the tragic event.

VICTOR HAREL
Press Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C.

"The Attack on the *Liberty*" is simply outrageous: it explains everything and justifies nothing. "Tragic acci-

dents" indeed happen in every war, but no matter how clever this casuistry, all Israel's actions before and after its barbarous attack speak loudest; the heart aches over such duplicity from an "ally."

L. M. BRAMBLE
Long Beach, Calif.

History would have been better served if Goodman and Schiff had stated that the attack on the *Liberty* occurred less than twenty-four hours before Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Syria in the Golan Heights, after (as they did state) it had been identified as an American intelligence-gathering ship, and as it was approaching waters where it could monitor Israeli communications. When the *Liberty* was torpedoed, the crew was ordered to prepare to abandon ship (J. M. Ennes, *Assault on the Liberty*). This proved impossible, because after expending their torpedoes the Israeli boats continued with a machine-gun attack that kept most men pinned below decks. They were able to put three life rafts over the side of the ship—two of these were sunk by gunfire and the third was taken on board one of the torpedo boats. The ship did not sink, and after two and a half hours the Israelis ceased their attack.

This attack on the crew and their lifeboats as they attempted to abandon ship was savage and inexcusable under any rules of engagement; it is not mentioned by the authors. Instead they offer us Colonel "L," who mysteriously and "temporarily" took charge of the navy war room and directed the *Liberty's* position removed from the battle-control table, and thereby allowed the "tragic accident" to occur.

HARRY A. ACKLEY
Santa Rosa, Calif.

Hirsch Goodman and Zeev Schiff reply:

We have in our possession the verbatim transcripts of the dialogue between the Israeli Naval War Room and the attacking vessels, the verbatim dialogue between Israeli Air Force HQ and the pilots, classified documents from three commissions of inquiry into the affair, the Yerushalmi Report, the testimony of all the major participants to the various commissions of enquiry, transcripts of our own interviews with the Israeli principals, and detailed charts.

We never claimed there was no flag, we never denied that Israel was guilty of serious mistakes, and we never claimed to have written the final version of histo-

ry. We claim to have added a new perspective, one never revealed before, and one that must surely interest any bonafide pursuants of history.

Now to the specifics: Mr. Green is wrong regarding the French embargo on Israel. After a meeting with Abba Eban on June 3, 1967, three days before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, President de Gaulle imposed the embargo, apparently in an attempt to discourage a pre-emptive attack by the Israelis. We stand by our statement that the *Liberty* was picked up by Israeli radar at 1:41. This is backed up by sworn testimony before legal commissions of inquiry by several participants to the tragedy.

What Mr. Ennes claims the signal man signaled is not the issue. What is relevant is the sworn testimony of the captain of the Israeli torpedo boat, and those around him, on what they read: "AAA"—"Identify yourself first."

Also, how can one claim that the forces involved in the attack on the *Liberty* knew the ship's identity at the time of the attack, when they reported back that they thought it was a Soviet vessel—a report that sent the Israeli general staff and the defense minister into a well-documented panic at the time.

We also contest Ennes's claim to interviews with any of the principals on the Israeli side, and challenge him to name those he claims to have interviewed.

In *Taking Sides* Stephen Green claims that the *Liberty* was attacked to prevent the Americans from knowing what Israel was doing in the 1967 war. In the same book he claims that American pilots were simultaneously flying missions for the Israeli Air Force. He has yet to explain the contradiction.

We apologize for the error regarding the final compensation settlement by Israel; had we benefited from official help in Israel in researching this article, the error would not have occurred.

This error, however, does not change the main thesis of our work: the attack was not deliberate but was the result of a chain of errors on both sides—errors that may be horrendous in their stupidity, but errors that are inherent in war, something the American Armed Forces know from their own experience.

MORE ON THE MACINTOSH

James Fallows's article ("Appropriate Technology," September *Atlantic*) about the Apple Macintosh is flawed by

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

NUCLEAR WINTER

Thomas Powers's optimistic "Nuclear Winter and Nuclear Strategy" (November *Atlantic*) may provide a ray of hope by demonstrating the suicidal consequences of nuclear war. But Powers failed to take account of two things:

1) The "nuclear winter" calculations are based on the blast and heat yields of conventional thermonuclear weapons. I would be surprised if the Department of Defense was not, at this very moment, studying and/or implementing the conversion of our conventional warheads to neutron warheads. These "enhanced-radiation" weapons sharply reduce the actual physical effects of heat, so that blast and fallout are reduced to minimum levels, perhaps low enough to avoid the effects of a nuclear winter, while the lethal and disabling effects of radiation on humans are increased.

2) Powers says that "the nuclear-winter problem does not end the possibility of a big war with Russia, but it does push planners in a new direction, away from apocalypse. Nothing stands in the way of this change except habit, inertia, and the quite staggering cost in money of building a whole new arsenal." Rather than standing in the way of change, the "staggering cost" (which may really not be so great) may be the very reason that the Pentagon will welcome and endorse the nuclear-winter scenario. James Fallow has written of the "iron triangle" of the "culture of procurement," in which the high cost of weapons is seen as an asset rather than a liability; Gregg Easterbrook, in your August issue, follows the same line of thinking; and Nicholas Lemann, in your October issue, clearly implies that American strategy is for arms-race escalation rather than disarmament. George W. Ball (in *The New York Review of Books*, November 8, 1984) has stated the position unambiguously: "America . . . [is] trying to speed the process of Soviet decay by economic pressures. . . . [We will] outspend and outpace the Russians in the arms race and thus, by bringing further pressure on their faltering economy, force them to give up their ambitions."

In this light the nuclear winter is good news to the Pentagon and to those who profit from defense spending. Indeed,

the redirection of our spending to build (or convert) a whole new arsenal may give the world a period of peace until the new weapons are operational. Furthermore, if "staggering cost" is involved, we may be forced, serendipitously, to shelve the Star Wars research, which could have such destabilizing effects.

But our "providential salvation" will not come through the findings of science or the consequences of technology. Only through economic, political, and moral changes will the world be safe from nuclear disaster. Einstein was right when he said that with the atomic bomb everything is changed except our ways of thinking. It is in the *you* task of re-educating the planet that our hope lies.

LOUIS GOLDMAN
Wichita, Kans.

I disagree with Thomas Powers's conclusion that a recognition of the nuclear-winter theory bodes well for future nuclear stability between the superpowers. In fact the theory might destabilize Soviet-American relations by leading one side to believe that it can actually fight and win a nuclear war.

The reason for this has to do with the megatonnage level required to trigger the nuclear-winter effect. Although further research is necessary, Carl Sagan has estimated that 250 to 1,000 megatons would generate sufficient smoke, soot, and so forth to block out the sun's rays. Once a megaton ceiling is determined with precision, an aggressor might well be tempted, especially during a crisis, to launch a first strike using just enough nuclear weapons to remain below the nuclear-winter threshold.


The incentive for attacking first in this manner would be that it would prevent a retaliatory strike (or else precipitate global catastrophe) and thus spare the aggressor's homeland.

MITCHELL REISS
London, England

Thomas Powers carefully describes the evolution of the effective way to destroy urban targets, from high-explosive to incendiary bombs. If this principle holds, it is not what kind of "match" is used but the resulting fires that will lead to catastrophic climatic change. The use of big nuclear matches, deliv-

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soned analysis of a tragic event in the long and warm relationship between the United States and Israel.

As a former U.S. Marine officer, I understand how easy it is for combatants in the field to make errors that can have extremely serious consequences. Consequently, I see no useful purpose in constructing a balance sheet of errors in order to ascertain whether the greater number was perpetrated by our people or by the Israelis. The article makes clear that there were more than enough errors to go around and that the attack on the *Liberty* was tragic but most certainly an accident. Only malice, or special interest, can cause one to conclude that the Israelis intended to assault an American vessel.

PERRY J. (SHERTZ)
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

"The Attack on the *Liberty*" offers new insights into the hazards of intelligence-gathering in war zones coupled with human errors in communication. Thus it is remarkable that repeated warnings to the USS *Liberty* from the commander of the Sixth Fleet and from the Joint Chiefs were never received. Likewise, Israeli officers were misguided by such factors as faulty radar readings. Above all, the article is further evidence of the tragic mistakes of war. Have not American or allied forces in Vietnam been subjected to bombing in error by friendly planes?

But as for the war in 1967, Israel stood alone, fighting for survival in the face of aggressive moves by Egypt and its allies to "drive the Jews into the sea." Israel's navy was weak, as noted by Goodman and Schiff, and its coastal heartland vulnerable to attack; "unidentified" vessels included Soviet spy ships nearby.

That Arab propagandists continue to exploit the *Liberty* incident is the making of war through other means.

JOSEPH BRANDES
Professor of History
William Paterson College
Wayne, N.J.

SCHOLARSHIP VERSUS CULTURE

Enough. Even the most devoted fan of Barzun's latest exercise in self-plagiarism. But the truly galling feature of his essay ("Scholarship Versus Culture," November issue) is not its stunning lack of originality—one could almost enjoy

the sensation it affords, déjà vu raised to a higher power—were it not for the vacuity of its thesis. If you're going to write clichés, you may as well pick the true ones.

Of course university learning is laughable. That hasn't been news since Rabelais published the card catalogue of the Library of St. Victor. Assembling the modern equivalents of the *Ars Petendi in Ecclesiam* is nearly as agreeable as Senator Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards for research projects he doesn't understand.

One can't do justice to human possibility by clinging to a short list of freshman profundities even if going ahead means thinking about literature instead of memorizing a Western Civ. textbook. The basic problem is that Mr. Barzun is too easy to satisfy. His idea of a cultured man is someone with sufficient learning to purchase and read a Jacques Barzun book and murmur, "How profound." Thus, despite the quotations from Nietzsche, Barzun's culture criticism is simply an attempt to give complacency a good conscience. To which one can only respond, in the phrase of Olive Oyl, "Pnooey."

JIM HARRISON
San Francisco, Calif.

As a graduate student writing yet another thesis on *Moby-Dick*, I can attest to the accuracy of Jacques Barzun's observation concerning "poor Melville"—that "like Saint Sebastian he is the target of all the arrows of all the methods." However, though the corporeal Melville was relatively poor, he cannot suffer from the analytical harpoons now fast to so much of his work. Besides, Melville asked for it.

In his brief catalogue of titles, "products" turned out by the culture industry, Barzun mentions *Melville's Thematics of Form*, by Edgar A. Dryden. It is clear in Dryden's book (and, I think, in any thoughtful reading of *Moby-Dick*) that Melville was a quite self-conscious artist who wrote that novel "with deliberate intent to commit an aesthetic act." to use Barzun's words. As Dryden and others have pointed out in their analyses, Melville made good use of his self-consciousness in turning out a wonderful book, a book that deliberately invites interpretation. Dryden's book makes its own appeal to the "esprit de finesse." He simply made an unfortunate choice of title.

MARK METCALF
Monroe, Neb.

**ISRAELI WRITERS IN "ATLANTIC MONTHLY" CLAIM
"NEW EVIDENCE SHOWS ATTACK WAS AN ACCIDENT"**

Almost a year ago word came from Israel that Israeli writers Hirsch Goodman and Zeev Schiff were preparing an article for **The Atlantic Monthly** which, they said, would "thoroughly discredit Jim Ennes and everyone who has ever written about the attack on the USS **Liberty**."

I have looked forward with some glee to publication of that article, as I remain confident in my conclusions that the attack was deliberate and that both governments are lying about it. Since publication of my book, authors Jim Bamford, Noam Chomsky, Donald Neff, Stephen Green, Alfred Lilienthal and others have rechecked and confirmed my conclusions, as have numerous American journalists and several government and military leaders such as Adlai Stevenson, Admiral Thomas Moorer, and others.

Now the September, 1984, issue of **The Atlantic Monthly** and dozens of newspapers around the world have published the long-awaited article or excerpts from it. And never did I suspect that two of the biggest guns in Israeli journalism could produce such slovenly, poorly researched, and just-plain-wrong text or that so many editors would swallow it whole. Nor did I suspect that my task of refuting it would be so easy.

The authors clearly made no attempt to check the obviously relevant evidence that is readily available from US Government files and from **Liberty** crewmen, including myself. Instead, they drew their story almost exclusively from Israeli sources while using my book, without credit or attribution, for background material. And the end result is a story that would draw a failing grade in any freshman journalism class. The article is grossly inaccurate throughout and reveals a departure from elementary scholarly standards that is astonishing.

For instance, the "new evidence" which is the heart of the Hirsch/Goodman story (a 1967 Israeli Court of Inquiry report by Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Justice Yeshayahu Yerushalmi), is not new at all. I mention the Israeli Court of Inquiry report in my book (pages 153-158) and show why it cannot be believed. For years I have distributed retyped copies of that report (also known as IDF Preliminary File 1/67) to the press and public because, seen as a whole, the Yerushalmi report is not believable. Its assertions are false and its conclusions are wrong. Not only are the Yerushalmi/Hirsch/Goodman/-Atlantic conclusions contrary to my personal observations from **Liberty's** bridge, but they are contrary to sworn testimony of **Liberty** crewmen and contrary to evidence found in other official records of the United States Government.

Moreover, the Yerushalmi report was dismissed as not believable in an official study done for Dean Rusk and Eugene Rostow by the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State and recently uncovered in a \$14,000 Freedom of Information lawsuit.

So the Hirsch/Goodman articles are not based on "new evidence" at all. Instead, they are based primarily on long-available and officially-discredited reports by an Israeli lieutenant colonel who was sitting in judgment on Israeli generals--a situation which could not have been expected to find the truth and which probably would not have been tolerated under any other circumstances.

The fact is, as more information becomes available about the attack, the conclusion becomes ever more inescapable that the attack was indeed deliberate. Stephen Green, in **Taking Sides** (Morrow, 1984) has now established that Israel planned more than 24 hours in advance to attempt to sink the **Liberty** and that the United States knew of the plan. Yet even with that certain knowledge of treachery, the Lyndon Johnson administration helped cover up the story to placate supporters of Israel.

The situation has not changed. The attack on the USS **Liberty** was deliberate and both countries are still lying about it.

James M. Ennes, Jr.
JAMES M. ENNES, JR.

15 SEPT 1984

TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Main Annex

18424

September 21, 1967

TO : U - The Under Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *feh*
FROM : L - Carl P. Salans *CPS*
SUBJECT: "The Liberty" - Discrepancies
Inquiry and U.S. Navy Inquiry
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

THIS IS PAGE ONE OF THE OFFICIAL FIVE PAGE DOCUMENT WHICH REFUTES THE ISRAELI EXCUSE AND THE SCHIFF/GOODMAN/ATLANTIC ARTICLE. COMPLETE COPIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION OFFICE, OR FROM THE USS LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION FOR \$1.00 AND A BUSINESS SIZE ENVELOPE WITH TWO STAMPS.

As you requested, we have compared the decision of the Israeli Judges, dated July 21, 1967, with the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, and the findings concerning the Liberty incident.

The following discrepancies are noteworthy:

I. Speed and Direction of the "Liberty"

- The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boat Division Commander reported and reconfirmed the target's (Liberty's) speed at 28 to 30 knots and that it had changed its navigational direction shortly after 1341 hours.

- The U.S. Navy inquiry established that the Liberty had been on a steady course at 5 knots from 1132 hours until the attack.

II. Aircraft Surveillance

- The Israeli report indicates that a ship was reported in the area by reconnaissance aircraft at 0600 and that another report was received of a contact between an Israeli aircraft and a surface vessel about 0900.

- The Navy Court finding of facts, plus testimony of various members of the crew indicate reconnaissance overflights of the Liberty at 0515, 0850, 1030, 1056, 1126, 1142, 1220, and 1245.

III. Identification by Israeli Aircraft

The Israeli report indicates that the fighter aircraft carried out a run over the ship in an effort to identify it.

REFILED
S/S CAG

[STEPHEN GREEN]

"TAKING SIDES"
W.H. MORROW

Nov. 16, 1984

Dear Jim,

I'm sure you've seen the enclosed - your attack is so much better than mine, you always seem to beat me to the punch.

Their letter is worse than the article.

On the embargo by France. Their statement makes no sense. Why would De Gaulle try to stop the attack by imposing an embargo? I'm certain it was a threat, as it was not made public until after the attack.

One overall thought. We really must get at the warning issue - it is the key point on the matter of "deliberateness." I call David Walsh today to encourage him to pursue the issue w/ Press, the NSA report, etc.

Regards,

Steve

P.S. Re embargo - compare Neff ("W. for S.") P. 192 with text of Atlantic article. At best, Goodman and Schiff are disingenuous.

US Liberty officer questions article about Israeli attack

of *The Jerusalem Post* almost a year ago, word through an acquaintance to your correspondent's editor, along with military affairs writer Zeev preparing an article about Liberty which, they did "thoroughly discredit" and everyone else who written about the 1967 USS Liberty."

...er-of-the-deck of the and my book, *Assault on Liberty* (Random House, generally considered the work on the subject. I ment of my conclusions was deliberate and governments have lied ab- quently. I have looked some glee to the long- Goodman treatise on Schiff/Goodman article ects. And frankly I am x. Never in my wildest suspect that two of the Israeli journalism e such slovenly, poorly and just-plain-wrong I suspect that my task would be so easy.

"evidence" cited by man (the Yerushalmi eep available for years "top secret" classifica- ew at all. I mention it

in my book (pages 153-158) and show why it cannot be believed. For years I have distributed copies of the Yerushalmi report to the press and public because, seen in a world, it is clearly false. Not only is it contrary to my personal observations from Liberty's bridge, but it is contrary to sworn testimony of Liberty crewmen and contrary to other official records of the United States Government.

Moreover, the Yerushalmi report was officially dismissed as not believable in 1967 by the Lyndon Johnson State Department in an analysis that was available to your authors. Dean Rusk and other American leaders have repeatedly dismissed the Yerushalmi report as unbelievable. Surely Schiff and Goodman are aware of this. Your readers are entitled to know this. Why did Schiff and Goodman fail to tell them that their "new evidence" has long been dismissed by the United States as hogwash?

Did Schiff and Goodman interview anyone who was aboard the ship? Had they done so they would know that the attacking aircraft did not make three careful, low-level, pre-attack orbits seeking to identify the ship and attack only after seeing "no flag or other signs of identification." In fact, Israel attacked a clearly marked American naval vessel and continued to attack long after examining the American flag at close

range.

Did they interview the signalman who supposedly signalled "Identify yourself first," or the admiral who investigated that part of the excuse in 1967? The truth, easily verified and documented in U.S. government files, is that no one signalled "Identify yourself first." Liberty's signalman Russell David frantically flashed "U.S. NAVY SHIP, USS LIBERTY" and the ship's international call sign until his signal light was shot out by the attacking boats.

Did Schiff/Goodman reconstruct the scene by plotting it on a chart of the area? Had they done so they would know that the torpedo boats could not possibly have picked up the Liberty at 1:41 and made the plotting errors that Israel claims led

to the attack. At 1:41, the boats were still far beyond radar range. The boats, then, could not possibly have called in the aircraft as claimed by the Israeli government in an excuse which blames the attack on the Israeli Navy. The attack was planned and executed in the Israeli war room. It was not a blunder by the Israeli Navy.

Did Schiff/Goodman interview any member of the Defence Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations which investigated the attack in 1967? Had they done so, they would know that the Israeli decision to attack was made the day before the ship arrived. The United States Government learned of it almost immediately and tried to move the ship to safety, but it was denied. Politics made this other truth too hot for public knowledge.

Schiff and Goodman fail to get even peripheral information straight. France did not withdraw support before the Six Day War; France withdrew support during the war because they concluded that the war was initiated by Israel. Israel has not "remained silent" about the attack since 1967; I have in my possession a series of official Israeli government excuses for the attack, plus innumerable Israeli consulate statements, plus several biographical statements by Israeli officials, and finally an "official Israeli version"

dispatched to the American Chief of Naval Operations in 1982. Silent indeed! And Schiff/Goodman are even wrong when they tell us that Israel has never paid for the loss of the ship. In 1980, to quash a pending Senate investigation, Israel finally agreed to pay \$6,000,000. The last payment was received in the U.S. Treasury in February, 1983. Those are some crackpot reports.

Authors Schiff and Goodman are cited in the American press as "authoritative military affairs correspondents." But in this case, they have departed from the practice of journalism and have stooped to the dissemination of propaganda. And a mighty sloppy job of it they did. The fact is, an abundance of readily-available evidence shows that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was deliberate, and that the Israeli version of the circumstances of the attack is simply self-serving baloney.

The Schiff/Goodman article is provably wrong. *The Jerusalem Post*, by distributing that material, unchecked, with its own esteemed hallmark, has sullied a tradition of journalistic excellence.

To pretend that the Schiff/Goodman polemic is the last word on this subject is ludicrous. The Schiff/Goodman report is propaganda.

JAMES M. ENNES, JR.
Woodinville, Washington.

and Zeev Schiff reply: er to the editor, James e stated his own version He has also chosen to onality.

at of this reply makes it respond to every specific We will deal with the failed, but first we will what we have done, for s, it provides an insight tually happened on the uring the 1967 attack on erty.

without ever having ither of us, assumes he ources. He ridicules us oley on the declassified report. We have in our the verbatim transcripts ge between the Israel .com and the attacking verbatim dialogues be- Air Force H.Q. and the ified documents from sions of inquiry into the Yerushalmi report; y of all the major parti- he various government transcripts of our own

interviews with the Israeli principals; photocopies and manuscripts of almost everything that has ever been written on the subject; and detailed charts.

Most of the above material was collected individually by us, without official help, while we were researching books we wrote separately on the history of the Israeli Air Force and the Navy. (The *IDF* and the *navy*: an encyclopedia of the army and the defence establishment. Vol. Three and Ten, Revivim I, Mag, Tel Aviv, 1983.)

We decided, in our article, not to present the attack in its entirety, for that has been done, but to concentrate only on the aspect of the mystery - what actually happened in Israel.

The picture we paint is not complimentary to Israel; in fact we were told by many in Israel that we did the country a disservice for having written on the subject at all. How then does Ennes conclude that we are guilty of propaganda?

Are we guilty of propaganda because we refuse to accept his version

of history as the "only" and only truth?

The Liberty was not attacked with malice aforethought. That is a myth that Ennes has chosen to perpetuate. And it is one should doubt that a clear anti-Israel motivation is behind much of what Ennes has written and said on the Liberty subject. He should refer to a speech made by Mr. Ennes at the New York Athletic Club in June 1963, at a meeting organized by America First Inc. - an organization the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has termed "a platform for the anti-Israel views of founder chairman Matthew Peter Bell" (ADL memorandum, June 12, 1964). There, on a platform with anti-Israel propagandist Alfred Lilienthal and M.J. Mohr of the American Arab League, Mr. Ennes left no doubt as to his sentiments.

Ennes is far from alone. In 1961, he was co-author of a Jewish conspiracy article in an article in *Encounter* magazine, *East Perspective* (Vol. XIV No. 3). Ennes claims that the conspiracy, disseminated by the communist bloc, of the

Israeli Embassy, the Israeli lobby and the American Jewish community, ran from journalist Jack Anderson who "could find no room in 1980 for stories unflattering to Israel," to the "East Coast book burning faction."

We have chosen to respond to the charges made against us in the "manuscript" because it is clear that the cloak of historical respectability and investigative objectivity was lifted from Ennes. We never contested his eyewitness version of events; we never claimed there was no flag; we never denied that Israel was guilty of serious mistakes, and we never claimed to have written the final version of history. We claim to have added a new perspective, one never revealed before, and one that must surely interest any *bona fide* pursuer of history.

Now to the details: Ennes is wrong regarding the French embargo on Israel. President De Gaulle informed Abba Eban, on June 3, 1967, three days before the outbreak of the Six Day War, that the embargo was in force, apparently in an

attempt to discourage an Israeli preemptive attack. As mentioned, we do have detailed charts of the attack, and stand by that the Liberty was picked up by Israeli radar at 1:41. What Ennes claims the signalman signalled is not of concern to us here. What is relevant here is the sworn testimony of the captain of the Israeli torpedo boat, and those around him, on what they read: "AAA" - identify yourself first.

We also contest Ennes' claim to interviews with any of the principals on the Israeli side, and challenge him to name those he claims to have interviewed.

We apologize for the error regarding the final compensation settlement by Israel; perhaps had we benefited from official help in Israel in researching this article, the error would not have occurred.

This error, however, does not change the main thesis in our work: the attack was not deliberate, but the result of a chain of errors - errors that may be horrendous in their stupidity, but errors that are inherent in war.

TYPICAL
ARTICLE

2 Israelis produce new evidence indicating Liberty attack mistake

United Press International

WASHINGTON - Two Israeli correspondents have produced new evidence indicating that Israel's attack on a US spyship during the 1967 Mideast war was a mistake.

The June 8, 1967, air strike against the Liberty, 13 miles off the Sinai coast, killed 34 US sailors and wounded 171.

Israel apologized for the attack as a case of mistaken identity and subsequently paid \$3 million to the families of the dead and wounded and \$2 million to the US government.

Washington closed the case, but speculation continued be-

cause of repeated charges that Israel knew the Liberty was a spyship and wanted to ensure no leakage of information when it was preparing to invade the Syrian Golan Heights the next day, June 9.

Israeli correspondents, Hirsch Goodman of the Jerusalem Post and Zeev Schiff of Ha'aretz, in the September issue of The Atlantic Monthly, write of unearthing new evidence indicating the attack was a "genuine mistake."

The Liberty, with 294 men aboard, was ordered to a position off the Sinai coast to monitor Egyptian and Israeli military radio traffic before the outbreak of

the war June 5. It was attacked by two bombers and three torpedo boats.

Among Israeli errors:

- Failure to use the correct marker in the Israeli navy's war room to identify the Liberty.

- The assumption the ship was shelling the town of El Arish, where, it later was learned, an Egyptian ammunition dump blew up.

- False radar readings showing the vessel traveling at speeds indicating it was an armed warship.

- A later report identifying the Liberty as Egyptian.

The News and Courier

Founded Jan. 10, 1803

ARTHUR M. WILCOX, Editor
ROBERT J. COX, Assistant Editor
RUSSELL F. HARNEY, Associate Editor

CHARLESTON, S.C., TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1984 PAGE 14-A

Liberty Attack Resurfaces

Seventeen years have passed since the U.S. Navy's intelligence collection ship, USS Liberty, was the target of a coordinated surface and air attack by Israeli gunboats and aircraft. Thirty-four American Navymen died and another 171 were wounded. The Israeli government apologized and paid compensation for the dead and wounded. Eventually, after 15 years, Israel paid the U.S. government for the loss of the ship. The payments were made despite an Israeli claim at the time that the attack was a "tragic error" of mistaken identity. Results of U.S. government inquiries into the attack were never definitive as to whether the attack was deliberate or in error.

Time is a great healer of wounds and for millions of Americans the attack on the Liberty faded from memory. The exceptions, of course, were the Liberty crew's survivors and next of kin plus those involved in the Navy's Court of Inquiry.

Now, in an apparent attempt to influence history, two Israeli journalists, with obvious information assistance from the Israeli government, have resurrected the Liberty episode in an article published here in The Atlantic magazine and in The Jerusalem Post in Israel. Claiming new and fresh information from Israeli government documents, the two argue that the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship.

The article was immediately rebutted by the then-chief of operations, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and, more importantly,

by surviving crew members of the Liberty. It was a former crew member who now alleges the Court of Inquiry "was a whitewash." George Golden, a lieutenant on the Liberty at the time, says he can prove that the Israeli planes and gunboats referred to the Liberty as an American ship before attacking it. He further alleges that "too many people (were) trying to shut our men up. Somebody higher up was putting the squeeze on our people not to say anything about the incident." Other former crewmen verified that they were forbidden by the government to discuss the matter for several months, even with their families.

Contacted now, these same people seem more than willing to discuss details of the day of the attack — details, no doubt, seared into their memories and unmarred by time.

For better or worse, the issue is back on the front burners again. It should not be allowed to just fade away a second time. The allegations of a high government cover-up cry out for investigation. The deliberateness of the attack needs to be resolved. The pages of history should not depend on The Atlantic magazine article as the last authoritative word on the subject. The former crew members, speaking for themselves and on behalf of their dead comrades, deserve a forum for their side of the story. We endorse the recommendation made by Adm. Moorer that "Congress should investigate this matter, even now, 17 years later." Let the truth be known.

Ask Whether It Was Made In USA

"Look for the union label" entered the language and took on an extra meaning. Now

is wholly to the good. But we can't help wondering how many items of clothing will war-

SEARCH PAPERS
ANDY
-SC

Evans And
Fritz N

TOLEDO, Ohio.— His staff informed his aren't there" for a mid Mondale gave a hint by building his campaign Ohio around a 24-year John F. Kennedy "Ronnie" Reagan.

That brought red crowds at rallies in Columbus, where party cheer anything. But the comprehension when to Reagan's 1960 letter Nixon. By comparing Marx and Hitler in a government," said he was calling government needy "a step to dict rhetoric seemed the politics of the '80s.

Although it has limited, campaign sources that the night before hotel suite, came

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AM-USS Liberty, Adv 22-2 Takes

Adv 29K

For Release Mon AMs, Oct. 29, and Thereafter

An AP Extra

Americans Rebut Israeli Version of 1967 Attack on Ship

EDITOR'S NOTE - Israel maintains its 1967 attack on an unarmed U.S. intelligence ship, which killed 34 U.S. servicemen, was an accident. Others believe it was intentional. The writer, an editor in the Associated Press World Services department, has interviewed principals in the incident and researched new information for this report.

By DAVID SMYTH

Associated Press Writers

NEW YORK (AP) - Fresh details and accusations have surfaced over an Israeli air and sea attack on an U.S. Navy ship 17 years ago that, by top-level American and Israeli accounts, came close to provoking a head-to-head U.S.-Soviet battle.

On June 9, 1967, in the midst of the six-day Arab-Israeli war, Israeli warplanes and gunboats attacked the USS Liberty, a lightly armed American naval intelligence vessel, in the Mediterranean Sea off the Sinai coast.

Thirty-four Americans died and 171 were wounded. Fearing the attack had come from the Soviets, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered armed aircraft from U.S. Sixth Fleet carriers into the air.

According to Johnson's memoirs, a superpower confrontation was avoided only after a flurry of messages on the Washington-Moscow hotline, in which the Soviets threatened "military intervention" in the Middle East and Johnson responded by moving the Sixth Fleet closer to Syria, a Soviet ally.

The still outstanding question in this incident is whether Israel intentionally attacked the U.S. ship, or whether - as two Israeli journalists said in a recent article, quoting Israeli government documents - it was a "tragic accident" of mistaken identity.

Top U.S. diplomatic, intelligence and military officers of that time - including former Secretary of State Dean Rusk - and the surviving Liberty crew say it was an accident. The two Israeli journalists acknowledge that the question remains open.

George H. Golien, a lieutenant on the Liberty who became the ship's second in command when the executive officer was killed in the attack, told the Associated Press he had "proof" from radio monitoring records that the Israeli planes and gunboats had referred to the Liberty as an American ship before attacking it.

"It is ridiculous to say this was an accident," retired Air. Thomas H. Moorer, who was U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, said in a telephone interview.

The (Israeli) article comes very short of putting the matter to rest. In the real world, there is no way it could have happened the way the Israeli journalists describe it, he said.

Congress should investigate this matter, even now, 17 years later, said Moorer, who is currently a senior consultant at the University of Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Goodman and Zeev Schiff, in an article published in the September issue of The Atlantic magazine in the United States and in The Jerusalem Post in Israel. Citing "still-classified Israeli evidence," they argue that the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship.

But Americans who have kept active files on the incident say the article raises no new evidence. Rather, the article contained "long-discredited Israeli government documents that were rejected as unbelievable by the U.S. government years ago," according to Lt. Cmdr. James M. Ennes Jr., the author of a 1982 book on the incident.

"U.S. intelligence documents indicate the Israelis attacked the Liberty deliberately. They feared she would monitor their plans to attack the Golan Heights in Syria - a move the United States opposed for fear of provoking Soviet military intervention," Ennes said.

The Israeli government apologized for the "tragic mistake" immediately after the attack, paid compensation for the dead and wounded some months later, and eventually, after 15 years, paid the U.S. government for the loss of the ship. Officially the U.S. government considers the case closed.

However, Rusk, former CIA director Richard M. Helms, and Louis W. Tordella, the former deputy director of the National Security Agency, told the AP in separate interviews that they didn't believe Israeli claims that the attack was accidental.

A dozen surviving Liberty officers and men interviewed by the AP all said the attack, which lasted more than an hour and smashed 821 holes in the ship's hull, could not possibly have been an accident.

Goodman, who is defense correspondent of The Jerusalem Post, and Schiff, who is military affairs editor of the Israeli daily Haaretz, offered new details in their blow-by-blow account of the attack as seen from the Israeli side.

They say that an Israeli reconnaissance plane reported "an American naval-supply vessel" 70 miles west of Gaza at 8:23 a.m. In the Israeli high command's underground war-room in Tel Aviv, the commander of the Israeli Navy, AIm. Shlomo Erel, then ordered a green marker placed on the battle-control board, designating a neutral vessel, and a Maj. Pinhasi identified the ship as the Liberty after consulting a naval manual.

However, "his correct identification came to naught," Goodman and Schiff add. "At 11 a.m. duty commanders in the navy war-room changed shifts. Lt. Col. L (his name remains classified) who took over temporary command ... ordered the green marker removed from the table to keep it "as uncluttered as possible."

MORSE<

b 0316

AM-USS Liberty, Adv 29. 1st Aid
Adv29<
For Release Mon AMs, Oct. 29, and Thereafter<
As AP Extra<
NEW YORK: as possible.

Nineteen minutes later, the Israeli writers say, the Liberty was rediscovered, and Israeli torpedo boats were sent out. Picked up on radar, the Liberty appeared to be "a warship ... sailing on an evasive course" at high speed.

Israeli planes were called in, circled the Liberty three times, and reported directly to their commander, Maj. Gen. Mordechai Hofer, "no flag or other signs of identification on the ship." Still not positively identified, but taken for an Egyptian ship, the Liberty was then attacked by the planes and later by the gunboats.

This account is disputed by the survivors of the Liberty's 294-man crew.

Golden said: "I had proof that they knew who we were. We had monitored the communications between the Israeli planes and gunboats and their bases in which they referred to us as an American ship.

"I turned my proof over to an admiral, but I don't know what was done with it. The Court of Inquiry (held later by the U.S. Navy) was a whitewash," Golden asserted. "There were also just too many people trying to shut our men up. Somebody higher up was putting a squeeze on our people not to say anything about the incident. The information I had showed it was not an accident, and our government knows this."

Ennes and other Liberty officers interviewed also maintain the Court of Inquiry disregarded vital evidence and that there was a U.S. government coverup of the incident. They said Liberty crewmen were forbidden to discuss the matter for several months, even with their families.

Of Israeli claims the ship bore no identification, Ennes, the Liberty's deck officer just before the attack, said, "That very morning I had ordered a brand-new flag put up. It was streaming freely in a 12-knot wind. Liberty's identification marks, 3TR5, were painted on her sides 10 feet high."

Signalman Russell O. David Jr. confirmed in a separate interview that he had put up the new flag. "When it was shot down by the Israeli planes," David said, "I put up a holiday ensign that was three times bigger. When the Israeli gunboats attacked, I kept flashing with my lamp 'US NAVY SHIP' until my lamp was shot out and I was wounded. I knew then they wanted us all dead."

Wayne L. Smith, the Liberty's chief radioman, said, "The Israelis jammed five of our six radio circuits as we tried to call U.S. Sixth Fleet for help, 400 miles away."

Chief Petty Officer Stanley W. White, president of the Liberty Veterans Association, said, "The Israeli planes and gunboats spent more than one hour hitting us with rockets, napalm bombs, torpedoes, cannon and machine-gun fire. They machine-gunned our firefighters on deck and they shot our life rafts out of the water. ... I don't know of a single member of our association who believes that attack was an accident."

"There was good visibility," Moorer said, "and with all her antennas sticking out of her, the Liberty was probably the most peculiar ship ever seen in the Mediterranean."

These complaints were mentioned to Adm. Isaac Kidd, who conducted the Court of Inquiry.

"There's nothing new about that," Kidd said of the charges. "I know some people were unhappy about the inquiry. Every witness has his viewpoint of one particular aspect of the incident, which he thinks is important - but he did not see the complete picture."

Kidd said his inquiry had been limited to establishing any culpability or negligence within the U.S. Navy. It singled out no one for censure or punishment. "The inquiry did not go into the responsibility of the attacking forces," he said.

Israeli government investigations likewise found nobody to blame.

"I have never believed the Israeli explanation," Rusk said in a telephone interview. And if they did attack an unidentified ship, he added, "even that would have been reckless considering the number of Soviet ships in the area."

In his memoirs, Johnson recalled that he instantly warned the Kremlin on the hotline that he had launched planes "to investigate" the attack.

Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli Chief of Staff, commented in his autobiography that Johnson "faced the awesome decision of ordering U.S. aircraft to attack the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, a fleet that Rabin estimated at around 70 warships."

Two days later, on June 10, Johnson faced an even bigger decision. On that day, the president recalled, the Soviets were on the hotline threatening "military intervention" if the Israelis did not immediately stop their attack on the Golan Heights.

Johnson, who wrote that "the peace of the world walked a tightrope," countered by moving the Sixth Fleet 50 miles closer to the Syrian coast.

The peril of a superpower confrontation ended when Johnson told the Soviets he "had received assurances" that Israel "would make the ceasefire with Syria completely effective."

"At least," Rabin wrote in his memoirs, "we were not plunged into a third world war" as a result of the Liberty incident.

End Adv. for Monday AMs, Oct. 29 and thereafter.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

11A AM The Virginia Star and The Loudoun Star, Sunday, Sept. 23, 1904



Article reveals Israeli version of '67 attack on US Navy ship

By G. Jefferson Price III
Baltimore Sun

JERUSALEM — An article by two authoritative military affairs correspondents has disclosed for the first time the Israeli version of events that led to the Israeli bombing of a U.S. Navy vessel in which 34 American sailors were killed and another 171 wounded at the height of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The article, written for Atlantic Monthly magazine and run Thursday in the English-language Jerusalem Post, acknowledges that, 17 years later, the question of whether the Israeli air and sea attack against the U.S.S. Liberty was intentional "remains open."

But the article, based largely on still-classified Israeli military documents, gives a blow-by-blow description of Israeli command decisions which, combined with previously documented U.S. Navy mistakes, led to one of the most devastating setbacks in U.S.-Israeli relations.

Hirsh Goodman, military affairs writer for the Jerusalem Post, and Zeev Schiff, military affairs writer for Ha'aretz, conclude that Israel's actions were negligent and inept. They wrote that some mistakes were the result of misreading information in the heat of a war situation in which the atmosphere was so tense that chief of staff, and later prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin "broke down under the strain and had to be replaced for 24 hours."

The authors have high security clearances. Goodman said much of the information was obtained while they collected material for books on the histories of the Israeli air force and navy. The books were approved by the Israeli military censor, but the Atlantic Monthly article was not submitted, Goodman said.

The authors contend there is no evidence that Israel deliberately attacked the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel out of fear it would in-

terfere with the Israeli war plan.

The Liberty was dispatched in late May 1967 to the Mediterranean off the Sinai peninsula, where Egypt and Israel appeared to be headed toward war. The war started June 5.

On the afternoon of June 8, while on station about 12 miles off the Sinai coast, the Liberty was attacked by Israeli jet fighter-bombers and torpedoed by Israeli naval vessels.

"The tragedy could have been averted," the authors contend, if messages dispatched from as high up as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordering the vessel to move 100 miles from the war zone following the outbreak of war had ever reached the ship.

But they add: "It could also have been averted if fatal mistakes were not being made at the same time by an overworked Israeli general staff." The Israeli version of events, taken mostly from the still-classified Israeli "war log," reveals that the first Israeli mistake occurred early on the day of the attack when Israeli aerial reconnaissance identified the Liberty as a destroyer.

A red marker on the Israeli navy war room map noted the vessel as "an unidentified," potentially hostile vessel, the article said.

Later, the Israeli spotter identified the vessel erroneously as a U.S. naval supply ship. Soon a green marker, signifying a neutral ship, replaced the red marker. Still later the same morning the vessel was positively identified as the Liberty.

But at 11 a.m., a new Israeli duty officer ordered the Liberty's green marker removed.

The vessel did not again draw the attention of those in the war room until almost 20 minutes later during a search for the source of what the Israelis erroneously believed was shelling from the sea against the Sinai town of El Arish, which they had captured from Egypt.

Convinced that the town was under attack from enemy vessels,

the Israeli command dispatched torpedo boats.

According to the article, the torpedo boat radars picked up the Liberty about 14 miles off the coast. An immediate air strike was ordered.

Two French-made Israeli Mirage jets circled the Liberty and reported seeing "no flag or other signs of identification," the authors reported.

(Other reports, including accounts by Liberty's crew, contend that it was a clear day and that the U.S. flag on the ship was in plain view.) The jets were ordered to attack.

Two other Israeli jets with napalm bombs were diverted from the Sinai and made two runs at the ship.

In the dense smoke from the burning ship, one of the pilots noticed the ship's identification marks and reported the first information that raised doubts about the floundering ship's identity.

Upon reaching the scene, the Israeli torpedo boats' commander hesitated, demanding that the Liberty identify itself. The Liberty flashed back the code for the Israeli vessel to identify itself first, according to the article. While the Israeli commander hesitated, machine gun fire came from the Liberty.

The authors write that the Israeli commander waited to consult his handbook on the identity of Arab naval vessels and that this check confirmed the Liberty was actually an Egyptian supply vessel.

The torpedo boats attacked. Only then, according to the article, did they notice the ship's identifying letters.

In a final twist of errors, they and their commanders on land feared they had hit a Russian vessel.

Later, the torpedo boat commander reported he had hit a U.S. Navy ship.

According to the article, later inquiries by the Israelis determined that "the attack on the ship was not conducted out of malice, nor... was there any evidence of criminal negligence. It was a genuine mistake."

Israel promptly apologized to Washington and by 1968 had paid more than \$7 million in damages to those wounded aboard the Liberty and the families of the 34 killed.

papers

Opinions

The News and Courier

THE EVENING POST

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Controversy over USS Liberty refuses to die American survivors refute magazine article which claims the Israeli attack was a 'tragic mistake'

By DAVID SMYTH

The controversy over an Israeli attack on a U.S. naval intelligence-gathering ship, which took the lives of 34 crewmen, refuses to die after 17 years.

Two Israeli writers say in the September issue of The Atlantic magazine, a Boston-based monthly, that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was a "tragic accident."

But former top officials of the U.S. government and a dozen survivors of the June 8, 1967 attack on the ship, interviewed this month by the Associated Press, say the attack was deliberate. One survivor claims Israeli's goal was to prevent Washington from getting immediate information on Israeli plans to attack the Golan Heights in Syria.

Dona Frank, who was then U.S. secretary of state, said in an interview, "I have never believed the Israeli explanation" that the attack on the Liberty was a case of mistaken identity.

Two top U.S. intelligence officers of that time, then-CIA Director Richard J. Helms and National Security Agency Deputy Director Louis W. Torrella, also said in separate interviews that they disbelieve the explanation given by Israel immediately after the attack that the assault was accidental.

Thirty-four Americans were killed and 171 were wounded when Israeli warplanes and gunboats attacked the Liberty in international waters off the Sinai coast during the Six Day War between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

The two Israeli writers, Hiram Goodman, defense correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, and Zeev Schiff, military affairs editor of the Israeli daily Haaretz, base their Atlantic article on Israeli government records.

Their account, they say, "is based on unedited, previously unpublished material retrieved by the authors over the past 10 years from Israeli naval and air force archives and on transcripts from two internal Israeli Defense Force investigations that remain classified."

Goodman and Schiff give a blow-by-blow account

of the incident as seen from the Israeli side. Schiff's version differs from a previous account given in the memoirs by Israeli Chief of Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin said the Israeli air force discovered the Liberty and initiated the attack, while Goodman and Schiff say that Israeli torpedo boats located her on their radar and then called in an air strike.

The Atlantic article says the Liberty was mistakenly identified as probably an Egyptian vessel when an officer of the Avir headquarters removed a marker on the Israeli high command's battle control map that designated her as a neutral ship.

Israeli planes and gunboats then attacked, the Israeli writers say, when they could observe no identification marks on the vessel.

This account is disputed by survivors of the Liberty's crew.

"They know who we were," Lieutenant Commander James M. Ennes said in an interview. Ennes, then a lieutenant, was the Liberty's deck officer in the seven hours preceding the attack.

"That very morning I had ordered a brand-new flag put up. It was streaming freely in the wind. The Liberty's identification marks — GTR5 — were painted on her sides 10 feet high," Ennes said.

When the Israeli gunboats attacked, Signalman Russell David said in a separate interview, "I kept flashing with my Aldis lamp 'US NAVY SHIP' until my lamp was shot out."

George Goldan, who became second-in-command of the Liberty when the executive officer was killed in the attack, said, "I had proof that they knew who we were. We had monitored the communications between the planes and gunboats and their bases in which they recognized us as an American ship."

Wayne Smith, the Liberty's chief radioaman, said

in another telephone interview, "The Israelis jammed five of our radio circuits as we called U.S. Sixth Fleet for help but I managed to get through on the sixth and last circuit."

Chief Petty Officer Stanley White, president of the U.S. Liberty Veterans Association, commented, "I don't know of a single member of our association who believes that attack was an accident."

Torrella said in a telephone interview this month: "I believe it was a deliberately planned attack. The Liberty was recognized, she was in international waters, she was flying an ensign and a flag."

Helms commented on Schiff, "to say that it was an accident is drawing a very long bow in view of the evidence."

Admiral Thomas Moorer, US Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, commented, "It is ridiculous to say this was an accident. There was no doubt either, she was flying the U.S. flag and the plane (F-4) torpedo boats attacked over a long period of time. With all her antennas sticking out of her, the Liberty was probably the most peculiar ship ever seen in the Mediterranean. I think Congress should investigate the incident, even now 17 years later."

Why would Israel attack the ship of a friendly nation?

"Because of the Golan Heights," said Ennes, the author of a book on the Liberty incident. "The White House had warned Israel not to attack Syria's Golan Heights for fear of Soviet intervention in the war. The Israelis attacked the Golan Heights the very next day. If the Liberty had still been there monitoring Israeli communications, the White House would have known about it immediately and prevented the assault."

Mr. Smyth, who is an Associated Press editor, wrote this article for AP's world service.

Jeffrey Watt. An

Cartoons of the week

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(from page 13)
 use of its air power, or problem, however, of its long maritime Mediterranean its only link with the Israel's navy was the an the country's deas the Egyptian navy with Soviet Osa and missile boats, the only one operational three World War II five operational torpedoes deployed in the

0 per cent of Israel's industrial infrastruc the Mediterranean general staff was con- Egyptians would use y to cut off Israel's y but also to shell The navy was conse- d to focus its atten- l defences.

his zone of fear that iled, undefended, on - patrolling 13 miles of Sinai, its presence e protagonists.

Yitzhak Rabin in- ander Castle, in Tel ael intends to defend attack by the Egyp- t be done by combin- d naval forces." The en from Rabin's auto- ntinues:

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ning could have been report, received ear- y, that two Soviet uthering vessels had off Israel's northern ipped stayed well clear rritorial waters. heir presence caused T consternation in the

ship some seventy miles west of Gaza. The spotter aboard the aircraft said he thought the ship was a destroyer. The duty officer immediately ordered a red marker placed on the battle-control table in the navy's war room. Red was the colour used to designate an unidentified target.

At 6.03 the spotter aboard the Nord filed a supplementary report in which he identified the ship as "an American naval-supply vessel." Though the ship had now been positively identified as American, and therefore neutral, no move was made to change the ship's designation on the control table from red to green - the colour used to designate a neutral target.

In the evidence he presented to the official IDF Commission of Inquiry, the duty officer responsible for updating the battle-control table testified that he had refrained from changing the colour code because "identification had been vague and uncertain."

FROM 6.00 A.M. TO 9.00 A.M. the Liberty was almost forgotten. The navy's attention was diverted to a suspected enemy-submarine penetration west of the town of Atlit, where a huge oil slick had been sighted. At 8.05 the navy dispatched the destroyer MV Haifa to the area. The Haifa detonated five depth charges at 9.02, but with no success.

While the hunt for the submarine was on, Aluf Erel entered the underground war room to take personal command of the situation. As he familiarized himself with the battle-control board, he questioned the duty officer about the red marker west of the Sinai coast. Told that the marker designated an American supply ship, he ordered it changed to green. Erel then concentrated his attention on the pursuit of the submarine.

At 9.29 five more depth charges were detonated off the Atlit coast (apparently with some success) the Haifa crew reported the

by officers were under instruction to keep the battle-control table as simple as possible. Erel's decision wiped out all reference to the presence of the Liberty off the Sinai coast. From 11.05 that morning the Liberty was no longer a known quantity for those operationally responsible for conducting the fast-moving three-front war from their underground bunker.

Nineteen minutes later, the Liberty was rediscovered, this time under tragic circumstances.

At 11.24 the air force reported to Aluf Mishne Issy Rahav, naval chief of operations, that the Sinai coastal city of El Arish, captured by Israeli forces the day before, was being shelled from the sea. Hardly had Rahav given instructions to recheck the information when, at 11.27, a second, independent, report came in, this time from Southern Command headquarters, that El Arish was being bombarded. The report added that the shells were falling short of the shoreline.

Explosions and smoke from El Arish were also noticed by the Liberty's crew. In his book, *Assault on the Liberty*, Ennes, who was duty officer on the bridge that morning, reports that a few minutes after the Liberty had executed a right turn to a new course 238 degrees, at 11.30 a.m., "a huge explosion rocked the town of El Arish."



but those speeds were sent back by T-204 to naval headquarters, and both were registered in the command's log book.

When asked during the official hearings to explain this discrepancy, Yfrach said that "the mistake could have been caused by what is known as 'radar jump,' or by erroneous reading by the radar operator, or by a combination of any of these three factors." Aluf Erel, in his evidence, said that it was unknown for the radars of torpedo boats to be "inaccurate."

At the time, however, the information reaching headquarters from T-204 led Aluf Mishne Rahav to two conclusions: that the target in question was a warship, and that it was sailing on an evasive course in the direction of Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal.

At 1.45 p.m. Rahav decided to order an attack on the ship. Since the three torpedo boats that he had at his disposal were still 20 nautical miles away from the target, and since they could develop a maximum speed of only 28 knots - the same as the target - he called for an air strike.

Rahav's request reached Air Force Command at 1.48. The senior air force battle controller, Sgan Aluf Shmuel Kislev, ordered two Mirage III C fighters, on their way back to Israel from an air patrol over the Suez Canal, to be diverted to the target. The Mirages reached the target a few seconds before 2.00 p.m. The lead plane dropped to an altitude of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled the target only once. On the second turn the lead pilot reported back to air force headquarters that the ship was not Israeli; it was painted battle-grey and had two cannons in the fore-castle, a mast in the front, and one funnel.

Aluf Mordechai Hod, the commander of the Israeli air force, who was in direct contact with the pilot, asked if any flag was visible. The pilot reported back: "I see no flag or other signs of identification."

T-204 radioed five. I see no flag." he said.

The pilot was told to report on damage and leave the target area. He radioed back that the ship was covered with heavy smoke, that the upper deck was badly damaged, and that he thought he could see men jumping into the water. At 2.16 the air-force controller in the central-operations room dispatched two helicopters to the area to pick up survivors.

At 2.18 the commander of the torpedo-boat squadron ordered his crew to prepare for an attack. Two minutes later, the naval-operations room ordered him to hold off "pending further clarification." The delay was ordered by naval headquarters after it received the news that the ship under attack had the identification markings CTR-5 on its hull. Obviously, doubt had arisen as to the true identity of the vessel.

Though they held their fire, the three torpedo boats continued to speed toward the target. By 2.24 they could see the burning ship. Thick, acrid smoke enveloped the entire vessel, except for the hull and part of the bridge - but even this limited view convinced Sgan Aluf Oren that the ship was not a destroyer.

"I understood then," Oren subsequently told the Commission of Inquiry, "that it could only have been an Egyptian naval-supply ship, or perhaps even a merchant vessel."

At 2.27 p.m. Oren ordered the signalman aboard T-204 to flash the message "What ship?" to the stricken vessel.

The Liberty replied, "AA," meaning "Identify yourselves first."

THE LIBERTY'S CAPTAIN could not have chosen a more unfortunate answer. Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly the same exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer, the MV Yaffo and an Egyptian ship, the Ibrahim-el Awal. Oren, who was a young officer on the Yaffo's bridge at the time, remembered the inci-

7:45 A.M. ON JUNE 7, the day of the attack on the Liberty, Israeli naval intelligence reported sighting three Egyptian submarines off the Israeli coast. The commander of the navy, Aluf Shlomo Erel, ordered Israel's three destroyers to intercept them. At 5:37 a.m. a periscope was sighted off the coast of Ashdod, and at 6:50 p.m. another periscope was reported outside the port of Ashdod. In addition to the general tension was the possibility of failure among the naval command: that morning, members of an elite frogman commando unit had been captured by the Egyptians in Alexandria after having managed to sink several boats. The capture of the frogmen was a severe loss to the

navy. On June 7, the third day of the attack, the Israeli naval command was frustrated and fearful, under-empowered to defend Israel's shores, dependent on the air force and in need of observation for long-range warning.

On June 8 began early for the Israeli navy. According to the war log, which contains many details of this day, the first aircraft taken, an air Nord aircraft took off from an Ashdod airfield at 4:00 a.m. with a radar spotter on board. Its mission was to patrol Israel's shores to ensure that no enemy vessels had penetrated Israeli waters during the night. The use of the aircraft and a radar spotter for early warning was necessary because of Israel's limited radar capability at the time. At 5:45 the duty officer in the Ashdod war room was informed by the Nord that he had sighted a

ship. The war room received a cable saying that an Israeli ship reported being shot at by an unidentified ship off the Sinai coast. Questioned after landing, the pilot said that he had not been fired on, but that he had seen a ship, which he described as being "grey, wider than usual, and with a bridge in the middle." The information was filed and forgotten.

Shortly before 10:00 a.m. the Nord aircraft returned to base. During a debriefing the navy spotter reported that he had clearly seen a GTR-5 on the side of the vessel he had sighted. The spotter's information was passed on to a Rav-Seren Pinhasi at the naval operations room at Naval Headquarters, who, after consulting *Jane's Fighting Ships*, identified the ship as the Liberty, an American intelligence-gathering vessel. Pinhasi's findings were double-checked by naval intelligence officers, who reported back to the operations center that the GTR-5 was an American intelligence vessel named the Liberty.

This correct information, however, came to naught. At 11:00 a.m. duty commanders in the Ashdod war room changed shifts. Sgan Aluf (his name remains classified), who took over temporary command, made a decision that proved fatal for the Liberty. He ordered the green marker designating its position removed from the battle-control table. "I wanted that battle-control table as uncluttered as possible," he explained later.

Though consistent with standard naval operating procedure, which

required that the ship be identified, the El Arish had not been sighted by an Egyptian intelligence agent. On the morning of June 8, however, the IDF general command assumed that the city was under attack from the sea.

This assumption was the second error sealing the Liberty's fate. In response to the presumed attack, Aluf Mishne Rahav, at 12:05 p.m., ordered three torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to depart the port of Ashdod and proceed in the general direction of El Arish. At 12:15 p.m. the captain of the flagship, Sgan Aluf Moshe Oren, was ordered to sail to a point 20 miles north of El Arish and patrol the area. At 1:00 p.m. he was informed that upon sighting the target he was to call for a immediate air strike.

At 1:01 Sgan Mishne Aharon Yfrach, the radar operator aboard T-24, the flagship, reported that he had picked up a "target" on his scope, and that the ship was 20 nautical miles northwest of El Arish, 14 miles off the Bardawil shore, and moving west at a speed of 30 knots.

The target's speed was a crucial factor in determining whether or not it was a ship of war. Standard operating procedure for the Israeli navy in 1967 decreed that any ship moving faster than 20 knots in a battle arena was to be presumed hostile. A second radar check was ordered. Now the target's speed was given at 28 knots.

This was the third Israeli mistake. Both radar readings were incorrect.

Whether or not the Liberty was flying a flag remains a major point of contention. The pilot, however, is not. The pilot's report left them assessing the target's status with the impression that no flag was being flown - a key factor in their decision that the ship was hostile.

Seconds after this radio exchange the order to attack was given. By 2:00 the two pilots had each strafed the Liberty four times. The pilots reported that they had scored "good hits" and that a fire had broken out on the "left-hand side of the ship."

WHILE THE ATTACK by the Mirages was still in progress, Air Force Command ordered two more aircraft diverted to the Liberty, this time Super-Mystère jets en route to a bombing mission over the Mitla pass, in central Sinai. They arrived on the scene just as the second Mirage was completing its last strafing run. Though the Super-Mystères were armed with napalm bombs, which are not suitable for attacking targets at sea, it was decided to use the aircraft anyway. The planes made two bombing runs each, but only one bomb hit the ship.

There was no return fire from the Liberty. This lack of response puzzled the lead pilot, who did another sloop around the burning ship and noticed that P-30, or what he thought to be P-30, was painted on the hull. Still puzzled, he dropped to 90 feet above waterline and completed a second sloop around the vessel. This time he reported seeing CTR-5 on the hull: "The ship's identification is Charlie-

dent well. If he still had any doubts that the burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they were now dispelled.

While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine-gun fire erupted from the ship's forecabin. That shots were fired has been confirmed by American seamen aboard the Liberty. It seems that one of the crew, Seaman Apprentice Dale Larkins, did not hear Captain McGonagle's "hold-fire" order, issued minutes before, and fired several volleys in the direction of the torpedo boats until he was told to stop.

Oren still hesitated. He consulted the Israeli navy's book identifying the ships of the Arab navies, and concluded that the ship in question was the Egyptian supply vessel El-Quseir. An independent check by the captain of one of the other torpedo boats came up with the same identification.

The court later questioned both officers at length on the contradiction between their conclusion that the ship was a supply vessel and the report that the vessel was doing "28 or 30 knots" at the time it was detected. Oren replied that he had assumed that the ship was a straggler, left behind by a larger Egyptian force that may have been in the area. The radar reading could have pertained to one of the other ships, he said.

At 2:37 Sgan Aluf Oren gave the order to attack the Liberty. Covering their advance with rapid cannon fire, the three torpedo boats sped toward the target. At 2:43, T-20 fired off the first torpedo, from

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It was only at 3.20 p.m. - a full half-hour later - that Oren, who had in the meantime looked the ship over closely, recontacted naval headquarters and said that he had been mistaken: the ship was not Russian but American.

At 3.30 the news was conveyed to Commander Castle in Tel Aviv.

Meanwhile, the two Israeli helicopters arrived on the scene, but after circling the ship for 20 minutes and finding no men overboard they returned to base.

At 4.02 two tugs were readied for departure from Ashdod in case they were needed to tow the ship in. At the same time, Aluf Erel ordered Oren to use his bullhorn to try and make contact with the American vessel and offer help. Under no circumstances, he was told, should he try to board the ship.

At 4.40 Israel's offer of help was rejected.

At 5.04 the three torpedo boats were ordered to return to base. They turned due northeast, in the direction of Ashdod, and at 5.50 the Liberty disappeared from their radarscopes.

There was one more attempt to make contact with the ship. At 6.15 p.m. Commander Castle was flown

to the area in an Israeli helicopter. He was able to do nothing other than circle the ship and throw down to the survivors on the burning deck a message packet containing his calling card, with a hastily scrawled message on the back: "Have you casualties?" There was no reply.

Crippled, the Liberty then sailed for Malta.

ON JUNE 12, 1967 - five days after the attack - the Israeli chief of staff appointed a special commission of inquiry into the incident. It was headed by Aluf Mishne Ram Ron, who later became a member of the Knesset.

On Ron's recommendation, the IDF's advocate-general Aluf Mishne Meir Shamgar, today the president of the Supreme Court, decided that "due to the importance of the issue in question and the seriousness of its repercussions" an investigative judge should be appointed to report on the evidence. On June 21 Sgan Aluf Justice Yeshayahu Yerushalmi was named to head a judicial investigation into the affair.

Yerushalmi heard 34 witnesses over a period of one month. While the hearings were still in progress he

issued an interim judgment that Sgan Aluf "L" - the officer who had ordered that the green marker be taken off the battle-control board - could be charged with negligence. But in his final judgement, rendered on July 21, 1967, Yerushalmi found no grounds for the prosecution of any of the officers or men involved. Yerushalmi's decision was confirmed by Advocate General Shamgar on July 24, after the latter completed a comprehensive review of the evidence placed before the court of inquiry.

Both Ron and Yerushalmi found that the attack on the ship was not conducted out of malice, nor independently in summing up and passing judgement was there any evidence of criminal negligence. It was a genuine mistake.

Yerushalmi isolated the five crucial factors that he believed led to the mistake: the report that El-Arish was being shelled from the sea; the report that the Liberty was moving at 30 knots per hour; the report from the Mirage pilots that it was a ship of war; the identification of the Liberty as the El-Quseir; the ship's inexplicable closeness to hostile shores in a time of war.

On June 10, 1967, in a formal apology, the government of Israel undertook to pay compensation to the families of the men killed and to the men wounded in the attack. A year later Israel paid out a total of \$7,773,000 to the families of the 34 servicemen killed, and in April of 1969 it paid another \$3,566,547 to the wounded.

However, Israel refused to pay the \$7,644,116 demanded by the U.S. government, on July 1, 1968, for repairs to the vessel. The reason given by the Israeli government at the time was that Israel did not accept the contention that it alone was responsible for the circumstances leading to the attack.

The question of damages has bounced back and forth over the years with no results. Finally, in January of 1980, Israel agreed to negotiate a settlement, but none has been negotiated to this day.

To this day, as well, the wounds have not healed. The issue resurfaces periodically, and with it the pain.

©Harsh Goodman and Ze'ev Schiff. This article will appear in the September issue of The Atlantic magazine.

James M. ...

Israelis allegedly meant to hit U.S. ship

Continued from Page 1

Israeli journalists said in a recent article getting Israeli government officials - it was a "major accident of mistaken identity."

The U.S. domestic intelligence and military sources of Israel were - including former secretary of State Dean Rusk - and the former Liberty ship crewman say it was a "major accident."

Back on U.S. ship premeditated

were wounded. Fearing the attack had come from the Soviet, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered armed aircraft from U.S. Sixth Fleet carriers into the area.

See ISRAELIS on Page 8

Israeli government spokesman said the "major mistake" immediately after the attack, paid compensation for the dead and wounded some months later, and eventually, after 15 years, paid the U.S. government for the loss of the ship.

The U.S. domestic intelligence and military sources of Israel were - including former secretary of State Dean Rusk - and the former Liberty ship crewman say it was a "major accident."

A dozen surviving Liberty officers and crew interviewed by the AP all said the attack, which lasted more than an hour, was premeditated. One Israeli journalist said he could not possibly have been mistaken.

George H. Golden, a bookmaker, said the Liberty was because the ship was in command when the executive officer was killed in the attack, told him it was from that he had "proof" from the radio monitoring records that the Liberty was an American ship before attacking it.

"It is ridiculous to say that was an accident," said retired Adm. Thomas R. Moore, who was U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in 1957.

The (liberal) article seems very short of putting the matter to rest. In the real world, there is no way it could have happened "the way the Israeli journalists describe it," he said.

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
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

INTERNATIONAL EDITION

ONE STORY - 1 AP-NY-09-21-84 2119EDT

Liberty Controversy Still Hot
NEW YORK (AP)

The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty during the Six Day War in 1967 was a "tragic accident," say two Israeli writers, who cite classified Israeli government documents in an article of the September issue of The Atlantic magazine.

But former top officials of the U.S. government and a dozen survivors of the June 8, 1967 attack on the intelligence vessel say they remain convinced that the attack was deliberate.

Thirty-four Americans were killed and 171 were wounded.

Hirsh Goodman, defense correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, and Zeev Schiff, military affairs editor of the Israeli daily Haaretz, wrote in the Atlantic that they had reviewed "unedited, previously unpublished material retrieved by the authors over the past 10 years from Israeli naval and air force archives and on transcripts from two internal Israel Defense Force investigations that remain classified."

They say the Liberty was mistakenly identified as probably an Egyptian vessel when an officer at Tel Aviv headquarters removed a marker on the Israeli high command's battle control map that designated Liberty as a neutral ship.

Israeli planes and gunboats attacked, the Israeli writers say, when they could observe no identification marks on the vessel.

That differs from the account by Israeli Chief of Staff, Gen. Yitzhak Rabin. In his memoirs, Rabin said the Israeli air force discovered the Liberty and initiated the attack, while Goodman and Schiff say that Israeli torpedo boats located the ship on their radar and then called in an air strike.

Dean Rusk, who was then U.S. Secretary of State, said in an interview, "I have never believed the Israeli explanation" of mistaken identity.

"To say that it was an accident is drawing a pretty long bow in view of the evidence," said Richard J. Helms, who was director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time.

"They knew who we were," Lt. Cmdr. James M. Ennes said in an interview. Ennes, then a lieutenant, was the Liberty's deck officer.

"That very morning I had ordered a brandy flag put up. It was streaming freely in the wind. The Liberty's identification marks -- GTR5 -- were painted on her sides 10 feet high," Ennes said.

When the Israeli gunboats attacked, signalman Russell David said in a separate interview, "I kept flashing with my Aldis lamp 'US NAVY SHIP' until my lamp was shot out."

George Golden, who became second-in-command of the Liberty when the executive officer was killed in the attack, said, "I had proof that they knew who we were. We had monitored the communications between the planes and gunboats and their home bases in which they recognized us as an American ship."

Wayne Smith, the Liberty's chief radioman, said in another telephone interview, "The Israelis jammed five of our radio circuits as we called U.S. Sixth Fleet for help but I managed to get through on the sixth and last circuit."

Chief Petty Officer Stanley White, president of the USS Liberty Veterans Association, commented, "I don't know of a single member of our association who believes that attack was an accident."

AP-NY-09-21-84 2119EDT

Liberty officer questions article about Israeli attack

The *Jerusalem Post* a year ago, word of an acquaintance or correspondent in, along with an affairs writer Zeev, writing an article about Liberty which, they thoroughly discredited everyone else who wrote about the 1967 Liberty.

off-the-deck of the my book, *Assault* (Random House,) considered the work on the subject. I of my conclusions was deliberate and omissions have lied ably. I have looked for the glee to the long-Goodman treatise on

the Goodman article. And frankly I am never in my wildest dream that two of the Israeli journalism which slovenly, poorly and just-plain-wrong aspect that my task could be so easy.

"evidence" cited by (the Yerushalmi available for years secret" classification at all. I mention it

in my book (pages 153-158) and show why it cannot be believed. For years I have distributed copies of the Yerushalmi report to the press and public because, seen as a whole, it is clearly false. Not only is it contrary to my personal observations from Liberty's bridge, but it is contrary to sworn testimony of Liberty crewmen and contrary to other official records of the United States Government.

Moreover, the Yerushalmi report was officially dismissed as not believable in 1967 by the Lyndon Johnson State Department in an analysis that was available to your authors. Dean Rusk and other American leaders have repeatedly dismissed the Yerushalmi report as unbelievable. Surely Schiff and Goodman are aware of this. Your readers are entitled to know this. Why did Schiff and Goodman fail to tell them that their "new evidence" has long been dismissed by the United States as hogwash?

Did Schiff and Goodman interview anyone who was aboard the ship? Had they done so they would know that the attacking aircraft did not make three careful, low-level, pre-attack orbits seeking to identify the ship and attack only after seeing "no flag or other signs of identification." In fact, Israel attacked a clearly marked American naval vessel and continued to attack long after examining the American flag at close



range.

Did they interview the signalman who supposedly signalled "Identify yourself first," or the admiral who investigated that part of the excuse in 1967? The truth, easily verified and documented in U.S. government files, is that no one signalled "Identify yourself first." Liberty's signalman Russell David frantically flashed "U.S. NAVY SHIP, USS LIBERTY" and the ship's international call sign until his signal light was shot out by the attacking boats.

Did Schiff/Goodman reconstruct the scene by plotting it on a chart of the area? Had they done so they would know that the torpedo boats could not possibly have picked up the Liberty at 11:41 and made the plotting errors that Israel claims led

to the attack. At 11:41, the boats were still far beyond radar range. The boats, then, could not possibly have called in the aircraft as claimed by the Israeli government in an excuse which blames the attack on the Israeli Navy. The attack was planned and executed in the Israeli war room. It was not a blunder by the Israeli Navy.

Did Schiff/Goodman interview any member of the Defence Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations which investigated the attack in 1967? Had they done so, they would know that the Israeli decision to attack was made the day before the ship arrived. The United States Government learned of it almost immediately and tried to move the ship to safety, but blundered. Politics made this bitter truth too hot for public knowledge.

Schiff and Goodman fail to get even peripheral information straight. France did not withdraw support before the Six Day War; France withdrew support during the war because they concluded that the war was initiated by Israel. Israel has not "remained silent" about the attack since 1967; I have in my possession a series of official Israeli government excuses for the attack, plus innumerable Israeli consulate statements, plus several biographical statements by Israeli officials. Finally an "official" statement

dispatched to the American Chief of Naval Operations in 1982. "Silent indeed!" And Schiff/Goodman are even worse when they tell us that Israel has never paid for the loss of the ship. In 1980, to quash a pending Senate investigation, Israel finally agreed to pay \$6,000,000. The last payment was received in the U.S. Treasury in February, 1983. Those are some crackerjack reporters!

Authors Schiff and Goodman are cited in the American press as "authoritative military affairs correspondents." But in this case, they have departed from the practice of journalism and have stooped to the dissemination of propaganda. And a mighty sloppy job of it they did. The fact is, an abundance of readily-available evidence shows that the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was deliberate, and that the Israeli version of the circumstances of the attack is simply self-serving baloney.

The Schiff/Goodman article is provably wrong. *The Jerusalem Post*, by distributing that material, unchecked, with its own esteemed hallmark, has sullied a tradition of journalistic excellence.

To pretend that the Schiff/Goodman polemic is the last word on this subject is ludicrous. The Schiff/Goodman report is propaganda.

JAMES M. ENNES, JR.
Woodinville, Washington.

and Zeev Schiff reply: to the editor, James stated his own version has also chosen to ally.

of this reply makes it on to every specific we will deal with the ised, but first we will at we have done, for is provide an insight llv happened on the ug the 1967 attack on y.

hout ever having er of us, assumes he rces. He ridicules us ly on the declassified port. We have in our verbatim transcripts e between the Israel n and the attacking rbatim dialogue be- r Force H.Q. and the d documents from ions of inquiry into Yerushalmi report; f all the major parti- various commissions sscripts of our own

interviews with the Israeli principals; photocopies and manuscripts of almost everything that has ever been written on the subject; and detailed charts.

Most of the above material was collected individually by us, without official help, while we were researching books we wrote separately on the history of the Israeli Air Force and the Navy. (*The IDF and its forces: an encyclopaedia of the army and the defence establishment*. Vols. Three and Ten, Revivim Publishing, Tel Aviv, 1983.)

We decided, in our article, not to present the attack in its entirety, for that has been done; but to concentrate only on one aspect of the mystery - what actually happened in Israel.

The picture we paint is not complimentary to Israel; in fact, we were told by many in Israel that we did the country a disservice for having written on the subject at all. How then does Ennes conclude that we are guilty of propaganda?

Are we guilty of propaganda because we refuse to accept his version

of history as the whole and only truth?

The Liberty was not attacked with malice aforethought. That is a myth that Ennes has chosen to perpetuate.

And if one should doubt that a deep anti-Israel motivation is behind much of what Ennes has written and said on the Liberty to date, we would like to refer to a speech made by Mr. Ennes at the New York Athletic Club in June 1983, at a meeting organized by America First Inc. - an organization the Anti-Defamation League of Bnai Brith has termed "a platform for the anti-Israel views of founder chairman Matthew Peter Balic" (ADL memorandum, June 12, 1984). There, on a platform with anti-Israel propagandist Alfred Lienthal and M.T. Mehdi of the American-Arab League, Mr. Ennes left no doubt as to his sentiments.

Ennes, as far back as June 1981, has been complaining of a Jewish conspiracy against him. In an article in Lienthal's *Mid-East Perspective* (Vol. XIV No.3), Ennes claims that the conspiracy, all orchestrated by the omnipresent hand of the

Israeli Embassy, the Israeli lobby and the American Jewish community, ran from journalist Jack Anderson who "could find no room in 1980 for stories unflattering to Israel," to the "East Coast book burning faction."

We have chosen to respond to the charges made against us in this manner because it is time that the cloak of historical respectability and investigative objectivity was lifted from Ennes. We never contested his eyewitness version of events; we never claimed there was no flag; we never denied that Israel was guilty of serious mistakes, and we never claimed to have written the final version of history. We claim to have added a new perspective, one never revealed before, and one that must surely interest any *bona fide* pursuant of history.

Now to the details: Ennes is wrong regarding the French embargo on Israel. President De Gaulle informed Abba Eban, on June 3, 1967, three days before the outbreak of the Six Day War, that the embargo was in force, apparently in an

attempt to discourage an Israeli pre-emptive attack. As mentioned, we do have detailed charts of the attack, and stand by that the Liberty was picked up by Israeli radar at 1:31.

What Ennes claims the signalman signalled is not of concern to us here. What is relevant here is the sworn testimony of the captain of the Israeli torpedo boat, and those around him, on what they read: "AAA" - identify yourself first.

We also contest Ennes' claim to interviews with any of the principals on the Israeli side, and challenge him to name those he claims to have interviewed.

We apologize for the error regarding the final compensation settlement by Israel; perhaps had we benefited from official help in Israel in researching this article, the error would not have occurred.

This error, however, does not change the main thesis in our work: the attack was not deliberate, but the result of a chain of errors - errors that may be horrendous in their stupidity, but errors that are inherent in war.

James M. Ennes

ARTICLE ABOUT PRO-ISRAELI PUBLISHER OF ATLANTIC

velopes stuffed with cash" without documenting the charge. (Caro's cavalier reaction to the demands for documentation — "Read the book" — did not help give the magazine story credibility.) The Stockman article two issues later provided a month of almost constant "impressions" (the marketing word for incidents of exposure). While acknowledging the importance of such publicity, Eckart Gütke says that "unless it's followed up, it will just be a bubble that bursts." Bruce Gray concurs: "No new advertiser has taken out a schedule specifically in response to the Stockman article."

For someone who insists that "The Atlantic is not in the scoop business," Whitworth has a curious knack for attracting scoops. When Robert Caro's agent, Lynn Nesbit, gave him first crack at the Lyndon Johnson biography, he seemed as surprised as the rest of the publishing community — and apologetic besides. "I didn't want to poach on Mr. Shawn's territory," says Whitworth, who edited Caro's biography of Robert Moses for The New Yorker. The well-publicized Caro deal prompted Seymour Hersh to think of The Atlantic for his work-in-progress on Henry Kissinger.

The Atlantic would be beneath the consideration of the Hershes and Caros if it were not for its generous rates. Whitworth says that he can compete with the industry's biggest spenders, Playboy and The New Yorker, only for the occasional major property; he consults with Zuckerman about expenditures that his budget can't cover. (The Atlantic can also offer writers dramatic cover display, which Playboy and The New Yorker do not.) Most articles, he says, have been in the \$1,500-\$5,000 range, compared with Manning's \$300-\$2,000. But, says Hersh, whose work The Atlantic has agreed to promote in advertisements in The New York Times and The Washington Post, "it wasn't just the money — you'd be underselling the magazine to say so. Whitworth is a wonderful editor and he's done a helluva job."

In between blockbusters, Whitworth's Atlantic has been a thoughtful, unflamboyant magazine that does not reflect the typical editor's concern about "the mix" of an issue or "overkill" on certain subjects. Lengthy book

ing a monthly's space limitations. So far, the only really ambitious "enterprise journalism" sponsored and published by the Zuckerman-Whitworth team has been the Stockman article.

There are no packaging or stylistic kagnappes to lure the dubious customer. Walter Bernard's new design — per Whitworth's wishes, "not too beautiful" — has, under the day-to-day art direction of Judy Garlan, become handsome, if still not terribly inviting. The editorial presentation of the articles is also deliberately unprovocative.

The cover stories have been "significant" (Nehru on Iran), though sometimes almost perversely untopical (Otto Friedrich on Auschwitz) or rather tired in the writing (Bruno Bettelheim on why children don't like to read). The back-of-the-book arts section favors listlike essays over criticism and at times is "heavier" than Whitworth, an amateur trumpet player with a passion for popular music, would like.

Whitworth's Atlantic is a sum, hardly a revolutionary change from the previous regime's, except for the steady supply of big names and big books and "The Education of David Stockman." Mostly, blockbusters aside, The Atlantic is manifestly the product of its deliberate, firm and unyielding editor — who is often described as "monkish." He is not a glad-hander; he puts in marathon hours at the office, subsisting late into the night on Cornnuts and other packaged "novelties." Following New Yorker custom, a few new stages have been added to the editing process: A fact checker reviews all articles, edited by the staff, and Whitworth edits, on galley proofs, everything in the magazine. (Overall, the writing in The Atlantic seems more careful, but one wonders how lines like the following from Caro's L.B.J. book slip in: "He would sit talking to a little girl or boy for hours — with, on his face, that great hard face to which, it sometimes seemed, no man could bring a smile, a broad, gentle grin.") Freelance writers have found him open to their ideas, and decisive. He often hears them out with little obvious enthusiasm, occasionally commenting, "I'm not sure that's true," and then abruptly offers the by-now despairing writer a lucrative assignment.

Perhaps it is because Whitworth is an essentially conservative

Yet Zuckerman's influence has been real. The two talk virtually every day (and Zuckerman's real-estate firm has just moved into The Atlantic Monthly building). Several months ago, Zuckerman sent Whitworth a couple of books by Moshe Safdie, the architect of one of Zuckerman's local developments. Impressed, Whitworth assigned Safdie a piece on post-modernist architecture, published in December.

Zuckerman's financial pledge that he would have no editorial influence, and arguably, an article criticizing Israel for its military and commercial connections with South Africa (the principal piece he found objectionable) did not dispute the country's franchise. Whitworth seems to have circumvented potential controversies by appealing to Zuckerman's expert opinion on such issues as the Middle East and business. This collaboration, with the editor seeking reinforcement from his boss, has led one magazine editor to speculate that Zuckerman may represent to Whitworth "a different kind of Mr. Shawn."

On the other hand, the editor has repeatedly proved himself capable of reversing Zuckerman, who makes a great show of playing editorial acolyte to Whitworth's guru. He has turned away writers solicited by Zuckerman. And an insecure man would have been alarmed when Zuckerman announced, "What I really want to be is one of Bill Whitworth's great writing discoveries." But Whitworth was impressively cold-blooded about the writing sample Zuckerman sent him, a jocular piece about his 1977 trip to China, published in The Boston Globe. "Mort," he said. "I don't think funny is your department."

Nor did he find anything ominous about the gift Zuckerman presented to him at a staff party: a leatherbound copy of the April issue, embossed with the words: "Whitworth, Found." But

day in North Side Hospital.
 Mr. Segel was born Nov. 8, 1907, in Russia. He was the son of Harry W. and Miriam Schwartz Segel and came to Youngstown as a child. He owned the Standard Beauty Supply Co. in Steubenville from 1936 to 1971 and the C. S. Beauty Supply Co. of Youngstown from 1972 to 1978.

He was a member of Rodef Shalom Temple and its brotherhood and B'nai B'rith and was an Army veteran of World War II.

He leaves his wife, the former Rose A. Segel, whom he married in 1936; two sons, Harry W. of Los Angeles, Calif., and Gershon N. of Santa Fe, N.M.; a sister, Mrs. Meda Cherr of West Palm Beach, Fla.; and a brother, Louis of Pittsburgh.

A memorial service will be held at 11 a.m. Monday at the Shriver-Allison Mortuary, West King Funeral Home, North ... There are no calling hours. The family requests material tributes take the form of contributions to the Temple of Heritage Manor.

9/9/81

U.S. ship attack was mistake

Israeli errors caused sinking

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Two Israeli military correspondents have produced new evidence to show Israel's attack on a U.S. spyship during the 1967 Middle East war was a mistake, not a deliberate attempt to sink the lightly armed vessel.

The June 8, 1967 air strike against the Liberty, which was 15 miles off the Sinai coast, killed 34 American sailors and wounded 171 others.

Israel almost immediately apologized for the attack, saying it was a case of mistaken identity, and subsequently paid \$6.7 million in compensation to the families of the dead men and the wounded. It paid another \$6 million to the U.S. government for damage to the Liberty, which eventually was scrapped.

Washington declared the case closed in 1960.

But the incident has taken on a life of its own because of repeated charges that Israel knew the Liberty, bristling with antennas, was a spyship and sought to ensure there would be no leakage of sensitive military information at a time when it was preparing to invade the Syrian Golan Heights. Israel did, the

Israeli correspondents Mirsh Goodman of the *Jerusalem Post* and Zeev Schiff of *Ha'aretz*, in an article in the September issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*, unearthed new evidence indicating the attack was a "genuine mistake," not intentional, because of a combination of errors.

Despite the evidence, the authors did not conclude the Liberty was not intentionally attacked and said only, "the mystery remains."

"There was no conclusion because this issue comes up at least once a year," Schiff, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, said in a telephone interview. "People won't let it (the incident) die."

The Liberty, with 294 men aboard, was ordered to a position in international waters off the northern Sinai coast before the outbreak of the war June 5 to monitor Egyptian and Israeli military radio traffic. It steamed alone and was armed only with four .50 caliber machine guns.

It was attacked by two French-built Israeli Super Mystere bombers and three torpedo boats.

Among the major errors leading up to the attack:

- Failure to use the correct marker in the navy's war room to identify the Liberty.

- The assumption the ship was shelling the coastal Sinai town of El Arish, where, it later was learned, an Egyptian ammunition dump blew up.

- False radar readings showing the vessel to be traveling at speeds indicating it was an armed warship, not an auxiliary vessel.

- A later report identifying the Liberty as Egyptian.

When the Liberty first was sighted by a spotter plane about dawn June 8, it was thought to be a destroyer and a duty officer in the war room ordered a red marker placed on the battle control table. Red was used to designate an unidentified target.

Eighteen minutes later, the spotter filed another report in which he identified the ship as "an American naval supply vessel," the article said. But no move was made in the war room to change the marker from red to green, with green having been used to designate a neutral target.

The duty officer, a Lt. Col. "L," later testified before an Israeli armed forces commission of inquiry that he did not change the color coding because "identification had been vague and uncertain," the article said.

Research Papers

THE **Atlantic** MONTHLY

November 5, 1984

Dear Mr. Ennes:

I'm responding to your letter of November 1, since I'm the editor most directly responsible for the Mail column.

Please rest assured that your earlier letter, along with letters from Stephen Green and others, will appear in the December Atlantic. We have sent proofs, however, to no-one, and I don't frankly understand why Ms. Hagopian thought we would. In any case, we believe your views are important, and we have made room for them.

Yours,



C. Michael Curtis
Senior Editor

James M. Ennes, Jr.



JMC/rg



The Sacramento Bee

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September 12, 1984

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Re your letter of Sept. 5 claiming "disinformation" in the Price article on the USS Liberty:

Your complaint should be registered with the Baltimore Sun, for which Price writes, and/or with the New York Times Syndicate, which distributes material from the Sun. Presumably, the Price article was widely published, and not just in The Sacramento Bee. If, as you claim, your challenge has merit, any corrections and/or follow-up should originate with the Sun/syndicate.

I fail to see how the account attacked your "professional integrity" since neither you nor your published work was mentioned by Price, and I must reject your assertion that The Bee has "a special obligation" to publish your letter.

Sincerely,

Albert S. Hunter
Letters Editor

ASH:dm

1
Sep 20, 1954

393 Central Park West^{11th}
Nyc Ny 10025

Dear James Ennes,

Thanks for your note. I guess we should wait just a little longer to see if you get a response from the Atlantic. I'm shocked to hear the treatment Green got from The Nation. I'm checking into this -- it sounds an outrage. I'm a great admirer of your book and -- if no satisfaction can be exacted from the AM or otherwise I'll do something in my column.

So let's stay in touch.

Best wishes,

John Green

James M. Ennes, Jr.

Research Papers



Association of
Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

October 9, 1984

Mr. James Ennes
[Redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I sent to the ATLANTIC MONTHLY concerning the Goodman and Schiff article on the Liberty incident. We have not received a reply to this letter.

I have been trying to reach Whitworth by phone without much luck thusfar. However, I will continue to pursue the matter.

The purpose of this letter is twofold: 1) to let you know of our concern; and 2) to inquire about your course of action on this matter and how you feel we can be most helpful to you.

For your information, your address was given to me by Professor Noam Chomsky who had called me to determine if I had been successful in getting an appointment with Whitworth. I am also in touch with Rev. L. Humphrey Walz regarding this and other articles.

If we can be helpful, please let us know.

Sincerely,

Elaine C. Hagopian

Elaine C. Hagopian
Public Affairs Chairperson

ECH/me
Enclosure



Association of
Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

556 Trapelo Road, Belmont, MA 02178, U.S.A. (617) 484-5483

September 6, 1984

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Mr. William Whitworth
Editor, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY
8 Arlington St.
Boston, MA 02116

Dear Mr. Whitworth:

The article by Goodman and Schiff, "The Attack on the Liberty," published in the ATLANTIC MONTHLY, September issue, constitutes an attempt to discredit the eyewitness account of James Ennes, as well as the important research of Stephen Green.

It is of course understood that Goodman and Schiff would want to absolve the Israeli military of any intentional assault on our ship, but it is difficult to understand why the ATLANTIC MONTHLY would want to cooperate with the effort. Ennes' account is meticulous to a fault. Hence, it is difficult to determine the motivation of the ATLANTIC MONTHLY in publishing the Goodman and Schiff article.

At this time, we are requesting an appointment with you to discuss the matter and to share with you our concerns about responsible reporting on this sensitive area of the world. Our main concern is that "factual" knowledge be accurate.

We look forward to hearing from you, and to setting a time for a meeting.

Sincerely,

Elaine C. Hagopian
Public Affairs Chairperson

ECH/ra
XC: ADC

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Israel Palestine

REVUE MENSUELLE

Director of Middle East Council of Churches international office, 150 Route de Farnay, 1211 Geneva 20

TO: LEOPOLDO J. NIILUS
FROM: MAXIM GHILAN

8 OCT. 1984

MAGELAN Switzerland

64, rue Taitbout

75009 PARIS - FRANCE

Tel : 826-27-38 - 826-30-83

RE/ LIBERTY WHITEWASH BY GOODMAN AND SCHIFF

Dear Leopoldo:

I am not at all surprised that these two Gentlemen were used to whitewash the "Liberty" incident, in the ATLANTIC MONTHLY of September 1984.

Both Goodman, and Schiff, but particularly Schiff, were bona fide members of the MOSSAD, and have been vetted by both the IDF and Shabak (Shin Beit Kelali) secret services.

This was under a number of Labor Governments.

Schiff has, true enough, written (together with Ehud Yaari) the best and most scathing indictment of Israeli politics in the Lebanese war (Israel's Lebanon War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, ISBN 0-671-47991-1); but that is aimed at a Likud Government; and it was a Labor Defense Minister and a Labor Prime Minister who gave the OK to the sinking of the "Liberty".

Incidentally, it is highly unlikely that a junior commander would attack an unidentified vessel without orders from above.

I would guess that, from his safe-house at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington DC, Zeev Schiff has prepared for himself a nice niche in the new Labor-led Israeli administration - or among its sycophants.

All the best,

*Maxim Ghilan, Israeli "exile"
editor of Israel et Palestine,
c/o Magelan*

PS - Would you object to my sending copies of this letter to both Noam Chomsky and Norman Finkelstein?

Answer, "No!"

Critique of "The Attack on the Liberty"
an article written by Mirsh Goodman and Zeev Schiff
Published in the September, 1984, issue of The Atlantic Monthly

by Joseph L. Meadors
a U.S.S. LIBERTY survivor

The September, 1984, issue of The Atlantic Monthly contains an article concerning the June 8, 1967 Israeli attack on the U.S.S. LIBERTY. To the untrained eye the article suggests that the attack was the result of a series of unintentional mistakes by the Israeli Defense Forces. To me, a survivor of the U.S.S. LIBERTY attack, the article contains so many contradictions and mis-statements that it boggles the mind. Except for the references to Stephen Green's book, TAKING SIDES, and the "Remember the Liberty" bumper stickers, you would think this article was written in 1979, not 1984. There are two things that suggest that.

First, above the title it says "Now new evidence throws light on this 'tragic accident'". This article quotes from a June, 1967, Israeli investigation presided over by Lieutenant Colonel Justice Yeshayahu Yerushalmi. They claim this is "new evidence". This "new evidence" was covered by James M. Ennes, Jr. (a seriously wounded U.S.S. LIBERTY survivor) in his book ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY (Random House, 1979).

Second, in the next to last paragraph, they state "The question of damages has bounced back and forth over the years with no result. Finally, in January of 1980, Israel agreed to negotiate a settlement, but none had been negotiated to this day." In September, 1980, Senator Adlai Stevenson publicly announced he would investigate the LIBERTY matter. Israel killed that investigation by suddenly agreeing in December, 1980, to pay \$6,000,000 for the \$40,000,000 ship. The Department of State reported the agreement with a press release entitled, "The Book is Now Closed on the USS Liberty Incident". As a result the Congressional investigation was called off. According to Treasury Department records, the third and last \$2,000,000 payment was received on February, 1983. To this day there has not been a Congressional investigation of the LIBERTY incident.

"Plainly, some groups, believed by Israeli intelligence to be funded by the Arabs, want to keep the issue alive." The group that is keeping the issue alive is the one made up of the survivors themselves. We survived the attack. We heard the stories that the Israelis were telling about the attack. We heard the version that the United States Government accepted. It has no relationship to the truth as we know it. We are the ones who are keeping the story alive. The Israelis claim that our version of the attack is wrong and theirs is right. The best way for the Israelis to shut us up is to challenge us to a public debate and humiliate us publicly. We have repeatedly challenged the Israelis to do this. They refuse to. I will let you decide

for yourself why they refuse to debate us publicly.

The article starts off with the disclaimer that "Mistakes are common in war". Israeli planes "mistakenly attacked a British ship". More than twenty Israeli servicemen were killed when "their tanks were mistakenly identified as Syrian". "American jets mistakenly bombed a mental hospital" in Grenada. What the survivors of the attack on the U.S.S. LIBERTY are saying is **THIS WAS NO MISTAKE. THIS WAS NO ACCIDENT.** There was too much reconnaissance going on that day to claim it was an accident.

"June 8 began early for the Israeli Navy. According to the war log, from which many details of this account have been taken, an air-force Nord aircraft took off from an unnamed airfield at 4:00 A.M. with a navy spotter on board." This airplane spotted what he reported was a destroyer "some 70 miles west of Gaza". The duty officer in the navy war room immediately ordered a RED marker placed on the battle control table. The spotter aboard the aircraft subsequently identified the ship as "an American naval-supply vessel". No move was made to change the marker in the war room from red to green because "identification had been vague and uncertain".

The aircraft spotter was debriefed at about 10:00 A.M. and he reported that he had seen the markings GTR-5 on the ship. The publications were examined and it was determined that the ship was "an American intelligence vessel named the LIBERTY".

The duty officers in the war room changed at 11:00 A.M.. "Lieutenant Colonel 'L' (his name remains classified), who took over temporary command, made a decision that proved fatal for the LIBERTY: he ordered the GREEN marker designating its position removed from the battle-control table." (emphasis added) First they marked the ship with a RED marker. Then they did not change it to green because "identification had been vague and uncertain". Then they removed the GREEN marker from the battle control table. In their next version they will say that they changed the marker to green when they identified the ship as the LIBERTY. If they did change the marker to green, why did they not say that in the first place? Why did they go out of their way to say that the marker was NOT changed from red to green?

It might interest you to know that Lieutenant Colonel "L" whose "name remains classified" was identified by Colonel Uri Algom of the Israeli Defense Forces History Department on page 8 of their 1982 "official version" as "Commander Lunz". This report, titled "THE ATTACK ON THE 'LIBERTY' INCIDENT 8 JUNE 1967" is available through the Freedom of Information Act from the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC 20350. It's nice to know that the Israelis have a pair of investigative reporters that are so dedicated to their work that they would spend ten years of their lives gathering evidence from Israeli naval and air-force archives and come up with evidence from a 1967 investigation that is still classified (but available at a nominal cost from the U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION,

P.O. Box 789, Woodinville, Washington 98072) and I drop a line to the United States Department of the Navy and get an unclassified copy of the 1982 version. I do in six weeks what the defense correspondent of The Sunday Times and the defense and military-affairs editor of the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz spent ten years doing. And I come up with an unclassified 1982 version while they come up with a still classified 1967 version. Now we get to a part of their story that could be a little confusing: The dispatch of the torpedo boats from Ashdod and their detection of the U.S.S. LIBERTY on their radar.

The article states "In his book, ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY, (James M.) Ennes, who was duty officer on the bridge that morning, reports that ... the LIBERTY had executed a right turn to new course 238 degrees, at 11:30 A.M. ... ". (This is also in the official transcript of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry) In other words, at 11:30 A.M. the authors of this article have the LIBERTY sailing on a course directly away from Ashdod.

At 12:05, Colonel Rahav (identified in the 1982 version as Chief of Naval Operations, Captain (Navy) Rahav) "ordered three torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to depart the port of Ashdod and proceed in the general direction of El Arish". These torpedo boats "could develop a maximum speed of only 28 knots". At 1:41 Second Lieutenant Aharon Yfrach (the 1982 version identifies him as "Ensign Yifrach Aharon") "reported that he had picked up a 'target' on his scope" The 1982 version says that the maximum range of these radar scopes is 12-15 miles. The LIBERTY is now on their radar more than 20 miles away and is plotted once going 30 knots and again going 28 knots.

The LIBERTY was 77 miles from Ashdod. If the LIBERTY was going 30 knots at the time and the torpedo boats had a maximum speed of 28 knots, how did the torpedo boats travel the 57 miles it was necessary to travel in the 96 minutes available to them (12:05 to 1:41) in order to have the LIBERTY on their radar at the time they said they did?

The reason the Israelis called in the air strike was because the torpedo boats had the LIBERTY plotted going 28-30 knots.

If the LIBERTY were standing still, the torpedo boats would have had to travel at over 35 knots to rendezvous with the LIBERTY when they said they did. The article clearly states "the three torpedo boats ... could develop a maximum speed of only twenty-eight knots".

The only way they could have had the LIBERTY on their radar when they did would be if the LIBERTY were traveling toward them. The article states the LIBERTY was on "course 238 degrees" at 11:30 A.M. DIRECTLY AWAY FROM ASHDOD.

The next thing you know, the authors are going to tell us that they have re-examined the evidence and the torpedo boats were actually at sea at the time.

The aircraft were called in and "the lead plane dropped to an altitude of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled the target only once." Do you think it would be reasonable to assume that some of the crew of the LIBERTY would have seen these passes? I defy you to find even one of the U.S.S. LIBERTY survivors who saw these identification runs. I was on the bridge all day. That was where I worked. I was one of the signalmen. I saw the attacking jets come in. There was a group of us that went from the pilot house to the signal bridge to witness what we thought would be another fly-by by the Israelis. (They had flown over the ship thirteen times on eight different occasions that morning prior to the attack. One time they flew so low that the engines on the planes rattled the steel deck plating on the ship. On at least one of these occasions, our radiomen had overheard the pilots radio their base that we were American.) Jim Ennes, who they mentioned in the article, was up there also. They didn't circle the LIBERTY twice, they didn't even circle the LIBERTY once. They came in with guns drawn and began the attack immediately. I saw them fly up our starboard side in the same direction the LIBERTY was traveling. I saw them turn across our bow. When they were almost directly ahead of the ship I saw them turn and begin strafing the LIBERTY from stem to stern. The sight of a warplane screaming down at you with its nose lit up by its machine guns and cannon is not a sight that is easily forgotten.

The pilots reported that the LIBERTY had "two cannons on the forecastle". Look at a picture of the LIBERTY. You really have to look hard to see the two .50 caliber machine guns in the forecastle. You can see very plainly the very large freshly painted identification markings directly below the machine guns. You can see very plainly the large dish antenna on the stern. I ask you, what Egyptian ship has the configuration of the LIBERTY?

When the torpedo boats rendezvoused with the LIBERTY the Division Commander ordered his signalman to flash the message "What ship?" to the LIBERTY. They claim that the LIBERTY responded with "AA" meaning "Identify yourself first". I was a signalman in the Navy for almost four years. In international flashing light procedure there is no signal that means "What ship?". The flashing light signal "AA" is the call of an unknown station. It does not mean "Identify yourself first". Quite the contrary. Flashing light procedure would require the ship transmitting the "AA" to signal her call sign first. So it is not a request for the receiving ship to send her call sign, but rather an offer by the transmitting ship to send hers.

It was during the lull in the attack that we were ordered to replace the steaming ensign, since it had been shot down. Frank Brown and I ran up to the signal bridge and raised a replacement ensign. The ensign we hauled up was Holiday Colors, measuring 7 feet by 13 feet. There was a brisk wind and the flag flew freely. The weather log indicates that prior to the attack while the LIBERTY was moving at 5 knots the relative wind was from 355 degrees (360 degrees being from dead ahead) at 12 knots. Since

the LIBERTY was now proceeding at flank (maximum) speed. We were traveling in the neighborhood of 15 knots. That would make the wind speed across the deck at around 20 knots. More than enough to extend the flag. In the book ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY there is a picture of the LIBERTY taken the day after the attack. The LIBERTY is standing still -- dead in the water. There is almost no wind. The flag is still flapping in the breeze. Clearly identifiable.

They claim the ship "was covered in heavy smoke" That may have been true when the planes completed their attack. That was not true when we raised the Holiday Ensign. There was no smoke on the signal bridge. How could there have been? The relative wind was blowing at over 20 knots. That would tend to dissipate the smoke.

Jim Taylor in his book PEARL HARBOR II (Regency Press 1980) includes two very interesting pictures.

Plate 1b shows the LIBERTY from about 500 yards the day after the attack. The picture was taken from one of the U.S. Sixth Fleet ships that arrived to offer assistance sixteen hours after we had been torpedoed. This is what the torpedo boats saw when they fired their torpedo from 550 yards. The LIBERTY is dead in the water. There is no wind.

Notice the flag. Fully extended.

Notice the Identification markings on the bow. Clearly visible.

Notice the identification markings on the stern. Clearly visible.

Notice the large dish antenna on the stern. Clearly visible.

This is what "an Egyptian naval-supply vessel, or perhaps even a merchant vessel" looks like

Plate 2a is a picture of the LIBERTY taken just prior to the torpedo attack. You can tell it is prior to the torpedo attack because the LIBERTY is still moving. The Atlantic Monthly article has the LIBERTY enveloped in a "thick, acrid smoke". Look at the picture. WHERE IS THE SMOKE?

"One of the young officers aboard (torpedo boat T-204) noticed the letters GTR on the hull of the ship". The torpedo boat commander radioed to his headquarters that "the ship could be Russian because of the letters on the hull". The Russians do not mark their ships with English letters. Why should they? They have an alphabet all their own.

"The news hit the IDF general staff like a thunderbolt." They were concerned about what the Russians would do. I guess it was a load off their minds when the torpedo boat commander "looked the ship over closely, recontacted Naval Headquarters and said

that he had been mistaken: the ship was not Russian but American."

"Two Israeli helicopters arrived on the scene." I saw one of those helicopters. It hovered very close to the port wing of the bridge. I saw the troops very clearly through the open helicopter door. I saw very clearly the weapons they were carrying.

According to the 1982 version, one of the Israeli helicopters, sent about 6:30 P.M., had the U.S. Naval Attache, Commander Ernest C. Castle on board. He dropped a message onto the LIBERTY asking how many casualties we had. The LIBERTY crewmen, with bodies lying all over the forecastle, "answered by signals ... which led him (Castle) to understand that they had one wounded". I will leave it to your imagination what signal the LIBERTY crewmembers made to the hovering Israeli helicopter.

As of this writing, The Atlantic Monthly has refused to provide a forum for any response by the U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION. Apparently they are afraid to give the American people a choice as to which version to believe.

What can you do to help tell the LIBERTY story?

Write your congressman. Ask him why there was never any kind of congressional investigation of the LIBERTY incident. Tell him that as one of his constituents, you support a congressional investigation. Ask him to start one.

Call your local newspaper editor. Tell him that you have read the Atlantic Monthly article and you want to know more about the LIBERTY.

Call your local television station news director and tell him the same thing.

If enough people show enough interest, we can get the U.S.S. LIBERTY story told in the public forum where it belongs.

(Joseph L. Meadors was one of the signalmen on the U.S.S. LIBERTY at the time of the Israeli attack on June 8, 1967. He is currently the co-ordinator of the MENSA sponsored U.S.S. LIBERTY SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP.)

Americans still claim '67 attack

Israel maintains its 1967 attack on an unarmed U.S. intelligence ship, which killed 34 U.S. servicemen, was an accident. Others believe it was intentional. The writer, an editor in the Associated Press World Services Department, has interviewed principals in the incident and researched new information for this report.

By DAVID SMYTH
The Associated Press

NEW YORK — Fresh details and accusations have surfaced over an Israeli air and sea attack on a U.S. Navy ship 17 years ago that, by top-level American and Israeli accounts, came close to provoking a head-to-head U.S.-Soviet battle.

On June 8, 1967, in the midst of the six-day Arab-Israeli war, Israeli warplanes and gunboats attacked the USS Liberty, a lightly armed American naval intelligence vessel, in the Mediterranean Sea off the Sinai coast.

Thirty-four Americans died and 171 were wounded. Fearing the attack had come from the Soviets, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered armed aircraft from U.S. Sixth Fleet carriers into the air.

According to Johnson's memoirs, a superpower confrontation was avoided only after a flurry of messages on the Washington-Moscow hotline, in which the Soviets threatened "military intervention" in the Middle East and Johnson responded by moving the Sixth Fleet closer to Syria, a Soviet ally.

The still-outstanding question in this incident is whether Israel intentionally attacked the U.S. ship, or whether — as two Israeli journalists said in a recent article, quoting Israeli government documents — it was a "tragic accident" of mistaken identity.

Top U.S. diplomatic, intelligence and military officers of that time — including former Secretary of State Dean Rusk — and the surviving Liberty crewmen say it was no accident. The two Israeli journalists acknowledge that the "question remains open."

George H. Golden, a lieutenant on the Liberty who became the ship's second in command when the executive officer was killed in the attack, told The Associated Press he had "proof" from radio monitoring records that the Israeli planes and gunboats had referred to the Liberty as an American ship before attacking it.

"It is ridiculous to say this was an accident," retired Adm. Thomas H. Moore Jr., who was U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in 1967, said in a telephone interview.

The (Israeli) article comes very short of putting the matter to rest. In the real world, there is no way it could have happened the way the Israeli journalists describe it, he said.

Congress should investigate this matter even now, 17 years later, said Moore, who is currently a senior research fellow at the University of Georgia's Center for Strategic and International Studies.



President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered aircraft into the air

The controversy was revived by two Israeli writers, Hiram Goodman and Zeev Schiff, in an article published in the September issue of The Atlantic magazine in the United States and in The Jerusalem Post in Israel. Citing "well-classified Israeli evidence," they argue that the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyptian ship.

But Americans who have kept active files on the incident say the article raises no new evidence. Rather, the article contained "long-discredited Israeli government documents that were rejected as unbelievable by the U.S. government years ago," according to Lt. Cmdr. James H. Eaves Jr., the author of a 1980 book on the incident.

"U.S. intelligence documents indicate the Israelis attacked the Liberty deliberately. They feared she would monitor their plans to attack the Golan Heights in Syria — a move the United States opposed for fear of provoking Soviet military intervention," Ennes said.

The Israeli government apologized for the "tragic mistake" immediately after the attack, paid compensation for the dead and wounded some months later, and eventually, after 18 years, paid the U.S. government for the loss of the ship. Officially the U.S. government considers the case closed.

However, Rusk, former CIA director Richard M. Helms, and Louis W. Tordella, the former deputy director of the National Security Agency, in a separate report believe Israel's attack was accidental. "A dozen surviving Liberty officers had been

interviewed by the AP all said the attack, which lasted more than an hour and smothered 621 holes in the ship's hull, could not possibly have been an accident.

Goodman, who is defense correspondent of The Jerusalem Post, and Schiff, who is military affairs editor of the Israeli daily Haaretz, offered new details in their blow-by-blow account of the attack as seen from the Israeli side.

They say that an Israeli reconnaissance plane reported "an American naval-supply vessel" 70 miles west of Gaza at 6:03 a.m. In the Israeli Navy command's underground war-room in Tel Aviv, the commander of the Israeli Navy, Adm. Shlomo Erel, then ordered a green marker placed on the battle-control board, designating a neutral vessel, and a Maj. Pinhasi identified the ship as the Liberty after consulting a naval manual.

However, "this correct identification came to naught," Goodman and Schiff add. "At 11 a.m. duty commanders in the navy war-room changed shifts. Lt. Col. L. (his name remains classified) who took over temporary command ... ordered the green marker removed" from the table to keep it "as uncluttered as possible."

"Nineteen minutes later," the Israeli writers say, "the Liberty was rediscovered" and Israeli torpedo boats were sent out. Picked up on radar, the Liberty appeared to be "a warship ... sailing on an evasive course" at high speed.

Israeli planes were called in, circled the Liberty three times, and reported directly to their commander, Maj. Gen. Mordechai Hod — "no flag or other signs of identification on the ship." Still not positively identified, but

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taken for an Egyptian ship, the Liberty was then attacked by the planes and later by the gunboats.

This account is disputed by the survivors of the Liberty's 4-man crew.

Golden said: "I had proof that they knew who we were. We had monitored the communications between the Israeli planes and gunboats and their bases in which they referred to us as an American ship."

"I turned my proof over to an admiral, but I don't know what was done with it. The Court of Inquiry (held later by the U.S. Navy) was a whitewash," Golden asserted. "There were

by Israel no mistake



Dean Rusk
then-secretary of state

also just too many people trying to shut our
men up. Somebody higher up was putting a
squeeze on our people not to say anything
about the incident. The information I had
showed it was not an accident, and our gov-
ernment knows this."

Ennes and other Liberty officers inter-
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regarded vital evidence and that there was a
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They said Liberty crewmen were forbidden
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cation, Ennes — the Liberty's deck officer
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my lamp was shot out and I was wounded. I
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Wayne L. Smith, the Liberty's radio room
chief, said, "The Israeli jammed one of our
radio circuits so we couldn't call U.S. ships.
I don't know how they did it."
Chief Petty Officer William J. ...
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said, "The Israeli planes and gunboats spent
more than one hour hitting us with rockets,
napalm bombs, torpedoes, cannon and
machine-gun fire. They machine-gunned our
firefighters on deck and they shot our life
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single member of our association who has
doubted that attack was an accident."

"There was good visibility," Moorer added,
"and with all her antennas sticking out of her,
the Liberty was probably the most peculiar
ship ever seen in the Mediterranean."

These complaints were mentioned to Adm.
Isaac C. Kidd, who conducted the Court of
Inquiry.

"There's nothing new about that," Kidd
said of the charges. "I know some people
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Kidd said his inquiry had been limited to
establishing any culpability or negligence
within the U.S. Navy. It singled out no one for
censure or punishment. "The inquiry did not
go into the responsibility of the attacking
forces," he said.

Israeli government investigations likewise
found nobody to blame.

"I have never believed the Israeli explana-
tion," Rusk said in a telephone interview. And
if they do attack an unidentified ship, he ad-
ded, "that would have been reckless con-
sidering the number of Soviet ships in the
area."

In his memoirs, Johnson recalled that he
instantly warned the Kremlin on the hotline
that he had launched planes "to investigate"
the attack.

Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli Chief of
Staff, commented in his autobiography that
Johnson "faced the awesome decision of or-
dering U.S. aircraft to attack the Soviet fleet
in the Mediterranean" — a fleet that Rabin
estimated at around 70 warships.

Two days later, on June 10, Johnson faced
an even bigger decision. On that day, the pre-
sident recalled, the Soviets were on the hotline
threatening "military intervention" if the Is-
raelis did not immediately stop their attack
on the Golan Heights.

Johnson, who wrote that "the peace of the
world walked a tightrope," considered by
moving the Sixth Fleet 80 miles closer to the
Syrian coast.

The peril of a superpower confrontation
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... ..

Research Papers



THE SUNDAY TIMES

PO. Box 7, 200 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8EZ Telephone 01-837 1234 Telex 22269

27th September, 1984

J.M. Ennes, JR,

USA

Dear Mr. Ennes,

Thank you for your letter of 5 September. At the outset I have to declare that The Sunday Times has a special interest in this matter as Hirsh Goodman is our correspondent in Jerusalem. I, therefore, think it would be both impossible and disloyal for us to publish an article attacking our own correspondent, even if I felt such a piece was justified.

I have read both your book and the recent articles in the Atlantic Monthly and also talked to Hirsh while he was preparing those articles. I am afraid I don't feel qualified to comment in detail on your allegations although I would say I know that both Hirsh Goodman and Zeev Schiff are journalists of the highest calibre and integrity.

I am afraid I must turn down your request that we commission an article by yourself and Stephen Green but do hope you have better success elsewhere.

Yours sincerely,

James Adams
Special Assistant
to the Editor

For release Mon AM, Oct. 29, and thereafter
An AP extra
Americans Rebut Israeli Version of 1967 Attack on Ship

EDITOR'S NOTE — Israel maintains its 1967 attack on an unarmed U.S. intelligence ship, which killed 34 U.S. servicemen, was an accident. Others believe it was intentional. The writer, an editor in the Associated Press World Services department, has interviewed principals in the incident and researched new information for this report.

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Wayne L. Smith, the Liberty's chief radioman, said, "The Israelis jammed five of our six radio circuits as we tried to call the U.S. Sixth Fleet for help" 400 miles away.

Master Chief Petty Officer Stanley W. White, president of the Liberty Veterans Association, said, "The Israeli planes and gunboats spent more than one hour hitting

us with rockets, napalm bombs, torpedoes, cannon and machine-gun fire. They machine-gunned our firefighters on deck and they shot our life rafts out of the water. I don't know of a single member of our association who believes that attack was an accident."

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Kidd said his inquiry had been limited to establishing any culpability or negligence within the U.S. Navy. It singled out no one for censure or punishment. "The inquiry did not go into the responsibility of the attacking forces," he said.

Israeli government investigations likewise found nobody to blame.

"I have never believed the Israeli explanation," Rusk said in a telephone interview. And if they did attack an unidentified ship, he added, "even that would have been reckless considering the number of Soviet ships in the area."

In his memoirs, Johnson recalled that he instantly warned the Kremlin on the hotline that he had launched planes "to investigate" the attack.

Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli Chief of Staff, commented in his autobiography that Johnson "faced the awesome decision of ordering U.S. aircraft to attack the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean"--a fleet that Rabin estimated at around 70 warships.

Two days later, on June 10, Johnson faced an ever bigger decision. On that day, the president recalled, the Soviets were on the hotline threatening "military intervention" if the Israelis did not immediately stop their attack on the Golan Heights.

Johnson, who wrote that "the peace of the world walked a tightrope," countered by moving the Sixth Fleet 50 miles closer to the Syrian coast.

The peril of a superpower confrontation ended when Johnson told the Soviets he "had perceived assurances" that Israel "would make the ceasefire with Syria completely effective."

"At least," Rabin wrote in his memoirs, "we were not plunged into a third world war" as a result of the Liberty incident.

Guardian, Oct. 27, 1984; Noam Chomsky

Israel's image, effectively crafted by propagandists for many years, suffered serious damage during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Party hacks labored mightily to show that "Much of what you have read in the newspapers and newsmagazines about the war in Lebanon -- and even more of what you have seen and heard on television -- is simply not true" (New Republic). But many were unwilling to believe that TV was simply fabricating the bombing of Beirut, or that journalists were lying in the service of the PLO. It was predictable that major efforts would be undertaken to reconstruct the battered image. The stakes are high.

Since the late 1960s, both major Israeli political groupings have been committed to controlling the territories conquered in 1967, and have therefore devoted themselves, with constant US support, to blocking a political settlement, as advocated in a broad international consensus including Europe, the Soviet Union, the nonaligned countries, the major Arab states, and for a decade, the mainstream of the PLO. In a remarkable propaganda exercise, the facts have simply been suppressed or denied in the US in favor of a completely fabricated "history."

But one fact cannot be suppressed. US-Israeli rejectionism entails that military confrontation will persist. In these circumstances, Israel can survive only as a heavily subsidized US dependency. As a direct result of US-Israeli rejectionism, Israel has become perhaps the world's most militarized society, with the highest per capita debt and a credit rating below that of Mozambique and Bangladesh. It is also compelled to serve US global interests, and indeed has done so with enthusiasm, serving as local cop-on-the-beat under the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine, supporting Rhodesia, South Africa, Mobutu, Argentine neo-Nazis, a succession of thugs and murderers in Central America, and others like them; and in general carrying out tasks that the US executive cannot publicly undertake. The result is an artificial society surviving on an ever-increasing American dole. It is essential to ensure that those who pay the bills are properly brainwashed. Hence the necessity of a major propaganda effort to overcome the impact on American opinion of the merciless siege and bombing of Beirut and the massacres carried out under Israeli eyes after the PLO fighters had been removed.

One element of this campaign has been the resurrection of the claim that the indigenous population were actually recent immigrants, drawn to the country when the Jewish settlers "made the desert bloom." It should be emphasized that reputable Israeli scholars treat these absurdities with contempt. In the major scholarly study of Palestinian nationalism, Israel's leading specialist on the topic, Yehoshua Porath, writes that the Arab population, always an overwhelming majority, "also grew...due for the most part to natural increase." In a 1975 Hebrew article, he deplored the resort to erroneous census figures and other "pointless legends" concocted to attribute the growth of the Arab population to immigration. It is also no secret in Israel that the small Jewish minority was largely anti-Zionist, so that virtually all of the indigenous population were opposed to the Zionist settlement. But in the United States, it is assumed, the "pointless legends" will be given credence, and will help renew popular support for US-Israeli rejectionism.

A recent example -- there have been others, for many years -- is Joan Peters's recent book From Time Immemorial, which presents the familiar fables as startling

new discoveries. The book, now in its 8th printing, has been received with awe by reviewers and others, who profess to be overwhelmed by its meticulous scholarship, its dramatic discoveries that refute the "myth" that Palestinians have some claims in the Land of Israel.

The first person to take the trouble to check the evidence Peters presents was Norman Finkelstein, who demonstrated that much of this "meticulous scholarship" is simply lifted without reference from old propaganda tracts, including ludicrous errors, that the demographic analysis (certified as authoritative by Philip Hauser, formerly director of the US census) is not merely erroneous but apparently faked, and that the scholarly references, when traced to their sources, turn out to be a "spectacular fraud."

An excerpt from Finkelstein's devastating study appeared in In These Times, and parts were reported by Alexander Cockburn in The Nation along with other remarkable examples of deceit. I will cite only one example to illustrate what Finkelstein has found throughout this clumsy propaganda effort. One central component of Peters's argument, to which she refers over a dozen times, is a section of the British Hope Simpson report which, she asserts, shows that illegal Arab immigration was tolerated by the British except in "flagrant" cases though this caused "injustice" to prospective Jewish immigrants. What the material she cites actually states is that all illegal immigrants must be deported "at once," with the exception of visitors (pseudo-travellers) who remain beyond the permitted period. Even in this category, "flagrant" violators should be expelled; others may remain in place of future immigrants. Furthermore, by far the main beneficiaries of this single exception, Finkelstein observes, were Jews. This is a typical example of the astounding new findings that have so entranced commentators eager to restore the faith.

The evidence presented by Finkelstein and others has repeatedly been brought to the attention of the author and publisher, and is in part in print. What has been shown is not the occasional minor error to be found in virtually any work, but systematic and consistent fraud. There has been no attempt to respond; rather, denial that response is necessary. A rational observer can only conclude that this study is a disinformation effort of the sort constructed by intelligence agencies -- as may actually be the case. The study seems to have been virtually ignored in Israel by the Hebrew press, who may have drawn this conclusion or may simply find it embarrassing.

Those who undertook this fraud evidently felt that they could rely on the subservience of the American intellectual community, and that exposure is irrelevant since it will be ignored beyond narrow circles. Object service to some favored state is nothing new. What is more interesting is the assessment of American intellectual culture by those responsible for this enterprise, an assessment that may well be accurate.

There are other recent examples of the same sort. Last spring, Arafat made a number of public statements, some published in major European journals, calling for negotiations with Israel leading to mutual recognition. The offer was rejected by Israel and ignored by the US government, following standard practice. The national press in the US suppressed the facts. The local "quality" press did report them, though inconspicuously. The San Francisco Examiner ran a UPI report giving the basic facts on the front page under a full-page inch-high headline reading "Arafat to Israel: Let's Talk." The unsophisticated press judges news by its significance, not understanding what is to be concealed.

To take another case, the Atlantic Monthly in September published the first article in a major US journal on Israel's 1967 attack on the US Liberty, which left

The authors neglect to mention that

34 crewmen dead and 75 injured after bombing, napalm, torpedoes, and machine-gunning of lifeboats. The article was written by two Israeli military correspondents, relying on secret and allegedly new Israeli evidence showing that it was just an unfortunate accident. The "new" evidence has been public for years, along with a State Department rejection of it as without credibility and a published analysis and refutation of it by Liberty officer James Ennes. The authors and editors did not even attempt to compare their claims with the direct eye-witness reports of Liberty survivors, which contradict them on crucial facts. An AP report citing testimony by the survivors refuting the story and rejection of the Israeli explanation by Dean Rusk, then-CIA director Richard Helms, and National Security Agency Deputy Director Louis Tordella, was almost entirely blanked out of the US press. The survivors of the worst US peacetime naval disaster of this century simply cannot find a way to bring to the public what they personally experienced. Orwell would have been impressed.

The record is long and illuminating. It is doubtful that there has ever been such amazing success in controlling the perception of contemporary history as that achieved by the "supporters of Israel," who are in fact driving it to ruin and ultimate destruction, as Israeli doves insist in warnings that can rarely reach an American audience. The primary victims of these propaganda successes and the policies they disguise are, of course, the indigenous population, who are now not only to be assaulted and oppressed but also written out of history. They have suffered a major catastrophe, dismissed as inconsequential here on racist grounds. It is also highly likely that the US-Israeli rejectionism that these disinformation projects are designed to conceal will lead to further wars, with regional and global consequences that may be grim indeed.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



THE SUNDAY TIMES

P.O. Box 7, 200 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8EZ Telephone 01-837 1234 Telex 22269

31st October, 1984

J. M. Ennes, Jr.

USA

Dear Mr. Ennes,

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of 15 October. I must apologise for the delay in replying but I have only just returned from a trip abroad.

I will address your points in the order you raised them:

1. As far as I am aware the Goodman/Schiff article was published in Atlantic Monthly which is hardly world-wide circulation. As far as I am aware the article in Atlantic did not merit a single column inch of news coverage in this country.
2. I don't accept that the article was "an elaborate apologia". On the contrary, the article sets out in considerable detail the failure in command and at times the sheer incompetence of Israeli high command. They have been criticised in Israel for publishing the article which some Israelis feel did their country a disservice.
3. Far from the authors using "efficient and officially discredited material" they drew on verbatim transcripts of the dialogue between the Israeli naval war-room and the attacking vessels; a verbatim dialogue between Israeli airforce HQ and the pilots; classified documents from three commissions of inquiry into the affair; the Yerushalmi report; the testimony of all the major participants to the various commissions on inquiry; their own interviews with the Israeli principals; and previously classified charts.
4. I don't accept that their material is "not new" nor that it is "provably wrong". A large amount of information that they included in the article had not been published before and as they were presenting a factual account from the Israeli perspective I don't see how it can be "provably wrong".

Cont/.....

J.M. Ennes, Jr.

31st October, 1984

5. I don't know whether you are aware of the reputations of Goodman and Schiff; if you were, you would realise that suggesting that either or both of them could write "an elaborate propaganda piece for the Israeli government" is simple rubbish. Both of them have extremely high reputations and integrity and they, when the occasion warranted, never failed to criticise their own government or their own armed forces.

6. I have no reason to suppose that Hirsh Goodman has on this occasion done anything than his usual excellent job as a reporter and I am therefore not prepared to give space in The Sunday Times to unwarranted attacks on his reputation.

7. I don't see how you can write an article generated in response to the Schiff/Goodman material which you say is "provably wrong" that can be anything other than an attack. I am also not clear what your qualifications are for writing an impartial balanced version of events. I understand that you are the editor/historian of the Liberty Veterans Association. Stephen Green is the author of *Taking Sides*, a book that was not received with too much enthusiasm by the Wall Street Journal, New York Times nor the Washington Post when they reviewed it.

8. To suggest that the Schiff/Goodman article was "fake and undocumented propaganda prepared by your correspondent on behalf of a foreign government" is quite clearly libellous and I will leave it to the authors themselves to resolve if they so wish.

9. The Sunday Times certainly allows readers access to the columns of the newspaper when it is justified. On this occasion I have no reason to believe this subject merits further discussion in our pages nor that your criticisms of Schiff and Goodman are justified. There is therefore absolutely no prospect whatsoever of our agreeing to you writing an article for The Sunday Times.

I consider this correspondence at an end.

Yours sincerely,



James Adams
Special Assistant
to the Editor

I SAID
"FALSE"
NOT
"FAKE"

"The Israelis murdered 34 of my buddies," U.S. Navy officer says.

Top U.S. government officials confirm he is telling the truth.

Israeli attack on US Navy ship could have unleashed World War III
top Israeli general says.

U.S. Admiral demands Congressional investigation.

U.S. and Israeli governments are partners in 17-year coverup

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

"Israeli warplanes and gunboats hit my ship, an almost unarmed US Navy intelligence vessel, with rockets, torpedoes, napalm bombs, machinegun and cannon fire," Lieutenant Commander James M. Ennes, US Navy retired, told the Inquirer.

"Thirty four of the 294 Americans aboard were killed and 171 were wounded. My leg was broken by a rocket fragment and I spent months in hospital."

"The Israelis insist it was an accident," Ennes said of the attack on the USS Liberty during the Six Day Arab-Israeli War. "But it was cold-blooded, premeditated murder."

"I have never believed the Israeli explanation" that the attack was a case of mistaken identity, concurred Dean Rusk, who was U.S. Secretary of State when the Liberty was attacked on June 8, 1967.

"You'd have to draw a pretty long bow to believe the Israeli explanation," agreed Richard J. Helms, who was CIA Director at the time.

"For 17 years there has been a coverup by both the U.S. government and the Israeli government," Ennes said.

"Congress should investigate this," said Admiral Thomas Moorer, who was U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in 1967. "I think the Israelis are lying when they say it was an accident."

Israel claims the Liberty was attacked off the Sinai coast when she was mistaken for an Egyptian ship but that the attack was broken off immediately when she was recognized as an American vessel. U.S. Navy repairmen counted 821 rents in the Liberty's hull after the attack, including rocket and machinegun bullet holes and a 40-foot gash from an Israeli torpedo. The attack lasted 1½ hours, crew members say.

The Liberty was attacked on purpose, said Louis W. Tordella, Deputy Director of the U.S. National Security Agency at the time. "She was reconnoitered by Israeli planes, she was in international waters, and she was flying an outsize ensign."

Why would Israel attack an American ship? "Because of the Golan Heights," said Ennes, the Liberty's deck officer just before she was attacked, and the author of a book on the incident.

"The White House had warned Israel during the Six Day War not to attack the Golan Heights in Syria because the Russians might come into the war. As long as the Liberty was monitoring Israeli communications the Israelis didn't dare attack. Once they had gotten rid of the Liberty they attacked the Golan the very next day."

General Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff in the Six Day War, admits in his memoirs that the Liberty incident might have unleashed World War III.

"For a while we thought we might have attacked a Russian ship," he says.

The Liberty and the Golan assaults in fact triggered two ominous messages in three days on the Moscow-Kremlin-White House hotline. The first impression in the White House was that the Russians had attacked the Liberty, and President Johnson warned the Russians on the ~~next~~ hotline he was launching U.S. Sixth Fleet planes to "investigate" the attack. Two days later the Russians sent a sizzling message over the hotline threatening "military measures" unless the Israelis stopped their attack on the Golan Heights.

Calling their bluff, Johnson moved the U.S. Sixth Fleet fifty miles closer to Syria and the world lurched toward a Superpower confrontation.

Whether the Israeli attack on the Liberty was intentional or an accident, it was "a reckless act" Dean Rusk commented.

"Not a man on our ship believes that Israeli attack was an accident," said ~~SKM~~ Chief Petty Officer Stan White, president of the USS Liberty Veterans Association.

"But our bitterness," he told the Inquirer, "is mostly at the U.S. government for covering up this scandal. The Liberty was sent out on a bungled mission. She might have been withdrawn to a safer distance if it hadn't been for a monumental military communications foulup. Top Navy brass refused Liberty's request for an armed escort. When she was hit, a Russian destroyer turned up to offer help hours before the U.S. Sixth Fleet came to our aid."

"Thirty four Americans were killed on that ship, and their buddies would like to know why. The remains of six of them were scraped together into one bodybag that weighed thirty pounds, and buried in a common grave at Arlington National Cemetery under a

tombstone that said DIED IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. You'd think they'd died in a warehouse fire in Istanbul.

"It took us years to get the marker changed to KILLED USS LIBERTY. And that is all we ever managed to achieve in setting the record straight. Those guys were murdered, and I urge my fellow veterans to back up Admiral Moorer's call for a Congressional investigation," White said.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

allowed betting on horse races in several thousand business establish-

week, during which the 120 lawmakers considered more than 1,000 bills

lands. ... from these ...

SACRAMENTO TREE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1984

G. JEFFERSON PRICE III IS THE BALTIMORE SON'S CORRESPONDENT IN ISRAEL.

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red
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ally

Article reveals Israeli version of '67 attack on US Navy ship

By G. Jefferson Price III
Baltimore Sun

JERUSALEM — An article by two authoritative military affairs correspondents has disclosed for the first time the Israeli version of events that led to the Israeli bombing of a U.S. Navy vessel in which killed 34 American sailors were killed and another 171 wounded at the height of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The article, written for Atlantic Monthly magazine and run Thursday in the English-language Jerusalem Post, acknowledges that, 17 years later, the question of whether the Israeli air and sea attack against the U.S.S. Liberty was intentional "remains open."

But the article, based largely on still-classified Israeli military documents, gives a blow-by-blow description of Israeli command decisions which, combined with previously documented U.S. Navy mistakes, led to one of the most devastating setbacks in U.S.-Israeli relations.

Irish Goodman, military affairs writer for the Jerusalem Post, and Zeev Schiff, military affairs writer for Ha'aretz, conclude that Israel's actions were negligent and inept. They wrote that some mistakes were the result of misreading information in the heat of a tense situation in which the atmosphere was so tense that chief of staff, and later prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin "broke down under the strain and had to be replaced for 24 hours."

The authors have high security clearances. Goodman said much of the information was obtained while they collected material for books on the histories of the Israeli air force and navy. The books were approved by the Israeli military censor, but the Atlantic Monthly article was not submitted, Goodman said.

The authors contend there is no evidence that Israel deliberately attacked the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel out of fear it would in-

terfere with the Israeli war plan.

The Liberty was dispatched in late May 1967 to the Mediterranean off the Sinai peninsula, where Egypt and Israel appeared to be headed toward war. The war started June 5.

On the afternoon of June 8 while on station about 12 miles off the Sinai coast, the Liberty was attacked by Israeli jet fighter-bombers and torpedoed by Israeli naval vessels.

"The tragedy could have been averted," the authors contend, if messages dispatched from as high up as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordering the vessel to move 100 miles from the war zone following the outbreak of war had ever reached the ship.

But they add: "It could also have been averted if Israeli mistakes were not being made at the same time by an overworked Israeli general staff." The Israeli version of events, taken mostly from the still-classified Israeli "war log," reveals that the first Israeli mistake occurred early on the day of the attack when Israeli aerial reconnaissance identified the Liberty as a destroyer.

A red marker on the Israeli navy war room map noted the vessel as "an unidentified," potentially hostile vessel, the article said.

Later, the Israeli spotter identified the vessel erroneously as a U.S. naval supply ship. Soon a green marker, signifying a neutral ship, replaced the red marker. Still later the same morning the vessel was positively identified as the Liberty.

But at 11 a.m., a new Israeli duty officer ordered the Liberty's green marker removed.

The vessel did not again draw the attention of those in the war room until almost 20 minutes later during a search for the source of what the Israelis erroneously believed was shelling from the sea against the Sinai town of El Arish, which they had captured from Egypt.

Convinced that the town was under attack from enemy vessels,

the Israeli command dispatched torpedo boats.

According to the article, the torpedo boat radars picked up the Liberty about 14 miles off the coast. An immediate air strike was ordered.

Two Israeli-made Israeli Mirage jets circled the Liberty and reported seeing "no flag or other signs of identification," the authors reported.

(Other reports, including accounts by Liberty's crew, contend that it was a clear day and that the U.S. flag on the ship was in plain view.) The jets were ordered to attack.

Two other Israeli jets with napalm bombs were diverted from the Sinai and made two runs at the ship.

In the dense smoke from the burning ship, one of the pilots noticed the ship's identification marks and reported the first information that raised doubts about the floundering ship's identity.

Upon reaching the scene, the Israeli torpedo boats' commander hesitated, demanding that the Liberty identify itself. The Liberty flashed back the code for the Israeli vessel to identify itself first, according to the article. While the Israeli commander hesitated, machine gun fire came from the Liberty.

The authors write that the Israeli commander waited to consult his handbook on the identity of Arab naval vessels and that this check confirmed the Liberty was actually an Egyptian supply vessel.

The torpedo boats attacked. Only then, according to the article, did they notice the ship's identifying letters.

In a final twist of errors, they and their commanders on land feared they had hit a Russian vessel.

Later, the torpedo boat commander reported he had hit a U.S. Navy ship.

According to the article, later inquiries by the Israelis determined that "the attack on the ship was not conducted out of malice, nor ... was there any evidence of criminal negligence; it was a genuine mistake."

Israel promptly apologized to Washington and paid \$20 million more than \$7 million in damages to those aboard the Liberty and the remains of the 41 killed.

Cable News Network, Inc.



2133 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
202-298-7400

September 24, 1984

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[Redacted]

Dear Jim:

Sorry for the delay in writing. The show sounds like an excellent idea for "Crossfire," which is our half-hour TV show. Will take it up with the producer.

Sincerely,


Patrick J. Buchanan

*The radio show is off the air; NBC
add the station, WB*

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OPERATION TRUTH

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Rev. John E. Karnes
Rabbi Samuel M. Silver
Rabbi Joseph Teichman
Herman Weiner, Esq.
Dr. Philip Rosen

Public Relations
Evelyn Feldman

Dear James M. Ennes, Jr.

I just read your letter in the
"Jerusalem Post" calling Hirsch-

Goodman and Zeev Schiff "propagandist"
for not agreeing with you that Israel

deliberately attacked the Liberty. I believe

that every decent American that knows the history of the
friendship of American and Israel. And America's support for
Israel will never believe that Israel plain wanted to attack
a ship of their best friend. I will say openly that only
anti-Semites and haters of Israel can say this. And why does
America help Israel? what you have to do, if you really

concerend with the Truth is to read a book and see a film by a Christian
eye witness in Lebanon "Israel- America's Key To Survival." By
Rev. Mike Evans and Jack Anderson and two American Generals. You can contact
the author and Producer for the book and the film at P.O. Box 709 Bedford
TX 76021 (871) 540-0346.

Sincerely,

Yaakov Riz
President Operation Truth

P.S. You can also read a book (as a former Army Officer) By a former
Brigadier General "World War Three Is Inevitable." By Dr. Roland
Pritikin P.O.Box 635 Rockford, Ill. 61105 (815) 399-8809



"I would run in the middle of the night to learn the Truth."

- Emilie Zola -

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Mr. Yaakov Riz, President
Operation Truth
1458 Levick Street
Philadelphia, PA 19149

Dear Mr. Riz:

Thank you very much for sending me an inscribed
copy of World War Three Is Inevitable.

I am most grateful and look forward to reading it
at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan
RONALD REAGAN

**THE JERUSALEM
POST**
PUBLISHED DAILY IN JERUSALEM

25th June 1985

Mr James M Ennes, Jr

**THE JERUSALEM
POST**
PUBLISHED DAILY IN JERUSALEM

Head Office
The Jerusalem Post Building,
P.O.B. 81, Romema,
Jerusalem 91000

Dear Mr Ennes,

We apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of November 15 last year, but for some reason it only arrived in Israel recently. The Washington office took an ~~inordinately~~ long time in forwarding it.

We never claim to do anything else, but for the first time reveal what actually happened on the Israeli side during the incident. However you saw this as an attempt to discredit your version. Not so.

We together came into contact with hitherto classified material during the course of research on two books: one on the Israeli Navy; the other on the Airforce.

Instead of you viewing this new information with interest in terms of finally classifying the issue, you chose not only to attack the information, but us personally as well.

We to are sorry that this has resulted in a shouting match, but your accusation made to the Sunday Times of London that "Hirsch Goodman was an agent working for a foreign government" went beyond the bounds of academic debate.

Neither of us intend taking the incident further. Our journalistic brief in writing the article was to present a specific sequence of events that revealed themselves in the hundreds of original documents we read. We checked and re-checked minute details. We made mistakes, like on the issue of compensation - but are satisfied that the essence of what we published is essentially what happened.

With regard to your personal affiliations, they are your private business. They only became public by the concerted, and often vitriolic, attack on us, our creditability and our motives.

Sincerely,


Z. SCHIFF


H. GOODMAN

THE JERUSALEM
POST
PUBLISHED DAILY IN JERUSALEM

September 22, 1985

James M. Ennes, Jr.


THIS IS REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR
RELEASE OF DOCUMENTATION TO
SUPPORT THEIR ARTICLE IN
ATLANTIC MONTHLY.


Dear Mr Ennes,

Thank you for your letter of July 29.


We have decided that at this time we cannot release our
documents for reasons to do with Israeli censorship
laws.

Yours sincerely,


Hirsh Goodman


Zeev Schiff

James M. Ennes, Jr.



MS FOR ARAB-AMERICAN AFFAIRS JOURNAL
SPRING, 1986

The USS Liberty: Back in the News
By James M. Ennes, Jr.

The ill-fated American intelligence ship USS Liberty has burst back into the news. And apologists for Israel are not happy about it.

This little-known subject, it seems, is finally coming out of the closet—albeit with some unintended help from Israel. Angry Americans are asking their Congressmen about the Liberty. Articles are appearing in military magazines after years of silence. News stories, editorials, letters to the editor and national talkshows mention the subject regularly. Former heads of government agencies are starting to speak out. And a retired Chairman of the

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Joint Chiefs of Staff has called upon the Congress "once and for all to clear up the unanswered questions surrounding this tragedy."¹

To refresh faded memories: On the fourth day of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, Israeli naval, air, and reconnaissance forces worked together to attack and almost to sink this lightly-armed neutral ship in international waters. Thirty-four Americans died and 171 were wounded from a crew of 294. The crippled vessel had to be sold for scrap.

But the story vanished from the news like the political bombshell it still is. Israel swore the attack was a mistake, and no amount of evidence to the contrary made any difference. Not the testimony of crewmen. Not CIA reports that Moshe Dayan ordered the attack against a ship he knew to be American. Not CIA findings that it was planned in advance. Not the opinions of a presidential advisor that the Israeli excuse was unbelievable nor an official State Department finding that it was untrue nor the opinion of the Secretary of State that the attack was deliberate.

All evidence paled alongside the sad reality that friends of Israel wielded power in the Lyndon Johnson White House.² Murder of Americans could be tolerated, embarrassment of Israel could not. So the truth about the USS Liberty was buried in top secret files while crewmen and others who knew the story were coerced into silence.

For eighteen years the story has simmered on the back burners of public consciousness: known to a few, denied by both governments, never fully reported in any news media. Newspaper articles have explored the subject

¹News conference, National Press Club News Room, December 11, 1985.

²For a comprehensive report on Zionist influence on the Johnson Administration, see Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1984).

briefly. Several books have been written. A number of government and military leaders have spoken out. Law suits under the Freedom-of-Information-Act have brought ever-more-damning evidence into the open and persistent pressure by survivors has kept the story alive. But until recently the USS Liberty has never received the important national coverage it deserves.

In 1984, however, Atlantic magazine commissioned two leading Israeli journalists, Zeev Schiff and Hirsch Goodman, to write an article about the Liberty attack. This would be the first major American magazine to give the Liberty more than passing mention. From the start, unfortunately, there seemed little chance that this would be the objective account that the story calls for, exploring both sides and searching for the truth.

Atlantic is owned by Canadian Zionist Mortimer Zuckerman whose goals for the magazine were outlined in a February 14, 1982, article in New York Times Magazine. No articles would be allowed, said Zuckerman, that "challenge Israel's right to exist." That injunction may be open to interpretation, Times Magazine noted, citing an earlier \$10,000 Zuckerman grant to The Nation. Zuckerman cancelled the "no strings" grant when he objected to some of The Nation's reporting about Israel.

Thus it was not surprising when word came from Israel that reporters Schiff and Goodman expected their piece to "thoroughly discredit everyone who has written about the USS Liberty." Clearly that was the intent of the article: to tell a story supporting the Israeli position and to attempt to refute the stories told by survivors and others who have previously investigated the affair.

Meanwhile, author Stephen Green (Taking Sides, Morrow, 1984) appealed to Atlantic editors for a chance to review the Schiff/Goodman manuscript or to publish an opposing view. No deal, said the editors. No

opposing views would be entertained until after publication of the Schiff/Goodman piece, and then only in the Letters-to-the-Editor section. Green appealed personally to publisher Zuckerman. Still no deal.

After several unexplained delays, the article finally appeared in the September issue of Atlantic under the title, "The Attack on the Liberty." Running to more than 10,000 words, it was an imposing spread. "Now new evidence throws light on this 'tragic accident,'" announced a subtitle, while an insert described the authors' credentials: "Hirsch Goodman is the defense correspondent of The Jerusalem Post and the Israel correspondent of The Sunday Times of London. Zeev Schiff is the defense and military-affairs editor of the Israeli daily newspaper Ha'aretz and a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace."

"Was the Liberty attacked intentionally?" the authors ask rhetorically in an opening paragraph. "Countless magazine articles and several books...have been written...but the mystery remains." Then, having presumably disarmed critics by sounding like open minded investigators, the authors proceed to present all the arguments for the defense, sidestepping the many contradictions, while ignoring the case for the prosecution.³

"Mistakes are common in war," the Israeli authors write. "Such tragic accidents have happened to every army in the history of modern war. But many reasonable people have not been able to accept Israel's attack on the Liberty as such an accident."

As examples of such nonacceptance, they cite "Remember the Liberty" bumper stickers (distributed by a surviving Liberty crewman at his own

³Schiff and Goodman in a letter to this writer defend their approach by saying that their purpose was not to present a balanced account, but to report "what was happening in Israel."

expense) and a New York Times 1984 memorial announcement for the man who died in the attack.

"Some groups, believed by Israeli intelligence to be funded by the Arabs, want to keep the issue alive," write Schiff and Goodman.⁴ Then they present a scenario of the attack which, if believed, would convince most readers that the attack was, indeed, another tragic accident of war.

The "New Evidence"

For almost eighteen years, the Israeli government has insisted publicly that the Liberty's presence in the area was unknown to Israel until after the attack—while admitting privately to the American government that the ship was correctly identified, and presenting an elaborate scenario to explain why the ship, after having been correctly identified, was nevertheless attacked. This is the story, denied publicly by the Israeli government, now told in the Atlantic.

According to this officially denied (but widely leaked and previously published) version, the Liberty was correctly identified by crewmen of a Nord reconnaissance aircraft eight hours before the attack and was properly marked on a chart in the Israeli war room. Unfortunately, say the

⁴Here the authors seem to be suggesting, even before the late-1985 spy scandal in which one Jonathan Jay Pollard was caught selling American military secrets to the Israeli government, that Israeli intelligence is active within the United States.

authors, a "Lieutenant Colonel 'L' ordered the marker removed from the battle control table" in order to keep the table "as uncluttered as possible."⁵

That move, say Schiff and Goodman, wiped out all reference to the ship in the Israeli war room. When Liberty was again sighted several hours later, the sighting coincided with explosions then occurring at the nearby town of El Arish, and the now-unidentified Liberty was mistakenly presumed to be an enemy engaged in shore bombardment.

According to the Atlantic account, torpedo boats dispatched to investigate the mistaken reports of "shore bombardment" sighted the Liberty on radar twenty nautical miles northwest of El Arish and mistakenly plotted the ship's speed at thirty knots--which, under Israeli gunnery doctrine, made the target an enemy who could be fired upon. A second radar check was ordered. This time Liberty was mistakenly determined to be moving in an evasive course at 28 nautical miles per hour (knots).

Since 28 knots was also the top speed of the boats, "which were still twenty nautical miles away from the target," an air strike was called.

According to Schiff and Goodman, two Mirage III C fighters on their way back to Israel from an air patrol over the Suez Canal were diverted to the target. The lead plane dropped to 3,000 feet and circled the ship twice searching for identifying marks, while the second aircraft circled the target once. Two "cannons" could be seen on the forecastle and the ship was determined not to be Israeli, but no markings could be seen.

⁵Schiff and Goodman withhold the officer's name on the grounds that it is classified information. However, an unclassified official Israeli government report entitled "The Attack on the 'Liberty' Incident" (published in 1982 by the Israel Defense Forces History Department in rebuttal to this writer's book on the subject, and presented to senior officers of the United States Navy with a cover sheet proclaiming the article "the official version of the State of Israel") identifies the officer as a Commander--not Lieutenant Colonel--Lunz.)

The presence or absence of a flag, say the authors, is moot, since Israeli headquarters was left with the impression that the ship had no markings and acted on that basis.

Each pilot strafed the ship four times before the arrival of two Super Mystère jets armed with napalm bombs. The Mystères made two bombing runs each, but only one bomb hit the ship.

At 2:27 P.M., torpedo boat T-204 asked "What ship?" by flashing light. Liberty, according to this account, refused to identify itself, insisting instead that the torpedomen identify themselves first.

~~After an exchange of gunfire, the boats fired five torpedoes.~~

Four missed. One exploded "just below the water line."

Still trying to sink the ship and also to establish her identity, we are told, the torpedomen crossed to the ship's left side, and while crossing the bow "noticed" the letters GTR on the hull of the ship. The time was 2:47. All firing ceased for fear the ship "could be Russian because of the letters on its hull."

At 3:20 P.M., after 33 more minutes of careful study from close range, the torpedomen reported that the ship was American.

At 4:40 the Israelis offered help, which was refused.

At 5:04 the boats commenced their return to base.

At 5:50 the Liberty disappeared from their radarscopes.

Subsequent Israeli investigations concluded that "the attack on the ship was not conducted out of malice...nor was there any evidence of criminal negligence. It was a genuine mistake."

"To this day," the authors conclude, "the wounds have not healed. The issue resurfaces periodically, and with it the pain."

A Press Blitz Spreads the Israeli Version

In what looked like a well-coordinated press blitz, the Atlantic article and excerpts from it were widely reprinted, often with headlines proclaiming, "New Evidence Shows Attack on American Ship was a Mistake." Excerpts from the article and interviews with the authors were filed with United Press International in New York, while the Baltimore Sun's correspondent in Jerusalem filed a detailed excerpt that appeared in many American newspapers.⁶ A

reporter in Beirut filed an excerpt with the Associated Press. The Jerusalem Post International Edition reprinted the original article,⁷ as did some other newspapers.

While some newspapers did publish rebuttal letters and interviews with Liberty survivors, most efforts to present the American side of the story met with stony silence. The Sacramento Bee angrily refused any rebuttal space. United Press International ignored requests to present the American side. The London Sunday Times asserted that printing a rebuttal in the Times would be "disloyal" to their correspondent and that, in any case, Schiff and Goodman have "credentials" which others presumably lack.

⁶The Boston Sunday Globe, September 9, 1984, and others.

⁷The Jerusalem Post International Edition, October 6, 1984, page 13.

Reaction to the Article

Letters-to-the-Editor published by the Atlantic in December, however, were uniformly critical of Israel for attacking the ship and of the magazine for publishing a one-sided account.

Among the letters published in December is one from this writer showing that Atlantic's "new evidence" is not new at all, has been officially discounted by the American government as false, and is overwhelmingly refuted by other, more compelling material. "Anyone studying the entire body of evidence," we write, "will reach the same conclusions."

Author Stephen Green writes: "To say that Goodman and Schiff are selective in their presentation...is an understatement. They seem unaware of literally hundreds of pages of detail [in other published accounts]. ...One would have expected the authors to at least remark on the dozens of inconsistencies between their story and the [U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry] report, even if they preferred to accept the version given by their Israeli sources."

"Simply outrageous. ...the heart aches over such duplicity from an 'ally,'" writes a reader. "...savage and inexcusable," says another.

In a counter-rebuttal, Schiff and Goodman reply: "We have in our possession the verbatim transcripts of the dialogue between the Israeli Naval War Room and the attacking vessels, the verbatim dialogue between Israeli Air Force HQ and the pilots, classified documents from three commissions of inquiry into the affair, the Yerushalmi Report, the testimony of all the major

participants to the various commissions of enquiry, transcripts of our own interviews with the Israeli principals, and detailed charts.⁸

"...What Mr. Ennes claims...is not the issue. What is relevant is the sworn testimony of the captain of the Israeli torpedo boat, and those around him...."

A similar exchange of letters appeared in The Jerusalem Post⁹ and the International Jerusalem Post.¹⁰ Here, however, Schiff and Goodman complain bitterly that criticism of their article amounts of a "personal attack" on the authors, and assert that "James Ennes has presented his own version of history."

"The picture we paint is not complimentary to Israel," the authors confess. "In fact, we were told by many in Israel that we did the country a disservice for having written on the subject at all. ...The Liberty was not attacked with malice aforethought. That is a myth that Ennes has chosen to perpetuate."¹¹

⁸This writer asked the two Israeli authors to release some of the material that might document their otherwise unsupported account. By letter the authors declined to do so on the ground that releasing their material would violate Israeli censorship laws.

⁹October 22, 1984

¹⁰November 10, 1984

¹¹A standard tactic of critics of the Liberty story is to attempt to attribute the story exclusively to Ennes and then to attempt to discredit Ennes. As we shall see, however, Ennes did not invent this story. He is merely one of several messengers. All known surviving crewmen, several authors and serious researchers, and many senior U.S. Government officials of the era tell the same story.

"It is time," say Schiff and Goodman, "that the cloak of historical respectability and investigative objectivity was lifted from Ennes."¹²

Some Atlantic readers cancelled their subscriptions to protest what they saw as unbalanced reporting. By February, however, the tone had changed. Here readers praised the scholarship of the article and lauded the magazine for publishing it. A former U.S. Marine officer asserted that only malice or special interest could cause one to conclude that Israel had deliberately attacked an American vessel, while a political science professor from Rutgers published his professorial opinion that the attack could not have been deliberate and a history professor from William Paterson College asserted that "Arab propagandists" are making "war through other means" by continuing "to exploit the Liberty incident."

Neither of the learned professors apparently looked beyond the one-sided Atlantic story. Neither questioned the fact that, except for some carefully selected background material, all of the "new evidence" cited by Atlantic came from Israel. No one apparently wondered why information from American government, military or intelligence sources was not included or why survivors of the attack were not questioned. No one including the authors apparently bothered to check the voluminous Navy Court of Inquiry file or State Department or other public records or wondered why the official American

¹²Schiff and Goodman attempt to do this by "revealing" that Ennes in 1983 appeared in New York City "on a platform with anti-Israeli propagandist Alfred Lillienthal and M.T. Mehdi of the American-Arab League" where he "left no doubt as to his sentiments" which they suggest are anti-Jewish. Although we know Lillienthal (who is Jewish) and Mehdi (who is Arabic) to be honorable men with whom we would be proud to share a platform, neither man was on the platform described by Schiff and Goodman. And while we have grave suspicions about the goals and methods of the international Zionist movement, we regard most American Jews more as victims than conspirators.

records told a different story. No one asked Atlantic to provide sources or asked how they might be checked. And while the authors clearly did read this writer's book on the subject, for they used it without attribution for much of their background material, they chose to ignore the evidence and testimony provided there.

The Associated Press Checks In

In New York, however, the Associated Press assigned veteran newsman David Smyth to look into both sides of the story. Smyth sought out several survivors of the attack plus key military, intelligence and diplomatic leaders of the era, and reviewed pertinent U.S. government files.

The story he found is quite different from that told in the pages of the Atlantic monthly:

Smyth discovered that, except for some names and other details, the story told by Schiff and Goodman is not new. It is the same story told privately by the Israeli government to top U.S. government officials and rejected by them in 1967.

The Israeli report was prepared by Israeli Military Judge Lieutenant Colonel Yeshayah Yerushalmi on July 21, 1967, and delivered by hand several days later to State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow along with urgent requests that it be withheld from the American public. There it was assigned to the State Department Legal Advisor, Carl F. Salans, for review.

The Salans review was devastating to the Israeli excuse--so devastating that, along with the Yerushalmi report itself, it was classified Top Secret by U.S. government officials and locked away from public scrutiny. The report finally surfaced in 1983, only because a Minneapolis citizen invested more than \$15,000 in legal action under the Freedom of Information Act to pry it loose.¹³

The Yerushalmi report itself, the object of that sensitive analysis, is still officially withheld more than eighteen years later, even though it was leaked to Liberty survivors in 1980 and has been widely published.

The State Department Discounts the Israeli Excuse

The Salans report cites several embarrassing discrepancies in the Israeli story:

1. Israel claims the ship was tracked at 28 to 30 knots on an evasive course. The U.S. Navy inquiry, however, shows that the ship's top speed was 18 knots and that during the pre-attack period she held a constant five knot speed on a steady course.
2. Israel claims that the only prior knowledge of the ship was an aircraft sighting at 6:00 A.M.. The Court of Inquiry, however, shows that

¹³James Miller VS United States Department of State, filed 1981 in Federal District Court, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

the ship was reconnoitered by Israeli aircraft on eight occasions during daylight (most of which were very low-level flights personally observed by this writer).

3. Israel claims the attacking aircraft made three runs over the ship moments before the attack in attempts to identify it. The ship's commanding officer, however, and other crewmen (including this writer who was on the bridge at the time) insist that no pre-attack reconnaissance runs were made by the attacking aircraft.

4. Israel claims the torpedo boats approached the ship before attacking and asked for identification, but that the ship answered with an "AA" signal meaning "identify yourself first." Salans discounts this report as contrary to sworn testimony of surviving crewmen.¹⁴

5. Israel claims that no flag or identification markings could be seen on the ship. The Navy Court of Inquiry established, however, that the ship's normal 5' by 8' colors flew at all times during and preceding the air attack, that they were quickly replaced after being shot down by the airplanes, and that an oversize 7' by 13' flag was hauled up five minutes before the start of the torpedo boat attack. Liberty's configuration and standard markings were clearly sufficient for identification, Salans

¹⁴According to the Navy Historian, "AA" is simply an attention-getting signal used to establish flashing light communications and has never meant "identify yourself." Even that point is moot, however, as Liberty's signalman reports that, although "AA" is a normal opening signal in flashing light communications, he dispensed with "AA" due to the urgency of the situation and simply flashed "USS LIBERTY, U S NAVY SHIP" and the ship's call sign over and over until he was wounded and his lamp was shot out by the torpedomen.

notes. Her hull markings were clear and freshly painted. The ship's name appeared in English on the stern.¹⁵

6. Israel claims the Liberty was mistakenly identified as the Egyptian freighter El Quseir. Salans notes, however, that El Quseir was roughly one fourth Liberty's size, very differently configured, and lacked Liberty's unusual antenna array and hull markings. Perhaps unknown to Salans but certainly known to the Israelis, El Quseir was actually a 43-year-old horse carrier for the Egyptian cavalry and was then in Alexandria waiting to be scrapped. Salans notes that even long-time Israeli supporter Clark Clifford officially described the El Quseir excuse as "unbelievable."

7. The Top Secret State Department report notes that if the Israeli forces believed that their target had been moving at 30 knots, they should have known immediately that the El Quseir, with a top speed of about 14 knots, was not their target.

¹⁵The Israelis make no effort to explain how experienced reconnaissance pilots and several trained officers on three torpedo boats could fail to recognize Liberty's distinctive silhouette or to observe Liberty's clear and oversize markings and identification signals even after examining them at length from very close range. The "cannons" described by Schiff and Goodman were .50 caliber machine guns with barrels perhaps three feet long and not much thicker than a man's thumb. If we are to accept the Atlantic account, the pilots and later the torpedomen could see the tiny guns but could not see the ship's name in letters two feet high on the stern or the ten foot high markings on the ship's hull or the eight foot long and later the thirteen foot long American flag flying freely from the highest part of the ship's tallest mast.

8. The report notes that "any trained observer" should immediately have recognized that the Liberty was incapable of a shore bombardment and thus could not have been the target the Israelis were supposedly looking for.¹⁶

9. The report notes that if the first sighting of the Liberty by torpedo boats was at 1:41 P.M. as claimed, and the report was then transmitted to headquarters, rechecked and verified by the torpedoman, retransmitted, a decision to attack then made, aircraft dispatched and the attack launched, all in the space of about fifteen minutes, then "no significant time was expended in an effort to identify the ship from the air before the attack was launched."¹⁷

¹⁶They should also have noted that no ship of the Liberty's size or configuration could possibly approach 28 or 30 knots; realizing that, it should have been clear that firing upon this "target" was contrary to Israeli gunnery doctrine which permitted firing upon an unidentified ship near the scene of a shore bombardment only if the ship was a "high speed target." Firing upon the Liberty, then, under these circumstances, should have been seen as a court martial offense under Israeli military law. Also, although there was an explosion in the coastal village of El Arish during the morning, it is clear now and should have been clear then that there was no shore bombardment.

¹⁷The Atlantic account would partially explain that quick response by conveniently reporting that the aircraft were actually returning from an air patrol over the Suez and thus were already airborne. Liberty survivors including this writer, however, recall that the attack was initiated by three [not two] Mirage aircraft that approached the ship from the northeast [Tel Aviv or Haifa], not from the southwest [Suez]. The airplanes were fully loaded with eighteen large rockets visible under each wing. It is extremely unlikely that these aircraft ignored thousands of easy Arab targets in their desert patrol area, returning fully loaded just in time to attack the USS Liberty.)

What The Department of State Did Not Know

Carl Salans had only limited information to work with: the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry file, which is deeply flawed and incomplete, and a report prepared for President Johnson by Presidential Advisor Clark Clifford (which has since vanished from government files).¹⁸ Although the Salans report serves as a powerful indictment of the Israeli excuse, it would have been even more damning if Salans had interviewed Liberty survivors or had full access to Central Intelligence Agency records.

For instance, Salans had no way of knowing that the firing did not stop at 2:47 as the Israelis claim. The torpedo boats fired cannon and machine guns on the Liberty until 3:15 when they sank the ship's empty life rafts waiting in the water for evacuees.

Salans had no way of evaluating the Israeli claim that only four aircraft participated in the attack. Senior U.S. Navy officers estimated later that at least ten aircraft were required to inflict the 821 rocket and cannon hits the Liberty received.

¹⁸According to Lyndon Johnson's Press Secretary George Christian, it was the Clifford Report which persuaded President Johnson not to demand of the Israelis a better excuse for attacking the ship. According to Christian, even though the story was far from complete and other evidence was yet to come in, Clifford's report failed to provide "proof" that the Israelis attacked deliberately. Therefore, in order to preserve good relations with the Israelis, Johnson decided not to press them for a more satisfactory story while their good will was needed for the U.S. to arbitrate peace in the Middle East. Asked recently for more details of his mysteriously missing report, Clark Clifford claims to have no recollection of it whatsoever and claims not to recall participating in the emergency meetings dealing with the Liberty, even though we have White House photographs of Clark Clifford in the situation room with President Johnson during the crisis.

Salans probably had no way of knowing that Israeli reconnaissance aircraft at 10:30 had been overheard by Liberty and other American radio intercept operators informing Israeli headquarters that they could see the ship's American flag.

He probably had no way of knowing that the Israeli claim of having picked up the Liberty on radar at 1:41 P.M. was physically impossible.

At that time the boats were about 27 miles from the Liberty; due to the curvature of the earth, they could not have detected a ship the size of the Liberty from more than about 15 miles.¹⁹

Salans overlooked an official Court of Inquiry finding that the Israelis jammed the ship's radio frequencies in an attempt to prevent her call for help. The selective jamming could not have been accomplished without prior knowledge that the ship was American.

Salans did not mention the Israeli claim that pilots (and later, torpedomen) feared that the letters "GTR-5" meant they had been firing on a Russian ship. Surely the Israelis are aware that Soviet ships write their hull numbers in Arabic numerals (not English letters) on the hull near the bridge (not on the bow).

And Salans could not have known that while he was preparing his report, CIA officials were informing members of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations that the attack was deliberate. According to author Stephen Green (Taking Sides, Morrow, 1984), who interviewed former congressman Robert L.F. Sikes of Florida and other committee members, the CIA learned a day before the attack that the Israelis had already decided to attack

¹⁹Even the official Israeli report "The Attack on the 'Liberty' Incident" acknowledges that the boats maximum radar range is 12 to 15 miles and that their claimed detection at 22 to 27 miles is highly unusual. We submit that it is impossible.

the Liberty if she operated in Israeli coastal waters because they could not tolerate an electronic eavesdropper in the area.

The Salans report does not contain an overall conclusion as to whether the attack was deliberate. Instead, the report is an item by item review of the main points of the Israeli excuse in which each Israeli argument is analyzed and rejected, point by point.

Although the conclusion seemed obvious, Washington reporter David Walsh tracked down Carl Salans recently to ask what conclusion he had drawn. "Oh, they knew the ship was American and attacked it deliberately," Salans said.

Survivors and Government Leaders Speak Out

Associated Press Reporter Smyth weighed the Salans report against the Atlantic article and then contacted survivors and the American officials who were most directly involved. His findings were reported in two important Associated

Press wire service stories that appeared in about 300 American newspapers in September²⁰ and October,²¹ 1984, plus numerous newspapers overseas. Although coverage was far from universal, the story nevertheless reached millions of Americans for the first time, plus more readers in overseas versions, and it set the story straight for the first time in the large-circulation news media.

²⁰Associated Press, 21 September 1984 "Liberty Controversy Still Hot." Versions appeared in weekend editions of the Norfolk, Virginia, *Virginian-Pilot* and Charleston, South Carolina, *News and Courier* among others, but did not get much attention, probably because it was released late Friday evening after most Sunday papers had been made up.

²¹Associated Press, October 29, 1984 "Americans Rebut Israeli Version of 1967 Attack on Ship." This much longer version ran in about 300 American newspapers and captured top front-page billing in many, along with banner headlines. It was featured in the *Los Angeles Times*, *Houston Chronicle* and, in Spanish, in the *Buenos Aires La Nacion*, among others. Charleston's *News and Courier* ran the story along with a powerful lead editorial calling for an official reinvestigation to allow surviving crewmen to tell their side of the story. Few papers with strong Zionist influence, however, such as the *Seattle*, *Chicago*, *New York* or *Washington, D.C.*, newspapers, ran the story at all.

After summarizing the Atlantic account and citing key discrepancies, the Associated Press stories reported the opinions of survivors and key leaders of the era:

Liberty's Jewish engineer officer, George Golden: "I had proof that they knew who we were. We had monitored the communications between the Israeli planes and gunboats and their bases in which they referred to us as an American ship. I turned my proof over to an admiral, but I don't know what was done with it. The Court of Inquiry was a whitewash. There were also just too many people trying to shut our men up. Somebody higher up was putting a squeeze on our people not to say anything about the incident. The information I had showed it was not an accident, and our government knows this."

This writer, who was Liberty's officer-of-the-deck: "That very morning I had ordered a brand-new flag put up. It was streaming freely in a 12-knot wind."

Liberty's signalman Russell David: "When [the flag] was shot down by Israeli planes, I put up a holiday ensign that was three times bigger. When the Israeli gunboats attacked, I kept flashing with my lamp "US NAVY SHIP" until my lamp was shot out and I was wounded. I knew then they wanted us all dead."

Liberty's chief radioman Wayne L. Smith: "The Israelis jammed five of our six radio circuits as we tried to call for help."

Richard Helms, who was CIA director at the time: "To say that it was an accident is drawing a pretty long bow in view of the evidence."

Dr. Louis Tordella, who was National Security Agency Deputy Director: "I believe it was a deliberately planned attack."²²

Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State at the time: "I have never believed the Israeli explanation."

Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer, who is now a senior consultant at the University of Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It's ridiculous to say this was an accident. In the real world there is no way it could have happened" the way the Israelis describe it. "Congress should investigate this matter, even now."²³

²²Tordella and then-NSA Director, General Marshall S. Carter, both testified before the House investigating committee (mentioned above) that they considered the attack to have been deliberate. Their testimony, however, has so far resisted declassification efforts.

²³Associated Press story "Admiral Charges Cover-up," September 7, 1985. Navy Times, December 9, 1985, and December 30, 1985.

The Story Won't Go Away

Those who would have us believe that the attack was a "tragic mistake" must certainly wish the Atlantic had never brought the subject up, and they now seem once more content to remain silent in hopes the truth about the Liberty will fade quietly into oblivion. It will not. Every new demonstration of Israeli intransigence brings the Liberty surging back into public consciousness; every new Israeli theft of American intelligence or technology, every new revelation of undue Israeli influence on American institutions, every new Israeli demand for American weapons systems or American money, moves more Americans to demand a better accounting of the Israeli attack upon the USS Liberty. And each letter to a Congressman moves the government very slightly closer to telling the truth.

"Why should people believe survivors of the attack and disbelieve the story told by the government of Israel?" we were asked recently by Israeli Foreign Affairs magazine.²⁴

²⁴ Israeli Foreign Affairs is "an independent monthly research report on Israel's diplomatic and military activities world wide" published by Jane Hunter, a non-Zionist Jew, for Zionist and non-Zionist readers. Typical articles discuss Israeli arms sales to Iran, Israeli military links with South Africa, and the influence of the Israeli Congressional Lobby (AIPAC). Subscriptions are \$20 sent to Israeli Foreign Affairs, 5825 Telegraph Avenue #34, Oakland, California 94609.

Our answer: "Because survivors are believable. The conviction that it was no accident is unanimous among known survivors and is supported by men who held key government positions at the time of the attack. They speak out publicly and give their names. Their stories agree with one another. What they say can be verified in sworn testimony and public records available from the government of the United States. The Israeli excuse, on the other hand, keeps changing. It conflicts with eyewitness accounts of survivors. It conflicts with official American records. And each new Israeli excuse conflicts with most previous Israeli excuses. Israeli sources are anonymous or unavailable or hide behind pseudonyms. Meanwhile, the evidence behind the Israeli excuses is locked away in Israeli files, released only to apologists and friendly journalists. If the attack were accidental as the Israelis claim, surely the Israeli government could come up with a believable excuse, documented with checkable sources, consistent with sworn testimony of survivors and compatible with the firm laws of physics."

--END--

James Ennes was a lieutenant on the bridge of the USS Liberty on the day of the attack. He retired from the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander in 1978 after 27 years of military service. His book on the subject, *Assault on the Liberty* (Random House, 1980), is a "Notable Naval Book" selection of the U.S. Naval Institute and was recommended as "choice" reading when reviewed in *The Washington Post* in May, 1980. The book is now in a fifth printing and can be ordered by any bookstore. Telephone orders can be placed toll free by calling 800 852-5000 or 800 424-3339 or 800 360-5788.

James M. Ennes Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

17

BACKGROUND INFO ABOUT SHIPS
AND AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ATTACK
AND "RESCUE"

PLANNING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
LIBERTY, COMMISSIONING, COMPLEMENT,
CHANGES OF COMMAND, DECOMMISSIONING,
COST, PLANS, DIAGRAMS

DECK AND RADIO LOGS OF

LIBERTY

SARATOGA

AMERICA



ANDREW JACKSON

COM SIXTH FLEET (RADIO)


(ALSO SEE COURT OF INQUIRY
FILE FOR MORE RADIO AND OTHER
LOGS)

FOLDER 17


Office Mess and Wash Room
Radio Reception Room



MAIN DECK




DRAWINGS FROM MEMORY BY JOHN SCOTT SHIPS DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER



- * I THINK THIS AREA HAS:
- ① BARBER SHOP
 - ② DENTAL OFFICE
 - ③ MODU ANT. RM

2ND DECK



3RD DECK

RESEARCH SPACES

? ? ?

PIT SWOOD

FRESH WATER BALLAST

FRESH WATER BALLAST

STORAGE ROOM

STORAGE ROOM

THIS WAS THE AREA WE SEARCHED

HOBBY SHOP

FRESH WATER & DIESEL FUEL OIL TANKS

MAIN ENG. SPACES

POST OFFICE ?

?

DRAWING

STORAGE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

For drawings of LIBERTY

Naval Ship System (Command)
Naval Center, Building 3
Ball Room
Crystal City, Virginia (on Route 1
Pennington, near the
depot)

Room 12. West 42

Ask for Mr Bassett
or
Mrs Fali

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Dictionary of
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
VOLUME IV • 1969

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

NAVAL HISTORY DIVISION • WASHINGTON

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USS Liberty (AGTR-5)—Hampton Roads, 1968.

III

(AGTR-5: dp. 7,725 (lt.); l. 455'; b. 60'; dr. 23'; s. 16 k.; cpl. 358; a. none; cl. Belmont; T. V2-S-AP3)

The third Liberty (AGTR-5) was laid down under Maritime Commission contract as SS *Simmons Victory* by Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oreg., 23 February 1945; launched 6 April 1945; sponsored by Mrs. Kenneth L. Cooper; and delivered to the Maritime Commission 4 May 1945.

During the closing months of World War II, *Simmons Victory* was chartered under general agency agreement by Coastwise (Pacific Far East) Line, San Francisco, Calif. After the war, she continued to steam the ocean shipping lanes. She saw considerable service in the Far East during the Korean conflict. On nine different cruises between 18 November 1950 and 23 December 1952, she steamed to Korea to supply and support American forces engaged in repelling Communist aggression in South Korea.

Simmons Victory entered the National Defense Reserve Fleet in 1958 and was berthed in Puget Sound at Olympia, Wash. Acquired by the Navy from the Maritime Administration in February 1963, she was delivered to Willamette Iron & Steel Corp., Portland, Oreg., for conversion to a technical research ship. She was renamed *Liberty* and classified AG-168 on 8 June 1963. Reclassified AGTR-5 on 1 April 1964, she was commissioned at Bremerton, Wash., 30 December 1964. Comdr. Daniel T. Wieland, Jr., in command.

After undergoing outfitting at Bremerton, *Liberty* steamed to the east coast where she arrived Norfolk, Va., 23 February 1965. Assigned to Service Squadron 8, she received specialized electronics and communications equipment, and during April and early May underwent shake-

down and intensive training out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Loaded with advanced research and evaluation gear, she possessed the technical capabilities, as well as ready mobility, which made her a valuable contribution to the Navy's comprehensive program of research and development projects in communications.

Liberty departed Norfolk 15 June, and during the next 3 months she operated off the western coast of Africa from the Canary Islands to the Cape of Good Hope while supporting research projects. After returning to the Atlantic coast 22 October, she operated out of Norfolk until 3 January 1966 when she again deployed to African waters. During the first 8 months of 1966 she completed two such deployments, and on 1 November she sailed on her fourth cruise as a floating research and development station ship.

On 2 June 1967, she sailed from Rota, Spain; and took station approximately 13 miles off the coast of El Arish, Sinai, United Arab Republic on 6 June, the fourth day of the brief Arab-Israeli War. That day, while conducting communications and electronic research operations, she was attacked by jet fighters at 1403 Lt. A bomb hit port-side amidships, and two or more Israeli fighters made repeated strafing, fragmentation bomb, and rocket runs over the ship. As a result, three major fires raged topside. At 1424, three motor torpedo boats, flying the Israeli flag, approached at high speed and at 1434 attacked. Three torpedoes were fired: one passed astern, a second may have passed beneath the ship, and the third exploded on the starboard side, forward, tearing a 35-foot-wide hole in the hull; 34 men were killed, 160 were wounded in the aircraft and torpedo boat attacks. Although severely wounded, Comdr. W. L. McConagle, the commanding officer, remained at the conn to guide the ship out of shallow water. As the gyrocompass was knocked out, and

the magnetic compass was of uncertain reliability, Commander McGonagle steered the ship, using its wake and the azimuth of the afternoon sun as reference points. Although the American flag was flying prior to both attacks, Israel maintained the attacks were due to mistaken identity. Navy fighters were launched from the *America* to provide air cover, and the Washington-Moscow hotline was put to use to prevent any misunderstanding that could have led to a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

Liberty arrived at Valletta, Malta 14 June in company with *Little Rock* (CLG-4), *America* (OVA-66), *Devis* (DD-637), and *Papago* (ATF-190). After undergoing repairs, she departed Valletta 16 July for the States in company with *Papago*. The ships arrived Norfolk 29 July. She entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard 2 March 1968; and 28 June AGTR-5 was placed out of commission in reserve at Norfolk, and assigned to the Norfolk group of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

Liberty was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Captain McGonagle received the Medal of Honor for his gallantry in saving the ship, remaining on the bridge for 17 hours, despite serious wounds, to bring the ship to safe waters.

Liberty III

A former name retained.

(SP-1229; t. 95; l. 108'; b. 24'; dr. 12'5"; s. 8.5 k.; cpl. 10; a. none)

Liberty III, an auxiliary pilot boat, was built in 1896 by John Bishop, Gloucester, Mass.; acquired by the Navy under free lease 10 September 1917 from her owner, Boston Pilots Relief Society; enrolled in the Naval Coast Defense Reserve 15 September 1917; and commissioned 21 September 1917 at Boston, Ens. Murdoch McLean USNRF, in command.

Assigned to the 1st Naval District, Boston, Mass., *Liberty III* served throughout World War I as a harbor entrance patrol boat, guiding the movements of ships that navigated the defensive area of the port of Boston. After the Armistice, she decommissioned 8 January 1919 at Boston and was returned to her owner the same day.

Liberty Belle

A former name retained.

(IX-72; t. 622; l. 198'; b. 44'; dr. 13')

Liberty Belle (IX-72) was built in 1910 by Harlan & Hollingworth, Wilmington, Del.; acquired by the Navy 23 April 1942 from the Wilson Line on a bareboat charter; and placed in service 1 January 1943 for duty in the 5th Naval District.

Assigned to experimental duty, *Liberty Belle* operated out of the Naval Mine Warfare Test Station, Solomons, Md., until early May 1944 when she sailed for Philadelphia. Arriving there, she was placed out of service 18 May 1944, and was returned to the Maritime Commission 10 April 1947. She was subsequently sold to Jersey Shore Lines of Atlantic Highlands, N.J., and renamed *Asbury Park*.

The seventh sign of the zodiac; a southern constellation between Virgo and Scorpio.

(AKA-12; dp. 10,713; t. 450'2"; b. 63'; dr. 26'6"; s. 15.5 k.; cpl. 405; a. 15"; 43"; cl. *Arcturus*)

Libra (AK-53) was laid down as *Jean Lykes* by Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Kearny, N.J., under contract for Lykes Steamship Co., Galveston, Tex.; launched 12 November 1941; sponsored by Mrs. Hale Boggs, wife of Congressman Lykes of Louisiana; acquired by the Navy 30 December 1941; named *Libra* 9 January 1942; and

commissioned 13 May 1942, Comdr. W. B. Fletcher in command.

Completing conversion at New York City 26 May 1942, *Libra* loaded combat equipment at Hampton Roads and sailed 10 June for Wellington, New Zealand, arriving 11 July. Laden with cargo for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, she sailed 22 July for rehearsals in the Fijis for the first Allied offensive in the Pacific, the Solomons campaign. *Libra* arrived off Tulagi 7 August and began an unloading interrupted six times in the next 8 days, as enemy air attack caused her to go to general quarters and stand off to maneuver in open waters. In the early morning 9 August she heard heavy gunfire to the northwest, where Allied men-o'-war engaged the Japanese in the Battle of Savo Island, fighting to protect the transports and their vital cargo. Later the same day, empty, she sailed for Wellington, arriving 20 August.

For the next 2 months, *Libra* sailed from Noumea to the Ellice Islands and Espiritu Santo, base for the Guadalcanal operation, building up supplies.

She returned to Guadalcanal 11 November, and her group almost immediately came under enemy air attack. The determined enemy sent another seven planes against the transports next day; all were splashed by *Libra* and her sisters. She sailed for Espiritu Santo 18 November at the Battle of Guadalcanal, just south of Savo Island, raged to a victory which gave the Allies sea control of the southern Solomons. Returning to Espiritu Santo 15 November, *Libra* prepared for two additional voyages to Guadalcanal during the next month, bringing cargo essential to the epic struggles of the marines to wrest the island from the Japanese.


From mid-December 1942 through March 1943, *Libra*, redesignated AKA-12 on 1 February, carried war equipment from New Zealand to bases in the New Hebrides. Joining the 3d Fleet 20 March, she returned to Guadalcanal 3 April, and 4 days later, joined in fighting off land-based enemy aircraft. She returned to Espiritu Santo 10 April, and during the next 80 days made four voyages carrying cargo for the occupation of Guadalcanal. For her superlative performance of duty through the Guadalcanal campaign, *Libra* received the Navy Unit Commendation. She earned it in part 30 June when, unloading cargo at Rendova, her task group came under heavy enemy air attack. *Libra's* antiaircraft fire downed 17 of the 25 attacking planes before they could launch torpedoes, but not enough to strike *McCawley* after passing under *Libra's* unladen and high in the water. *Libra* took the stricken transport in tow. Later the same day, the two were attacked by eight divebombers, three of whom they splashed. Helled of the tow later that afternoon, *Libra* returned to Guadalcanal.

Aside from a repair period in New Zealand in August, *Libra* gave the next 4 months to building up the base on Guadalcanal with cargo from New Caledonia, then was part of the assault force for Bougainville, arriving Empress Augusta Bay 1 November. Promptly unloading, she sailed the same day for Guadalcanal for additional cargo, with which she arrived Bougainville 8 November, immediately to splash one of 25 dive bombers attacking her transport group.

Libra carried cargo among the New Hebrides, Solomons, and Marshalls until June 1944, when she prepared for the assault on Guam. Arriving off Guam from Eniwetok 21 July, she quickly discharged heavy equipment for the 3d Marines on the Asan beaches, then sailed for San Francisco, arriving from Pearl Harbor 19 August.

Overhauled, *Libra* sailed from San Francisco 20 October for Milne Bay, New Guinea, and Manna, where she readied for the Lingayen Gulf landings. She entered the gulf 11 January 1945, off-loaded her vital cargo, and sailed for Leyte, Ulithi, and Guam. Her final amphibious operation was Iwo Jima, off which she arrived 10 February. For 2 weeks she maneuvered off the volcanic beaches, avoiding enemy shore batteries as she landed marine combat gear.

For the remainder of the war, *Libra* carried cargo from Noumea to Leyte and intermediate ports. In the first of




Dassault Mirage III

France


Data and silhouette: Mirage III-E.
Photograph: Mirage III-EP.
Single-seat long-range fighter-bomber,
in production and service.

Powered by: One 13,670 lb.s.t. (with reheat) SNECMA Atar 09C turbojet and, optionally, one 3,307 lb.s.t. SEP 844 rocket-engine.
Span: 27 ft. 0 in.
Length: 49 ft. 3 1/2 in.
Empty weight: 15,540 lb.
Max. gross weight: 29,760 lb.
Max. speed: 1,460 m.p.h. at 40,000 ft. (Mach 2.2).
Tactical radius: 420 miles at 595 m.p.h. at 36,000 ft. with external tanks.
Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon in fuselage and one AS.3. air-to-surface missile or Matra R.530 air-to-air missile under fuselage, and two rocket pods or 1,000-lb. bombs under wings. Two Sidewinders can also be carried.



Development and Service:

The Mirage III was designed as an all-weather fighter capable of operating from short unprepared airstrips. The prototype flew on November 17, 1956, with 2,000 lb.s.t. Atar 101G turbojet, with which it reached a speed of Mach 1.6. Later, with a rocket supplementing its turbojet, it attained Mach 1.9. It was followed by the Mach 2 Mirage III-A with 3,225 lb.s.t. Atar 9B turbojet, of which ten were built, and the generally-similar Mirage III-C (first flown October 9, 1960) of which 95 were built for all-weather interception and day ground attack duties with the French Air Force, with optional rocket-engine, and one for the Swiss Air Force. Others were delivered to Israel (III-CJ) and to South Africa (III-CZ). Alongside the Mirage III-C, Dassault developed and produced the III-B, a tandem two-seat trainer which is 2 ft. longer and retains the same strike capability as the III-C. This version first flew on October 20, 1959, and has been produced for the French Air Force, Israel (III-BJ), Switzerland (III-BS), South Africa (III-BZ and III-DZ), Australia (III-D), Pakistan (III-DP), Brazil (III-BB), Libya, and the Argentine. Following the Mirage III-C was the III-E, first flown on April 5, 1961. This is a long-range fighter-bomber version with Atar 09C engine, fuselage lengthened by 1 ft and new nav. attack equipment. French orders for 180 are supplemented by export orders from the Argentine, Colombia, Pakistan (III-EP), South Africa (III-EZ), Spain (III-EE), Libya, Australia (III-O, licence-built), and Switzerland (III-S, licence-built). A reconnaissance version of the III-E is designated Mirage III-R and was first flown in prototype form in November 1961. It carries five cameras in the nose and has been ordered by the French Air Force (III-R and III-RD, the latter with improved equipment), Pakistan (III-RP), Switzerland (III-RS), South Africa (III-RZ and III-RDZ) and Libya.



Dassault MD-452 Mystère IVA

Single-seat interceptor, in service.


Powered by: One 7,716 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza Verdon 350 turbojet.
Span: 36 ft. 5 1/2 in.
Length: 42 ft. 11 in.
Empty weight: 12,950 lb.
Gross weight: 18,700 lb.
Max. speed: 695 m.p.h. at sea level (Mach 0.91)
Endurance: 1 hr. 10 min. without external tanks.
Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon and pack of 55 rockets in fuselage. Underwing racks for two 1,000 lb. bombs, napalm containers, packs of six air-to-ground rockets or packs of 19 air-to-air rockets.



Development and Service:

Developed from the Mystère IIC, which served briefly with the French Air Force, the Mystère IVA (first flown September 28, 1952) introduced a thinner (7.5 per cent thickness/chord ratio) wing, increased sweepback (41°), larger fuselage and more powerful turbojet. An "offshore" procurement order for 225 production models was placed by the U.S.A.F. in April 1953, followed by a French Government order for 100, and the first Mystère IVAs entered service in 1955. The first 50 aircraft had 6,280 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza Tay 250 turbojets, after which a switch was made to the more powerful Verdon. Altogether 421 Mystère IVAs were built, of which 110 were exported to the Indian Air Force and 60 to the Israel Air Force, which used them in combat against Egyptian MiG-15s and 17s during the Sinai campaign in 1956 and again in June 1967. The French Air Force is replacing its Mystères with Mirages; only two squadrons remained operational by early 1970, and few remain in service in India. About 30 were believed to be still operational in Israel in 1970.

Variants of the Mystère IV were three prototypes and 16 pre-production IVBs (first flown December 16, 1953) with Avon R.A.7R engine and F-86-type lipped air intake, and the IVN prototype (flown July 19, 1954), an Avon-powered tandem two-seat all-weather interceptor with a nose radome similar to that of the F-86D and L Sabres.




Dassault MD-452 Mystère IVA

France

Single-seat interceptor, in service.

Powered by: One 7,716 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza
 101st. turbojet.
 41 ft. 11 in. length.
 12,950 lb. gross weight.
 18,700 lb. maximum weight.
 695 m.p.h. at sea level (Mach 1.13)

Time to climb: 10 min. without external tanks.
 Two 30 mm. cannon and pack of 55
 rockets. Underwing racks for two
 napalm containers, packs of six
 rockets or packs of 19 air-to-air



Development and Service:

Developed from the Mystère IIC, which served briefly with the French Air Force, the Mystère IVA (first flown September 28, 1952) introduced a thinner (7.5 per cent thickness, chord ratio) wing, increased sweepback (41°), larger fuselage and more powerful turbojet. An "offshore" procurement order for 225 production models was placed by the U.S.A.F. in April 1953, followed by a French Government order for 100, and the first Mystère IVAs entered service in 1955. The first 50 aircraft had 6,280 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza Tay 250 turbojets, after which a switch was made to the more powerful Verdon. Altogether 421 Mystère IVAs were built, of which 110 were exported to the Indian Air Force and 60 to the Israel Air Force, which used them in combat against Egyptian MiG-15s and 17s during the Sinai campaign in 1956 and again in June 1967. The French Air Force is replacing its Mystères with Mirages; only two squadrons remained operational by early 1971, and few remain in service in India. About 30 were believed to be still operational in Israel in 1970.

Variants of the Mystère IV were three prototypes and 10 pre-production IVBs (first flown December 16, 1953) with Avon R.A.7R engine and F-105-type flapped air intake, and the IVM prototype (flown July 19, 1954), an Avon-powered tandem two-seat all-weather interceptor with a nose radome similar to that of the F-86D and L Sabres.



Dassault Super Mystère B-2

France


Single-seat interceptor and tactical strike fighter, in service.

Powered by: One 7,955 lb.s.t. (9,700 lb. with reheat) SNECMA Atar 9 turbojet.
 Span: 34 ft. 5 1/2 in.
 Length: 46 ft. 1 in.
 Gross weight: 22,046 lb.
 Max. speed: 740 m.p.h. at 36,000 ft. (Mach 1.13)
 Range: 600 miles.
 Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon and pack of 55 air-to-air rockets in fuselage. Underwing racks for two 19-rocket packs, two 1,100 lb. bombs, napalm tanks, air-to-air missiles or 12 air-to-surface rockets.

Development and Service:

The Super Mystère is a development of the Mystère IVB, with thinner, more sharply swept wing, better visibility for the pilot and an improved, elliptical air intake. The prototype Super Mystère B-1 (flown March 2, 1955) had an Avon R.A.7R engine with reheat and exceeded Mach 1 on its fourth test flight. A switch was made to the Atar 101 for the five pre-production and 180 production (first flown February 26, 1957) Super Mystère B-2s, the last of which was delivered in 1959. Three squadrons of B-2s were still operational with French air defence elements in 1970 and will probably continue until these units are re-equipped with the Mirage F1. The Super Mystère B-2 remains in front-line service as a fighter-bomber in Israel, which purchased a total of 24, as illustrated.

One airframe was re-engined as a flying test-bed for the SNECMA Atar 9 turbojet (13,250 lb.s.t. with reheat) and was designated Super Mystère B-4. It flew for the first time on February 9, 1958, and had a rate of climb of almost 30,000 ft. min. at sea level.



JOHN W. R. TAYLOR
and GORDON SWANBOROUGH

**Military
Aircraft
of the
World**



Charles Scribner's Sons
New York

Introduction

Except during two World Wars, the pace of military aviation progress has never moved so rapidly as it is doing today. There was a time back in the 'fifties when it seemed likely that guided missiles would replace piloted fighters and bombers for many duties. Even now the once-mighty RAF strategic bomber force has disappeared in favour of four Polaris missile-carrying submarines, while the fixed-wing squadrons of the British Fleet Air Arm are living on borrowed time, despite a reprieve for one of the aircraft carriers from which they operate. Yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, America has under development a swing-wing four-jet supersonic strategic bomber, as well as new generations of fighter aircraft for both the USAF and US Navy.

The Soviet Union, too, has new combat aircraft of tremendous power and performance in service. By adapting the Tu-114 transport into an airborne warning and control system aircraft (known to NATO as "Moss"), to direct its interceptor fighters against incoming raiders, it is even a step ahead of the USAF, which is only now beginning to evolve a similar, eight-engined version of the Boeing B-52 carrying a huge "saucer" radome on its back. There are rumours, too, of a new swept-wing supersonic bomber from Tupolev in the class of the North American Rockwell B-1A.

Clearly, therefore, the military aeroplane remains as vital as ever in what is sometimes called "the missile age", and about 300 different types are covered in this book. These include not only all types of combat aircraft in service with the world's air forces, but also the trainers, transport aircraft and other second-line equipment. No other book on the market covers all significant military aeroplanes in such a comprehensive, highly detailed but compact form, at the sort of price readers can afford to pay.

First-line fighters, bombers, maritime reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance aircraft, tactical support helicopters, and strategic and tactical transports are treated as "major" types, with a silhouette as well as a photograph. Second-line combat aircraft, obsolescent types, light transports, communications aircraft and trainers are given almost the same coverage, except that no silhouette is included.

It is a pleasure, as always, to record that our silhouettes were drawn by Dennis Punnett, whose skill at this exacting art is unrivalled.

We should also like to thank the public relations staffs of aircraft manufacturers, information branches of air forces, the Soviet Press news agency, and many others who provided photographs and data. Without their enthusiastic help, *Military Aircraft of the World* could never have achieved its present standards of completeness and accuracy.



Aérospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon *France*

Photograph: SA 321G
Heavy assault and anti-submarine helicopter, in production and service.

Powered by: Three 1,550 h.p. Turboméca Turmo III C6 shaft-turbines.
Rotor diameter: 62 ft. 0 in.
Fuselage length: 65 ft. 10 1/2 in.
Empty weight (Naval version): 14,640 lb.
Gross weight: 27,557 lb.
Max. speed: 149 m.p.h. at sea level.
Max. range: 671 miles, with one engine stopped.
Accommodation: Crew of two, 30 troops, 15 liters or equivalent freight.
Armament: Anti-submarine attack weapons in naval version, including up to four homing torpedoes, in pairs on each side of the cabin.



Development and Service:

Largest helicopter yet built in France, the Super Frelon (Hornet) was developed from the lower-powered Frelon, of which two prototypes were flown. A technical collaboration agreement with Sikorsky led to the introduction of some typical Sikorsky design features, including a boat-type hull to permit amphibious operations, with stabilising floats on the main undercarriage legs. The rotor systems are also of Sikorsky design. The first of two prototypes of the Super Frelon flew on December 7, 1962, with 1,320 h.p. Turmo engines, and subsequently set a helicopter speed record of 217.77 m.p.h. over a 15.25-km. course which stood until 1971. The second prototype was representative of the naval anti-submarine version, with crew of four, sonar, search radar in the stabilising floats and provision for other special equipment and weapons. Four pre-production Super Frelons followed the prototypes, with 1,500 h.p. engines; the first of these flew on January 31, 1964 and the last on January 9, 1965. Orders to date include 18 SA 321G anti-submarine versions for the French Navy, 16 transports for the South African Air Force and 12 transports for the Israel Defence Force. In French naval operations, one Super Frelon carrying detection and tracking equipment is usually accompanied by two or three others armed with attack weapons. The first unit was commissioned in May, 1970.



Dassault Mirage III

France


Data and silhouette: Mirage III-E.
Photograph: Mirage III-EP.
Single-seat long-range fighter-bomber,
in production and service.

Powered by: One 13,670 lb.s.t. (with reheat) SNECMA Atar 09C turbojet and, optionally, one 3,307 lb.s.t. SEP 844 rocket-engine.
Span: 27 ft. 0 in.
Length: 49 ft. 3 in.
Empty weight: 15,540 lb.
Max. gross weight: 29,760 lb.
Max. speed: 1,460 m.p.h. at 40,000 ft. (Mach 2.2).
Tactical radius: 420 miles at 595 m.p.h. at 35,000 ft. with external tanks.
Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon in fuselage and one A-9.30 air-to-surface missile or Matra R.530 air-to-air missile under fuselage, and two rocket pods or 1,000-lb. bombs under wings. Two Sidewinders can also be carried.



Development and Service:

The Mirage III was designed as an all-weather fighter capable of operating from short unprepared airstrips. The prototype flew on November 17, 1956, with a 9,900 lb.s.t. Atar 101G turbojet, with which it reached a speed of Mach 1.5. Later, with a rocket supplementing its turbojet, it attained Mach 1.9. It was followed by the Mach 2 Mirage III-A with 13,225 lb.s.t. Atar 9B turbojet, of which ten were built, and the generally similar Mirage III-C (first flown October 9, 1959) of which 95 were built for all-weather interception and day ground attack duties with the French Air Force, with optional rocket-engine, and one for the Swiss Air Force. Others were delivered to Israel (III-C.I) and to South Africa (III-CZ). Alongside the Mirage III-C, Dassault developed and produced the III-B, a tandem two-seat trainer which is 2 ft. longer and retains the same strike capability as the III-C. This version first flew on October 20, 1959, and has been produced for the French Air Force, Israel (III-BJ), Switzerland (III-BS), South Africa (III-BZ and III-DZ), Australia (III-D), Pakistan (III-DP), Brazil (III-BB), Libya, and the Argentine. Following the Mirage III-C was the III-E, first flown on April 5, 1961. This is a long-range fighter-bomber version with Atar 09C engine, fuselage lengthened by 1 ft and new nav attack equipment. French orders for 100 are supplemented by export orders from the Argentine, Colombia, Pakistan (III-EP), South Africa (III-EZ), Spain (III-EE), Libya, Australia (III-O, licence-built), and Switzerland (III-S, licence-built). A reconnaissance version of the III-E is designated Mirage III-R and was first flown in prototype form in November 1961. It carries five cameras in the nose and has been ordered by the French Air Force (III-R and III-RD, the latter with improved equipment), Pakistan (III-RP), Switzerland (III-RS), South Africa (III-RZ and III-RDZ) and Libya.



Dassault MD-452 Mystère IVA France

Single-seat interceptor, in service.

Powered by: One 7,716 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza

Verdon 350 turbojet.

Span: 36 ft. 5 1/2 in.

Length: 42 ft. 1 1/2 in.

Empty weight: 12,950 lb.

Gross weight: 18,700 lb.

Max. speed: 695 m.p.h. at sea level (Mach

0.91).

Endurance: 1 hr. 10 min. without external tanks.

Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon and pack of 15

rockets in fuselage. Underwing racks for two

1,000 lb. bombs, napalm containers, packs of six

air-to-ground rockets or pack of 2 air-to-air


rockets.



Development and Service:

Developed from the Mystère IIC, which served briefly with the French Air Force, the Mystère IVA (first flown September 28, 1952) introduced a thinner (7.5 per cent thickness chord ratio) wing, increased sweepback (41°), larger fuselage and more powerful turbojet. An "offshore" procurement order for 225 production models was placed by the U.S.A.F. in April 1953, followed by a French Government order for 100, and the first Mystère IVAs entered service in 1955. The first 50 aircraft had 6,280 lb.s.t. Hispano-Suiza Tay 250 turbojets, after which a switch was made to the more powerful Verdon. Altogether 421 Mystère IVAs were built, of which 110 were exported to the Indian Air Force and 60 to the Israel Air Force, which used them in combat against Egyptian MiG-15s and 17s during the Sinai campaign in 1956 and again in June 1967. The French Air Force is replacing its Mystères with Mirages; only two squadrons remained operational by early 1970, and few remain in service in India. About 30 were believed to be still operational in Israel in 1970.

Variants of the Mystère IV were three prototypes and 16 pre-production IVBs (first flown December 16, 1953) with Avon R.A. 7R engine and F-86-type tipped air intake, and the IVN prototype (flown July 19, 1954), an Avon-powered tandem two-seat all-weather interceptor with a nose radome similar to that of the F-4D and F-4L Sabres.



Dassault Super Mystère B-2 France


Single-seat interceptor and tactical strike fighter, in service.


Powered by: One 7,495 lb.s.t. (9,700 lb. with reheat) SNECMA Atar 101G turbojet.
Span: 34 ft. 5 1/2 in.
Length: 46 ft. 1 in.
Gross weight: 22,046 lb.
Max. speed: 743 m.p.h. at 36,000 ft. (Mach 1.7)
Range: 600 miles.
Armament: Two 30 mm. cannon and pack of 35 air-to-air rockets in fuselage. Underwing racks for two 19 rocket packs, two 1,000 lb. bombs, napalm tanks, air-to-air missiles, and 12 air-to-surface rockets.

Development and Service:

The Super Mystère is a development of the Mystère IVB, with thinner, more sharply swept wing, better visibility for the pilot and an improved, elliptical air intake. The prototype Super Mystère B-1 (flown March 2, 1955) had an Avon R.A.7R engine with reheat and exceeded Mach 1 on its fourth test flight. A switch was made to the Atar 101 for the five pre-production and 180 production (first flown February 26, 1957) Super Mystère B-2s, the last of which was delivered in 1959. Three squadrons of B-2s were still operational with French air defence elements in 1970 and will probably continue until these units are re-equipped with the Mirage F1. The Super Mystère B-2 remains in front-line service as a fighter-bomber in Israel, which purchased a total of 24, as illustrated.

One airframe was re-engined as a flying test-bed for the SNECMA Atar 9 turbojet (13,250 lb.s.t. with reheat) and was designated Super Mystère B-4. It flew for the first time on February 9, 1958, and had a rate of climb of almost 30,000 ft., min. at sea level.





Douglas A-1 Skyraider

U.S.A.

Single- and two-seat counter-insurgency attack bomber and armed escort, in service.

Data and silhouette: A-1J.

Photograph: A-1E.

Powered by: One 3,050 h.p. Wright R-3350-26WB piston-engine.

Span: 50 ft. 9 in.

Length: 38 ft. 10 in.

Empty weight: 12,550 lb.

Gross weight: 25,000 lb.


Max. speed: 318 m.p.h. at 18,000 ft.

Range: up to 3,000 miles with external tanks.

Armament: Fixed armament comprises four 20 mm. cannon in wings, up to 8,300 lb. of assorted stores under wings.

Development and Service:

One of the most versatile light attack bombers ever produced, the Skyraider originated from a U.S. Navy requirement in 1944 and 3,160 had been built when production ended in 1957. Although too late for service in World War II, the Skyraider, under its earlier AD designation, was one of the U.S.N.'s most potent weapons in the Korean War, and is still operational in South Vietnam. Versions designated from AD-1 to AD-7 were redesignated from A-1A to A-1J in 1962. Until 1967, the U.S.N. was using several versions in Vietnam, including the A-1H low-altitude model, A-1J with strengthened airframe and EA-1E and EA-1F electronic countermeasures versions. These had been withdrawn from service by the end of 1967, leaving the U.S.A.F. and Vietnamese Air Force the principal users of the Skyraider, primarily with the A-1E two-seater, known universally in Vietnam as the "Spad". Among foreign users of the A-1, Britain had a batch of 50 under MDAP for airborne early warning duties with the Royal Navy (no longer in service), and a quantity went to the French Air Force, which now uses them primarily in support of its forces based in former French territories in North Africa.





Douglas A-3 Skywarrior

U.S.A.


Data and silhouette: A-3B. Photograph: EKA-3B
Three-seat carrier-based attack bomber, in service.

Powered by: Two 10,500 lb.s.t. Pratt & Whitney J57-P-10 turbojets.
Span: 72 ft. 6 in.
Length: 76 ft. 4 in.
Empty weight: 38,298 lb.
Gross weight: 73,000 lb.
Max. speed: 810 m.p.h. at 10,000 ft.
Range: over 2,900 miles.
Armament: Two 20 mm. cannon, 1 radar-controlled tail mounting (not always fitted). Assorted weapons in bomb-bay.



Development and Service:

Development of the Skywarrior began soon after the end of the War, when the U.S. Navy drew up plans for super-carriers such as the *U.S.S. Forrestal*. It was the largest aircraft produced for carrier operations when the prototype first flew on October 28, 1952, designated XA3D-1. This and the second prototype were powered by Westinghouse XJ40-WE-3 engines but production aircraft switched to J57-P-6s. All Skywarriors were built with A3D designations, changed to A-3 in 1962. The first production A-3A flew on September 16, 1953 and deliveries to the Navy began in March 1956. Subsequent modifications to five of the 50 A-3As built produced the EA-3A for electronic countermeasures and the single YRA-3A for reconnaissance. The A-3B, which began to reach the fleet in 1957, has more powerful engines and provision for flight refuelling; 164 were built. The first of 30 RA-3Bs was flown on July 22, 1958 and carries cameras in the weapon bay. The EA-3B for electronic countermeasures has a crew compartment in the bomb-bay, seating four, and first flew on December 10, 1958; 24 were built. Final version, first flown on August 29, 1959, was the TA-3B, a trainer for radar operators serving on EA-3Bs. It carries an instructor and six pupils in the fuselage; 12 were built and one was modified to VA-3B as an executive transport. Primary operational deployment of the Skywarrior in 1970 was for electronic reconnaissance in support of U.S. operations over Vietnam. Others have been converted to KA-3 and EKA-3 tankers and will remain in service until replaced by KA-6Os.



U.S.A.

McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk


U.S.A.

Data and silhouette: A-4F. Photograph: A-4M.
Single-seat carrier-based light attack bomber, in production and service.

Powered by: One 9,300 lb.s.t. Pratt & Whitney J52-P-8A turbojet.
Span: 27 ft. 8 in.
Length: 40 ft. 3 1/2 in.
Empty weight: 10,000 lb.
Gross weight: 24,500 lb.
Max. speed: 674 m.p.h. at sea level.
Range: Over 2,000 miles with external fuel.
Armament: Two 20 mm. cannons in wings; fuselage crutch and four wing stanchion points carry maximum 10,000 lb. load of assorted bombs, rockets or other stores.

Development and Service:

The prototype XA4D-1 flew on June 22, 1954, with a Wright J65-W-2 engine. The A4D designation of ensuing production models was changed to A-4 in 1962. The 166 A-4As had J65-W-4 engines and entered service in October 1956. They were followed into production by the A-4B, which was first flown on March 26, 1956; this version had a J65-W-16A engine, improved controls (identifiable by a single-surface rudder with external bracing) and other improvements. Equipment for all-weather operation, including terrain-clearance radar in a slightly lengthened nose, produced the A-4C, first flown on August 21, 1958. Douglas built 542 A-4Bs and 638 A-4Cs. The A-4E, which first flew on July 12, 1961 had more payload and range, with a J52-P-8A engine, and 500 had been built by the end of 1965. Early that year, the U.S. Navy ordered the TA-4E trainer, with lengthened fuselage for tandem seating and a J52-P-8A engine. The first of 139 flew on June 30, 1965 and production models, redesignated TA-4F, began to reach the Navy in May 1966. On August 31, 1966, Douglas flew the prototype A-4F, and deliveries of this version began in June 1967. As described above, it has a J52-P-8A turbojet, avionics in a saddle bay behind the pilot and other changes. A-4Cs modified to an equipment standard comparable with that of the A-4F for service with U.S.N. Reserve carrier air wings are designated A-4L. The A-4M, first flown on April 10, 1970, is a U.S.M.C. derivative of the A-4F with 11,200 lb.s.t. J52-P-408A and other improvements. The R.A.N. has purchased eight A-4G and two TA-4G; the A-4H and TA-4H are being supplied to Israel; the R.N.Z.A.F. has bought ten A-4Ks and 4 TA-4Ks; and Argentina 50 surplus A-4B Skyhawks.





McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II U.S.A.


Two-seat multi-mission land and carrier-based fighter and fighter-bomber, in production and service.
Data and photograph: Phantom F.G.R. Mk.2.

Powered by: Two 12,250 lb.s.t. (20,315 lb. with reheat) Rolls-Royce RB.168 Spey 202 turbofans.
Span: 38 ft. 9 in.
Length: 58 ft. 3 in.
Gross weight: 58,000 lb.
Max. speed: Mach 2.5.
Range: Over 2,000 miles.
Armament: Basic armament of four Sparrow III missiles on semi-submerged mounts under fuselage and two Sparrow II or four Sidewinder missiles on two wing pylons. Alternative armament includes nuclear or conventional bombs exceeding 10,000 lb. in weight, Vulcan gun pods, rocket pods, etc.

Development and Service:

Development of the Phantom II began in September 1953 under the designation AH-1 as a high-performance attack two-seater for the U.S.N. The designation was changed to


F4H on May 26, 1955, after the specification had been altered to include air-to-air armament, and the first XF4H-1 was flown on May 27, 1958. Production orders followed and the first U.S. Navy Squadron, VF-101, received its first aircraft in December 1960. Trials in the ground attack role led to U.S.A.F. adoption and basic Navy and U.S.A.F. versions became the F-4B and F-4C respectively. The first F-4C flew on May 27, 1963, the first YRF-4C (reconnaissance version) on August 9, 1963 and the first production RF-4C on May 18, 1964. The RF-4B reconnaissance version for the U.S.N. flew on March 12, 1965. Later U.S.A.F. versions are the F-4D (flown December 8, 1965) with improved avionics and F-4E with nose-mounted M-61 gun. The Navy acquired one squadron of F-4Gs with improved avionics followed by full production F-4Js with J79-GE-10 engines and many improvements. F-4K and F-4M are Spey-engined respectively for the Royal Navy and R.A.F. as Phantom F.G.Mk.1 (48 ordered) and F.G.R.Mk.2 (120 ordered). The R.N. has received 28 Phantom F.G. Mk.1s, to equip one operational squadron, No. 802, and one training unit, No. 767. R.A.F. Strike Command has received Phantom 1s to equip No. 43 Squadron. Phantom 1s will equip two other Strike Command squadrons (all three being based at Leuchars); Mk.2s will equip Air Support Command's No. 6 and No. 54 Squadrons and No. 228 OCU. First squadrons of R.A.F. Germany to become operational with Phantom 2s are Nos. 14 and 17. Iran is receiving 84 F-4Ds and delivery of 18 F-4Es to South Korea began in mid-1969. Israel received the first of 50 F-4Es and 6 RF-4Es (since supplemented by 18 more F-4Es) in the latter half of 1968. Germany has begun equipping with 88 RF-4E reconnaissance fighters, with about 200 F-4E(F) air superiority fighters to follow; and Japan ordered 104 F-4EJs as F-104 replacements late in 1968, the first example of this model flying on January 14, 1971. The R.A.A.F. has leased 24 F-4Es as interim equipment, pending delivery of its F-111Cs.





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Nord 2501/2504 Noratlas

France

Twin-engined medium-range transport, in service.

Data, silhouette and photograph: Nord 2501.


Powered by: Two 2,040 h.p. SNECMA (Bristol) Hercules 738 or 758 piston-engines.
Span: 108 ft. 7 in.
Length: 72 ft. 0 in.
Gross weight: 45,415 lb.
Max. speed: 273 m.p.h.
Range: 1,550 miles with a 1-ton payload.
Armament: None.


Development and Service:

The Nord 2501 Noratlas is standard equipment in the French, Federal German, Portuguese and Israel Air Forces. Others are used by civil airlines, some with wingtip-mounted Turboméca Marboré turbojets to provide reserve power for take-off and emergency use.

The original prototype Nord 2500 (first flown September 10, 1949) had 1,600 h.p. Gnome-Rhône 14R engines. The second prototype, designated Nord 2501 and first flown on November 27, 1950, switched to Hercules engines and 200 aircraft of this type were built for the French Air Force; 30 were supplied to Israel and 12 entered service with the Portuguese Air Force. Twenty-five were built for Federal Germany, where a further 161 were produced under licence by Flugzeugbau Nord. The first German-built Noratlas flew on August 6, 1958. Three have been transferred to the air force of Niger and a small number were supplied to Nigeria.

Maximum payload of the Nord 2501 is about 7½ tons of cargo or 45 passengers, including paratroops. Other military variants were the 2504, of which five were supplied to the French Navy as flying classrooms for anti-submarine crews, with wingtip-mounted Marborés; and the 2508 transport, of which two were built with 2,500 h.p. Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines and wingtip-mounted Marborés, and were taken over by the German Air Force in 1963 to flight test equipment under development for the Transall C-160 transport.





North American Rockwell RA-5C Vigilante

U.S.A.

Carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft, in production and service.

Powered by: Two 11,870 lb.s.t. (17,850 lb. with afterburning) General Electric J79-GE-70 turbojets.

Span: 53 ft.

Length: 75 ft. 10 in.

Gross weight: approx. 80,000 lb.

Max. speed: 1,345 m.p.h. (Mach 2.1) at 40,000 ft.


Range: 3,000 miles.

Accommodation: Crew of two in tandem.

Armament: Four underwing pylons for nuclear or conventional bombs, missiles or external fuel tanks.

Development and Service:

First flown on August 31, 1958 (as the XA3J-1), the Vigilante was designed primarily to deliver any type of bomb after operating from the deck of an aircraft carrier and to have a Mach 2 speed. A unique feature was the "linear" bomb bay, comprising a tunnel running the length of the fuselage, from which bombs were ejected at the aft end. As originally designed, the A3J-1 was to have had an XLR46-NA-2 rocket motor in addition to the jet engines but this scheme was abandoned. The A-5A Vigilante (57 delivered) entered service with VAH-7 in 1961, and was first operational at sea on board the U.S.S. *Enterprise* in February 1962. The A-5B Vigilante (six built, prototype first flown on April 29, 1962) was a long-range version of the A-5A with additional fuel in a "saddleback" fairing on the fuselage, but the attack role was abandoned before this version entered production and the RA-5C was adopted instead in the reconnaissance role. The RA-5C is externally similar to the A-5B, with four underwing attachments for 333-gallon fuel tanks, bombs or missiles, and carries cameras, side-looking radar and other reconnaissance equipment in a long ventral fairing. The first RA-5C flew on June 30, 1962, and deliveries to the U.S.N. began in 1964. In addition to new production, all A-5As and Bs were converted to RA-5C standard, and the type was re-instated in production in 1969 to meet Vietnam needs. Current orders are for 46 new aircraft, as described above. Earlier RA-5Cs have 17,000 lb.s.t. J79-GE-8 engines.



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


Sud-Aviation S.O.4050 Vautour *France*

Twin-engined bomber and all-weather fighter, in service.
Data and silhouette: Vautour IIA.
Photograph: Vautour IIB.

Powered by: Two 7,720 lb.s. SNECMA Atar 101E-3 turbojets.
Span: 49 ft. 6 in.
Length: 31 ft. 1 in.
Gross weight: 45,000 lb.
Max. speed: 686 mph. at sea level (Mach 0.9).
Range: 2,485 miles.
Armament: Four 30 mm. cannon. Two packs containing total of 232 rockets. Underwing attachments for four Matra R.511 air-to-air missiles.

Development and Service:
The prototype Vautour flew on October 16, 1952. Production orders were placed for a total of 140 Vautour IIs, made up of 30 Mk. IIA single-seat ground attack aircraft, 40 Mk. IIB two-seat bombers and 70 Mk. IIN two-seat all-weather fighters. The IIBs and IINs were delivered to the French Air Force and remain in service. Twenty-five of the IIAs were supplied to Israel, and those remaining still form an important part of the country's attack force.
The Vautour IIA is armed with four 30 mm. cannon and carries three 1,000 lb. or six 750 lb. bombs internally, plus four bombs of up to 1,000 lb. each under its wings. The Mk. IIB carries the same weapon load as the IIA, except that the nose guns are deleted to make way for the glazed bomb-aimer's position. All versions are supersonic in a dive.



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Northrop F-5

U.S.A.

Lightweight fighter, in production and service.

Data and silhouette: F-5A. Photograph: CF-5A.

Powered by: Two 4,000 lb.s.t. (with afterburning) General Electric J85-GE-13 turbojets.
Span: 29 ft. 10 in. (over tip-tanks).
Length: 47 ft. 2 in.
Empty weight: 6,000 lb.
Gross weight: 20,570 lb.
Max. speed: 925 m.p.h. (Mach 1.4) at 30,000 ft.
Max. range: 1,565 miles.
Accommodation: Pilot only (pilot and observer/traanee in F-5B).
Armament: Two 20 mm. cannon in nose. One Sidewinder air-to-air missile on each wingtip; five pylons under fuselage and wings for assorted stores up to a total of 6,200 lb.

Development and Service:

The F-5 was the outcome of a project begun by Northrop in 1964 to develop a small, lightweight supersonic fighter which would be substantially cheaper than its contemporaries of similar performance. Construction of three N-156Fs began in May 1968 as a private venture which was subsequently backed by the U.S. Department of Defense, and the first of these flew on July 30, 1969. Production contracts were placed by the Department of Defense for 1-17's to be supplied as the F-5A and F-5B (single-seat) and F-5B (two-seat) under mutual aid programmes to such nations as Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Iran, Ethiopia, Libya and South Korea. The R. Norwegian A.F. ordered 108 including F-5Gs, camera-equipped F-5Gs and F-5Bs for training. Spain ordered 26 SF-5As and 34 SF-5Bs, assembled by C.A.S.A. and used by the Spanish Air Force as the C-9 and CE-9 respectively. In Canada, Canadair is building 22 CF-5A single-seaters and 26 two-seat CF-5Ds for the Canadian Armed Forces plus 75 NF-5As and 30 NF-5Bs for the R.Neth.A.F. The first two aircraft off the Canadair line were CF-5As and were shipped to Edwards A.F.S. for testing in July 1968. Third aircraft, and the first to fly at Montreal, was a two-seat CF-5D, completed in August 1968.

An improved version known as the F-5-21 has updated engines and many other new features, and will be produced to U.S.A.F. contract as the F-5E for America's allies. An F-5B fitted experimentally with J85-GE-21s, rated at 5,000 lb.s.t., was first flown on March 28, 1968, as the prototype YF-5B-21.



James M. Ennes, Jr



Sud-Aviation S.O.4050 Vautour

France

Twin-engine bomber and all-weather fighter, in service.

Data and silhouette: Vautour IIH.
Photograph: Vautour HB.

Powered by: Two 7,720 lb st SNECMA Atar 101E-3 turbojets
Span: 49 ft 6 1/2 in
Length: 51 ft 1 in
Gross weight: 45,635 lb
Max. speed: 685 m.p.h. at sea level (Mach 0.9)
Range: 2,400 miles
Armament: Four 30 mm cannon. Two racks containing total of 232 rockets. Underwing attachments for four Matra R 511 air-to-air missiles.

Development and Service:

The prototype Vautour flew on October 16, 1962. Production orders were placed for a total of 140 Vautour IIs, made up of 30 M. IIA single-seat ground attack aircraft, 40 M. IIB two-seat bombers and 70 M. IIC two-seat all-weather fighters. The IAs and IIs were delivered to the French Air Force and remain in service. Twenty five of the IAs were supplied to Israel, and those remaining still form an important part of the country's attack force.

The Vautour IIA is armed with four 30 mm cannon and carries either 1,000 lb. or six 750 lb bombs internally, plus four bombs of up to 1,000 lb each under its wings. The M. IIB carries the same weapon load as the IIA, except that the nose guns are deleted to make way for the glazed bomb-aimer's position. All versions are supersonic in a dive.



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IAI

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Facilities Manager
S. Cohen

This company was established in 1953 as Bech Aircraft Ltd. The change of name to Israel Aircraft Industries was made on 1 April 1967. IAI employs over 2,000 people in all its factories. It is licensed by the Israel Civil Aviation Administration, U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, British Civil Aviation Authority, and the air forces of Israel, the United States and France as an approved repair station and maintenance organization.

Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd is composed of several divisions, plants and subsidiary companies as follows:

Bech Aviation is comprising three dividers concerned with Avia, Bech and Arava divisions. The services range from those around aircraft to complete rebuilding of airframes, engine components, accessories, equipment and systems. This Division is capable of maintaining, repairing, inspecting and overhauling any aircraft from a Piper Cub to a Boeing 707 transport and transport aircraft in any category of military aircraft. The division specializes in U.S., British and French equipment. The test cells can accommodate engines from 600 to 30,000 hp (227-22,700 kg st. thrust) and retesting of aircraft out motors is a specialty.

The Aircraft Manufacturing Division and its specialized subsidiaries produce a wide range of precision equipment, sub-components, primary parts, jigs and tooling and spare parts for jet engines and aircraft. It produced the French CM 110 Magister jet trainer under license from primary components manufactured by IAI and incorporated a number of modifications and improvements.

Among other items, flap assemblies for the Dassault Mystere 20 Sabre executive aircraft are built by this Division, which also produces a complete range of ground support equipment for many aircraft currently in production are several cargo loading systems for modern aircraft.

The Engineering Division is engaged in a variety of aircraft design and development programmes. It has originated many major aircraft part modifications in support of the Bech Aviation and Aircraft Manufacturing Divisions, such as those for the Magister and for the conversion of Boeing Stratojets to a "wing tail" cargo-loading configuration. The major current project of the Division is the development of an indigenous design, the Arava twin turboprop STOL transport described below.

IAI has concluded preliminary agreements with Bech Aviation whereby the latter will build the Arava under license. The French-built version will be known as the Sherpa.

Following the acquisition of the license for production rights for the Commanche, a number of modifications have been designed for incorporation into the IAI production models of this aircraft, which are known as Commanche J.

ISRAEL

The company's electronic subsidiary, E.I.A., although wholly owned, is fully autonomous. Its current research, design and production programmes are concerned with airborne systems and medical electronics.

Other IAI subsidiary plants include: Otho (manufacturing aviation glass fibre products), I.M.E. and I.M.V.M. (manufacturing precision gears and electro-mechanical units), Avia (instruments), and Hydraulic Components Plant (manufacturing servo-command and hydraulic components).

IAI ARAVA

Intended as a robust and versatile rough field STOL transport, the Arava has been evolved primarily for third level operators. It is being developed to meet the full structural and performance requirements of the FAA.

Design work started in mid 1966 and construction of a prototype began towards the end of the same year. This aircraft has Pratt & Whitney T401 P16A 27 turboprop engines, and was scheduled to fly for the first time in 1968.

FAA Type Two turboprop STOL light transport

Wings: Braced high wing monoplane, with single streamline section, bracing strut each side. Wing section NACA 63-215A 117 mod. 65. Aspect ratio 10. Constant chord of 60.10 ft (2.04 m). Dihedral 4.50. Incidence 0.27. No sweepback. Light alloy two spar torsion box structure. Five type light alloy ribs. Double slotted light alloy flaps. Plug type light alloy spools along wing at 21% chord. Trim tabs and geared tabs on port aileron. Pneumatic de-icing boots optional.

Fuselage: Semi-monocoque, semi-monocoque light alloy and structure of structural frames and single skin panels.

Tail Unit: Cantilever light alloy structure, with twin fins and rudders, carried on twin booms extending rearward from engine nacelles fixed in the fuselage. Electrically actuated trim tabs in elevator and rudders. Pneumatic leading edge de-icing boots optional.

Landing Gear: Non-retractable tricycle type, with single wheel on each unit. Main wheels carried on twin struts, incorporating pneumatic shock absorbers. Main wheel size 11.00 x 12. Nose wheel size 6.00 x 6.00. Tire pressure (all) 40 lb sq in (2.8 kg/cm²). Disc brakes. Anti-skid units, low speed, 1500-2000 rpm. 1.07 kg curb, floats, optional.

Power Plant: Two T401 P16A 27 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) turboprop engines, each driving a three blade full feathering reversible pitch propeller, diameter 1.6 m (5.25 ft). Two integral fuel tanks in each wing with total capacity of 200 Imp gallons (1,300 litres).

Accommodation: Crew of two, two passenger seats, main cabin fitted for 12 passengers in four rows. Two rows of configurations possible. 12 seats, 12 seats, 12 seats and 12 seats. 12 seats for pilots and attendants. Convertible to 16 seats. Downward hinged seats, with seats at rear of cabin for use as fuselage section is lowered. Seats through more than one row. Seats necessary for cabin crew, located outside of flight deck. Cabin heated and air conditioning optional.

Systems: Hydraulic system for main wheel steering only. Fuel system with two 200 200A fuel tanks, 200 200A fuel tanks and two 200A fuel tanks. Static inverters.

Electronics and Equipment: Instrumentation standard. Instrumentation includes VHF, VOR, ILS, beacon, DME, AIC, transport, weather radar and PA systems.

Dimensions External


Wing span	60.10 m (197 ft 2 in)
Length overall	26.50 m (87 ft 1 in)
Length of fuselage	26.50 m (87 ft 1 in)
Height overall	10.00 m (32 ft 8 in)
Propeller ground clearance	1.50 m (4 ft 11 in)
Fuselage span	17.00 m (55 ft 9 in)
Wheel track	13.00 m (42 ft 8 in)
Wheelbase	15.00 m (49 ft 3 in)

Dimensions Internal

Cabin, excluding flight deck and tail	
Length	12.80 m (42 ft 0 in)
Max width	2.00 m (6 ft 7 in)
Max height	3.00 m (9 ft 8 in)
Floor area	24.00 sq m (258 sq ft)
Volume	76.80 cu m (2,712 cu ft)
Storage holds (volume inside fuselage)	117 cu m (4,150 cu ft)

Area:	
Wings, gross	670.20 sq ft (62.50 m ²)
Ailerons (total)	16.00 sq ft (1.48 m ²)
Folding edge flaps (total)	94.72 sq ft (8.76 m ²)
Spandrels (total)	13.16 sq ft (1.22 m ²)
Fins (total)	52.31 sq ft (4.84 m ²)
Rudders (total incl tabs)	37.03 sq ft (3.44 m ²)
Fuselage	100.75 sq ft (9.36 m ²)
Elevator, including tabs	30.03 sq ft (2.79 m ²)

Weights and Loadings:	
Weight empty	6,970 lb (3,158 kg)
Max payload	4,610 lb (2,091 kg)
Max T.O. and landing weight	12,300 lb (5,579 kg)



IAI Arava twin-turboprop STOL light transport

110 ISRAEL: AIRCRAFT-IAI

Max zero-fuel weight 11,880 lb (5,390 kg)
 Max wing loading 26.63 lb/sq ft (130 kg/m²)
 Max power loading 0.73 hp/shp (0.97 kg/shp)

PERFORMANCE (estimated at max T.O. weight)

Max level speed at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) 217 mph (320 km/h)

Max diving speed (structural) 290 mph (468 km/h)

Max and econ cruising speed at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) 209 mph (317 km/h)

Stalling speed, flaps up 58 mph (87 km/h)

Stalling speed, flaps down 62 mph (93 km/h)

Rate of climb at S.L. 1,715 ft (522 m)/min

Rate of climb at S.L. one engine out 445 ft (135 m)/min

Service ceiling 29,550 ft (9,000 m)

Service ceiling, one engine out 11,150 ft (3,400 m)

STOL T.O. run 390 ft (119 m)

STOL T.O. to 30 ft (15 m) 1,000 ft (305 m)

STOL landing from 30 ft (15 m) 970 ft (295 m)

STOL landing run 393 ft (120 m)

Range with max fuel, 30 min reserve 750 miles (1,217 km)

Range with max payload, 30 min reserve 501 miles (808 km)

IAI COMMODORE JET

In 1967, Israel Aircraft Industries acquired all production and marketing rights for the North American Rockwell Corporation (formerly Aero Commander) Jet Commander high-speed executive jet transport. The first of two prototypes was completed in March 1967 for the first flight on 27 April 1967.

After completing the first stages of flight testing it was modified to production standards in September 1967. This involved lengthening the fuselage by 2 ft 8 in (876 mm) forward of the wing. At the same time, the max T.O. weight and useful load were increased.

The second prototype (N612J), flown on 14 April 1968, was completed to this standard, and another airplane was produced for structural testing. The first production Jet Commander flew on 8 October 1968, and FAA (FAR 25) Type Approval was received on 4 November 1968. The first delivery, to The Tanker-Rolls Bearing Company, was made on 11 January 1969. By April 1969 more than 125 Jet Commanders had been delivered.

Many modifications and improvements have been incorporated by IAI into the original Jet Commander 1121 model, resulting chiefly in increased fuel capacity and performance. These improved versions include:

Commodore Jet (formerly Jet Commander) 1121A. Up-wing fueling, integral tanks, zero weight of 17,500 lb (7,938 kg), new wheels, tires and brakes, improved cockpit lighting and 44,000 ft (13,410 m) ceiling. Optional features include redesigned interior and equipment for all-weather operation.

Commodore Jet (formerly Jet Commander) 1121B. With 20,000 lb (9,070 kg) of increased empty weight, air fuel tank, air fuel control meter charts, and max T.O. and landing weights of 18,500 lb (8,391 kg) and 17,000 lb (7,715 kg) respectively. New qualified main wheels, tires and brake assemblies, reinforced main landing gear and air modulated anti-lock system. Details below apply to this version.

Notes and views of the Commodore Jet in Europe and the western hemisphere are under review by the American Aviation Association of Washington DC, USA.

TYPE: Twin jet light executive transport.

Wings: Cantilever mid-wing monoplane. Wing section NACA 64A2. Aspect ratio 6.19. Chord 19 ft 6 in (5.94 m) at root, 18 ft 6 in (5.64 m) at tip. Dihedral 2°. Incidence 1° at root, 1.5° at tip. Sweep-back 4.02° at quarter-chord. Wingtip flush-ribbed fairing structure. Manually-operated all-metal cabin door. Manually-operated all-metal

IAI wing-tail freighter conversion of the Boeing Stearman transport

serviced by man standing on ground. Fuel in integral tanks in wings and four bladder-type tanks in fuselage, with total capacity of 1,000 U.S. gallons (4,126 litres). Overwing refueling. Fuel capacity 21 U.S. gallons (79 litres).

Accommodations: Standard seating for two pilots and up to eight passengers in air-conditioned and pressurized cabin. Typical arrangement has two seats side by side on either

side, from the entrance lobby with outward-opening self-lunged door on port side. All of the lobby is the main cabin. Baggage compartment aft of cabin. Cabin lighting and radio lights standard. Separate oxygen systems for pilots. Standard and optional interior design arrangements available.

Systems: Max cabin pressure differential 8.0 lb/sq in (56.7 kPa). Hydraulic system, pressure 2,000 lb/sq in (140 kg/cm²), operates landing gear, brakes, spoilers and nose wheel steering. Primary electrical system includes two 28A starter-generators. Secondary system includes two AC generators. Standby system includes two 25 Ah batteries.

Electronics and Equipment: Blind-flying instrumentation standard. Provision for full range of radio and radar communications, navigation, storm warning, glidepaths and lander and ADF equipment, fully duplicated if required. Optional duplicated all-weather

instrumentation. Approved by FAA for Category II operations.

Dimensions, EXTENSIVE:

Wing span 43 ft 5 in (13.26 m)

Length overall 30 ft 5 in (9.27 m)

Height overall 15 ft 6 in (4.73 m)

Fairing span 19 ft 6 in (5.94 m)

Wheelbase 12 ft 6 in (3.81 m)

Wing chord 19 ft 6 in (5.94 m)

Passenger door 4 ft 6 in (1.37 m)

Height 2 ft 6 in (0.79 m)

Height to sill 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Service door (port side) 12 ft 6 in (3.81 m)

Width 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Length 30 ft 5 in (9.27 m)

Height from ground 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Service door (under main fuselage) 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Width 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Length 18 ft 6 in (5.64 m)

Dimensions, INTERIOR:

Cabin, excluding thigh deck and floor 10 ft 6 in (3.20 m)

Length 4 ft 6 in (1.37 m)

Max width 4 ft 6 in (1.37 m)



Max height 4 ft 6 in (1.37 m)

Floor area 54 sq ft (5.02 m²)

Volume 61 cu ft (1.72 m³)

Baggage hold (cabin) 21 cu ft (0.59 m³)

Volume 21 cu ft (0.59 m³)





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D. C. 20374

NHC/AR IN REPLY REFER TO
Ser 127
2 February 1979

Lieutenant Commander
James M. Ennes, Jr., USN (Ret.)
[REDACTED]

Dear Lieutenant Commander Ennes,

Your letter of 20 January regarding the LIBERTY incident, which cites the Freedom of Information Act, was received in this branch on 24 January.

Our office holds a declassified copy of the "Record of the Court of Inquiry into Attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5)" which convened on 10 June 1967. The record includes as exhibit 6 LIBERTY's Quartermaster Notebook for 8 June 1967 and the CIC Watch Officer's Log for that date as Exhibit 14. A microfilm copy of the Court of Inquiry is being prepared and will be forwarded under separate cover upon completion.

Ship deck logs are in the custody of the Deck Log Section (OP-09B15D), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. We are forwarding a copy of your letter to that office for separate reply concerning the logs of LIBERTY, AMERICA, SARATOGA, and ANDREW JACKSON.

We were unable to locate a repository where the radio logs and flight deck records are stored. Since records of this type are not permanent records, as are the ship deck logs, it is quite possible that they have now been destroyed. However, some of the information you are seeking may be recorded in the deck logs of AMERICA and SARATOGA. We are attaching the radio log maintained by Commander Sixth Fleet, for the period 1305Z, 8 June 1967 through 0442Z, 9 June 1967, which may be of related interest.

In combing our holdings of message traffic relating to the LIBERTY incident, we noted that prior to the attack on LIBERTY, photographs of the civilian evacuees were shipped to the Naval Photographic Center in Washington by the Navy Combat Camera Group Atlantic Detachment Naples. Following the attack, news media films taken on board AMERICA of the launch of aircraft were requested to be sent ashore by COD aircraft. Several pertinent messages are attached and includes mention of the

photographs taken on board LIBERTY during the attack. Also there were combat camera men embarked in USS DAVIS to cover the rescue and assistance operations to LIBERTY. CTF-60 indicated that the film would be forwarded by the fastest available means to the Naval Photographic Center.

We hope that this information will prove useful.

Sincerely yours,



D. C. ALLARD
Head, Operational Archives Branch

Encl:

- (1) ComSISTHFLT Radio Log 8-9 June 1967
- (2) Four messages

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D. C. 20374

NIC/AR

IN REPLY REFER TO

FROM: Director of Naval History
TO: Chief of Naval Operations
Ship Deck Logs Section (OP-09B15D)
Room 5B595, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350

SUBJ: Referral of Correspondence for Separate Reply

1. The letter described below is forwarded for appropriate action.


D. C. ALLARD
By direction

NATURE OF INQUIRY: Deck Log data request

NAME AND ADDRESS OF REQUESTOR: LCDR James M. ENNES, Jr., USN (Ret)


DATE OF REQUEST: 20 January 1979

REMARKS: The Naval Historical Center does not hold Ship Deck
Logs.

COPY TO: LCDR ENNES



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INTL. TRAVEL ATTY.
CHICAGO 2 ILL. MAY 51
IN ACCORD WITH THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OF NAPLES
TRANSFERRED TO THE AIR MAIL
SERIAL NUMBER 754

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RT
0500Z JUN 57
FM ATHENS
TO WASHINGTON
INFO RUMBLE IN THE BASKETBALL
RT
UNCLASIFIED
DURING MATL
AD YOUR 0500Z JUN 57
MATE 0100Z AM HAND CARRIED TO ATHENS 6 JUN FFT TO YOU.
MOR FILM INCL 100 FT. RLS NOW AVAIL IF REQ.
BT

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12
PLAS ACT.....

TCR: 1540433 JUN 57

NR: 281728

CWO.....
(Signature)

07 20 18Z JUN 57

NO. OF SUBJECTS

DO YOU HAVE PERIODS OF DEVELOPING

DO YOU HAVE PERIODS OF DEVELOPING

DO YOU HAVE PERIODS OF DEVELOPING

SI

2
LONG ACT. ...

JUN 50 ...

...

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CHIEF OF STAFF

TO: [Illegible]
FROM: [Illegible]
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

BT

1. WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE VESSELS.
BELIEVE TO BE ISRAELI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED THE SHIP AFTER
ATTACK

BT
2. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE. WILL HAVE TO BE MADE
FROM SHIP'S PHOTOGRAPHS -4-4Z

UNQUOTE
3. NOS GRACE COMMENTS: NOT APPROPRIATED.
BT

FLAG ANT. [Illegible]

FORM 1-67 15 JAN 1967 [Illegible]

CHIEF OF STAFF

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Research Papers

NRJL NR2116
O 281000Z JUN 67
FM CTF SIX ZERO
TO RUEPJS/CAAD PA
INFO:UTPRC/CONSIST
RUEHQA/CINCSNAVEUR
RUEHAAA/CNO
RUFFSK/USCINCPAC
RUEPJS/JCS
BT

DECLASSIFIED

RECEIVED PAO

CONFIDENTIAL

FLEET P/O SENDS

1. RE: ADVISE DISPOSITION FILM CURRENTLY HELD BY CBS, NBC, SC,
SEC. LIFE MAGAZINE ABOARD AMERICA. FILM SHOWS PREPARATION FOR
LAUNCH AND LAUNCH OF AIRCRAFT FROM DURING LIBERTY INCIDENT. NEWS-
PAPER DESIRE TO SEND FILM ASHORE BY FIRST AVAILABLE COA AIRCRAFT
7 JUN.

BT

ARTICLE CALLS AGERs & AGTRs "INTEL SHIPS."
RAY SCHMIDT TOLD ME THAT HOLTHAUS CLEARED THIS WITH CNSC.

Comment and Discussion 87

...re-arranged activities, such as Congressional prohibition, to "cure" the problem is pure folly. We should be investigating methods for dealing with various degrees of in-service union activity, and looking for procedures and policies to limit and control the power of organized labor within the military. The risks of unpreparedness are simply too great.

People in the military do not necessarily want a union *per se*. What is needed is some form of active, effective representation, a voice in the decisions that affect daily working and living conditions. Pro-union sentiment within the service is a manifestation of the collective question, "Who will speak for me?" As it stands, only the labor unions have taken positive steps to answer this question. The allegiance of our armed services personnel may go to the unions by default. At the least, organized labor might gain an unshakable foothold in the military that would serve as the basis for further expansion as the timing seems right. It is time for someone other than the unions to take the offensive in a positive and realistic manner.

If I may be permitted to paraphrase Captain Holland's words ("Command at Sea—the Ultimate Spectacle") in your December, 1976, issue: we must not look outward for solutions to problems but inward, to ourselves. These efforts must start at the top, but they must be sustained throughout all levels of the service. In the final analysis, we all will have to face the consequences of inaction. No agency or organization will do this for us.

"A Time for Victories"

(S. J. A. Culver pp. 54-56, February 1977 Proceedings)

"The Last Triple Expander"

(Go J. Koch, pp. 58-67, February 1977 Proceedings)

Commander H.L. Holthaus, U. S. Navy, former executive officer, USS Belmont (AGTR-4)—In this age of fleet modernization following the retirement of most World War II-vintage ships, the number of those on active

duty with memories of duty in a Victory or Liberty ship is limited. Both of these articles are valuable reminders of the usefulness of the Liberties and the Victories, past and present.


The "Liberty" article referred pictorially to the USS *Georgetown* (AGTR-2). However, there is more to be said about the Navy's experiment with seaborne intelligence. Most of what the general public, and the naval community as well, knows of this effort is limited to what was published as a result of the USS *Liberty* (AGTR-5) and the USS *Pueblo* (AGER-2) being lost from service due to foreign intervention. Aside from the questions of political and professional judgments that were made at the time of each crisis, there are other footnotes to this chapter of naval history worth associ-

ing with a discussion on the usefulness of converted merchant hulls.


Within the commissioned ranks of this program were eight ships, three AGERs and five AGTRs. At least two other similar platforms were operated by the Military Sealift Command. Three ex-Army AKL hulls were selected for the AGER conversion. Although they were intended to resemble ordinary coastal freighters, and therefore not attract attention, their cover and subsequent advantages remained only as the figment of a planner's imagination. Envisioned in the planning for the conversion of these hulls was the concept that the AKL hull could be structurally converted under the AGER designation and then the special electronic package attached thereto, making it an AGER.



Liberty and Victory hulls floated the U.S. Navy's seaborne intelligence program which the public remembers most for its losses of the Liberty (pictured dead-in-the-water after the Israeli attack) and the Pueblo (pictured in Wonsan Harbor).



U. S. NAVY, G. O. 8 140001



U. S. NAVY

In addition to the *Pueblo*, the Navy operated two other AGTRs—USS *Palm Beach* (AGER-3) and USS *Banner* (AGER-1).

An uncoordinated "program" to select, convert, and operate these ships became the subject of considerable comment after the capture of the *Pueblo* and continued until the *Palm Beach* (AGER-3) was decommissioned in December 1969. The *Banner* (AGER-1) was the most successful ship of the program, having escaped major international controversy and deployed more or less successfully in the intended area of operations.

Three of the AGTRs, the *Oxford* (AGTR-1) and *Jamestown* (AGTR-2) in addition to the *Georgetown*, were Liberty hulls capable of making 11 knots. The *Belmont* (AGTR-4) and the *Liberty* were converted from Victory hulls and capable of 18 knots. Although both hull conversions proved to be seaworthy and capable of extended overseas deployment, the slow speed operationally stereotyped the three Liberty-hull AGTRs to those missions that could be fulfilled by steaming at a slow station

speed with a minimum of transits. The Victory hull conversion, with a greater speed, provided the United States with two multi-purpose intelligence ships.

The *Belmont* and the *Liberty* were converted concurrently at the Willamette Iron and Steel Company, Portland, Oregon. The *Belmont* was commissioned in November 1964; her twin in January 1965. The *Liberty's* career was brief and dramatic, ending in 1967 when damaged beyond economical repair by Israeli attack. In October 1969, the *Belmont*, on her eighth deployment, was operating at a sustained speed of 18 knots "with" the Soviet helicopter carrier *Maska* and other Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea, when she took a "policy torpedo" from Washington and was recalled to Portsmouth, Virginia to join her sister. Her January 1970 decommissioning marked the end of the nation's brief experiment with seaborne


intelligence using AGTRs and AGTRs. Parenthetically, within the hour, the President's former flagship, the USS *Northampton* (CC-1), became the next casualty of a changing C²—command control, and communications—policy as the tugs eased her into "warm" berth.

The AGTRs were equipped with an interesting communications capability dubbed as the TRSSCI (technical research ship special communications system). Simply put, this system was a precursor of our present-day satellite communication systems and allowed these ships, from their remote areas of operation, to bounce radio transmission off the moon to earth stations. Many technicians learned how to use the *Nautical Almanac* or *Air Almanac* to determine when the ship and the earth station were both looking at the moon at the same time.

These ships contributed another episode to history after the near sinking of the *Liberty* made the arming of intelligence ships a high priority exercise. Extra guns were located and sent to individual ships, leaving to each commanding officer and his crew such decisions as where, for example, to install guns and ammunition lockers, and how to write and implement training doctrine and operating procedures.

Likewise, the *Pueblo's* tragic end provoked official attention to the need of providing each intelligence ship with a capability to destroy, on command decision, all of her classified documents and equipment. Further, the need to scuttle a ship quickly was moved to the front burner. Official sanction to carry incendiary and explosive devices on board was obtained. The Naval Weapons Test Center, China Lake, California, was tasked to quickly rig a primitive self-destruct arrangement on all intelligence ships. Once installed, GQ included a rapid abandon ship drill in tandem with a countdown to "melt" everything that was classified and blow a series of holes out of the ship at waterline level. Repel boarders drills were also commonplace, notwithstanding the fact that the freeboard of the AGTR was high enough to reduce any real danger from boarders. The AGER liter-


James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers



U. S. NAVY



U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE COLLECTION



U. S. NAVY (JAMES M. STRATFORD)

The Navy's Liberty hull intelligence ships were the Oxford (AGTR-1), Georgetown (AGTR-2) and Jamestown (AGTR-3) pictured clockwise from the top left photo.


ally had no freeboard and was therefore easy prey.

The *Belmont* took an innovative approach to the problem of destroying classified documents by locating two unused roll stabilization tanks in the bowels of the ship directly beneath the intelligence spaces. Ship's personnel then designed and built a giant incinerator in these tanks that was easily accessible in a crisis situation and large enough to accommodate all the ship's classified material, and then some. Ventilation and heat localiza-

tion measures were also devised using the port kingpost forward of the bridge as an auxiliary stack. The effort cost \$50. Additionally, commercial equipment was leased to completely microfilm all the ship's publications and administrative records. As a result, very little classified material was retained in hard copy form upon reporting to the Mediterranean for the subsequent deployment.

There was a time for Victories in the seaborne intelligence role and that

hull could be used again with a high degree of success. However, the recommended 'way-to-go' in the future is to place the requirement and its full implementation under the aegis of an officially designated program manager who has complete coordinative control of hull design, equipment, and all personnel. Otherwise we will again flounder as a result of compartmented planning and create the same hostile environment and vagaries of responsibility that contributed to our intelligence paranoia of the Sixties.



U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE COLLECTION

USS Belmont (AGTR-4)—the Liberty's twin sister.

A Time for Victories

By Captain John A. Culver, U. S. Naval Reserve

The very name of their type signified the goal toward which they were built, and hundreds of Victory ships did make significant contributions to the winning of World War II. In the conflicts which followed in Korea and Vietnam, the military results were less satisfactory than before, but that lack of success was in spite of, rather than because of, these fine ships. Amidst the confusing combinations of hot war, cold war, peace, détente, and stalemate that have characterized the last three decades, the type has continued to turn in dependable, enormously useful performance in both military and merchant colors. That the Victory ships have served well and still do so today provides vivid testimony to the practicality, versatility, and durability of their design and construction.

The largest merchant shipbuilding effort during World War II was the Liberty ship program. Shipbuilders turned out more than 2,700 ships on a mass production basis. The original idea for the Victory was to develop a better and faster ship to speed up cargo movements and replace the 12-knot Liberty. The new vessels were considered "emergency" ships when conceived, but in April 1943, the designator was changed from EC2-S-AP1 to VC2-S-AP1, and the term "Victory ship" was adopted.

A typical designator, EC2-S-AP1, broke down as follows:

- E—Emergency; V—Victory
- C—Cargo
- 2—400 to 449 feet
- S—Steam; M—Motor
- AP—Design letters for ship's hull
- 1—original ship; 2—first conversion; 3—second conversion

Victory ships were turned out by the dozens in the waning months of World War II. At right, the SS Drury Victory is shown shortly before launching at the Permanente Metals Corp. shipyard at Richmond, California in the summer of 1945. The inset shows a number of Haskell (APA-117)-class attack transports being built by the California Shipbuilding Corp. at Terminal Island, San Pedro, California.

The hull form was designed to accommodate a range of horsepower with little difference in optimum performance. The designations of the variations originally planned included:

- ▶ EC2-S-AP1—5,500-horsepower Lentz engine
- ▶ EC2-S-AP2—6,000-horsepower Victory-type engine
- ▶ EC2-S-AP3—8,500-horsepower C3-type turbine
- ▶ C2-M-AP4—5,850-horsepower Diesel
- ▶ VC2-S-AP5—8,500-horsepower Victory configured as transport (APA)

(In the first four of these designations, the E was changed to a V in 1943.)

The Lentz-type engine was built and tested at the Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory, Philadelphia Navy Yard, in 1943. The Lentz principle of steam distribution was used in reciprocating steam engine using poppet valves with the engine arranged as double compounds and in line. The basic engine developed





major problems during testing and was dropped as a prime mover for the Victory ship because industry was not experienced in the necessary type of casting. Moreover, manufacturers had already worked out details for quantity production of 6,000-horsepower turbines which were called the Victory type. The 8,500-horsepower C3 type was installed in the AP3-type ships as turbine and gear production eased near the end of World War II. Though planned, Diesel propulsion engines were never installed in production versions of Victory ships. (The *Emory Victory* did get one as part of a feasibility test. She was later renamed the SS *North Star III* and operated in Alaskan waters for the Bureau of Indian Affairs.) The Navy took a keen interest in the speed of the AP3 type and the ease with which it could be transformed into a troop transport. This interest developed into the AP3-type attack transport.

There were 414 cargo types and 117 transports completed among the Victory ships, all of which were built between 1944 and 1946. Some of these fine vessels are still sailing today in private steamship companies and in the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Until recent years, several Victories were part of the active Navy fleet as well. A few AP3 transports remain on the Navy list for possible reactivation.

The basic characteristics of the cargo version are shown below:

Length overall—455 feet, 3 inches
 Length between perpendiculars—430 feet, 6 inches
 Beam, extreme—62 feet, 1 inch
 Depth to main deck, molded—35 feet, 0 inches
 Draft, loaded—28 feet, 0 inches
 Gross tonnage (approximate)—7,200
 Net tonnage (approximate)—4,300
 Deadweight tonnage, total—10,600
 Displacement (tons at 28-foot draft)—15,200
 Speed of AP3 type—15.5 knots
 Speed of AP3 type—17 knots
 Speed of AP3 type—17.7 knots (14,837-ton displacement)

There is nothing complicated about the design of a Victory ship. The hull lines were made simple and conventional, in keeping with the ship's design objectives of simplicity and ease of construction. The five hatches are serviced by electric winches and provide easy access for maintenance.

The Victories were built in emergency shipyards set up during World War II. The ship design was prepared to accommodate the smallest capacity crane of these yards. Moreover, the individual yards could modify the standard plans to suit their methods of construction. The planning for the building of these ships was outstanding by all concerned, and the entire program was a

tribute to American know-how. Delivery dates were ahead of schedule in many shipyards because of the urgency of the need for shipping and the commitment to meet that need. We would do well to exhibit this sort of commitment today.

Once built, these ships demonstrated in three wars their ability to get the job done—to carry the men and cargo where they were needed. Many a Victory stood off an invasion beachhead in the midst of an amphibious assault. Many more proved themselves steady workhorses in moving thousands of tons of goods to faraway ports.

These old hulls, originally designed for cargo, still find many uses today, including service in the nucleus fleet of the MSC. The USNS *Greenville Victory* (T-AK-257), for example, is an AP3 type. She is manned by a Civil Service crew and has retained her basic design characteristic with no major conversions. Her usual mission is to carry Department of Defense cargoes in point-to-point operation, but in the spring of 1975, she transported thousands of South Vietnamese refugees in the evacuation of that doomed nation. The role was reminiscent of that played by the SS *Meredith Victory* which in 1950 evacuated 14,000 Korean civilians in her cargo holds during the siege of Hungnam.

Four of the Victory-class vessels have undergone substantial modification for their work as part of the MSC's fleet support program. There are the USNS *Norwalk* (T-AK-279), USNS *Furman* (T-AK-280), USNS *Victoria* (T-AK-281), and USNS *Marshfield* (T-AK-282), which are fleet ballistic missile cargo ships. They carry torpedoes, spare parts, packaged petroleum, and Poseidon missiles themselves to the deployed submarine tenders and thence to the submarines.

Victory ships are also classed as surveying ships. The USNS *Bowditch* (T-AGS-21) and the USNS *Dutton* (T-AGS-22) were converted in 1957-58 to conduct ocean hydrographic surveys. These ships are the AP3 type and are the ex-*South Bend Victory* and *Tuskegee Victory* respectively. The conversions consisted of the installation of highly sensitive navigation equipment to pinpoint their position during surveys. They are designed to chart the ocean floor and to record magnetic fields and gravity.

Related in mission is the USNS *Kingsport* (T-AG-164). As an AP3 cargo type, she was known as SS *Kingsport Victory*, but her last name is gone now that she is wearing MSC markings and serving as a hydrographic research ship. For a time in the early 1960s, she was the world's first satellite-communications ship.

The USNS *Range Sentinel* (T-AGM-22) was originally the USS *Sherburne* (APA-205), an AP3 type. She was converted in 1969-71 to a range instrumentation ship. The conversion added an extensive array of ultramodern



MARITIME ADMINISTRATION



BYRON B. WHITEHEAD JR.


radar and telemetry equipment used for downrange tracking of missiles for the Navy's Poseidon program. The conversion was mostly below decks where electronics gear and workshops were added. A number of tracking antennas were mounted topside. Another AGM still in the MSC fleet is the USNS *Wheeling* (T-AGM-81), the former *Seton Hall Victory*. She was converted in the early 1960s and assigned to the Pacific Missile Range. Among her other duties, she was involved in the testing of the AWG-9 fire control system used in the F-14 Tomcat.

Four Victories of the AP3 type were made into refrigerated stores ships for the Navy. The last of these, the USS *Denetola* (AF-56), was decommissioned and stricken from the Navy list on 30 April 1976. She was the last Victory hull in commissioned U. S. Navy ser-

Victory ships made a substantial contribution to the logistic support of U. S. forces during the Vietnam War. At top is the SS Baton Rouge Victory aground in the Saignh River after striking a mine in August 1966. Seven seamen died as a result of the attack. Bottom, the SS Allegheny Victory, offloads ammunition at Cat Lai near Saigon.

vice, although there is still a slight possibility that one or more attack transports might be reactivated.

For all their value as specialized Navy or Military Sealift Command ships, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Victories have been primarily cargo vessels. They comprised a majority of the cargo ships brought out of the mothball fleet during the Vietnam War. The cost of activating one of them was about \$400,000.



(The original cost of each Victory was in the \$2-3 million range.) Their conditions of readiness varied, depending on many different factors and the operational wear and tear they had experienced since completion. A few of these ships encountered major difficulties on their initial voyages after activation, but most did not.

Our military effort in Vietnam would have been severely hampered without Victory ships. The logistics supply train required approximately 400,000 to 600,000 tons of supplies per month flowing into Southeast Asia. The available operational tonnage of our merchant marine was pressed into service to meet the flow of material to Vietnam, and the U. S. Government activated ships from the maritime reserve fleets to meet the added, heavy logistic demand. A large majority of the ships in the reserve fleet were Victories. About 130 of them were reactivated in the 1960s in order to haul cargo to the Far East. These ships were already old then and often referred to as "rustbuckets," but they performed a vital service.


That service was not without hazards. The SS *Baton Rouge Victory* was sunk in the Long Tau River by a Viet Cong mine in August 1966, temporarily blocking a major supply channel to Saigon. The ship's engine room was flooded, and several American seamen were killed. The SS *Clarksburg Victory*, loaded with military cargo, struck a submerged object at the mouth of the Saigon River en route to Cam Ranh Bay in the fall of 1966. She was disabled by a flooded engine room.

The availability and seaworthiness of the Victories taken out of the reserve fleet for the Korean and Vietnam conflicts well demonstrated their value. But where will the United States be in a few more years when the last Victory ships have exhausted their useful lives? Will we be able to support any sealift operations five years from now? Can we continue to ignore the vital necessity for building ships? Containerships are fine, but they have their limitations, particularly in the sorts of military


sealift situations for which our ships will probably be required. We are unlikely to be transporting material to sophisticated containerports, nor is it likely that commercial operators will be able to make many containerships available on short notice because they will still have their own schedules to maintain.

Typical scenarios for contingency operations call for logistic resupply of forces in or near Third World nations. And that's why it would not be unreasonable to build 200 breakbulk Victory ships right now in addition to the more modern types already under con-


Opposite page (top), the USS *Denebola* (A-56). Center, the ex-*Notre Dame* Victory was converted to a Great Lakes ore carrier. Bottom, Poseidon missiles are transported in tubes just forward of superstructure in the USNS *Marshfield* (T-2K-282), an FBM support ship. Below, a merchant version of the Victory ship is the SS *Mormacelm*. Bottom, attack transports under way in 1963. In foreground are the Victories USS *Talladega* (APA-208) and USS *Renville* (APA-227).




MOORE MCCORMACK LINES



U.S. MARINE CORPS



Above, the USNS Private John R. Towle (T-AK-240), strengthened for operation in ice, is shown in antarctic waters in 1961. Right the USNS Wheeling (T-AGM-81), which was involved in testing the fire control system for the F-14 Tomcat.



struction. Planners must face the fact that existing ships grow old and tired while potential problems have little respect for a once-mighty Victory fleet with greatly reduced current strength.

The advantages of building 200 Victory ships for the 1980s and beyond include:

- ▶ Shipyard personnel will "think" production and enhance their production capability.
- ▶ The simple, proven, functional design lends itself to series production.
- ▶ The reliability of the Victory machinery plant is proven over many years of operation, and training crews and engineers requires a minimum of time due to the ease of operating the machinery.
- ▶ The quantity of ships produced can be used for sealift emergencies and for upgrading the nonsubsidized fleets during times of peace.
- ▶ The program will allow operators to retain their containers and prevent foreign flag takeover.
- ▶ The cost of the program would be less than any small quantity programs under way today, based on dollars per ship.

Some people will consider this kind of program as regression. But this is an emergency measure to save the American merchant marine, not the optimum kind of program that the maritime industry and government would like to promote. Many of the experts say the American merchant marine is in serious trouble. They hammer away at what isn't being done, but they don't offer specific solutions to the problems. This Victory ship program is an idea for a specific solution to help our merchant marine, but is not intended to solve all the ills of our "fourth arm of defense."

There is no time for "nice-to-have" designs. The

Merchant Marine Act of 1970 may eventually revitalize the American sealift capability for both military and commercial purposes. But chances for success are bleak, and we may end up with no merchant marine at all. If 200 much-needed Victory ships were built within the next few years, they could reverse the downward trend that has steadily eroded our shipping resources for the last three decades. As Victories, they would thus be well-named indeed.



Captain Culver was commissioned and received a merchant marine engineer's license upon graduation from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy in 1917. His active Navy duty was served from 1947 to 1952 on board the USS *Wain* (APD-135), the USS *Tumult* (AM-127), USS *Linnat* (AMS-24), USS *Gull* (AMS-16), and USS *Hubbard* (DD-748). He has seen merchant sea duty in the SS *American Pilot*, SS *American Mariner*, SS *Nanook*, SS *Hunter Victory*, and SS *Mormonite*. An engineering duty officer in the Naval Reserve, he was avionics officer of Reserve Jet Squadron VA-911, executive officer and commanding officer of Naval Reserve Officers School 1-7, Naval Reserve Engineering Unit 1-7, Boston, and Ship Maintenance and Repair Unit 1001, Boston. He is now commanding officer of Advance Ship Repair Base-Floating Workshop (ASRB-YR 201), Newport. He holds a BS degree in marine engineering, a chief engineer's license in the merchant marine, and a professional engineer's license in the state of Massachusetts. Compiler of *Ships of the U. S. Merchant Fleet*, published in 1963, he also wrote an article on merchant shipping for *Naval Review* 1966. He now works at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where he is an industrial engineer for the Naval Sea Systems Command.

The Last Triple Expander

By Lieutenant Commander James C. Kraft, U. S. Navy



U. S. NAVY (JAMES C. KRAFT COLLECTION)





With the transfer of the engine repair ship USS *Tutuila* (ARG-4) to the Republic of China Navy on 21 February 1972, an era of propulsion came to a close in the U. S. Navy. She was the last operational fleet unit employing the triple-expansion, steam reciprocating main engine.

In the early 18th century, Thomas Newcomer developed a successful steam engine. This design was called atmospheric because the pressure of the atmosphere itself provided the motive force. Steam was admitted to and completely filled the cylinder. Condensation of the steam formed a partial vacuum within the cylinder, allowing atmospheric pressure on the outside to move the piston. James Watt improved this

design by using positive steam pressure to move the piston and a separate condenser to collect exhausted steam and reduce piston back-pressure. These engines operated very slowly and were extremely large. They served for many years as water pumps in English coal mines. Advances in valving and boiler design allowing for higher temperatures and pressures eventually gave birth to the multi-cylinder designs which were finally replaced by the turbine early in the 20th century.

As technology improved, engines became more compact, and early in the 19th century the first applications of piston-engine steam propulsion to railways and marine vessels became an accomplished fact. During the century,



The Tutuila (ARG-4), facing page, is seen in Norfolk in May 1944, a month after commissioning; bottom left, nestled alongside a tank landing ship and a trio of covered lighters in Vietnam; and, above, pier-side at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, during Operation Springboard in March 1955. Moored with the Tutuila are the HMCS Terra Nova (DDE-259), USS Vermillion (AKA-107), and HMCS Restigouche (DDE-257).

new materials and designs allowed continued increases in steam pressures, thus requiring the addition of more cylinders to efficiently utilize the steam. By 1900 the triple-expansion engine was the standard propulsion plant where high power and speed were required. Among the more famous examples of triple-expansion power were the battleship *Maine*, the cruiser *Olympia*, the liner *Titanic*—which combined triple-expansion power with the new Parsons turbine in one hull—and, of course, innumerable vessels of the world's merchant fleets. As a converted merchant hull, the *Tutuila* was driven by this same type of power plant.

The *Tutuila* began her long career as the SS *Arthur P. Gorman*, one of the more than 2,700 Liberty-type hulls launched during World War II. With the vast numbers of landing craft in the Pacific theater powered by internal combustion engines, a need was recognized for a class of repair ships specially outfitted to support these craft. The "cookie-cutter" Liberty hulls streaming out of building yards were the obvious choice for such repair vessels. Thus did the *Arthur P. Gorman* metamorphose after launching into the USS *Tutuila*, an internal combustion engine repair ship. She was commissioned in April of 1944 and later that year proceeded to Ulithi Atoll to support Pacific Fleet operations.

Decommissioned after the war, she was recommissioned to serve in the Western Pacific during the Korean conflict. Upon termination of those hostilities, she returned to her home port of Norfolk and served in support of the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force until 1966. That year, she steamed to Vietnam where she spent the last five and a half years of her U. S. Navy career servicing the multitude of small boats which made up the "brown water navy."

This article is not, however, intended to be a chronicle of a ship's service, nor is it desired to relate the history and developmental details of the reciprocating main propulsion steam engine. Rather, it is simply an attempt by the *Tutuila's* last engineer officer to describe his particular power plant, which just happened to be the last of a kind within the Navy. Even though it was outdated by 1920, the triple-expansion plant was pressed into service in great numbers to

drive the commerce of war and lingered on to drive a repair ship during two other wars.

Reporting aboard a triple-expander as engineer certainly caused some anxious thought. I kept reminding myself that the physics of the system were essentially the same as those of a turbine plant. Heat goes in one end (boiler) and motive force comes out the other (engine). I also kept reminding myself that, with the vast expansion of shipbuilding when these ships were built, few people had had a great depth of experience in any type of marine engineering. Thus, these plants had to be simple, reliable, easily maintained, and easily mastered. As it turned out, this was all true. The entire main plant was easily learned, easily operated, easily maintained, and, above all, it was forgiving. It generally forgave us more often than we forgave it.

The design theory of the engine was quite simple. Three cylinders were arranged in line, fore and aft, on the ship's centerline. The pistons drove a crankshaft which was coupled directly to the propeller shaft. There was no reduction gear. Steam was admitted to the first (high-pressure) cylinder where it partially expanded. It was then exhausted through a pipe into the second (medium pressure) cylinder where further expansion occurred. It was then exhausted into the third (low pressure) cylinder where the final expansion took place. At this point, all usable power had been extracted from the steam and it was exhausted into the main condenser which was maintained at a vacuum of about 26 inches of mercury. Three cylinders were incorporated because a single-cylinder engine would have to be of gigantic proportions in order to efficiently use the power delivered by the steam. Even so, the *Tutuila's* engine was still quite large. Built by the Ellicott Machine Corporation of Baltimore, the engine had cylinder bore diameters of 24 1/2 inches, 37 inches, and 70 inches with a stroke of 48 inches. Its weight fully assembled was 271,000 pounds. To give some idea of the sheer mass of the engine, the cylinder head for the third stage (low-pressure) cylinder weighed 4,000 pounds, some 300 more than the author's 1971 model station wagon. Indicated horsepower was 2,500 at

601 p.m. However, due to torsional stresses in the propeller shaft, speed was limited to 601 p.m. This gave the ship a maximum speed of 11.4 knots.

Steam was supplied by two Babcock and Wilcox design sectional header, large-tube boilers with a working pressure of 220 pounds per square inch. This was quite low compared to the 600-psi and 1200-psi steam generators found in most modern Navy warships. Superheater outlet temperature was 450°F.

Engine construction was simplicity itself, and all components were massive. Excepting nuts and bolts, no engine component weighed less than 110 pounds. Each cylinder and its associated valve chamber were cast integrally. The cylinders and valve bodies were then bolted together to form the three-cylinder, in-line arrangement. This assembly was supported over the crankshaft by six box-section stanchions which were mounted to the engine bedplate. The entire assembly, from bedplate up, was mounted on reinforced sections of the double bottoms, which served as reserve feed water tanks. An example of this mounting in a warship can be seen in the engineering picture of the USS *Brooklyn* on page 121 of the April 1966 *Proceedings*. From crankshaft centerline to cylinder relief valve was 19 feet

7 1/2 inches high. The engine was 21 feet, 5 1/2 inches long and 12 feet wide at the base.

The main condenser was located on the port side, mounted on a sub-frame of the main engine support stanchions. Steam exhausted from the low-pressure cylinder through a large pipe into the condenser, where sea water—pumped through tubes by the main circulation pump—cooled the steam and condensed it back to water. Condensate (condensed steam) was removed by a piston-type pump, known as a wet-air pump, which also served as an air ejector to remove air as well as water from the condenser. This pump created the main condenser vacuum so necessary to the efficiency of all steam engines. Attached to either side of the wet-air pump were bilge pumps. Various high-friction portions of the engine were cooled by a continuous flow of cooling water which ultimately drained into the bilges. Before the present concern about pollution of the world's waterways, this drainage, along

with the constant drip of lubricating oil from the engine into the bilges was simply pumped overboard whenever the engine was in operation.

The open feed system began with the discharge of condensate from the wet air pump into the open hotwell surge tank located to port of the main condenser. The hotwell served two purposes, as a feed storage tank and as a lubricating oil separator. The latter task was accomplished by using a compartmented tank. This arrangement produced some stagnation within the tank and allowed oil to settle on the water's surface. One of the hotwell compartments also contained a basket, filled with koota sponges and wrapped with terry cloth toweling. All condensate was required, by tank design, to pass through the basket, thereby being subjected to the filtering action of the toweling and sponges to remove the lubricating oil. (The koota sponge is a natural animal sponge with a relatively porous structure. The author has seen them advertised recently as a beauty aid for use in the bath.) In the hotwell they helped filter oil from the feedwater. Monthly maintenance called for sponge removal from the hotwell and a trip through the ship's laundry prior to replacement. This removed oil and other residue from the sponge.

Two reciprocating feed pumps, almost identical in design to those on the *Sawyer* and *Greer* class destroyers' emergency feed pump, supplied feed water through a feed heater direct to the boiler via the external feedpipe. No economizers were installed in the boilers. All auxiliary equipment was driven by reciprocating machinery. This included fuel oil service pumps, main circulating pump, racking engine, forced draft blower (one blower served both boilers and ran wide open all the time), and the reversing engine which will be described along with the valve gear. During her conversion, the *Tatada* received diesel main generators and turbine and electric driven fire and flushing pumps. In the unaltered Liberty cargo hull, these two were of reciprocating drive.

The valving of the main engine was probably its most complex part. The crankshaft had six eccentric shafts, six circular journals—two for each of the cylinders. Each eccentric actuated a valve link or piston. There were three eccen-



trices and valve links for ahead operation and three for going astern. When the engine in ahead operation, the diesel valve gear, eccentrics, links, and rods were positioned under the cylinder valve chests, admitting steam and exhausting the cylinders at the proper time. The astern rods and links were held out of the way on a sliding rail and idled up and down. To reverse the engine, the sliding rail was moved to a position where the ahead rods and links were in an idle position and the reverse mechanisms were positioned under the valve chests, moving the valves such that the engine turned over in the opposite di-

rection. This mechanism is somewhat hard to describe and envision, but it was quite simple in operation. The device was known as the Stevenson Link.

These links were positioned by a small steam engine known as the reversing engine. Using the reversing engine, it was possible to reverse the engine even at full power in about 15 seconds. The main engine would come to a rapid teeth rattling stop and then turn astern. This was for obvious reasons, an emergency procedure and not normally used. The customary method was to close the throttle to about one third ahead steam pressure, start the reversing engine, re-



An example of the massive triple-expansion reciprocating steam engines built by the hundreds for Liberty ships in World War II. It was close to 20 feet tall.



Skinner Unaflo Engine

Top, the Skinner Unaflo engine. The five-cylinder, 3,700-horsepower version shown above was one of two in the USS-1 class. Top right, the USS Neptune (L-400-2). When she was transferred to the Military Sealift Command in 1973, the Neptune was the last U. S. Navy ship with a reciprocating steam engine. Right, one of the cylinders in the Unaflo engine.

verse the links, and then reopen the throttle. It is also interesting to note that the engine operated with equal efficiency in either direction, giving full power either ahead or astern.

Engine lubrication was accomplished almost entirely by hand. The two exceptions were the crosshead slippers and the valve eccentrics, which were not oiled by hand but were also equipped with oil pans or sumps and lippers. At the bottom of each stroke, the dipper picked up oil and lubricated the bearing surface. In all other cases, oil boxes and cups were kept in the engine room

oil, and they did the rest. Specially woven wick wicks were installed in both parts of the oil piping, thus reducing the flow to a drop or two of oil each engine revolution. Oil consumption was several gallons per watch. The oil (Navy code 1005) was designed to partially emulsify in water. Thus, specific amounts of water were added to the eccentric and slipper sumps to obtain proper consistency. If there was too much water, the oil turned into a light froth strongly resembling whipped cream. In this state it was highly viscous and led to overheating. When there was

too little water, the oil quickly drained from the engine, and that also led to overheating due to metal-to-metal contact.

In the *Intada* we had no specific formula for what percentage oil-water mix was ideal. With the constant shower of oil and water from the engine, the best method must have been the one we used because it worked. A small quantity of the emulsion was rubbed between the fingers, and then water or oil was added to the sump on the basis of feel.

When lighting off, the main steam

lives were left closed and small bypasses opened to allow a small amount of warming steam to pass through the engine. The crankshaft was turned over using this process by the tacking engine. The reversing engine was run continuously, shifting the valve links and admitting bypass steam to both ends of the cylinders. Cylinder drains were opened and as the engine warmed up condensate was continuously blown from the engine. After a suitable period, the tacking engine was stopped and disengaged and the throttle cracked open. As the last pockets of water were forced out, the engine would begin to rotate, first in one direction and then the other. Until all water was drained, the engine refused to budge more than a fraction of a revolution. Once fully warmed and drained, the engine was in standby, rotating several turns in each direction as the reversing engine continued to shift the valve links back and forth. Upon receipt of the first engine order from the bridge, the reversing engine was stopped in the appropriate position, and the ship was under way. Depending on the engine order, the reversing engine was stopped with either the ahead or reverse valve linkage in the correct position.

Once the ship was under way, the wet air pump began to build vacuum in the main condenser and as the engine warmed up, it became more agile and responsive. In modern terminology, we let the engine do its own thing. All transits were full power trials, but "full power" was what the engine wanted, not what the *Tutuila's* officers or crew wanted. Throttle opening was set for about 50 r.p.m. (about 8 knots). Greater throttle openings on a not fully warmed engine would cause vacuum to fall in the main condenser and reduce boiler pressure. As the engine warmed, revolutions slowly increased and the throttle opening could be increased until a setting of 62 to 64 r.p.m. was achieved. At this breakneck speed, the *Tutuila* was maintaining a steady eleven knots, more or less, and usually less. During one 24-hour period en route to Hong Kong in January against the winter monsoon, a grand total of 56 miles showed on the navigational plot.

While in operation, the oiler kept the engine order, the lower level watch

checked his bearings, and the throttle man counted turns on his lever operated revolution counter. No tachometer was installed. In rough weather, the throttle man also kept his hand on the throttle flapper valve lever. This flapper could quickly close the main steam line if the screw came out of the water. This action prevented the engine from running away as the stern lifted and the screw came clear. Without the rapid closing of the steamline, the engine would rapidly increase speed, pounding and shaking the ship with its full 271,000-pound bulk. The ship would shake from stern to stern when this happened, and I sometimes wondered if how would remain attached to stern.

Cooling water was continuously circulated through the face of each cross-head slipper assembly, and piping was also strategically located to spray water onto each connecting rod bearing if it became overheated. This cooling water drained continuously to the bilges. With the exception of the crankshaft main bearing journals, all temperatures were determined by feel since thermometers would have been unreadable if placed on that dancing array of machinery. In order to feel the connecting rod bearing, one gingerly placed his hand in position in the connecting rod pit and allowed the bearing web (bottom end of the connecting rod) to brush his hand as it came by. If a person reached too far in, his hand and arm were violently thrown back against the engine support column. If he didn't reach in far enough, he missed entirely. Though somewhat frightening to the uninitiated, the procedure was easily and quickly mastered. The wearing of any type of jewelry was, of course, forbidden on the engine room. A Naval Safety Center observer would probably have

suffered agonizing pains of doubt and frustration when first witnessing the process.

This engine was by no means the ultimate in reciprocating steam power, nor was it the only triple-expansion design incorporated into ship propulsion. Another common design was the four-cylinder triple-expansion unit. It consisted of the first and second expansion in separate cylinders with the second expansion exhaust steam then being divided between two third expansion cylinders.

A radically different design was the Skinner Uniflow engine. In outward appearance it resembled the large marine diesels being installed in modern merchant ships. It featured an enclosed crankcase and pressure lubrication and was called Uniflow because steam was admitted to only one cylinder before being exhausted. It had a counterweighted crankshaft which allowed it to run at higher speed than the triple-expansion plant.


The Uniflow engine was installed in the first dock landing ships in the *Tacoma*-class (LST-9) patrol frigates, and in some escort carriers. The last U.S. Navy vessel with a Uniflow plant was the repair ship *USS Neptune* (ARG-2), which was decommissioned in 1974 and transferred to the Military Sealift Command. She is still in active service for the MS.

The triple-expansion engine will probably remain for quite some time to come as a marine propulsion unit. Some older merchant hulls still throb to the thump and swish of her reciprocating drive. But, for the U.S. Navy, the reciprocating, triple-expansion steam engine has, in all likelihood, stroked its last. With the naval history it helped write, the rest is well deserved.




The ex-Tutuila as the Picn Tai (ARG-516) at Keelung, Taiwan, in 1973.

The versatility of the humble Liberty ship hull is well demonstrated on these two pages. Several dozen of the "Lgly Ducklings," as they were called by John Corley Bunker, author of a Naval Institute book on the ships, served as active Navy vessels during World War II. Others were pulled from the reserve fleet in subsequent years and converted to special applications.



The USS Georgetown (AGTR-2), whose mission was similar to that of the ill-fated USS Liberty (AGTR-5)



USS Kent Island (AG-28) brings servicemen home to the United States at the end of World War II.




In the late 1950s, four T34 turboprop aircraft engines were mounted on the USS John L. Sullivan (YAG-37). It was part of an experiment to see if such engines could be used where conventional underwater propulsion was impractical.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers




USN Interceptor (AGC-8), one of several ships used for long-range radar warning



USN Granville S. Hall (YAG-40) - experimental ship equipped to measure radiation from nuclear weapon tests.



USCGC Serpens (AK-97) - Coast Guard-manned USN Serpens (AK-97) carried cargo in the South Pacific until destroyed by an explosion in the Solomon Islands in December 1944.



Lightly loaded USS Arided (AK-73) rides high after conversion to Navy use in 1942.

U.S. NAVY JAMES C. BANEY COLLECTION


James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



The SS Jonathan Coxton is launched sideways at a Gulf Coast shipyard during World War II.




SS Francis Preston Blair was beached on Saumarez Reef in the Coral Sea in 1945.



SS John Chester Kendall loaded with 10,000 tons of wheat for India in 1953.

SS Libertis was built in seven days at this Los Angeles shipyard in 1943.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



In 1956, the Liberty ship Thomas Nelson was equipped with diesel engines, one of which is shown above. She was also given rotating cargo cranes in lieu of conventional booms. Her bow was modified and lengthened 20 feet to improve her seakeeping qualities. Below the William C. Ralston is scuttled in April 1958 with 8,000 tons of obsolete World War II munitions on board.



MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SHIP LIBERTY



EGYPTIAN SUPPLY VESSEL EL QUSEIR

One of those cases of misrouted orders and a tragic resemblance.

has realized all along that without a strong showing in the primaries to demonstrate that he can win elections, his candidacy may wither. Romney, unless he manages to coalesce the moderates behind him, may also have to gamble everything on the primaries. Both Romney and Nixon see New Hampshire's March 12 primary, the first in the nation, as a critical contest that could get their campaigns off to a running start or detour them into a dead end. For that reason, Romney is spending four days this week at a friend's home on Lake Winnepesaukee, meeting with local politicians, college professors and businessmen. Also important will be the laundry-list primaries in Nebraska and Oregon,* where Reagan, and possibly Illinois Senator Charles Percy, will be facing Romney and Nixon. The result of the primaries could well be a stand-off, with no man emerging as the obvious pacesetter. In that case, the 1968 convention may turn into the most open and hard-fought contest the G.O.P. has witnessed in a generation.

ARMED FORCES

Inquest for Liberty

In the early June afternoon the eastern Mediterranean sky was clear, the sea calm. The U.S. Navy communications ship *Liberty*, a converted Victory freighter, was steaming west-northwesterly at five knots, about 14 nautical miles off the Sinai Peninsula. Seconds later, lookouts sighted jet fighters bearing in from the southeast at 7,000 ft. A rocket slammed into *Liberty's* port side amidships, igniting two 55-gal. gasoline drums; a bomb struck the starboard side. The planes, sweeping down in teams of two or more, raked the ship with crisscross rocket and machine-gun fire, riddling hull and superstructure with 421 hits.

No sooner had the planes retired than three PT boats appeared from the northeast, spraying *Liberty* with machine-gun

* Wisconsin is also considering a bill to change to a presidential primary like the one in Oregon, where any man who is considered a potential candidate is placed on the ballot.

fire and launching two torpedoes, one of which found its target. It tore a 39-ft. wound amidships below the water line.

Fragmentary Answers. The attacks ended 35 min. later, leaving 34 officers and crewmen dead, 75 wounded and two large questions unanswered: Why was *Liberty*, a sophisticated U.S. electronic spy ship monitoring both sides communications during the Arab-Israeli war, cruising so close to the battle zone? Why did the Israelis go out of their way to attack a neutral ship?

Last week, after a seven-day secret investigation, a Navy court of inquiry offered only fragmentary answers. Its summary pointed out that "U.S.S. *Liberty* was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity." A 5-ft. by 8-ft. U.S. flag flew at the masthead, must surely have been seen by three separate Israeli planes that surveilled the ship during the morning. Her name was lettered on the stern in English, which could hardly have been confused with the Arabic script on Egyptian ships. "The court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify *Liberty* correctly," said the summary. But it added: "The court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack."

Holiday Ensign. Navy people had an unofficial explanation. The spotter planes in the morning correctly identified *Liberty*, they maintain, and Israeli intelligence in Tel Aviv even looked her up in *Jane's Fighting Ships*. But the word did not reach all patrolling jet pilots and PT commanders, who expected to find only Israeli or Egyptian ships in the area. Since *Liberty* bears a slight resemblance to the Egyptian supply ship *El Quseir*, the Israeli commanders attacked. *Liberty's* U.S. flag was shot away during the air attack and the "holiday ensign" (7 ft. by 13 ft.) run up to replace it as the attackers bore in was obscured by flames and smoke. After their torpedo run, Israeli PT-boat commanders evidently realized their mistake and stopped astern of *Liberty* to signal: "Do you need assistance?" When

Premier Levi Eshkol learned of the attack, he wired apologies to Washington, and offered amends for "the tragic loss of life and material damage."

Ironically, the court reported that "early on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued orders for *Liberty* to move farther from the coast, even though such a move would partially degrade her mission"—a mission never explained in the summary. The messages "were misrouted, delayed and not received until after the attack." Moreover, only three days earlier the Israelis had asked the Pentagon what ships it might have in the area in the coming week. Because of some mix-up they got no reply, and apparently decided that the U.S. Navy was not operating in the area. After spotting *Liberty*, Israeli pilots and PT-boat commanders evidently concluded that they were attacking a disguised Egyptian ship.

THE CONGRESS

Smogbank on the Hill

The most persuasive defense offered by Connecticut's Thomas Dodd in fighting Senate censure was that his colleagues judged him by standards that are unwritten and unresolved. Having rejected that argument by condemning Dodd, the Senate nonetheless is under considerable public pressure to produce an ethics code that provides explicit guidelines for members' behavior—and to do it soon. "Such a code is mandatory," says Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. "We all suffered." Predicts perennial Watchdog John Williams of Delaware: "We'll do it before we go home." Many Senators realize that the Dodd affair and other cases have cast a moral smogbank over Capitol Hill. Utah's Wallace Bennett, an austere Mormon, received a letter from a constituent 1,000 miles away, saying: "We can smell you clear out here."

Inside Joke. Yet Bennett, senior Republican on the Standards and Conduct Committee, which investigated Dodd and which must now draft a code, maintains that it is "a terribly difficult assignment. I'm not even sure that it's possible." History supports his skepti-

NOTES ON TORPEDO BOATS:

T 200
T200 AYAH
T201 BAZ
T202 DAYA
T203 PERESS
T204 TAHMASS
T205 YASOOR

four 20MM anti aircraft guns
one 40MM gun
two 17.7 inch torpedoes
top speed 42 knots
fifteen men

Built by Chantiers de Meulan, France

dimensions: 85 1/3 X 20 2/3 X 5 feet

range: 600 miles at 29 knots

displacement: 62 tons standard

machinery: 2 Napier Deltic diesels
2 shafts
4600 BHP

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8 April 1974

The Editor, Jane's Fighting Ships
49/50 Poland Street
London W1A 2LG

Dear Sir:

Several months ago I received from you: the enclosed card promising a letter reply in answer to a question I asked about a recurring error in Jane's Fighting Ships. Since I have not received your reply, perhaps the letter was lost in the mail. I would be grateful if you could take time to answer my question again.

My question pertains to the Israeli AYAH class Motor Torpedo Boat which appears in several recent issues of Jane's.

Although the 1971-72 Jane's lists the boats as:

T200	AYAI
T201	BAZ
T202	DAYA
T203	PERESS
T204	TAHMASS
T205	YASOOR,


the photographs which accompany several of your issues identify the boats differently. For example, your 1966-67 issue ~~identifies~~ pictures a boat with hull number T-206, but the picture is captioned "TAHMASS." Your 1971-72 issue repeats the same picture with the same caption, and ~~also~~ pictures boat T-204 with the caption "PERESS." I have consulted more recent Jane's, but have been unable to clarify the inconsistency.

Could you possibly verify for me the correct names and hull numbers of these boats?

1973/74 JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS

Dimensions: 110 x 27 x 2.144
 Missile launchers: Gabriel surface to surface (see notes)
 Guns: AA 40 mm or 76 mm (see notes)
 Tubes: 2 side launchers for 21 in torpedoes (surface or A/S)
 Main engines: 4 Napier Deltic diesels 13 500 bhp 4 shafts - 40 knots
 Oil fuel tanks: 30
 Range miles: 2 500 at 15 knots 1 800 at 20 knots 1 000 at 30 knots
 Complement: 15 to 40

Built by Ch de Normandie Cherbourg from designs by Lurssen Werft of Bremen. Political problems caused their building in France instead of Germany - a political embargo kept the last five in France until their journey to Israel began on Christmas Eve 1969. Two batches were built: the first six (Acco Eilat Hada Mispar Mizrah Mizrah) being fitted originally with three 40 mm AA guns and ordered in 1966. The second six (Suzah Harel Harel Saar Souda) were ordered in 1966 and fitted with 76 mm O (I) Meteor AA guns. Five of these ships were delivered to Israel and two (Acco and Saar) made the journey on completion of local trials after the 1969 French arms embargo. The last five arrived off Haifa in January 1970 after a much publicised passage which proved the remarkable endurance of this class. The last batch was fitted for solar but this was omitted from the 76 mm gun fitted group. Since their arrival in Israel provision of Gabriel surface to surface missiles has progressed. The first group can mount an armament varying from one 40 mm gun to one 76 mm gun. The second group has two 76 mm gun mounts forward and two triple trainable launchers aft for three 40 mm tubes and two 21 inch torpedoes. The second group also mount the two triple launcher armaments as well as the 76 mm gun forward. The control room system is controlled by radar and optical sights and launches a low speed missile with a 150 lb. warhead to a range of 12.5 miles.




AVA 1970, Israeli Navy

4 "NEEMA" CLASS

NEEMA 40	NEEMA 52	YAMA 48	ZAFONA 60
Displacement tons	32		
Dimensions feet	67 0 x 16 0 x 4 0		
Guns	2 - 20 mm		
Main engines	2 diesels 2 shafts 1 840 bhp = 36 knots		
Complement	10		

Built in Japan during 1968. Handy boats of the small coastal defence type. Used for coastguard and police work in peace time.



NEUMA 1970, Israeli Navy

3 "YARDEN" CLASS

YARDEN 42	YARKON 44
-----------	-----------

Displacement tons	38 standard, 108 full load
Dimensions feet	100 x 20 x 6
Guns	2 - 20 mm AA
Main engines	Diesels 2 shafts, speed 22 knots
Complement	16

Both built by Yacht & Boatwerk at Burmeister Bremen, Burg, Germany. Yarkon was launched on 26 July 1956 and Yarden in 1957. Present status uncertain.



YARDEN Israeli Navy

10 SWIFT TYPE (OR-USA PCF)

Displacement tons	22.5 full load
Dimensions feet	50 0 x 13 0 x 3 8
Guns	1 - 81 mm mortar, 3 - 60 cal MG
Main engines	2 geared diesels, 960 bhp, 2 shafts = 28 knots (max)
Complement	8



N 854 1972, Dr Giorgio Arca




HANIT 1971, Israeli Navy

3 "OPHIR" CLASS TORPEDO BOATS

OPHIR T 150	SHVA T 151	YARSHISH T 152
-------------	------------	----------------

Displacement tons	40
Dimensions feet	70 x 12 x 5
Guns	1 - 40 mm AA, 2 - 20 mm AA
Torpedoes	2 - 17 7 in
Main engines	High octane petrol engines, 4 000 bhp, 40 knots

Motor torpedo boats Gunboats built for the Israeli Navy by Cantieri Baglietti, Varrate, Italy in 1956-57. In reserve.



SHVA 1966, Israeli Navy

8 "AYAN" CLASS TORPEDO BOATS

AVA T 207	YAYA T 202	TANMASH T 204
BAZ T 201	PERESS T 203	YADDER T 205

Displacement	35 standard
Dimensions feet	65 3 x 20 7 x 5
Guns	1 - 40 mm, 4 - 20 mm AA (see notes)
Torpedoes	2 - 17 7 in
Main engines	2 Napier Deltic diesels, 2 shafts, 4 600 bhp = 42 knots
Complement	15

Built by Chantiers de Meulan France. Launched in 1960-66. It now appears that at least two boats mount 20 mm guns forward as well as aft. All are probably in reserve prior to disposal.

JANE'S YEARBOOKS

100, Brook Street,
London W1A 2LG,
England.
Tel: 01-437 9844
Telex: 23461
Cables: BRITPUB LON

JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS

From the Editor
Captain J E Moore
Rimhurst
Rimbury
Hitcham
Sussex BN27 1SF England
Tel: Eastbourne (0323) 763264

ST GILES HOUSE 49-50 Poland Street London W1A 2LG

Telephone 01-437 9844

Telex: 23461

Cables: BRITPUB LON

Your reference

our reference


date

Dear Mr. Ennes,

I thank you for your letter of the 11th. It is most kind of you
and really a pleasure. I have been struck with the interest
shown in "Jane's Fighting Ships" and "Jane's Ships" by you and
the boys. I am glad I have been able to help you, and will be
glad to do the best I can for you. All this is done in the
best of good faith.

If you have seen the 1974 edition of "Jane's Fighting Ships" you will
know that this class has now been deleted from the Israeli Navy and I
am terribly sorry that I am unable to tell you which were involved in the
attack. I suggest you send your request to the National Archives,
Washington D.C., who should be able to tell you.

With best wishes, and yours,
Yours sincerely,


J. E. Moore,
Captain, RN.

AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED TO DEFEND LIBERTY

The Virginian-Pilot Sunday, June 11, 1967

"ABOARD THE AMERICA (UPI)-- 'As soon as I was able to confirm the attack," Martin said, "that is when I ordered aircraft to protect, and to protect only, the Liberty. The pilots' instructions were to defend the Liberty.' (sic)"

"Four F5 Phantom jet fighter-interceptors armed with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles and two A4 skyhawks armed with air-to-ground missiles, along with a refueling tanker, were sent aloft by America and four Skyraiders were catapulted off the deck of the carrier Saratoga.

"Martin ordered the planes recalled when 'I received a message that the attack was by Israeli forces and that the Israel government had apologized. The message was received from the embassy in Tel Aviv."

NAVY TIMES July 26, 1967

"USS AMERICA [By JOZ B. G. Plaxton] ...the first word that reached America and the Defense Department gave no indication of the attacker's identity. The flight deck came alive. In a matter of minutes, F4B Phantom interceptors were in the air to ward off any possible attack against task force units. At the same time, bombs and rockets moved from the magazines deep within the ship to the flight deck. Four A-4 Skyhawk attack bombers were loaded and launched together with fighter cover."

Virginian-Pilot (undated)

"NORFOLK [By Clifford Hubbard] ...Jets were launched from the 6th Fleet carriers but recalled when the Israeli government reported the attack had been made by their forces in a tragic mistake."

Virginian-Pilot (?) (undated)

"NORFOLK [By Ronnie Magland] ...Before the United States received word from Tel Aviv confirming Israeli responsibility for the attack and issuing an apology, planes were launched from two U.S. aircraft carriers, the America and Saratoga."

(unknown newspaper - undated)

"WASHINGTON (AP) ...Israel promptly apologized for the attack, but not before the Navy ordered planes from the 6th Fleet's two attack carriers, the Saratoga and the America, to scramble and head for the scene."

WASHINGTON STAR (undated)

"[by Orr Kelly] "Her skipper was able to get off a brief, uncoded voice report to the 6th Fleet, reporting that she was under attack. A reporter aboard the carrier America when the report came in saw planes and bombs hurriedly readied and thought World War III had started.

"Even high-ranking officers in the fleet, it is now known, feared much the same thing. They didn't know, until the apology came from Tel Aviv, who had attacked the Liberty."

The Virginian-Pilot 9 June 1967

[By Donald H. May] "WASHINGTON (UPI)-- Ten Americans were killed..."

"When the Liberty first sent word she was under attack, the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga, cruising southeast of Crete about 400 miles away, launched aircraft. The America sent four A-1J attack planes toward the Liberty, and the Saratoga launched four A-1J bombers with fighter cover.

"While these planes were streaking toward the Liberty, a message of apology was received from Tel Aviv. The planes were directed to return to their carriers before they reached the ship, a converted World War II Victory ship."

"...The attack occurred at 8:05 a.m. EDT, or 2:05 p.m. Middle East time."

SECDEF 08224RZ JUN 67 - "DEF 7448 FROM OASD (PA) FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS"
"...IMMEDIATELY AFTER FIRST WORD THAT SHIP HAD BEEN TAKEN UNDER ATTACK THE TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE SIXTH FLEET--AMERICA AND SARATOGA--BOTH LAUNCHED AIRCRAFT TO HEAD TOWARD THE SCENE. THE AMERICA LAUNCHED 4 A-4s AND THE SARATOGA 4 A-1s, WITH FIGHTER COVER. WHILE THEY WERE PROCEEDING TOWARD THE LIBERTY A MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV APOLOGIZING FOR THE ATTACK. IT WAS THEN CLEAR THAT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FIGHTERS WERE NOT REQUIRED. THEY WERE DIRECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR CARRIERS. THEY DID NOT REACH THE LIBERTY BUT RATHER TURNED BACK TO THEIR CARRIERS..."

CTF 60 0Y1316Z JUN 67 -
AMERICA TO SEND 4 A-4s,
SARATOGA TO SEND 4 A-1s.

COF 0Y1320Z
(SAME)

WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE TRSs? From February 1975 NSC Bulletin (sanitized)

The USS OXFORD (AGTR-1) was commissioned on 8 July 1961 and conducted research operations in the South Atlantic and South Pacific Oceans, the Caribbean Sea, and in Southeast Asian waters. She was the first ship to receive a signal via the moon from a shore-based facility, and after a few weeks was able to transmit signals by this method. NAVSECGRU service was terminated in December 1969, and the USS OXFORD was sold to the Ho Fa Steel and Iron Company of Taiwan for scrap on 14 May 1970.

The USS GEORGETOWN (AGTR-2), commissioned on 9 November 1963, conducted ops off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America, in the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas, and

in the equatorial Pacific Ocean. The USS GEORGETOWN's comms included the Communications Moon Relay System. She terminated NAVSECGRU duties in December 1969. The USS GEORGETOWN was sold for scrap to NV Intershitia, Rotterdam, Netherlands, in July 1970.

USS JAMESTOWN (AGTR-3), commissioned on 13 December 1963, operated in the Mediterranean and Caribbean, in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and in Southeast Asia.

She terminated NAVSECGRU service in December 1969, and was sold 14 May 1970 to the Mitsubishi International Corp., for scrap.

The fourth TRS, the USS BELMONT (AGTR-4), was commissioned on 2 November 1964, and conducted research ops in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans and in the Caribbean Sea.

Terminated in January 1970, the USS BELMONT was sold on 24 June 1970 to the Boston Metals Company of Baltimore, Maryland for scrap.

The last of the AGTRs, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5), was commissioned on 30 December 1964. She served in the South Atlantic and Mediterranean. Attacked by Israeli air and naval forces on 8 June 1967 while on station in the Mediterranean, the USS LIBERTY suffered severe damage and the loss of many lives. LIBERTY returned to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia in July 1967 and was deactivated on 28 June 1968. The ship was sold to the Boston Metals Company of Baltimore on 23 November 1970 for scrap.

The USNS PVT. JOSE F. VALDEZ (T-AG 169) was placed under MSTs control on 29 August 1961 and conducted NAVSECGRU operations mostly in the Atlantic Ocean. Equipment for the Communications Moon Relay System was installed in 1968. She terminated NAVSECGRU service in September 1969, and was returned to the Maritime Administration which sold her for scrap in July 1977 to Consolidated-Andy, Inc.

The other T-AG, USNS SGT. JOSEPH E. MULLER (T-AG 171), was returned to MSTs control on 20 September 1962 and began her NAVSECGRU mission soon afterwards. The USNS MULLER operated off Havana, Cuba for most of her time with the NAVSECGRU. Terminated on October 19, MULLER was sold to Union Minerals and Alloys Corporation of New York City in October 1971 for scrap.

The USS BANNER (AGER-1) was the first "environmental research ship" and was redesignated as such on 2 May 1967. She conducted NAVSECGRU operations in the Pacific

Ocean before being terminated in November 1969. The USS BANNER was scrapped and sold to Mitsui and Co., Ltd., of Japan in May 1970.

The USS PUEBLO (AGER-2) was designated as an AGER on 2 May 1967, and was commissioned on 13 May 1967 under the command of LCDR Lloyd Bucher. While operating in international waters in the Sea of Japan off the coast of North Korea, USS PUEBLO was harassed and seized by four armed North Korean patrol boats on 23 January 1968. She was forced to enter the harbor at Wonsan, North Korea, where she still remains in the hands of the North Koreans. The USS PUEBLO is the only TRS that is still carried on the U.S. Navy active list in commission.

Finally, the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-3) was commissioned on 13 May 1967. She conducted environmental research operations in the Atlantic Ocean before being terminated in November 1969. The USS PALM BEACH was sold in May 1970 to Ralston H. Robertson of Barte, Alabama for scrap.


James M. ...

LEGISLATIVE BOX SCORE

In the past we have generally avoided inclusion of news pertaining to legislation that is pending in the House and Senate. However, we have decided to include news pertaining to legislation that is pending in the House and Senate. This is because of the importance of this information to our readers. We will continue to include this information in the future.

QUESTION AND ANSWER

Question from an E-6: Why must the Assistant Naval Science Instructor (ANSI) under the Naval Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (NJROTC) program have a college degree?



H.R. 11333

military--active duty and retired--and all other Federal pay checks for child support. (Alimony is not included, although that was indicated in one article appearing in NAVY TIMES.) Passed by the House and the Senate, but the conferees could not resolve the differences between the House bill and the Senate amendments. Temporarily shelved but may be reconsidered after Congress reconvenes on 21 January 1974. The Navy has consistently opposed the attachment or garnishment, for whatever purpose, of military pay--active or retired. (This provision was an amendment to a bill introduced by Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm.)

H.R. 11333 - Provides for an 11 percent increase in social security benefits to be phased in two increments in 1974. Passed the House and Senate and was signed by the President on 3 January 1974.

H.R. 10866 - This bill, introduced by Representative Les Aspin on 17 October 1973, would place certain limitations on the space-available transportation system operating within the Armed Services. It would impose a graduated fee schedule by rank or rate upon various officers and enlisted men, both active duty and retired. This bill was referred to the Armed Services Committee.

If you desire details concerning these legislative proposals, you can no doubt obtain them by writing your respective Congressional representatives.

Interested in this second career opportunity? Apply directly to the nearest Naval District NJROTC Program Manager.

WHERE ARE THEY NOW?

Many of you have asked what happened to former commands. Of course we can't write them all up in one issue--that would take a book--but we can, from time to time, give you some nostalgia. Here is the first increment:

SHIP	DISPOSITION
USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVS-39) (Ex-CVA, CV)	LAKE CHAMPLAIN was sold on 5 July 1972 to Union Minerals and Alloy Corp. of New York for \$364,000.
USS WALKER (DD-517)	WALKER was sold to Italy 2 July 1969 and renamed FANIE (D-561). She is still active with the Italian Navy.
USS PICKAWAY (LPA-222)(Ex-APA)	PICKAWAY was transferred to permanent custody of the Maritime Administration on 1 September 1971.
USS LIBERTY (AOTR-5) (Ex-AG-168)	After being mistakenly attacked by Israeli forces in June 1967, LIBERTY was decommissioned 28 June 1968 and sold on 23 November 1970 to Boston Metals Co. of Baltimore, MD.
USS SIRAGO (SS-485)	SIRAGO sold on 2 May 1973 to Jacobson Metal Co. of Chesapeake, VA, for approximately \$85,000.

If you would like information about a ship on which you have served, send your request to Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers-7313), Navy Washington, D.C. 20370. We will try to answer all your questions in the newsletter.

Experimental, Research & Surveying Ships—continued

2 TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS (AGTR)

"VICTORY" TYPE

BELMONT (ex USS Victory) AGTR 4 (ex AG 187)
LIBERTY (ex USS Liberty) AGTR 5 (ex AG 188)

Displacement tons 2,190 light, 10,880 full load
Dimensions feet 489 66 x 62 x 24
Main engine Turbine 1 shaft 8,900 hp - 18 knots
Complement 280
Guns 20 mm and 50 calibre MG

Modified Victory ships. Conversion by Bethlehem Iron & Steel Portland. One commissioned 2 Nov and 30 Dec 1964 respectively. Mobile bases for research in communications and electromagnetic radiation. Considered Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) ships. Liberty severely damaged by Israeli air and torpedo boat attack in Eastern Mediterranean on 8.2.1967. She was decommissioned on 26 June 1968 in reserve. A photograph of Liberty taken on 9 June 1967 appears in the 1968-1969 EDITION of JANE'S FLEET AND AIRCRAFT.

Modified Liberty ship. Oxford began conversion in Sep 1960 by New England Shipyard and completed on 8 July 1961. For research and experimental in communications and electromagnetic radiation. Georgetown and Jamaica Bay built by New England Shipbuilding Corp in 1945, were converted by New England Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co and commissioned on 9 Nov 1963 and 13 Dec 1963 respectively. All reclassified as AGTR on 1 Apr 1964.



1966 United States Navy

"VICTORY" TYPE

by Oregon Shipbuilding Co. All converted to support the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard & respectively and J. J. Kelly & Co. Operated by NTS for chart the ocean floor and establish locations with a



United States Navy (AGTR 4)

AGTR 4

8,000 hp - 17 knots

by Wash Radio Co Inc. converted to surveying

for several machine gun

ASC 15 on 15 (AGTR 4)



United States Navy




BELMONT (AGTR 4) 1966 US Navy

3 TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS (AGTR)


"LIBERTY" TYPE

OXFORD (ex Samuel R. Alden MCE 3121) AGTR 1 (ex AG 189)
GEORGETOWN (ex SS R. Earl W. Hart) AGTR 2 (ex AG 185)
JAMESTOWN (ex SS J. Howard Gard) AGTR 3 (ex AG 186)

Measurement tons 2,330
Dimensions feet 441 50 x 62 x 23
Main engine Turbine 1 shaft 2,500 hp - 12.5 knots
Complement 275 (22 officers, 257 men)



OXFORD (AGTR 1) 1964 United States Navy




GEORGETOWN (AGTR 2) 1964 United States Navy

1 GUIDED MISSILE SHIP (AGM) CONVERTED SEAPLANE TENDER

NORTON SOUND (AM 1) (ex AV 11)

Displacement tons 9,106 standard, 12,170 full load
Length feet overall 643 25 (1765 21 1/2)
Beam feet 71 6 (27 3/4)
Draft feet (max) 23 6 (7 1/2)
Guns 1-54 (127 mm) 54 cal experimental (see Gunners notes)
1 main launcher for standard testing
1 Basic Point Defence Missile System (BPDMS) launcher for Sea Sparrow missiles (see Gunners notes)
Main engines 2 geared turbines (AP's Chalmers)
12,000 hp 2 shafts
Boilers 4 (Babcock & Wilcox)
Speed knots 19.2
Complement 292 (22 officers, 270 enlisted men)



NORTON SOUND (AGM) US Navy

The Norton Sound serves as a seagoing weapons laboratory and test centre under the operational control of Commander, Cruiser Division Force Pacific Fleet. She was originally a seaplane tender (AV 11) of the Curtiss class, fitted with helicopter platform forward and missile launching ramp aft during late 1940s and reclassified as Guided Missile Test Ship (AGM 1) on 8 Aug 1951. Subsequently served as test ship for several guided missile systems and lately for advanced gun systems. During August and September of 1968 the Norton Sound launched missiles which exploded three nuclear weapons at an altitude of about 300 miles to determine effects of nuclear explosions on space or missile defences (Project ARGUS). From 1963 until 1966 the Norton Sound served as test ship for the Typhon advanced fleet air defence system.

CONSTRUCTION Built by Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. San Pedro Calif. Laid down 7 Sep 1942, launched 28 Nov 1943, commissioned 9 Jan 1945. As built the Norton Sound had a 30 ton capacity beam drag for large salvages, 240720 73482 and a second 30 ton beam on her lower second deck removed when fitted with missile launching ramp. Original armament consisted of four 5 inch guns, two in

single mounts forward and two in single mounts deep hanger and 20 40 mm AA guns, forward 5 inch guns removed to make space for helicopter platform, all other armament removed prior to modification as Typhon test ship.

GUNNERY Fitted in 1949 with light weight 5 inch 54 cal gun and associated Mark 66 Gunfire Control System for operational test and evaluation. The light weight Mark 48 gun is intended for sea-construction trials. It has a rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute, weighs 50,000 pounds and is operated by three-man crew, none of whom are in the mount. The mount's elevation capacity can be 20 rounds in the gun's leader drum without the use of ammunition handlers. The gun offers a significant increase in reliability over previous guns of the calibre

MISSILES The Norton Sound has served as a test platform for several ship-launched rockets and missiles. Currently a launch surface to sea missile launcher is installed aft for tests of the Standard missile as a support for BPDMS launcher for the Sea Sparrow missile.

TYPHON In 1963-64 the Norton Sound was converted to serve as test ship for the Typhon fleet air defence system. The conversion was undertaken at the Maryland Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Baltimore, Maryland, recommissioned on 20 June 1964. A large dome shaped radar installation was erected amid the bridge structure (see photographs in 1968-1969 edition). Typhon system was designed to counter surface and guided missile threats of the 1970s. A large high powered radar was to automatically and continuously search across target track and guide the launched

CORVETTES (ex-FLEET MINESWEEPERS)

2 ex-BRITISH "BANGOR" TYPE

Name: MATROUH (ex-NMS Stormway)
Under: Royal Navy
Launched: 17 July 1943
Completed: 17 Nov 1941
Displacement tons: 672 standard, 800 full load
Dimensions: 100 m x 28.5 x 9.3
Guns: 1 x 4 in 1.1 in 2-40 mm AA (4 20 mm in Matrouh)
AS weapons: 2 DVT
Main engines: 2 shafts, 2 shafts, 2400 bhp = 16 knots
Speed: 16 knots
Complement: 60

Former "Bangor" class fleet minesweepers acquired from Great Britain. Now rated as corvettes. Sailed ship Matrouh sunk in heavy weather off Alexandria on 7 Mar 1953.

MISSILE BOATS


11 ex-USSR "OSA" TYPE

Displacement tons: 180 standard, 200 full load
Dimensions: 121.3 m x 23 x 6.5
Guided weapons: 4 large hood type missile launchers in two ranges of 15 to 18 miles
Guns: 4-25 mm (2 in x 1 forward, 1 aft)
Main engines: 3 shafts, 4800 bhp = 36 knots
Reported to have been delivered to Egypt by the USSR in 1968

8 ex-USSR "KOMAR" TYPE

Displacement tons: 75 standard, 100 full load
Dimensions: 88 m x 23 x 6
Guns: 2 launchers with missiles of 10 to 15 miles range
Main engines: 2 shafts, 4800 bhp = 36 knots

Former Soviet missile patrol boats reported transferred from the USSR in 1962 to 1967. A detail boat named Komar 2190 reported to have been launched at Port Said on 18 May 1963 by the Communist Government.



MATROUH

Egyptian Navy, Official



1966 Col. Ryan Borg

FLEET MINESWEEPERS

4 ex-USSR "Y 03" TYPE

Name: BAHABA, CHARRIEN, GARBIA, MINIYA
Displacement tons: 410 standard, 530 full load
Dimensions: 200 x 27.2 x 9
Guns: 4 x 37 mm AA
Main engines: Diesel = 18 knots

Four reported to have been transferred from the Soviet Navy and delivered to Egypt in 1956 and two others later. Minya and Yarmouk were allocated to Syria.

INSHORE MINESWEEPERS

2 ex-USSR "S 01" TYPE

Name: EL FAYUM, EL MAROUTIEN
Displacement tons: 130 standard, 180 full load
Dimensions: 100 x 18 x 4.3
Guns: 1 x 7 mm AA, 7-25 mm AA
Main engines: Diesel = 2 shafts, 480 bhp = 10 knots
Complement: 10

Reported to have been transferred by the USSR to Egypt in 1962, possibly a third ship transferred later.

SYMS TYPE
The wooden coastal minesweepers. Gafa (ex-SYMS 2013) was lost on 20 July 1959 as a result of full load explosion off Minya Matrouh, later ship Carfour (ex-SYMS 2040) and Far (ex-SYMS 2171) were transferred to the Algerian Navy CA 6 and CA 7 and the remaining six (ex-SYMS 2028), Kousse (ex-SYMS 2078), Col. (ex-SYMS 2113), Mouta (ex-SYMS 2038), Nohad (ex-SYMS 2069) and Sifa (ex-SYMS 2149) are no more than moustering hulks.

PATROL VESSELS

8 ex-USSR "801" TYPE

Displacement tons: 215 light, 220 full load
Dimensions: 138 x 147 m x 20 x 10 m
Guns: 4-25 mm (2 rear mountings)
AS weapons: 4 two-barrel ahead throwing rocket launchers
Main engines: 3 shafts, 3100 bhp = 28 knots

Former Soviet submarine chasers. Reported to have been transferred by the USSR to Egypt in 1962 to 1967.

ROCKET ASSAULT SHIPS

8 ex-USSR "POLNOCHNY" TYPE

Displacement tons: 900 to 1000
Dimensions: 245 x 39.3 x 9.8
Armament: Rocket missiles
Main engines: Diesel, 4800 bhp = 18 knots

A new type of Soviet amphibious vessel has been similar to the United States medium rocket landing ships of the LST(R) type. The TRV type which can carry eight to ten tanks, was delivered by the USSR to the Egyptian Navy in 1965-66.

TORPEDO BOATS

3 ex-USSR "SHERSHEN" TYPE

Displacement tons: 180
Dimensions: 121.5 x 23 x 6.5
Guns: 4-25 mm AA (2 twin)
Torpedo tubes: 6-21 in (single)
Main engines: Gas turbine, speed 40 knots

One delivered from USSR in Feb 1967 and two (326 329) in Oct 1967

38 ex-USSR "P 6" TYPE

Displacement tons: 80
Dimensions: 88.5 x 20 x 6
Guns: 4-25 mm AA MG
Torpedo tubes: 2-21 in
Main engines: Diesel = 42 knots

The first twelve boats were reported to have arrived at Alexandria on 18 Apr 1966. Two P-6 boats were destroyed by British naval aircraft on 4 Nov 1966. The above particulars refer to the early arrivals. Six former Soviet motor torpedo boats of the "P6" class are reported to have been transferred by the USSR in 1968. See particulars in the USSR section.

8 ex-YUGOSLAVIAN TYPE

Displacement tons: 66 full load
Dimensions: 78 x 20.7 x 6.2
Guns: 1 x 50 mm AA
Torpedo tubes: 2
Main engines: 2 shafts, 4800 bhp = 36 knots

Purchased from Yugoslavia in 1966. Similar to US Higgins boats. 2 MTBs of Shershen P-183 type were sunk by Israeli aircraft off Sidi Barrani on 12 July 1967. Reported one P-183 was sunk by Israeli MTBs off Sidi Barrani on 11 July 1967. The two motor torpedo boats of the Shershen "D" type, El Nassar and El Zafir are reported to have been damaged at sea. The three motor launches of the British Fennit "B" type, Mouta (ex-ML 134), Sifa and Sahr are now little more than rusted hulks. The transport El Ussor (ex-Si Amos Ferret) and the yacht Mouta (ex-Fahr to Sahr) and El Mouta (ex-Royal Yacht Mouta) which were used as landing ships, were damaged from the hit in 1967.

LANDING CRAFT

8 ex-USSR "MP" TYPE

Several utility landing craft of the MP 526 1, delivered to the Egyptian Navy in 1966.

No. 1 No. 4 No. 7 No. 10 No. 13 No. 17
No. 2 No. 5 No. 8 No. 11 No. 14 No. 18
No. 3 No. 6 No. 9 No. 12 No. 15 No. 19

Displacement tons: 22 light, 26 loaded
Main engines: Diesel = 11 knots
On LST type. (The tank landing ship LST (ex-LST 701) was sunk as a block-ship near Sidi Barrani in the Suez Canal on 1 Nov 1966).

FLEET TUGS

8 ex-USSR "GENTSEV" TYPE

A number of Soviet fleet tugs were reported transferred to the Egyptian Navy in 1966.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

CARRIER

1966 United States Navy



1966 United States Navy
Small helicopter landing area on flight deck



1966 United States Navy



1966 United States Navy

Aircraft carriers continue to serve as a primary means of projecting US tactical air power overseas with current emphasis being on their providing combat support in South Vietnam reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and maintaining a force in readiness to support US interests in the crisis-ridden Eastern Mediterranean area. In addition, aircraft carriers permit rapid deployment of tactical air power to areas where the lack of land bases, inadequate support facilities or political considerations prevent or delay the use of land-based tactical air power. (For example, US aircraft carriers were deployed off Egypt after the North Syrians seized the intelligence ship Pueblo in January 1968 and again when the North Koreans shot down a heavy EC-121N reconnaissance plane in April of 1969). To meet these requirements the US Navy currently operates 15 Attack Aircraft Carriers (CVAs) and seven ASW Support Aircraft Carriers (CVS). In addition, a Training Aircraft Carrier (CVT) is employed in training Navy and Marine Corps pilots.

ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS The force level of 15 attack carriers has been maintained on having two carriers continuously deployed in the Mediterranean and three in the Western Pacific. However, the Vietnam War has required that the United States maintain five of these ships in Asian waters. Two of these of these ships normally conduct strikes against Vietnam while the other carriers are replenished at sea or are in Asian ports for country visits and maintenance. The two or three ships not on the line regularly rotate with those attack carriers flying strikes and thus constitute a ready reserve in the event of expanded hostilities in the area or to support US policy elsewhere in the Western Pacific.

The normal deployment of two attack carriers in the Mediterranean and three in the Western Pacific requires a total force of 15 attack carriers to provide for overhaul

and operational commitments in the Atlantic and the Western Pacific. The requirements for the CVAs met by existing carrier deployments, reducing the number of carriers available in the Atlantic and by employing an ASW carrier as a "limited" attack carrier in South East Asia.

The current 18 ship attack carrier force is composed of the Forrestal design two Midway class carriers and four modified Essex Hancock class ships. A second nuclear powered carrier, the *Amey*, is now under construction and two more ships of this type are planned. It is anticipated that these three ships and the carrier *Amey*, which is now being modernized at the Naval Air Station, will be replaced by the four Essex type carriers now employed in the Atlantic. This by the mid 1970's. The US Navy also plans four nuclear and eight conventional attack carriers of post war construction plus three emergency modernized Midway class ships (originally completed 1945-1947). Each attack carrier normally operates a carrier air wing of 22 to 25 squadrons.

The force level of 15 attack carriers is composed of 15 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II) and 12 to 14 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II) and 12 to 14 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II). The force level of 15 attack carriers is composed of 15 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II) and 12 to 14 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II). The force level of 15 attack carriers is composed of 15 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II) and 12 to 14 squadrons (F-4 Phantom II).

ASW SUPPORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS The Navy has ordered seven ASW support carriers, four of which are modernized ships of the Essex class. An additional ship of this type, the *Leahurst*, is employed in the Gulf of Mexico as a Training Carrier (CVT). Each CVS normally operates 12 squadrons of fixed wing aircraft (5-2 Trainers) plus a detachment of radar warning aircraft (E-2B Hawkeye) plus a detachment of ASW carriers operating in the Western Pacific. The Navy currently operates four A-4 Skyhawks for each ASW carrier and one A-4 Skyhawk for each ASW carrier. The Navy currently operates four A-4 Skyhawks for each ASW carrier and one A-4 Skyhawk for each ASW carrier.

Recent studies have indicated that ASW carriers are expensive to operate in relationship to their effectiveness compared with other ASW platforms (eg land based patrol, destroyer type ships, attack submarines). Accordingly, it is tentatively planned to reduce the ASW carrier force to four ships (two in Atlantic and two in Pacific) when the Vietnam War is "concluded". However, the ASW force is being maintained at seven ships to meet the threat of Soviet and Communist Chinese submarine threat in the 1970's.

TRAINING AIRCRAFT CARRIER No aircraft are assigned to the Training Carrier *Leahurst*. However, in an emergency situation she could engage an active or reserve ASW air group. Her ability to support effectively ASW operations would depend upon the degree to which she could be outfitted with aircraft stores, spare parts and maintenance facilities prior to being deployed.

PHOTOGRAPH The photograph on this page shows the USS *America* on Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam. She is shown in the process of launching aircraft. On her forward catapults are an A-4 Skyhawk and an E-2B Hawkeye. On her aft catapults are an A-4 Skyhawk and an F-4 Phantom II.

2-1 NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVAN): "NIMITZ" TYPE

Name	No.	Builder	Ordered	Status
<i>Nimitz</i>	CVAN 68	Newport News SB & DD Co	31 Mar 1967	Under construction
<i>Enterprise</i>	CVAN 69	Newport News SB & DD Co		Proposed
<i>Amey</i>	CVAN 70	Newport News SB & DD Co		Proposed

The lead ship for this class, the *Nimitz*, was authorized in the FY 1967 new construction program. It is scheduled to be launched in October 1970 and completed in 1972-1973. The *Enterprise* is scheduled to be launched in October 1971 and completed in 1973-1974. The *Amey* is scheduled to be launched in October 1972 and completed in 1974-1975.

The *Nimitz* will have a displacement of 66,100 tons. She will be the largest attack carrier ever built. She will have a length of 1,042 feet and a beam of 134 feet. She will have a top speed of 30 knots. She will have a complement of 1,500 crew members and 1,000 aircraft.

Some of the most conventionally powered aircraft carriers (the *America* and *John F. Kennedy*).


ENGINEERING These carriers will each have only two nuclear reactors compared to the eight reactors required for the carrier *Enterprise*. The nuclear cores for the reactors in these ships are expected to provide sufficient energy for the ships to each steam for at least 13 years, an estimated 800,000 to 1 million man hours between "refueling".

NOMENCLATURE The *Nimitz* honors Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz who was Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area during World War II and Chief of Naval Operations from December 1945 to December 1957.

4 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVA): "KITTY HAWK" CLASS

Name	No.	Builder	Launched	Commissioned
<i>Kitty Hawk</i>	CVA 63	New York SB Corp, Camden, NJ	27 Dec 1966	29 Apr 1967
<i>Constellation</i>	CVA 64	New York Naval Shipyard	14 Sep 1967	27 Oct 1967
<i>Ambessa</i>	CVA 66	Newport News SB & DD Co	9 Jan 1967	1 Feb 1968
<i>John F. Kennedy</i>	CVA 67	Newport News SB & DD Co	22 Oct 1964	23 Jan 1968

Deployment tons: *Kitty Hawk* 60,100 standard, 75,200 full load; *Constellation* 60,100 standard, 75,200 full load; *Ambessa* 60,300 standard, 75,200 full load; *John F. Kennedy* 61,000 standard, 83,000 full load.
Length (feet (meters)): *Kitty Hawk* 880 (307 ft) o/a; *Constellation* 1,042 (323 ft) o/a; *Ambessa* 1,072 (326 ft) o/a; *John F. Kennedy* 1,047 (319 ft) o/a.
Beam (feet (meters)): *Kitty Hawk* 129 (39 ft); *Constellation* 130 (39 ft).
Flight deck width (feet (meters)): *Kitty Hawk* 280 (79 ft) maximum; *Constellation* 282 (79 ft) maximum; *Ambessa* 282 (79 ft) maximum; *John F. Kennedy* 282 (79 ft) maximum.
Other: *Kitty Hawk* 280 (79 ft) maximum; *Constellation* 282 (79 ft) maximum; *Ambessa* 282 (79 ft) maximum; *John F. Kennedy* 282 (79 ft) maximum.
Compliments: 4 steam; 70 to 90 according to type.
Aircraft: 2 from T-60 surface to air launchers on *Kitty Hawk*, *Constellation*, *Ambessa*, *John F. Kennedy*.
Systems: 3 Basic Point Defense Missile Defense Missile System (BPDMS) launchers with Sea Sparrow missiles.
Main engines: 4 geared turbines (Woods Hole).
Shafts: 280,000 shp, 4 shafts.
Speed: 30 knots (Foster Wheeler).
Other: 30 knots.



AMERICA (CVA 66)

1966 United States Navy

396 UNITED STATES

"KITTY HAWK" CLASS continued

Complement 2,700-2,800 officers, approx 2,000 enlisted, plus approx 2,000 assigned to attack on wing for a total of 4,700 to 5,000 officers and enlisted men per ship

These ships were built to an improved "Forestal" design and are more recognized by their island superstructure which is set further aft than the superstructures in the four "Forestal" class ships. Lift arrangement also differs (see design notes). The *Kitty Hawk* was authorized in fiscal year 1956, new construction program; the *Constellation* in FY 1957, the *America* in FY 1961, and the *John F. Kennedy* in FY 1962. Completion of the *Constellation* was delayed because of a design change in the island superstructure. Construction of the *John F. Kennedy* was delayed because of debate over whether to provide for such conventional or nuclear propulsion. Estimated construction costs were \$217,963,000 for *Kitty Hawk*, \$247,620,000 for *Constellation*, and \$277,000,000 for *John F. Kennedy*.

CLASSIFICATION: Officially known as the "Kitty Hawk" class, generally referred to as improved Forestal class.

DESIGN: These ships are officially considered to be of a different design than the "Forestal" class by the Navy's Ship Characteristics Board. The island structure is smaller and set further aft in the newer ships with the deck edge lifts forward of the superstructure a third aft of the structure and the well deck on the other quarter (compared with two lifts aft of the island and the port-side lift at the forward end of the angled deck in the older ships). This lift arrangement considerably improves flight deck operations. All four of these ships also have a small radar mast aft of the island structure.

ELECTRONICS: All four ships of this class have highly sophisticated electronic equipment and the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS). The *America* and *John F. Kennedy* have also mounted SQS-23 sonar, the first US attack carriers with anti-submarine sonar (several

Aircraft Carriers—Continued



JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 67)

1969 United States Navy

ASW carriers have been listed with their modernizations).

MODERNIZATION: The *Constellation* was extensively modified during her 1960 overhaul with her displacement and overall length both increased to the dimensions noted above.

NOMENCLATURE: ASW carriers are generally named after battles and historic ships. However, the *Kitty Hawk* better honors the site where the Wright brothers made their historic flights than the converted aircraft carrier hull name which served in World War II. The *Constellation* remembers a frigate built in 1797 and a later ship built at Baltimore, Maryland, although no longer in Navy commission. The name "America" was previously


carried by a 14-gun ship of the line launched in 1782 and presented to France by the racing schooner which bore her name to the America's Cup, and by the USS *America* which was taken over by the US Navy in World War I, renamed and used as a troop transport. The *John F. Kennedy* remembers the martyred student who was assassinated in 1963. The destroyer *John F. Kennedy* (DD 823) honors the water teacher who was killed in a bombing explosion over England in World War II.

PHOTOGRAPHS: A close-up view of the *John F. Kennedy*'s island structure and the ship's unusual angled funnel appears in the 1968-1969 edition. The *Kitty Hawk* began launching an F-2A Hawk early warning aircraft at the cruiser on Yankee station in the Gulf of Tunesia. The *America*'s stern fueling destroyers in the Mediterranean.



KITTY HAWK (CVA 63)

1968 United States Navy



RICHARD E. BYRD (DDG 23)

AMERICA (CVA 66)

WILLIAM R. RUSH (DD 714)

1967 US Navy Photo I. Combs

Aircraft Carriers—Continued

1 NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVAN) ENTERPRISE TYPE

Name	No.	Builder	Laid down	Launched	Commissioned
ENTERPRISE	CVAN 65	Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.	4 Feb 1968	5 Feb 1969	25 Nov 1969

Displacement tons	75 700 standard; 83 350 full load
Length, feet (meters)	1 040 (317.0); 1 123 (341.2) (at beam)
Beam, feet (meters)	133 (40.5)
Draft, feet (meters)	25 (7.6)
Flight deck length, feet (meters)	287 (78.2) (maximum)
Capacity	4 000
Aircraft	70 to 100 according to type
Missiles	2 Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) launchers with Sea Sparrow missiles (see Armament notes)
Main engines	6 geared steam turbines (Westinghouse); approx 300 000 shp
Nuclear reactors	2 pressurized water cooled A2W (Westinghouse)
Speed, knots	30
Complement	2 870 (120 officers; approx 2 750 enlisted men); plus crew of 2 000 assigned to attack or being for a total of over 5 000

The *Enterprise* was the largest warship ever built at the time of her construction and will be rivaled in size only by the nuclear-powered carrier *Zumwalt*. The *Enterprise* was authorized in the Fiscal Year 1968 new construction program. She was launched only 19 months after her keel was laid down. During her first year of operation the *Enterprise* made a six-month deployment to the Mediterranean and took part in the Cuban quarantine of 1962. During that year she recorded more than 12 000 arrested landings, a record for non-combat operations. The *Enterprise* was flagship of Task Force One during Operation Sea Orbit when she carried the nuclear-powered cruise ship *Long Beach* (CGN 9) and the nuclear-powered freighter *San Diego* (T-ES 25) circumnavigated the world in 1964, covering more than 30 000 miles (underway 57 days) without refueling. The estimated cost of the *Enterprise* was \$135 million. The Fiscal Year 1968 budget provided \$20 000 000 to prepare plans and place orders for construction of a second nuclear-powered carrier. Construction money was spent otherwise.


ARMAMENT The *Enterprise*—the world's largest warship—was completed without any armament in an effort to keep construction costs low. Since the Targeting and Control System (TACS) provided Sea Sparrow (SP) missiles was installed in 1967 because of danger to the ship operating in Gulf of Tonkin. A third Sea Sparrow launcher will be installed during the ship's 1970 overhaul. The BPDMS launcher is a modified eight tube ASROC missile launcher. The launchers are visible in the overhead view on the following page.

DESIGN Built to a modified "Fletcher" Class design the most distinctive feature is the island structure. Her propulsion eliminated requirement for smoke stacks and hulls are extensively covered with superstructure and reducing vulnerability to battle damage (radioactivity and biological agents). Radar scanner, radar antenna (ballboards) are mounted on tops of island electronic countermeasure (ECM) antennas. Long range antennas have increased range and performance (see



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65)

1969 US Navy PH1 W R Deaton



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65)

1968 US Navy PH1 P Poole



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65)

1968 United States Navy

James M. Jones Jr. Research Papers

Aircraft Carriers--Continued

"ENTERPRISE" TYPE continued

... (unreadable) ... The Enterprise has four decks above the top forward island and one aft or standard side and one additional side for improved "B" to "A" deck access.


ELECTRONICS Fitted with the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS).

ENGINEERING The Enterprise is the world's second nuclear powered warship (the cruiser USS *Long Beach* was completed a few months earlier). Design of the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier began in 1950 and work continued until 1953 when the program was postponed pending further work on the submarine reactor program. The large ship reactor project was reinstated in 1958 on the basis of technological advance made in the previous 14 months. The Atomic Energy Commission's Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory was given prime responsibility for developing the nuclear power plant. Construction of a land based prototype plant (designated ATW) began in April 1958 at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. This plant consists of two reactors and the associated steam generating equipment to drive one shaft of an aircraft carrier. The first reactor core was installed on 8 Aug 1958 and critically was achieved on 21 Oct 1958. The second reactor achieved criticality on 10 July 1959 and the two reactor plant was first operated at full power on 15 Sep 1959 demonstrating the feasibility of nuclear propulsion for large ships. The first of the eight reactors installed in the Enterprise achieved criticality on 2 Dec 1960 shortly after the carrier was launched. After three years of operation during which she steamed more than 20,000 miles, the Enterprise was reworked and refueled from November 1964 to July 1965. Her second set of reactors cost about 25 per cent greater. The eight core units installed in the Enterprise cost \$64,000,000; the second set cost about \$20,000,000. The Enterprise will be reworked during her 1970-1971 overhaul. In addition to extra steam and high speed turbine nuclear propulsion for aircraft carrier propulsion, one space for anti-air warfare and radar systems, one for beam and searchlights, one for electronic equipment, one for electronic power, and one for electronic control without affecting the nuclear reactor system.

NOMENCLATURE The US Navy ships have carried the name Enterprise. The first was a British wooden ship captured in 1779 and armed for use on Lake Champlain. The second Enterprise (CV-6), was the first of the US line of aircraft carriers. She earned 23 battle stars. The Big E was laid in 1958 and is today...



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65) 1968 US Navy PH1 R. L. Fitzgerald PHOTOGRAPHS The photograph above shows the Enterprise departing the Naval Air Station at Alameda (San Francisco) California on 2 Jan 1968. Note aircraft carrier ship (ARV) of upper right. Aircraft parked at the stern of the Enterprise include (from left) an EA-3B Skywarrior, F-4 Phantom, an A-1 Skyhawk, an SH-3 Sea King helicopter and an RA-5C Vigilante.



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65) 1968 United States Navy



ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65) United States Navy

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MANU
INDEX

Aircraft Carriers - Continued

4 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVA) "FORESTAL" CLASS

Name	No.	Builder	Laid Down	Keel Laid	Commissioned
"FORESTAL"	CVA 59	Newport News SB & DD Co	14 July 1954	11 Dec 1954	1 Oct 1955
"SARATOGA"	CVA 60	New York Navy Shipyard	18 Dec 1952	18 Oct 1955	18 Apr 1956
"RANGER"	CVA 61	Newport News SB & DD Co	2 Aug 1954	19 Sep 1956	10 Aug 1957
"INDEPENDENCE"	CVA 62	New York Navy Shipyard	1 July 1955	1 June 1958	10 July 1959

Displacement tons	Forests: 58,650 standard; 78,000 full load Others: 62,000 standard; 78,000 full load
Length feet (metres)	990 (301.8)
Beam feet (metres)	103.9 (31.66)
Draft feet (metres)	129.5 (39.45)
Flight deck width feet (metres)	280 (79.2) maximum
Other	252 (76.8) maximum
Catapults	6 steam
Aircraft	70 to 90 according to type
Guns	4 5-in. (127 mm) dual purpose removed from Forestal (see Gunner's notes)
Missiles	1 Basic Point Defence Missile System (BPDMS) launcher with Sea Sparrow missiles in Forestal
Main engines	4 geared turbines (Westinghouse) 4 shafts
Boilers	280,000 shp in Forestal 280,000 shp in others
Speed knots	Forests: 33 Others: 38
Complement	7,700-12,000 officers and crew




FORESTAL (CVA 59)

1968 United States Navy

The Forestal was the world's first aircraft carrier designed and built after World War II. The design drew heavily from the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CVA 58) which was canceled immediately after being laid down in April 1949. The Forestal was authorized in the Fiscal Year 1952 new construction programme. The


DESIGN The Forestal Class ships were the first aircraft carriers designed and built specifically to operate jet-powered aircraft. The Forestal was redesigned during construction to incorporate British-developed angled flight decks and steam catapults. These were the first US aircraft carriers built with an enclosed flight deck to improve seaworthiness. Four large deck edge lifts are fitted, one forward of island structure to starboard and one at forward edge of angled flight deck to port. Other features include armoured flight deck and advanced underwater protection and internal compartmentation to reduce effects of con-

CLASSIFICATION The Forestal and Saratoga were initially classified as Large Aircraft Carriers CVL 59 and 60 respectively, reclassified as Attack Aircraft Carriers (CVA) in October 1952 to reflect their purpose rather than size. The 1968 United States was a "Teesee" carrier (CVA).



RANGER (CVA 61)

1967 US Navy LT Capt E. M. Wilson



INDEPENDENCE (CVA 62)


1968 US Navy Prof. R. J. Campbell



1968 US Navy



United States Navy



United States Navy

Aircraft Carriers - Continued

versions and nuclear plants. Most configurations differ from the standard design and have been modified as required.

ENGINEERING: The Saratoga and other ships have an improved heat plant, increased machinery weight of the improved plant is more than compensated by increased performance and increased fuel consumption.

UPHELD: A four ship class mounted 8 5 inch guns on each side in two mounts on each quarter. The forward mounts, carrying the guns mounted with ship operators in rough weather, tending to sink the ship's deck. The forward gun mounts and guns were subsequently removed, reducing armament to four guns

per ship. The guns are 5 inch 54 caliber rapid fire dual purpose weapons. The four 5 inch guns were removed from the Forrestal class in 1967 and a longer BPDMS launcher for 500 Sparrow missiles was retained forward on the standard hull. Two additional launchers can be assigned (BPDMS launcher is just visible in photograph on previous page).

MODERNISATION: During an overhaul in 1963-1964 the length of the Ranger's rigid flight deck was extended eight feet to accommodate nuclear aircraft.

NOMENCLATURE: The Forrestal honours James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy from 1942 until he was

appointed the first US Secretary of Defense in 1947. A gun he held until shortly before his death in 1949. The Saratoga commemorates the Battle of Saratoga, New York, in the American Revolution and five carrier class designations including a carrier of World War I (CVA-3). The first US Ranger was a sloop built in 1777 and a later ship of that name was the first US gun for the purpose carrier (CV-4). The first USS Independence was a sloop built in 1775 and a later ship of that name was a light carrier (CVL-22) which had extensive combat in World War II.

PHOTOGRAPHS: The Ranger's stern has been sponsored. They probably will be removed in the next major overhaul.



RANGER (CVA 3)

1968 United States Navy

3 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVA): "MIDWAY" CLASS

Name	No	Builder	Laid down	Launched	Commissioned
MIDWAY	CVA 41	Newport News SB & DD Co	27 Oct 1943	20 Mar 1945	10 Sep 1945
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT	CVA 42	New York Navy Yard	1 Dec 1943	29 Apr 1945	3 Nov 1945
CORAL SEA	CVA 43	Newport News SB & DD Co	10 July 1944	Apr 1945	1 Oct 1947

Displacement tons

Midway	51,000 standard 61,000 full load
F.D. Roosevelt	51,000 standard 62,674 full load
Coral Sea	52,500 standard 63,400 full load
Length feet (metres)	901 (274.3) x 179 (54.6) x 65
Beam feet (metres)	121 (36.9)
Draft feet (metres)	36 (11.0)
Flight deck width feet (metres)	222 (67.3) max run
Catapults	3 steam in Midway and Coral Sea 2 steam in F.D. Roosevelt
Aircraft	60 to 75 according to type
Guns	4 5 in 127 mm dual purpose in F.D. Roosevelt, three guns in Midway and Coral Sea (two gunnery masts)
Main engines	4 geared turbines (Westinghouse in Midway and Coral Sea General Electric in F.D. Roosevelt)
Boilers	212 200 hp 4 shafts 12,000 sq ft (117 sq cm) (Babcock & Wilcox)
Speed knots	33
Complement	2,800 112 officers approx 2,500 enlisted men; plus approx 1,500 assigned to attack or being for a total of 4,000 per ship

These carriers were the largest US warships constructed during World War II. Completed too late for service in that conflict they were the backbone of US naval strength for the first decade of the Cold War. Beginning in 1949 they were modified to have atomic and dual nuclear weapons making them the world's first warships with nuclear strike capability. (F2V SC Sparrow and F4U Corsair were the first delivery aircraft). As they operated in the Atlantic and Mediterranean during the Korean War but subsequently they have operated in the Pacific. The entire class has been in service since (except for overhaul and modernisation) and the ships were completed more than 24 years ago.

CLASSIFICATION: These ships were initially classified as Large Aircraft Carriers (CVA-41) respectively reclassified as Attack Aircraft Carriers (CVA) in October 1962.

DESIGN: These ships were in the same design with a standard displacement of 45,000 tons, full load displacement of 60,000 tons and an overall length of 900 feet. They have been extensively modified since completion (see above). These ships were the first US warships with an armoured flight deck and the first US warships with a decked flight deck large to enable them to pass through the Panama Canal.



CORAL SEA (CVA 43)

United States Navy

Midway Class continued

Aircraft Carriers Continued


CONVERSION. As the fleet expanded to 16 CVLs and 20 CVLAs, the Navy reduced production of the latter to 10 ships. The latter were produced in 1943-44. The CVLAs were produced in 1944-45. The CVLAs were produced in 1944-45. The CVLAs were produced in 1944-45.

MISSILES. During the 1960s these ships were fitted with the Regulus surface-to-surface missile. It had a range of 500 miles and a speed of 500 knots.

MODERNIZATION. All three Midway Class carriers have been extensively modernized. The most extensive conversion package gave them angled flight decks, steam catapults, enclosed "hull-down" bow sea structures, and new lift arrangements. *Franklin D. Roosevelt* from 1963 to 1966, *Midway* from 1964 to 1967, and *Coral Sea* from 1966 to 1969. At Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Lift arrangement was changed in *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and *Midway* to one centered lift forward and one deck edge lift at forward end of angled deck on port side. The *Coral Sea* has an improved arrangement with lift forward and one at forward end of angled deck on starboard side and third lift at forward end of port side. The *Midway* began another extensive modernization at the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard in February 1966. She is scheduled for recommissioning in January 1970. The modernization included provisions for handling newer aircraft, new catapults, new lifts arranged as in *Coral Sea*, and new electronics. A major modernization program for the *Franklin D. Roosevelt* to have begun in fiscal year 1970 has been cancelled because the *Midway* modernization is taking longer and costing more than originally estimated (28 months and \$68,000,000 was planned. Actual cost is requiring approximately 48 months and \$178,000,000). The *Franklin D. Roosevelt* is expected to operate the new A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft.

NOMENCLATURE. The *Midway* and *Coral Sea* recall the first carrier versus carrier battles in history. Our numbered US carriers stopped the Japanese Navy in both engagements of 1942. The *CVA CVB 32* was Admiral Fletcher's *Task Force 32*, named on 8 May 1942 after death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 12 April 1945.

PHOTOGRAPHS. Note the forward sparrows compare with the *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and the absence of sparrows in the more updated *Coral Sea*. In her latest arrangement the *Midway* resembles the *Coral Sea* in deck arrangement but retains her island structure which is the design model in her latest photo. A photo graph of the *Midway* taken prior to her conversion appears in the 1966-1969 edition.



CORAL SEA (CVA 42) 1966 United States Navy



FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVN 70) 1966 United States Navy



FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVN 70) 1967 US Navy PHOT J D Good

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
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
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Aircraft Carriers - Continued




MIDWAY (CVA 41) As of 1951
Port side extension for flight deck not completed


1951



MIDWAY (CVA 41)



CORAL SEA (CVA 43)



1951

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402 UNITED STATES
Aircraft Carriers - Continued
MIDWAY (CVA 41) As of 1951
Port side extension for flight deck not completed
1951
MIDWAY (CVA 41)
CORAL SEA (CVA 43)
1951

Aircraft Carriers - Continued

4 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVA) - 'HANGCOCK' CLASS

Type	No.	Builder	Launched	Commissioned	Decommissioned
TICONDEROGA	CVA 14	Newport News S B (D Co)	1 Feb 1943	7 Feb 1944	10 Sep 1947
HANGCOCK	CVA 19	Bethlehem Steel Co (Quincy)	26 Jan 1943	26 Jan 1944	19 Apr 1944
SAN HOA	CVA 31	New York Navy Yard	1 Feb 1943	29 Apr 1944	29 Nov 1944
ORISKANY	CVA 34	New York Navy Yard	1 May 1943	13 Oct 1945	29 Sep 1950

Displacement tons	Others
Standard	42,825 full load
Length feet (overall)	621.269
Beam feet (overall)	89.0 (271 ft) at
Beam feet (max draft)	89.4 (272 ft) at
Draft feet (max draft)	106.6 (32.5)
Flight deck width	131.2 (40)
Speed knots	196 (27.5) maximum
Complement	1,721 (53.5) maximum
Capacity	2 steam
Aviation	80 to 70 according to type
Guns	4 5.5 (127 mm) 38 cal dual purpose (single)
Main engines	4 geared turbines (stealthouse)
Boilers	180,000 shp 4 shafts
Speed knots	8-600 per (4.7-7.2) (air)
Complement	18,000 (5,000) (100) (100) (100) (100)



TICONDEROGA (CVA 14)

United States Navy

Twenty three 'Essex' class aircraft carriers were completed between 1941 and 1946 and the modified Oriskany was completed in 1950. Fourteen of these ships fought in World War II, many saw combat in the Korean War and Vietnamese War.

Two one-hangar ships of this class were converted into missile cruisers - the Oriskany (CVA 34) and the USS Zumwalt (CVA 49) and six others were converted prior to being converted to missile cruisers.

The system is intended primarily to deal with the threat of high performance aircraft.

operate advanced aircraft including the Mach 1.7 Crusader fighter and the F-105 fighter.

CLASSIFICATION: These ships were initially classified as 'Essex' class (CV) and redesignated as Attack Aircraft Carriers (CVA) in October 1952. The remaining ships of the type are known as the 'Hancock' class.

GUNNERY: As built, except for the Oriskany, these ships mounted 12 5 inch guns, 60 or 72 40 mm guns, and 82 20 mm guns. The Oriskany carried only 10 5 inch guns and 44 40 mm guns. Armament reduced progressively with 3 inch guns replacing 5 inch weapons. Maximum 5 inch armament remains on ships in service as carriers (CVA CV5).

NO. 100: The hull number 100 was assigned to the Oriskany (CVA 34) in honor of the ship's namesake, the USS Oriskany (BB-3), which was named for the imaginary island in Jules Verne's novel which President Roosevelt told the crew was the base for the Double Day's raid against Japan in 1842. Several ships renamed during construction to carry on names of carriers lost in battle. The Hancock and Ticonderoga exchanged names during construction.

DESIGN: All 24 ships were built to the same basic design with a standard displacement of 27,100 tons, full load displacement of 38,300 tons, and an overall length of 608 or 672 feet. There were two aircraft carriers built with a deck edge lift in addition to two complete lifts, except for a small outboard platform lift in the corner (CVA 31) launched in 1938.

MISSILES: During the 1950s the 'Essex' class ships were fitted with the Regulus I surface-to-surface missile (Regulus) - Lexington, Hancock, and San Antonio, and the Regulus II - Oriskany.

PHOTOGRAPHS: Overhead view of Oriskany showing the ship in the Gulf of Tonkin has proper air on A-1 Skyraiders parked forward. The planes have since been described by the Navy. The Oriskany's island structure is clearly visible (two E-1B Hawk aircraft are parked next to the island) and F-4 Phantom II fighters are parked on starboard deck edge. Note landing operations mast on island structure on the Ticonderoga.

ELECTRONICS: The Oriskany and the frigates Ring (DLG 10) and Meade (DLG 11) conducted the initial tests of the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) in 1961-1962. NTDS is a highly automated system for collecting, processing, exchanging and evaluating data on tactical situations. Provides are assigned to every

MODERNIZATION: The completion of the Oriskany was delayed after World War II showing had to be completed with fewer hulls. Improved elevators, radar, and flight deck controls, aviation fuel storage and other features for operating jets. All of these ships






ORISKANY (CVA 34)

1966 US Navy Photographic Center



1947 US Navy



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
Aircraft Carriers - Continued

11 NEW SUPPORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CVS
1 TRAINING AIRCRAFT CARRIER CVT


18682 CLASS

Name	No.	B. No.	Builder	Keel Laid	Launched	Commissioned
6888	CVS 9	Newport News 58	DU Co	28 Apr 1941	31 Oct 1942	31 Oct 1942
6889	CVS 10	Newport News 58	DU Co	1 Oct 1941	21 Jan 1943	18 Apr 1943
6890	CVS 11	Newport News 58	DU Co	1 Dec 1941	20 Apr 1943	18 Aug 1943
6891	CVS 12	Newport News 58	DU Co	3 Aug 1942	29 Aug 1943	28 Nov 1943
6892	CVS 13	Newport News 58	DU Co	15 May 1943	28 Oct 1943	30 Dec 1943
6893	CVS 14	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6894	CVS 15	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6895	CVS 16	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6896	CVS 17	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6897	CVS 18	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6898	CVS 19	Bethlehem Steel Co. Quincy	Quincy	18 Oct 1942	26 Feb 1944	17 Mar 1944
6899	CVS 20	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6900	CVS 21	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6901	CVS 22	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6902	CVS 23	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6903	CVS 24	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6904	CVS 25	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6905	CVS 26	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6906	CVS 27	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6907	CVS 28	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943
6908	CVS 29	New York Navy Yard	New York	18 Dec 1942	28 Jul 1943	24 Nov 1943

Characteristic	Standard	Others
Displacement (full)	32,800 standard, 41,120 full load	Lake Champlain 33,800 standard, 40,900 full load
Length (full)	822 (282 ft)	Lake Champlain 829 (274 ft)
Breadth (full)	101 (33 ft)	Lake Champlain 102 (33 ft)
Draft (full)	31 (9 ft)	Lake Champlain 31 (9 ft)
Speed (knots)	33	Lake Champlain 33
Complement	1,615 (1,115 crew, 500 aircraft)	Lake Champlain 1,615 (1,115 crew, 500 aircraft)



1867 US Navy PHCS W. A. Johnson



United States Navy

Eight of these ships are in service, seven serving with anti-aircraft groups and the eighth as a training carrier. Active ships are indicated by asterisks. The Lake Champlain received the Anderson as training carrier in May 1962, the latter subsequently being transferred. The Lake Champlain was mothballed in 1965, the last US light aircraft carrier to operate from deck aircraft. See previous listing for Markham class aircraft carriers for general class notes. The Randolph was decommissioned in July 1958 and placed in reserve. The Essex was decommissioned in June 1969 and placed in reserve. The latter ship in active service for 22 years (1943-1967-1969-1989). The intended successor as a light aircraft carrier from 1960 to 1969, carrying an aircraft of light and light deck aircraft, she reports to ASW fleet in August 1967 when she received the indicated Essex.

ANGLED DECK The Anderson was the first US carrier to have an angled flight deck. The angled deck, a British invention, was pioneered by the HMS *Ark Royal* in the hour of flight deck on the port side, reducing the landing area and increasing the landing speed. The design was adopted by the US Navy Shipyard Department December 1952. The design greatly increases efficiency and safety of high speed carrier operations.

Initial angled deck landing trials were conducted on the British light carrier *Formosa* and then the US large carrier *Essex* with a simulated angled deck landing area being painted on the standard light decks.

CLASSIFICATION These ships were initially classified as aircraft carriers (CV). All were subsequently redesignated as support aircraft carriers (CVS). *Anderson* was redesignated CVT on 1 Jan 1945. *Lake Champlain* was redesignated CVT on 1 Sep 1967. *Essex* on 27 June 1969. *Essex* on 30 June 1968. *Essex* on 8 Mar 1969.

1960 redesign on 31 Mar 1962. *Essex* on 1 Oct 1962. *Essex* on 30 June 1969. Their places in the CVA ranks were taken by new construction ships. The *Essex* as training ship since May 1967, was officially designated as a Training Aircraft Carrier (CVT) on 1 Jan 1969.

MODERNIZATION *Essex* was modernized in 1945-46. *Essex* was modernized in 1945-46. *Essex* was modernized in 1945-46.

ENGINEERING The *Lake Champlain* made an Atlantic crossing from Gibraltar to Newport News in 4 days 8 hours in November 1945, averaging 32 knots.

The Philippine Sea of this class (former CV 47) made a Pacific crossing from Singapore to San Francisco in 7 days 13 hours averaging 29.2 knots.

MODERNIZATION Except for the *Anderson* all of these ships were extensively modernized while in an active carrier status, or that the *Lake Champlain* received angled flight decks. While in a CV status the *Essex* had four integrated *Markham* *Randolph* *Essex* *Bennington* and *Essex* were extensively modernized under the so-called Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM II) program. They received new electronic equipment (including some) retransmitted combat information centers.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Aircraft Carriers Continued

Essex Class continued

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
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NOMENCLATURE
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- 31 Jan 1942
- 18 Apr 1943
- 18 Aug 1943
- 20 Nov 1943
- 9 Dec 1943
- 17 Mar 1944
- 24 Nov 1943
- 9 Aug 1944
- 2 Mar 1946
- 26 Jan 1949
- 15 Feb 1949
- 1 June 1949



BENNINGTON (CVS 20) TAPPANANNOCK (AD 43) MERRIN (DD 104) 1968 United States Navy



HORNET (CVS 12) 1968 United States Navy



BATAAN (CVS 33) 1968 US Navy PHJ S R Micro PH 2, D Torrey

United States Navy
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Command and Communication Ships *(Continued)*

1 MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS RELAY SHIP AGMR CONVERTED ESCORT CARRIER


Name	No.	Builder	Keel Laid	Launched	1st Cruise	Decommissioned
ANNAPOLIS	AGMR 1 (ex AGC 39 ex CVE 107)	Lead Shipyard, Fair	14 Nov 1941	20 Jan 1942	14 Feb 1945	1951

Displacement tons: 11,471 (standard) 22,500 (full load)
 Length (feet (metres)): 575 (171.0) (ex 562 (171.6))
 Beam (feet (metres)): 75 (22.9)
 Draft (feet (metres)): 30 (9.1)
 Flight deck width (feet (metres)): 108 (32.9)
 Guns: 8 3 in (76 mm) (50 caliber)
 Main engines: 2 Fairbanks (Diesel)
 16 KVO ship shafts
 Boilers: 4 (Coal)
 Speed knots: 18
 Complement: 170 (44 officers) (bottom stowage)

The Annapolis was built as the escort aircraft carrier (CVE) number CVE 107. She was decommissioned on 21 May 1946 and placed in reserve. She was active as a CVE from 1942 to 1945. After the war, she was again decommissioned. After conversion on 1 May 1951 she was redesignated as a Major Communications Relay Ship (AGMR 1). Converted to a communications relay ship by the New York Navy Yard on 1 May 1951.

CONVERSION: During conversion the ship was fitted with extensive communications relay equipment including apparatus for 22 transmission frequencies, frequency band coverage from low frequency to ultra high frequency. The power outputs of the transmitters were from 10 to 10,000 watts. Numerous radio receivers also were installed as were five large antenna towers. The ship was renamed Annapolis and redesignated AGMR 1 on 1 June 1951. The former escort carrier CVE (AGC 39) as CVE 111 (ex CVE 111) was to have been converted to the AGMR 2. Her conversion never began because of the availability of the larger carrier Saper for use in this role.

DESIGN: The Gilbert Islands class was one of 18 Com. Communication Ships (AGMR) built during the latter part of World War II. The surviving ships of this type are classified as large ships (ASV) and are listed in the section on Logistic Support Ships.



ANNAPOLIS (AGMR 1)

PHOTOGRAPHS: Note enclosed "hulk and blue sea" variation. She has a small helicopter landing area installed during conversion to AGMR to improve rough sea operations. The helicopter landing area is on the starboard side of the former flight deck.



ANNAPOLIS (AGMR 1)

1966 United States Navy

1 MISCELLANEOUS FLAGSHIP AOP: CONVERTED SEAPLANE TENDER

Name	No.	Builder	Keel Laid	Launched	Commissioned
VALCOUR	AOF 1 (ex AVP 58)	Lead Shipyard, Shreveport	21 Dec 1942	5 June 1943	5 June 1943

Displacement tons: 1,788 (standard) 2,800 (full load)
 Length (feet (metres)): 300 (91.4) (ex 311 (95.1))
 Beam (feet (metres)): 41 (12.5)
 Draft (feet (metres)): 13 (4.0)
 Guns: 8 .40 mm (102 mm) (11 quad)
 Main engines: 2 (Diesel)
 2 (Diesel) (Larssen) (Marine)
 Speed knots: 20
 Complement: 6

The Valcour serves as flagship for the US Commander Middle East Force operating in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. From 1960 to 1963 the Valcour related the same with her sister ships Osage Bay (AVP 58) and Goodwin Bay (AVP 41). All three were fitted with advanced communications, radar and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment, pointed white and painted as commissioned. The Valcour was released and transferred to the Middle East Force and was permanently assigned to the Middle East area.

DESIGN: The Valcour was one of 25 Barnegat class (AO) seaplane tenders built during World War II. Several served as Navy auxiliaries and Coast Guard cutters.



VALCOUR (AOF 1)

1966 United States Navy

Harold H. Hill,
 Thomas J. Lloyd Jones, Jr.
 David S. Lewis
 James S. McDonnell
 Sanford N. McDonnell
 William A. McDonnell
 Jackson R. McEwen
 Dickar P. Murray Jr.
 William H. Orthwein, Jr.
 George E. Pake
 George S. Roubicek
CHAIRMAN OF BOARD AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER:
 James S. McDonnell
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER:
 David S. Lewis
CORPORATE OFFICE VICE PRESIDENTS:
 Charles R. Able
 John R. Allen (Eastern Region)
 Willwood E. Beall
 Walter F. Burke
 Richard J. Davis (External Relations)
 Donald W. Douglas Jr. (Administration)
 C. Warren Drake (Manufacturing and Quality Assurance)
 John E. Forry (Controller)
 Robert C. Krone (Personnel)

SECRETARY: John I. Sam
VICE PRESIDENT: Joseph H. Cantor
VICE PRESIDENTS:
 Joseph W. Antonides (Procurement)
 O. Rubin Crow (Corporate Auditor)
 Robert A. Hall (Planning and Information Systems)
 Robert J. Hawkins (Auditor West)
 Robert L. Haskinson (Associated Activities)
 Arthur W. Hyland (Accounting)
 Lewis Larmore (Douglas Advanced Research Labs)
 Albert E. Lombard (McDonnell Research Labs)
 O. Ben Marble (Marketing Communications)
 Gilbert D. Masters (Manufacturing)
 H. Earl Moore (Quality Assurance)
 Michel E. Olivier (Representative Europe)
 Anthony J. Pascecki (Financial Planning)
 A. Joseph Quackenbush (Corporate Planning)

Laboratories
Douglas Advanced Research Laboratories
 5251 Bolsa Avenue, Huntington Beach, California 92647
STAFF VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR: Dr. Lewis Larmore
McDonnell Research Laboratories
 Box 516, St. Louis, Missouri 63166

McDonnell Aircraft Company
 See below
Douglas Aircraft Company
 See pages 370-385 of this section
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
 See "Military Missiles" and "Research Rockets" sections.
McDonnell Automation Company
 Box 516, St. Louis, Missouri 63166
PRESIDENT: William H. Orthwein, Jr.
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER:
 Robert L. Harmon
 Subsidiaries of McDonnell Douglas Corporation include: Conduction Corporation, St. Charles, Missouri; Hycon Manufacturing Company, Monrovia, California; Douglas Aircraft Company of Canada, Ltd., Milton, Ontario; Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington; McDonnell Douglas (Japan) Ltd., Tokyo; and McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
 At the end of June 1969, McDonnell Douglas employed a total of 119,137 people working in 49 communities in 17 states, Washington, DC, and Canada. Total office, engineering, laboratory and manufacturing floor area was 26,891,000 sq ft.

McDONNELL AIRCRAFT COMPANY (a Division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation)
HEADQUARTERS:
 Box 516, St. Louis, Missouri 63166
PRESIDENT: Sanford N. McDonnell
VICE PRESIDENTS:
 Robert J. Baldwin (Aircraft Engineering)
 Robert H. Belt (Advanced Engineering)
 Alvin L. Boyd (Fiscal Management)
 Chester V. Braun (F-4 Programme Manager)
 Garrett C. Covington (General Engineering)
 Richard J. Davis (External Relations)
 C. Warren Drake (Operations)
 George S. Graf (Engineering)
 Robert C. Krone (Personnel)
 Robert C. Little (Marketing)
 Donald Mulvern (F-15 General Manager)
 Madison L. Hanesy (Engineering Technology)
 John P. Cochran (Product Support)
 Sydney C. Wilkinson (Manufacturing)

Production at St. Louis continues to be concentrated on various versions of the F-4 Phantom II two-seat twin-engine fighter for the US Navy, USAF, US Marine Corps, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, Imperial Iranian Air Force, and other customers.

West Germany gave final approval in late November 1968 for the purchase of 88 reconnaissance versions of the Phantom for its air force; and on 27 December 1968 the US State Department announced that an agreement had been reached for the sale of 50 Phantoms to Israel.

On 1 November 1968, the Japanese Defence Agency selected the F-4E Phantom interceptor as the mainstay of its defence arm. These aircraft will be built in Japan under a licence agreement, with some components being supplied from St. Louis.

McDonnell have carried out considerable research and development on the technology required for the greater utilisation of beryllium. Under a programme sponsored by the USAF Flight Dynamics Laboratory, they have designed and fabricated a rudder for the F-4 Phantom II, and this was flown for the first time on a USAF YF-4E on 14 May 1968. The weight saving value of beryllium for structural components is demonstrated by comparing the 64 lb (29 kg) weight of a conventional F-4 aluminium rudder with the 42 lb (19 kg) weight of the new rudder.

A flight test programme was undertaken to establish the capability of beryllium structures to perform satisfactorily in service over an extended period of time.

In addition, on 10 September 1968 an RF-4C Phantom made the first flight with a beryllium composite rudder. On 27 March 1969, McDonnell received a USAF contract to build 40 beryllium composite rudders. Forty-five of these will be retrofitted on USAF F-4 Phantoms in operational service. The remaining five will be tested to verify unrestricted flight use and to develop and demonstrate environmental protection.

McDONNELL PHANTOM II
US Navy and USAF designations: F-4 and RF-4
 The Phantom II was developed initially as a twin-engine, variable-sweep, long-range, all-weather attack fighter in service with the US Navy. A letter of intent to order two prototypes was issued on October 1, 1954, at which time the aircraft was designated AH-1. The designation was


changed to F4H-1 on May 28, 1955, with change of mission to missile fighter. Early production aircraft were to be F4H-1F's with additional external weapon carrying ability. A camera-equipped reconnaissance version was ordered as the F4H-1P.

The following versions have been developed:
F4H-1. Prototype, which flew for the first time on May 27, 1958. It was designed for Mach 2 speeds and, in fact, achieved Mach 2.6 during its flight trials.


F-4A (formerly F4H-1F). The 11th production F-4B was equipped for trials in the ground attack role under this designation. During one test, it

carried a total of twenty-two 500 lb bombs under its fuselage and inner wings. Further F-4B's were subsequently equipped to F-4A standard. After evaluation of this version, the USAF decided to order land-based versions of the F-4 under the designations F-4C and RF-4C.


F-4B (formerly F4H-1). Standard all-weather fighter for US Navy and Marine Corps. Development series of 23 followed by 68 production models in 1961. First 40 were cash powered by two General Electric J79-GE-2A turbojets (each 16,125 lb = 7,303 kg st with afterburning). Subsequent aircraft have J79-GE-8's. About 850 built by mid-1968.



McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom II tactical fighter, with additional scrap views of noses of RF-4C (upper) and F-4E (lower)



McDonnell Douglas RF-4C Phantom II multi-sensor reconnaissance aircraft (Air Portraits)



McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II multi-role fighter (two General Electric J79-GE-17 turbojet engines) with M-61A1 multi-barrel gun under nose (Gordon S. Williams)

RF-4B (formerly F4H-1P). Multi-sensor reconnaissance version of F-4B for US Marine Corps. No dual controls or armament. J79-GE-8 engines. High-frequency single side-band radio. Twelve ordered under 1963 fiscal year budget. First one flew on March 12, 1965. Overall length increased to 63 ft (19.3 m).

F-4C (formerly F-110A). Two-seat fighter for USAF, developed from F-4A, with J79-GE-15 turbojets, cartridge starting, wider-tread low-pressure tyres size 30 x 11.5, larger brakes, Litton type LN-12A/B (ASN-48) inertial navigation system, APQ-100 radar, APQ-100 EPI scope, LADD timer, Lear Siegler AJB-7 bombing system, GAM-83 controls, dual controls and boom sight refuelling instead of drogue (receptacle in top of fuselage, aft of cockpit). Folding wings and arrester gear retained. For close support and attack duties with Tactical Air Command, PACAF and USAF. Initial orders for 280 under 1962-63 budget. First F-4C flew on May 27, 1963. The last of 583 was delivered to TAC on May 6, 1966. Replaced in production by F-4D.

RF-4C (formerly RF-110A). Multiple-sensor reconnaissance version of F-4C for USAF, with radar and photographic systems in modified nose which increases overall length by 2 ft 9 in (0.81 m). Three basic reconnaissance systems are: side-looking radar to record high-definition radar picture of terrain on each side of flight path on film; infra-red detector to locate enemy forces under cover or at night by detecting exhaust gases and other heat sources; forward and side-looking cameras, including panoramic models with moving-lens elements for horizon-to-horizon pictures. Films can be processed in flight and ejected over ground command post. Systems are operated from rear seat. HF single side-band radio. Initial series of 26 ordered under 1962-63 budget. This version is replacing all RF-66 aircraft in USAF service. YRF-4C flew on August 9, 1963. First production RF-4C flew on May 18, 1964.

F-4D. Development of F-4C for USAF, with J79-GE-16 turbojets, APQ-109 fire-control radar, ASQ-22 servoed sight, ASQ-91 weapon release computer, ASQ-22 lead computing amplifier, ASQ-22 lead computing gyro, 30kVA generators, and ASN-63 inertial navigation system. First F-4D flew on December 5, 1965. In production. Two squadrons of F-4D's (32 aircraft) have been ordered by the Imperial Iranian Air Force.

F-4E. Multi-role fighter for USAF, capable of performing air superiority, close-support and interdiction missions. Has internally mounted M-61A1 20-mm multi-barrel gun, improved (AN/APQ-120) fire-control system and J79-GE-17 turbojets (each 17,000 lb = 8,120 kg st). Increased radius of action is provided by an additional fuselage fuel cell. First production F-4E delivered to USAF for initial testing on October 1967. On 1 November 1968, the Japan Defence Agency selected the F-4E as the main fighter for the JASDF. These aircraft will be built in Japan under licence agreement, with some components being supplied from St. Louis.

F-4F. Development of F-4E for US Navy, with AN/ASW-31 de-ice and communications equipment. Interim model pending availability of F-4J. In service with Vietnam with Squadron VF-313 from USS *USS Hancock* in Spring of 1968. (F-4H designation not used, to avoid confusion with original F-4H (see above)).

F-4G. Development of F-4E for US Navy and Marine Corps, primarily as interceptor but with full ground attack capability. J79-GE-10 turbojets. Increased flap area, 16½° drooping ailerons and slotted tail give reduced approach speed in

spite of increased landing weight. Westinghouse AN/APQ-10 Doppler fire-control system. Lear Siegler AJB-7 bombing system, 30 kVA generators. First F-4J demonstrated publicly on May 27, 1968. In production.

F-4K. Development of F-4B for Royal Navy, with improvements evolved for F-4J plus other changes. The Westinghouse AN/APQ-10 pulse Doppler fire-control radar system has been modified to allow the antenna to swing around with the radome. This "foldable radome" reduces the length of the aircraft, making it compatible with the deck elevators on British aircraft carriers. Two Rolls-Royce Spey RB.168-25R Mk 201 turbofans (each rated at 12,500 lb = 5,670 kg st dry) with 70% reheat. The air intake ducts are 6 m (19.7 m) wider than on US models to cater for these powerful engines. Drooped ailerons. Tailplane has reduced anhedral and incorporates a leading-edge fixed slot. Strengthened main landing gear. Nose landing gear strut extends to 40 m (132 ft) wider than on US models on the F-4J, to permit optimum incidence catapulting. Martin-Baker ejection seats. Weapons include Sparrow air-to-air missiles and Martel air-to-surface missiles. Decision to order this aircraft for the RN taken in February 1964. Initial contracts for two YF-4K's and two F-4K's. First flight 27 June 1966. 24 ordered as Phantom FG. Mk 1. First three aircraft were delivered to the Royal Navy on 23 April 1968 and the Navy's first Phantom training unit, 767 Squadron

was commissioned at RNAS Yeovilton on 14 January 1969, followed by the first operational Phantom unit, 892 Squadron, also commissioned at RNAS Yeovilton, on 31 March 1969.

F-4M. Version for Royal Air Force. Generally similar to F-4K, but with larger brakes and low-pressure tyres of F-4C. Folding wings and arrester gear retained. Orders for F-4K and F-4M expected to total about 174, with 50% of the components manufactured in the UK. First F-4M flew on February 17, 1967. Deliveries began on 23 August 1968, and initial unit crew training was under way with No. 225 Operational Conversion Unit, based at RAF Coningsby. RAF designation is Phantom FG. Mk 2.


A total of more than 2000's of all models had been built by December 1968. Production was then at the rate of about three per working day.

The Phantom II has set up many official records since December 1966, including World Speed and Height Records of 1,406.48 mph (2,265.425 km/h) and 94,848 ft (29,040 m) respectively. Records still standing at the time of writing are as follows.

On August 28, 1961, a speed record of 69,273 mph (111,477 km/h - Mach 1.2) was set up over the hazardous 3-km low-level course (maximum altitude 100 m = 328 ft) by Lt Hunt Hardisty and Lt E. De Esch in one of the F-4A's. This exceeded the previous (subsonic) record, set up eight years earlier, by over 149 mph (240 km/h).



McDonnell Douglas F-4J Phantom II of the US Marine Corps (Duane A. Kusulka)



McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG. Mk 1 (F-4K) for the Royal Navy

PERFORMANCE (at max T.O weight, except where indicated):
 Max level speed (80% fuel) at 38,000 ft (11,600 m) above Mach 1.23
 Max permissible diving speed 819 mph (1,316 kmh) IAS
 Max cruising speed at 38,000 ft (11,600 m) above Mach 0.95
 Econ cruising speed Mach 0.88
 Stalling speed flaps extended (80% fuel) 138 mph (232 kmh) IAS
 Rate of climb at S/L (80% fuel) 30,000 ft (9,145 m) min
 Service ceiling (80% fuel) 53,000 ft (16,135 m)
 Service ceiling, one engine out (50% fuel) 40,000 ft (12,200 m)
 T.O run 2,500 ft (762 m)
 T.O to 50 ft (15 m) 3,700 ft (1,128 m)
 Landing from 50 ft (15 m) at A/CW of 8,450 lb (4,014 kg) 4,600 ft (1,372 m)
 Landing run 3,000 ft (914 m)
 Range with max fuel, with 600 lb (272 kg) reserve fuel 1,100 miles (1,770 km)

NORTHROP F-5

USAF designation: F-5

This light tactical fighter is similar in design and construction to the T-38 Talon supersonic trainer and utilizes a higher-rated version of the J85 turbojets fitted in the Talon. Its design was started in 1955 and construction of the prototype of the single-seat version (then designated N-150C) began in 1958. It flew for the first time on July 30, 1959, exceeding Mach 1 on its maiden flight. Two more prototypes were built and there are several production versions, as follows:

F-5A. Basic single-seat fighter. Two General Electric J85-GE-13 afterburning turbojets. First production F-5A flew in October 1963. Norwegian version has ATO and arrestor hook for short-field operation. Total of 569 F-5A aircraft had been ordered by the beginning of 1969.

F-5B. Generally similar to F-5A, but with two seats in tandem for training. First F-5B flew on 24 February 1964. A total of 90 F-5B's had been ordered by the beginning of 1969.

An F-5B, with General Electric J85-21 engines of 3,000 lb (2,270 kg) st, is being used as a propulsion system test bed for the planned Northrop F-5-21 fighter. It flew for the first time on 26 March 1969.

F-5A-1F. Basically similar to F-5A, but powered by higher-rated (4,300 lb = 1,950 kg st) General Electric J85-GE-15 turbojets with afterburning. Electrically-actuated canopy doors, on each side of rear fuselage, provide additional air during take-off and flight at speeds below 330 mph (530 kmh). Two-joint extending nose-wheel increases angle of attack on ground by 3°, helping to reduce take-off distances by 25%. Prototype, converted as private venture from an F-5A, flew for the first time in May 1965. Offered to USAF Tactical Air Command.


CF-5A/B. These are the designations of the versions of the F-5A/B that are being produced for the Canadian Armed Forces. Several improvements have been incorporated in the CF series, including higher thrust engines (J85-CAN-15), and flight refueling capability. Manufacture and assembly of the 115 aircraft on order is being carried out by Canadair Ltd. The engines are built by Ormco Ltd. The programme was initiated in the latter half of 1965 and deliveries will extend to the end of 1970. Maximum speed is in excess of 1,000 mph (1,609 kmh), with a maximum rate of climb of 31,000 ft (9,450 m) min.

Some CF-5 aircraft will utilize a reconnaissance nose unit developed by Northrop. This nose houses up to three 70-mm Vinten cameras and contains seven windows. When fitted, it does not limit the aircraft's weapon delivery capabilities.


RF-5A/D. Versions of the F-5 being produced for the Royal Netherlands Air Force with a Doppler navigation system, 275-gallon (1,040-litre) fuel tanks and fuel-carrying flaps. Manufacture and assembly of the 103 aircraft on order are integrated with F-5 production by Canadair Ltd, with deliveries extending to the end of 1971.

RF-5A. Reconnaissance version of the F-5; initial deliveries were made in mid-1968. Its four KC-97 cameras, each with a 100-ft film magazine, can provide forward oblique, transverse and spot vertical coverage, including horizon-to-horizon with coverage. Associated equipment includes four light sources, dragging and cooling systems, a pilot static nose boom and a computer "J" box, all housed in a nose compartment with forward-hinged clamshell top cover. A total of 69 RF-5A's had been ordered by January 1969.

The F-5A and B were ordered into production by the US government, through the USAF, in October 1959, to meet the demand for a light tactical fighter.




Northrop F-5A supersonic combat aircraft, with additional side elevation of nose (bottom)



Northrop F-5 single-seat tactical fighter (two General Electric J85-GE-13 afterburning turbojets)

under way at a combined rate of 10 aircraft a month by mid-1964. Initial deliveries, beginning April 1964, were made to Williams AFB, Chandler, Arizona, where the USAF Tactical Air Command is training pilots and maintenance personnel of countries that will receive F-5's. The first foreign air force to receive F-5's was the Imperial Iranian Air Force, which put into service its first squadron of 13 aircraft on February 1, 1965. Iran is to have six more squadrons of F-5's.

Greece began equipping two squadrons in 1965; Norway received 64 aircraft in 1968-67 with follow-on orders to bring the total to 109. Other nations equipping with F-5's include Canada, Ethiopia, Morocco, Republic of Vietnam, South Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines, Libya, Netherlands, Spain, Thailand and Turkey. Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) of Spain is co-operating on production of the 70 Spanish F-5's.



404 USA: AIRCRAFT-NORTHROP

The USAF has evaluated a squadron of F-5s in Vietnam, where 12 aircraft flew up to 33 sorties a day for a successful trial period as a first-line combat unit.

The F-5 is suitable for a wide range of combat and photographic reconnaissance duties. It can take off, climb to altitude, complete a mission and return to base on one engine.

Special attention has been paid to simple maintenance. The aft portion of the fuselage is removable to permit quick engine replacement, handling of the engines being facilitated by an overhead track and trolley arrangement in each engine bay. The hydraulic pump and generator and their engine-driven gearbox comprise a packaged unit mounted on the airframe structure.

The basic interception weapons comprise two Sidewinder missiles on wingtip launchers and two 20-mm guns in the fuselage nose. Five pylons, one under the fuselage and two under each wing, permit the carriage of a wide variety of other operational warloads. A bomb of more than 2,000 lb (910 kg) or high-rate-of-fire gun pack can be suspended from the centre pylon. Underwing loads can include four air-to-air missiles, Bullpup air-to-surface missiles, bombs, up to 20 air-to-surface rockets, gun packs or external fuel tanks. The reconnaissance nose does not eliminate the 20-mm nose gun capability.

The structural description of the T-38 Talon applies also to the F-5A/B, except in the following details:

TYPE: Light tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircraft.

WINGS: Chord 11 ft 3 in (3.43 m) at root, 2 ft 3 in (0.69 m) at tip. Continuous-hinge leading-edge flaps of full-depth honeycomb construction.

LANDING GEAR: Main wheels fitted with tubeless tyre size 22 x 8-5, pressure 85-110 lb/sq in (6-13 kg/cm²). Nose-wheel fitted with tubeless tyre size 18 x 6-5, pressure 60-100 lb/sq in (4.2-12.6 kg/cm²).

POWER PLANT: Two General Electric J85-GE-13 turbojets with afterburning, each with max rating of 4,000 lb=1,850 kg st and military rating of 2,720 lb=1,234 kg st. Two internal fuel tanks composed of integral cells with total usable capacity of 57 US gallons (212 litres). Provision for one 160 US gallon (608 litre) jettisonable tank on fuselage centre-line pylon, two 160 US gallon (608 litre) jettisonable tanks on underwing pylons and two 50 US gallon (189 litre) wingtip tanks. Total fuel, with external tanks, 1,132 US gallons (4,289 litres). Single pressure refuelling point on lower fuselage. Oil capacity 4.7 US quarts (4.5 litres) each engine.

SYSTEMS: Electrical system includes two skVA engine-driven generators, providing 115V 400 c/s AC power, and 24V battery.

ELECTRONICS AND EQUIPMENT: Standard equipment includes AN/ARC-310 UHF radio, PP-2024 SWIA-Missile AVX, AN/ARC-16 interceptors, J-4 compass and No-7 night optical sight. Space provision for AN/APX-40 IFF, AN/ARW-77 Bullpup AUX and AN/AHS-65 TACAN. Blind-flying instrumentation not standard.

DIMENSIONS, EXTERNAL:


Wing span	25 ft 3 in (7.7 m)
Span over tip tanks	25 ft 10 in (7.87 m)
Length overall:	
F-5A	47 ft 2 in (14.38 m)
F-5B	46 ft 4 in (14.12 m)
Height over tail:	
F-5A	13 ft 4 in (4.07 m)
F-5B	13 ft 1 in (3.99 m)
Tailplane span	14 ft 6 in (4.44 m)
Wheel track	11 ft 0 in (3.35 m)
Wheelbase:	
F-5A	15 ft 4 in (4.67 m)
F-5B	15 ft 0 in (4.57 m)

AREAS:

Wings, gross	170 sq ft (15.79 m ²)
Ailerons (total)	9.24 sq ft (0.86 m ²)
Trailing-edge flaps (total)	18.0 sq ft (1.67 m ²)
Leading-edge flaps (total)	12.3 sq ft (1.14 m ²)
Fin	25.2 sq ft (2.34 m ²)
Rudder	6.1 sq ft (0.57 m ²)
Tailplane	33.0 sq ft (3.07 m ²)

WEIGHTS AND LOADINGS:

Weights empty, equipped:	
F-5A	8,093 lb (3,667 kg)
F-5B	8,381 lb (3,778 kg)
Max military load	6,389 lb (2,897 kg)
Max T.O weight:	
F-5A	20,876 lb (9,333 kg)
F-5B	20,116 lb (9,124 kg)
Max zero-fuel weight:	
F-5A	14,212 lb (6,446 kg)
F-5B	13,782 lb (6,237 kg)
Max design landing weight	14,857 lb (6,736 kg)
Max wing loading:	
F-5A	181 lb/sq ft (8,800 kg/m ²)
F-5B	178 lb/sq ft (8,600 kg/m ²)



Northrop F-5A single-seat reconnaissance fighter, showing the reconnaissance nose unit

PERFORMANCE (F-5A at AUW of 11,430 lb = 5,193 kg; F-5B at AUW of 10,840 lb = 4,916 kg, unless indicated otherwise):

Max level speed at 36,000 ft (11,000 m):	
F-5A	Mach 1.4
F-5B	Mach 1.34
Max permissible diving speed:	
F-5A	818 mph (1,315 km/h) IAS
Max cruising speed without afterburner, at 36,000 ft (11,000 m):	Mach 0.98
Even cruising speed:	Mach 0.87
Stalling speed, 30% fuel, flaps extended:	
F-5A	147 mph (237 km/h)
F-5B	138 mph (221 km/h)
Rate of climb at S.L.:	28,700 ft (8,750 m) min
Service ceiling:	over 30,000 ft (9,144 m)
Service ceiling, one engine out:	over 30,000 ft (9,144 m)
T.O run (with two Sidewinder missiles):	
F-5A at AUW of 13,863 lb (6,287 kg)	2,630 ft (801 m)
F-5B at AUW of 13,047 lb (5,917 kg)	2,240 ft (683 m)
T.O to 30 ft (10 m) (with two Sidewinder missiles):	
F-5A at AUW of 13,863 lb (6,287 kg)	3,650 ft (1,113 m)
F-5B at AUW of 13,047 lb (5,917 kg)	3,150 ft (960 m)
Landing from 30 ft (10 m) with brake-chute:	
F-5A at AUW of 9,541 lb (4,327 kg)	3,800 ft (1,158 m)
F-5B at AUW of 9,541 lb (4,327 kg)	3,800 ft (1,158 m)
Landing run with brake-chute:	
F-5A at AUW of 9,541 lb (4,327 kg)	2,270 ft (692 m)
F-5B at AUW of 9,541 lb (4,327 kg)	2,270 ft (692 m)
Range with max fuel, with 600 lb (272 kg) reserve fuel and 3% service tolerance:	
F-5A, tanks retained	1,400 miles (2,250 km)
F-5B, tanks retained	1,405 miles (2,261 km)
F-5A, tanks dropped	1,565 miles (2,518 km)
F-5B, tanks dropped	1,570 miles (2,525 km)
Combat radius with max payload, allowances as above and five minutes combat at S/L:	
F-5A	215 miles (346 km)
F-5B	225 miles (362 km)
Combat radius with max fuel, two 750 lb (340 kg) bombs, 600 lb (272 kg) reserve fuel, 3% service tolerance and 8 minutes combat at S/L:	
F-5A	550 miles (885 km)
F-5B	560 miles (900 km)

Operational: Hi-Lo Lo-Hi climb from radius with max fuel, 60 minutes dash to and from target and return for combat radius with max fuel at RF-5A 600 miles (965 km)

NORTHROP NASA M2-F2 F3

Under contract to NASA's Flight Research Center, Northrop built two vehicles for re-entry research vehicles. The design F2 (now M2-F3 - see below), was a Research Center concept and represented refined metal development of the wooden M2-F1 glider described on page of the 1963-64 *Jane's*. The other, designated H1, is based on a Langley concept.


Both vehicles have a basic delta planform and are D-shaped in cross-section. The main difference is that, in the M2-F2/F3, the sole of the D is on top, whereas in the H1, it is on the underside of the fuselage.

Each vehicle has a conventional structure for the forward fuselage. The structure is basically a box with two full-depth keels extending from the base of the vehicle. The keels have provision of non-structural support doors on the outside and act as a bay for the rocket fuel. The keels also use the same components which are "off-the-shelf". For example, both are fitted with a modified North American T-19 unit and Northrop's main legs with F15 and brakes. The pilot sits on a modification of the F-100 ejection seat in a pressurized differential pressure cabin. Hydraulic and electrical power is provided by silver-zinc batteries. Cabin air and pressure provided by 3,000 lb sq in (210 kg/cm²) air tank in each vehicle, for 100 ft and a four tanks mounted on the underside of the aircraft being entered by its "under-plate". Each vehicle has an integral PCM instrumentation system for time read-out.

The M2-F2 F3 is controlled in pitch by a flap on the aft lower surface and by two flaps on upper aft surface which are used for pitch. These surfaces are also used for roll control. Flaps on the aft outer face of each wing are used for yaw control. These surfaces can also be actuated simultaneously to act as speed brakes. Pitch flight control surface is actuated by dual 1 lb/sq in (210 kg/cm²) hydraulic system actuator. Stability auger station is provided in all the axes.

Unlike the original wooden M2-F1, the M2-F2 was so designed that, after initial unpowered flight trials, it could be fitted with an X-15 liquid-propellant rocket engine of the kind initially to the X-15 research aircraft. To enable it to be air-launched from beneath the starboard wing of a B-52 Stratofortress "mother plane", it was designed to utilize an air-launcher under the existing X-15A carrier-pylon.

The M2-F2 was delivered to NASA on July 1, 1965. Following tests in the Agency's full scale wind tunnel at Ames Research Center, it made its first unpowered flight on July 12, 1965, after release from the B-52 at 45,000 ft (13,716 m). Its pilot, Mr Milton O. Thompson, made a 100 ft flare-out at about 25,000 ft (7,620 m) and, after completing two 90° turns, increased speed to 354 mph (569 km/h) in order to be able to flare-out and slow the rate of descent from 250 ft/sec (76 m/sec) to under 5 ft/sec (1.5 m/sec) for the landing. Emergency thrusters, fitted for use during the flare, were not used and the M2-F2 was landed successfully four minutes after release at about 190 mph (305 km/h) on Rogers Dry Lake bed, near Edwards AFB, California.



66-67 JAMES
(NO OVERTIME CLASSIFICATION)
SPECIAL PROJECT SHIPS

VALDEZ & MULLER - NOW CLASSIFIED AS AUXILIARIES
LIEUT. JAMES G. ROBINSON "WAS MODIFIED FOR SPECIAL PROJECT
WORK & RECLASSIFIED AS T-AG-170 IN 1963, AND RETURNED
TO ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION T-AG-274 ON 1 JULY 64.

USNS ORCA/IVORY
USNS PRIVATE JUNE
E. VALDEZ T-AG-169
USNS SILENT WISDOM
E. MULLER T-AG-171
TE 271572Z

ENV. RESH. SHIPS
NOT SHOWN - PHU SAYS ARL-25 (BANNER) WAS
CONVERTED TO SPECIAL PROJECT SHIP IN 1965.

TRS
(ALBANY, LIB, OXF, JTN, GUTN)
"MOBILE BASES FOR RESH IN COMMS &
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS, JARNED."

2460
338.5
11.5

69-70 JAMES
EXPERIMENTAL, RESEARCH & SURVEYING SHIPS;
SPECIAL MISSION SHIPS

VALDEZ & MULLER - "SPECIAL MISSION SHIPS WHICH
COLLECT MAGNETIC RADIATION INFORMATION &
METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
MILITARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH SHIPS #3
BANNER, PUEBLO, PALM BEACH - "CONVERTED FOR
PASSIVE INTELLIGENCE OPS. RECLASS. RECLASSIFIED,
FITTED FOR ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) &
SONAR EQPT. FOR SUSTAINING NOISE SIGNATURE
IDENTIFICATION & HYDROGRAPHIC WORK.

TECHNICAL RESH SHIPS
ALBANY, LIBERTY, OXFORD, JARVIS, GEORGETOWN
"MOBILE BASES FOR RESH IN COMMUNICATIONS AND
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION, CONSIDERED
ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) SHIPS.

James M. Ernes Jr. Research Papers

Commissioning of

UNITED STATES SHIP

LIBERTY

(AGTR-5)



PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD

Bremerton, Washington

30 December 1964



NAVAL COMMISSIONING

The commissioning ceremony signifies the beginning of the ship's career of service to the country. The breaking of the commission pennant at the truck simultaneously with the hoisting of the national ensign and the union jack officially mark the ship's status — "In Commission." Thenceforth, the Commanding Officer and the Ship's Company have the responsibility of bringing the ship to a peak of readiness equal to any demand placed upon her by our country in peace or war.

**UNITED STATES SHIP
LIBERTY
AGTR-5**



Built at:
**OREGON SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION
PORTLAND, OREGON**



**Launched
May 1945**



Converted by
**WILLAMETTE IRON AND STEEL COMPANY
PORTLAND, OREGON**



Commissioned
December 30 1964
**PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD
BREMERTON, WASHINGTON**

MISSION AND PURPOSE OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The mission of the USS LIBERTY will be to conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communication systems such as satellite communications.

★

HISTORY OF LIBERTY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1915 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May of 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Liberty was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research Ship and was delivered to the Vinette Iron & Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the 10 cities and towns in the United States named LIBERTY. These towns and cities are located in the following States: Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.

★

DATA OF INTEREST

Length overall 455 feet
Draft (full load) 29 feet
Beam 60 feet
Displacement 11,500 Tons
Propulsion, Steam turbine - single screw 8500 HP
Boats 26 foot Motor whaleboat, capacity 22
33 foot Personnel boat, capacity 45
33 foot Utility boat, capacity 45
24 CO₂ inflatable lifeboats, capacity 15

3

UNITED STATES SHIP LIBERTY (AGTR-5)



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



ROBERT E. HARRIS
Captain, U.S. Navy

Captain Robert E. Harris, USN, was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 17 February 1917. He entered the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, in June 1936, and graduated in June 1940.

After service in the Engineering Department of the USS PENNSYLVANIA, Captain Harris put the USS WASHINGTON in commission on 15 May 1941, and served in her Engineering Department until April 1943. During this period the ship saw service with the British Home Fleet on the Murmansk Patrol, and off Guadal Canal.

From May 1943 to June 1945, the Captain attended postgraduate school at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass. He graduated with a Master of Science Degree in Naval Construction and Engineering, and was designated an Engineering Duty Officer. He then spent four years at the U. S. Naval Shipyard at Charleston, South Carolina, in the Production, Industrial Relations, and Planning Departments.

On 15 May 1949, the Captain put the USS SALEM in commission as Engineering Officer, and served in her through several tours in the Mediterranean as COMSIXTH Fleet Flagship until July 1951. The Captain was then ordered to the Department of Marine Engineering at the United States Naval Academy, where he administered the instruction of midshipmen in Fluid Mechanics and Thermodynamics for the next three years.

In July 1954, the Captain reported to the U. S. Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, as head of the Technical-Administrative Services Department, and second in command. This was followed by tours with the Board of Inspection and Survey, Washington, D.C. (1958-60), and in the Bureau of Ships (1960-61).

On 1 July, 1963, the Captain resumed duties as the Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Industrial Management, USN Thirteenth Naval District.

Captain Harris is married to the former Joanne G. Smullin, of Collingswood, N. J. Captain and Mrs. Harris have a son and a daughter—Michael, who is attending Western Washington State College in Bellingham, Washington, and Kim, who lives at home.



REAR ADMIRAL W. E. FERRALL, USN

Rear Admiral Ferrall assumed duties on 21 July 1964 as Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, with his headquarters at the U. S. Naval Air Station, Seattle, Washington. His last assignment was Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command and Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District with headquarters at Fort Amador, Canal Zone.

William Edward Ferrall was born in Columbiana, Ohio on 8 September 1905. He attended Crafton High School and entered the U. S. Naval Academy on 11 June 1923. After graduation, he served in the USS WEST VIRGINIA, USS COLORADO and USS WATERS. After completing submarine instruction at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, he served on the submarines USS BONITA and USS BASS. Upon completion of graduate studies at the University of California, he returned to sea duty, assuming command of the USS SEA DRAGON, and for outstanding service as Commanding Officer during World War II was awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Bronze Star.

When detached from command of the SEA DRAGON in 1943, he had duties in the Navy Department, Staff Submarine Force Pacific, and commanded a Submarine Squadron and Division in the Pacific.

As Commanding Officer of USS BAYFIELD in the Korean theatre, he received a Gold Star in lieu of the third Bronze Star.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in March 1955, he was assigned as Chief of the Naval Group, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey; Commander, Mines Force, Atlantic Fleet; and served as Director, Plans and Policies with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
COMMISSIONING CEREMONIES
30 December 1964**

Band Selections

Thirteenth Naval District Band

★

Invocation

Commander P. J. Bakker, CHC, USN
Chaplain, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

**Welcoming Remarks and
Introduction of Distinguished Guests**

Rear Admiral Floyd B. Schults, USN
Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

Remarks and Introduction of Principal Speaker

Rear Admiral William E. Ferrall, USN
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District

★

Commissioning Address

VADM H. N. Wallin, USN (Ret.)

★

Reading of Navy Department Orders to Commission

U. S. S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
Rear Admiral William E. Ferrall, USN

6

Ensign, Jack and Commission Pennant are hoisted
as the band plays the National Anthem.
The ship is now in commission.

★

**Reading of Commanding Officer's orders
and assumption of command**

CDR D. T. Wieland, USN

★

First watch is set by the Executive Officer

LCDR J. A. Massolini

★

Benediction

Commander P. J. Bakker, CHC, USN
Chaplain, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

Band Selections

Thirteenth Naval District Band

7



VICE ADMIRAL HOMER NORMAN WALLIN, U.S. NAVY

Vice Admiral Wallin, born in Washburn, North Dakota, December 6, 1893, attended Washburn High School, Jamestown College and the University of North Dakota, all in North Dakota, before his appointment to the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, from his native state in 1913. He graduated and was commissioned Ensign in March 1917.

After graduation in 1917, VADM Wallin served aboard the battleship NEW JERSEY. He then reported for duty under postgraduate instruction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was appointed Assistant Naval Constructor in September 1918.

In July 1941 Admiral Wallin reported for duty as Material Officer on the staff of the Commander, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet aboard the USS CALIFORNIA. Following the Pearl Harbor attack he was assigned as Fleet Salvage Officer and had charge of the salvage of many vessels of the Pacific Fleet. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, in September 1942.

From November 1942 to August 1943 Admiral Wallin served as Maintenance and Damage Repair Officer on the staff of Admiral Halsey, Commander, South Pacific Force, and for that service was awarded the Legion of Merit.

Returning to duty in the United States, Admiral Wallin was Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Ordnance, Seattle, Washington from October 1943 to November 1946, and for his services in that assignment received a Letter of Commendation with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon from the Secretary of the Navy.

Transferred to Philadelphia in November 1946, he served as Commander of the Naval Shipyard there until January, 1949, when he assumed command of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth, Virginia. In March 1950 he had technical charge of the refloating of the Battleship MISSOURI. He was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Ships in February 1951. After two and a half years in this position, he asked to be relieved in order to return to his native Northwest and take command of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. This request was granted and on August 27, 1953 he assumed command of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit and the Commendation Ribbon, Admiral Wallin has the Victory Medal, Atlantic Fleet Clasp (USS NEW JERSEY); and is entitled to the American Defense Service Medal, Fleet Clasp; the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal; the American Area Campaign Medal; and the World War II Victory Medal.



CDR DANIEL T. WIELAND, JR., USN
Commanding Officer

CDR Daniel T. Wieland, Jr., was born at Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania, on August 2, 1922 and subsequently entered the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland in July 1942. Upon commissioning as Ensign June 6, 1945 he served as Assistant Gunnery Officer in USS JOHN R. PIERCE (DD-763) in the Pacific area.

Commander Wieland remained in the Pacific area as Gunnery Officer aboard the USS ENDICOTT (DMS-35) for the next three years. The ship operated extensively in the China area during this period.

The University of Nebraska at Lincoln was Commander Wieland's home for the next two years where he served as Ordnance and Gunnery Instructor.

July of 1951 found Commander Wieland commanding the USS OSPREY (AMS-28). During his tenure the OSPREY was awarded the Navy Unit Citation and Korean Presidential Unit Citation. Commander Wieland was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with combat "V" for his service during the thirteen months aboard OSPREY. During this period OSPREY was engaged in combat minesweeping operations on both coasts of North Korea and was engaged by shore batteries on eight different occasions.

Commander Wieland was then reassigned to the Advanced Mine Countermeasures Course for the next 32 weeks. Upon completing the course he assumed command of the USS JUBILANT (AM-255). He decommissioned JUBILANT at Orange, Texas in April 1954.

His next assignment was Officer-in-Charge of the Combat Information School at the Fleet Training Center, Charleston, S.C.

From June 1956 until May 1958 he was assigned to the Joint U. S. Military Mission of Aid to Turkey at Istanbul, Turkey. His primary field during this period was Ordnance and Gunnery and Minesweeping advisor to the Turkish Fleet and Naval Academy. This tour of duty was followed by a one year tour as Executive Officer of USS WILLARD KEITH (DD-775).

In September 1959 Commander Wieland assumed command of USS ROBERTS (DE-749). He commanded ROBERTS until September 1961, when he was assigned as Director Training and Operations, U. S. Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek, Va. Commander Wieland served in this capacity until ordered as Prospective Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in August 1964.



LCDR JOHN A. MAZZOLINI, USN
Executive Officer

LCDR John A. Mazzolini, born on 15 September 1928, received his early education in Hoiyoke, Massachusetts and at Billard Academy New London, Connecticut. He attended the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York where he graduated in December 1950 with a BS degree, Third Officer's License and was commissioned as Ensign in the Merchant Marine and U.S. Naval Reserve.

He entered the Navy in June 1951 and was ordered to the USS MANATEE (AO-58) as assistant First Lieutenant and served as Navigator and Operations Officer. He attended the U.S. Navy Salvage School then at Bayonne, New Jersey, graduating in March 1953 as Salvage Officer and Salvage Diver. He was then ordered to the USS SHAKORI (ATF-102) where he served as Executive Officer. During this assignment he was accepted for augmentation into the regular navy. In March 1954 he was ordered to the USS SHANNON (DM-225) where he served as Operations Officer. In January 1956 he was ordered to the staff Commander Mine Squadron Four as Communications Officer. In March 1957 he was ordered to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Training Division as head of the Seamanship and Navigation desk. At this time he co-authored the 13th edition of Knight's Modern Seamanship. In February 1959 he attended the General Line School, Monterey, California. Upon graduation he attended the Engineer Officer's School, San Diego, California. In February 1960 he was ordered to the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-185) as Main Propulsion Assistant. In May 1961 he was ordered to assume the duties of Engineer Officer. This was followed in October 1962 by a tour of duty with the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Korea before being ordered to the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) for duty.

Lieutenant Commander Mazzolini is married to the former Martha L. Wilson of Tucson, Arizona. They have three children: Jacqueline, age 8; Joele, age 6, and John, age 3. His family is currently residing in Sedona, Arizona.



MR. GEORGE WIRTZ, General Manager
Willamette Iron & Steel Company

Willamette Iron & Steel Company is recognized as a major ship conversion and repair yard. During World War II, the company was engaged in the defense program under Bureau of Ship's contracts. A total of 72 vessels of twelve different types were built, converted, or completed, including troop transports, aircraft carriers, patrol craft, mine sweepers, landing ships, barracks vessels and lighters at a total value of approximately \$175,000,000,000.

In the past ten years, the company has successfully completed contracts for the conversion and repair of ships, both naval and civilian, aggregating in excess of eighty million dollars.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) OFFICERS

CDR DANIEL T. WIELAND Commanding Officer	LCDR JOHN A. MAZZOLINI Executive Officer
LCDR ROBERT J. CORRADO Research Department Head	LT JOHN B. STOCKTON Research Officer
LT JAMES S. ERVEN Research Officer	LT RICHARD H. LEE Electronics Material Officer
LT DONALD H. PEOPLES Research Officer	LTJG RAYMOND FINK Research Officer
LT LESTER A. MORCERF Operations Officer	LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN Engineering Officer
LTJG JOHN T. LILLIS Main Propulsion Assistant	ENS HARRY GRAY Damage Control Assistant
LTJG JOHN B. PERKINS Supply Officer	ENS LARRY G. BRANNAN Disbursing Officer
LTJG SID E. MERIDITH First Lieutenant	ENS MICHAEL D. SWEENEY Deck Division Watch Officer

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) CREW

SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

Johnston, F.L. Smith, W.R.

CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

Barrigar, E.	Haller, B.J.	Quick, E.R.
Boyle, F.W.	Jones, K.A.	Thomas, D.D.
Clemmer, C.H.	Miller, H.C.	Wines, J.D.

FIRST CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Bailey, R.J.	Daniels, G.F.	Combsby, L.R.
Bey, R.	Hill, K.C.	Perry, R.L.
Brown, L.S.	Leach, E.H.	Ware, R.A.
Brown, N.R.	Novosel, J.	
Butler, C.R.	Olson, R.H.	

SECOND CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Baker, D.	Ehachad, A.R.	Preston, D.R.
Bales, L.	Ellison, T.L.	Reitz, A.E.
Berry, T.W.	Field, F.	Ruiz, R.G.
Bird, T.A.	Franco, J.A.	Shawley, A.
Boyer, R.	Giles, R.E.	Stenzel, D.L.
Breisch, T.C.	Hickman, L.W.	Street
Dahlstrom, H.J.	Luttrell, J.E.	Wachtstetter, R.A.
Davidson, B.R.	Miller, J.W.	Washam, G.D.
Donaldson, G.C.	Pickard, N.	Welty, D.C.
		Westerby, C.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) CREW

THIRD CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Allen, R.W.	Kohl, T.A.	Reynolds, J.D.
Baker, E.R.	Krokos, S.L.	Schuele, J.D.
Binzer, D.H.	Lilly, I.	Shepard, J.L.
Blabac, J.R.	Melton, L.D.	Small, W.
Bullock, E.	Mich, K.R.	Spicher, J.C.
Casale, R.	Mills, T.B.	Staub, E.E.
Davis, R.E.	Nearly, J.J.	Stoddard, G.D.
Hall, T.E.	Nixon, L.	Stowell, W.C.
Harrison, D.O.	O'Classen, F.J.	Taylor, R.W.
Huggins, G.W.	Pierce, J.C.	Valano, G.
King, C.E.	Polk, J.A.	Wolford, G.P.
King, G.	Rehm, R.E.	Wentzel, W.L.
		West, D.L.

FIREMEN AND SEAMEN

Ary, S.P.	Funk, C.E.	Ringenil, L.J.
Bagen, P.J.	Gatdula, C.	Roberts, W.M.
Balcer, J.	Gilman, R.C.	Robinson, C.T.
Berry, R.M.	Grandlund, C.L.	Rogers, L.G.
Blaney, T.F.	Hutchings, L.N.	Sasso, H.
Bonsignore, J.A.	Karn, S.L.	Sainz, D.D.
Booe, M.J.	Keentus, H.M.	Seman, M.A.
Brummett, H.L.	LaVergne, R.	Sollenberger, W.
Busson, M.H.	Lynch, D.	St. Clair, R.A.
Butterbaugh, C.L.	Maloney, J.P.	Suaman, C.R.
Buxton, R.L.	Marmon, E.G.	Sweetsia, M.A.
Cockrell, J.A.	McLendon, H.W.	Tarter, J.B.
Conner, J.D.	Mola, E.D.	Valentyn, J.W.
Dewar, T.R.	Morgan, G.T.	Vogt, R.L.
Dotter, D.M.	Newman, R.L.	Wilkison, T.H.
Edwards, W.	O'Brien, O.	Willmart, D.G.
Ferrell, A.	Pattno, M.S.	Willson, T.H.
Fischer, R.N.	Pfohl, J.K.	Zeiler, W.A.
Ford, D.M.	Rice, E.V.	Zimmerman, J.L.


FIREMEN AND SEAMEN

Amos, R.	Gonzalez, E.	Pecue, J.W.
Anderson, L.	Gurchik, S.	Perkins, E.G.
Baker, D.	Hauber, T.I.	Peters, S.L.
Barton, G.	Hazen, D.	Pfeile, C.
Bass, J.M.	Hemphill, N.G.	Reliford, W.D.
Beattie, F.M.	Hendrix, E.	Ringe, R.A.
Bethel, R.	Hight, B.M.	Sales, D.L.
Bobbitt, T.	Hinkle, L.R.	Shellhame
Boles, K.	Huff, T.J.	Smith, C.D.
Brown, F.(n)	Jenkins, A.	Snyder, L.W.
Brown, F.J.	Jewell, G.	Strother, L.
Bush, M.A.	Kasecky, J.	Tomczak, D.
Carr, J.	Kinser, J.H.	Tromblee, H.I.
Chavers, J.	Kloskin, L.S.	Turner, G.I.
Cloniger, S.	Koch, R.K.	Veroni, L.
Cooke, L.B.	Koromah, G.M.	Wagoner, D.L.
Cotten, J.E.	Laine, R.	Wallace, J.
Cronise, J.	Lumpkins, D.	Walraven, R.M.
Cutright, A.	Marfil, S.	Ward, J.W.
Cvetan, S.	McRae, G.	Watson, N.
Daudelin, G.	Meaux, E.	Williamson, J.K.
Dye, G.	Mercado, R.	Winters, C.L.
Edwards, L.	Moody, J.W.	Woods, B.R.
Fleming, J.	Nelson, L.B.	Zwart, L.L.
Fowler, R.W.	Otteni, R.F.	
Gilson, R.D.	Pahidea, S.	



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECOMMISSIONING OF
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)



Southgate Annex to Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

1100 28 June 1968

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Built by

OREGON SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION
Portland, Oregon

Launched

May 1945

Converted by

WILLIAMETTE IRON & STEEL COMPANY
Portland, Oregon

Commissioned

30 December 1964

PUGET SOUND NAVY SHIPYARD
Bremerton, Washington

Decommissioned

28 June 1968

Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

MISSION

The mission of LIBERTY was to conduct technical research projects, in support of U. S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which included electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications.

HISTORY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the STONIS VICTORY, she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific, including Suoyong Bay, Pusan, during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The ship was selected by the Navy for conversion to a technical research ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship Commissioning on December 30, 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Wash. under the new name of LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten towns and cities in the United States which are located in the following states: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. After commissioning, LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal on the way to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia. LIBERTY made four operational deployments to the South Atlantic off the west coast of Africa. While on her fifth deployment, she was attacked on 8 June 1967 in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea by jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats. Thirty-four men lost their lives and another two hundred were injured. Permanent repairs were made to her hull in Malta and she returned to the States on 29 July 1967. LIBERTY began her deactivation phase prior to decommissioning on March 4, 1968 at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia.

PROGRAM

BAND SELECTIONS

Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four Band

INVOCATION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U. S. NAVY

READING OF SHIP'S HISTORY

Lieutenant Wallace I. WHITE, U. S. NAVY
Executive Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

REMARKS

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PLANK OWNER RECOGNITION

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PROGRAM

READING OF ORDERS TO DECOMMISSION USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Captain Charles J. BEERS, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, Naval Inactive Ships
Maintenance Facility, Norfolk, Virginia

HAULING DOWN OF COLORS

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

**CUSTODY OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) TRANSFERRED TO
NAVAL INACTIVE SHIPS MAINTENANCE FACILITY**

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

BENEDICTION

Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL
Chaplain Corps, U. S. NAVY

BAND SELECTIONS

Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four BAND

COMMANDING OFFICER Donald L. BURSON, LCDR, U. S. NAVY

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON was born in Houston, Texas on May 12, 1934. After graduating from the University of Texas he entered Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island in August 1956. His first tour of duty was aboard the USS BLUE (DD-744) as Fire Control Officer. During this tour he was awarded the China Service Medal for participation in the Formosa Patrol. After attending nine weeks of Gunnery Officer School, San Diego, he returned to BLUE as Gunnery Officer, and was appointed Lieutenant (junior grade), and received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in operation in support of Quency. In December 1959, he reported to the Military Sea Transportation Service Office, Houston, Texas as Executive Officer and Control of Shipping Officer. He was promoted to Lieutenant in February 1961. His next assignment was a two year tour as Executive Officer aboard the USS BRUCE (MSC 439) which operated in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean and the Mediterranean. He reported aboard

the USS AUCILLA (AO-56) as Operations Officer in November 1963. He was awarded the Bronze Star in lieu of a second award for the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in the Dominican Republic Contingency. During this time AUCILLA operated in the Western and Northern Atlantic, and Caribbean as part of the Second Fleet. In August 1965 he reported to CINCLANTFLT Staff as Frequency Control Officer in the Communications Division. He was appointed Lieutenant Commander in December 1965 and served at CINCLANTFLT until reporting aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in June 1967 as Executive Officer. He assumed command of LIBERTY on October 02, 1967. He will report to the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-2), as Commanding Officer in August. He is married to the former Miss Dorothy Virginia Curtis of New York City. The BURSON's have two sons.

PREVIOUS COMMANDING OFFICERS

- Commander Daniel T. WILKINS, Jr. - 30 Dec 64 - 25 Apr 66
- Commander William L. MOTTWALE - 25 Apr 66 - 02 Oct 67
- Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON - 02 OCT 66 - 28 Jan

OFFICERS

- Executive Officer.....LT Wallace I. WHITE, Jr.
- Chief Engineer.....LT John J. BILLINGTON
- Operations Officer.....LTJG David G. LUCAS
- Supply Officer.....LTJG Edward A. ADAMS, Jr.
- First Lieutenant.....LTJG Malcolm P. O'MALLEY

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

MMCS Richard J. BROOKS

FIRST CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| BU1 George W. BAYON | MM1 Charles M. MARTIN |
| DC1 Donald F. DAVIS | HM1 Thomas L. VAN CLEAVE |
| SD1 Eddie G. ELDER | CS1 Gordon J. WEDIG |
| RM1 William H. EMBS | |

SECOND CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| E2 Ric'ey G. ALEXANDER | MM2 James R. PATTERSON |
| CS2 Gary L. BARTON | YN2 Martin D. POWLEDGE |
| E1R2 John P. CANNON | EN2 Elmer F. RASMUSSEN |
| SH2 Henry E. DURZENSKI, Jr. | EM2 Richard J. REGER |
| MM1 Jerry G. HOBSON | DC2 James C. SMITH |
| MM2 Charles K. HAUCK | MR2 Larry B. THORN |

* Plank Owner

James M. Ennes

THIRD CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

EM3 Richard E. ANDERSON	SH3 Thomas W. LEMON
EM3 Samuel A. BELL, Jr.	EM3 James A. MARAIO
SFM3 Danny M. BLANTON	MR3 Walter C. McDANIEL
MM3 John E. BOOTH	BT3 David B. MILLER
BT3 Don W. BOTCHER	IC3 Kenneth J. MORRIS
EM3 "J" "C" COLSTON, Jr.	BT3 Richard G. MUMFORD
SFM3 Duilio DFMORI	ETR3 Arthur M. PASCALE
SFM3 George A. EVANS	HM3 Roger D. PEMBERTON
HM3 Eddie T. GREEN	SK3 Jesse H. PERDUE, Jr.
SD3 Troy L. GREEN	SK3 Harvey L. PURCELL
SK3 Edward D. HANDY	MR3 David RAMEY
SM3 Richard L. HARRIS	SK3 Martin J. ROSE
HM3 Ronald L. HURLEY	SK3 Victor J. ROSSI
MM3 Duane D. JOHNSON	EN3 Ronald W. SCHNEIDER
BT3 Robert C. KIDD	BT3 Michael R. SIMPSON
*DC3 John H. LINSER	QM3 Larry J. SLAVENS
SK3 Josef W. LEHMAN	BT3 Joseph D. SPOUDT

FIREMEN - SEAMEN - STEWARDSMEN

FN Benjamin G. AISHE	FN Gerald F. IONASSO
SA Henry A. BEALER	SN Robert L. McALLISTER
FN Maurice A. BRODEUR	SN Walter D. MEHAFFIE
EMFN Luther R. BURRESS	*TN Ramon N. MERCADO
FN Robert L. BUXTON	SN Brent W. MOORHEAD
SI Thomas A. COYCC	FN Thomas COYCC
SA Berkley A. CULBERSON	SN Thomas A. QUINIERO
TN Rodolfo A. DIANA	SMN Michael R. RAPINAC
FN Thomas M. GREEN	SN Stephen J. RICHARD
SN Lowell S. JONES	SA Raymond THOMEN
SN David J. KISIEL	TN Pedro P. WATAN
SN Charles M. MAKO, II	SN Tommy W. WHEELER
	SN James L. WILLIS, Jr.

* Plank Owners



Commanding Officer
USS Liberty (AGTR-5)

**CHANGE OF COMMAND
CEREMONY**

2 OCTOBER 1967

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Selections by COMPHELANT Band

Official Party Proceeds to Rostrum

Invocation by Lieutenant Francis L. Harrel,
CPC, U.S. Navy

Remarks and Reading of Orders by
Commander William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy

Reading of Orders and Remarks by
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. Burson, U.S. Navy

Remarks by Rear Admiral Ben W. Sarver,
COMSEPLANT

National Anthem by COMPHELANT Band

Official Party Leaves Rostrum

Selections by COMPHELANT Band

Reception

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



COMMANDER WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE
UNITED STATES NAVY

Commander William L. McGonagle was born in Wichita, Kansas on November 19, 1926. He enlisted in the Navy in January 1944, and upon completion of the NRUTC program at the University of Southern California in June 1947, was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy.

After a three year tour of duty aboard the USS FRANK KNOX (DDG-742) where he served as First Lieutenant, Gunnery Officer, AEW Officer, Engineering Officer and Communications Officer, Commander McGonagle was ordered to the USS KITE (AKS-29). Aboard the KITE he served as Gunnery Officer, Engineering Officer, and Executive Officer. During his tour the KITE was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Korean Service Medal with six battle stars and the United Nations Ribbon for service during the Korean Conflict.


In January, 1952, Commander McGonagle was assigned to the U.S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany where he was Officer-in-Charge of 18 German built and manned minesweepers engaged in clearance and check sweeping for mines planted during WWII in the Baltic and North Seas.

Upon promotion to Lieutenant in 1953, Commander McGonagle was ordered to the U.S. Naval Communications Station, Philadelphia, where he served as Personnel Officer and Administrative Assistant. Upon completion of this tour in January 1955 Commander McGonagle reported to the USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) as First Lieutenant. He served in this billet for two years before receiving orders to assume command of the USS NATALO (ATF-86).

From January, 1959 to June, 1961 Commander McGonagle was an instructor in Naval Weapons, Operations and Tactics and Naval Leadership for the NROTC Unit at the University of Idaho.

From July, 1961 to July, 1963 Commander McGonagle served as Commanding Officer of the USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42). Commander McGonagle served on the staff of CONSERVAC as Current Operations Officer immediately prior to assuming command of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-4) on April 25, 1966. Commander McGonagle's next duty will be prospective Commanding Officer, USS KILAUEA (AE-23).

Commander McGonagle is married to the former Miss Jean Stuehan of Glendale, California.



LIEUTENANT COMMANDER DONALD L. BURSON
UNITED STATES NAVY

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. Burson was born in Houston, Texas on May 12, 1934. After graduating from the University of Texas he entered Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island in August 1956 and was commissioned Ensign in December 1956.

Lieutenant Commander Burson's first tour of duty was aboard the USS BLUE (DD-744) as Fire Control Officer. During this tour he was awarded the China Service Medal for participation in the Formosa Patrol. After attending nine weeks of Gunnery Officer's School, San Diego, he returned to BLUE as the Gunnery Officer, was appointed Lieutenant Junior Grade, and received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in operations in support of Quoy.

In December 1957, Lieutenant Commander Burson reported to the Military Sea Transport Service Office, Houston, Texas as Executive Officer and Naval Control of Shipping Officer. He was promoted to Lieutenant in February, 1961.

His next assignment was a two year tour as Executive Officer aboard the USS DEWOLF (M80-430) which operated in the western Atlantic and Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Commander Burson reported aboard the USS AUCILLA (AG-66) as Operations Officer in November of 1961. He was awarded the Bronze Star in lieu of a second award for the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in the Dominican Republic Contingency. During this time the AUCILLA operated in the Western and Northern Atlantic and Caribbean as part of the Second Fleet.

In August 1965 he reported to the CINCLANTFLT Staff as Frequency Control Officer in the Communications Division. He was appointed Lieutenant Commander in December of 1967 and served at CINCLANTFLT until reporting aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-6) on June 17, 1967 as Executive Officer.

Lieutenant Commander Burson is married to the former Miss Dorothy Virginia Curtis of New York City.

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

HISTORY OF LIBERTY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in the the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Liberty was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Company in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten cities and towns in the United States named Liberty. These towns and cities are located in the following States: Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.

After commissioning LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal. She arrived in her home port of Norfolk, Virginia on 23 February 1965. LIBERTY left Norfolk on 2 April conducting roll stabilization tank test, shakedown at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and specialized training prior to her return to Norfolk on 10 May.

Since then LIBERTY has completed five operational deployments to the South Atlantic and Mediterranean.

MISSION AND PURPOSE OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The mission of the USS LIBERTY is to conduct technical Research Projects, which in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and communication systems such as satellite communications.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) OFFICERS

CDR WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE
Commanding Officer

LCDR DONALD L. BURSON
Executive Officer

LT WALLACE I. WHITE
Navigator

LT JOHN J. BILLINGTON
Engineering Officer

LTJG DAVID C. LEE
Research Officer

LTJG JOHN D. SCOTT
Damage Control Assistant

ENS DAVID G. LUCAS
First Lieutenant

ENS EDWARD A. ADAMS
Supply Officer

ENS PATRICK M. O'MALLEY
Operations Officer

ENS DANIEL G. KERICH
Main Propulsion Assistant

CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

BROOKS, R. J., MMC



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



*Commanding Officer
USS Liberty (AGTR-5)*

**CHANGE OF COMMAND
CEREMONY**

25 APRIL 1966

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Selections by DESFLOT 8 Band

Official Party Proceeds to Rostrum

Invocation by Lieutenant Frank E. Garver, CMC, U.S.Navy,

Remarks and Reading of Orders by
Commander Daniel T. Wieland, U.S.Navy,

Reading of Orders and Remarks by
Commander William L. McEnagle, U.S.Navy,

Remarks by Captain. Burns W. Spore,
CONSERVATION 8

National Anthem by DESFLOT 8 Band

Official Party Leaves Rostrum

Selections by DESFLOT 8 Band

Reception



COMMANDER DANIEL T. WIELAND JR.
UNITED STATES NAVY

CDR Daniel T. Wieland, Jr., was born at Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania, on August 2, 1922 and subsequently entered the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland in July, 1942. Upon commissioning as Ensign June 6, 1946 he served as Assistant Gunnery Officer in USS JOHN R. STERNE (DD-758) in the Pacific area.

Commander Wieland remained in the Pacific area as Gunnery Officer aboard the USS ENELCOTI (DMC-95) for the next three years. The ship operated extensively in the China area during this period.

The University of Nebraska at Lincoln was Commander Wieland's home for the next two years where he served as Ordnance and Gunnery Instructor.

July of 1951 found Commander Wieland commanding the USS OSPREY (AMS-26). During his tenure the OSPREY was awarded the Navy Unit Citation and Korean Presidential Unit Citation. Commander Wieland was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with combat "V" for his service during the thirteen months aboard OSPREY. During this period, OSPREY was engaged in combat minesweeping operations on both coasts of North Korea and was engaged by shore batteries on eight different occasions.

Commander Wieland was then reassigned to the Advanced Mine Countermeasures Course for the next 32 weeks. Upon completing the course he assumed command of the USS JUBILANT (AM-255). He decommissioned JUBILANT at Orange, Texas in April, 1954.

His next assignment was Officer-in-Charge of the Combat Information School at the Fleet Training Center, Charleston, S.C.

From June 1956 until May 1958 he was assigned to the Joint U.S. Military Mission of Aid to Turkey at Istanbul, Turkey. His primary field during this period was Ordnance and Gunnery and Minesweeping advisor to the Turkish Fleet and Naval Academy. This tour of duty was followed by a one year tour as Executive Officer of USS WILLARD KEITH (DD-775).

In September 1959 Commander Wieland assumed command of USS ROBERTS (DE-740). He commanded ROBERTS until September 1961, when he was assigned as Director Training and Operations, U.S. Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek, Va. Commander Wieland assumed command of USS LIBERTY (AOA-5) on 30 December 1964 upon her commissioning. Commander Wieland's next duty will be as Commander Mine Division 44.

Commander Wieland is married to the former Miss Norma Oplinger Shickshiny, Pennsylvania.



COMMANDER WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE
UNITED STATES NAVY

Commander William L. McGonagle was born in Wichita, Kansas on November 19, 1926. He enlisted in the Navy in January 1944, and upon completion of the NROTC program at the University of Southern California in June 1947, was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy.

After a three year tour of duty aboard the USS FRANK KNOX (DD-742) where he served as First Lieutenant, Gunnery Officer, ASW Officer, Engineering Officer and Communications Officer, Commander McGonagle was ordered to the USS KITE (AMS-22). Aboard the KITE he served as Gunnery Officer, Engineering Officer, and Executive Officer. During his tour the KITE was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Korean Service Medal with six battle stars and the United Nations Ribbon for service during the Korean Conflict.

In January, 1952, Commander McGonagle was assigned to the U.S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany where he was Officer-in-Charge of 18 German built and manned minesweepers engaged in clearance and check sweeping for mines planted during WWI in the Baltic and North Seas.

Upon promotion to Lieutenant in 1953, Commander McGonagle was ordered to the U.S. Naval Communications Station, Philadelphia, where he served as Personnel Officer and Administrative Assistant. Upon completion of this tour in January 1955, Commander McGonagle reported to the USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) as First Lieutenant. He served in this billet for two years before receiving orders to assume command of the USS MATACO (ATF-80).

From January, 1959 to June, 1961 Commander McGonagle was an instructor in Naval Weapons, Operations and Tactics and Naval Leadership for the NROTC Unit at the University of Idaho.

From July, 1961 to July, 1963 Commander McGonagle served as Commanding Officer of the USS RECLAIMER (ARS-47). Prior to receiving orders as the Prospective Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY (AOA-5) Commander McGonagle served on the staff of COMSERNVPAC as Operations Officer.

Commander McGonagle is married to the former Jean Stoneham of Glendale, California.

HISTORY OF LIBERTY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May 1946 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in the the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Liberty was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Company in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten cities and towns in the United States named Liberty. These towns and cities are located in the following States: Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.

After commissioning LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal. She arrived in her home port of Norfolk, Virginia on 23 February 1965. LIBERTY left Norfolk on 2 April conducting roll stabilization tank test, shakedown at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and specialized training prior to her return to Norfolk on 10 May.

Since then LIBERTY has completed two operational deployments from 15 June to 22 October 1965, and from 3 January to 21 March 1966. Both of these deployments took her to the South Atlantic where she operated for the most part off the West Coast of Africa.

MISSION AND PURPOSE OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The mission of the USS LIBERTY is to conduct technical Research Projects, which in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and communication systems such as satellite communications.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) OFFICERS

CDR DANIEL T. WIELAND Commanding Officer	LCDR PHILIP M. ARMSTRONG Executive Officer
LCDR ROBERT J. CORRADO Research Department Head	LCDR JOHN B. STOCKTON Research Officer
LT JAMES S. ERVEN Communications Officer	LT RICHARD H. LEE Electronics Material Officer
LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN Engineering Officer	LT DONALD H. PEOPLES Research Officer
LT RAYMOND C. FINK Research Officer	LTJG PHILIP A. CAMPBELL First Lieutenant
LTJG MICHAEL D. SWEENEY Operations Officer	LTJG HARRY D. GRAY Main Propulsion Assistant
LTJG LARRY G. BRANNAN Supply Officer	LTJG JOHN A. McCORKLE Navigator
ENS RALPH N. SULLIVAN 1st/2nd Division Officer	

CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

JOHNSTON, F.L., CTCS	THOMSON, D.D., CTCS
BOYLE, F.W., SKC	CHAPMAN, P.O., CTC
CLEMMER, C.H., MMC	HAGGARD, H.C., CTC
HALLER, B.J., CTC	MILLER, H.C., CTC
ORCHARD, G.O., CTC	QUICK, E.R., CTC
WINES, J.D., CTC	



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Construction and planning of USS LIBERTY

2 ^{EST} Sept 1976

Talked with Jack Shannon during the week about ship and reviewed old (1964) files on the TRSs. Files included a locally made summary and two OPNAV instructions:

OPNAVINST 09010.202 (OP-42 Ser 0653P42 5 JULY 1963
Subject: Approved Characteristics for TRS (AGTR),
SCB Project No. 192B, FY 1963 (U) (signed by John Sylvester, dpy CNO

References were: OPNAVINST 09010.177 of 19 April 1962 and
OPNAVINST 9010.176 of 12 April 1962

OPNAVINST 09010.177 was also in the file and included specification for all of the positions (27 of them) along with an outline of the mission of the ship which was quite general: "collect foreign electronic emanations which may or may not contain information."

The ship was to accommodate	<u>Officers</u>	<u>CPOs</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ship	10	8	153	171
Resch Ops	9	10	135	154
Margin	2	2	14	18
	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>302</u>	<u>343</u>

The locally prepared brief on TRSs says that TRSs were built by the Navy to satisfy a 1956 requirement of NSA. At one point there were plans for seven AGTRs, but TRS-6 and TRS-7 were disapproved by JOD. The paper also reports (and perhaps this was the reason for disapproval) that the costs of the ships were:

TRS-1	13,000,000	♦ (It is not clear from the paper whether 39,000,000 was the cost of TRS-4 & 5 total, or each.)
TRS-2	29,000,000	
TRS-3	29,000,000	
TRS-4	39,000,000	
TRS-5	39,000,000	

The original complement of LIBERTY^{NSG} officers were:

RSCH OPS DEPT HEAD	LCDR ROBERT J. CORRADO
OPERATIONS OFCR	LT JOHN B. STOCKTON
ASST. OPS OFCR	LTJG RAYMOND C. FINK, JR.
PER	LTJG DONALD H. PEOPLES
COMMUNICATIONS	LT JAMES S. ERVIN
MAINTENANCE	LT RICHARD H. LEE

TRSSCOMM: Shannon said that TRSSCOMM was originally a land based system used successfully by GENSER. When GENSER abandoned the system, Commander White in G-40 arranged to put TRSSCOMM on the TRs (and eventually got some kind of medal for it). The system never really worked well. Jack attended a meeting at the Pentagon which was called to decide the future of the system, and CNSG defended it. Some of the people at CNSG HQ measured message volume against cost and calculated that the system cost \$5.00 per word for the few messages that were sent, but this figure never reached the decision makers.

TRSSCOMM: Came across citation for COMMANDER WILLIAM C. WHITE, USNR, Deputy Director for Logistics, Naval Security Group. Citation outlines how he obtained two transceivers that had been declared surplus by the Air Force and arranged to have them modified into a ship/shore microwave moon relay system between Cheltenham and USS OXFORD. Oxford "prototype" installation became operational 25 February 1964 two years after conception.

On 28 January 1966 his accomplishment of the first ship/shore microwave moon relay system was recognized by a Navy Commendation Medal given to him at personnel inspection at NAVSECSTA by Captain Ralph E. Cook, USN. The citation concluded with the words, "The magnitude of this unique and most significant accomplishment places it in the front rank of historic happenings in the annals of Naval Communications."

Files on TRSSCOMM show planning that was underway to replace all TRSSCOMM installations in 1972-73 with systems geared to artificial satellites.

CONSTRUCTION OF SHIP: (references)

1. Memorandum for the Chairman, Ship Characteristics Board (OP-943L/Ser 010381P94)
26 March 1962
Subject: Approved Characteristics for Technical Research Ship (AG) Conversion, SCB Project #192; changes to (U)
2. Memo #1 lists ref: OPNAVINST 09010.129 dated 25 April 1958.
No subject or further identification provided.
3. OPNAVINST 09010.202 dated 5 July 1963 (OP-42 Ser 0653P42)
Subject: Approved Characteristics for Technical Research Ship (AGTR), SCB Project #192B, FY 1963 (U)
Appendix A to Enclosure 1 details electronics including each position to be installed in Research Radio
4. OPNAVINST 09010.177 dated 19 April 1962 (OP-42 Ser 0361P42)
Subject: TRS (AG) (Conversion), SCB Project No. 192A; Approved Characteristics for (U)
(This instruction also details the electronics including Rsch Radio)
(This instruction is Ref (a) to #3 above)
5. OPNAVINST 9010.76 of 12 April 1962
(This is reference (b) to #3 above, and is not further identified)

MORE ON TRSSCOMM

12 October 1976

TRSSCOMM operated in the S band (1700-2400MHz) and used 10,000^{WATTS} (10KW) power.

The ships had 16' dish antennas.
Shore Stations had 84' dish antennas.

The first two transceivers (the ones that CDR White picked up as surplus) were AN/FRC-56 transceivers. After the initial prototypes checked out, AN/FRC-137 transceivers were used ashore & AN/SRC-33 transceivers afloat.

The history of these things admits that there were serious problems with shipboard manipulation of the antennas because of the moving platform and vibrations, but a writer claimed that these could be worked out. Except for movement of the shipboard antenna, the system was sound, the papers say. May have to find substitute for hydraulic system, writer guesses.

Commander White personally appeared before a committee of Congress to argue for the money to install TRSSCOMM. Members were: Strom Thurmond,

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNITED STATES SIXTH FLEET TASK ORGANIZATION

Main task forces are:

- TF 60 - Attack Carrier Striking Force with two attack carriers, screening cruisers, frigates, and destroyers.
- TF 61 - Amphibious Force with amphibious ships to transport and land a reinforced Marine battalion, and supporting minesweepers.
- TF 62 - Fleet Marine Force, a reinforced Marine battalion landing team with some 1800 men with tanks, artillery, trucks, and helicopters.
- TF 63 - Service Force, consisting of underway replenishment ships, tenders and repair ships.
- TF 64 -
- TF 65 -
- TF 66 - Anti-Submarine Force with one carrier and screening destroyers.
- TF 67 -
- TF 68 - consisting of several attack submarines
- TF 69 - "the fleet ballistic submarine in the Mediterranean."

source: JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1970-71, page 386.

TG 60.2 was Saratoga and escorts according to 26JUL67 Navy Times Story.

CARRIER TASK FORCE (CTF 63?) UNDER COMMAND Y
RETIR ADY L.R. 6813

SHIPS INCLUDED

OILER TRUCKEE
DD LLOYD THOMAS
GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER SAMPSON

NOTES

CNO in 1967 was Admiral David L. McDonald

CONTACT ALFA was USNS PRIVATE JOSE F. VALDEZ T-AG 169, returning from TRS duty on East Coast of Africa. VALDEZ passed through Suez Canal just before it closed. Bob Maze was aboard

USNS JOSEPH P. MUELLER T-AG 171 was on TKS duty off Cuba in February, 1968, when she lost her engines. She was well protected and had good communications, according to Ed Meders who was aboard. Ed says the ship's teletype circuits were patched through directly to JCS headquarters. As the ship drifted toward the beach, fighters were scrambled from a U.S. air base and stayed in the area ready to respond within one or two minutes. Mueller was (since Liberty incident) accompanied at all times by a destroyer that remained five miles farther out to sea, and this destroyer came in to assist. Several tow lines were passed between Mueller and the DD, but they kept breaking. Finally, just as the ship was about to drift into Cuban waters, a line held and the ship was towed out of the area. This was apparently never picked up by the press except for one small article in a Chicago paper.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

AIRCRAFT RANGES

USA-NORTHROP F-5

MAXIMUM SPEED (F5A mach 1.4 / F5B Mach 1.34)
COMBAT RADIUS with maximum payload & five minutes combat
F5A 215 miles (346 km)
F5B 225 miles (362 km)
COMBAT RANGE with max fuel, two 750lb bombs, 600 lb reserve fuel
F5A 550 miles
F5B 560 miles

jane's page 404

✦ USA-McDONNELL PHANTOM II F-4

MAXIMUM SPEED Holds world record: 1066.48MPH - 1969
COMBAT RADIUS
INTERCEPTOR - over 900 miles (1450 km)
GROUND ATTACK - over 1,000 miles (1600 km)
FERRY RANGE 2300 miles (3700 km)***

jane's page 374

✦ USA-McDONNELL DOUGLAS SKYHAWK (U.S. Navy designation F-4)

MAXIMUM SPEED A-4A 664 MPH (1,068 km)
MAX RANGE with external tanks - over 2,000 miles (3,200 km)

jane's page 384

SWEDEN-SAAB 37 VIGGEN THUNDERBOLT

MAXIMUM SPEED mach two plus
COMBAT RADIUS with external armament
hi-lo-hi over 620 miles (1,000 km)
low only over 310 miles (500km)

jane's page 175

SWEDEN-SAAB 35 DRÖKEN

MAXIMUM SPEED
fuel capacity 880 imp gals (4,000 ltr) internal fuel capacity
1650 imp gals (7,500 ltr) total with external tanks
RADIUS OF ACTION
hi-lo-hi internal fuel only 350 miles (564 km)
hi-lo-hi with two 1,000lb bombs & two drop tanks 447 mi (720km)
FERRY RANGE with maximum int & ext fuel 1760 miles (2840 km)

***Dana Adams Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East says (on page 248)
"...a phantom can fly 1,600 miles unrefueled."

ITALY - FIAT G91Y

TYPICAL COMBAT RADIUS 466 miles (750km)

FERRY RANGE with maximum fuel (2,175 miles) (3,500km)

jane's page 128

INTERNATIONAL - SEPECAT - JAGUAR

RANGE ON INTERNAL FUEL ONLY

hi-lo-hi 775 miles (1250km)

low only 405 miles (650km)

RANGE WITH EXTERNAL FUEL

hi-lo-hi 1,025 miles (1650 km)

low only 530 miles (850 km)

FERRY RANGE with external fuel 2800 miles (4,500 km)

FRANCE - DASSAULT MIRAGE G

Ferry Range 4,000 miles (6,500 km)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

GUNNERY DOCTRINE

1. ORDNANCE INSTALLATIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

The ordnance installation aboard the USS LIBERTY consist of four single mount .50 caliber machine guns located port and starboard on the O1 level frame 37 and port and starboard on the O3 level frame 89. These guns are .50 caliber Browning Machine Guns, M2, Heavy Barrel with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. The guns have a firing arc of 220° in the forward mounts port and starboard and 140° in the amidships mounts, all mounts have limit rails installed to prevent the guns from shooting in to the ship's superstructure. They may be used to defend against either low flying aircraft or small surface craft, but their primary function is to act as a deterrent to any attempt by hostiles to board the ship.

2. STANDARD COMMANDS AND REPORTS.

In order for the .50 caliber mounts to be as effective as possible, there must be a thoroughly understood and standardized system of commands and reports utilized.

a. Standard Procedures. The following actions will be carried out when General Quarters is sounded:

1. Gun crews proceed immediately to stations bringing the topside if not already mounted.
2. When sufficient personnel are on station, the station will report "Manned" to Gun Control over the 5JP circuit.
3. When ready to open fire at a reduced rate with sufficient personnel on hand, each station will report "Ready".
4. When the station is in a fully ready condition with sufficient personnel to service the station at a normal rate, and ammunition is nearby, the station reports "Manned and Ready".
5. During peacetime when conditions do not require the breaking out of ammunition, the reports of "Ready" and "Manned and Ready" will be modified by the words "Except for Ammunition".

b. Ammunition Commands.

1. "Ammunitions Type" (followed by a type such as armor piercing or ball) is a command to gun crews to designate the type of ammunition.
2. "Replace Ammunition" is a command to replace all ammunition expended from ready stowage. A report of completion is made when the ammunition has been replaced.

c. Firing Commands.

1. "Standby" is the command for loaders to prepare to load.
2. "Load" is a command to load the guns. This command may be omitted, in which case the guns are loaded at the command "Commence firing".
3. "Commence Fire" is the command from the controlling station to load and open fire on previously specified targets or to resume fire after a command to "Check Fire".

c. **Firing Commands. (Cont'd)**

4. "Check Fire" is the command to discontinue fire, usually temporarily. All other functions of the control parties and gun crews continue. Loaded hot guns must be fired as soon as possible on safe bearings in accordance with established procedures.

5. "Silence" is a command used in case of a serious or potentially serious casualty. It may be given by an observer or by any other person. At the command Silence every man in the vicinity freezes in his tracks and remains there without noise or confusion until further orders are given.

6. "Carry On" is the command to continue normal battery operations that have been interrupted by the command "Silence".

7. "Cease Fire" is the command to stop firing. A command to cease fire does not signify the end of an action or mission. As soon as "Cease Fire" is given, hot guns are unloaded on safe bearings as soon as possible. Immediately after "Cease Fire" all guns will report any casualties to material or personnel experienced during action and the status of the gun, whether loaded or clear followed shortly by an accurate account of ammunition expended.

8. "At Ease" is the command given to allow the man at stations to relax when they must remain at stations.

d. **Open Fire Doctrine.**

The command to "Commence Fire" will normally come from the Commanding Officer via the Gun Control Officer. Exceptions to this are made during wartime as follows:

<u>Surface Target</u>	<u>Gun Control</u>	<u>Mt. Operator</u>
a. submarine or periscope, not previously identified as being friendly, sighted.	X	
b. torpedo or wake directed toward ship.	X	
c. positively identified enemy close aboard during a melee.	X	X
<u>Air Target</u>		
a. Plane(s) making a threatening approach.	X	
b. Plane(s) making surprise attack.	X	X
c. Any plane attacking after an air engagement has started.	X	X
d. Radio control bomb or Rocket approaching.	X	X

3. **TARGET DESIGNATION AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.**

a. **Bearing:** All reports of bearing are given in three digits. All ciphers in bearing reports are pronounced "zero". For example bearing 050 is reported "zero five zero".

b. **Range:** 1. When the range is an even hundred or thousand, it is reported as the number of hundreds or thousands as in the following example:
 "Range eight hundred" (800)
 "Range three thousand" (3000)

3. TARGET DESIGNATION AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURES. (Cont'd)

2. When the range is below 1000 and not an even hundred each digit is pronounced. For example:

"Range nine seven hundred" (970)

3. When the range is above 1000 and ends in an even hundred it is reported as follows:

"Range four seven hundred" (4700)

c. Altitude: The absence of height finding radar makes an estimate of altitude largely guess work and since there is no automatic or mechanical fire control it is largely unimportant.

d. Position Angle: The angle above the horizon of and aircraft in degrees as follows:

"Position angle one" (1 degree)

"Position angle forty seven" (47 degrees)

e. Due to the limited ordnance capabilities of LIBERTY the primary responsibility for target acquisition is with the mount operator. Initial target designation may come from gun control, but as indicated in Open Fire doctrine, it may be initiated by the mount operator.

4. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE-SURFACE.

a. Type and method of fire. Rapid continuous fire is accomplished in short bursts (three to five rounds per barrel) until hitting gun range is established, at which time a shift is made to normal rapid continuous fire.

b. Spotting is direct and will be corrected by the individual gunner.

c. Maximum range of opening fire is 2000 yards.

d. Type of projectiles: API, API-T, and Incendiary.

5. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE - ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

a. Type and method of fire - All firing is continuous fire. Fire is interrupted only when the target is obscured.

b. Maximum range of open fire is 2000 yards.

c. Type of projectile - API, API-T, and Incendiary.

d. Priority of targets - based on best estimate of enemy capabilities or threats.

6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST.

Prior to operation of the .50 caliber machine gun the following items must be checked by the mount operator. A similar inspection will be held after firing.

a. Check the general appearance of the weapon.

b. Full the bolt to the rear, release, and check for smooth operation.

c. Check the cover latch and be sure that the spring has enough tension to keep the cover securely latched.

6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST. (Cont'd)


- d. Raise the cover and check the functioning of the cover detent pawl.
- e. Move the belt feed lever from side to side and make sure the belt feed mechanism moves in its full travel in both directions.
- f. Check the back plate latch and lock.
- g. Check to see if the bore is clear.
- h. Check the head space.
- i. Check timing.

7. FIRING SECTORS AND FIRING ARC.

The mount firing sectors are as follows: Mount 51 from 000° to 090° R; mount 52 from 270° R to 360° R; Mount 53 from 090° R to 160° R; Mount 54 from 200° R to 270° R. Any target in these arcs or sectors is the responsibility of the respective mount.

The mounts firing arcs are limited as follows: Mount 51 from 320° R to 160° R; Mount 52 from 200° R to 040° R; Mount 53 from 020° R to 160° R; Mount 54 from 200° R to 340° R.

Mount 51's firing sector is designate Sector I, Mount 52's firing sector is designated Sector II, Mount 53's firing sector is designated Sector III, Mount 54's firing sector is designated Sector IV.



U. S. S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09801

History OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May of 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The ship was selected by the Willamette Iron and Steel Co. in February 1963.

The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the 19 cities and towns in the United States named LIBERTY. These towns and cities are located in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas.

On her maiden voyage from Bremerton to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, the LIBERTY stopped for a port visit in Rodan, Panama, Canal Zone. Sea trials took her to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the ports of Key West, Florida and Montigo Bay, Jamaica. The LIBERTY recently returned from her fourth cruise to South Atlantic waters. Ports visited during this time included Santa Cruz and Las Palmas in the Canary Islands; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Capetown, Republic of South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola and Monrovia, Liberia.

The mission of the LIBERTY is to conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) is a unit of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, assigned to the Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and under the operational control of Commander Service Squadron EIGHT.