

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMONS VICTORY (AG-168), she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Suoyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1950. The SIMONS VICTORY was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Company in February 1963. The conversion culminated in commissioning on 30 December 1964 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name USS LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten cities and towns in the United States named Liberty. These towns and cities are located in the following states:

Indiana
Illinois
Missouri
Mississippi
Kentucky

New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Texas

Since her commissioning the ship has been a test, research and development platform for the Navy's Communications Projects. The need for this type of ship became apparent as modern communications including earth satellites, produced many phenomena not consistent with current research data. As a highly mobile and sophisticated station, the LIBERTY is sent to various areas to participate in experiments with new communications methods. The ship also has a limited capability of conducting routine hydrographic and oceanographic observations.

After commissioning LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton, Washington undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal. Under the Command of Commander Daniel T. WIELAND, Jr., USN, (r), arrived in her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia on 23 February 1965. LIBERTY left Norfolk on 2 April conducting roll stabilization tank test, shakedown at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and specialized training prior to her return to Norfolk on 10 May.

On her initial deployment from 15 June 1965 through 22 October 1965, LIBERTY visited the Canary Islands; Lagos, Nigeria; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Capetown, South Africa; and Dakar, Senegal.

Social functions by and for the ship's company were enjoyed in all ports. The Ivory Coast Armed Forces in Abidjan staged an outdoor cookout for the crew, replete with native food and drink. LIBERTY sailors swapped hats, danced in a torrential tropical downpour, and returned to the ship drenched but delighted with new foods and friendships.

After this Abidjan visit, in a message to the State Department and the LIBERTY, United States Ambassador Morgan praised the Officers and Crew for their contribution toward cementing Ivorian - American relations.

LIBERTY delivered Peace Corps and Project Hand Clasp material to African ports during her second deployment from 4 January 1965 through 22 March 1966, and revisited old friends in Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos.

Port calls are eagerly awaited by LIBERTY personnel since her employment schedule involves periods of three to four months independent steaming, with port visits of only two or three days after three to four weeks at sea. To enable her to fulfill her operational commitments, she is capable of feeding her crew for 120 days; cruising 15,000 miles without refueling; supplying her crew with 12,000 gallons of fresh water daily; and caring for the crew with a modern sick bay including dental facilities and a Medical Officer is assigned for each deployment.

For underway entertainment, LIBERTY is outfitted with a complete hobby shop, including a slot car racing track, various athletic gear for games and sport shooting, daily movies, a well stocked library, and complete ship's store and soda fountain facilities. Fishing is frequently enjoyed as is an occasional volleyball game topside while underway, sunbathing, topside cook-outs and talent programs.

These extensive facilities and capabilities of LIBERTY are but tools to implement her mission. The goodwill and spirit generated by her crew are, in turn, reflections of her competence in executing this mission. She has been officially commended by a Department of Defense Agency for the excellence of her Research operations. Admiral T. H. MOORER, Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, visited LIBERTY on 25 May 1966 and subsequently expressing his appreciation for a fine briefing on LIBERTY research operations and commented that he was very favorably impressed with the condition of the ship and the appearance of the crew.

During her inport period, following the second deployment, Commander Daniel T. WIELAND, Jr., USN of Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania, relinquished command of the LIBERTY to Commander William L. MOGONAGLE, USN of Wichita, Kansas on 25 April 1966. Among the visiting dignitaries were RADM H. A. RENKEL, USN, Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and Commodore B. W. STONE, USN, Commander Service Squadron EIGHT.

The LIBERTY's third operational deployment extended from 31 May to 30 August 1966. Dakar, Senegal; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola, and Monrovia, Liberia, were visited by LIBERTY during this cruise. The LIBERTY in keeping with her rapidly growing reputation as "an ambassador of goodwill", again delivered material for the Peace Corps and Project Hand Clasp to various African ports. In addition, 6,000 pounds of books were presented to the Nigerian Armed Forces by the LIBERTY.

The LIBERTY departed Norfolk, Virginia, the ship's homeport, on her fourth cruise 1 November 1966. Thus far during her present deployment the LIBERTY has visited Las Palmas, Canary Islands; Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The LIBERTY again embarked with materials and books for distribution in several west African countries.

The second anniversary of the commissioning of USS LIBERTY was observed at sea with a ceremony consisting of cutting a cake to celebrate the occasion and a short speech by the senior "plank owner" still aboard, LT George H. GOLDEN, USN, Engineering Officer. There were only forty other plank owners aboard at this time.

USS LIBERTY is a unit of the United States Atlantic Fleet assigned to the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and administratively assigned to and under the operational control of Commander, Service Squadron EIGHT.

The year 1966 ended with LIBERTY on station with all hands diligently exerting every effort to fulfill the mission assigned.

DATA OF INTEREST

Crew: 17 Officers, 300 Enlisted Men

Length: Overall 455 feet

Draft: (full load) 29 feet

Beam: 60 feet

Displacement: 11,500 tons

Propulsion: Steam turbine - single screw 8,500 hp

Boats: 26 foot Motor whaleboat, capacity 22

33 foot Personnel boat, capacity 45

33 foot Utility boat, capacity 45

24 CO2 inflatable lifeboats: capacity 15

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-9)
FPO NEW YORK, 09301

DUTY DEPT: ENG

PLAN OF THE DAY

----- Saturday, 06 MAY 1967 -----

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

WORKING UNIFORM

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Continue Field Day
1300 - Commenced Holiday Routine
1300 - Matinee in the Mess Hall
1400 - Matinee in the Wardroom

NOTES

1. There will be a cookout on the 01 level aft (weather permitting) on Sat., 13 MAY at 1630. Anyone interested in providing entertainment (combos, vocal groups, etc) please submit names to Ship's Office.

2. A zone inspection is scheduled for 1000, Saturday, 13 May.


3. Commencing today shirts may be removed topside. When shirts of "T" shirts are worn, hats will also be worn. When stripped to the waist, hats will NOT be worn. Bridge watch will be in full uniform.

4. A satellite communications system known as TRSSCOM1 (Technical Research Ship Special Communications) has recently been installed on board. The system employs high power microwaves concentrates into a very narrow beam of RF energy. This energy field is considered dangerous to health and can result in damage to certain sensitive parts of the human body. This danger area exists in the direction that the antenna is pointed and extends 600 feet in that direction, and is approximately 20 feet wide.

To preclude the possibility of injury, no one will be allowed on the 01 level aft of the superstructure during the periods of operation.

Operation periods between reveille and taps will be announced over the IMC. At all other times the position of the antenna should be noted. The normal stow position of the antenna is pointing directly up. Where doubt exists, the OOD should be contacted before entering the danger area. The operating spaces are out of bounds to all hands, except assigned personnel, at all times.

5. Because this ship will visit areas where malaria is prevalent, CHLOROQUINE PRIMAQUINE tablets will be dispensed to all personnel each week. As a preventive measure, containers will be placed in serving line on the mess decks.



THE COMMISSION PENNANT

The distinctive mark, other than the National Ensign, of a ship of the Navy in commission is a flag or pennant at a masthead.

The commission pennant traces its origin back to various sources.

During the days of chivalry noblemen were identified by a personal pennant or banner.

There is a story of a sea battle in which the Dutch raised a broom to their masthead to indicate their desire for a clean sweep. The British replied with a horsewhip to show their intentions toward the Dutch.

The commission pennant as shown here, combines both the banner and whip.

The pennant presented to Captain WYNNAGE today is the one used aboard during his tour of command.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: SUPPLY

PLAN OF THE DAY

-----FRIDAY, 05 MAY, 1967-----

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY

OFFICERS & CPO'S: TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED: CLEAN DUNGAREES

WORKING UNIFORM

TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0730 All Hands fall in on the O1 level aft for presentation of advancement certificates and awards.

0815 (about) Commence field day.

1300 All off duty helmsmen and the after steering General Quarters Team report to after steering for instruction and drill.

NOTES

1. The following named personnel will receive awards and certificates at 0800. Uniform for recipients is Tropical White Long. All other personnel may wear working uniforms:
- | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| THOMAS, Charles J. | JOHNSON, Melvin P. | REDENBARCEA, Wayne J. |
| AMEEN, Timothy P. | THORNTON, Thomas R. | KIDD, Robert C. |
| ANDERSON, James M. | MYERS, David V. | MEGNETT, James H. |
| BENKERT, Joseph A. | RITENBURG, Douglas | OLIPHANT, Glenn R. |
| BOWEN, Larry L. | SCHNELL, Robert J. | PATTEN, Dennis A. |
| CALLIGAN, John J. | AIMETTI, Americo F. | MATTHEWS, James A. |
| CARPENTER, Joseph | BROWN, Francis | WHITE, Stanley W. |
| CONVERSE, Jerry L. | BRUMMETT, Gary W. | RAMMELSBERG, Albert |
| EIKLEBERRY, Dennis M. | CARNAHAN, David M. | BROOKS, Richard J. |
| GALLO, Ernest A. | DEMORI, Duilio | SMITH, James C. |
| JONES, Charles F. | FISHER, John W. | BYRD, Charles E. |
| KEENE, Richard W. | HALBARDIER, James T. | SMITH, Thomas B. |
| LANDIS, Calvin L. | HAUCK, Charles K. | STOUDT, Joseph D. |
| STURMAN, Richard S. | HAZEN, David | WARD, Jerry W. |
| MOWREY, John R. | TOURNET, Phillip F. | HIGGINS, Alan |
| | MEYER, Stephen E. | |

2. Yesterday's General Quarters went more smoothly than anticipated considering the number of new men assigned. It is planned to muster and instruct Repair Parties separate from General Quarters until they are well organized and trained. When these Repair Party sessions are scheduled, personnel should arrange for their own watch reliefs/standbys ahead of time.

3. Nobody likes to drill. When we become proficient at all general drills, further drilling will be held to a minimum. All hands should make a concerted effort to learn as quickly as possible so that we may have a relaxed and enjoyable cruise.

4. Beginning Monday, 08 MAY 67 the Ship's Office will be open for personal business to all enlisted personnel between the hours of 0800 and 1130.

3. To assist personnel who have recently reported aboard in becoming more familiar with the ship, the following brief history is provided:

History of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the SIMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May of 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The ship was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research Ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron and Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the 10 cities and towns in the United States named LIBERTY. These towns and cities are located in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas.

On her maiden voyage from Bremerton to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, the LIBERTY stopped for a port visit in Rodman, Panama, Canal Zone. Sea trials took her to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the ports of Key West, Florida and Montigo Bay, Jamaica. The LIBERTY recently departed for her fifth cruise to South Atlantic waters. Ports visited during the past four deployments include Santa Cruz and Las Palmas in the Canary Islands; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Capetown, Republic of South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola and Monrovia, Liberia.

The mission of the LIBERTY is to conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communication

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) is a unit of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, assigned to the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and under the operational control of Commander Service Squadron EIGHT.

P. M. ARMSTRONG
Executive Officer



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

31 August 1983

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes,

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of July 19, 1983, in which you seek information concerning the mission of the USS ANDREW JACKSON (SSBN 619) in June 1967. The request was forwarded to this command by Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet.

Unfortunately, the documents you seek are not available at this command.

Sincerely,

David W. Thomas

David W. Thomas
LCDR USN
Force Public Affairs Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

26 August 1983

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes,

This is a final response to your Freedom of Information Act request of July 19, 1983, in which you requested information concerning the mission of the USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-619) in June 1967.

Enclosed is the Patrol Upkeep schedule for Rota, Spain from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967. However, the CINCLANT Transit Order 57-67 and COMSUBRON SIXTEEN Transit Order 234-67, requested in your letter, were destroyed in accordance with existing procedures prior to 1970.

The direct cost of search and duplication services performed in complying with your request has been determined to be under \$30, therefore, you will not be billed.

Any additional available information regarding your request will be provided directly to you by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare) (OP-02).

Sincerely,

Owen J. Resweber

OWEN J. RESWEBER
Captain, U. S. Navy
Public Affairs Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANTHONY PEARSON (CONSPIRACY OF
SILENCE) CLAIMS SSBN ANDREW
JACKSON OPERATED WITH THE LIBERTY.
THE LOGS SHOW SHE CAME TO
ROTA FROM WEST (SET CLOCKS AHEAD)
ON CINCLANT TRANSIT ORDER.

THEREFORE, AD WAS MAKING TRANSIT OF
ATLANTIC (WHILE CONDUCTING SPECIAL
OPERATIONS) FROM UNITED STATES TO
SPAIN. IT WAS NOT OPERATING IN
THE MED AS PEARSON CLAIMS. ALSO,
SHE APPROACHED ROTA FROM WEST
(ON EASTERLY COURSE).

USS ANDREW JACKSON SS-324 ZONE DESCRIPTION 0(B) DATE Wednesday 14 June 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1600		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

LEGEND
1. CELESTIAL
2. ELECTRONIC
3. VISUAL
4. D. R.

REMARKS

08-08 Underway conducting special operations in accordance with AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT 57-67. Other commercial operations in accordance with COMUSMACV TRANSPORT 224-67.

P.P. Fitzpatrick
P.P. FITZPATRICK, LT, USN

08-12 Underway as before 0800 Surfaced because DEWOT 1000 started the maneuvering match, steering various courses at various speeds standing into RFA Harbor 1001. Moved station with USS CANBUS (AS-24) with standard maneuver lines west of four ships. Other ships in the net are USS TAIK H. BOE (4504645) and USS GEORGE WASHINGTON COLEMAN (SSAN 67) on the port side of USS CANBUS. CANBUS is moving star to gun two at the Japanese Island Base in RFA Harbor. Other ships present include various units of the 1st Fleet that are in the 5000 COMUSMACV SURFACED included in CANBUS. 1700 Ship closer at about one hour to compare with gun time (1000).

D. W. McCarty
D. W. MCCARTY, LT, USN

12-17 Arrived at RFA 1530 Commenced off loading transport.

E. J. Benner
E. J. BENNER, LTJG, USN

17-24 Moved as before. 1755 Secured off loading transport.

J. R. Fisher
J. R. FISHER, LTJG, USN

EXAMINED

R. Anderson LCDR U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS Albatross (SS-382) ZONE DESCRIPTION 0 B DATE 1-13 JUNE 19 67

AT/PASSAGE FROM Special operations TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1800		
L _____	BY _____	
A _____	BY _____	

LEGEND	
1	CELESTIA.
2	ELECTRONIC
3	VISUAL
4	D R

REMARKS

UNDERWAY CONDUCTING special operations in accordance with BuChant
Toward 57-67

Albatross
R. W. CORRYA LCDR USN

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EXAMINED

Albatross 1967 U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

DATE	TIME	LOCATION	ACTIVITY	REMARKS
10/10/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/11/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/12/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/13/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/14/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/15/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/16/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/17/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/18/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/19/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/20/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/21/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/22/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/23/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/24/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/25/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/26/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/27/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/28/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/29/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/30/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD
10/31/67	0800	SEA	ARRIVED	ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD

PREVIOUS UPKEEP PERIOD IS WITH CINQUE (ROTA). YET AT SOME POINT IN PATROL 14, SHE HAS TO HAVE OPERATE UNDER CINCLANT IN ORDER TO RETURN TO ROTA UNDER CINCLANT TRANSIT ORDERS

APRIL 17 COMMENCED PATROL FROM P. (MUST BE U.S. DUE TO TRANSIT ORDERS FROM CLF) WITH GOLD CREW

ARRIVED ROTAS, SPAIN, JUNE 14, FOR CINQUE WEEKS PERIOD

UNCLAS
ROTA PATROL UPKEEP SCHEDULE 1 JAN 67-31 DEC 67

Revised 22 August 83
by CWO (OP-212)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY'S DECK LOGS
FOR 8 JUNE 1967.

THESE ARE NOT THE ORIGINAL
LOGS. THEY WERE REWRITTEN AT
McGONAGLE'S DIRECTION AND SIGNED
BY HIM. OFFICERS WHO ACTUALLY

STOOD THOSE WATCHES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN NOTIFIED. THEY WERE NOT.

I THINK SOME OF THE LOGS WERE
CHANGED. IS THIS PART OF
THE COVER-UP?

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OF LIBERTY AGT-5 ZONE DESCRIPTION -20 DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967
 (Day) (Month) (Year)

AT/PASSAGE FROM ATA, SPAIN TO OPS - AREA

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0800 31°-24.0'N BY 4			1100 31°-22.2'N BY 4			1400			1-CELESTIAL 2-ELECTRONIC 3-VISUAL 4-D R
1300 33°-39.8'E BY 4			1800 33°-41.5'E BY 4						

REMARKS

08-04 STEAMING INDEPENDENTLY ENROUTE FROM ROTA, SPAIN TO
 OP-AREA. COURSE IS 078, SPEED 10 KNOTS. TAW CINCUSARIVEP
 MUYCO 7-67. CONDITION OF READINESS III MODIFIED AND
 MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE IS SET THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
 BOILER NR (1) AND 5/5 GENERATOR 2 & 3 ARE ON THE
 LINE. OTC IS CO. THIS VESSEL 0300 C/L TO 123
 N. 1 0112

04-08 STEAMING AS BEFORE 0553 C/L TO 190. 0413 C/L TO 060
 0600 C/L TO 123. 0754 C/L TO 120
 W.L. MIGNAGLE CDR USN

08-12 STEAMING AS BEFORE 0808 CROSSED 100 FOOT DEEP CREEK
 0849 C/L TO 253. 0905 C/L TO 5 KNOTS. 0930 SIGHTED
 EA' ARISH MINERT. 866. 203 DISTANCE 13 MILES. 1030
 UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT ORBITED (2) TIMES AFT PORT
 BEAM THEN RETURNED TO MAIN BEAM AT 1057. 1136
 UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT CIRCLED SHIP. 1132 C/L TO 283.
 W.L. MIGNAGLE CDR USN

12-16 STEAMING AS BEFORE. 1305 CAPTAIN IS ON THE BRIDGE. 1310
 EXERCISED THE CREW AT GENERAL QUARTERS (DRILL). 1311
 SET MATERIAL CONDITION ZEBRA THROUGHOUT SHIP. 1314
 AT 1300 SIGHTED EXPLOSION ON COASTLINE RANGE 13 MILES
 1330 SIGHTED EXPLOSION ON COAST BEARING 130, RANGE 25
 MILES. 1346 SET MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE THROUGHOUT
 THE SHIP. 1346 SECURED FROM GENERAL QUARTERS (DRILL).
 SET CONDITION OF READINESS III MODIFIED THROUGHOUT
 SHIP. 1403 LIND EXPLOSION PORTSIDE AMIDSHIPS. 1405
 SOUNDED GENERAL QUARTERS. LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF
 FRAME 85-01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE
 PUMPS ARE LOCATED. 1405 A/E AHEAD FLANK. 1405 TO 1410
 SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE
 UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT MAKING COORDINATED STRAFING,
 ROCKET AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER THE SHIP. THREE
 MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF THE SHIP
 WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE. A TOTAL OF EIGHT OFFICERS
 AND MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES
 RECEIVED DURING THE AIR ATTACK. ONE OFFICER KILLED
 ON 04 LEVEL. ONE MAN KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52.
 ONE DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD
 SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE 01

EXAMINED

W.L. Mignagle U. S. N. - NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

ENCLOSURE (1)

USS LIBERTY

AGTR-5

DATE THURSDAY 9 JUNE 1967
 (Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS CONTINUED

12-16 LEVEL PORTSIDE APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER THROUGHOUT TIP-SIDE AREA FROM IMPACT AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS. 1417 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS. 1424 3 MTBS SIGHTED VISUALLY ABOARD STARBOARD BEAM DISTANCE 3-4 MILES. 1436 IT WAS NOTED THAT NORMAL STEERING ENSIGN WHICH HAD BEEN FLYING FROM THE GAFF HAD BEEN SHOT AWAY DURING THE AIR ATTACK. HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDARM. 1438 MTB SIGNALING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STARBOARD QUARTERS LIGHT OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WINDMILL BOAT. 1438 ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. COMMANDING OFFICER ORDERED HOLD FIRE. 1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE ON CENTER OF THE THREE MTBS. COMMANDING OFFICER ORDERED ENS. LUCAS TO PROCEED TO MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING. MTB BELIEVED TO BE FLYING STAR OF DAVID FLAG. FLAG QUITE SMALL. 1431 WARD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD. MTB COMMENCED STRAFFING STARBOARD SIDE OF THE SHIP. 1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF THE SHIP. 1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS. TWENTY-FIVE MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB STRAFFING FIRE. TORPEDO HIT IN VICINITY OF THE RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT THEIR GENERAL QUARTERS STATION. THIS AND ADJACENT SPACES WERE FLOODED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THESE SPACES DIED AS EITHER BLAST OR DROWNING. THE FOLLOWING DIED AS A RESULT OF THE AIR/TORPEDO ATTACK:

LCDR PHILIP C. ARMSTRONG, JR. USN, 56925/1100

LT. STEPHAN S. 72TH, USN, 66963/1100

LT. JAMES P. PIERCE, USN, 64905/6462

CTC MELVIN D. SMITH, USN, 493 93 96

CTC ROBERT D. LINN, USN, 571 13 74

CTI FREDRICK T. WALTON, USN, 236 91 86

CPT DAVID W. MARLBOROUGH, USN, 810 04 80

CT3 DWANE R. MARGGRAF, USN, 773 96 50

CT3 PHILLIP C. TIEDTKE, USN, 914 93 84

CTA ROBERT R. EISENBERG, USN, 776 09 35

CT3 THOMAS R. THORNTON, USN, 997 97 91

CTA JERRY L. CONVERSE, USN, 794 79 44

CTSN CARL G. NYGREN, USN, 778 37 16

CTI CURTIS A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 24

CTI JOHN E. SMITH, USN, 237 77 94

T.F.R. CTSN LAWRENCE P. HAYDEN, USN, 999-54-57-810 53 76

CTSN JAMES L. LENA, USN, 497 56 57

SN GARY R. BLANCHARD, USN, 771 77 32

EXAMINED:

W.M. Vinton

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

QMSN
 THODARE
 L. ARF. T. A.

USS LIBERTY ATRS ZONE DESCRIPTION -2B DATE THURSDAY 8 JULY 1967
(Day) (Month) (Year)
 AT/PASSAGE FROM ROTF, SPAIN TO OPS-AREA

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0000			1000			2000			1. CELESTIAL
L	BY		L	BY		L	BY		2. ELECTRONIC
A	BY		A	BY		A	BY		3. VISUAL
									4. D. B.

REMARKS

12-16 CONT. SN CARL L. HOAR, USN, 774 46 48
 ICEN DAVID (NMN) SKOLAK, USN, 850 17 83
 PC2 JOHN C. SPICHER, USN, 473 41 77
 GMG3 ALEXANDER N. THOMPSON, USN, 770 47 31
 QMG3 FRANCIS (NMN) BROWN, USA, 778 76 70
 CTS ALAN (NMN) HIGGINS, USN, 788 62 97
 CTS WILLIAM B. ALLENBAUGH, USN, 634 47 9
 ALLEN M. BAUE, CIVILIAN, 531 48 9527 687
 CTS BONNIE J. CAMPBELL, USN, 586 13 82
 CTS JERRY L. COSS, USN, 773 61 59
 CTI JAMES M. SUTTON, USN, 511 31 23
 CTS ANTHONY P. MENDLE, USN, 772 62 87
 SGT JACK L. RAPER, USMC, 199 46 71
 CPL EDWARD E. REMMEYER, USMC, 23 04 17
 THE NUMBER OF INJURED WAS 170. THEIR NAMES ARE AS
 FOLLOWS: ENLISTED PERSONNEL
 CTI REGINALD N. ADDINGTON, USN, 519 53 86 SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE LEFT LEG
 CTS JOSEPH D. ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS,
 MULTIPLE
 EMFA RICHARD E. ANDERSON, USN, 851 31 36 LACERATION FIFTH
 DIGIT, LEFT HAND
 EMEN JOSEPH W. AS WORTH, USNR, 649 53 18 CONTUSIONS AND
 ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE
 CTI RICHARD F. BAKEA, USN, 486 80 12 SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE
 CTSN NATHAN D. BENEDICT, USN, 139 55 74 SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE
 CTI LUCAS T. BINGHAM, USN, 521 33 63 PUNCTURE WOUNDS, RIGHT
 AND LEFT HANDS
 FN GERALD P. BISHER, USN, 810 42 43 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS,
 MULTIPLE, RIGHT LEG
 CIVILIAN DONALD L. BARLOCK, 09-7, FLASH BURNS, FACIAL
 CTS GLEN L. BLOHAM, USN, 774 27 59, BURN, FIRST DEGREE, RIGHT
 KNEE
 CSS SALVATORE (NMN) BOCCELLA, USN, 796 97 69, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE,
 RIGHT AND LEFT HANDS
 FN JOHN E. BOOTH, USN, 998 19 47, BURN, FIRST DEGREE, LEFT FOREARM
 FN DONALD A. BUTCHER, USNR, 779 82 59, LACERATION, THIRD DIGIT, LEFT
 HAND
 CTS LARRY L. BOWEN, USN, 796 85 28, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS
 CTS JAMES V. BRONG, USN, 913 41 23, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

EXAMINED

W. W. Watson, Lt. J. G.

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

USS LIBERTY

AGTR-5

DATE THURSDAY 9 JUNE 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS--CONTINUED

12-14 CONT

BT3 FRANK J. BROWN, USN, 796 69 65, BURNS, FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE, AND LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH HANDS, LEFT CALE, AND BACK

VN2 VIRGIL A. BROWNFIELD, USNA, 744 33 49, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

BT3 GARY W. BRUMMETT, USNR, 646 29 20, FLASH BURNS, FIRST DEGREE, FACIAL

CT3 RONALD D. BUCK, USN, LACERATION, FIFTH DIGIT, RIGHT HAND

FN DANNY R. BYRD, USN, 890 54 86, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, RIGHT FOREARM

CT1 RICHARD C. CARLSON, USN, 444 13 12, SHRAPNEL WOUND, MULTIPLE

CS3 DAVID N. CARNAHAN, USN, 810 42 93, CONTUSION, LEFT LEG

CT1 JEFFREY R. CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

SN WILLIAM E. CASPER, USN, 746 40 4, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

CT1 FRED M. CHADSEY, USN, 686 46 82, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, LEFT KNEE

CT3 CALVIN L. CLEVELAND, USN, 353 80 77, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, AND LACERATIONS

SN J. C. COLSTON JR., USN, 711 04 51, SHRAPNEL WOUND, LEFT ANKLE AND ABRASIONS

SN RODNEY G. CONCEPCION, USN, 674 36 09, SHRAPNEL AND GUN SHOT WOUNDS

SN EDIE L. COPE, USN, 495 59 71, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

FN GEORGE R. CRAINSH, USN, 993 07 12, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, RIGHT LEG

CTSN RODNEY L. DALLY, USN, 820 04 91, BURN, FIRST DEGREE, RIGHT FOOT, AND CONTUSION, RIGHT KNEE

CTSN DALE E. DAVIES, USN, 860 44 52, LAMBOGACRAL STRAIN

SM2 RUSSELL DAVID, USN, 633 33 65, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS

CT3 JAMES A. DAVIDSON JR., USN, 699 64 72, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH KNEES

CT1 MARVIN E. DODD, USN, 599 79 51, PUNCTURE WOUND, RIGHT THIGH AND CONTUSION, BUTTOCKS

SHS HENRY E. DURZEWSKI, USN, 546 73 16, ABRASIONS, LEFT CALE

CTSN KENNETH B. FAKINS, USN, 744 04 49, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

CTSN KENNETH P. ECKER, USN, 851 30 43, CONTUSIONS, LEFT KNEE

CT1 LEWIS D. ECKHART, USN, 922 69 34, CONTUSIONS, BOTH KNEES

CT3 EIKLEBERG, DENNIS M., USN, 914 71 10, PUNCTURE WOUND, MULTIPLE, LEFT CALE AND THIGH

SN DONALD E. FOLLIN, USN, 917 66 74, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

CT3 KENNETH R. GAUTHIER, USN, 771 37 90, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE

RD3 RONALD D. GILSON, USN, 744 91 33, ABRASION AND CONTUSION, RIGHT FOREARM

EXAMINED:

W. H. Watson Lt. JG

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

DECK LOG-REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5 ZONE DESCRIPTION -2B DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967
AT/PASSAGE FROM PLTA, SPAIN TO OPS - AREA

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0800		
L	BY	
A	BY	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
1200		
L	BY	
A	BY	

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
2000		
L	BY	
A	BY	

LEGEND	
1	CELESTIAL
2	ELECTRONIC
3	VISUAL
4	D R

EXAMINED

12-16 CONT.

CTSN "A.F." GRANTSKI, USN, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE.

YN3 STEVEN C. GURCHIK JR., USN, 147 82 42, CONTUSION, SACROILIAC.

CT3 DAVID W. HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

GM3 DAVID C. HARRIS, USN, 146 94 42, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, RIGHT CHEST.

SN WARREN D. HENRY, USN, 918 44 65, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE.

CT3 CHARLES A. HENDRICKS, USN, 615 51 12, ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

SH2 DONALD (NMN) HAROLD, USN, 169 72 41, PUNCTURE AND SUPERFICIAL SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CT3 ALAN (NMN) HIGGINS, USN, 708 12 07, GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL WOUND, MULTIPLE, CHEST.

CT3 JOHN S. MORSE, USN, 148 96 29, SUPERFICIAL SHRAPNEL WOUND, FN JOHN M. HRANKOWSKI, USN, 810 48 15, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, BOTH ARMS.

SN THOMAS F. JACKSON, USN, 619 15 44, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CT3 FREDRICK (NMN) JOHNS, USN, 794 91 14, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CTSN JAMES T. KAVANUGH, USN, 918 51 32, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

FR GLEN S. KELLY, USN, 850 76 36, SPRAIN, RIGHT ANKLE, AND CONTUSIONS, BOTH KNEE.

BT JAMES E. KELLY, USN, 773 86 89, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH LEGS.

CTSN EUGENE H. KIRK, USN, 918 91 30, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SN DAVID J. KISIEL, USNR, 493 76 04, CONTUSIONS, RIGHT PARIETAL SKULL.

FN STEPHAN J. KRASHANSKY USNR, 354 72 98, SPRAIN, LEFT ANKLE, AND ABRASIONS, LEFT FOOT.

CT3 LOREN W. KREUN, USN, 558 49 74, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SN ALAN E. KRINER, USNR, 779 57 61, SHRAPNEL WOUND, FIFTH DIGIT, RIGHT HAND.

CT1 RONALD G. KUKAL, USN, 539 00 94, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH LEGS.

SN JOHN D. LAMAR, USNR, 779 56 36, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CTC CARLYLE E. LAMKIN, USN, 518 49 45, LACERATION, RIGHT HAND, AND CONTUSIONS, BACK.

EXAMINED

M. M. Watson

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5

DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS—CONTINUED

12-16 CONT.

CT2 CAVIN L. LANDIS, USN, 777 52 31, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
EMFA STEVENS J. LA TORRE, USN 914 73 54, FRACTURE, PROXIMAL TIP,
RIGHT TIBIA.

T1A SPEN JOEL W. BERMAN, USNR, 944-28-89 771 54 02, LACERATIONS,
MULTIPLE, RIGHT THUMB, RIGHT FOREARM, AND SCALP.

EM2 WILLIAM M. LEMBY, USN, 723 35 21, SHRAPNEL AND GUN
SHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SN THOMAS W. LEMOND, USNR, 917 44 31, CONTUSIONS AND
ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

ET1 JOSEPH P. LENTINI, USN, 544 82 55, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
MULTIPLE.

CT2 ANTHONY T. WHEFIELD, USN, 776 10 30, CHIPPED RIGHT UPPER
INCISOR.

LT2 ROBERT W. LONG, BSO 92 55, USN, LACERATIONS, FOURTH AND
FIFTH DIGITS, RIGHT HAND.

5/SGT BRUCE F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 187 50 36, SHRAPNEL
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

FN GERALD F. LOSASSO, USNR, 746 12 83, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE,
BOTH KNEES.

EMFN JAMES A. MARIO, USNR, 414 29 05, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE,
BOTH KNEES.

TN SOFRONIO P. MARELL, USN, 776 90 09, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
MULTIPLE.

CT2 JOHN L. MASSENGALE, USN, 695 14 21, CONTUSIONS, FACE, LEFT
ANKLE, AND FIRST DIGIT, RIGHT HAND.

SN JIMMY L. MATTHEWS, USN, 992 21 92, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
MULTIPLE.

ETC JAMES A. MATTHEWS, USN, 345 13 52, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS,
MULTIPLE.

CTSN PATRICK H. MC ANDREWS, USN, 811 44 21, LACERATIONS, LEFT
HAND AND LEFT KNEE.

SN ROBERT L. MC CALLISTER, USN, 919 61 90, LACERATION, THIRD
DIGIT, LEFT HAND.

CT2 DAVID L. MC FEEGAN, USN, 774 71 92, FRONTAL BRAIN
CONCUSSION, AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CTSN FRANK (NMN) MC INTURFF, III, USN, 861 44 71, LACERATIONS
MULTIPLE, BOTH HANDS.

SMSN JOSEPH L. MEADERS, USN, 871 04 56, CONTUSIONS AND
ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

CT2 STEPHAN E. MEYERS, USN, 771 42 03, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS,
MULTIPLE.

FN DAVID B. MILLER, USNR, 854 28 36, BURN, FIRST DEGREE,
LEFT ELBOW, AND LACERATION, LEFT HAND.

SF1 RICHARD D. NEESE, USN, 430 77 24, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS,
MULTIPLE, HANDS.

BT2 JOHN PAUL NEWELL, USN, 776 03 93, CONTUSIONS, LEFT HAND.

EXAMINED:

Montgomery

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY AGTR-E ZONE DESCRIPTION -2 B DATE JULY DAY 5 JUNE 11 67
(Day) (Date) (Month)

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0300			1200			2000			1-CELESTIAL
L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			2-ELECTRONIC
A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			3-VISUAL
									4-D R

REMARKS

13-16 CONT.

BT3 EUGENE (NMN) OWENS, USN, 549 25 64, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT HAND.

PTSN DONALD W. FOGLEW, USN, 866 53 17, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, BOTH LEGS.

SN STAMATIE (NMN) FAHDES, USN, 793 34 78, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

PTSN HERBERT J. PARKER, USNR, 133 54 15, BURN, SECOND DEGREE, RIGHT HAND.

CS3 DENNIS A. PATTEN, USN, 964 30 77, LACERATION, LEFT HAND.

T.S.2. IN SALVADOR (NMN) PAYAN, USNR, 796 26 15, SKULL FRACTURE AND MULTIPLE GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS.

CT3 GARLAND W. PAYNE, USN, 773 11 02, LACERATION, LEFT WRIST.

PTSN HERBERT C. PEETOM, USN, 24 10 73, LACERATION, LEFT LEG.

SK3 EDWARD G. PERKINS, USN, 43 83, CONTUSIONS, LEFT LEG.

SN GERALD H. PIERSON, USNR, 794 07 20, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

CT1 CARL L. PIERSON, USN, 535 78 16, SHRAPNEL WOUND, RIGHT THIGH, AND CONTUSION, RIGHT ARM.

QM3 FLOYD H. POLLARD, USN, 353 55 47, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

CT3 J.C. POPILSKI, USN, LACERATION, RIGHT PARIETAL SCALP.

SMN HARVEY A. WELLS, USNR, 417 37 39, HEMATOMA, LEFT FACE.

SN THOMAS J. WINTERO, USNR, 779 59 90, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

BT3 ALBERT E. RAMMELSBERG, USN, 119 90 38, LACERATION, LEFT KNEE.

TC1 JOHN R. RANDALL, USN, 517 81 45, SHRAPNEL WOUND, RIGHT FOREARM.

QM3 RICHARD J. REGER, USNR, 697 11 63, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

SMN THOMAS J. ^{BEILEY} ~~REGER~~, USN, 913 50 66, GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SM ROBERT E. REINY, USN, 810 40 15, CONTUSIONS, SCALP.

CT1 CHARLES L. ROWLEY, USN, 451 48 03, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

PTSN ROBERT A. SCARBOROUGH, USN, 778 20 10, PUNCTURE WOUND, LEFT WRIST.

ENS KENNETH M. SCHALEY, USNR, 694 00 58, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

EN RONALD W. SCHNEIDER, USN, 860 64 72, CONTUSION, RIGHT KNEE.

CT3 ROBERT J. SCHNELL, USN, 542 65 84, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

HM3 SANDY L. SCHULMAN, USN, LACERATION, BACK.

CT3 MAURICE B. SHAFER, USN, 695 94 96, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

PTSN DAVID A. SHAW, USN, 904 39 56, SHRAPNEL WOUND, LEFT ANTERIOR

EXAMINED

William St. W.

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

James M. ... Search Papers

USS LIBERTY

AGTR-5

DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS—CONTINUED

12-14 CONT THIGH.
 FN MICHAEL B. SIMPSON, USNR, 917 52 02, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE BOTH ARMS.
 CTS HAROLD E. SIX, USN, 777 58 53, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 SN LARRY J. SLAVENS, USNR, 916 92 00, SHRAPNEL AND GUN SHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.
 DCB JAMES C. SMITH, USNR, 777 14 71, CONTUSION, RIGHT ELBOW
 CTSN JERRY D. SMITH, USN, 915 81 03, TRAUMATIC ARTHRITIS, LEFT KNEE
 SH3 THOMAS B. SMITH, USN, 918 04 37, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH HANDS.
 CTS DENNIS C. SOPER, USN, 776 22 26, LACERATION, RIGHT SHIN, SEE
 SN LARRY L. SOPER, USN, 698 89 13, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 BT3 JOSEPH D. STOUT, USN, 870 41 42, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH ARMS.
 CTS JOHN B. SUTTER, USN, 795 24 58, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH LEGS
 PTA RALPH B. SWEET, USN, 775 06 25, LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN.
 CTS CHARLES J. THOME, USN, 789 48 12, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS AND LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN.
 CTC HAROLD J. THOMPSON, USN, 471 27 27, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, LEFT FOREARM AND LEFT THIGH.
 MR3 LARRY E. THORN, USN, 687 22 43, LUMBOSACRAL AND CERVICAL BACK STRAIN
 ETS BARRY R. TIMMERMAN, USN, 770 11 63, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 SP3 PHILLIP F. TOUNEY, USN, 773 22 66, LACERATION, FIRST DIGIT, RIGHT HAND
 FN JEFFREY L. TRIPLETT, USN, 354 81 35, CONTUSION, MULTIPLE, CHEST AND LEFT ARM
 CTS SAMMY M. UBER, USN, 917 08 36, LACERATION, LEFT ANKLE
 SK2 DONALD ANCO (NMN) VALDEZ JR., USN, 370 92 58, LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN
 HM1 THOMAS L. VAN CLEAVE, USN, 298 39 72, LACERATION, RIGHT HAND.
 SN CARL J. YICKERS, USNR, 775 67 19, LACERATIONS, THIRD AND FOURTH DIGITS, RIGHT HAND.
 BM3 JERRY W. WARD, USN, 775 76 67, GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.
 SN RICHARD L. WEAVER, USNR, 999 88 63, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 CS2 GORDON J. WEDIG, USN, 428 92 34, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, RIGHT THIGH.
 SN GEORGE W. WILSON JR., USNR, 529 34 49, LACERATIONS AND GUN SHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 CTSN DANIEL B. WOOD, USN, 796 87 55, ABRASIONS, LEFT HAND.
 CTSN ROBERT R. ZAGER, USN, 840 63 62, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT LEG.

EXAMINED:

M. M. Nelson

V. S. B. NAVIGATOR

USS LIBERTY AIR-5 ZONE DESCRIPTION -28 DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967
 (Day) (Date) (Month)

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0000			1000			2000			1. CELESTIAL
L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			L _____ BY _____			2. ELECTRONIC
A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			A _____ BY _____			3. VISUAL
									4. OTHER

SQUARES

12-16 CONT.

MM3 ROBERT M. DYE, USN, 594-67 63, LACERATION AND BURN, FIRST
 DEGREE, LEFT FOREARM.

ETSN THOMAS E. VANDERSCHUR, USN, 850 34 20, LACERATION, FIFTH
 DIGIT, LEFT HAND.

CT3 TIMOTHY P. AMEEN, USN, 774 03 93, SPRAIN, LEFT ANKLE.

CT3 DAVID Y. MYERS, USN, 840 45 33, HEMATOMA, BOTH LEGS.

CT3 GREGORY L. WELCH, USN, 694 46 37, LACERATION, LEFT HAND.

CTSN ROBERT M. WALTER, USN, 840 19 27, LACERATIONS, BOTH HANDS.

CTSN EDWARD H. BECHTEL, USN, 840 25 47, LACERATION, RIGHT HAND.

SN VICTOR J. ROSSI, USN, 840 17 53, LACERATION, LEFT HAND,
 AND ABRASION, RIGHT KNEE.

CT3 DAVID W. PAGE, USN, 454 23 51, CONTUSION AND ABRASIONS,
 MULTIPLE.

CTA TERRY A. McFARLAND, USN, 795 25 54, CONTUSIONS, BOTH
 LEGS.

CTSN ROBERT B. VANDVENTER, USN, 916 69 27, LACERATIONS,
 RIGHT HAND.

EMEN CALVIN (LAW) BOSTIC II, USN, 795 71 61, SHRAPNEL
 WOUND, SECOND DIGIT, RIGHT HAND.

MMC RICHARD BROOKS, USN, 454 62 63, LACERATION, LEGS, BILATERAL
 AND CONTUSIONS + ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

OFFICERS WOUNDED ON 8 JUNE, 1967:

CDR WILLIAM L. MCGONAGLE, USN, 444447/1100, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE.

JAMES G. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1415, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE.

LCDR DAVID E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1110, FLASH BURNS, FACIAL.

LT MAURICE H. BENNETT, USN, 638125/1110, FLASH BURNS, FACIAL
 AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

LT JAMES M. ENNES, USN, 653840/1415, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE.

LT RICHARD F. KIEFER, USNR (MC), 710107/2105, LACERATIONS,
 MULTIPLE.

LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN, USN, 574328/6302, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE.

NSIC LLOYD C. PAINTER, USNR, 622274/1105, LACERATION, RIGHT
 HAND, AND HEMATOMA, RIGHT FLANK.

NSIC RICHARD P. TAYLOR, USNR, 639116/3105, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS,
 MULTIPLE.

NSIC MALCOLM M. WATSON, USNR, 699039/1105, CONTUSIONS AND
 ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

EXAMINED

James M. Ennes U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

USS LIBERTY

A-10-S

DATE THURSDAY 7 JULY 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS—CONTINUED

12-16 (CONT.)

ENS DAVID G. LUKAS, USNR, 710515/1105, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
 1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGH THE SHIP. 1434 \$ LOST STEAM
 PRESSURE - SECURED ENGINE AND BOILERS. 1440 HULL NUMBER 02
 ONE MTO OBSERVED TO BE 206-17. MTO'S STANDING AWAY FROM
 SHIP. 1503 ONE MTO RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALED, "DO YOU
 NEED HELP" COMMANDING OFFICER DIRECTED THAT, "NEGATIVE"
 BE SENT IN REPLY. 1507 HELICOPTERS BEARING STRAIGHT TOWARD
 APPROACHED SHIP AND HOVERED 600 YDS. DISTANCE. HULL NUMBERS
 04 OR 04 AND 03 OR 03. 1514 POWER RESTORED TO RANGE EXCEPT
 FOR RUDDER. STEERING MANUALLY FROM AFTER STEERING. ATTEMPTING TO
 CLEAR AREA TO NORTHWARD AT SPEEDS VARYING FROM 2.0 TO 9 KNOTS. PERSONNEL
 CASUALTIES TREATED ON CONTINUOUS BASIS IN WARD ROOM AND MESS
 DECK. FLOODING BOUNDARIES ESTABLISHED, FIRES EXTINGUISHED.
 1523 LUBE OIL SUCTION LOST AFTER BOTH ENGINES HAD BEEN PUT ON
 THE LINE AT APPROXIMATELY 1520. 1531 STARBOARD LIST OF 9 1/2°
 1537 THREE TORPEDO BOATS APPROACHING SHIP AT HIGH SPEED
 STARBOARD SIDE. APPROXIMATE RANGE 5 MILES. 1540 HOISTED CODE INDIA
 -LIMA- NOT UNDER COMMAND. 1542 TORPEDO BOATS REVERSED
 COURSE AND APPEAR TO BE RETIRING. ONE APPEARS TO BE SMOKING.
 1655 REESTABLISHED COMMUNICATIONS.

N. P. M. S. ...
 W. L. MAGNAGLE CDR USN

16-20 VARIOUS COURSES AT VARIOUS SPEEDS. 1600 MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
 FROM TRANSMITTER ROOM. 1608 AN UNIDENTIFIED SMALL BOAT
 IS APPROACHING SHIP TO STARBOARD AMIDSHIP AT HIGH SPEED.
 1610 EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO STEER SHIP FROM STEERING AFT.
 1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT ARE APPROACHING. 1620 UNIDENTIFIED
 SMALL BOAT APPROACHING. 1633 PATROL CRAFT NO. 204 AND TWO
 OTHER CRAFT ARE CLOSE ABEAM TO PORT. THE COMMANDING
 OFFICER SAID "BOATS ARE BELIEVED TO BE ISRAELI" C/LC TO
 3 KNOTS. 1641 C/LC TO 8 KNOTS. 1641 C/LC TO 5 KNOTS. UNABLE TO CONTROL
 SHIP AT 8 KNOTS. 1645 RECEIVED MSG. FROM COMSIFLT THAT
 ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY. 1655 SHIP'S LIST INCREASED TO
 10° TO STBD. 1700 A/E STOP. 1701 C/LC TO 330. 1703 C/LC TO 330.
 1703 LET GO PORT ANCHOR. ALL ORDER RESCINDED BEFORE
 EXECUTED. 1704 A/E BACK 1/2. 1705 A/E BACK 2/3. 17 FATHOMS
 UNDER KEEL. 1708 FLOODING UP TO SECOND DECK BETWEEN W.T.
 FRAME 52-78. NO FLOODING NOTED ELSEWHERE AT THIS TIME.
 FUEL OIL TANK IS RUPTURED STBD SIDE FWD IN THE VICINITY OF
 FRAMES 52-18. W.T. BULKHEAD HOLDING. SHIP NOW HAS LIST
 OF 9° STBD. 1713 TORPEDO BOATS PREVIOUSLY LOGGED HAVE NOW
 RETIRED FROM SIGHT. 1717 FATHOMETER PRESENTLY OUT OF COMMISSION.
 1718 FATHOMETER BACK ON LINE. 26 FATHOMS UNDER THE KEEL. 1721
 TO 1750 VARIOUS COURSES AND VARIOUS SPEEDS. 1750 FOLLOWING MESSAGE
 WAS RECEIVED FROM COMSIFLT: "ESCORT ON WAY. ASSESS DAMAGE
 AND IF POSSIBLE CONTINUE ON COURSE 940 MAGNETIC. MAX SPEED

EXAMINED:

W. L. Magnagle U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

USS LIBERTY ALTA-S ZONE DESCRIPTION -20 DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	POSITION	ZONE	TIME	LEGEND
0000			1700			1800			1-CELESTIA
L _____	BY _____		L _____	BY _____		L _____	BY _____		2-ELECTRONIC
A _____	BY _____		A _____	BY _____		A _____	BY _____		3-VISUAL
									4-0-0

REMARKS

16-24 CONT UNTIL 100 MILES FROM PRESENT POSITION THEN TURN
 270 MAGNETIC. 1757 MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM COMSIXFLT: "
 ESCORT PROCEEDING MAX SPEED OF DESTROYERS.
 1800 EXPERIENCING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING SHIP
 VARIOUS COURSES AT 10 KNOTS. 1840 HELICOPTER APPROACHED
 WITH SIDE MARKINGS ON TAIL OF SA 321-K FUSELAGE NR 04.
 1850 RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE DELIVERED FROM HELICOPTER
 BEING WRITTEN ON BACK OF CARD, "DO YOU HAVE CASUALTIES?"
 1900 CONTINUING VARIOUS COURSES.

W.L. Mesnabie
 W.L. MESNABIE CDR USN
 22-24 ON VARIOUS COURSES AT 10 KNOTS. 2352 SHIFTED STEERING
 CONTROL BACK TO BRIDGE. STEADIED ON COURSE 300 (PIC).
W.L. Mesnabie
 W.L. MESNABIE CDR USN

CONTINUED

W.L. Mesnabie
 U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS AMERICA (CVA-66)

DATE Thursday 9 June 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS - CONTINUED

11-12 (Cont'd.) International special operations day stages and code RN to indicate conduct of flight operations. 1124 to 2200 hours commenced maneuvers and exercises. Courses and speeds for the conduct of flight operations.

G. W. THOMPSON LTJG USNR

12-16 Underway as before. 1432 Com Car Div 4 assumed command of TF 69 composed of LITTLE ROCK AMERICA THOMAS RUSH ROAN SAMSON LAWE SHERMAN BYRD MOALE USS GALVESTON (C16-B) COMCRUDESFLOT 10 included USS DANIS (DD-987) COMDESRON 12 included USS SAGATOGA (CVA-66) USS BASILONE (DD-824) USS SELLERS (DD-11) USS KRAUS (DD-849) COM DESRON 12 included and USS MARETT (DD-778). Formed carrier ready formation. Formation axis is 300. 9 AM formation center ahead. LITTLE ROCK 3000 yards SAGATOGA 210. 3000 yards LITTLE ROCK 300. 2500 yards and GALVESTON 120. 2500 yards. THOMAS SHERMAN RUSH DANIS MARETT KRAUS formed circular screen of which S. SELLERS BYRD BASILONE SAMSON operating independently. ROAN MOALE LAWE operating independently. 1503 received following injury report while standing in serving line waiting to disembark. DIBBSON REE 693 BE 90. USN received a laseration to his right upper leg when he was accidentally cut him. Treatment administered by Medical Department. Disposition: Duty 1500. Sighted from under 2 below and 4 below Berlin.

J. F. BULLOCK
J. L. BULLOCK LTJG USNR

17-18 Underway as before. 1712 DIBBSON REE and MASSEY transferred to command of COMDESRON 12. BYRD directed to join screen.

J. L. PINI LTJG USNR

18-20 Underway as before. 1800 observed fire radar 30 and 40 miles. 1956 scanned for flight operations. Screen course 090 speed 25 kts.

J. L. KELLER LTJG USNR

21-24 Underway as before. 2115 090 to 250. 2133 090 to 090. 2142 detached to 60. 2150 moved on duty assigned. 2142 detached from flight operations. 2150 detached from under 1 above. 2144 below. 2157 090 to 090. 2157 090 to 090.

Examined: R. L. M. JONES
R. L. M. JONES LTJG USNR
R. L. M. JONES LTJG USNR

James M. Ennes Papers

USS AMERICA (AG-130) ZONE DESCRIPTION - 20 DATE ZULU 0500Y 8 JUNE 19 67

AT 0500H FROM 0500H TO 0600H

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0500		
1 27° 06' N	01	0500
1 26° 52' N	01	0500

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0500		
1 28° 01' N	01	0500
1 28° 20' N	01	0500

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
0500		
1 28° 25' N	01	0500
1 28° 18' N	01	0500

LEGEND	INITIAL
1-0001	TRIC
1-0002	VISUAL
1-0003	A.D.D.

0500H

05-01 5 starting in company with TG 00.1, composed of USS LITTLE ROCK (AG-130), CONSIXTHLET (AG-130), USS AMERICA (AG-130), COMCARDIV FOUR (AG-130), USS ROBERT SHERMAN (DD-82), CONDORON 10 (AG-130), USS THOMAS (DD-764), CONDORON 102 (AG-130), USS BIRD (DDG-28), CONDORON DIV 102 (AG-130), USS SANDPSON (DDG-10), USS ROAN (DD-853), USS LAURE (DD-763), USS BUSH (DD-714), and USS MOBLE (DD-693), operating in a special operating area in accordance with CTR 02 Op Order 50-00 modified by CTR 02 Op Schedule No. 7. The ship information guide. Formation center bears 150° 1000 yds. LITTLE ROCK on an abeam 150° 2000 yds. SHERMAN, THOMAS, ROAN, LAURE, and SANDPSON are in a circular pattern around BIRD operating independently within visual range. RUSH and MOBLE are operating independently to prosecute a search pattern. Formation course is 000° speed 12 kts. 5000. CONSIXTHLET, OTC in COMCARDIV FOUR. Condition of weather III, sea moderate, visibility 10 kts. Ship is darkened except for visual navigational lights. 0100 C/L to 130°. 0112 C/L to 160°. 0119 C/L to 210°. 0209 C/L to 180°. 0300 C/L to 090°.

J. H. Wilson
Tel. 1216, USNR

04-02 Underway on before 0400 C/L to 180°. 0405 C/L to 270°. 0450 Lighted from mast in ALPHA boiler 0500 C/L to 180°. 0527 C/L to 090°. 0617 C/L to 080°. 0645 C/L to 315°. 0705 secured from mast in BRAVO boiler.

J. H. Wilson, LTJG, USNR

08-12 Underway on before 0846. 0846 mustered the crew on station. Adventure: Hope. 0920 C/L 165°. 0850 USS R Patrol Craft 150 began maneuvering within screen in close proximity to the vessel. RPA 100 maneuvered to within 400 yds. of this vessel several occasions. Vessel's action was not a result of normal course and speed changes to maintain heading. 0915 received of CAS aircraft of 1st Lt. Quarter. 0952 to 20 kts. 1030 Commanding Officer of the vessel assumed tactical command. 1040 to 105° to 320° following the course change, vessel was executed to turn to the west to conduct night operations. The vessel closed the vessel to within 100 yds. of starboard bow before turning to 320°. Action was an apparent disagreement on the identification of the vessel on this vessel. When showing the

Commander
J. H. Wilson

James M. [unclear]

USS SARATOGA (CA-60) ZONE DESCRIPTION -2B DATE THURSDAY 8 JULY 1967
(Mo) (Da) (Yr)
DEPARTURE FROM POLOUNAH BAY MANARSAI ISLAND TO SOUND BAY GREEN

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
123° 35' 24" W	2	01 2
123° 32' 24" W	2	01 2

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
123° 35' 24" W	2	01 2
123° 32' 24" W	2	01 2

POSITION	ZONE	TIME
123° 35' 24" W	2	01 2
123° 32' 24" W	2	01 2

LEGEND	1. CELESTIAL
	2. ELECTRONIC
	3. VISUAL
	4. D. B.

REMARKS

00:04 UNDERWAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CTF 60 OPERATION ORDER 50-66. STEERING IN COMPANY WITH THE USS GALVESTON (CG-3) USS DAVIS (DD-97) AND OTHER UNITS OF THE UNITED STATES SIXTH FLEET SORTY AND CTF 60.2 IN THE USS GALVESTON (CG-3) BASE COURSE IS 120°(T)166 BASE SPEED IS 14 KTS STEERING SHIP'S FORMATION FORTY (40) IN STATION 2840 (0). THE USS GALVESTON (CG-3) IS GUIDE. BOILERS ON THE LINE ARE ONE BAKER (13) TWO HALE (14) THREE BAKER (15) GENERATORS ON THE LINE ARE ONE (4) TWO (1) FIVE (5) SIX (6) AND SEVEN (7). THE SHIP IS IN READYNESS CONDITION III WITH MATERIAL CONDITION THREE SET THROUGHOUT. ALL NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS ARE ON AND BURNING BRIGHTLY. MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION ON THE GUIDE. FORMATION HEAD IS 120°(T)166 ONLY ONE 180°(T)166 ON THE LINE 0124 1/2 TO 1900(1)166 0135 1/2 TO 2600(1)166 MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION ON THE GUIDE. BASE COURSE 120°(T)166 BASE SPEED 14 KTS 0309 1/2 TO 15 KTS 1/2 TO 1790(1)166 0311 1/2 TO 14 KTS 0313 1/2 TO 0300(1)166 MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION ON THE GUIDE. BASE COURSE 095°(T)166 BASE SPEED 14 KTS 0338 COMPLETED RUNNING TUBES ON ALL STEERING BOILERS.

04:08 STEERING AS BEFORE. 0425 COMPLETED RUNNING TUBES ON ALL STEERING BOILERS. 0425 SHIFTS STEERING TO PORT UNIT PORT CABLE. 0502 PLACED 2 BAKER BOILERS ON THE LINE. 0508 OBSERVED SUNRISE TURNED OFF ALL NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS. 0515 1/2 TO 17 KTS. 0535 1/2 TO 0530(T)166 MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION. 0544 1/2 TO 20 KTS. 0545 1/2 TO 000°(T)166 MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION. 0618 1/2 TO 330°(T)166 0551 RELEASED TO COMMENCE APPROACH ALONGSIDE USS BUCKLEY (DD-61) MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY ON FIRST LINE OVER. 0618 COMMENCED PUMPING.

J. A. Johnson
J. C. Johnson, USN

06:18 STEERING AS BEFORE. 0727 COMPLETED PUMPING. 0741 MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION ON THE GUIDE (06-117). 0742 MANEUVERING TO TAKE STATION 280°(T) 2000 YDS FROM BUCKLEY. MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION. 0751 ASSUMED STATION AS GUIDE OF FORMATION. BASE COURSE 310°(T) BASE SPEED 14 KTS. 0800 COMMENCED RUNNING TUBES ON ALL STEERING BOILERS. 1011 1/2 340°(T) 1011 1/2 100°(T) 1026 COMPLETED RUNNING TUBES ON ALL STEERING BOILERS. 1027 1/2 090°(T) 1028 RECOVERED TWO (2) 1/2. 1028 LAUNCHED TWO (2) 1/2.

H. A. Smith
H. A. Smith, USN

EXAMINED

Ch. M. Smith U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

James M. Smith

USS SARATOGA (CA-60)

DATE Thursday 8 June 1967
(Day) (Date) (Month)

REMARKS—CONTINUED

12-14 STEERING AS BEFORE. 1209 @ 14 KTS. 1212 CONDENSED FLASHING
TUBES ON ALL STEERING BOILERS. 1245 HIT FIRE UNDER TWO ABL
(20) BOILER. 1251 TWO ABL (20) BOILER ON THE FIRE. 1315 KTS.
1316 @ 090°(T) PSC. 1325 @ 17 KTS. 1324 HIT FIRE UNDER THREE
ABL (30) BOILER. 1405 @ 20 KTS @ 090°(T) PSC. 1415 @ 100°(T) PSC
1424 @ 130°(T) PSC. 1431 @ 090°(T) PSC. 1441 @ 315°(T) PSC @ 26 KTS.
1455 @ 300°(T) PSC @ 15 KTS. 1459 @ 210°(T) PSC. 1503 @ 110°(T) PSC.
1507 @ 26 KTS. 1521 @ 24 KTS. 07E 60 BECAME 80PA AND 07E
1534 @ 22 KTS. 1540 @ 200°(T) PSC. 1556 @ 250°(T) PSC.

L. E. Shaffer

L. E. SHAFER, LT, USN

16-15 STEERING AS BEFORE 1601 @ 23 KTS. 1602 COMPLETED LAUNCH AND
RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT. MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY. 1613 COMPLETED LAUNCH AND
RECOVERY OF AIRCRAFT HAVING LAUNCHED FOUR (4) AND RECOVERED ONE (1). 1614
LAUNCHED ONE (1) CIA. 1622 @ 160°(T) PSC. 1637 @ 110°(T) PSC. MANEUVERING 200
AT VARIOUS COURSES AND SPEEDS TO MAINTAIN STATION. 1706 @ 200°(T) PSC. 1709
@ 250°(T) PSC. MANEUVERING AT VARIOUS COURSES AND SPEEDS TO MAINTAIN STATION.
1730 @ 160°(T) PSC. 1732 @ 110°(T) PSC. MANEUVERING AT VARIOUS COURSES
AND SPEEDS TO MAINTAIN STATION.

R. G. Cameron

R. G. CAMERON, LTJG, USN

18-20 STEERING AS BEFORE. 1826 OBSERVED SHOT, TURNED ON ALL NORMAL AIRSEARCH
LIGHTS. 1833 @ 200°(T) PSC. 1840 @ 230°(T) PSC. MANEUVERING AS NECESSARY
TO MAINTAIN STATION. 1854 @ 160°(T) PSC. 1856 @ 110°(T) PSC. MANEUVERING AS
NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN STATION.

D. S. Timm

D. S. TIMM, LT, USN

20-24 STEERING AS BEFORE. 2115 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2117 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2122 OBSERVED
FLASHING MESSAGES GREEN. RECOVERED ONE (1) ABL. 2124 EXHAUST FROM NAVIGATIONAL AIRCRAFT
2125 @ 090°(T) PSC. 2130 @ 20 KTS. 2136 @ 100°(T) PSC. 2140 @ 100°(T) PSC. 2200 HOLD
TURNS ON 80PA. 2205 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2210 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2215 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2220 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2225 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2230 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2235 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2240 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2245 @ 200°(T) PSC. 2250 @ 200°(T) PSC.

J. L. Thibodeau

J. L. THIBODEAU, LTJG, USN

GRAPHED

C. M. Morris

U. S. N. NAVIGATOR

COMMANDER 6th FLEET
RADIO LOGS

UNFORTUNATELY, THESE START
ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER CAPT.

JOSEPH TULLY IN CARRIER

USS SARATOGA RECEIVED AND

ANSWERED LIBERTY'S CALL

FOR HELP.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OMNAV FORM 3810-1 (Rev. 11-38) Recorder from FPSO Coq 1 Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSIXTHELT	OPERATOR BAKER RMSA	CREW 1	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1305Z	SET CONTINUOUS WATCH THIS CKT///BAKER RMSA	RS DE SCHEMATIC	REQ RADIO CHK K	
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	RDO CHK K		
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	RDO CHK K		
1306Z	RS DE SCHEMATIC	K		
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	(LONG COUNT) K		
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	RDO CHK K		
1307Z	RS DE SCHEMATIC	IF YOU READ ME GIVE ME LONG COUNT K		
	(LONG COUNT) RS	AR		
	RS DE CP	K		
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	BE ADVISED YOU ARE BARLEY WEAK AND RD K		
	AA DE AA	REQ U GIVE ME LONG COUNTS K		
	CP DE BELMONT	STA SCHMATIC WORKING RS REQ U STAND BY		
1308Z	CP DE FC	K		
	RS DE SCHEMATIC	REQ SHORT COUNT K		
1309Z	CP DE FC	K		
	(AA STATION TUNING ON FREQ)			
	RS DE C CORRECTION DE SCHEMATIC	REQ LONG COUNT K		
	(CW ON FREQ)			
1309Z	CP DE FC	K		
	UKN DE C	CP	SAY AA IN K	
	CP DE FC	FC	INT COMM RS K	
	CP DE CP	CP	IMI K	
	CP DE FC	FC	INT COMM RS K	
	FC DE CP	CP	REF UR LAST - NEG STA SCH HAS COMM RS K	
	(PUTTING NEW REC ON RS)			
1310Z	SCH DE RS	RS	K	
	RS DE CP	CP	RDO CK K	
	RS DE CP	CP	RDO CK K	
	RS DE CP	CP	(LONG COUNT) RDO CK K	
	ALL STA THIS NET DE SCH		BE ADVISED THIS STATION HAS LOST	
	LOST CONTACT WITH RS- REQ MAINTAIN STRICT LISTING WATCH			
	RS DE CP	CP	K	
	SCH DE AA	AA	R AR	
	SCH DE FC	FC	R AR	
	SCH DE CP	CP	R AR	
	SCH DE CP	CP	K	
	SCH DE SCH	SCH	K	
	SCH DE CP	CP	INT CW BACKGROUND K	
	SCH DE SCH	SCH	C K	
	SCH DE SCH	SCH	C WILL BRING UP REC NOW K	
	CP DE CP	CP	R AR	

DATE

PAGE NO.

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cog | Stock 0107 700 1000

ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHFLT OPERATOR: BAKER RMSA CREW: 1 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1315Z	T...O...L...E...//MIC
1315Z	NO SIGS AT THIS TIME
	CP DE FT K
	CP DE FT K
	RS/2 DE SCH/2 K
	RS DE SCH HOW COPY K
	CP DE SCH K
	CP DE SCH K
	CP DE CP R CW NOTHING K
	DE SCH COPY STA ANR COPY STA ANR K
	DE CP REQ SAY AGAIN K
	DE SCH COPY STA ANR -INT COMM STA RS K
	DE CP R UR LAST NEG COMM RS K
1320Z	DE SCH R AR
	DE CP REQ LONG COUNT FOR TUNNING K
	DE SCH (COMPLIED) K
	DE CP REQ LONG COUNT FOR TUNNING K
	RS SCH K
	RS SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
	CP DE SCH K
	UNK DE CP IMI K
	CP7 DE SCH K
	DE CP K
	DE SCH R INT ANYTHING FROM RS K
	DE CP NEG K
	DE SCH BE ADVISED THIS STA NOTHING RS K
1324Z	DE CP R AR
	(CW ON REC QSA1 UN READABLE)//MIC
	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
1328Z	RS DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
	(NOTHING HEARD FROM RS THIS STA)
	SCH DE CP K
	CP DE INT CRZ K
	DE DE BE ADVISED GDING TO TUNE AROUND FREQ K
1329Z	CP DE RS WAS 1KC LOW AWHILE AGO K
	J DE K
	DE K
	DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
	DE J (COMPLIED)
	DE CP IMIM K
	DE RS WAS 1KC LOW K
	RS SCH K
	RS DE K
	RS DE KJ
1331Z	RS DE REQ U GIVE ME SHORT COUNT K

DATE: PAGE NO:

James M. Ennes Research Papers

RADIO LOG

CPNAV FORM 8878-1 (Rev. 11-58) Extension from FPO Cag. Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHELT OPERATOR: BAKER RMSA CREW: 1 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1331Z	T.....O.....L.....E..... RS DE SCH U ARE WEAK AND UNREADABLE K DE RS IMI K (NOTHING HEARD) CP DE FC K CP DE FC K 1332Z SCH DE FC K SCH DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K FC DE SCH K SCH DE FC INT COMM RS K DE DE SCH RS VERY WEAK AND UNREADABLE K DE FC REQ U PASS TO RS- CAN U IDENTIFY NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS INT COPY K R STAND BT K 1333Z RS DE S SH INT U IDENTIFY GUNBOATS K SCH DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K RS DE SCH INT IDENTIFY NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS K SCH DE CP RDO CK K CP DE SCH GOOD AND READABLE AR (STA TESTING ON FREQ) SCH DE CP REQ SHORT COUNT K CP DE SCH (COMPLETED) K DE CP LOUD AND CLEAR AR 1334Z RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K (CP CAUSING INTERFERENCE TO SCH) RS DE SCH INT NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS K 1337Z RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K 1338Z (CW ON FREQ) RS DE SCH K 1339Z (CW UNK) RS DE SCH K RS DE SCH RDO CK K CP DE FC K UNK DE CP IMI K DE FC INT COMM RS K UNK DE CP IMI QRA K CP DE FC RDO K FC DE CP NEG COMM RS-ARE MAINTAINING COMM WITH SCH-SCH DOES NOT HAVE COMM RS K RS DE SCH K (UNK CW) RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K

DATE	PAGE NO.

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2816-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO Cag 11 Dept 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY **COMSIXTHELT** OPERATOR **BAKER RMSA** CREW **1** CIRCUIT **BELMONT** FREQUENCY **11255 KCS**

TIME TRANSMISSION

1340Z	T....O...L...E.... RS DE SCH (UNK CW)		REQ LONG COUNT K
	JNK DE CP SCH DE FC RS DE SCH MM DE SCH RS DE SCH RS DE SCH FC DE SCH SCH DE FC SCH DE SCH SCH DE CP SCH DE CP		IMI K K G-C K STAND BY K REQ LONG COUNT K REQ LONG COUNT K K K IN REF UR LAST-NG CONTACT RS K K R AR HAB RS QSA5 BEFORE ATTACK-REQ HE COME UP ORESTES ON A SIX MEGGER K BE ADVISED U WERE QRK5-PAUSE- UNDERSTNAD U WERE QRK5-REQ HE COME B 6 MEGGER ORESTES K
1350Z	SCH DE FC SCH DE FC SCH DE FC DE DE SCH DE DE FCC DE DE SCH DE DE FC DE DE SCH RS DE SCH RS DE SCH		K K K K REQ U GIVE ME WRITTEN AUTHENTICATION K IMI K (COMPLIED) R AR BE ADVISED R FC COPIES U QRK5 BEFORE APPROX 30 MIN ATTACK K REQ LONG COUNT K
1353Z	RS DE SCH (CW UNK)		
	SCH DE FC FC DE SCH SCH DE FC FC DE SCH FC DE SCH FC DE SCH SCH DE FC SCH DE FC SCH DE FC		K K REQ U PROVIDE ME WITH REQUESTED INFO ASAP K R AR K REQ LONG COUNT K REQ LONG COUNT K (COMPLIED) K HOW COPY K R AR
1355Z	SCH DE FC		REQ TO KNOW IF YOU RECEIVED MY 5711 OVER BROAD CAST K

James M. Ennes Research Papers

DATE	PAGE NO.

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FFSO Cag. 'T' Slot 0107 700 1000

ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHFLT OPERATOR: BAKER RMSA CREW: 1 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION		
1355Z	T.....O.....L.....E..... SCH DE FC		REQ TO KNOW IF U RECEIVED KR NR 05711 IMI REQ TO KNOW IF U RECEIVED KR NR 05711 K STAND BY AR
1357Z	RS DE SCH SCH DE CP SCH DE CP DE DE CP DE DE CP RS DE SCH FC DE SCH SCH DE CP RS DE SCH SCH DE CP		K K K K I JUST HEARD STA RS L/C- REQ U TRY AND CONTACT HIM K R AR REQ LONG COUNT K K STAND BY K INT HEAR STA RS CALLING U K K REQ U ADVISE RS I AM READING HIM FIVE BY K
	RS DE SCH DE DE SCH BELMONT DE CP N0001 DE CP BELMONT DE CP DE DE N0121 DE DE CP DE DE N0121 N0121 DE SCH DE DE N0121 DE DE SCH N0212 DE BELMONT DE DE N0212 DE DE BL DE DE N0212 SCH DE FC DE DE CP FC DE SCH DE DE FC SCH DE FC DE DE CP DE DE FC DE DE FC		R AR BE ADVISED CP READING U FIVERS-SND TRAFFIC AR K K K HAVE TRAFFIC 80 NET K PASS TRAFFIC K PASS TO BELMONT CALL EXT 021-INFORM 021 ADA RILELY-RILELY REQ A CANCEL HIS REP HIS IMPEACHMENT THIS EVENING REQ CONFIRMATION FROM N021 K IMI Q AA 021 K (COMPLIED) R - BE ADVISED (NOTHING HEARD) K K W/VR K UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE FLASH TRAFFICK (BRK) INT NOTIFY THAT I AM COPYING RS - FIVERS K AFFIRM ON THAT K
1400Z			R AR K K K STILL NEED CONFIRMATION K

DATE	PAGE NO.

(over)

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cap. '1' Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSIXTHFLT	OPERATOR BAKER RMSA	CREW 1	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
--------------------------------	-------------------------------	------------------	---------------------------	--------------------------------

TIME	TRANSMISSION		
1400Z	T.....O....L....E.... RS DE FC INT REC MY LAST K RS DE CP K CP DE RS K DE CP REQ U COME TO ME ON 103PF AND EDA02A CP DE FC REQ U PASS TO RS FROM COMSIXTHFLT K DE FC INT IDENTIFY GUMBOAT K RS DE DEL K RS DE FAN K ALL STA THIS NET I AM WORKING STA RS FIVE BY BOTH WAYS CP AR CP DE FC K CP DE FC K FAN DE CP REQ U PAS TO STA RS -CAN U IDENTIFY GUNBOATS K RS DE CP K CP DE CP K DE C CP K I PASS FROM FAN-STA FC REQ TO KNOW IF U CAN IDENTIFY ATTACHING GUNBOATS K		
1423Z	CP DE RS AS1 K CP DE FC REQ U HAVE RS AUTHENTICATE K FAN DE FC K DE DE FF K DE DE FC REQ U PASS TO CP TO PASS TO RS CAN U IDENTIFY AND AUTHENTICATE K BT WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT OF THE VESSELS- BELIEVE TO BE ISRAELI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED SHIP AFTER ATTACK-WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT-BELIEVED TO ISRAELI HELO TH THAT CIRCLED SHIP AFTER ATTACK- POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE WILL HAVE GO FROM SHIPS PHOTOS K I COPY-ESTIMATE HOW LONG TO TAKE INFORM K		
1441Z	RS DE FC STANDY BY AR CP DE FAN REQ U PASS UR LAST TO RS K CP DE FC K FAN DE FC RELAYED MY LAST TO CP-REQ THAT CP RELAY MY LAST TO RS K FAN DE FC K DE FAN RELAY TO CP TO RELAY TO RS WHAT IS UR PRESENT CONDITION K FC DE FAN STAND BY AR CP DE FAN REQ U PAS TO CP FROM FC -WHAT IS UR PRESENT CONDITION K FF DE FC LAST WORD IS CONDITION K		

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2110-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FSO Log "I" Stock 0107 708 1003

ACTIVITY COMSLYTHELT	OPERATOR BAKER RMSA	CREW 1	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
	CP	DE	FAN	K
	CP	DE	BELMONT	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	BELMONT	INT READY TO COPY K
		DE	CP	R K
		DE	BELMONT	REQ SITREP -YA HAVE BEEN ATTACHED BY
		DE	CP	WHOM K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	BELMONT	DE	CP	K
	BELMONT	DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	-0- UNDERWAY 8 KNTS .43 MAGNETIC
				AT 1430Z
				-0- UNDERWAY 8 KNTS .43 MAGNETIC
				AT 1430Z K
				R AR
				UNDERWAY 8 KTS COURSE 340 MAGNETIC
				TIME 1430Z K
	CP	DE	FAN	K
	SCH	DE	FAN	K
		DE	SCH	K
		DE	FAN	K
		DE	FAN	K
	SCH	DE	(COUT OUT)	
	SCH	DE	(COUTOUT)	
	BELMONT	DE	FAN	PASS TO CP FOR TRANS TO RS -BT CAN U
	SCH	DE		IDENTIFY ATTACKERS ALSO WHAT IS UR PRE
				CONDITION K
	BELMONT	DE	DE	IMI K
	RS	DE	SCH	INT REC MSG CONCERNING CONDITION-
				AND ATTACKERS U ATTEND TO MSG
				081414Z
	BELMONT	DE	CP	IMI K
	BELMONT	DE	CP	UNABLE TO COPY K
	FAN	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	FAN	ZFR REQ K
		DE	SCH	R AR
		DE	FAN	K
1443Z	CP	DE	FAN	K
	CP	DE	FAN	K
	CP	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	SCH	I WILL RELAY K
		DE	FAN	R -RELAY TO RS - ASSIST IS ON THE WAY
				BT K
				R AR
	RS	DE	SCH	K
		DE	SCH	

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cap. 1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSIXTHFLT OPERATOR BAKER RMSA CREW 1 CIRCUIT BELMONT FREQUENCY 11255 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION		
1443Z	T.....O...L.....E..... RS DE SCH K RS DE SCH K CP DE SCH K DE DE CP REQ U PASS TO RS FROM FC ASSIS ON WAY K DE DE CP R AR DE DE CP I PASS FROM FC ASSIST ON THE WAY K RS DE CP K FC DE CP K UNK DE RS R R THANK U MUCH AR DE DE RS K DE DE RS K		
1447Z	RS DE SCH K SCH DE CP RELAY FROM FC ASSIST IS ON THE WAY K SCH DE FAN RELAY TO RS NOTIFY FC WHEN ASSIST DE DE FAN ARRIVES ON SCENE K DE DE SCH INT COPY MY LAST K DE DE FAN C-GIVE TO CP NOW K DE DE SCH R AR DE DE SCH K DE DE FAN BELIEVE RS COPYING UR STA K DE DE SCH K DE DE SCH REQ RELAY TO FC CORR--- DE DE SCH REQ U ADVISE WHEN ASSIS ARRIVES K DE DE SCH REQ U NOTIFY WHEN ASSIS ARRIVES K DE DE CP K DE DE CP HAVE TOP HAND K CP DE SCH K DE DE RS R R AR DE DE SCH R-RS ROGERS LAST AR DE DE CP K SCH DE RS REQ TO KNOW WHAT TYPE OF ASSIS IS DE DE CO COMING K DE DE RS R AR SCH DE RS REQ TO KNOW WHAT TYPE OF ASSIST IS COMING K RS DE SCH STAND BY K SCH DE FAN STAND BY AR DR DE CP K CP DE CP STATION REQ U COME UP E4.4H K DR DR RR WE ARE UP NOW REQ TP PUT UP COUNTER ALSO REQ TO KNOW IF THIS IS TRANSMIT AND REC K		
1452Z	SCH DE RS ASSIST AS REQ-ARE U COPYING KR BCST K RS DE SCH R AR RS DE SCH REF UR LAST- ASSIST AS REQUIRED ON THE WAY-U COPY KR BCST K DE DE SCH K RS DE SCH R U AST AND REQ U STAND BY K SCH DE FAN REQ U CORR TO RS- ASSIST AS REQ AS REQUESTED K		

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Log. 1st Sheet 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY CONSIXTHELT	OPERATOR BAKER RMSA	CREW 1	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1455Z	T.....O.....L.....E..... SCH DE RS CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR DE CP DE DE DR DE RS FAN DE CP DE DE FAN CP DE FAN			R R AR K K REQ PUT COUNTER FOR A ROX TWO MIN K UNDERSTAND U WANT HIM TO PUT COUNTER FOR TWO MIN- INT C C K C K WE HAVE INTEL PHOTS AND SURFACE VESSELS-BUT NO MEANS OF DEVEL -INT MEANS OF DEVEL SAME K K ZUJ AR PASS TO RS -ZUE AND REQ TO DNOW WHETHER HE IS COPYING KR K
1500Z	RS DE SCH SCH DE RS DE DE SCH RS DE SCH SCH RS DE DE SCH DE DE FAN RS DE CP SCH CP DE CP DE DE SCH FAN DE FAN DE DR DE FAN DE DR CP DR CP DR CP DR			K K REF UR LAST ZUE-ALSO REQ TO KNOW ARE U COPYING KR K ARE U CAPABLE OF COPYING KR BCST K NEG K R AR R AR K K K REQ U PASS TO FAN THAT HE HAS CARRIED OUT EMMERGENCY DISTRUCTION K ZOF CP-CARRIED OUT IMMERGENCY DIS K R AR K K REQ U TAKE OUT GUARD GB NET K R AR K K K
1501Z	CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR			ADVISE WHEN WE HAVE HIM GB K R AR K K K K
1502Z	CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR CP DE DR			K K K K K
1503Z	CP DE C			QRZ DR K

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2816-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FFSO Csg. "1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMS LYTUEL T	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1527Z	T.....0.....L.....E..... SCH	DE	CP	K
1531Z		DE	SCH	IMI FROM ESCORT TO PASSING SAME UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT APPROACHING STA ROCK STAR K
1539Z		DE	CP	I RELAY FROM RS- THREE UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARDS RS K
1534Z	SCH FAN SCH	DE	FAN	R AR K K
		DE	SCH	ADD TO MY LAST TO RS-IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVED ACCEPT MEDICAL ASSIST CARE FOR DEAD IF OFFERED K
		DE	FAN	REQ U IMI K PRESENT POSITION 270 ESCORT AND IF POSSIBLE PRESENT 340 MAX K

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FFSO Cap. "I" Mod. 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHELT OPERATOR: BAKER RMSA CREW: 1 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1540Z	SCH	DE	FAN	REQ U CORR LAST TO RS (SAME INFO AS BEFORE) REQ U SAY WORD BEFORE ASSIST K IMI K ESCORT ON THE WAY K R AR K SENDING MSG TO U ON ORDER WIRE K K
1542Z	BELMONT CP	DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE	SCH FAN SCH SCH CP SCH SCH FAN	PASS TO RS IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVED EXCEPT MEDICAL ASSIST AND CARE FOR THE DEAD IF OFFERED K RDO CK K K G/R K INT WISH ME TO PASS LAST K R AR YOU ARE WEAK BUT READABLE SAY 2 TIMES I PASS FROM FC ESCORT ON THE WAY ASSESS ASSESS DAMAGE DAMAGE AND AND IF IF POSSIBLE POSSIBLE CONTINUE CONTINUE COURSE COURSE FIGURED 340 FIGURES 340 MAX SPEED SPEED UNTIL 100 MILES 100 MILES K CONFIRMATION BACK AND FORTH K R ZUJ AR K K I PASS FROM FAN IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVES ACCE PT MEDICAL ALL MEDICAL ASSIST AND CARE FOR DEAD IF OFFERED K WHAT STA SENDS K I PASS FROM FC K R AR K K REF UR LAST ON CVA LINK REQ U CEASE SENDING I HA E IMMEDIATE TFC FOR U K K K REQ U GEE CONFIRMATION STA BELMONT OF ESCORTS TO RS K REQ TO KNOW WHC ESCORTS IS K ZUJ ZR ZUJ ON THAT FAN GETTING NOW AR IMI K DESTROYERS MAX SPEED K R ZUJ AR
1545Z	DR DR	DE DE DE DE DE DE	DR RS FC DR FC DR FC CP DR CP DR FAN DR DR FAN DR	
1556Z	CP FAN	DE DE DE DE	DR FAN DR DR FAN DR	

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cpg. "1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSIXTHFLT	OPERATOR BEST RM3	CREW 2	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1605Z	T.....O.....L.....E..... CP DE DR DE DR	DE DR DE DR DE SCH DE (ORM) DE RS DE RS	DR DR DR SCH (ORM) RS DR	INT QSO WHELLUS AFB ANY MEANS K ZOF SCH TO ALL STAR NEED TO KNOW HOW MANY AND TYPES OFF AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED FOR CONTINGENCY WHAT TIME FIE AIRCRAFT REVOVER NEED ASAP R AR INT COPY K RELAY PLS (BKN) BIG DIPPER AND MADORK R AR
1607Z		DE SCH DE CP DE DR DE CP	SCH CP DR CP	ZBD NEED TO KNOW HOW AND TYPES WERE LANUCHED FOR CONTINGENCY WHAT TIME DID AIRCRAFT REVOVER NEED ASAP K ZUJ K K K REF LAST I HAVE COMM WITH WHEELUS AFB HOWEVER CANNOT READ U THIS CTK K O K K REF LAST OUR 1800Z QTH 31.35N 33.32E BT NW AT 10 KNTS K R AR
1611Z	FC BEL	DE CP DE CP	CP CP	ZBD RS 1800Z QTH 31.35N 33.32E BT INW AT 10 KNTS K R AR INT ZULU K C K R AR INT TIME 1600Z C K R AR CORR MY LAST TO READ
	CP BEL RS 7 CP DR	DE FC DE RS DE CP DE BEL DE CP DE RS DE CP DE RS DE FC DE FC7 DE DR DE FC DE DR	FC RS RS CP BEL CP CP RS CP RS RS FC FC7 DR FC DR	K K IMI K REPEAT K C C K K REQ C SPPELLE OF ALL ESCORTS K R MATAIOR VIG DIPPER K R TKS AR K INT QSO CP K R TRY TO PASS K I QSL FOR RS POSIT 1800Z QTH K R AR

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ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHLT OPERATOR: BEST RM3 CREW: 1 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1623Z	T....0... L...E..... DE CP DE CP DE CP BEL K STA RS HAVE NO WAY DERTEM. TOR FILES DESTROYED ALSO AND DO NTO ACK RECP K REPEAT AA ACK J K
1628Z	DE BEL DE BEL DE BEL DE SCH DE FC DE SCH FC 0700Z REQ FC CONF/ EXPEDT TO ----- REQ CONF RDV TIME ESCORT TO RS K K K -0-081 26Z FM SCH TO FC BT UNCLAS LAUNCH FOR A1H 081602Z FOR SUDA BAY GREECE WITH ----- IMI AA SUDA BAY K COMPLIED K IMI AA WITH K COMPLIED K
1630Z	DE FC DE SCH DE FC DE CP DE DR DE CP DE DR DE CP DE DR DE FC DE DR DE FB DR K K REF AA LAST SUBJ NOW BEING DISCUSSED ANOTHER CKT K R AR K K REF FC CONF --SUBJ BEING DISSUCSED ELSEWHERE K INT C K C K R AR K K INT TFC FOR WHEELUSE K K INT QSO WHEELUS ATT K ZUG HOWEVER I CAN PASS VIA ATHENS AF K R B C HAS COMM WITH WHEELUS AND STILL ASKING REPLY FM B C AS TO WHETHER HE K K K
	DE FAN DE FAN DE CP PASS TO RS JCS MSG 080100Z TOR NTO INT HE REC THE MSG K R AR

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ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHELT OPERATOR: BEST RM3 CMTW: 2 CIRCUIT: BELMONT I FREQUENCY: 11255 KOS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1636Z	T....0....L....E..... RS CP INT REC JCS MSG TOR NOT IMPORTANT K 1640Z CP DE DE RS ZUJ AR FC DE DE SCH K SCH DE DE FC K DE DE SCH ZBD IBA COME F511 K 1641Z DE DE AA RAR SCH DE DE FT K SCH DE DE FT K DE DE FT ZES 2 K SCH DE DE SCH ZFR I WASS PASSING TO FC K 1643Z RS DE DE FC QSY LAST K RS DE DE CP K RS DE DE CP K DE DE RS FAN DE CP CP FAN K DE DE CP FAN J K DE DE CP FAN R AR SCH DE FC K DE DE SCH K 1646Z FC DE DE FC OSO CVA LINE K DE DE SCH R AR DE DE SCH K DE DE FC K SCH DE SCH QZ CVA REQ QSA QRK K DE DE FC ZUJ AR DE DE FC QRK 4/5 K CP DE FC R AR 1654Z NO SIGS. DE FAN COUNTING REC TUNNING AND XMTER ALIG) 1656Z (EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE BEING PASSED) 1658Z EXERCISE TFC 1701Z YAPD DE CP RELAYED EXERCISE TFCTE 1706Z SCH DE CP INT QRK K DE DE SCH W/RINT BLAND BROAVO W/D NR 5 K DE DE CP COMPLIED K DE DE FC BLNK B-FR IS VSMWZN K SCH DE SCH R-INT C PBLNK FR IS VSMWZN K FC DE FC R AR 1712Z FC DE R K

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ACTIVITY COMSIXTHFLT	OPERATOR BEST RM3	CROW 2	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
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TIME	TRANSMISSION
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1712Z	T.....O.....L.....E..... MM DE CP IMI K MM DE CP R R ZIK W/D NR 5 ---SEE FILES (MM WEAK AND UNREADABLE) (STEADY KEY ON HICOMM NOW)	
1715Z	RS DE DR K RS DE DR K DR DE DR QRZ RS AR DR DE DR K DR DE DR K RS DE DR K DR DE DR R K DR DE DR INT ORU K DR DE DR R R ZUJ AR	
1719Z	(STEADY KEY ON HI COMM) DR DE DR K DR DE DR ZBD TOP HAND -REQ UR TOR OF STA FC 080917Z MIM 080917Z K U GARBLED RELAY CP K R AR CP DE DR K CP DE DR K CP DE DR R-ZOF RS-BT FM TOPHAND REQ UR TOR OF FC 080917Z K	

	CP DE BEL INT TOR 1704Z INT C K CP DE BEL I DONT KNOW K SCH DE BEL R ZUJ AR SCH DE BEL K BEL DE BEL K DE DE BEL K DE DE BEL R INT TOR FOR W/D NR 5 1704Z INT C K CP DE RS C ZUJ AR RS DE CP O O O K CP DE RS R ZUJ AR U W/B UT RED-FM USS LIBERTY -TO CNO -INFO CINCUSNAVEUR JCS CINCLANTFLT COMSIXTHFLT COMSERVLANT BY UNCLAS SITUATION FLOOLOING AIR ATTACK 1. AT TIME 081205Z WHILE SHIP ON COURSE 283 SPD 5KTS POSIT 35. CORR 35CORR 31-35.5N 33-29E EAST SHIP ATTACKED BY UNIDENTIFIED JET FIGHTERS BELIVED TO BE ISARELI APPROX 6 STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP APPROX 6 STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP APPROX 081225Z 3 TORP BOATS ONE IDENTIFIED AS	
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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2916-1 (Rev. 11-88) Recorder from PPSO Log Sheet 0107 708 1000

Activity COMSIXTHFLT	OPERATOR REST RM3	CREW 2	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
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TIME	TRANSMISSION
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1721Z

T...O...L...E...
(CONTINUED)

3 TOR BOATS ONE IDENTIFIED AS ISRAELI APPROACHED SHIP STBD QUARTER HI SPEED HULL NR 1 BOAT WAS 206 -17 APPROX 081427Z TOOK TORP BOATS UNDER FIRE WITH 50 CALIBMACP GUNS RANGE 2000 YDS. TORP BOAT LAUNCHED TORP AND STRAFING ATTACK TOR HIT STBD SIDE SHIP HAS 10* STBD LIST WATER TIGHT BOUNDRIES ESTABLISHED AND HOLDING AFTER ATTACK TORP BOATS CLEARD TO EAST AVOUT FIVE MILE CLEARING AREA AT 10 KTS. 2. PHOTOS OF AIRCRAFT AND BOATS TAKEN AFTER COMPLETED TWO ISRAELI HELOS ORBITED SHIP AT ABOUT 081255Z RANGE 500 YDS ISRAELI INSIGNIA CLEARLY VISIBLE PHOTOS TAKEN SEVERAL PROJECTILES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM TOPSIDE AREAS NR DEAD EST 10 NR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED EST 15 TOTAL WOUNDED 75 NR MISSING CURRENTLY UNDERTERMINED 3. SHIP

UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION WILL SUBMIT CASREPT ASAP. SEPERATELY 4. EXTENSIVE SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TOPSIDE LOWER DECK SPASES FWD DESTROYED 5. COMM CAP LIMITED WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJECT-- ILE RECOVERED AS DIRECT WHIP WILL REQ DRYDOCKING AND EXT REFITTING.

INT COPY K
(MANY IMI RS COMPLIED)
R 081715Z AT 1742Z AR

R AR
DISREGARD AR
SENDING ZDK 081715 TO CP ...PS
ZFR AR
R OSI 1702Z K

K
K
K
REQU RELAY TO RS DTG ETA 0600B BT DOES RS HOLD EMPRESS DOROTH 081612Z K
REQ U SPELL UR CALL SIGN PHONETIC K
G A Y T I M E G O L F (SAID SAME)
REQ IMI 0600B TO 081612Z K

COMPLIED K
QS B ***ED
PASSED FROM GG K

1745Z

CP	DE	RS
RS	DE	CP
CP	DE	CP
CP	DE	RS
CP	DE	FC
CP	DE	FC
CP	DE	FC
RS	DE	SCH
CP	DE	GOLF
CP	DE	GOLF
CP	DE	CP
CP	DE	GOLF
CP	DE	CP
GG	DE	CP
GG	DE	GOFL
GG	DE	CP
GG	DE	CP
RS	DE	CP
RS	DE	CP

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ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHFLT OPERATOR: BEST RM3 CREW: 2 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255

TRANSMISSION

TIME				TRANSMISSION
1759Z	T.....0.....L.....E.....			R AR TOPHAND REQ UR ETR FC 080917Z K I READ BACK K WA FC IS 080917Z K
1801Z				AS AR K K BE ADVISED TOPHAND IS QSO ON 1H K IMI K COMPLIED K
1803Z				R AR INT QSO WITH AR WE DO NOT HAVE ANY INFO ON 080917Z ART SPACES ARE BLOCKED OFF K REF UR LAST TO RS CONCERNING DTG 080917Z BE ADVISED RS CANNOT COPY ANY FLT BCST K R AR K K REQ ----- IMI WA RDVU K R WA RDVU -MAKE K ZUJ AR O K K -0-081700Z FM SHOC TO IAG 9306 CLONT ACEX BY NATO UNCLAS SHOC 112 EXER WIDE AWAKE /67 A. 60.5 B. FR IS VSWMZN THRU C. BACKWOOD D. NINE E. REPT F. 081700Z EXER EXER EXER BY K K K K Z07 FM GG REQ U TAKE COURSE 300 FOR RMWJ MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT REPT THIS CKT BT K INT COPY K K INT QSL K IMI AA RDVU K COMPLIED K INT QSL MY LAST K
1808Z				
1813Z				K K QRZ CP K

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ACTIVITY: COMSIXTHFLT OPERATOR: REST RM2 CREW: 2 CIRCUIT: BELMONT FREQUENCY: 11255 KCSL

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1813Z	T....0...L....E..... DE DE CP DE DE CP DE DE RS DE DE FC DE DE BEL DE DE BEL DE DE FC DE DE CP DE DE CP RS RS RS RS RS RS CP CP FC FC SCH DE DE CP DE DE FC DE DE SCH DE DE FC DE DE SCH DE DE SCH DE DE RS DE DE SCH DE DE SCH SCH DE DE RS FC DE DE SCH DE DE FC DE DE FC DE DE RS DE DE FC DE DE RS DE DE SCH DE DE RS SCH DE DE GG GG DE DE FF RS DE DE GG SCH DE DE FC DE DE DE BEL DE DE GG DE DE PAW DE DE BEL DE DE PAW DE DE SCH DE DE FC DE DE SCH 1820Z GG SCH RS SCH SCH DE DE GG GG DE DE FF FC DE DE GG FC DE DE FC DE DE DE 1823Z BEL DR FC DE DE GG DE DE PAW DE DE BEL DE DE PAW DE DE SCH DE DE FC DE DE SCH 1826Z BEL DE DE FB DE DE FC DE DE BEL DE DE FC DE DE BEL RS DE DE FB DE DE FC DE DE BEL DE DE BEL
	INT QSL K INT QSL LAST FM GG K, R K K K K K K K K ZOF RS-WERE U FLYING US.COLORS AT TIME OF ATTACK K IMI K K K INT QSD RS K AS AR K K ZOF RS-FM FC P - WERE U FLYING US COLORS AT TIME OF ATTAC K K ZUE K ZBD RS ZUE K R AR K K K BT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO STEER COURSE FIG 300 MAGNETIC HAVE NO FACILITES AVAILABLE FOR POSIT K R I COPIED AR K K BT AS OF 200Z RECOMUTE RDVU TIME WITH RS AND ADVISE BY K R AR K R AR (PASSING TFC NOT CONCERNING) K ZBD RS BT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO STER COURSE FIG 300 MANGETIC WE HAVE NO FACILITES FOR POSIT BT K R AR RDO CK K W/R K W/R AR RDO K

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO Cag. '1' Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSXI THFLT OPERATOR BEST RM3 CREW 2 CIRCULAR BELMONT FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
1831Z	T....O....L....E.....	
	RS DE BEL RDO CK K	
	DR DE BEL RDO CK K	
	DE DE DR W/R K	
	DE DE BEL R AR	
	BEL DE SCH W/R K	
	RS DE CP RDO CK K	
	RS DE CP RDO CK K	
	CP DE RS K	
	RS DE CP W/R INT TFC K	
	CP DE CP G/R INT TFC K	
	DR DE RS ZU G K	
	FC DE FC BEL INT QSL 081651Z (YQJQ) K	
	BEL DE FC BEL K	
	DE DE FC BEL ZBD DEVIL INT COMM WITH DR K	
	DE DE FC BEL R COMM THIS NET ZFR MY TFC ON BRAVO K	
1837Z	FC DE DR R AR	
	DR DE FC K	
	RS DE FC DR K	
	DR DE FC DR REF UR LAST DO NOT HOKD SUBJ MSG K	
	CP DE BEL K	
	BEL DE CP K	
	DE DE CP (QRMS)	
	DE DE CP QSA1 K (BELMONT) K	
	DE DE CP INT RELAY TORS 081715Z VIA ANY MEANS K	
	FC DE CP AS AR	
	BC DE DR K	
	DR DE FC K	
	DE DE FC DR REF THAT MSG INT U GONNA SEND IT K	
	DE DE FC R ZUJ AR	
	RS DE GG K	
	GG DE RS W/R ZOF THRU CP K	
	CP DE GG R AR	
	BELL DE BEL REF MY LAST INT AND K	
	CP DE CP IMI K	
	BEL DE BEL COMPLIED K	
	BEL DE CP WE ARE CK QRX K	
	DE DE FC R AR	
	DE DE DR REF MY LST ON TASK GR ORESTES MSG DOES	
	DE DE DR NOT NEED TO BE RELAYED K	
	DE DE DR R AND REF U MSG 081615Z JUST REG THIS	
1851Z	DE DR STA K	
	DE FC R AR	

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO COG. Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHERL				

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1851Z R	T.....O.....L.....E..... RS DE FC K FC DE RS K RS DE FC BT DO YOU HAVE CAPABILITY OF SHIFTING DE RS FREQ OF THIS NET K DE FC BELIEVE AFFIRM HOWEVER IF WE ARE NOT CONTACTED IN 15 MINS WILL SHIFT BACK TO THIS NET K R WILL PASS TO NC AND DO NOT SHIFT AT THIS TIME INT QSO BEL K
1853Z	CP DE FC BEL DE CP BEL DE CP BEL DE CP DR DE CP CP DE DR DE CP DE DR BEL DE DR DR DE BEL DE DR PAW DE BEL DE PAW DE BEL DE PAW DE DR FC DE DR PAW DE FC DE PAW DE FC KZOF BEL'S BELIEVES HE HAS CAPABILITIES OF SHIFTING FREQ THIS NET HOWEVER IF COMM NOT ESTABLISHED WITHIN 15 MINS AFTER SHIFT HE WILL RETURN THIS FREQ K P (PASSED) PASS TO ER TO PASS TO RS IF HE KNOWS FREQ 48 K K BEL REQ TO RS IF HE KNOWS FREQ FOR 48 K K K K
) PASSED) R AR K C K C K R AR
4658Z	

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Co. "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
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TIME	TRANSMISSION
1916	<p>RS DE BUUB CAT K (LATE ENTRY--BEL ADVISED AT APPROX 1916Z FAN TO ADVISE BC TO QAP RS ON 4B AND ADVISE)</p> <p>RS DE BC K PAW DE FC K AA DE BEL K BEL DE FAC ZGN FM STA RS ON 4B K DE BEL R WOULD YOU BEL DE BC K AA DE BEL REQ LONG COUNT K DE BC (COMPLIED) AA DE BEL BEL DE BC (OFF FREQ) BC DE BEL R AR BEL DE PAW REQ NET K DE BEL R AR RS DE PAW K RS DE PAW K RS DE PAW K PAW DE BEL # INT ZGN RS THIS NET K PAW DE BEL K PAW DE BEL K BEL DE PAW K</p>
1924	<p>DE BEL INT QSO RS K DE PAW ZUG K DE BEL R AR CP DE GTG K GTG DE CP K DE GTG INT CKT 4B K BEL DE FC K BEL DE FC K DE FAN STA BLC COPY RS LOUD AN D# DE CLEAR ON 4B K DE KEEP COM WITH RS ARE SHIFIT DE ING THIS NET K DE FAN R AR BEL DE GTG K GTG DE FC QSY 4B K DE GTG R AR YAPD DE BEL QSY 4B AR (THISTA QSY'D) (6720KCS) BEL DE RS IMI K DE BEL REQ PASS TO BG INT QRV ON HA02HG K</p>
1926	
1928	<p>RS DE BC R AR FC DE SCH K RS DE SCH K</p>
1930	<p>(CARRIER ON FREQ)</p>

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2818-1 (Rev. 11-58) Reorder from FPO Cag. Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
1930Z	T.....O.....L.....E			
RS	DE BC			G&R QRU AR
	DE CP			K
	DE RS			R K
RS	DE CP			C&R AR
	DE FC			RDO CK K
	DE RS			R K
	DE FC			R AR
1931Z	RS DE SCH			RDO CK K
AA	DE BC			ZUJ
RS	DE SCH			RDO CK K
	DE RS			G&R K
RS	DE SCH			QRU AR
BEL	DE DR			K
FC	DE DR			K
	DE FC			K
	DE DR			INT QSA K
	DE FC			L&C K
	DE DR	INT REPLY TO ME		LAST K
	DE FC			ZUG K
	DE DR			R AR
FC	DE FT			K
	DE FC			K
1935	BEL DE FT			W&R AR
BR	DE DR			REQ NET
	DE FC			K
	DE DR			K
1936	DE FC			INFO BEING PASSED VISUAL
RS	DE DR			R AR
	DE BC			RDO CK K
1939	DE RS			L&C K
RS	DE BC			SAME QRU AR
	DE BC			K
	DE RS			K
	DE BC			REQ YOU CONFIRM THE NR
1942				DEAD ALSO WOUNDED
1944	DE RS			(SERIOUSLY) K
MM	DE SCH			ZUJ AR
BC	DE MM			W&BR K
MM	DE FC			RDO K
BC	DE BEL			L&C AR
				INT TFC FM TOP HAND TO
				PASS TO RS K
1947	DE BC			ZUG ZUJ
BEL	DE RS			K
CP	DE RS			K
RS	DE CP			K
RS	DE BC			K
BC	DE RS			R REF LAST 1/4 DEAD REF-

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO Cag. 11 Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
1947	T, , , , , 0 L E			
	DE BC			WEEN 15 AND 25 SEROUSLY
	DE RS			WOUNDED 100 INJURED K
	DE BC			J K
	DE RS			AFFIRM K
1949Z	BEL			INT NR MISSING K
1950	DE BC			NEG K
	DE RS			(PASS INFO ABOUT WOUNDED
	DE BC			TO BELMONT)
	DE BEL			R AR
RS	DE GTG			K
GTG	DE FC			ADVISED OFF FREQ AND
				LOUD B/GROUND SQUEAL K
RS	DE GTG			K
GTG	DE RS			K
RS	DE GTG			BT UNDERSTAND UAR PRE -
				SENTLY 300 (QSA1)
	DE RS			ZUJ
	DE RS			REQ RELAY FOR STA CALL -
				ING ME K
	DE GTG			BT BELIEVE U AR PRESENT -
				LY ON COURES 300 SPD 10
1953	GTG	DE SCH		INT C K
RS	DE FC			ZUJ
SCH	DE FC			INT QSA K
GTG	DE RS			RELAY TO RS FM GTG (ABOVE INFO)
	DE GTG			REF LAST THAT IS AFFRIMATIVE K
GTG	DE FC			R AR
	DE GTG			K
	DE FC			K
	DE GTG			ADVISED HE STILL OFF FREQ K
FC	DE FC			R AR
	DE BEL			K
	DE FC			K
	DE BEL			???????
BEL	DE FC			REQ COUNT K
BEL	DE SCH			INT QSO RS K
BEL	DE SCH			MI K
BC	DE BEL			QSA1 RELAY THRU FC K
BEL	DE BC			K
RS	DE BEL			K
RS	DE BEL			K
	DE PS			K
1957	DE BEL			R AR
FC	DE DR			K
	DE FC			K
	DE DR			NEVER RECIED VISUALLY SEND VIA
				61S K

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James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cag. "1" Shack 0107 709 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
----------	----------	------	---------	-----------

TIME	TRANSMISSION
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1957	T.....0.....L.....E			
2000	DR DE FC AA DE FC BEL DE BEL BC DE ULCER BC DE SCH SCH DE SCH BC DE BC			R AS AR N/C K K K K
2006	BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH			INT QSO BEL K AS AR (N/C) ZOF BEL INT MSG HE WANTS ME TO RELAY TO RL K REQ COUNT K (COMPLIED) IMI K REQ PASS TO BEL TO GIVE YOU MSG HE WANTS ME TO PASS TO RS K ZUJ??J K C K ZUJ AR K
2010	BEL DE BC MM HAS BEL AND ADVISE HE IS BEL DE MM SCH DE BC DE SCH DE BC DE SCH DE FC BEL DE FC			ANS BC BUT ZGN THYSTA ALSO PASS IN BLIND BEL HAS BAD MITTER OUT K K ZUG QSO BEL K R AR REQ YOU PASS AND TFC FOR RS VIA 9361 AND I WILL RELAY AR RDO CK K W&BR K R L&C AR RDO CK K K K GIVE SCH CALL AND RELAY K IMI K (COMPLIED) R AR K K ZUJ K K
2015	RS DE SCH SCH DE RS RS DE SCH RS DE FC BC DE RS RS DE CBC DE RS DE BC DE RS DE BC RS DE BC DE BC DE RS DE BC			R AR K K ZUJ K R K (SCH TRYING TO HOLD RDO CK WITH RS NG TFC) ### O K K
2019	SCH DE BC DE SCH			
2019	FC DE SCH DE FC			

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2816-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPO Ceg. "1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
2019	T.....O.....L.....E			
2021	FC DE SCH SCH DE FC SCH DE FC DE SCH			O K QRV K (NET IN USE AR -0-081900Z FM SACEUR TO E3D2/ NATO UNCLAS SHOC 114/67 SF/OW WT BCST LISTEN WATCH CKT HZ001 - C WA 114/67 DEACTIVATED
2024	BC DE FC DE BEL			R AR (HOLDING RDO CKS)
2026	RS DE FC FC DE RS DE FC			K K MSG -FM YQJQ TO RS STEELJAW 702 WILL AIRBORNE AT APPROX. 2100Z TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMM UNICATIONS BT K
2028	FC DE RS BC DE FC DE BC			QSA 1 PASS THRU BC K K K
2029	RS DE FC DE BC DE BC DE RS DE BC DE BC			ZOF RS (LAST MSG) R AR K K (PASSED MSG) IMI AA 2100Z K KCOMPLIED)
2030	FC DE RS DE BC DE FC DE BC DE FC DE BC RS DE BC BC DE RS DE BC			R AR K K RS QSA UR LAST K R AR K K NEED TO KNOW ON THE RNR OF SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IF THE NR 15 TO 25 ARE INCLUDED IN THE NR 100 OF THE WOUNDED K
2034	BC DE RS DE RS DE BC			ZUJ AR K K
2035	RS DE RS BC DE BC			REF LAST AFFRIMATIVE K K
2041	RS DE RS DE GTG DE RS DE GTG			K K R AR NEED NAMES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED K (FOR CNO)

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-88) Recorder from IPSC Cap. "I" Stock 0107 700 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CBFW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
----------	----------	------	---------	-----------

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2041	T.....O.....L.....E
	BC DE BEL INT QSO FC K
2044	BEL DE FC INT QRZ K
	DE BEL ZUG AR
	RS DE BC K
	DE RS K
	DE BC REQ COUNT K
	DE RS (COMPLIED)
	DE BC RS MEDIUM AND RADABLE K
2047	(ALL STAS TRYING TO GET FT BEL HAS 0 TFC FOR HIM)
2052	NO SIGNALS-CONCERNING THISTA
2057	NO SIGNALS-CONCERNING THISTA
2102	NO SIGNALS
2107	BC DE RS RDO CK K
	DE BC L&C AND DO U HAVE INFO YET K
	DE RS ARE YOU REFERRING TO NAMES OF
	DE BC WOUNDED K
	DE RS I AM REFERRING TO LIST OF DEAD
	DE RS AND WOUNDEDK
2109	DE RS BE ADVISED SHIP WILL SUBMIT PER-
2115	RS DE BC SONNEL CASREPT ASAP
	RS DE SCH ZUJING AR
	FAN DE BEL RDO CK K
2116	DE RS RDO CK K
	FAN DE FAN REQ LONG COUNT K
	FAN DE RS (COMPLIED)
	FAN DE FAN W&QRM REQ RELAY THRU ANOTHER STA K
2117	RS DE FAN IMI K
2120	FAN DE FC K
	RS ADVISED BC THAT CASREPT (PASSED INFO FM RS)
	WILL PASS VIA THIS CKT ASAP LIST IS BEING DRAFTED NOW AND
2125	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING THISTA
	RS DE CP
	DE RS
	DE CP
	DE RS INT QSL 080110Z FM JCS K
	DE CP IMI DTG K
2128	DE RS COMPLIED K
	CP DE RS ZUJ AR
	DE CP K
2129	DE RS K
	OP DE RS REF LAST JCS 080110Z AS AR
	RS DE CP
	CP DE RS
	RS DE CP
	CP DE RS
	CP DE RS REF LAST 080110Z IT IS NOT KNOWN
	CP DE RS YET THAT SPACE IS BLOCKED -

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2816-1 (Rev. 11-88) Recorder from PPSO Cag. "1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
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TIME	TRANSMISSION			
2129	T.....0.....L.....E			
	CP	DE CP	IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH-BELIEVE MSG DESTROYED K	
	FC	DE FC	R AR	
	CP	DE CP	K	
	CP	DE CP	K	
	DR	DE FC	INT QSO CP K	
2132	CP	DE DR	K	
	DR	DE CP	K	
	CP	DE DR	ZUJ K	
	FC	DE DR	ZUE QSO CP K	
		DE FC	ZOF CP ACORDING ROUTING INST	
			JCS 080110Z WE DO NOT BELIEVE	
			SUBJ MSG HELD BY RS K	
2134	FC	DE DR	J K	
		DE DR	K	
		DE FC	K	
		DE DR	IMI K	
	CP	DE FC	(COMPLIED)	
2136		DE DR	K	
2140		DE CP	R FC'S LAST AR	
	BEST OFF TO EARLES			
	BM	DE PET 1	K	
		DE PET 1	RELQ NET	
	RS	DE		
	BEL	DE MM	ZOF CONT QSY THE I MEGGER TO NUCO	
			JZ NY	
			(LOGGING IN ONLY TRANSMISSIONS	
			CONCERNING RS-----MIC ON	
2148	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING ROCK		STAR	
2153	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING ROCK		STAR	
2157	RS	DE FF	K	
	FF	DE RS	K	
	RS	DE FF	L/C AR	
		DE FF	RELEQUISH NET AR	
	BEL	DE MM	REQ NET FOR BDO CK RS K	
	RS	DE MM	RDO CK K	
	MM	DE RS	W/UNREADABLE ARE YOU RELAY THROUGH	
			FF K	
	FF	DE MM	K	
		DE FF	K	
		DE MM	NO TRFC WITH RS PASS NEG TRFC WITH	
		DE FF	RS K	
			R - FOR RS FOLLOWING FROM MM	
		DE A	(COMPLIED)	
			QSY 620- TO A013PE 2202 AUT MTN HOW	
			COPY	
		DE RS	HAVE 0 FOR U K	

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from PPSO Cag. "I" Sheet. 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
----------	----------	------	---------	-----------

TIME	TRANSMISSION
------	--------------

2153

T.....O.....L.....E
 DE FF
 FF DE RS
 DE FF
 FF DE RS

GA K
 WITH IMMEDIATE TFFC K
 K
 -0-082202Z FM RS TO CINCPAC INFO
 BUPERS BUMED NAVAL FINANCE CENTER
 CLEV COMFIVE CNO CINCUSNAVEUR
 CINCLANTFLT COMSIXTHFLT
 COMSERVLANT COMSERVRONEIGHT BT
 UNCLAS PERSONEL CASREPT
 1. KNW DECAND NEXT OF KIN LTCDR
 P.M. ARMSTRONG ALSO UBN 569075,
 1100 MRS. MARIE K. ARMSTRONG
 131 CAYNCA ROAD VIRGINIA BEACH
 VIRGINIA, 23461 QM3 FRANCIS(NMN)
 BROWN USN 778 76 70 MRS. AND MRS.

11/12

62

62 97 MR AND MRS WILBER C HIGGINS 219 FIDDLERS GREEN
 BOVER DELEWARE, SN CARL LUIS HOAR USN 774 48 MRS AND
 MRS. JAMES B. HOAR GROUP 3. NAVERINO OHIO CFCN DAVID (NMN)
 SKOLAK USN 850 17 83 MR AND MRS. RUDOLF SKOLAK 2318
 WEST. 19 AVE. GARY INDINIA PC2 JOHN CLARENCE SPICHER 473
 41 77 USN MRS LINDIA LEE SPICHER 7941 HAMPTON BLVD
 NORFOLK VIRGINIA GMG3 ALEXANDER NEIL THOMPSON JR USN
 770 47 21 MRS GALE E THOMPSON 4 CRYSTAL DRIVE WARWICK R.I.
 LT. STEPHEN SPENCER TOTH USN 689 61 3/11 CAPT JOSSPH
 CHARLIE TOTH USN PARA RET PARA 301 53 ST. VIRGINIA BEACH
 VIRGINIA - FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF PERSONNEL AS MISSING IN
 ACTION - LT JAMES C. PEECE USN 649805/6462 649 64 805/
 6462 MRS BAULIENE M. PEECE 1633 WILDWOOD DR. VIRGINIA
 BEACH VIRGINIA - REQUEST CINCPAC NOTIFY NEXT OF KIN -
 ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BT

2222

FC DE RS HOW COPY K
 RF DE RS K
 RS DE FF K
 DE RS HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO -
 DE FF ZUJ AR
 RS DE FF K
 DE RS

FOLLOWING LIST OF PERSONNEL
 LISTING AS MISSING ACTION
 ALAN BLUE CIV 531423327 GG-7 MRS KATHY A. BLUE 11605
 ROCK WOOD DR. SILVER SPRINGS MD. CT2 R.J. KEMPBALL USN
 USN 586 13 23 MRS ELIZABETH KALEIN CAMPBELL 46A DOORWOOD RD.
 MONTROSE SCOTLAND, CT2 ROBERT B. ESENBURG USN 776 09 35
 MR AND MRS BENJAMIN ENESBERG 703 SOUTH LEXINGTON PARK WAY
 SAINT PAUL MINN. CT1 WARREN E. HERSEY USN 903 67 11
 MR AND MRS WARREN O. HERSEY 17 PINE STREET STONEHAM MASS.
 CT1N LAWRENCE P. LAYDEN 870 53 70 - USN MR AND MRS JAMES

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cag "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
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TIME TRANSMISSION

2222

T.....00000.....L.....E
 HUSTON #BAYDEN 1411 ALSTON HUSTON TEXAS CT1 CURTIS A. GRAVES
 519 58 24 USN MR AND MRS BURTRON D. GRAVES 13211 ORANGE
 FORTH LAURDERDALE FLA. CT3 DIAMERROPH RO MIRGRRAF USN
 778 82 75-18 AL DUBLIN LANE WAOUCKKEEPSIE NEW YORK
 CTCN JAMES L LENAUS USN 997 55 58 MR AND MRS LEANDER
 JOSEPH LENAUS 735 EAST STATESSTREET UNION MISSIOURI (MARIE)
 CTC RAYMOND E LIND USN 571 13 74 MRS GAY LINN 33
 CARAVAGGIO SCALA D. APT 39. NAPLES ITALY-
 RS DE FF GA AFTER ITALY K
 DE RS SAY AGAIN AA ITALY - CTCN DAVID
 W. MARLBOROUGH B10 04 80 USN MR WILLIAM J. MARLBOROUGH 88
 VANNAIS STREET SPRINGFIELD MASSM. CTSN CARL C. NYGREN USN
 788 3716 MR ARVID CARL NYGEN 3512 TUSCOA ST. SEAFORT N.Y.
 CTC MELVIN DOUGLAS SMITH USN 493 95 96 MRS JUDITH ANN SMITH
 304 MORENO COURTS WARRENGTON FLA.

2249

FF DE RS H/C K
 DE FF GOT IT K
 RS DE FF R GA ALL AFER FLA K
 RS DE FF R
 FF DE RS K
 RS DE FF THIS MISSING IN ACTION OR WOUNDED
 DE RS IN ACTION K
 LIST IS NOW PERSONNEL MISSING IN
 ACTION K
 AA FLA K
 AA FLA
 DE RS
 99797 91 MR WILLIAM RAY THORTON 215 NORTH RACE
 STREET SPRINGFIELD OHIO CT2 A.P. MENDELE USN
 777 62 87 NO NEXT OF KIN KNOWN CT1J.M LUPTON 511 31 28
 USN NO NEXT OF KIN KNOWN PHILLIP CHARLES TIEDTKK USN 914
 32 84 MR ARTHUR L. TIEDTKE 16 30 ETHEL COURT MODESTO CALIF
 CT1 FREDRICK JAMES WALTON USN 236 31 86 MRS AUDREY JANE
 WALTON 2735 MILITARY ROAD

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FFSO Cdg. "1" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY COMSIXTHFLT	OPERATOR BEST RM3	CREW 2	CIRCUIT BELMONT	FREQUENCY 11255 KCS.
-------------------------	----------------------	-----------	--------------------	-------------------------

TIME	TRANSMISSION		
6			NIAGRA FALLS ,NEW YORK CT1 JOHN CALEO SMITH JR. USN 237 77 94 MRS SANDRA ANN SMITH 23A RONDES BURY ROAD N.W.6 LONDON CPL ED WARD E. REHMEYER USMC 21 20 919 MRS AND MR. EDWARD E REHMEYER JR. BOX NR 4 RAILROAD PENNA.
	FF	DE	RD
		DE	FF
	RS	DE	FF
	RS	DE	FF
	FF	DE	RS
			IMI K K K REQ U CORR CT2 RICHARD W KEENE 75 20 18-MR RICHARE WALTER RICHARD WLATER KEENE SR K BELEIVE U BEING CALLED BY DC- K R U MSG THROUGH PENNA BELEIVE U BEING CALLED BY DG ON FREQ K R -REQ CORR-3. A DDITIONAL AVAILABLE. DETAILS WILL BE SUBMITTED ASAP REQ CINCPAC NOTIFY NEXT OF KIN K ALL AT THIS TIME R U MSG AR K ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH RS PRESNT POSIT WILL ADVISE PRESENT EXT WHEN GET RS PRESENT LOCATION K K K I HAVE RS 0100B POSIT DO U WANT K C K NUCO PSDW UNNUCO NUCO BV VS BR UNNUCO COURSE 3000 PD 10 KTS K R AR
	FF	DE	RS
	RS	DE	RF
	DC	DE	FF
	FF	DE	DC
	DG	DE	FF
		DE	DG
	DG	DE	FF
		DE	DG
	DG	DE	FF
2359Z	FF	DE	DG
	END OF RADIO DAY 08 JUNE 67 PERARSON RM2		

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSO Cag Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	PEARSON RM2	STRD	HI-COMM	6720

TIME	TRANSMISSION
0001Z	NEW RADIO DAY FOR 09 JUNE 67 PEARSON AND EARLS ON WATVH
0045	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME
0050	NOTHING COPIED FROM RS AT THIS TIME
	FF DE DF K
	DE DE DG RS DRT NUOO UP CU FX UNNUOO NUOO PJ ED SO L"
	UNNUOO 1245B HAVE AIRCRAFT IN XXXA AREA
	UNABLE TO CLOSE FOR POSITIVE ID DUE TO
	GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS ETA STILL 0600B
	DG DE FF R AR
0130	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME
0135	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME FM RS
0145	NOTHING HEARD FM RS
0200	NOTHING HEARD FM RS
0215	NOTHING HEARD FM RS
0230	NOTHING HEARD FM RS
0236	RS DE FC K
	FC DE RS K
	RS DE FC LOUD AND CLEAR AR
0247	DE HD REQ EUCOM PAO FOR IMM RESP REF MY 081702Z
	67 REST OF MSG ON PAPER VIA O/W FM FANFAIR
0315	QSY HI-COMM TO E4.4D...WM
0325	ANY STA THIS NET DE RS REQ LONG COUNT FOR RECVR TUNING
	LONG COUNT GIVEN K
	RS DE FC K
0326	RS DE CP K
	CP DE RS U ARE WEAK BUT READABLE K
0328	DE FF COUNTING FOR RECVR TUNING AND XMITTER ID
0329	RS DE FC RAD CK K
	FC DE CP K
	CP DE FC K
	FC DE CP WEAK AND READABLE INT U INCREASE POWER K
0340	SHIFTING MITTER ON 11255
0342	DE RS BACK UP ON HI-COMM
	REQ FIRST HELO BRING WEBR
	AA G
BC	DE RS AA BT - UNCLAS FIGURES 1. REFERENCE MY 082202Z
	REQ ADD FOLOWING LIST TO DEAD SN GARY BLANCHARD
	771 77 22 MR EARL T. BLANCHARD

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from PMSO Cag. "1" Sect. 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY **COMSIXTHFLT** OPERATOR _____ CREW _____ CIRCUIT _____ FREQUENCY _____

TIME	TRANSMISSION
0412Z	<p>BC DE RS 0279 ROSE PARKWAY WITCHATA KANSAS 2. R F MY 082202Z REQ ADD FOLLOWING LIST OF MISSING- JACK LEWIS PAPER SGT USMC 1094072 SHERRY S YAPER 477 WEST SST BELLEVUE TARDNA TERR CAMP LEJEUNE, NC. STA. J.M. LUSTON 514 011 22 WEST DE MI. UNAVAILABLE- ST PL 77 200 BE ADVISED HAVE DATE NUMBER OF YOU ZOU UNABLE TO COPY K STANDING BY AR W/BR ALSO COPY K</p>
0415	<p>BC DE RS SCH DE RS CP DE FF FF DE FC FC DE D D DE FC D DE D D DE FC CP DE FC RS DE FC RS DE CP CP DE RS RS DE CP CP DE RS</p> <p>REQ ASSUME GUARD TO ALERT NET K R AR RDO CK K RDO CK K K K GA TD FC K R -0-090355Z FM USS LIBERTY TO CINCPAC-INFO R BUPERS CHIEF BUREAU NAVAL FINANCE CENTER CLEV. COMFIVE-CNO-CINCUSNAVEUR-CINCLANTFLT-COMSIXTH FLT-COMSERVANT-COMSERVON 8-BT CP DE TR S H/C SO FAR K REQ SAY AGAIN AA FM K R -AA FM PS ETC..... (INITIAL) REPLIES READY IF FIVE'S WILL ZOF K WILL PASS TO A K NT ORV K AA NAV FINANCE CENTER CLEV. - COMFIVE-CNO- CINCUSNAVEUR-CINCLANTFLT-COMSIXTHFLT-COMSERVANT/ COMSERVON 8-BT A DE PS H/C SO FAR K R ORV K</p>
0417	<p>RS DE CP CP DE RS RS DE CP CP DE RS A DE RS</p> <p>RS DE SA A DE RS</p> <p>RS DE A A DE PS RS DE A A DE PS</p> <p>AA BT- UNCLAS 1. REF MY 082202Z- REQ ADD FOLL- OWING TO LIST OF DEAD GARY RAY BLANCHARD- 771 77 22 MR EARL T. BLANCHARD 0279 ROSE PARKWAY WITCHATA KANSAS A DE PS H/C SO FAR K REQ REQ FROM 22 TO BLANCHARD K R- 22 TO BLANCHARD- 22 EARL T. BLANCHARD A DE PS H/C NOW K R REQ AT KANSAS K AA KANSAS- 2. REF MY 082202Z REQ ADD FOLLOWING TO LIST OF MISSING JACK LEWIS PAPER SGT USMC 11994072 SHERRY S. YAPER 477 CAMP LEJEUNE WEST TO TRACE WEST BELLEVUE TARDNA TERRA</p>

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TIME	TRANSMISSION
<p>0442Z</p>	<p>RS DE ULCER UC DE RS CP DE U CP DE CP CP DE U CP DE FC</p> <p>CE A DE RS K POSSIBLE CORP- LEWIS RAPER- 199 40----- NEXT OF KIN NOT AVAILABLE -RT END OF MESSAGE ST CP DE RS K IMI AA TERPCE K G K FOP CORP- WA WEST- BELIEF K K</p>

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SHIP WEATHER OBSERVATION SHEET

USS Liberty A6TR-5 DATE (GMT) Thursday 8, JUNE 19 67
AT/PASSAGE FROM Rota, Spain TO Ops - AREA

TABLE I

TIME (GMT)	WINDS <input type="checkbox"/> IF ESTIMATED		VISI- BIL- ITY (Miles)	WEATHER (Symbols)	BAROMETER (Inches)	TEMPERATURE (Degrees and tenths)		CLOUDS			SEA WATER TEMP. (Degrees and tenths)	SEA WAVES			SWELL WAVES		
	Direction (True)	Force (Knots)				Dry Bulb	Wet Bulb	Amount (Tenths)	Height	Type		Direction (True)	Period (Seconds)	Height (Feet)	Direction (True)	Period (Seconds)	Height (Feet)
00	325	7	10	CLR	29.90	-	-	-	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	-
01	310	5	10	CLR	29.89	-	-	-	-	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	287	6	10	CLR	29.89	-	-	-	-	-	72	CALM			CALM		
03	016	8	10	CLR	29.90	-	-	-	-	-	72	CALM			CALM		
04	334	9	10	CLR	29.91	-	-	-	-	-	72	CALM			CALM		
05	313	10	10	CLR	29.91	-	-	-	-	-	72	CALM			CALM		
06	320	8	10	CLR	29.91	-	-	-	-	-	72	CALM			CALM		
07	130	4	10	CLR	29.93	-	-	-	-	-	74	"			"		
08	315	5	10	CLR	29.93	-	-	-	-	-	74	"			"		
09	357				29.93	-	-	-	-	-	74	"			"		
10	290	7	10	CLR	29.93	-	-	-	-	-	74	"			"		
11	265	7	10	CLR	29.90	-	-	-	-	-	74	CALM			CALM		
12																	
13																	
14																	
15																	
16																	
17																	
18																	
19																	
20																	
21																	
22																	
23																	

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DRICK
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TABLE II
SYNOPTIC OBSERVATIONS

WEATHER PRESS DI

DATE	TIME	WIND DIR	WIND SPC	SEA DIR	SEA HGT	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	WAV DIR	WAV HGT	WAV PER	

now
filled in

EXAMINED

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SHIP

VA-64

Attack Squadron Sixty-Four is a light jet attack squadron equipped with Douglas A4c "SKYHAWK" aircraft. The squadron is skilled in the delivery of all types of special and conventional weapons. VA-64 is commanded by CDR Keith C. Spayde, Jr., USN, who relieved CDR J. E. Kneale, USN, in June. When not deployed, VA-64 is homebased at NAS Cecil Field, Florida.

SEPT 71
WAYNE KYLE
POB 1/71
PALMDALE, CAL 93550
VA-64 PARTICIPATED IN
ABORTED LATE RESCUE
ATTEMPT FROM
USS AMERICA




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**REPORT OF THE JCS
FACT FINDING TEAM**

**USS LIBERTY INCIDENT
8 June 1967**



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T-2304



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301

87 MAY 1982
Ref: 82 DFOI-615

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in response to your May 18, 1982 Freedom of Information Act request for a copy of the Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967.

A copy of the report is enclosed. Portions have been excised as they are currently and properly classified and therefore exempt from disclosure under the provisions of 5 USC 552(b)(1). The Initial Denial Authority is Major General Charles W. Dyke, U.S. Army, Vice Director, Joint Staff.

I am required by law to advise you of your right to administratively appeal the decision that has denied you part of this document. Such an appeal should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Pentagon, Washington, D. C. 20301 and should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" on the envelope. Your appeal must offer justification for reversal of the initial denial and must be received by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) no later than 45 working days after receipt of this letter. A copy of this letter should be included (copy provided).

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hinkle
Charles W. Hinkle
Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosure

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At approximately 1210Z, 8 June 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was attacked by Israeli aircraft in the vicinity of 31°-23'N, 33°-25'E. This position was about thirteen (13) miles from the Minaret at El Arish, which was bearing 142°T. LIBERTY was attacked subsequently by Israeli motor torpedo boats at or about 1253Z, 8 June 1967, and was severely damaged. LIBERTY's mission was governed by directives emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Pursuant to orders approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Fact Finding Team of five members was constituted from the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "... examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 8 June 1967 which terminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 081210Z June 1967."

3. Major General Joseph R. RUSS, USA, was designated senior member. Terms of Reference were also provided. (See Annex A, Part IV)

4. The Fact Finding Team began its examination before the formal approval of the Terms of Reference on the oral authority of the Director, Joint Staff. The activities visited and the person interviewed are listed in Annex B, Part IV, conforming to the following schedule:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place/Activity</u>	
Friday 9 June	Washington, D. C.	Preliminary preparations
Saturday 10 June	Washington, D. C.	Director, J-3 Deputy Director New Reconnaissance C-3 C-3 (C-3) and Repre- sentatives
Sunday 11 June	Washington, D. C.	Study and con- tinued prepara- tions
Monday 12 June	Washington, D. C.	Service Action Officers Mr. Pat COE, White House Staff
Tuesday 13 June	London; enroute Stuttgart, Germany	USNAVEURCOM USCIBCOM
Wednesday 14 June	Stuttgart; enroute COMSIXTHFLT	USCIBCOM
Thursday 15 June	On board USS LITTLE ROCK Enroute and at Malta	COMSIXTHFLT USS LIBERTY; Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry; and COMSERVLANT
Friday 16 June	Enroute and in London	(USNAVEURCOM
Saturday 17 June		Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry
Sunday 18 June	Enroute	
Monday 19 June	Washington, D. C.	(Senior Aide, Office of CMC; Dep Dir for Reconnaissance; CDO (NMCC)
Tuesday 20 June		

5. Inasmuch as the Fact Finding Team was not a legal investigative body, in conducting its examination the Fact Finding Team observed the following constraints:

- a. Interviews were not conducted under oath.
- b. Individuals were not warned of their rights nor designated as interested parties.
- c. Interference with the Naval Court of Inquiry was avoided.
- d. Impact upon LIBERTY's personnel was held to a minimum.
- e. Representatives of the military services were invited to accompany the team; Captain W. CRAVEN, Office of Chief Naval Operations (OP-03R) and Captain C. A. TURNER, Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR, did accompany the team throughout the European itinerary.

6. No insurmountable difficulties were encountered. However, note is made of the following:

- a. Travel to Asmara is extremely difficult. As a consequence, determination of pertinent facts originating at that location were obtained by telephone and/or by message.
- b. The focus of damage and destruction in LIBERTY was on the bridge and in the communications facilities. Consequently, there were no records or communications files surviving which could be examined, nor were there any surviving key communications personnel available who had direct knowledge and reliable power of recall. For this reason the Fact Finding Team accepted such information as the Navy Court of Inquiry had been able to deduce and which was provided by the Senior member, Navy Court of Inquiry.

c. The Fact Finding Team received JCS message 7964, ZTO 142258Z June on 15 June on board Flagship, COMSIXTHFLT. This message advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the precept to the Fact Finding Team, and that it had added to the Terms of Reference a requirement to "...incorporate in your report any official US public statements which bear on your findings." Actions to comply with this necessitated obtaining pertinent information and material by other than direct interview in some instances.

7. Compilation of all known official US public statements has been completed. Careful review of these statements reveals that none have a bearing on the findings presented herein. In view of this fact, they are not included as a part of this report but are retained on file in the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group.

8. In Part II, Section I, the Findings of Fact are amplified by discussion. The discussion is provided as a device for making available various opinions which cannot be categorically stated as facts but which contribute to a fuller understanding of the situation relating to the incident under study.

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PART II

FINDINGS OF FACT

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SECTION 1

PERTAINING TO COMMAND
AND CONTROL ACTIONS

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FINDINGS OF FACT

PERTAINING TO COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIONS

1. During May 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5), had been operating off the West African coast under the operational control of COMSERTFLANT 8, a subordinate command of COMFLANTFLT.

DISCUSSION:

This is the normal command control arrangement for technical research ships (TRS) under the administrative command chain in the Atlantic.**

2.

DISCUSSION:

a. USNS VALDEZ, as a USNS ship manned by a civilian crew, was not placed under operational control of a USEUCOM subordinate commander.

b. Deployment of USS LIBERTY is the first instance of the operation [REDACTED] in the Mediterranean under the operational control of the area commander since the Cyprus incident.

[REDACTED] (See Tab 3)
[REDACTED] (See Tab 1)
[REDACTED] (See Tab 3)
[REDACTED] (See Tab 1)

NOTE: ANNEX C, PART IV, CONTAINS ALL MESSAGES REFERRED TO HEREIN.

Subsequent to approval by the JCS VRS, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the JCS Committee, the JCS VRS, through CONSERVON 5, initiated movement of USS LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean by way of Rota, Spain. USS LIBERTY arrived Rota on 31 May where her logistics were completed, INTRINSIC publications delivered, repairs effected and special technical equipment and personnel boarded.

III III

approval procedure is designed to insure that military implications and responsibilities, as well as diplomatic and international political risks and ramifications, are fully weighed.

b. The stop at Rota was required to insure USS LIBERTY would have available the necessary operational and logistics support information providing for coordination and support of her operations in the area.

c. Enroute Rota USS LIBERTY had experienced machinery derangements to the propulsion system and to a significantly important antenna.

d. It was also necessary to provide augmentation of capability by special technical equipment required by her mission;

personnel also joined at Rota. [REDACTED]

On 29 May, [redacted] submitted [redacted] proposed operating areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and recommended that USS LIBERTY operate in Operation Area 3 (3A-3E to 3-E); further, that adjustment in closest points of approach to land and adjustments in the operating areas should be changed as necessary for operational and safety reasons. See Chart 1, Annex E, Part III.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

5. Commanders were made aware of this deployment as information addressees on sailing orders issued* by COMSERVRON 8 to USS LIBERTY to go to the Eastern Mediterranean.

DISCUSSION:

a. Conversations with the respective commanders indicate that this was the extent of knowledge each had regarding the ship's mission.

b. It would appear that custom and usage may have enabled this sort of intercommand exchange in [redacted] channels to become compartmented. Close monitorship should be exercised over these staff activities by the commander in view of the unusual degree of confidence reposed in these highly-technical, specialized personnel.

[redacted] COMSERVRON 8 MSG, DTG 240020Z May 67. (See Tab 4) [redacted]

6. On 1 June 1967, the JCS/JRC directed* USS LIBERTY be passed to operational control of USCINCEUR upon entering Rota and this was accomplished. USCINCEUR, in turn, requested** CINCUSNAVEUR to assume operational control as USS LIBERTY passed sea buoy inbound to Rota.

DISCUSSION:

a. This action is consistent with previous policy guidance disseminated*** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which outlined, among other things, that operational control would be effected by the cognizant unified and specified commander through the Naval component commander to a specific fleet or force commander.

b. It was further noted that the procedures for developing schedules for the USS LIBERTY while in the USCINCEUR area of responsibility were specifically outlined**** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 June 1967.

7. On 1 June USCINCEUR informed# the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the expected ready for sea date (1 June) of USS LIBERTY and requested guidance with respect to schedule, operating areas, and any special requirements. He also instructed CINCUSNAVEUR to establish procedures to insure daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) and Planned Intended Movement (PIM) reports as required by current reconnaissance reporting instructions. CINCUSNAVEUR so instructed USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

~~This reflects the unfamiliarity with a TRS capability and its performance (i.e., the imposition of transmitting require-~~

*JCS MSG 6499, DTG 291602Z May 67. (See Tab 7)
**USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 300932Z May 67. (See Tab 11)
***JCS MSG 5838, DTG 052235Z November 65. (See Tab 1)
****JCS MSG 7206, DTG 062050Z June 67. (See Tab 35)
#USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 010035Z June 67. (See Tab 14)

of USS LIBERTY, but completely prudent for other types of
Naval ship operations.

COMUSCENAF, assuming operational control of USS LIBERTY
on 31 May, instructed* the ship to enter Rota for fuel and load-
ing of technical material and personnel and, when ready for sea
about 1 June, to depart for the Eastern Mediterranean. General
instructions were given pertaining to staying in international
waters and to communications matters. Technical operations were
directed in accordance with technical specifications to be
issued separately.

DISCUSSION:

a. This directive associates with routine operational mat-
ters; [REDACTED]

It is difficult to see how the military judgment of a command
can be exercised without this knowledge.

b. From this message, it is not obvious that "technical
direction" would not flow from the commander [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and that the commander would not be
knowledgeable of such direction.

c. On 1 June, the ICS/JRC provided* COMUSCENAF with USS
LIBERTY's schedule. This directed USS LIBERTY depart Rota 2 June
when ready for sea and proceed during period 2-8 June via
Gibraltar Straits thence via Northern African Coastal route to
12N-33E. Closest points of approach to Spain, Tunisia, Sardinia,

*COMUSCENAF MSG, DTG 311750Z May 67. (See Tab 13)
**ICS MSG 0724, DTG 311545Z June 67. (See Tab 15)

Libya, Greece, Algeria, and Libya were stipulated. Therefore, to operate in Operation Area 3 subject to 12.5 NM closest point of approach, United Arab Republic and 6.5 NM closest point of approach Israel.

DISCUSSION:

a. This schedule is complete in itself and does not explain the rationale supporting the route or operating position selected.

LIBERTY was being sent in direct support of the COMSIXTHFLT requirements, as well as those of CINUSNAVEUR and USOCINCPAC. In discussion with these commanders, all disclaimed knowledge of this aspect other than to speculate that, in the course of events, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None felt that USS LIBERTY was available to be responsive to tasks directly imposed by himself.

10. USCINCEUR passed* action to CINUSNAVEUR, who directed** USS LIBERTY to proceed as instructed in the schedule previously provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was issued by CINUSNAVEUR who had delayed action pending receipt of a report from USS LIBERTY that repairs to an antenna had been completed. When so reporting, USS LIBERTY also advised*** that she would depart 1230Z, 2 June, and proceed at best speed.

DISCUSSION:

In the light of future events, the words in USS LIBERTY's report "...proceed at best speed," in accordance with previous

*USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 012030Z June 67. (See Tab 19)
**CINUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 020717Z June 67. (See Tab 21)
***USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021132Z June 67. (See Tab 22)

Instructions, are significant. However, this is a significance not readily apparent to readers on 2 June in view of USS LIBERTY's subsequent movements to comply with her understanding of the urgency of her employment reflected in COMSERVCON 8 Movement Directive "...best possible speed." The team was informed that the Commanding Officer of USS LIBERTY stated that this was the first instance in which he had ever been ordered to use best speed.

11. USS LIBERTY departed* Rota at 1330Z, 2 June. Her movement report conformed to her ordered track and indicated a speed of advance at 15 kts with an estimated time of arrival at Operation Area 3 (32N-33E) of 0300Z on 8 June; thereafter, to operate within a circle of 50 miles radius. This report also advised that USS LIBERTY would guard NAVCOMSTA Morocco teletype broadcast until 0001Z on 7 June when a shift to the NAVCOMSTA Asmara teletype broadcast would be made.

DISCUSSION:

Commands received this movement report and compared the intention with the track USS LIBERTY had been directed to follow - no significant disagreement was apparent. Thereafter, despite unavailability of daily Position Reports (POSIT reports), assumption persisted that USS LIBERTY would be and was where such projections indicated. (This becomes significant on 7 June when USS LIBERTY's 070800Z POSIT report** is received and indicates USS LIBERTY is about one day ahead of assuming commencement of her 9 June assignment.)

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

11. USS LIBERTY reported* its 2400Z position on 2 June and also reported passing three Soviet ships steaming in column. In this report to CINCUSNAVEUR, and various information addressees, USS LIBERTY cautioned that daily situation and position reports might be delayed to avoid transmitting at times which would have a deleterious effect on the execution of the primary mission. This was received by CINCUSNAVEUR 031133Z.

DISCUSSION:

a. The caveat that mission performance could preclude transmitting routine general service communications seems to have misled all echelons into accepting non-receipt of position reports.

b. Such surveillance platforms must suspend technical operations when transmitting; therefore it is customary practice to select suitable operational opportunities to effect the transmission of outgoing traffic in least time. This, normally, does not affect the operations of the ship, especially in a peacetime environment.

12. CINCUSNAVEUR advised** COMSIXTHFLT and the SIXTHFLT Service Force Commander on 3 June that USS LIBERTY would conduct extended, independent operations in the Eastern Mediterranean pursuant to the schedule of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter alia, and indicated the requirement that logistic support be provided by those commanders. Pertinent instructions were to be provided USS LIBERTY by COMSIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

This message is consistent with their correct understanding that the affected commands had a support role only and not one extending to active control of USS LIBERTY's movements.

USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 031016Z June 67. (See Tab 25)

14. COMSIXTHFLT indicated his desire to visit the USS LIBERTY. However, previous instruction had been issued stating that association of the SIXTHFLT with the USS INTREPID should be avoided. Based on this precedent, the visit to the USS LIBERTY was not accomplished.

DISCUSSION:

When USS LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT, the latter wanted to board her to see what he could do for her and what she could do for him in other than [REDACTED]

15. On 5 June, hostilities between Israel and the United Arab Republic broke out.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

16. On 5 June CINCUSNAVEUR cancelled previous geographical guidance for employment of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 60) and instructed* that the Task Force ships and aircraft be operated no closer than 100 NM from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria, and United Arab Republic and no closer than 25 NM from the coast of Cyprus. Other Task Forces to be addressed separately. It was explained that this was dictated by consideration which made it desirable to complicate the situation for the Russian warships moving into or in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as to improve the fleet's posture for tasks relating to the Israeli-United Arab Republic hostilities which might be imposed by higher authority. COMSIXTHFLT promulgated** orders to carry out the above to SIXTHFLT units that day (5 June).

* CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 051352Z June 67 (See Tab 25)
** COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 052015Z June 67 (See Tab 29)

DISCUSSION:

a. This directive accommodated COMSIXTHFLT desire to gain sea room to pursue necessary and routine training without, in any way, making it possible for such normal routine activity to be misinterpreted by the Middle East belligerents or by the Russians. The "bonus benefit" as stated.

b. COMSIXTHFLT stated that this was the day he expected higher authority would have modified USS LIBERTY's orders in the interest of her safety; that had he had unequivocal operations control and concomitant understanding of USS LIBERTY's mission, he would have rendered such a judgment on 5 June.

It was accepted that the mission was overriding. The point was reinforced by:

(1) USS LIBERTY's ordered positioning was consistent with the requirements of mission as specified.

(2) The fact of US neutrality and the operation of this unarmed naval vessel in international waters under such circumstances did not contribute to a feeling of apprehension.

(3) In the event evaluation or related other tasks were required of the SIXTHFLT, utilization of the

(4) COMSIXTHFLT stated that had the USS LIBERTY been under his complete operations control, he too would have placed her where she was directed to operate in order to utilize her as envisioned in paragraph (3) above.

17. . . . On 6 June, CINCUSNAVEUR advised* COMSIXTHFLT that USS LIBERTY would be changed to his operational control at 0001Z, 7 June, "in order to facilitate area command and control" and satisfy any "requirement for protection." COMSIXTHFLT was instructed to operate USS LIBERTY in accordance with the schedule issued** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to derive maximum benefit from USS LIBERTY's capabilities. Authorization was also granted to modify the above mentioned schedule for safety reasons as dictated by the local situation. In this multiple-addressee message, USS LIBERTY was directed to change to COMSIXTHFLT operational control at 0001Z, 7 June. USS LIBERTY was also informed that no position reports had been received since the 022400Z June report. USS LIBERTY was directed to submit future reports of position as of 1800Z and to raise precedence of the reports to IMMEDIATE, modifying the USCINCEUR address to internal indicator "for JRC."

DISCUSSION:

The above position report instruction changes were prompted by a request by USCINCEUR JRC, who notified CINCUSNAVEUR that USS LIBERTY situation and position reports were being considerably delayed due to competition with a large volume of other PRIORITY traffic. This change was designed to get these reports into the "quiet part of the radio day" and to make them less competitive with the large volume of high precedence traffic that all NAVCOMSTAS in the area were being deluged with.

*CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 061357Z June 67. (See Tab 30)
**JCS MSG 6724, DTG 011545Z June 67. (See Tab 18)

18. At 2000Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY notified* the Movement Report Office, London, among others, that she would shift to the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at 0001Z, 7 June. At 2036Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY reported** for operational control to COMSIXTHFLT, effective at 0001Z, 7 June. Among other things, she also reported fuel state and endurance. USS LIBERTY also appraised COMSIXTHFLT that Condition of Readiness THREE modified had been assumed and that self-defense capability was "limited to four .50 caliber machine guns and small arms."

DISCUSSION:

The significant content of this routine administrative action by USS LIBERTY is the overt inclusion of the description of her self-defense capability. The Commanding Officer stated that this was premeditated response intended as a tactful, although obtuse, reminder of USS LIBERTY's movement into the Eastern Mediterranean and into the focus of hostilities which the new geographical restrictions on SIXTHFLT in the CINCUSNAVEUR message had high-lighted.

19. On 6 June (about three hours after USS LIBERTY originated her reporting message and 29 hours prior to its receipt by COMSIXTHFLT) COMSIXTHFLT sent*** USS LIBERTY a message of instructions. This message referred to the Arab/Israeli situation and cited the unpredictability of United Arab Republic actions. It directed USS LIBERTY to conduct operations in accordance with the schedule provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR movement order and CINCUSNAVEUR sailing order. USS LIBERTY was directed to maintain a high state of

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062000Z June 67. (See Tab. 33)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062036Z June 67. (See Tab 34)
***COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 062349Z June 67. (See Tab 36)

vigilance against attack or threat of attack and to report "any threatening or suspicious actions directed against her or any diversion from schedule necessitated by external threat. Advise if local situation dictates change in area of operation assigned by reference JCS schedule." Contact report requirements were defined. USS LIBERTY was also instructed to copy Morocco teletype broadcast and to utilize TF 60 tactical circuits as required "...although not assigned to TF 60." USS LIBERTY was required to ACKNOWLEDGE. This message was never brought to the knowledge of the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

a. This message reflects a contradiction. Attention is invited to:

(1) The fact that it directs USS LIBERTY to copy the Morocco Fleet teletype broadcast;

(2) The fact that USS LIBERTY's original movement report advised* that she would shift to Asmara Fleet teletype broadcast at CHOP time (070001Z June).

b. USS LIBERTY did not receive the COMSIXTHFLT message. Consequently, USS LIBERTY did, in fact, shift to Asmara. However, there is no indication that this was a factor in the mis-handling errors in the communications of operational directives addressed to USS LIBERTY.

c. When USS LIBERTY failed to acknowledge this message, COMSIXTHFLT initiated tracer action through the ship-shore terminal to ascertain if it had been delivered. This was not completed prior to attack on USS LIBERTY, but did ascertain non-delivery for reasons cited in the section following, dealing with the flow of directives and analyses of the transmission modes.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021330Z June 67. (See Tab 23)

... at 33-16N, 28-54E and indicated a PIM of 16.3 kts
... 070300Z. Thence stationary within 30 NM of 31-45N,
33-12E. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at 060036Z (an interval
of 13 hours and 28 minutes after being transmitted by USS LIBERTY).

DISCUSSION:

a. The various recipients received this as their first positive knowledge of USS LIBERTY's actual position. Subsequently, in this report it is shown that because of PRIORITY precedence previously used for these reports, those reports for 3, 4, 5, and 6 June had been backlogged and delayed in delivery and in two instances, erroneously filed without delivery.

b. This indicated that USS LIBERTY had speeded up over the Movement Report Speed of Advance indicated on departure Rota; rather, USS LIBERTY had proceeded "at best speed" to arrive Operations Area 3 "as soon as practicable." The missing position reports contained the movement report adjustments indicating this.

c. By the time various JRCs received this information, the USS LIBERTY was almost one day ahead of the schedule promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by mid-afternoon on 7 June, Washington time, was nearing a closest point of approach 100 NM from the United Arab Republic and Israeli coasts. (See chart 2, Annex E, Part IV)

USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

to satisfy technical requirements. No action required prior to attack on USS LIBERTY. (See chart 1, Annex E, Part IV)

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable other than to observe that this was overtaken by the attack on USS LIBERTY.

28. (C) About 2230Z, 7 June, the JCS/JRC notified* USCINCPAC information to various addressees including Chief Naval Operations, CINCPACNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT and USS LIBERTY) that USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to United Arab Republic was changed to 20 NM and closest point of approach to Israel was changed to 15 NM. It also advised that "...in view present situation Eastern Mediterranean, operation area specified in JCS schedule for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate."

DISCUSSION:

a. This action was taken by message and it should be observed that it occurred only a short interval prior to a more significant JCS/JRC action sequence. It was consistent with established, approved routine and normal procedures set forth in SM 676-66*** and the JCS/JRC charter.

b. This change in USS LIBERTY's Schedule Track [redacted] was prompted by a question raised by Chief Naval Operations concerning the prudence of sending USS LIBERTY to a position so close to the area of hostilities.

[redacted]
JCS MSG 1357, DTG 072230Z June 67. (See Tab 42)
Enclosure to JCS 2150/214-2, dated 19 August 1966

not accompanied by a clarification of USS LIBERTY's mission, without which no commander could have exercised military judgment.

23. About 072350Z June, and subsequent to discussions between representatives of JCS/JRC and Office of Chief Naval Operations, the Director, J-3, CNO authorized Chief, J3, to request USCENTCOM to apply the geographical restrictions of 100 NM closest point of approach to United Arab Republic and Israel, 25 NM closest point of approach to Cyprus, which were in effect on SIXTHFLT units, to USS LIBERTY. In view of the haste necessitated by USS LIBERTY's nearness to this geographical restriction, the JRC initiated a phone call to Headquarters, USCENTCOM.

DISCUSSION:

a. Early in the day Chief Naval Operations had raised a question concerning the ordered movement of USS LIBERTY. As a result of a query to JCS/JRC, he had been advised that technical reasons [REDACTED] were overriding. However, this did result in initiation of action to adjust the closest point of approach to 20 NM as indicated in the preceding fact. In view of the modified geographical restrictions of 100 NM on SIXTHFLT units and the inadequacy of the justification advanced by JCS/JRC, Chief Naval Operations again required his staff to press for modification of USS LIBERTY's movements, at least to conform to SIXTHFLT geographical restrictions.

...received were not aware of the modified geographical
restrictions which permitted SIXTHFLT units to operate to
a 100 NM closest point of approach. The same message to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Chief Naval Operations
had been received as follows:

<u>CNO</u>	<u>JCS (JCS Msg Center)</u>	<u>Time Difference</u>
071548Z	071630Z	42 minutes

The analysis of communications in Annex D, Tab 2, treats
this incident in more detail. However, it is a fact that
this is one of several instances. All indicate that Navy
message processing procedures generally result in earlier
delivery of the same message to Navy addressees than do the
procedures in effect to and through the NMCC message center
for serving the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Note that this change of closest point of approach of
USS LIBERTY to 100 NM occurred only about one hour after
the 20 NM modification to USS LIBERTY's schedule.

24. JCS/JRC Duty Officer placed the call via secure
voice and contacted CINCUSNAVEUR Operation Duty Officer, who
was requested to have USS LIBERTY comply with COMSIXTHFLT
message, DTG 071530Z, which restricted SIXTHFLT units to remain
beyond 100 NM of Israel and United Arab Republic coast and 25
NM from Cyprus. Brevity of time was explained as the reason
for the call. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer advised
that they would get the message right out to SIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

a. In CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters there are three co-located
duty officers:

These watch personnel come under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff (D-6).

b. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer was the watch officer exercising cognizance over

c. Unlike the previous procedure, this action was contrary to customary usage in that it:

(1) By-passed the USCINCEUR's JRC in going directly to the component headquarters.

(2) Employed voice communications, vice record communications, to initiate an action.

(3) Was initiating an action orally on a watch-to-watch basis rather than passing information of intent to do so at a future time, which seems to have been usual practice.

25. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer informed the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and drafted an appropriate message for dispatch to COMSIXTHFLT as follow-up action in accordance with verbal assurance given to the JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer contacted the CINCUSNAVEUR Deputy Chief of Staff, advising him of the JCS/JRC phone call and the proposed course of action. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that release be deferred pending receipt of an authoritative indication that the JCS/JRC action had been officially approved (i.e., in this case, a Date-Time-Group reference).

response to oral communications from higher authority only .
if evidence of its official status were available. This
was defined to mean:

(1) If transmitted by a flag/general officer;

(2) If evidence were provided that a record directive
had, in fact, been approved AND released (such as an
assigned message Date-Time-Group, cite number, etc.) and
was beyond recall other than by official cancellation.

b. Staff personnel stated that use of a secure circuit
nor use of an authenticator would have been an accepted
substitute for this evidence of verification that the oral
communications, from other than a flag/general officer, had
been approved by an authority in the other headquarters.

26. In response to the order of the Deputy Chief of Staff,

CINCUSNAVEUR, the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer
placed a call to USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact
with the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer who was advised that the
JCS/JRC had verbally requested USS LIBERTY be moved (as indicated
above) and advised that the Date-Time-Group of the message
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was required before he could
take action on the request. The USEUCOM Command Duty Officer
said he would call back.

At about the same time, the JCS/JRC Duty Officer called
USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact with the JRC watch
officer, who was advised of the verbal request made to the
CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer. He explained that
USCINCEUR had been by-passed in the interest of saving time;
that CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "HAD promised to
take action."

Duty Officer's request. On the basis of the JCS/JRC Duty Officer's call and his use of the word "had" in his message, both USEUCOM duty personnel assumed no further action was required.

DISCUSSION:

a. At USEUCOM headquarters the JRC is physically separated from the USEUCOM Command Center. These two facilities are in the same building but are on separate levels. There are the following key watch personnel:

(1) USEUCOM Command Duty Officer

(2) USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer

b. JCS/JRC Duty Officer employment of the word "had" in his conversation to USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer which informed him of action JCS/JRC assumed was in progress at CINCUSNAVEUR, based on the phone call contact with CINCUSNAVEUR's Operations Duty Officer, misled the USEUCOM Duty Officer into believing CINCUSNAVEUR had acted or would act. He took no further action.

27. Approximately three hours passed without action or additional communications between CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters and USEUCOM headquarters on this matter. Subsequently, CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer (CCDO) called USEUCOM headquarters and this time was put in contact with USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer. CINCUSNAVEUR CCDO asked what action was being taken by USEUCOM headquarters. USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer answered by asking the same question of the CINCUSNAVEUR CCDO, i.e., what action was being taken by CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. He was advised CINCUSNAVEUR action was being withheld pending

requesting the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message or to provide an USEUCOM Date-Time-Group. The call terminated.

DISCUSSION:

Note carefully that unlike the initial call to USEUCOM, when the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer was reached, this call put CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer into contact with the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer.

28. Prompt action was then taken by the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer in contacting the JCS/JRC Duty Officer to obtain the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message. The requested information was promptly relayed to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer. Coincident with this event (080325Z) the JCS/JRC message was placed in the hands of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer.

DISCUSSION:

a. The expedition with which this required action was accomplished by USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was, of course, coincident with the eventual availability of the Date-Time-Group at the NMCC message center. It is possible that the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer might have obtained the JCS/JRC message Date-Time-Group had he been contacted initially instead of the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer. In assessing the NMCC message center procedure, some skepticism exists.

b. The fact is evident, however, that USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer, being more experienced in such matters, had a better appreciation of the urgency connected with this, as well as more intimate knowledge of the standard procedure for quick reaction adjustments to [] operations.

USEJCOM JRC Duty Officer, necessary action would have been set in motion precluding this delay of about three hours.

29. CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer directed a teletype conference with COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer be set up on secure teletype circuit. This was done by 0410Z and for the next thirty (30) minutes effort was made to pass the JCS/JRC message. Transmission difficulties resulting from atmospheric made this difficult and COMSIXTHFLT acknowledgement was not obtained until about 080455Z. CINCUSNAVEUR also sent a confirmation message* which COMSIXTHFLT received at 080518Z.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

30. COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer prepared a message* to USS LIBERTY to carry out the JCS/JRC message directive. This was processed and ultimately ready for presentation to Assistant Chief of Staff (OPS) for release by 0630Z on 8 June. However, because of his preoccupation in activities with COMSIXTHFLT and his Chief of Staff in preparation for a Secretary of Defense directed press conference, the message was not released until 0913Z. The message, although assigned an IMMEDIATE precedence, was not transmitted to NAVCOMSTA Morocco for relay to USS LIBERTY until 1035Z 8 June because of delays incident to transmission of other equal or higher precedence messages. USS LIBERTY did not receive this message.

*CINCUSNAVEUR Wirenote, DTG 080455Z June 67. (See Tab 49)
**COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 080917Z June 67. (See Tab 53)

directly to COMSIXTHFLT, that press and media representatives be thoroughly briefed on SIXTHFLT operations as part of the effort in progress to refute United Arab Republic allegations that the SIXTHFLT was actively supporting Israel. The briefing was to be conducted forenoon, 8 June, on the USS AMERICA and COMSIXTHFLT and his key staff officer had been engaged in preparations since 0600 local time.

31. The COMSIXTHFLT message to USS LIBERTY was received by NAVCOMSTA Morocco at 081050Z and delivered onward over Defense Communications System (DCS) to DCS Station Asmara (Army Communications Center, Asmara). DCS Station Asmara, through operator error, delivered the message onward to NAVCOMSTA Greece. NAVCOMSTA Greece sent it back, whereupon, it was delivered to NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 081510Z and placed on the teletype broadcast at 081525Z. USS LIBERTY's communications equipment had been destroyed in the meantime, during the attack.

DISCUSSION:

This is an over-simplified statement of the facts. The communications flow analysis (Annex D, Tab 6) highlights the situation existing at NAVCOMSTA Greece as a consequence of having to handle Foreign Broadcast Intercept System (FBIS) traffic. This is a non-military activity and it was dumping a high volume of high precedence traffic on NAVCOMSTA Greece, with an adverse impact on military communications.

32. USS LIBERTY's 080800Z POSIT/SITREP report was the movement arrival report indicating 31-34N, 33-30E and that USS LIBERTY would remain within 30 NM of that point. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at 081120Z.

Not applicable.

33. USS LIBERTY reported*, by IMMEDIATE message, having been orbited by three DELTA Wing single-engine jet aircraft three times at 31-27N, 34-00E at 080650Z. These were not identified. Their altitude estimated to be 5,000 feet at two miles. USS LIBERTY stated that no amplifying report would be submitted. COMSIXTHFLT received this at 080920Z.

DISCUSSION:

COMSIXTHFLT was not alarmed by this because USS LIBERTY's indication of no further reports was taken to mean that the overflight was routine and was not indication of any apprehension by USS LIBERTY. It is to be noted that at least one other report of overflight of USS LIBERTY by an aircraft earlier in the Mediterranean transit had been made by USS LIBERTY.

34. USS SARATOGA reported** at 081235Z that a FLASH message on the Navy High Command tactical voice circuit had been received from USS LIBERTY reporting, "I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33-25E, 31-23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE." It was determined that USS LIBERTY lost all antennae in this strafing attack.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 080742Z June 67. (See Tab 51)
**USS SARATOGA MSG, DTG 081235Z June 67. (See Tab 54)

35. (C) Ac 031237Z, USS SARATOGA relayed a message* received from USS LIBERTY on CINCUSNAVEUR's Single Side Band circuit, reporting, "Unidentified gunboats approaching vessel now."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable; to fix time of event only.

36. NAVCOMSTA Greece relayed a USS LIBERTY message** to COMSIXTHFLT reporting, "At 081253Z we have been hit by a torpedo starboard side, listing badly, request assistance immediately."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

*See Tab 55
**See Tab 56

ADDITIONAL

RELATED FACTS

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CINCUSNAVEUR

COMSIXTHFLT

USCINCEUR/CNO/CINCLANTFLT/CTF SIX ZERO/
 CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO/CTF SIX ONE/CTF SIX TWO/
 USS INTREPID/CTF SIX FOUR/CTF SIX THREE/

FOR COMMUNICATIONS
 USE ONLY

TAPE _____
 CUTTER _____
 PROOF _____
 READER _____
 COWPO _____
 CWO _____

EASTMED OPS (U)

A. MY 202300Z MAY 67

1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A LARGER AND MORE
 SUITABLE OPERATING AREA FOR TF 60, THE GEOGRAPHICAL
 LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PARA SIX, REF A ARE
 MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. ROUTINE TRAINING OPERATIONS MAY BE
 CONDUCTED NORTH AND WEST OF THE LINE CONNECTING
 36-00N9, 28-30E3 AND COAST OF LIBYA AT 23-00E5.

B. NO AIR OPS AUTH WITHIN ONE ZERO ZERO
 MILES OF THE UAR.

GP-3

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

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SGN	

271052 MAY 67

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ORIGINATOR SECTION N312																							
ACTION DEPARTMENT N3																							

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
FROM: JCS

DATE: 29 MAY 67

INFO:

TO: CINCLANT
USCINCEUR

INFO: ONO
CINCLANTFLT
CINUSNAVEUR
COMSERVLANT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSERVRON 8
USS LIBERTY



JCS 6499 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

1. FOR CINCLANT: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND
ROTA O/A 31 MAY REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON USCINCEUR.

2. FOR USCINCEUR: UOPN ASSUMING OPCON REQUEST
MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT EASTERN MED.
WILL PASS SKED ASAP. GP-4


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AGI			
DTC			DTC 291602Z MAY
SUSPENSE			

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020202 0175 1900043

Liberty '65

P 3000Z MAY 57
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.../CONCLANT
.../CONCLANT
.../CONCLANT
.../CONCLANT
.../CONCLANT



... LIBERTY GROUP ()
... MAY 57
... MAY 57
... ON ARRIVAL
... JRC AND CINCLANTFLT KEPT INFORMED
LIBERTY MOVEMENTS.

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ORIGINATOR SECTION		<i>W</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>K</i>																		
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James M. Ennes, Jr.

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ON RUC...
 SE RUEDSPA44216 1520001
 MAY 67
 FM COMSEC/VRON FIGHT
 TO RUEPP/ISS LIBERTY
 RUEHKA/COMSERVLANT
 INFO RUEHKA/CINCLANTFLT
 RUEHKA/CINCSNAVEUR
 RUEHKA/CHO
 RUEPUS/JCS/JRC
 RUEHKA/CINCLANT/JRC

[Stamp: RUC...]
 RUEHKA/COMSERVLANT
 RUEHKA/COMSERVLANT
 RUEHKA/COMSERVLANT
 BT

PAGE TWO RUEDSPA44216
 A. MY 291500Z APR 67 NOTAL
 B. CINCLANTFLT 300000Z MAY 67 NOTAL
 1. FOR COMSERVLANT: COIC TAKES REF R FORAC.
 2. FOR LIBERTY: CANCEL THE UNEXECUTED PORTION OF REF A.
 3. CHOP TO USCINCPAC ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
 4. YETP CINCLANT/CHO AND CINCLANTFLT INFORMED YOUR MOVEMENTS.
 BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION																			
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INFO CCCCC

U 300932Z MAY 67

FM USCINCEUR

TO ~~USSCINCPAC~~/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUFPPBK/CONFIRMED

Mc...

INFO NAAM/CNO


INFO NKA/CINCLANTFLT

INFO NKA/COMSERVLANT

INFO PRC/COMSIXTHFLT

INFO NKA/COMSERVRON 8

INFO TUA/USS LIBERTY



ECJG/JRC 03588. USNAVEUR FOR H-32. SUBJ:

USS LIBERTY (U) REF JCS 6499 29/1602Z MAY 67 (NOTAL).
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF, REQUEST YOU ASSUME OPCON OF USS LIBERTY WHEN

PAGE 2 RUFPPBK 031 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHIP PASSES SEA BUOY INBOUND TO ROTA O/A 31 MAR 67 AND PREPARE FOR
EXTENDED OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MED. GP-4
BT


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OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

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FOR INFO

- 1. CINCUSNAVEUR/OPORD 7-67 (U)
- 2. CINCUSNAVEUR/300930Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- 3. CONSERVROM EIGHT 240020Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- 4. CINCUSNAVEUR 311351Z MAY 67 NOTAL
- 5. CINCUSNAVEUR/OPORD 50-30 NOTAL
- 6. CINCUSNAVEUR/INST 4235.25 NOTAL
- 7. CINCUSNAVEUR/USCOM/EASTLANTINST 02000 -B (COMMONPLANE) NOTAL
- 8. NAVEUROPREP MANUAL OF 1 JUN 66 NOTAL
- 9. CINCUSNAVEUR/INST P03120.58 NOTAL

1. UPON CHECK TO CINCUSNAVEUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, ENTER ROTA FOR FUEL AND LOADING TECHNICAL/LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL SPECIFIED REF 9.

2. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING, AFTER RECEIPT OF NAVEUR/SIXTHFLT MED PUGS BEING DELIVERED

33151 ...003
921149 94(25) 1P(7) 7P(1) 8FR(1)

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CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC 011035Z/02MAY57/HT/2

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... JUN 4 DEPT
... FOR EXTENDED
... TO BE CONDUCTED LAW
... SEPARATELY.

INTERNATIONAL WATERS DURING TRANSIT AND
... AT ENTION DIRECTED APPENDIX VIII, ANNEX
... CLAIMED AND TERRITORIAL SEAS.

COMMUNICATIONS LAW REF P.
1942


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0 010035Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/US LIBERTY



ECJC/JRC 08685. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR H-32 AND
N-31. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A: USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
B: CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67

- FOR JCS. REF A STATES THAT USS LIBERTY EXPECTS TO BE RFS 011400Z JUN 67 FROM ROTA. INTEND SHIP PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN EAS WHEN READY AS OUTLINED REF B. AWAITING YOUR GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO SCHEDULE, OPERATING AREA AND ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
- FOR USNAVEUR. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND ARRANGE FOR LIAISON OFFICER TO MEET USS LIBERTY WITH DOCUMENTS AS REQUESTED REF A. SCHEDULE AND OPERATING AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP. FURTHER REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH REPORTING PROCEDURE TO INSURE

PAGE TWO RUFPSK 002 S E C R E T
SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS MORNLT 0430Z DAILY, AND THAT ANY INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED ASAP IAW CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. GP-4.
BT

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 FM JCS
 TO RUFPSK/USCCNCEUR
 INFO RUENAAA/CNO
 RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

INFORM ME WHEN THIS MESSAGE
 IS RECEIVED BY ALL ADDRES
 ANS BY 168

M d s d o f

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
 RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

~~RCTPRC/COMSIXTTFLE~~
 RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY

BT
 UNCLAS 6714 J3 SENDS.
 SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
 REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD THE USS LIBERTY AT
 ROTA, SPAIN UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE.
 BT

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ORIGINATOR SECTION	X	Y	Z																	
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C 010419Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUSLMS/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS

Handwritten: K/C/SO

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RUSLMS/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS

BT
RUSLMS/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A: JCS 6714, 010309Z MAY 67
BT

- 1. PER REF A, REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA PENDING ARRIVAL OF THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BEING PROVIDED BY DIRNAVSECGRU ACTION, AS OUTLINED REF B.
- 2. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ WHEN PERSONNEL ARE ABOARD AND SHIP'S PLANNED DEPARTURE TIME. GP-4

NNNN

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ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
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ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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010419 05 JUN 67

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FM 1150Z JUN 67
TO RUMPHUSS AIRCRAFT
INFO RUMPHUSS INCOMBAT
RUMPHUSS JCS
RUMPHUSS JCS

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CS FOR JCS - UNCLANT FOR JCS
CINCUSNAVEUR MEMORANDUM 7-67 CHANGE ONE: (U)
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 FASEP
1. MODIFY REF A AS FOLLOWS:
2. DELETE PARA TWO.

3. INSERT NEW PARA TWO, QUOTE: UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND
LOADING AFTER RECEIPT OF AIRCRAFT/INFLIGHT MED SUPS BEING DELIVERED
BY COMBAT CENTER C-130 AFTER PERSONNEL INDICATED [REDACTED]
(OTHER MEANING HAVE REPORTED) AND WHEN RFS: REPORT READINESS FOR OPER-
ATIONS. WHEN DETECTED, DEPART PORT AND PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN-
EAN FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH IAW TELL SPECS ISSUED SEPARATELY. OPAREAS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE
FOR IAW TELL. UNQUOTE.

4. ADD NEW PARAGRAPH SIX, QUOTE: 6. REPORTS.
5. UNQUOTE REPORTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IAW REF H.
6. SUBMIT CLASSIFIED SECRET AND POSIT REPORT AS OF 2400Z DAILY. USE
PRIORITY PRECEDENCE UNLESS URGENT WARRANTS INCREASED SPEED. IN-
CLUDE PER FOR NEXT 24 HOURS AND COMMENTS/STATUS AS APPROPRIATE.
ADDRESS ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR, INFO ADDRESS SAME AS THIS MESSAGE.
UNQUOTE.

GP-3
BT
FLAS ACT

TOR 011633Z JUN 67

NR 547/01

CWO.....DRB

011305Z JUN 67

Operations (J-3) in supervising worldwide reconnaissance activities. He is the principal agent assisting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising reconnaissance operational direction over the unified and specified commands. The Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), according to its charter, supports the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, and is operated continuously under a JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The JRC is not organizationally under the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

The NMCC is operated under a Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) who is continuously on duty. For this reason there are five DDOs and flag/general officer rank personnel who rotate on duty.

Neither the JRC nor the NMCC is subordinate to the other. Their interrelationship is not formally spelled out.

DISCUSSION:

a. The JRC charter provides that it function under the authority and direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subject to the supervision and guidance of the Director, Joint Staff.

b. Because of the sensitivity and classification associated with the reconnaissance operations which it is required to "supervise," "coordinate," "monitor," and in some instances "control" in actual practice, the JRC is autonomous in relation to the NMCC. The same applies to the JRC at Headquarters, USEUCOM.

c. In both locations the JRCs are physically separate from the command centers.

d. It is important to note that all queries by higher authority regarding military operations, including incidents,

is directed to the ICS on duty within the area, and in this case, had no knowledge of the operation of USS LIBERTY prior to the attack.

e. At Headquarters, USNAVEUR, the Operations Duty Officer is the Duty Officer having cognizance over reconnaissance operations. He is subordinate to the Command Center Duty Officer and the Duty Captain and is physically co-located within the Command Center.

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(100): These functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124). See also

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL; CONTROL. "1"

DISCUSSION:

While this term is used in assigning responsibility to a commander, in actual practice the direction of the platform's movements is controlled by another higher authority (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The commander's function, consequently, is not consistent with this definition and use of this term is a potential source of confusion and misunderstanding. It would seem that an early determination should be made either:

- (1) To amend the procedure to make the commander's responsibility complete with respect to what operational command is customarily accepted to mean; or

to TRS and special operation ships only.

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SECTION 2

SUPPORTING COMMUNICATIONS

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1. The means of communications available for the issuance and transmission of operations directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY from 1 through 5 June 1967 were a combination of Defense Communications System (DCS) and Navy voice and teletype dedicated networks. Of particular note was the interrelationships of transferring messages from the DCS relay stations to the appropriate NAVCOMSTA dedicated networks.

2. The USS LIBERTY departed Rota, Spain, on 2 June 1967, with the following communications arrangements:

a. Copy Morocco fleet teletype broadcast to receive general service communications until 7 June 1967, at which time, shift to Asmara Navy teletype broadcast.

b. Transmit to any shore Naval Communications Station to deliver any outgoing general service messages.

c. Copy Morocco [redacted] broadcast to copy [redacted] traffic.

d. Transmit to Morocco to deliver outgoing [redacted] Traffic.

e. Set up direct teletype communications [redacted] when position [redacted] is favorable.

3. There were eight key messages pertinent to the USS LIBERTY incident of which four message directives were originated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four messages by subordinate commanders, carrying out the JCS directives. These messages contained instructions regarding the assigned operating

paragraphs. Detailed analysis outlined in the tabs dealt only with key addressees. There were many other miscellaneous addressees on these messages.

4. on 29 May 1967,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to assume operational control of the USS LIBERTY upon arrival at Rota, Spain. Subsequent messages between USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USS LIBERTY indicate this message was received and operational control was assumed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and ultimately by COMSIXTHFLT on 7 June 1967.

5. On 1 June 1967,** the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to sail the USS LIBERTY on 2 June 1967 and established schedule and area of operation with a final position at 32°N, 33°E. This JCS directive also established closest points of approach to the United Arab Republic (UAR) of 13NM. The USS LIBERTY, in her 2 June 1967 position report*** indicated receipt of the JCS directive by stating her estimated arrival at the final destination (080300Z Jun 67).

6. Due to hostilities between the UAR and Israel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 7 June 1967,**** directed USCINCEUR by priority message to change the USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to 20NM for the UAR and 15NM for Israel. Because it was mis sent to the Pacific by the Department of the Army Communications Center, this message was not received by the USS LIBERTY prior to attack.

REASON: Since a majority of US Navy Mobile Fleet messages are destined for the Pacific, local procedures in the Department of the Army Communications Center allow direct transmission to the communications center serving the task

* JCS msg 6499/291602Z May 67 (Tab 7, Annex C)
** JCS msg 6724/011545Z June 67 (Tab 18, Annex C)
*** USS LIBERTY msg 022108Z June 67 (Tab 24, Annex C)
**** JCS msg 7337/072230Z June 67 (Tab 42, Annex C)

Cheltenham, Maryland. After preliminary review of the message and noting a task force addressee, the routing clerk in the Department of the Army Communications Center assigned the San Miguel, Philippines routing indicator on the assumption that the addressee was in the Pacific. Detailed explanation of routing and delay times is contained in Tab 1, Annex D.

7. By immediate message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 June 1967,* directed USCINCEUR to cancel previous JCS directive establishing 20 nautical mile limit and established 100 nautical mile limit. This message was not received by the USS LIBERTY.

REASON: A series of personnel errors resulting in misrouting the message to the Pacific area for the same reason as stated for previous message in paragraph 6. Subsequent retransmissions were required which delayed the ultimate broadcast (after the attack) to the USS LIBERTY. Tab 2, Annex D, provides complete details of delay times and misrouting data.

8. While the previous paragraphs have dealt with the delivery of JCS message directives to the USS LIBERTY, the following paragraphs will outline subordinate command directives concerning USS LIBERTY operation.

9. On 6 June 1967, ** CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume operational control of USS LIBERTY at 070001Z June 1967 and further stated that operational area might be modified, for safety reasons, as dictated by the local conditions. This directive also requested that position reports be changed to

"as of 1800Z" and upgraded to immediate precedence. The USS LIBERTY was instructed to "Chop" to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z.

* JCS msg 03477080110Z June 67 (Tab 45, Annex C)
** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 061357Z June 67 (Tab 30, Annex C)

by the USS LIBERTY in her message, also on 6 June 1967,* as she reported to COMSIXTHFLT acknowledging the change of operational control as of 070001Z.

10. The COMSIXTHFLT message on 6 June 1967,** instructed USS LIBERTY to change operational control to COMSIXTHFLT and provided instructions regarding threats of attack, logistical requirements, contact reports with unidentified or hostile ships/aircraft, and emergency action procedures. Specific instructions regarding communications procedures were also given. This message was probably undelivered to the USS LIBERTY since she shifted to the Asmara broadcast on 7 June 1967 as originally scheduled by her 2 June 1967 movement report (see Tab 24, Annex C).

11. USCINCEUR message on 8 June 1967,*** directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take for action the JCS directive changing the closest points of approach to UAR and Israel to 100 nautical miles. Prior to dispatch of this message, various efforts had been made by telecon, voice and teletype, to pass the action and a copy of the JCS message directive to COMSIXTHFLT. This action was completed approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes prior to dispatch of USCINCEUR message. See Tabs 3 and 4, Annex D for analysis. Since direct circuits were used, the USS LIBERTY was not included in any of the telecon transmissions between CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT. The USS LIBERTY was an addressee on the USCINCEUR directive which was placed on the Asmara fleet broadcast at 081059Z. Since records were not available from the USS LIBERTY, receipt of the USCINCEUR message could not be confirmed. It should be noted, however, that this directive

* USS LIBERTY msg 062036Z June 67 (Tab 34, Annex C)
** COMSIXTHFLT msg 062349Z June 67 (Tab 36, Annex C)
*** USCINCEUR msg 080625Z June 67 (Tab 49, Annex C)

make no mention of new geographical constraints, but only

stated "This confirms reference a (telecon between USCINCEUR) to take reference b (JCS directive which was misent to the Pacific and not received by the USS LIBERTY) for action."

12. The final directive to be discussed is the COMSIXTHFLT instructions* establishing a new closest point of approach of 100 nautical miles to the UAR and Israel. The directive was in response to CINCUSNAVEUR action outlined in a message** relayed via telecon. After internal staffing and delay in preparation and transmission due to equal or higher precedence traffic, the COMSIXTHFLT message was broadcast to and received by NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco, approximately one and one-half hours prior to the attack on the USS LIBERTY. The NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco relayed via the DCS Major Relay at San Pablo, Spain, to DCS Major Relay (Army Communications Center) Asmara. Due to a personnel error, resulting in sending the message to NAVCOMMSTA, Greece, which sent it back for delivery to NAVCOMMSTA, Asmara, the message was not placed on the fleet broadcast until 081525Z, some three hours after the attack. It is apparent that the USS LIBERTY did not receive the message. (See Tab 5, Annex D)

13. The following paragraphs are designed to provide a basis for assessing the USS LIBERTY communications capability.

14. During the transit of the USS LIBERTY to its designated position, a quality communications product was being obtained, and criticom special circuits to the communication shore station (Morocco) were good. The USS LIBERTY shifted from the Morocco broadcast to the Asmara broadcast at 070001Z in accordance with information given in USS LIBERTY movement report, DTG 021330Z.

* COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 67 (Tab 53, Annex C)

** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 080455Z June 67 (Tab 48, Annex C)

...which has fewer customers, may provide better service,
and may be more responsive to rerun requests. This is a
useful procedure because Naval Communication Station, Morocco
and Greece offer a larger choice of frequencies, are
simultaneously keyed, and cover a larger area of the Mediterranean,
thus requiring fewer shifts of broadcasts. The crew aboard
the USS LIBERTY verified the excellent quality of communications
prior to the attack. Further attesting to this is the fact that
only 14 out of approximately 1000 messages required a rerun on
6 June 1967. Of these 14, only six were applicable to the
USS LIBERTY. Of the six, three had previously been obtained,
which indicates some lack of good record keeping.

15.

16.

17. Although the attack resulted in a complete loss of
communications, emergency restoration of HICOM voice capability
was completed within minutes of the attack. All USS LIBERTY
communications immediately after the attack were via HICOM
voice network.

SUBSECTION II
STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to and concurrent with the hostilities between the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Israel, traffic volume in the Mediterranean area communications stations almost doubled during the week prior to the USS LIBERTY incident. Naval Communication Station (NAVCOMMSTA) Greece particularly was loaded with large amounts of Flash and Immediate traffic. A special channel for Flash and Immediate message traffic to State Department Athens was set up from NAVCOMMSTA, Greece and soon became backlogged. During the period 5 - 10 June 1967 inclusive, records of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center indicated that 610 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) messages were received. Of these, 317 were Operational Immediate and 15 were Flash, or 54% of the total 610. (See Tab 5, Annex D, for comparative analysis of message volume for 1 - 12 February and 1 - 12 June.)

2. The overall increased volume of high precedence message traffic, Operational Immediate and Flash, had a direct bearing on the ability to transmit instructions to the USS LIBERTY. Specifically, the COMSIXTHFLT Communications Center had seven Operational Immediate and one Flash message which were in station at the time of release of COMSIXTHFLT message 080917Z to the USS LIBERTY regarding new constraints on geographical limits of operation. Other communications centers at other locations had the same situation existing. Directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the delay in delivery of the 7 June USS LIBERTY position report was due to high precedence communications. For this same reason

position reports for 3, 4 and 5 June were also delayed. Due to long delays or non-receipt of position reports, it was assumed by all echelons that the USS LIBERTY was on schedule and proceeding to on-station location, while in actuality, the ship was on station nearly one day in advance of initially established arrival time.

3. Originators of messages destined for the European area raised the precedence of their traffic to improve delivery time. Many high precedence messages contained large numbers of addressees, thereby delaying rapid delivery. Some operation orders sent by electrical means were very lengthy (i.e., 19AF Seymour Johnson AF Base 00349/301730Z May, 28 pages, 83 addressees; and CINCAFSTRIKE 88847/280051Z May, 46 pages, 81 addressees). Very lengthy messages tend to clog communication circuits causing backlogs of equal and lower precedence traffic. The principles of communication economy demand that originators use the lowest precedence permissible, have as few addressees as are necessary, and be brief and concise.

Application of these principles help preserve the integrity of communication networks, permits more rapid delivery of all traffic and reduces possible backlog delays; however, in this Middle East situation, these principles were widely violated.

4. At 051200Z June USCINCEUR imposed "Minimize" on originators of teletypewriter messages within European Theater, but did not request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further impose "Minimize" on messages into the theater. This message was transmitted about the same time CINCUSNAVEUR requested "Minimize" be imposed. In an attempt to overcome backlogs, communication personnel stood extra watches (watch off and watch on in some cases) and ordered additional communication channels where possible.

5. As a separate but related item, a NATO emergency action message exercise was conducted in the midst of the period subsequent to the attack on the USS LIBERTY when there was extensive high precedence message traffic and when "Minimize" had already been imposed to reduce abnormal amount of traffic. These high precedence exercise messages interfered with actual high precedence traffic associated with the attack on the USS LIBERTY. Additionally, this incident is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of communications facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over whom the US military commander cannot exercise control. (See Tab 6, Annex 2, for NATO Wide Awake 9-67 Information.)

6. As a consequence of this JCS Fact Finding Team procedural disparities between commands and communications center activities became apparent.

a. The application of date time groups is accomplished in several different methods, with no direct meaningful correlation. For example, one command assigns the DTG as it is received at the message center. Another command assigns the DTG at the time it is released, while still another assigns the DTG just prior to preparation for transmission.

b. The procedures for processing outgoing messages by the NMCC message center, Pentagon, are unnecessarily delaying JCS traffic. The requirement to administratively process outgoing messages prior to receipt and transmission by the Department of the Army Communications Center is questioned.

c. The present methods of assignment of routing indicators for the addressees does not minimize personnel errors. In the case of communications to the USS LIBERTY, personnel

error in routing indicator assignment was a major factor causing untimely delivery of critical messages. Further discussion and specific cases are provided in Subsection I of this Annex.

d. The difference in procedures for transmission and delivery of messages from the originator to the primary action agency has been highlighted during this study. In one instance, two command centers located in the same building but served by different communications centers, were addressees on a specific Flash message. However, one command center received the message approximately one hour before the other command center was aware of its existence. (See Tabs 7 and 8, Annex D, for specific examples.)

e. Personnel manning of the communications centers contacted by the team is below established authorized strength. Verification of need for additional personnel was evidenced by the necessity for augmenting shifts and compressing schedules which have been in existence, in one instance, for the past fourteen months. In addition, individuals performing such functions as routing indicator assignments, tape preparation and torn tape relay are, for the most, inexperienced individuals with minimum time in service (one to two years). This factor contributes to personnel errors introduced into the preparation and transmission of messages. Supervisory officer personnel are very junior and rarely have in excess of one or two years length of service; yet they are in positions where exercise of judgment could be a key factor in selecting the order in which important messages of the same precedence should be sent.

7. . . . The practice aboard technical research ships (TRS) (USS LIBERTY) of combining general service and

in a single package causes delay

in processing of general service traffic. In each of these cases, the general service traffic has to be segregated and separate messages created for the general service portion. While the mission and employment of the TRS probably justifies this practice, the procedure should be defined as a standard so that operational control authorities can treat it on the basis of exception to the ordinary route.

9. It was the expressed opinion at USCINCEUR and CINUSNAVEUR that the Defense Communications Systems (DCS) performs satisfactorily during normal peacetime periods but was not responsive in crisis periods. The lack of flexibility in routing of communications traffic and ability to augment, on a contingency basis, was cited as particular deficiencies.

10. The CINUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT expressed the inability of the DCS to react to all needs and emphasized that dedicated circuitry would always be a requirement if effective command and control is to be accomplished. COMSIXTHFLT amplified this desire by stating "he would trade one ship for effective communications," emphasizing his dissatisfaction with current capabilities of equipment and facilities.

11. The Deputy, USCINCEUR, stated that communications at Stuttgart, Germany, despite the mobile configuration currently being employed, are far superior to those previously provided at Camp Des Loges, France.

CONVENTION III

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS ITEMS

1. The increased volume of traffic during the Middle East crisis highlighted the need to augment the Defense Communications System (DCS) on a contingency basis, to support unforeseen trouble areas. This augmentation should not necessarily be in terms of hardware but also in terms of:

- a. Calling up additional leased circuits.
- b. Circuit rearrangement.
- c. Manpower pools.
- d. Elimination of relays by establishing direct circuits between points of high traffic volume.

2. The impact of introducing into the DCS a volume of high precedence traffic, from a National Communications System (NCS) Operating Agency (i.e. State Department) during a crisis period, degrades the already overloaded DCS. This saturation emphasized the lack of prior consideration to handle the NCS and other (NATO) agency traffic over DCS facilities.

3. The introduction of NATO exercise traffic into the DCS during crisis periods, such as occurred on 8 June 1967 is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over whom the US military commander cannot exercise control.

4. From an analysis of communications, the need for traffic management of communications was apparent. Institution of re-routing around trouble areas or making maximum use of direct circuits are means to alleviate pressure points which result in times of crisis.

5. As a result of the JCS Fact Finding Team examination regarding the USS LIBERTY, numerous procedural deficiencies were revealed:

- a. Assignment of improper precedence and excessive number of addressees was observed.

b. Procedure for assignment of date time group is not consistent within or between command/services.

c. The methods of and procedures for assignment of routing indicators exposes a means for personnel error. The use of such advancements as automatic scanners and application of Automatic Data Processing would eliminate personnel error, reduce manpower requirements, improve quality of transmission and reduce message handling times.

d. As evidenced by a specific message directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the methods of transmitting a message from an originator to two addressees in the same location (Pentagon) are different, resulting in one addressee receiving the message in advance of other addressees which require an additional relay point. For efficiency and operational expediency, messages should flow to the addressees in the most direct route.

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PART III

RECOMMENDATIONS

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RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The interrelationship between the Deputy Director for Operations, as senior watch officer within the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) be formalized.

2. The term "Operational Control" not be used in assigning responsibility to a commander of a unified and specified command or subordinate command for [redacted] ship [redacted] operations when, in fact, his responsibility is not intended to be fully consonant

with that term as defined in JCS Publication No. 1. If a new descriptive term is required, it should be promulgated.

3. The current policy guidance whereby [redacted] requirements are validated and approved be continued.

4. The procedures governing the control of [redacted] platforms be made more definitive with respect to [redacted] platforms, and be disseminated to insure:

a. Commanders of unified and specified commands, as well as major component commanders, have a clearer and mutual understanding of the relative importance of [redacted] activities within their respective areas of responsibilities.

b. [redacted]

4. Artificial "barriers" between operational elements of staffs and the [redacted] staff elements which apparently have emerged [redacted] be specifically reviewed and eliminated in order to improve the value and timely utilization of the [redacted] at all major command echelons.

5. The present JCS/JRC charter and policy guidance defined in SM 676-66, dated 19 August 1966, be continued as an effective modus operandi for the rapid reaction control of the [redacted] but that JCS/JRC adhere to the established procedures whereby JRC must deal with JRCs in the established chain.

6. The necessary clarification of the authority delegated JRC duty personnel to issue oral directives in the name of the commander concerned be issued within and to all affected commands as soon as possible, establishing a system of authentications, if necessary, to achieve quick reaction capability.

7. There should be no independent operations in a commander's area without his being informed and his responsibility clearly defined.

8. All echelons appreciate that ships of LIBERTY class are defenseless, and that it is impossible for an operational commander to protect it adequately without negating its usefulness; i.e., without providing escort and combat air patrol (CAP) he can only react to attack once initiated or threatened, which in this case was too late.

9. A specific exception and procedure be spelled out for [redacted] platforms, the nature of whose missions preclude adhering to standard movement reporting.

10. The exploitation of available technology be accelerated to modernize message handling and routing procedures to minimize impact of relative scarcity of qualified career personnel in the current and expanding environment of extremely rapid and high volume communications.

11. The need for dedicated command and control circuitry, as opposed to use of common user circuitry, be carefully reevaluated in view of this incident.

12. As a matter of urgency, the Department of Defense Communications Satellite program be accelerated to achieve shipboard terminals as soon as practicable in order to improve ~~the capability of fleet control communications.~~

13. Possible undesirability of amalgamating NATO-US military communications and communications satellite programs be carefully reviewed.

14. The impact on the Defense Communications System (DCS) by National Communications System (NCS) communications should be carefully surveyed in light of the impact of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Department of State traffic on the military DCS communications stations in this crisis situation.

15. The Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) ~~study the procedures used to find and apply the correct routing indicators for addressees of messages with the object of finding a modern method which will minimize personnel errors.~~

16. The impact of the DCS function on a communications station should be reviewed, with respect to the manning and experience levels of the communications station; that the ~~personnel allowances and requirements of communications stations~~ be reexamined.

17. The Defense Communications Agency establish a traffic management capability, as opposed to circuit management, in order to provide for dispatching the flow of traffic through unburdened DCS paths to effect prompt relief of congestion during contingencies.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

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Subject: Fact-Finding Team (U)

1. You are herewith designated senior member of an ad hoc fact-finding team to examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operational directives to the USS LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 3 June 1967 which culminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY (DD-391) on 081210Z June 1967.

2. The team shall comprise the following members whose security clearances are as indicated:

Major General Joseph A. Russ, USA, 019830, TS/SI
Rear Admiral Francis C. Fitzpatrick, USN, 092-18, TS/SI
Colonel William A. Garrett, USAF, PR 10658, TS/SI
Captain William D. Owen, USN, 107088, TS/SI
Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF, PR 47187, TS/SI

You are also to request the Military Services to designate a point of contact to facilitate your obtaining such assistance from the Services as you may require.

3. Your fact-finding study shall include:

a. The means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY.

b. The specific orders:

(1) Issued to the USS LIBERTY between 1 June and 3 June 1967.

[Handwritten signature]
12


GROUP 4
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
after 12 years

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5. You are directed to report your findings together with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. The court of inquiry convened by CINCPACFLT to inquire into the circumstances leading to and connected with the attack on the USS LIBERTY will inquire into administrative, disciplinary, and internal matters within that command which are not within the scope of the examination by the fact-finding team. This fact-finding team will not infringe upon the prerogatives of the court of inquiry.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



B. E. SPIVY
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Copy to:
USCINCPAC
CINCPACFLT

COMDR 6TH FLEET
JSA
CNC
CSAF
CNC

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ANNEX B

ITINERARY

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ITINERARY

DEPARTED	Washington, D. C.	2020	12 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	0815	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1655	13 June 1967
ARRIVED	Stuttgart, Germany	1910	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	Stuttgart, Germany	1400	14 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1935	14 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens, Greece	0805	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1000	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1015	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1025	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1235	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1240	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1243	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1440	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens, Greece	1445	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Malta	1815	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Malta	0700	16 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	1330	16 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1330	18 June 1967
ARRIVED	Washington, D. C.	1645	18 June 1967

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NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
John S. McCain, Jr. ADM, USN	CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
J. C. WYLIE, Jr. RADM, USN	Deputy, CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
M. C. HANLEY, Jr. CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff	13 June 1967
W. N. HATCH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence	13 June 1967
E. E. LEE CDR, USN	Admin Officer/Head, Plans Policy	13 June 1967
R. D. SMITH CAPT, USN	Head, ISIC	13 June 1967
E. L. GOLAVOTTI LT, USN	Asst Ship Operations	13 June 1967
R. F. ROEMER CDE, USN	Asst for Carrier & Special Wpns Ops	13 June 1967
C. A. TURNER CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Logistics	13 June 1967
L. R. RAISH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Communications	13 June 1967
[REDACTED]		
G. D. JORGENSEN CDR, USN	Command Center Duty Officer	13 June 1967
<u>COMSIXTHFLT</u>		
W. I. MARTIN VADM, USN	COMSIXTHFLT	15 June 1967
C. H. SMITH CAPT, USN	Chief of Staff	15 June 1967
R. I. KASTEN CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	15 June 1967
<u>CINCUSNAVEUR</u> (Board of Inquiry)		
I. C. KIDD RADM, USN	Chairman	15 June 1967
B. M. ATKINSON CAPT, USN	Member	15 June 1967

ANNEX C

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES

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SUMMARY OF MESSAGES

EFFECTING

LIBERTY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS

<u>ZTO</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
1. 052235Z NOV	JCS (5838)	TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, INFO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS, OPS CONTROL OF TRS W/E EFFECTED THRU COMPONENT COMMANDS.
2. 241212Z FEB	USCINCEUR	DIRECTED COMPONENTS TO CLEAR ALL ITEMS REQUIRING DECISION WITH USEUCOM.
3. 240020Z MAY	COMSERVON 8	DIRECTED LIBERTY TO DEPART ABIDJAN ASAP FOR ROTA.
3. 241732Z MAY	LIBERTY	TO ALCON GIVING ETA ROTA AT 312000Z MAY AND ETA OF AREA OFF PORT SAID 061400Z (THE INDICATION COMSIXTHFLT HAD THAT LIBERTY TO BE STATIONED OFF EGYPT).
6. 271052Z MAY	CINCUSNAVEUR	OUTLINE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF OPS AND DEFINED USNM CPA UAR LIMITATION.
7. 291602Z MAY	JCS (6499)	TO CINCLANT AND USCINCEUR APPROVING DIVERSION OF LIBERTY TO EAST MED. INFO LIBERTY.
9. 300040Z MAY	CINCLANTFLT	SERVANT AND OTHERS - DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP TO USCINCEUR UPON ARRIVAL ROTA. INFO LIBERTY.
10. 300202Z MAY	COMSERVON 8	DIRECTS LIBERTY TO CHOP TO USCINCEUR.
11. 300932Z MAY	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR INFORMING OF RESPONSE FOR ASSUMING OF CONTROL OF LIBERTY UPON ARRIVAL AT ROTA.
12. 310828Z MAY	LIBERTY	PIM REPORT

TO USNAVEUR DEPART ROTA FOR
EAST MED.

14. 010035Z JUN USCINCEUR
REQUESTS JCS UNDESIGNATED WITH
REQUESTS FOR JCS UNDESIGNATED WITH
UNDESIGNATED WITH JCS UNDESIGNATED WITH
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15. 010309Z JUN JCS (6724)
TO USCINCEUR - INFO LIBERTY
AT ROTA UNITS COMPLETED
INFO AND INFO LIBERTY
BOARD AT ROTA. INFO LIBERTY.

16. 010449Z JUN USCINCEUR
INFO USNAVEUR TO TAKE JCS MSG
010309Z JUN.

17. 011305Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR
TO LIBERTY - INFO LIBERTY
TO INFO CALLING INFO LIBERTY
INFO AND INFO LIBERTY
ABOARD.

18. 011545Z JUN JCS (6724)
TO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS, INCLUD-
ING LIBERTY, INFO LIBERTY
BE SAILED TO EAST MED DEPARTING
OFF PORT SAID ON 3 JUN.

19. 012130Z JUN USCINCEUR
DIRECTS USNAVEUR TO TAKE INFO
JCS MSG 011545Z JUN. INFO
LIBERTY.

20. 012120Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR
HOLDS LIBERTY UNTIL REPAIRS
COMPLETED

21. 020717 JUN CINCUSNAVEUR
LIBERTY - DEPARTED TO PROCEED
ON 2 JUN IN ACC JCS MSG 011545Z
JUN.

22. 021132Z JUN LIBERTY
REPAIRED AT 021230Z DEPARTED
AT THAT TIME AT BEST SPEED.

23. 021330Z JUN LIBERTY
USNAVEUR AND OTHERS - MOVEMENT
REPORT SHOWING ETA 080300Z
AT 32N and 33-30E.

24. 022108Z JUN LIBERTY
ALCON - DEPARTED ROTA.

25. 031016Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR
ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT THAT
LIBERTY WOULD BE CONDUCTING
SURVEILLANCE OPS IN EAST MED
AND REQUESTED LOG SUPPORT.
INFO LIBERTY.

26. 051352Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR
TO COMSIXTHFLT - CPA OF 100
NM TO JAR AND OTHERS.

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27. 051850Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR TO COMSIXTHFLT, AIR AND SURFACE OPS CPA 25 NM FROM CYPRUS IS AUTHORIZED.

28. 051934Z JUN LIBERTY TO ALCON - ADVISED OF 2-00 POSITION OF 13-20N AND 10-10E AND ADVISED SHE HAD ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE.

29. 052015Z JUN COMSIXTHFLT TO CTF 60 - CPA OF 100 NM TO UAR AND OTHERS.

30. 061357Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR TO COMSIXTHFLT, DIRECTING OP COM OF LIBERTY AT 070001Z.

31. 061410Z JUN USCINCEUR TO USNAVEUR, INFO LIBERTY ET AL, RE: SCHEDULES AND TIMES AS OF 1500Z "0" PRECEDENCE.

32. 061844Z JUN LIBERTY TO ALCON - POSITION REPORT OF LIBERTY.

33. 062000Z JUN LIBERTY CHOP REPORT.

34. 062036Z JUN LIBERTY ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT OF STATICS AND ACKNOWLEDGED CPCON CHANGE SCHEDULED FOR 070001Z.

35. 062050Z JUN JCS (7206) OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING SCHEDULE FOR LIBERTY WHILE IN USCINCEUR AREA.

36. 062349Z JUN COMSIXTHFLT TO LIBERTY OUTLINING CPCON GUIDANCE.

37. 070259Z JUN JCS (7239) TO COMSIXTHFLT - CJCS REQUESTED VERIFICATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO COMM OR CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ISRAEL.

38. 070626Z JUN COMSIXTHFLT CONFIRMED TO THE JCS AND OTHERS THAT VOICE CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND TEL AVIV HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. ALSO STATED NO COMM WITH ISRAELI FORCE EXISTED.

39. 070908Z JUN LIBERTY TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION REPORT AS OF 070800Z AND ETA AT 31-45N and 33-30E at 072300Z.

40. 071503Z JUN COMSIXTHFLT ADVISED JCS AND OTHERS OF AIR OPS OF 5-6 JUN AND ALSO ADVISED OF 100 NM CPA FOR AIR AND SURFACE OPS.

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42. 072230Z JUN JCS (7337) CHANGED CPA TO 20 NM AND GAVE OPTION TO MODIFY THIS TASKING (011545Z) AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE. INFO LIBERTY.

43. 072350Z JUN JCS(JRC)- TELECON TO USNAVEUR, ADVISING THAT CPA OF LIBERTY WAS BEING CHANGED TO 100 NM. MSG TO FOLLOW.

44. 080030Z JUN JCS(JRC)- TELECON TO USCINCEUR ADVISING OF CALL TO USNAVEUR AND SAME INFO AS GIVEN TO USNAVEUR.

45. 080110Z JUN JCS (7347) CONFIRMED 100 NM CPA AS RELAYED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.

46. 080325Z JUN USNAVEUR - TELECON TO USCINCEUR REQUESTING DTG OF JCS MSG. USCINCEUR OBTAINED AND RELAYED TO USNAVEUR.

47. 080410Z JUN USNAVEUR - TELECON TO COMSIXTHFLT, AUTHORIZED TEXT OF JCS 080110Z AND REQUESTING TAKE FORAC. OFFICIAL MSG TO FOLLOW. (TRANS-ACTION COMPLETED AT 080455Z)

48. 080455Z JUN CINCUSNAVEUR TO COMSIXTHFLT CONFIRM TELECON BY WIRENOTE.

49. 080625Z JUN USCINCEUR TO USNAVEUR, OFFICIALLY CONFIRMING 080410Z ACTION COMPLETED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.

50. 080634Z JUN LIBERTY TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION AS 31-45N and 33-30E WITHIN 30 NM FOR NEXT 24 HOURS.

51. 080742Z JUN LIBERTY TO ALCON - ADVISED OF BEING ORBITED BY TWO JET AIRCRAFT.

52. 080856Z JUN LIBERTY DESTROYING SUPERSEDED MATERIAL DUE TO CURRENT SITUATION AND SHALLOW WATER.

53. 080917Z JUN COMSIXTHFLT TO LIBERTY - DIRECTED NEW CPA OF 100 NM. REQUESTED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. (NOT RECEIVED PRIOR TO ATTACK).

54. 081235Z JUN LIBERTY RELAYED BY USS SARATOGA. ADVISED OF ATTACK.

55. 081237Z JUN SARATOGA LIBERTY'S REPORT OF THREE MTBS APPROACHING.

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
56. 081250Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	DIRECTS AMERICA TO LAUNCH A/C TO ASSIST LIBERTY.
57. 081254Z JUN	LIBERTY	RELAYED BY SARATOGA, ADVISING OF TORPEDO ATTACK.
58. 081301Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA GREECE	TO JSNAVEUR - RELAYED INFO RECEIVED FROM LIBERTY VIA VOICE HICOM THAT TORPEDO HIT ON STARBOARD. OCCURRED AT 081253Z.
59. 081316Z JUN	CTF 60	DIRECTS BOTH AMERICA AND SARATOGA TO LAUNCH FOUR A/C IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY. REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.
60. 081320Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR AND AIG 998 - CONFIRMED LIBERTY ATTACK. INDICATED A/C BEING DEPLOYED.
61. 081339Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	CNO INFORMED OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. FACT THAT LIBERTY POSIT ON EDGE OF UAR CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND PILOTS ARE TO DEFEND LIBERTY, NOT TO PENETRATE CLAIMED LIMIT. DESTRUCTIVE FORCE BY A/C AUTHORIZED.
62. 081340Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO LIBERTY - REQUEST CONFIRMATION AND ADVISED TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH ANY STATION.
63. 081410Z JUN	CTF 63	RECOMMENDS PAPAGO BE DIRECTED TO ASSIST.
64. 081412Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO	LIBERTY REPORTED UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKERS, HELOS CIRCLE CAMP AFTER ATTACK, POSSIBLY ISRAELI.
65. 081414Z JUN	USDAO TEL AVIV	REPORTED TO WHITE HOUSE AND OTHERS INCLUDING COMSIXTHFLT, THAT ATTACK WAS A MISTAKE.
66. 081416Z JUN	JCS (7354)	AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND LIBERTY AGAINST FURTHER ATTACK.
67. 081417Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	RELAY THE 081339Z (081349Z) MSG TO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS.
68. 081425Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR INFORMED OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS.

<u>DTG</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>ADDEE/TEXT</u>
69. 081430Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INSTRUCTS VP A/C TO REMAIN 100 NM FROM COAST AND BORDER OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT.
70. 081439Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	FIRST SITREP FOUR DEAD EXCESS OF 50 WOUNDED ON LIBERTY.
71. 081455Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	LIBERTY UNDERWAY AT 2 KTS COURSE 340PM.
72. 081514Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMS ALL HIGHER AUTHORITY ONLY COMM WITH LIBERTY VIA KICOM NET.
73. 081517Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	INFORMS COMSIXTHFLT THAT ONLY NEWS RELEASES WILL BE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.
74. 081521Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMED USCINCEUR AND OTHERS THAT TEL AVIV HAS RECEIVED REPORT THAT ISRAEL A/C AND MTBS HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED THE LIBERTY AT 081200Z.
75. 081529Z JUN	JCS (7369)	USE OF FORCE WITHDRAWN.
76. 081609Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USE OF FORCE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED.
77. 081649Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	ALL A/C RECALLED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.

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FROM: JCS
 TO: CINCPAC
 CINCLANT
 INFO: CNO
 USNINCEUR ✓
 CINCSOUTH
 CINCPACFLT
 CINCPACFLT
 CINCPACFLT

DATE: 06 NOV 65 INFO:

REF: [faded text]

JCS 5338. J-3 SENDS.

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR TRS OPERATIONS (U)


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 3. CNO MEMO CP-922YE/RM 00238P92, 27 OCT (ACTAL)

1. SUGGESTED GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED BY THE REFERENCES
 FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS.

THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE
 REF AND IS ISSUED FOR USE IN GENERAL PLANNING FOR
 SIGINT SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS WHEN REQUIRED.

A. DESCRIPTION. SPECIAL MODIFIED FORMER
 MERCHANT SHIPS CONFIGURED TO CARRY OUT THEIR
 MISSION.

B. MISSION.



DRAFTER THW/QJ	RECEIVING OFFICER DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED	RELEASED AT (ZULU) 2
DOCUMENT MARKING	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 1 OF 4
REFER TO MESSAGE ADD 25 AGI DTG SUSPENSE 27	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR. 70183 ADD NR. DTG 052235Z

ENTIRE MSG

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(2) CLASSIFICATION OF DETAILS OF SPECIFIC NATURE OF MISSION: REQUIRES HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE

(3) DIVERSION FROM MISSION. THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR [REDACTED] PURPOSE ONLY. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE MADE ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY, IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF JCS PUB 2 (UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES), PARAGRAPHS 30229 AND 30245 APPLY.

C. THE MISSION OF THE TRS IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.

D. CONTROL OF TRS.

MST 5 ?

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SHIP. MILITARY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE SHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE COGNIZANT UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER THROUGH THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO A SPECIFIC FLEET OF FORCE COMMANDER.

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DTG		AGG NR.		
SUSPENSE		DTG		

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INNNV KX3346ZCZCDBAR25PBD 015PBD 015

C di Rome

RUFFEK 095
RUFFEK 095 0681435
291430Z MAR 67
USCINCPAC
INFO CINCPACNAVPER
241212Z FEB 67
USCINCPAC
CINCPACNAVPER
CINCPACNAVPER
USASACUR

*M/C
1914*

*RECEIVED
FEB 21 1967*

UNCLAS 12CJCO 02056. USAF FOR OTR,
NAVPER FOR N-32, USARPAC FOR ALAGC-A, USASACUR FOR
PN-E. SUBJ: MESSAGE ADDRESSEES.
REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES ON YOUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO
OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATER AND REQUIRING AN
OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BE LIMITED TO THIS
HEADQUARTERS AND THOSE IN-THEATER AGENCIES ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS. ALL PLANS AND PROGRAMS REQUIRED BY CURRENT
DIRECTIVES TO BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL ARE EXAMPLES OF MESSAGE
TRAFFIC REQUIRING AN OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

PAGE 2 RUFFEK 095 UNCLAS & F T O
AS APPROPRIATE, THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST APPROVAL,
COORDINATE WITH, OR INFO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND/OR OTHER
MAJOR COMMANDS ON THEATER PLANS AND PROGRAMS

S

ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
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ACTION DEPARTMENT															
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UNCLASSIFIED

FEB.

USCINCPAC 241212Z

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RUEP/IS/JCS/JRC
CINCLANT/JRC

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CINCLANTFLT
CVC
RUEP/IS/JCS/JRC
CINCLANT/JRC

RUEP/IS/JCS/JRC
CINCLANT/JRC

0210Z APR 67
CVC

1. REFERENCE A.
2. INSTRUCTIONS TO GET UNDERWAY, WHEN RFS ASAP DEPART
3. AND PROCEED BEST POSS SOA TO ROTA SPAIN TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT
4. EQUIPMENT, WHEN RFS PROCEED TO OP AREA OFF PORT SAID. SPECIFIC
5. DETAILS WILL FOLLOW.
6. REMAINDER PER A UNCHANGED.

3

FL/G

TOP 0210Z 04 MAY 67

NR 234/24

Handwritten signature
CVC.....CARL

2 4 0 0 2 0 7 MAY 67

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VV PPNG 97AP4366ZCMAB942ZCYMD264

PP RUTPRC

DE RUCIJHA 530C 1450245

ZNY CCCCC

R 241732Z MA Y 67

FM USS LIBERTY

TO RUEJSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT

INFO RUEJNKA/COMSERVLANCANT

RUEJNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEJNAAA/CNO

RUEJUS/JCS/JRC

RUEJNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

RUEJLVO/CINCLANTNAVEUR

RUEJFRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEJNKA/CINCLANTNAVEUR

RUEJNKA/NAVSTA ROTAF

BT

6. YOUR 240000Z MAY 67

1. DEPARTED ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST 240530Z MAY. SOA 15 KTS. ETA ROTAF 310000Z MAY. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS WILL BE NECESSARY TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERS AND REFUEL. THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSANDS GALLONS NSFO WILL BE REQUIRED. ETA OPARK OFF PORT SAID 061400Z JUN 67. REF 6 PERTAINS

2. DO NOT HOLD ANY COMSIXTHFLT INSTRUCTIONS/OPLANS/ORDERS/TAPV NOTES/ETC. IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO HAVE THEM DELIVERED ON ARRIVAL ROTAF.

3. UNODIR WILL INCLUDE FOLLOWING COMMANDS AS INFO ADDRESSES ON DAILY PIR REPORT AFTER ENTRY INTO MEDITERRANEAN: CINCLANTNAVEUR/COMSIXTHFLT/DIRNAVSECNAVNAVEUR.

GP-4

BT

FLAG OCT.....³

TOR 250335Z MAY 67

NR 273/23


CNO.....DRB

2 4 1 7 3 22 MAY 67

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROSTER OF PERSONS VISITED

USCINCEUR

NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
David A. BURCHINAL GENERAL, USAF	Deputy, CINCEUR	14 June 1967
W. J. McCAFFREY M/GEN, USA	Director Operation Directorate (J-3)	14 June 1967
David I. LIEBMEM B/GEN, USAF	Deputy Director for Command and Control	14 June 1967
James FEELY, Jr. B/GEN, USMC	Deputy Director for Operations	14 June 1967
W. G. KILLE COL, USAF	Chief Operation Center Division	14 June 1967
R. L. ROYEM COL, USAF	Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
R. S. QUIGGINS COL, USAF	Deputy Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
G. G. LITTLE CDR, USN	Staff Officer, JRS (J-3)	14 June 1967
C. K. RUSSELL L/COL, USA	JRC Watch Officer (J-3)	14 June 1967
L. H. BERGMAN L/COL, USAF	Staff Officer, Operations & Readiness Divisions (J-6)	14 June 1967
		
CAPT HERMES USA	DCA-Europe Operations	14 June 1967

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE
IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 7 JUN 67

INFO:

DISTRIBUTION

TO: JCS

INCEUR
INCOUSAFE

A. JCS 070259Z JUN 67

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO REPEAT NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ANY ISRAELI SOURCE EITHER MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY AND NONE REPORTED BY ANY COMSIXTHFLT SUBORDINATE COMMAND. CONFIRMATION OF LATTER HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS BY FLASH MESSAGE. WILL ADVISE ASAP.

2. AT AMEMB TEL AVIV REQUEST AS SET FORTH IN HIS 291440Z MAY 67 HAVE ACTIVATED RADIO VOICE CIRCUITS. TRANSMISSIONS LIMITED TO TEST COUNTS AND SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ABOVE REPORTED TO SECSTATE IN MY 010155Z JUN 67

GP-3

NOTE: UNABLE TO LOCATE REF. JCS 070259Z

DRAPER TW/ELH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
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REFERS TO MESSAGE		4:797
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AGI 75		
DTC		
SUBPENSE		0706247

ACTION PRECEDENCE FLASH	INFO PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE	SPECIAL HANDLING NONE
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FROM: CCMS IXTHTFLT DATE: 7 JUNE 67

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO
CINCSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
CINCSAF
CINCPAC

DISTRIBUTION

DIR

1. CCMS IXTHTFLT 070626Z JUN 67
2. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.
3. PRIOR TO 052015Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 35E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES. AT 052015Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 10 MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.
3. ON 5 MAY BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

ORIGIN	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
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AGI		DTG 071503Z
DTG		
SURPRISE		

ACTION PRECEDENCE FLASH	INFO PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE	SPECIAL HANDLING NONE
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ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM 0826Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING FIGURES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.

5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER

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FORM 48750 REV SEP 61
(Supersedes 48750 REV AUG 61
if no used until obsolete)


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ACTION PRECEDENCE FLASH	INFO PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE	SPECIAL HANDLING NONE
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SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.

GP-3

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ADD	AGI NR.
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AD2	AGI NR.
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AD3	AGI NR.
-----	---------

AD4	AGI NR.
-----	---------

AD5	AGI NR.
-----	---------

AD6	AGI NR.
-----	---------

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PRECEDENCE INFO PRECEDENCE SPECIAL HANDLING
IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE NONE

LIBERTY

DATE: 6 JUNE 67

DISTRIBUTION

STAGLANT

UNCONVINCED

UNCONVINCED EIGHT

FOUR

UNCONVINCED

STAGLANT

UNCONVINCED EIGHT

NAVCOM STA MOROCCO

FOR PASS TO JRC

UNCONVINCED PASS TO JRC

STAGLANT PASS TO JRC

INTERP/POSIT

A. US01NCEUR 0614-07 JUN 67 (NOTAL)

1. 07080025 POSIT 33-06N2 E8-50E9. PIM 09/16.5 UNTIL

072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.

C. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTED AS OF 0600Z

FOR C6P
080036Z

IN REF A. GP-4

DRAFTER

TW/EJH

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.

1 OF 1

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGI NR.

AGC

AGI

AGC

SUSPENSE

42085

AGC NR

STG

070900Z

[Handwritten signature]

CLASSIFICATION
INFO PREFERENCE
PRIORITY
SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM: JCS 9 JUN 67 INFO
TO: USOINCEUR

INFO: ONO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINUSNAVEUR
JCS XTHFLT
OCE 67
USS LIBERTY

JCS 7337 U-3 SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

R: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67

1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.

2. CHANGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM.

GP-4

[REDACTED]

DRAFTER ED/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

DOCUMENT MARKING
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

REFERS TO MESSAGE
AGG 95
AGI
DTG
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
172230Z

2

CALL TO NAVEUR 7 JUNE 2350 Z

This is Major Breedlove in JRC in Washington

Yes, say again, who is this?

Major Breedlove in JRC. I would like to speak with your
duty officer, please.

This is Lt Thompson.

Are you familiar with LIBERTY operations?

No Sir, I have someone who can.

Yes, and who will that be, please?

Lt. Galapotti, wait one.

Yes sir, major?

Yes, Major Breedlove in JRC in Washington. Have some
word for your reference USS LIBERTY. Do you have a pencil
and ready to copy?

Yes sir.

O.K. I am making reference to a COMSIXTHFLT msg DTG
071501Z June which you were an info addressee on.

Yes sir.

Now, we request the LIBERTY Comply.

Request LIBERTY to --

Comply.

I can't get that word -- spell please.

Comply - c o m

Right

Comply with new SIXTHFLT

Yes.

OP area defined last sentence.

You are coming in garbled Major - defined

Last sentence.

Last spelli out, please, you are still coming in garbled.

S e n t e n c e

Ah, right.

Maybe I'd better start over so you can get texture

No sir, I can read up to request the LIBERTY comply with
op area defined.

Last sentence in para 1

Last sentence in para 2

of COMSIXTHFLT

of COMSIXTHFLT

Msg 071503Z June (Yes) until further notice (Yes) and
that is NOT CLOSER THAN

Not closer than

100

100

Nautical miles

Nautical miles -----

to Israel (right); Syria (right), Egypt (right - that's
UAR) and 25 NM - that is two five

25 NM

to Syprus (right) end of message. (right) Now read
back please.

JRC msg - is this DTG or verbal?

This is verbal I am giving you right now, it will be followed by a written message in the morning.

Right - reference COMSIXTHFLT msg 071503Z Jun, request LIBERTY comply to 6th Flt op area defined last sentence para 2 of SIXTHFLT msg 071503Z until further notice and not closer than 100 NM to Israel, Syria, UAR and 25NM to Syprus - is that affirmative?

That is affirmative.

And you are Major --

Major Breedlove.

Spell last name, please.

B r e e d l o v e

That's Major Breedlove in JRC EUCON?

No JRC_Washington and May I have a spelling on your name?

G a l a p o t t i, Lt. Galapotti. I'll send it down to 6th Flt and you say there will be a follow on?

Yes, there will be a follow on.

Yes sir.

Yes, I called because time is getting short to where she will be in those limits.

Looks to me like she's almost there.

Yeah, that's right so go mushy, mushy.

Yes sir, Roger; we will go to 6th Flt and info her and she will probably ll ll or something and (this word is garbled) away.

5

CK


OK, will get that out right now to 6th FLT on this.

Thank you.

You're welcome.

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6

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER DIST: C.I.C.S-1(6) DJS-3(7-9) SJCS-3(10-12) J3-8(13-20) JRC-3(21-23) GEN LEMNITZER-1(24) ANMCC/NEACP/NECAP FILE-1(CY#1) (20) CV CY#2 DACC CY#3 JRC COMEBACK ADV CYS#4 AND #5 TO NMCC 080110Z JUN 67		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS DISTRIBUTION JCS JRC SJCS
FROM: JCS TO: USCINCEUR INFO: CNO CINCLANT CINCLANTFLT CINCSNAVEUR COMSIXTHFLT CTF 6 USS LIBERTY	COORDINATION CNO CAPT KING	
JCS 7347 J 3 Sends.	ZFF-3	
STEW: USS LIBERTY (3) REFS: a. JCS 7337/072230Z Jun 67 (Message Follows) b. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z Jun 67 (NOTAL) (Message Follows) 1. (1) Cancel ref a. 2. Req LIBERTY comply new op areas defined last sentence para 2 ref b, until further notice, i.e., not closer than 100 NM to ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT and 25 NM to Cyprus. OP-3	REFS ARE: a. JCS 7337 b. IN 61629 ??	
DATE: 7 MONTH: JUN YEAR: 1967	TIME: NO OF PAGES:	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE SAM RORNA, JR. Capt. USN Chief, Recon Programs Div, JRC	PHONE: 50581	SIGNATURE  MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD Captain, USN
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PERMANENT DISPOSITIONS: JCS 7347/080110Z Reconnaissance Center	

VV KMG 28PRC018
 PUTPRO 09 1991417

0600 1 408

091417Z JUN 67
 COMSIXTFLT
 RUSSBY USCINCEUR
 URSBY/COMUSNAVEUR
 URSBY/COMUSMAPE
 URSBY/COMUSSAFE
 URSBY/COMUSAREUR
 URSBY/COMA SLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT
 URSBY/COMAIRMED
 URSBY/COMSLANT
 URSBY/COMINTFLT
 URSBY/COMHQB
 URSBY/COMINCEASTFOR
 URSBY/COMSTRIKE
 URSBY/COMINCEAFSA
 URSBY/COM SIX ZERO
 URSBY/COM JUN 67
 COMSIXTFLT

Dupe
CIC
meloc
has been
sent **7**

T 0
 TITIC
 SS LIBERTY POSIT 31-23N 33-25E HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD AT 061230Z
 UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS IN VICINITY. LIBERTY LISTING BADLY.
 MESSAGE FROM LIBERTY AUTHENTICATED.
 FT 159 3 8 DTG 061349Z

NNNN

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FFI-3
 #62
 12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Contingency Watch Team
 To: CINCUSNAVEUR
 Via: Deputy Chief of Staff
 Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 08010Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES

EVENTS

072350Z

Major EREKLOVE, JRC WDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VCCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major EREKLOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major EREKLOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.

LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.

08000'Z

LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.

080010Z

CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major EREKLOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT.

CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group

of a message and had by passed USCINCEUR. It wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JCS and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMUSMACV as we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

080030Z

The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

080325Z

The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS Liberty. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCPACFLT had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 081102. As he was relaying this information the Duty Officer heard the JCS communication and that it had been received by COMUSMACV.

The Command Center Duty Officer then had the radio room set up a telephone to COMUSMACV in the event that the JCS communication was not received.

080552

Considerable time was caused by attempts to establish a telephone connection. After being unable to establish a telephone connection, JUNCHEN and the radio operator contacted COMUSMACV and requested a telephone with the radio room as soon as possible.

080612Z

Two way telephone was established, with COMUSMACV having difficulty receiving communications. The JCS communication was received by COMUSMACV, and they did not hold any information. The JCS communication was received by COMUSMACV.

to him three times before receiving an acknowledgment at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a message "FROM CINCPACFLT COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMNAVSTA DUTY OFFICER RE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. SPECIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCPACFLT did not hold JCS 072230Z, CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCPAC for it.

080507Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCPACFLT FORAC message was 080455Z.

080515Z After talking to LCOL RUSSELL, USCINCPAC, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCPAC FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL FLYING ZONES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY STATES AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

080521Z Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate exactly when the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and consultation with the watch team that took place.

R.D. Russell
CAPT R.D. RUSSELL, USN

J.S. Jorgensen
CDR J.S. JORGENSEN, USN

11

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE

03 JUN 67	PHONE EXT. NO. 696	PRECEDENCE	CLASS	IMMED	ROUTING	AM USE
		ACTION		CCU		
		INFO				

FROM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO COMSINFLE

INFO

UNCLAS EPTO

050102Z JUN 67

1. TAKE FORAC.

READDC: SSN/1103/TL/W2/38 JUN 67/81
 O 081906Z JUN 67
 FM CINCUSNAVEUR
 INFO USCINCEUR
 JCS
 CNO
 CINCANTFLT

JUN 0 08 30

ORIGINATOR SECTION N3	SECTION DEPARTMENT N3	RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

COM	
YON	
SSN	
SEN	

080455Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

12

MIT
RETURN TO
MSG 1131

030000Z JUN 67
RUCOR 011 1590528
C 030625Z JUN 67
USCINCPAC
COMUSMACV
TO RUEHQBH USN 4838
TO RUEHQA USN 4838
TO RUEHRC/CONSIXTHFLT
TO RUEHJ/JCS

ECJIC/JIC 09045 USNAVEUR FOR H-32 AND H-311
JCS FOR JIC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF A. FONECON LTC RUSSELL,
USN 7847 AND CDR JORGENSEN, DUTY OFFICER, NAVEUR, 030425Z JUN 67.
REF B. JCS 7847, 030110Z JUN 67.
(C) THIS CONFIRMS REF A TO TAKE REF B FORAC. SP-3

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ORIGINATOR SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
SECTION DEPARTMENT																				

GROUP 1	
GROUP 2	
GROUP 3	
GROUP 4	

NAVEUR HCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

USP 585
12086340 JUN 5
11 035 1 1371
20 00000000
200 000
210
SINGLANT
210000

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..... 577 . 1 . 4582 003 722 . PIN WITHIN 10 00 0 .

1071 0 128 JUN 6

NR: 164/28

CVO. *DEW*

1507
.....
.....

8 8 2 5 3 2 274

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100 02 17
SE
WILL. M
50
70

AFS
VCR
NAV

LIBERTY
S
S

S
S
S
S

PLEASE FIND LIBERTY DO
LIBERTY SINGLE ENGINE JET FIGHTER A/C ORBITED USS LIBERTY
ON 12-11-67 AT 08:50Z AT TIME 08/0502. NO IDENT. VESSEL
EST. 5 MILES. DISTANCE EST. 2. MILES. NO AMPLIFYING
RECORD WILL BE KEPT.

JUN 5

MFG NR 418/09

CVO

0 8 8 7 4 2 7 7

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B. 75VV 100015

02

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

1957 1571 00

SECTION 15 17 (U)

SECTION 15 17 (U) ...

SECTION 15 17 (U) ...

SECTION 15 17 (U) ...

SECTION 15 17 (U) ...

SECTION DAILY

SECTION DAILY

SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
SECTION 15 17 (U)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Handwritten mark resembling the number '3'.

SECTION	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Handwritten notes and a large '3' next to a horizontal line.

(SECTION 15 17 (U))

16

Z 070259Z JUN 57 ZFFJ
 FM JCS
 TO RUTPOR/COMSTXTHPL
 INFO RUPPE/USCINCPAC
 RUDL/COMUSMACV
 RUPPE/COMUSAF
 ZFM/012

Just

JCS 7239 /CJCS SENDS.
 SUBJ: UAR ALLEGATIONS OF US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL (U)
 1. UAR AUTHORITIES HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY HAVE INFORMATION, PERHAPS THROUGH INTERCEPTS, THAT US PERSONNEL WERE TALKING WITH THE ISRAELIS, OR WERE OTHERWISE INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISRAELIS, LEADING THE UAR TO BELIEVE THAT WE MAY HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.
 2. YOU ARE AWARE OF UAR ALLEGATIONS THAT US CARRIER AIRCRAFT WERE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND ALSO OF OUR PROMPT AND VIGOROUS DENIAL. WE HAVE YOUR

PAGE TWO RUPPE 002 S E C R E T
 ASSURANCE THAT SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT WERE NOT WITHIN 200 MILES OF EGYPT, SYRIA OR ISRAEL.

3. REQUEST THAT YOU VERIFY ASAP THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT OR ANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET AND THE ISRAELIS. IF THERE WERE ANY TYPE COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, PROVIDE COMPLETE DETAILS ASAP.

4. OF EQUAL INTEREST TO US WOULD BE ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE AS TO ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO GET YOU TO INTERVENE IN THE WAR. FYI THERE HAVE BEEN ALLEGATIONS FROM UAR SOURCES TO THIS EFFECT.

5. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO COMMENT IF, BUT ONLY IF THEY HAVE INFORMATION BEARING ON ALLEGATIONS OF US PARTICIPATION IN, OR COLLUSION WITH, ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS. GP-3
 BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	XXXXXXXXXX																				
ACTION DEPARTMENT	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

COM	
TOR	070259
SEN	
SCN	

070259 JUN 57

(WHEN FILLED IN)

17

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		DISTRIBUTION	
PRECEDENCE	PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	
IMVED	IMAFD	NONE	
FROM: JCS	DATE: 02 JUN 67	INFO:	
TO: USICINCEUR	///	///	
INFO: CNO CINCLANTFLT CINCSNAVEUR COMSIXTHFLT CTF 64 USS LIBERTY			
S 5724 J-3 SENDS			
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY SKED (U)			
1. WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:			
A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.			
B. 2-8 JUN. ENROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE NAV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POST 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MALTA 3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.			
C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5NM			
DRAYER: DGY/JFD	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED BY (ZULU)	
DOCUMENT MARKING	DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED		PAGE 1 OF 1
REF TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGI NR.	42571
AGC 65		AGC NR.	
AGI		DYS	011545Z 011545Z
DYS			

18

MESSAGE		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
PRECEDENCE	PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
IMMED.	IMMED.	NONE
DISTRIBUTION		
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINFANT (JRC) CINFANTFLT-SE, INCLUDED AS INKO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS, DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.		
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.		
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKEE FOLLOW		
GP-3		
DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED BY (SVL7)
DOCUMENT MARKING	DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVALS; AND AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED	
REF TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PAGE 2 OF 2
AGD		AGI NR. 4077
AGI		AGO NR.
		DTS

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UNCLASIFIED

JUN 17 07 43

212 1522833

USCIB
 COMUSMACV
 US LIBERTY

URGENT 0124 01345Z JUN 67
 FROM: (U) COMUSMACV
 TO: (U) USFOR, FMPC, WAVEUR FOR W-32, SUB: USS LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	O	O	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
ACTION DEPARTMENT	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

PAGE 1 OF	
CON	
YOR	6635/01
SSN	
SEN	

078 012030 JUN 17

UNCLASSIFIED

20

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DRAFTER <i>[Signature]</i>	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
DATE 2 JUL 1967	PHONE EXT. NO. 396	ACTION			X		
		INFO			X		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS LIBERTY//USCINCPAC

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE _____

CLIPPER _____

PROOF READER _____

LETTER _____

INFO _____

INFO: [REDACTED]

CINCPAC//COMSERVANT//NAVCOMSTA SPA/

DEPARTURE OF USS LIBERTY FROM ROTA

1. USCINCPAC [REDACTED] /JPC 08586 DTG 010419Z JUL 67

2. IN REPLY TO PARA 2 OF REF A, REQUIRED EXTRA PERSONNEL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL ARE NOW ABOARD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA.

3. FOR USCINCPAC, [REDACTED] SEND A COMMUNICATION ADVISORY MESSAGE IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THAT SHIPS SPECIAL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA [REDACTED] HAVE DIRGCTG

4. [REDACTED] HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IS UNDER REPAIR, [REDACTED] A

5. TO REPAIR ROTA UNTIL [REDACTED] SYSTEM IS REPAIRED.

6. FOR USS LIBERTY. REQUEST ADVISE ETR, [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] SAILING ORDERS WILL FOLLOW. IAW REF B.

GP-4




OPERATOR SECTION	XXX	X		X	X				
ACTION DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

(PAGE) OF 1

CDR	
YDR	
ENR	1245
SEN	

DATE: 012120 JUL 1967

(WHEN FILLED IN)



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... ..

... ..

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Cap. Owen

~~TO~~
~~INFO~~
~~...~~

APR 1958
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR

NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMSTA TURKEY

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCUSNAVEUR PASS TO JRC
REF HQREP 021330Z LIBERTY AGTR-5, 01/1

ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR 5, 02/1
STD - HQREP SPAIN, 021330Z CO 015, 015, 015
VIA - HQREP GERMANY, 021730Z CO 015, 015, 015
VIA - HQREP FRANCE, 050330Z RH 015, 015, 015
ETA - HQREP GERMANY, 080300Z
NOV IND 32 06N 033-30E 080300Z 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECOPS, CINCUSNAVEUR
311750Z, 07/1

OP Directive dated 311750Z

33(5) ... COG
92(14) 94(25) :P(7) F(1) BPR(1)

022425
056

NO. 100
004256/3/14
PAGE 2
REC-11
03-1345Z
CINCUSNAVEUR

USS LIBERTY 021330Z

23

... TANGCO ... LIBRARY. 07000120 ... 774
... 015, OKG, 35-774. 005-3586, 02173013, 015, OKG,
37-0010, 010 0003, 00034023, 015, OKG, 37 0000, 038-0006, 00030021,
32-0005, 000-3000, 00030021, 31175077, 00000120, 00770000
SP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
004256/3/JH	2		2	03:1345Z	021330Z JUN 67

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

JOB PAID TO JRC
CONSULT PASS C JRC
PIL (C)
10. 1948 JUN 27 20517 20-11 - 100-2984
PIL (C) EASTERN 15 100.
RECEIVED 20517 20-11 100-2984
... TRANSPORT STRAIT ...
... SHIPS OF ...
... SHIPS CALLED LIBERTY ...
... NAVY SHIP UNQUOTE ...

... THREE ...
... LIGHT UNQUOTE ...
... REPORT ...
... DAILY SITING ...
... REPORT ...
... AT ...
... TRINITY ...

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DRAFTED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	PRECEDENCE	PLAS	INDEXED	ROUTING
	PLAS EXT. NO.	ACTION		X	
		INFO			

FROM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO COMSIXTHFLT - ZFF 3

INFO USCINCEUR/COMASWFORSIXTHFLT/TF 60

SIXTHFLT MOVEMENTS

- A. JCS 201910Z MAY 67
- B. CINCUSNAVEUR 271052Z MAY 67

1. REF A IS THE ONLY RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS IN GENERAL ISSUED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. REF B PROVIDED GEOGRAPHICAL GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TF 60. REF B IS HEREWITH CANCELLED.

2. THE THREAT IMPOSED BY THE MOVEMENT OF SOME 20 RUSSIAN WARSHIPS AND SUPPORT SHIPS INTO THE EASTERN MED, PLUS AN ESTIMATE OF SOME 3-9 RUSSIAN SUBS PROBABLY CONCENTRATED IN SAME AREA, DICTATES THAT THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF THE FLEET SHOULD NOW BE EXPLOITED TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR

FOR COMMUNICATOR USE ONLY

TYPE
FILTER

INDEX
SEARCHED

GROUP

FILED

ORIGINATOR SECTION																				
02																				
ACTION DEPARTMENT																				
N3																				

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

CLASS	
TIME	
DATE	10/76
BY	

051352 JUN 7

RE WITHIN SCREEN ONLY

THE RUSSIANS TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE ON OUR
MOVEMENTS, PLACE A STRAIN ON THE TENUOUS RUSSIAN
LOGISTIC BASE FOR THEIR FLEET AND (IN LIGHT OF
TODAY'S OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES) IMPROVE OUR POSTURE
FOR QUICKLY CARRYING OUT WHATEVER TASKS THAT MAY
BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES ARE
PROVIDED FOR PRESENT DISPOSITION AND EMPLOYMENT
OF TF 60:

A. OPERATE FAST CARRIER TASK GROUP SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN/AEGEAN NO CLOSER THAN
100 MILES FROM COASTS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL,
AND UAR:

~~REDACTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. OTHER TASK FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY.

GP-3

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

CLASS. BY	DRAFTED BY	DEPT. BRANCH	PLAS	NOSES	PRIORITY	COPYING	AS. NO.
	GRS						
5 JUL 67	T-1	PHONE EXT. NO.			XX		
		494			XX		

FROM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO COMSIXTHFLT

INFO USCTHRET//CTF 60

CYPRUS FLIGHT RESTRICTION

NO CLOSER THAN
 2. AIR AND SURFACE OPERATIONS SEVENTY-FIVE (75)
 FROM COAST OF
 MILES OF CYPRUS ARE AUTHORIZED.

GP-4

Return to Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr.

[Handwritten Signature]

ORIGINATOR SECTION																				
CIO	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
ACTION DEPARTMENT	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

COM			
TOP			
COM	1166		
COM			

05/856 Jul 67

NNNNHVV KXC304VV A0213VV PRC891
 CO RUTPRC
 DE RUTPRC 166 1962019
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 052019Z JUN 67
 FM CONSIXTHFLT
 TO RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
 INFO RUTPRE/CTF SIX THREE
 RUTPRC/CTF SIX FOUR
 RUTPRD/CTU SIX SEVEN PT TWO PT TWO
 RUTPRD/CTG SIX SEVEN PT TWO
 RUTPRF/CTF SIX SEVEN
 RUTPRG/CINCUSNAVEUR
 BT

ACTION TAKEN

JUN 6 1 30 AM '67

Handwritten notes:
 C. G. Turner
 C. G. Turner

TF 60 MOVEMENTS
 A. CONSIXTHFLT OPORD 199-67 (DTG 272239Z MAY 67)
 1. GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS TO TF 60 SHIP MOVEMENTS AND FLIGHT
 OPERATIONS IMPOSED BY REF A AND OTHER DIRECTIVES OF HIGHER
 AUTHORITY HEREBY REVISED. OPERATE TF 60 IN THE AEGEAN SEA AND
 EASTERN MED (EAST OF 25-00E7) NO CLOSER THAN 100 MILES FROM COASTS
 OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND UAR. 3 100 MILE RESTRICTION
 FOR FLIGHT OPS VICINITY CYPRUS HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND FLIGHTS
 ARE NOW AUTHORIZED TO WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS. DO NOT ENTER

Large handwritten signature: K

Diagonal watermark: James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION	MEM XXX	X
ACTION DEPARTMENT		
143		

DATE	05/22/67
TIME	
BY	
FOR	

052019 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 166 S E C R E T

TERRITORIAL WATERS OF DODECANESSE ISLANDS UNLESS DIRECTED TO CONDUCT TRANSIT BETWEEN CYPRUS AND GREECE.

2. THE THREAT IMPOSED BY THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET WARSHIPS AND THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF 8-9 SOVIET SUBMARINES DICTATES THAT THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF THE CVA GROUP BE EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO SOVIETS, AGGRAVATE THE SOVIET LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND IMPROVE TF 68 POSTURE TO CARRY OUT WHATEVER TASKS MAY BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

3. TO INCREASE READINESS POSTURE OF TF 68 DESIRE YOU DIRECT CARRIER TASK GROUPS TO POSIT 34-30N 30-00E, EACH CVA GROUP MOVING SEPARATELY TO THAT POINT WITH A RANDOM 1. UPON ARRIVAL PROCEED TO VICINITY 33-45N 32-00E. THEREIN OPERATE TF 68 WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS ESTABLISHED PAR ONE ABOVE UTILIZING RANDOM PINS AND UTILIZING PERIODS OF HIGH SPEED TO DENY SOVIETS THE CAPABILITY TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCES IN A PARTICULAR AREA FOR SURVEILLANCE. DISPOSITION/FORMATION AT YOUR DISCRETION TO PROVIDE BEST POSTURE FOR DEFENSE AND TASKING AS REQUIRED.

4. AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT TASKS WILL BE ASSIGNED. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS INTENTIONS OF HIGHER

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 166

AUTHORITY BECOME MORE CLEAR, KEEP TF 68 ON THE MOVE WITHIN LIMITATIONS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS.

5. FOR CTF 63. WHEN NOT JOINED WITH TF 68 FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT, DESIRE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP UTILIZE DIVERSIONARY COURSES WITHIN LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY REQUIRED RDVU.

GP-3
BT

Handwritten signature and markings in Arabic script.

James M. ... Search Papers

NOTE

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
GROUP: UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-10

DISTRIBUTION

DATE: 13 JUN 64

UNCLAS//FORN DISSEM//COMSIXTHFLT 081315Z JUN 64

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED]

1. USN LIBERTY REPORTED UNDER ATTACK AT POSIT 34 27 03.00N, WAS HIT BY TORPEDO AND WAS LISTING 50 DEG. ATTACKER NOWHEREBY DECLARED HOSTILE BY COMSIXTHFLT 1A 4 11 00.00Z. LIBERTY MESSAGE AUTHENTICATED.

2. [REDACTED] DIRECTED TO GO TO SCENE TOWARD SCENE. TASK FORCE 60.0000 POSIT 34 22N 02 26E.

3. [REDACTED] ORDERED TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A119S AND [REDACTED] TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A119S WITH FIGHTER COVER TO DEFEND USN LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF [REDACTED].

4. [REDACTED] WILL LAUNCH, WILL RELIEVED ON STATION.

5. [REDACTED] FIRST ACFT ON SCENE ONE HOUR AND 30 MINS AFTER [REDACTED].

6. [REDACTED] LAUNCH AT 1345Z.

DRAFTED DOCUMENT MARKING REFERENCE MESSAGE ADD ARI OTS SUSPENSE	RELEASING OFFICER NONE	RE-CLASSIFIED BY (R 767) PAGE 1 OF 1 CBI NR. 42925 CCG NR. 081320Z
---	---------------------------	--

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

[Faint routing and header markings]
CINCUSNAVEUR
USS LIBERTY

mc-500

Research Papers

ECJIC/JRC 08941. USNAVEUR FOR N-31
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF: A. MY
0858Z JUN 67. B. CINCUSNAVEUR
0858Z JUN 67.

1. REF A REQUESTS SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS
LIBERTY TO ARRIVE THIS HQ NL1 0430Z DAILY. REF B DIRECTS THE USS
LIBERTY TO SUBMIT THE DAILY SITREP MESSAGE AS OF 2400Z HOURS
AS A MATTER OF PREFERENCE.

2. RECEIPT OF USS LIBERTY SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS AT THIS
HQ HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY BEYOND TIME REQUESTED IN REF A.
REQUEST THESE REPORTS BE ASSIGNED
HIGHER PREFERENCE OF IMMEDIATE
AND BE SUBMITTED DAILY AS OF 1800Z. GP-4
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X	X	X	X							
SECTION DEPARTMENT	U	0	0	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	CITE
NAVY NUMBERING	0	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N3	1	2	3	3	1	1	2	4	1	1	7

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

COM				
YOR		0611550		
SDN				
DSR				

061400 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

COMM : TT

TUV KXCS31VV NSBM82B KCA894
CC RUCRAG RUCRAG
DE RUGKC 1666 1971919
ZNY
C 261844Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUCRAG/CINCPACNAVEUR
INFO RUEKDA/JCS

mcloc

~~INFO RUEKDA/CINCPACNAVEUR
RUEKDA/CINCPACNAVEUR
RUEKDA/CINCPACNAVEUR~~

RUEPSON/CONSERVON EIGHT
RUFPEK/USCINCEUR
~~RUCIUSA/NEOTA~~

~~RUCRAG/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFPEK/COMFAIRMED
RUCYRE/CTF SIX ZERO~~

PAGE TWO RUGKC 1666
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT

A. YOUR 061757Z JUN 67
1 061800Z POSIT 34-18N6 024-06E2. PIM 107/16

2. MY 032028Z, 042050Z, AND 051934Z ARE
DTG PRIOR PIM REPORTS. REF A PERTAINS. SUBSEQUENT
PIM REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO COMSIXTHFLT.

3. TEMPORARY REPAIRS HAVE RETURNED TRSSCOMM.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TO SATISFACTORY
OPERATIONS.
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCPACNAVEUR	XXX		X						X
ACTION DEPARTMENT	USG/E N3									

COM	
FOR	2102/16
BY	
DATE	12

061844 JUN 67



(WHEN FILLED IN)

NNNNVV KY029VV BBH934VIX
 DE N3R RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
 088781

PP RUCKRS
 DE RUCKC 1978 1582052
 ZNY

P 052000Z JUN 67
 FM USS LIBERTY
 TO AIG TWO FOUR ZERO ~~TS MRG LONDON~~ ~~INFO USCOM EASTLANT~~
 INFO RUEKDA/JCS
 RUEHAAA/CNO
 RUECNKA/CINCLANT

*140-008
 me*

Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RUESSPA COMSERVRON EIGHT
 RUEPXX USCOMCEUR

RUTPRC/CONSIXTHFLT
 RUTRF/COMFAIRMED

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1978
 RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
 RUEFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
 RUTPCR/NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
 ZEN/NAVCOMSTA GREECE
 RUECPNA/NAVCOMSTA ASMARA
 BT

JCS PASS TO JRC
 CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
 USCOMCEUR PASS TO JRC
 CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 062000ZS LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF 021330Z9 011 10//
 OPS SO LIBERTY AFTR-5, 11//
 CH3 CHP 070001ZS CONSIXTHFLT, 12//
 CFN 062000ZS, 070001ZS, 13//END
 GP-4
 BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	X	X	X	X	X	X				
ACTION DEPARTMENT										
<i>N3 N3SE</i>										

CON	
TON	<i>05/21/75</i>
SEN	
DIR	<i>sum</i>

06 2000 JUL 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE USE	ODD	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRIORITIES

ACTION

INFO

070 JUNE 6 2050 67

FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
JCS LIBERTY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION:
JCS
JIC
SJCS

COORDINATION:
CNO
Rich Swanson
76033

JCS 7206 J-3 sends.

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REFS: a. JCS 6724/011345Z Jun 67
b. JCS 5838/052235Z Nov 65 (NOTAL)

1. Request procedures outlined herein be followed in developing schedules for LIBERTY while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility:

a. Planning/approval of routine monthly sked:

(1) [redacted] state requirements to CINCUSNAVEUR including recommended ports of call.

DATE	TIME
06	1700
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	1967
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
R. G. ANDERSON LCdr, USN Recon Programs Div Joint Recon Center, J-3	50581	
TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	
MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD Captain, USN		
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS (S), JUIII GP-3. Reconnaissance Center	

D. FORM 173
1 NOV. 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

JCS 7206 / 062050Z

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION PRIORITY		R.G. ANDERSON	50581
INFO DOCUMENT		ICDR, USN	

(2) CINCUSNAVEUR prepare sked to fulfill requirements including dates/areas of ops, CPA's, ports of call for logistics and pass plan to USCINCEUR.

(3) USCINCEUR review and pass sked to JCS(JRC) for approval. Proposed skeds are required by JCS NLT 20th of the month preceding the month for which the sked is submitted.

(4) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval or modifications.

(5) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(6) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

b. Modification of approved sked due to changes in technical tasking:

(1) [REDACTED] state requirement to JCS(JRC).

(2) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of modification.

(3) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(4) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

c. Modification of approved sked involving a change of 48 hours or less for operational reasons:

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4		
REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS GP-3.				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION		R.G. ANDERSON	
INFO		ICDR, USN	50581

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders and inform JCS(JRC) and USCINCEUR of reason for the change.

d. Modification of approved sked involving a change of more than 48 hours for operational reasons:

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR pass proposed modification to USCINCEUR.

(2) USCINCEUR review and pass to JCS(JRC) for approval.

(3) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval.

(4) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(5) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

2. (U) Ref a is the existing approved sked for June 1967.

3. (C) The following should be addressees on all messages pertaining to skeds or sked changes:

JCS (JRC)

CNO

USCINCEUR


CINCUSNAVEUR



CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	1		
REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
C2.2					

ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION 510-011002		R. G. ANDERSON	50581
INFO 11060000		LCDR. USN	



NOTE: USS LIBERTY is not an addressee on these messages.

4. (U) Ref b provides guidance on contingency planning for TRS ops.

5. (U) For [redacted] Request you provide CINCUSNAVEUR your recommended July sked ASAP. GP-3.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	4		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-3.				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION.	

DD FORM 173-1
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

... ACTION DIR. BUENOS ...

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT DATE: 16 JUN 67 INFO:
TO: USS LIBERTY

INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
JCS
ONO

COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NKOIO
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
CINCLANT
CTF SIX THREE
CTF SIX SEVEN
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

- A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL ✓
- B. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB ✓
- C. SLINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL ✓
- D. CINCUSNAVEUR 011300Z JUN 67 NOTAL ✓
- E. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66 NOTAL ✓
- F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL

1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF

B, C AND D
2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF
UAR ACTIONS, MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR
THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY
THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY

DRAFTER	ED/LJH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT
DOCUMENT MARKING	DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YRS.		PAGE 1
REFERS TO MESSAGE	AGG	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	AGING
	17%		6623492

ACTION PRECEDENCE
IMMED

INFO PRECEDENCE
IMMED

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

VERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE

IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.

3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.

4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.

5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN SIXTHFLT

6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS. IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.

7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

A. COPY KR BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY KRA BCST.

B. IF PERMANENT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.

C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIRED

D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.

KNOWLEDGE:

RELEASING OFFICER

CP-4

DOCUMENT MARKING

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

ADD

AS1

OTG

PAGE

AGI NR.

4717

0672127

INFO: BR(3) JS(4) CDDM (12)aps/C
2772012003

1012

EX CV: 3F(3)(15)mjs/VF

ADD DIST: J6(1) (16)ans/W PER CAPT JOY
J6.

WEN CYS JRC(2)(18)jow/VF PER LTC RUSSELL
JRC 30.13JUN67

JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

UNRESTRICTED LIBERTY ←

RUSSEL/RUSPCS/JCS

RUSSEL/RUSPCINCEUR


RUSSEL/RUSC

RUSSEL/RUSCINCLANT

RUSSEL/RUSCINCLANTFLT

RUSSEL/RUSCINCSNAVEUR

RUSSEL/UTT SIX FOUR



3:247374

UNRESTRICTED LIBERTY

UNRESTRICTED SIX SEVEN

JUN

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

555c

2772012003

YOUNG, JR. 1012

7 - 181235Z

FM 1012

TO DIRECTOR

FROM 1012

INFO 1012

BT

BT

RECEIVED RECOMMENDATION FOR STAR IRV UNDER ATTACHMENT

31.2IN 33.215 HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE

TOP SECRET

BT

BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL
12422
SA

2

PAGE TWO RUTPRO 052 S

ECIN 48140 (2of2)

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS

1. JCS 079343Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

2. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

3. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67H

4. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF 3. PROCEED IMMED TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-42N/32-33E UNTIL FURTHER

NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.

5. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-3

BT
REF: 079545 and 080110 cannot identify in SMD
62349 ECIN 48140

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

KUS

XRAJ 571945
Z NC 078 08/2357
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUDOPD BINGHAM/AVR
INFO RUDOPD BINGHAM/AVR
RUTRELT 57 2000
BT

(N) CLASS INFO
FOLLOWING INFO FROM USS LIBERTY.
7 AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33.25E 31.25N. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQ IMMED ASSISTED POSITION)
NOTE: NO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED. INTERCEPTED 034, 04 FROM
USS SARATOGA
BT

FOR DELETED 07 57

NR 482/88

CWO...

NO 0 7 5 3 2 N 87

0 JUN 67 13 01

KNR179VV BBN979V KJF306

051 1591237

JUN 67

SARATOGA

CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
SIX ZERO PT ONE
SIX ZERO PT TWO

RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR IN CINCUSNAVEUR SINGLE SIB
UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS APPROACHING VESSES NOV UNQUOTE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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(PAGE 1 OF _____)

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SSN	2

051 1591237 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

0 JUN 67 13 07z

.VV KXC133VV
..ZZ RUTPP
DE RUTPRC 078 1591250
...
O 091253Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPP/USS SARATOGA
RUTPP/USC AMERICA
INFO RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
BT

COMM NOTE: HAVEUM NOT IN HQ 1113.
THIS IS COURTESY COPY.

1. AMERICA LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S TO PROCEED TO 31-23N 33-25E TO
DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK BY GUNBOATS. PROVIDE
FIGHTER COVER AND TANKERS. RELIEVE ON STATION. SARATOGA LAUNCH
FOUR ARMED A-1'S ASAP SAME MISSION.
GP-4
BT

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1114

(PAGE: CP)			
CON			
TO			
SEC			
SN			

OFF 1257 Jun 67

(THIS IS FILED IN)

081254Z
FM USS SARATOGA

TO COMUSMACV

INFO CIG SIX ZERO PT ONE
CIG SIX ZERO PT TWO
CONSISTENTLY

BT

UNCLAS E F T O

THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM USS LIBERTY
HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE
IMMEDIATELY

W/R THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

33(8) ... 70G
SN(4) GO(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09H(1) 090(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
OPA(1) - 34 94

030270

107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
011511/2/38	1		1	08/14/52	081254Z JUN 5

USS SARATOGA 081254Z

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT
GREECE

NAVY DEPARTMENT
GREECE

UNCLAS

RECEIVED MSG VIA VOICE HICOM FROM USS LIBERTY

AT 001253Z WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO
STARBOARD LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY
JANUARY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NOT WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

33(8) ...COG
50(4) 50(2) 59(1) 098(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
54(1) 55(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) 10(7) F0(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATHAP(1)
0P(1) * 34 34 61

03420C

107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
011671/5/58	1		1	10/1535Z	001501Z JUN 67

NAVCOMMSTA GREECE 081301 Z

NNNN

VV KXC243VV AGB546VV NYC908
... 'ZZ RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 104 1591452

ZNY
Z 081452Z JUN 67 - *EE PDD*
FM COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
Z 081316Z JUN 67 - *FILE*
FM CTF SIX ZERO
TO USS AMERICAO
USS SARATOGA
INFO COMSIXTHFLT
TASK FORCE SIX ZERO
BT

DEFENSE USS LIBERTY

1. FOR AMERICA: LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S ASAP TO PROCEED TO:
31 23N9/33-25E3 TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK
BY GUNBOATS. PROVIDE TANKERS AND FIGHTER COVER.
2. FOR SARATOGA: LAUNCH 4 ARMED A1'S RELIEVE ON STATION OVER
LIBERTY.
3. FOR ALL: PLAN TO RELIEVE ALL ACFT ON STATION OVER USS LIBERTY
AS REQUIRED.

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 104 S E C R E T

4. DEFENSE OF USS LIBERTY MEANS EXACTLY THAT. DESTROY OR DRIVE OFF
ANY ATTACKERS WHO ARE CLEARLY MAKING ATTACKS ON LIBERTY.
REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. DEFEND YOURSELF IF ATTACKED.

NO. NATURE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
DEPARTMENT																				

1 PAGE 1 OF _____

COM	
TON	152718
SSN	
SON	16

070 7F1316 Jan 67

3

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ACT. ON PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPEC. HANDLING
LFTO

DATE: 10 JUNE 67

CITIZENSHIP

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLAS E.O. 13526 REP/06001/COMSIX FUEL T 081315Z JUN 67

INFO: LIBERTY

ATTN: 211

1. US NAVY USS LIBERTY REPORTED UNDER ATTACK AT POSIT 34.31N 03.52E, WAS HIT BY TORPEDO AND WAS LISTING BADLY. ATTACK IN AREA HEREBY DECLARED HOSTILE BY COMSIXTHFLT (AM) 0100Z (UNRINT P01) 00.00. LIBERTY MESSAGE AUTHENTICATED.
2. TASK FORCE DIRECTED TO GO TO PROCEED TOWARD SCENE. TASK FORCE 00 DEPART POSIT 34.22N 04.25E.
3. US NAVY DIRECTED AMERICA TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED ATIS AND 00 DEPART TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED ATIS WITH FIGHTER COVER TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF LAND. TANKERS ALSO WILL LAUNCH, WILL RELIEVED ON STATION.
4. EST. FIRST ACFT ON SCENE ONE HOUR AND 30 MINS AFTER 1345Z. ESTIMATE LAUNCH AT 1345Z.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

NO. CASES AT (EULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 1 OF 1

NOTE: THIS MESSAGE HANDLED BY P21 NAT AGZ AAP FOR MR. NYTEL

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGI NR.

42925

AGC NR.

AUG

NONE

AGI

OTS

SURPENGE

AGI

081320Z

YOUR AND PROTECT TO CINCUSNAVER ONLY KKK

UNCLASIFIED
UNCLASIFIED - FOE UNKUNZ ONLY
1501349

1501349 07 - READ

TO - CINCUSNAVER
ESTABLISHED SIX ZERO
1501349 JUN 67 - 0210

FM CINCUSNAVER
TO USS AMERICA
USS SARATOGA
BT

RE: LIBERTY INCIDENT

1. THE CINCUSNAVER INST P05120.5B FORCES ATTACKING LIBERTY ARE
DECLARED HOSTILE

2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY
TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. DO NOT USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED.
DO NOT PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARDS LAN

3. THE PURPOSE OF COUNTERATTACK IS TO OBTAIN LIBERTY ONLY.

4. BRIEF ALL PILOTS CONTENTS THIS MSG. IN ADDITION BRIEF PILOTS THAT
EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL LIMIT ONLY 12 MILES AND LIBERTY RIGHT ON
EDGE. DO NOT FLY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE EXCEPT AS REQUIRED
TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS PARA 2 ABOVE. BRIEF FIGHTER COVER THAT ANY
ATTACKS ON WNTACFAINER

ET, LIXHROQ, OR THEY THEMSELVES IS

HOSTILE ACT AND PARA TWO ABOVE APPLIES.

CP-4
BT

ORIGINATOR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
DEPARTMENT																				

CON	
TO	1400/P
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070 0181339 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
CINCSNAVEUR

TO USS LIBERTY

INFO NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMSTA SPAIN

UNCLAS

1. ESTABLISH IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY MED AREA COMSTA.
2. NAVCOMSTA CANS MOROCCO TAKE ALL AVAILABLE ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH USS LIBERTY REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.
3. FOR USS LIBERTY REQUEST CONFIRM REPORT OF ATTACK

M.R THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

03:00 066
ENR: 09:1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10:6) 03(1)
04:1) 05:7) 30:16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(24) 96:2) 007(8)
008(1) 1P:7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATHAP(1)
CPA(1) + 34 94

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107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GRD.
C11662/3/7	1		1	08/16/12	071340Z JUN 67

CINCSNAVEUR 081340 Z

KX0273
 A33551VV PRE607
 037 1591410
 JUN 67
 SIX THREE
 COMSIXTHFLT
 SIX ZERO
 USNAVEUR
 PAFAGO
 BT

e/mc

SALVAGE OPERATIONS

A. 031322Z JUN 67 NOTAL
 1. FOR COMSIXTHFLT: RECOMMEND PAFAGO BE DIVERTED AT MAXIMUM SPEED
 TO PROCEED VICINITY 31-23N9 33-25E3 TO ASSIST LIBERTY
 2. FOR PAFAGO, IF COMSIXTHFLT CONCURS DIVERT FROM PRESENT POSIT
 AND PROCEED TO VICINITY POSIT PARA ONE TO ASSIST LIBERTY. ADVISE
 ALCOM ETA UPON ARRIVAL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SALVAGE OPERATIONS
 OR ASSIST LIBERTY AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.
 GP-4
 BT

J.C.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
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DATE OF _____

CON			
TO	165818		
SSR			
SON			

081410 June 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

~~SECRET~~ 080245Z9 UNTIL
IDENTIFIED VIC TO 204877 SOVIET DD38

~~080245Z9 UNTIL 080245Z9. T. E. BYRNE AND SAMPSON AS LAAAAVVVVVVVVVV~~
080232

33
080232

080232

mic/oc

080232 57
080232 080232
080232 080232

UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING BOATS
BOATS AFTER ATTACK HELICOPTER CIRCLED THE SHIP
BOATS TO BE ISRAELI.

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ORIG WATCH SECTION	C										CITE	S	O
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
ACT ON COORDINATE	C										CITE	S	O
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CGN	
TO:	147218
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SN	R

081412 Jan 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NR 2089
142 JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL (M) IV ISRAEL
TO R EMB / WHITE HOUS
RUEP / O D
RUEP / V A / V O
RUEP / DEPT STATE
RUEP / C O M SIX T H P L T
RUEP / P R S / C I N C J T P T X I
RUEP / V D / C I N C H A V E U R
RUEP / O A / J U S
RUEP / S I E S / D I A
RUEP / T A / J U N
RUEP / S I E S / V C E U R - U S E I C O M
RUEP / P R I M / C O S SIX Z E R O P T T W O
RUEP / P R S / U S A F C
RUEP / P R S / C I N C U S R E U R
RUEP / W R / C O S SIX Z E R O
BT

0825 JUN 67.
ALUSMA CALLED TO FLC TO RECEIVE REPORT . ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTS : ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,
POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND OBJECT
APPLIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. SP-3.
BT

FLAG ACT.....

TR: 05/14252 JUN 67

NR: 522/67

CVO.....

/// (P) ///

CITE LOGS)

14 142 JUN 67

MMNCSZCKDA132ZCEGC123
RUDLKD
RUENCS 0140 1591424

061017 1430Z

mc/oc

031413Z JUNE 67 ZFFS - INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG RECEIVED
BY ALL ADDEES (ANS BY 5795)

JCS
RUFPOK/USCINCPAC
RUFPOK/COMSIXTHFLT
RUDLKD/CINCSANAVEUR

JCS 7394 JCS SEND
- YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE WHATEVER FORCE REQUIRED
TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY FROM FURTHER ATTACKS.

BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	MM	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

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SEN	R

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RNNNIVV KXC221VV A38540904

0 JUN 67 15 02z

***** ZZ EUTPRQ
DE RUTPRC 097 1591430
ZNY EEEEE
Z CINCASZ JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPRC/CTF SIX SEVEN
RUTPRC/CTF SIX SEVEN PT TWO
RUTPRC/PATRON SIGONELLA
RUTPRC/PATRON ROTA
INFO RUTPRC/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPRC/CINCUSHAVEUR

BT
UNCLAS
VP REQUIREMENTS
1. INSTRUCT ANY VP ACFT AIRBORNE AT THIS TIME OR PREPARING TO LAUNCH TO REMAIN WEST OF TZUVUJLHDREES EAST LONGITUDE AND REMAIN AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED MILES FROM COAST AND BORDERS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.
2. BE PREPARED TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO CTF 60/COMSIXTHFLT REQUIREMENTS.
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION	V	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SECTION DEPARTMENT	C	O	C	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
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	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3


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
091430 JUN 67
UNCLASSIFIED


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ANNEX E

CHARTS







Gelidonya Burnu

Cuzipasa

Gülnur

Yedigöller

Karatay

Hinzir B

Süv

Incekum Burnu

C. Andreas

Ras Ibn H

A. Gadhafi

Be

To

C. Kormakiti

Kyrenia

Morphou

Azysokha

C. Arhanti

Lefka

Nicosia

Famagusta

C. G. G. C.

Larnaca

Klima

Episkopi

Limassol

C. Gata

CYPRUS

Tai Ab

(Tripl

Al Eatrü

Janiyah

Buyrut

#39

ETA 072300Z, 080800Z POSIT

#50

080800Z

Şayda

Marj Yun

Şur

Acre

Safad

Haifa

Tiberia

#51
080650Z
A/C ORBIT

Nal ya

Tulkayn

Jaffa

I-Aviv

Lydda

Ramallah

Jerusalem

Beit Lahm

Al Kh

Dend

Beersheba

Awja

Al Far

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512352
ATTACK

Dumyut Bar Sa'ad
(Port Said)

UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC

Imatliyah

Gabal
Y'ajlaq
1099

(CAIRO) 32°

Suez

34°

Scale 1:2,000,000





ANNEX F

MEMO FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS,

DATED 18 JUN 67

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS GROUP

18 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Fact-Finding Team (U)

1. The Fact-Finding Team established in accordance with MJCS 271-67, dated 15 June 1967, has substantially completed gathering of all pertinent facts relating to the issuance and transmission of operational directives to the USS LIBERTY associated with events during the period 7 June to 8 June 1967, which culminated in the attack on the ship on or about 061210Z June 1967.

2. The final report of the Fact-Finding Team is being completed as a matter of priority and will include a complete compilation of record information, as well as an analysis of all related facts. Appropriate recommendations will be submitted.

3. Preliminary examination of the information available indicates the following:

a. There were four (4) messages disseminated during the period of 7-8 June 1967 from higher headquarters to subordinate echelons containing revisions to previous instructions regarding the assigned operating location of USS LIBERTY. Since each of these message transmissions contained instructions for substantially increasing the closest point of approach (CPA) to the UAR and Israel, the receipt of any one of these by the USS LIBERTY would undoubtedly have resulted in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene of action then underway between Israel and the UAR. Although the USS LIBERTY was either an action or an information addressee on each of these directives, there is no evidence available to confirm that the ship's Captain received any one of them.

An identification of these directives and a brief summary of each follows:

Identification

Remarks

(1) JCS message #7337
DTG 072211Z Jun 67
Action: USCINCEUR
Info: CINCUSNAVEUR,
COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY,
and others

Advised in view of situation in E. MED., operating area previously specified "for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." Designated CPA 20 NM from UAR and 15 NM from Israel.

(2) JCS message #7347
DTG 050110Z Jun 67
Action: USCINCEUR
Info: CINCUSNAVEUR,
COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY,
and others

Requested LIBERTY comply with geographical constraints imposed on 6th Fleet units, "i.e., not closer than 100 NM Israel, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM Cyprus."

(3) USCINCEUR message
ECJB/JRC 09045, DTG
080625Z Jun 67
Action: CINCUSNAVEUR
Info: COMSIXTHFLT, USS
LIBERTY, JCS, and others

Confirms verbal instructions to "take for action" JCS 7347 (a.(2) above)

(4) COMSIXTHFLT message
DTG 060917Z Jun 67
Action: USS LIBERTY
Info: JCS, USCINCEUR,
CINCUSNAVEUR, and others

Directs LIBERTY to "proceed immediately" to new operating location. "Do not approach coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 NM and Cyprus closer than 25 NM. Acknowledge."

b. A preliminary examination has been made of the circumstances relating to each of the above. The failure of the USS LIBERTY to receive any one of these time-critical revisions to operational directives can be attributed to a combination of (1) human error, (2) high volume of communications traffic, and (3) lack of appreciation of sense of urgency regarding the movement of the LIBERTY.

In recognition of the fact that the ship was approaching her initially assigned area (12.5 NM UAR and U.S. Israeli), action was initiated through the JCS/JRC Duty Officer direct to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center via secure voice, requesting that LIBERTY be instructed to comply with previous geographical constraints imposed by COMSIXTHFLT on air and sea units, i.e., no closer than 10 NM from UAR and Israel and 25 NM from Cyprus. NAVEUR advised JCS/JRC Duty Officer that prompt action would be initiated to inform COMSIXTHFLT. By separate action, both JCS/JRC Duty Officer and CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer informed the USCINCEUR Command Center. Some four hours and forty-five minutes elapsed before these instructions were relayed to COMSIXTHFLT for action. Based on preliminary analysis of available information, the following findings apparently contributed to this delay:

(1) JCS/JRC did not use normal command channels but, in the interest of efficiency, issued operational instructions direct to a subordinate commander (CINCUSNAVEUR). Proper follow-up action was taken to advise USCINCEUR of the request for action passed to CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer and that "he had taken action." As it developed, this was an unwarranted statement and was misleading.

(a) While these actions in themselves resulted in some misunderstanding in the minds of duty officers in both the EUCOM and NAVCOM Command Centers as to who had the action responsibility, delay in dissemination of these operational directives cannot be solely attributed to the JCS/JRC action in initially bypassing CINCEUR, since verbal confirmation of the authenticity of these instructions (Date-Time-Group of JCS message) via secure voice communication was received by the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer simultaneously with his being handed a hard copy of the message.

(b) It can be further deduced that the existence of a verbal CINCUSNAVEUR policy requiring verification, either in the form of a message Date-Time-Group or call from a General/Flag officer, before action can be taken on telephone instructions emanating from higher headquarters, effectively precluded exercise of judgment by the duty officer and the possibility of an earlier response on the part of the LIBERTY.

(2) The JCS message directive regarding new geographical constraints for USS LIBERTY movements was transmitted to and received by USCINCEUR approximately two hours after verbal notification. CINCUSNAVEUR received the message directive approximately three hours from time of verbal notification. COMSIXTHFLT received the directive via CINCUSNAVEUR four hours and forty-five minutes from notification to USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR. COMSIXTHFLT instructions to LIBERTY were broadcast ten hours and thirty-five minutes from original initiation of the action to relocate LIBERTY.

(.) The reasons for delays on the Flagship of COMSIXTHFLT were internal staffing, a delay in transmitting due to other traffic of the same and higher precedence, and the commander and his staff were deeply involved in high priority press activity directed by DOD and plans for evaluation of dependents.

4. Notification of the additional task to incorporate official US public statements bearing on the findings was received on the afternoon of 15 June 1967. Although Public Affairs statements available in the European Command have been reviewed, those available in the Washington area have not as yet been fully analyzed. All those reviewed to date indicate no bearing on the findings.

5. There appears to be no evidence to indicate the existence at any time of conflicting instructions pertaining to the operation of the USS LIBERTY.

6. The team met with the senior member of the court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR on 15 June 1967 in Malta. In order to preclude infringement upon the prerogatives of that group, information pertaining to receipt and reaction of the LIBERTY to operational directives was obtained by the team from facts previously collected by the court of inquiry. Subsequently, at Hqs CINCUSNAVEUR, an exchange of facts was mutually beneficial to both efforts.

JOSEPH R. RUSS
Major General, USA
Chief, JCCRG

Copy to: Director, Joint Staff

Watch Log

OFF: Major Breedlove

NCO: Msgrt McNulty

TIME LOCAL	MSG/CALL FROM/TO	MESSAGE OR EVENT
2000	TO NAVFOR Galaleott	Passed instructions to hold the USS LIBERTY outside 100 NM of Israel, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM of Cyprus, per Capt Rorex-Capt Vineyard's instructions. (see classified tape 3 footage 192/210)
2030	TO EUCOM" Russell	passed the above info to EU. EUCOM: Msg is being dispatched.

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PROM: 07/0730

TO: 07/1930 June 67

ACTION

NOTIFICATION
AGCY TYPE NAME

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

II

FULL
(TU)
XEDN ITPVUXTGTWACTUTWCTN W LORG XTVY
EIZHX TVBIJH

TXPTF
58
"0342 9EKO KJ
/ SST

N. H. P.
HABEMDN

...27 RUTPRKRUENAA - Relay
RE RUTPRG 099 1591439

Z 1430Z JUN 67
FM COMNAVFLT
TO RUEKRC/SINCRNAVFOR
INFO RUEKRC/SINCRNAVFOR

A. UNUSUAL TEL ADVIS 1038L 081414Z JUN 67
1. UNUSUAL TEL ADVIS 1038L 081414Z JUN 67
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Bornas Copy FFB
FOR JC5
[Signature]

PAGE 1 OF

CON	
TO	JCS
SEN	
SEN	PC

011439 Jun 67

3

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ORIGINATOR																			
DIST. GRN																			

RELAY

Liberty

VV SAC241DE CNL VV AG6545VV NYC907
...
... 591455
... JUN 67
... CONSIXTHFLT
... RUI POK/USCINCEUR
INFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCSNAVEUR)
.../CNO
.../JCS

RUTPP/CONFIRMED
RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
BT

CONFIRMED 06305 CONSIXTHFLT 0817TEZ
1. FOLLOWING MSG REC FROM USDAO TEL AVIV.
NOTE: ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO. TO RECEIVE REPORT.
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTS'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT
08:20Z. POSITION 31-25N 33-33E. MAY98 NAVY SHIP. IDF
HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND
OBJECT APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR
COAST. UNDUCT.
2. AT 08:43Z LIBERTY REPORTED UNDERWAY AT EIGHT(8) KNOTS,
340 DEGREES MAGNETIC.

COMMUNICATIONS RECORD TABLE

1	M	M	M	M	X
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
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20					

(PAGE 1 OF ...)

CON	
FOR	1518/P
SSN	
SEN	FL

081455 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

KX 779VY 00000V NY011
MODE RUTPRC 114 1991311

04Z JUN 67
SIXTHFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMSTA G
LEUF
NAVCOMSTA ASHARA
NAVCOMSTA SPAIN
NAVCOMD LONDON

mc/oc

US LIBERTY APXISES SHE HAS CARRIED OUT EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF
CRYPTO PUBS AND KEY CARDS.
ONLY COMM VIA CINCUSNAVEUR HICOM E04.04.

OPERATION	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	CITY	BO
CINCUSNAVEUR	XX	XX	XX	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NY	0
NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NY	0
NAVCOMSTA G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NY	0
NAVCOMSTA ASHARA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NY	0
NAVCOMSTA SPAIN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NY	0
NAVCOMD LONDON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	NY	0

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

COM	
TCR	16582/88
SSN	
SSN	

DTG 0181519 SUNKE

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

ZNY CCCCC

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

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Handwritten signatures and initials: "D. K. Lee", "8-C", "AW 3", "11/5/70"

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

0141VV 03262VV NYC979

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0141VV 03262VV NYC979

UNCLAS CKDA 169ZCEGA 660
UNCLAS HVDLKD
DE RUEPJS 017C 1591533
081529Z JUNE 67 77FF3
RUEPJS
RUEPJS/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/COMSINMFLT
RUEPJS/COMUSNAVEUR

0. J... 15.522
mc/oc

JCS 1369 JCS SEND
REF: JCS 7354/081416Z
ADM RIVERO TO GEN BURCHINAL 8 JUN
1. CONFIRMING REF TELECOM DISCONTINUE USE OF
FORCE AUTHORIZED BY REF (3) GP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
ADJUTANT GENERAL																				
ENGINEER																				
NAVY																				
ARMY																				
AIR FORCE																				
ARMY AIR CORPS																				
NAVY AIR FORCE																				
ARMY AIR FORCE																				
ARMY AIR FORCE																				

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON	
TOR	15522/38
SRN	
SRM	

DTG: 081529Z, JUNE 67

3 (WHEN FILLED IN)

NY

~~SECRET~~ ENTPRO ENUEPEK KUMHANO *Relay*

2 12 19 09 09
7 12 19 09 09
OFFICE SIX ZERO
USS AMERICA
USS SARATOGA
KINROSSUSHAVEUR
USS
USS

COMINTFLT 081339Z
CANCEL ()
OF FORCE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED.

000000KXNJ

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATING SECTION	M	X	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
ACTION DEPARTMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON	
TOR	162118
SN	
SN	R

081609 : dec 67
3
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NNNNVV K:CC25VV AGB722VV PRC144

OO RUDLKD

ZNY CCCCC ZFD R:TPRC 051 1600724

ZZ RUFPBK RUFRE RUPPBWL RUDLKD RUDLAM RUENAAA RUEPJS RUTPP

RUDLHA RUFFAG

DE RUTPRC 128 1591649

120500Z JUN 67

FM COMSIXTHFLT

TO NAVFOR PACSCINCPAC

INFO WASHINGTON WAVEUR-SDO

WAVEUR-SDO

INFO WAVEUR-SDO
INFO WAVEUR-SDO

1. THE AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT ON BOARD COMSIXTHFLT 081645

2. THE AIRCRAFT OF AMERICA AND SARATOGA HAVE BEEN RECALLED AND ARE

3. BEING DIRECTED TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED.

BT

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

SECTION											
				X							X
C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	A	B
										NCU	
										LONDON	

COM		
TON	09/1322	
SSN		
SON		

081649 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANNEX D


COMMUNICATIONS TABS

INDEX OF JCS MESSAGES

- 100-1 Analysis of JCS message 7337002210Z Jun 67
(100 mile CPA message)
- 100-2 Analysis of JCS message 7347000110Z Jun 67
(100 mile CPA message)
-
- 100-3 Summary of Events for JCS message 7347000110Z
Jun 67
- 100-4 CINCNAV message 060625Z Jun 67 (Instruction
directive to CINCUSNAVEUR)
- 100-5 COMSIXTHFLT message 080017Z Jun 67 (Instruction
to USS LIBERTY re 100 mile limitation)
- 100-6 Traffic volume - NAVCOMSISTAS
- 100-7 NAT-1111 Awake Exercise Message
-
- 100-8 Analysis of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z Jun 67
(policy for SIXTHFLT operations)
- 100-9 Analysis of USS LIBERTY message 080742Z Jun 67
(overflight of USS Liberty aircraft)

LIBERTY JCS MESSAGE 7337 080110Z


"20 MILE MESSAGE"



Cancelled by JCS 7347, DTG 080110Z (Elapsed time between events, 2 hrs 40 min).

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE JCS MESSAGE 7347/080110Z June 1967

"JCS 100 MILE MESSAGE"



* Guam sent message to Kunia with instructions to relay to Morocco. Kunia misrouted to DACC in error.


In all cases, delays in transmission from the DACC were caused by the unusually large amount of flash precedence traffic and other immediate precedence traffic which was also awaiting transmission. Messages are handled by precedence in the order received in DACC; first in first out by precedence. During period of such large volume of traffic, it is virtually impossible to determine if the subject matter of a message warrants its transmission before another message of the same precedence.

@ NSA dead-end terminal. Could not relay over General Service Communications. Did not return to DACC. Filed without action.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE USCINCEUR MESSAGE

FCIC/JRC 09045/080625Z June 1967


Confirms telecon to CINCUSNAVEUR to take JCS 080110Z for action.



No evidence this message was received by the USS LIBERTY, based upon information provided by US Navy Court of Inquiry.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE COMSIXTHFLT, DTG 080917Z June 1967

"COMSIXTHFLT 100 MILE IMPLEMENTING MSG TO USS LIBERTY"



Monthly Telephone Station Account

For Month of Feb

1	Feb	1,013
2	Feb	1,233
3	Feb	1,253
4	Feb	1,051
5	Feb	974
6	Feb	820
7	Feb	1,039
8	Feb	1,004
9	Feb	355
10	Feb	850
11	Feb	772
12	Feb	925

Total 12,002

1	Jun	1,013
2	Jun	1,233
3	Jun	1,253
4	Jun	1,051
5	Jun	974
6	Jun	820
7	Jun	1,039
8	Jun	1,004
9	Jun	355
10	Jun	850
11	Jun	772
12	Jun	925

Total 12,002

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Local Communication Unit Report

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	383	1 Feb	171
2 Feb	387	3 Feb	171
3 Feb	989	4 Feb	171
4 Feb	873	5 Feb	171
5 Feb	843	6 Feb	171
6 Feb	843	7 Feb	171
7 Feb	898	8 Feb	171
8 Feb	704	9 Feb	171
9 Feb	310	10 Feb	171
10 Feb	338	11 Feb	171
11 Feb	974	12 Feb	171
12 Feb	984		

Total 10337

Total 17,241

II. Black Messages Handled

3 Jun	2
6 Jun	2
7 Jun	20
8 Jun	17
9 Jun	6
10 Jun	20

Total 77

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	153
6 Jun	143
7 Jun	176
8 Jun	232
9 Jun	201
10 Jun	214

Total 1,219

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Mail Communications Station Report

Messages Handled

1 Feb	6,573
2 Feb	7,133
3 Feb	7,038
4 Feb	6,643
5 Feb	4,487
6 Feb	5,903
7 Feb	6,330
8 Feb	7,351
9 Feb	7,793
10 Feb	7,715
11 Feb	6,009
12 Feb	4,939

Total 80,103

1 Jun	8,115
2 Jun	8,115
3 Jun	8,115
4 Jun	8,115
5 Jun	7,115
6 Jun	7,115
7 Jun	7,115
8 Jun	7,115
9 Jun	7,115
10 Jun	7,115
11 Jun	7,115
12 Jun	7,115

Total 89,000

II. Night Messages Handled

5 Jun	37
6 Jun	30
7 Jun	31
8 Jun	95
9 Jun	13
10 Jun	18

Total 223

III. Daytime Messages Handled

5 Jun	168
6 Jun	155
7 Jun	110
8 Jun	80
9 Jun	73
10 Jun	93

Total 692

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Postal Communication Station Report

Messages Handled

1 Feb	3,901
2 Feb	6,775
3 Feb	8,259
4 Feb	8,508
5 Feb	9,092
6 Feb	3,160
7 Feb	5,241
8 Feb	8,521
9 Feb	6,529
10 Feb	6,938
11 Feb	5,293
12 Feb	<u>4,419</u>

Total 69,122

1 Jun	10,114
2 Jun	10,114
3 Jun	10,114
4 Jun	10,114
5 Jun	10,114
6 Jun	10,114
7 Jun	10,114
8 Jun	10,114
9 Jun	10,114
10 Jun	10,114
11 Jun	10,114
12 Jun	<u>7,518</u>

Total 112,518

Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	96
6 Jun	203
7 Jun	114
8 Jun	251
9 Jun	162
10 Jun	<u>341</u>

Total 1,190

Exchange Messages Handled

5 Jun	134
6 Jun	213
7 Jun	162
8 Jun	181
9 Jun	181
10 Jun	<u>179</u>

Total 1,053

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Post Office Communication Station Messages

Messages Handled

1 Feb	7,503
2 Feb	7,603
3 Feb	8,023
4 Feb	7,570
5 Feb	8,222
6 Feb	8,963
7 Feb	7,801
8 Feb	8,133
9 Feb	8,033
10 Feb	8,335
11 Feb	7,393
12 Feb	5,203

Total 87,963

1 Jun	11,000
2 Jun	11,000
3 Jun	11,000
4 Jun	11,000
5 Jun	11,000
6 Jun	11,000
7 Jun	11,000
8 Jun	11,000
9 Jun	11,000
10 Jun	11,000
11 Jun	11,000
12 Jun	11,000

Total 132,000

Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	23
6 Jun	15
7 Jun	23
8 Jun	124
9 Jun	12
10 Jun	3

Total 200

Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	100
6 Jun	107
7 Jun	133
8 Jun	250
9 Jun	82
10 Jun	20

Total 749

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NAVAL MESSAGE

9 June 1967

MESSAGE NUMBER DATE TIME GROUP (OCT)
101 14 16 00

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO: COMSTRIKFORSOUTH

EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67

THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY AT 081230Z SET OFF A CHAIN OF EVENTS REQUIRING EXTENSIVE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO BE INTRODUCED FOR MANY HOURS INTO A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH ALREADY HAD IMPOSED MINIMIZE TO REDUCE THE ABNORMAL VOLUME OF TRAFFIC CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.

EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67 WAS CONDUCTED 081700Z. THE FIRST COPIES OF THE NATO MESSAGE LACKED ONE PHONETIC LETTER IN LINE BRAVO, THUS MAKING NATIONAL AUTHENTICATION OF NATO MSG INITIALLY IMPOSSIBLE. A CORRECTION MSG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED. NUMEROUS COPIES OF NATIONAL MSG CONTAINED QUOTE 5-67 INSTEAD OF 9-67. DUE TO THE ECHO EFFECTS OF USEUCOM/ACE COMMAND REACTION COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL AND NATO VERSIONS (INCLUDING DUPLICATIONS), WERE RECEIVED IN EXCESS OF 125 TIMES DURING A TWO HOUR PERIOD OVER ALL CIRCUITS AVAILABLE TO COMSIXTHFLT. THESE HIGH PRECEDENCE EXERCISE MESSAGES INTERFERED WITH ACTUAL HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

SINCE WIDE AWAKES ARE SACEUR INITIATED EXERCISES, IT IS ASSUMED THAT WIDE
WAKE 9-67 WAS IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE SACEUR WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EXISTING
SITUATION AT 081700Z6. HOWEVER IT IS SUBMITTED THAT PROCEDURES SHOULD EXIST
WHICH BY HIGHER NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN PREVENT EXERCISE INTERFERENCE WITH
AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY.

IT IS URGED THAT IN THE FUTURE ALL COMM/ALERT EXERCISES BE SUSPENDED
WHENEVER ACTUAL ALERTS OR DEFCONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED AND WHEN ACTUAL SIXTHFLT
EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS OR MINIMIZE HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT.

SP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

(States policy that SIXTHFLT will operate)

071503Z (Date Time Group
of Message)

JCS

071543Z

071630Z

071630Z

Received at DACC
Advance copies
transmitted

t o

071630Z

NMCC Message
Center

071633Z

Transmitted
to NMCC

759
Armed

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

071548Z

106000Z From UAR, Syria and Israel)

Navy

071548Z

Received at Navy Comm
Center via Meltenham

071549Z

Transmitted to Flag Plot

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USS LIBERTY MESSAGE 080742Z
(Overflight by two jet aircraft)

081057Z Immediate Precedence

CNO Comm
Rcvd copy
via AUTODIN

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
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Delays attributed to equal or higher precedence
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1



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

2

NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
FILE

AN IMPORTANT CHRONOLOGY
OF ATTACK & SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUCH
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RE ATTACK, "RESCUE,"
COMMAND AND CONTROL,
TIME ZONES,
PERSONNEL

LESS PERTINENT DOCUMENTS
FROM THIS FILE, INCLUDING
"LESSONS LEARNED, CAN
BE FOUND IN THE
HOOVER LIBRARY

FOLDER 19

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22337

IN REPLY REFER TO

5720
Ser 143/15584
23 AUG 1985

Mr. James Miller
3402 E. 125th Street
Burnsville, MN 55337

Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal

Dear Mr. Miller:

This is in response to your letter of June 7, 1985, received in this office on June 13, 1985. That letter appeals the decision of Rear Admiral D.H. McDowell, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Security Group Command, to partially deny your request for information concerning the USS LIBERTY. Your letter is considered a request for a final determination under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1982).

Both your letter of appeal and the requested document have been carefully reviewed and, for the reasons stated herein, your appeal must be denied.

The excised portions of the document consist of classified material, the release of which would jeopardize national security. The document has been reviewed for possible declassification and, as a result of this review, it has been concluded that the withheld portions remain properly classified under the criteria set forth in Executive Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). Accordingly, the withholding of this classified information is authorized by both statute and regulation, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982); 32 C.F.R. § 701.8(a)(1) (1984).

This letter constitutes final denial of your request. As the Secretary of the Navy's designee for this purpose, the undersigned is the individual responsible for this action, 32 C.F.R. § 701.9(a)(1) (1984). You are further advised of your right to seek judicial review.

Sincerely,

RICHARD L. SLATER
Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Acting Judge Advocate General
For the Secretary of the Navy

FO LDER 17

4

Judge Advocate General
Department of the Navy
200 Stycal Street
Alexandria, VA 22322

7 June 1985

Subject: FOIA Appeal U.S.S Liberty Documents

Reference: FOIA Request dated 11 July 83
NSGC ltr. dated 10 Aug. 83
Naval Hist. Center ltr. to J. Miller dated 6 Oct 83
FOIA Appeal to NSGC dated 8 Mar 84
Ltrs. to NSGC dated 6 July 84 and 17 Dec. 84
NSGC ltr. dated 4 Mar. 85
Nagc ltr. dated 23 May 85

Gentlemen:

This is an appeal under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. This appeal concerns the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) documents provided under their cover letter of 23 May 85 signed by Mr. G.G. Henriksen. These documents contain excised passages and documents excised in total which are a small part of the total yet are too numerous to cite. My appeal is for release of all excised documents and all excised passages.

The background for this appeal concerns the controversial nature of this attack. Many sources including virtually all surviving crew members of the Liberty are convinced the attack was deliberate. Continued withholding of NSGC documents on an 18 year old historical event under exemption (b)(1) gives the clear appearance of a foreign policy decision and not a decision based on national security.

The FOIA gives agencies discretionary authority to release classified documents via declassification. Thus continued non-release of these documents could legitimately be interpreted as evidence of a continuing U.S./ Israeli coverup. In other words, if Israel bears no culpability for a deliberate attack as claimed, then why continue to withhold these more sensitive documents which would provide more information and in turn support the Israeli claim of innocence.

Please consider that E.O. 12356 expressly forbids the classification of information to protect unlawful conduct from public disclosure:

In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of the law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency. (E.O. 12356, Section 1.6(a))

The term "law" embraces treaties, and at the time of the Israeli attack on the Liberty (1967), the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Israel and the United States (TIAS 8748, 5 UNT, Pt. 1,550) was in effect. That Treaty provides that

"Each party shall at all times accord equitable treatment to the persons, property, enterprises, and other equitable interests of nationals and companies of the other party.

(Article I)

Between the territories of the two Parties, there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.

(Article XII, section 1)

Vessels of either Party shall have the liberty...to come with their cargoes to all ports, places, and waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation.

(Article XIX, section 3)

There shall be freedom of transit through the territories of each Party by the routes most convenient for the international transit... for articles of any origin en route to or from the territories of such other Party.

There can be no doubt that the well coordinated Israeli Naval/Air attack on the Liberty, even if inadvertent, violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. It therefore constitutes a violation of law, and, accordingly, may not be afforded protection of exemption (b)(1) by the terms of the Executive's Order's own exemption.

As provided by law I look forward to your response within 20 days, however if more time is required in order to provide full responses to the points cited in this appeal, then please advise me of your response date and I will concur with any reasonable date you provide.

Sincerely,

James Miller
James Miller
3402 E. 125th St.
Burnsville, MN 55337

Encl:
NSGC ltr. dated 23 May 85

James Miller's US Research Papers

6



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
2001 NEBRASKA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20300 -5212

5520
Ser GH/ 7083
23 MAY 1985

Mr. James Miller
3402 E. 125th Street
Burnsville, MN 55337

Dear Mr. Miller:

This is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the release of a document on the U.S.S. LIBERTY generated by Naval Security Group historian.

I am pleased to inform you that the declassification review of this document has been completed and substantially all of the records contained in this document have been declassified to enable release. A copy of the declassified document is enclosed, and I have determined that any allowable fees associated with your request be waived.

While most of this document is now releasable, some portions have been found to be still properly classified in accordance with current classification standards. These portions have been deleted in order to protect the interests of national security. All deletions made fall within the provisions of Exemption 1(5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)); consequently, to the extent that deletions were found necessary and have been made pursuant to this exemption, your request must be denied.

Because your request has been partially denied, you are advised that it is your right under the FOIA and Title 32, Section 701.9, Code of Federal Regulations, to appeal this determination. To be considered, any appeal must be in writing and be received within 45 days from the date of this letter. It is recommended that a copy of this letter be attached to any appeal, and that the letter of appeal and the envelope both bear the notation "FOIA Appeal." Any appeal should be addressed to the designee of the Secretary of the Navy who is the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22322.

The official responsible for the partial denial of your request is RADM D. H. McDowell, USN, Commander, Naval Security Group Command. If you have any questions concerning this response, Mr. Dean Clatterbuck, 202-282-0235 is familiar with your request and will endeavor to assist you in any way possible.

You have now received a copy of all releasable records and documents held by the Naval Security Group Command Headquarters which relate to the U.S.S. LIBERTY.

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Your patience and cooperation during the time required to complete the declassification review is appreciated, and we trust that the enclosed information will prove to be useful to you.

Sincerely,

G. G. HENRIKSEN
Special Assistant for Security
By direction of the
Commander, Naval Security Group Command

Encl:
(1) Copy of declassified file on U.S.S. LIBERTY

NOTE: THE FILE RELEASED HERE WAS AVAILABLE TO ME WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY (WITHOUT DELETIONS). I MADE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE FILE NUMBER (NSG LIBERTY FILE 5750-1) AND ASKED FOR RELEASE UNDER FOIA SOON AFTER MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY IN 1978. I WAS TOLD THE FILE COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED. IN 1982 I PERSONALLY ASKED GEORGE HENRIKSEN TO HELP. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT THE FILE COULD NOT BE FOUND. NOW SUDDENLY IT APPEARS.

THE ORIGINAL FILE, HOWEVER, CONTAINED A GREAT MANY MESSAGES, INCLUDING ONE FROM AMEMB TEL AVIV PLEADING ON THE HALF OF ISRAEL TO KEEP THE ISRAELI EXCUSE PRIVATE BECAUSE IT "STRIPS THE ISRAELI NAVY NAKED" (BY MAKING IT LOOK INCOMPETENT IF THEIR STORY IS TO BE BELIEVED.)

2
J. M. Ennes
27 FEB 1986

Reviewed for declassification as authorized by
Executive Order 12356 on 11 April 1985
(Date)

Present Classification and Special Handling Requirements:

UNCLASSIFIED	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRET	SI CODEWORD
TOP SECRET	SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM
	FOR INFORMATION
	FOIA EXEMPTION

Reason for extension of classification (if applicable):

- Military plans, weapons, or operations
- Vulnerabilities or capabilities relating to the national security
- Foreign government information
- Intelligence activities, sources or methods
- Foreign relations/activities
- Scientific, technological or economic matters
- Nuclear materials or facilities
- Cryptology
- Cryptographic Security

Authority: COMNAVSECGRU (GHE/IGN)

Next Scheduled Review Date: Not Applicable

Item(s): Sanitized copy of NAVAL SECURITY GROUP FILE
ON U. S. S. LIBERTY

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Department of Government Studies

~~SECRET~~Introduction

➔ The development of the Middle East crisis in May 1967 led to the diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from her normal operating area off the coast of West Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean

(U) Arab-Israeli hostilities commenced on 5 June 1967. On 8 June, while operating in international waters off the coast of the United Arab Republic, LIBERTY suffered an unprovoked attack by air and naval forces which resulted in 34 deaths, ~~numerous~~ injuries and extensive damage to the ship.

(U) On 9 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a Fact Finding Team "to examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1-8 June which culminated in the attack on LIBERTY..." The Team submitted its report to the Director, Joint Staff, on 21 June.

To provide complete support to the JCS Fact Finding Team, on 10 June DIRNSA directed his staff to fully document the following:
 responsibility vis-a-vis the JCS(JRC) and other authorities for LIBERTY's operations;
 the basis and rationale for selection of the operating area, definition of all aspects of the mission which would influence positioning of the platform and identification of the degree to which the mission might have been degraded were LIBERTY confined to operating in waters no closer than 100 nm from the coasts of Israel and Egypt and 25 nm from Cyprus. A report was submitted to DIRNSA on 11 June.

(U) A Court of Inquiry was convened by CINCUSNAVEUR on 10 June to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on LIBERTY. The findings of the Court were submitted to and approved by CINCUSNAVEUR on 18 June and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for review. A summary of proceedings was released to the press on 28 June.

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR activated TF 100 at 120001Z June to supervise dry-docking of LIBERTY at Malta in order to prevent disclosure of classified information and equipment to unauthorized personnel. TF 100 was disestablished 151500Z June.

(U) DIRNAVSECGRU directed that a history of the LIBERTY incident be compiled for Naval Security Group files to record the facts and to document lessons learned. This document, The LIBERTY Incident, has been prepared in response to the DIRNAVSECGRU requirement.

The LIBERTY Incident

The development of the Middle East crisis during the period 15-23 May 1967, resulted in the declaration on 23 May. The same day, requested that the JCS authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to an operational area off Port Said

The request to deploy LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean was the result of

requirements to develop optimum data for U.S. forces which might have become involved in the crisis, providing direct support to

These requirements could be fully satisfied only with a seaborne platform

responsibility for LIBERTY operations, including the rationale for selection of areas of deployment, is documented in a Report to the Director, NSA -- USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) 23 May-8 June 1967 of 11 June 1967.

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At JCS direction, LIBERTY was ordered to Rota, Spain, to prepare for extended deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. The stop at Rota was required to insure that LIBERTY would have available the necessary operational and logistic support information concerning the coordination and support of her operations in the area. En route Rota, LIBERTY had experienced difficulty with the propulsion system and with an important antenna. At Rota, repairs were effected, NSA, ~~and Navy~~ and technical support materials were provided to LIBERTY. On 2 June, the ship departed Rota for Area 3, one of five operating areas approved by JCS. (See Annex B.)

JCS 011545Z June 1967 specified a closest point of approach (CPA) of 12.5 nautical miles (nm) to the UAR and 6.5 nm to Israel.

The diversion of LIBERTY to the Mediterranean brought the ship into USCINCEUR's area of responsibility; consequently, operational control of LIBERTY passed from CINCLANT to USCINCEUR.

Arab-Israeli hostilities commenced at approximately 050700Z June.

To "facilitate command and control and any possible requirement for protection during Middle East hostilities," CINCUSNAVEUR chopped operational control of LIBERTY to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z June.

requested JCS to take immediate action to change LIBERTY's operating area from Area 3 to Area 2 to meet tasking requirements. No action on this request resulted prior to the attack on LIBERTY. In the meantime, CNO had challenged the prudence of sending LIBERTY to a position so close to the area of hostilities. In reply to a query to JCS(JRC), CNO was informed that technical reasons were overriding. The CNO/JCS dialogue prompted the issue of JCS 072230Z June 1967 which changed LIBERTY's CPA to the UAR to 20 nm and to Israel, 15 nm. The message also advised that the operating area specified in JCS 011545Z June 1967 was "for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." At the moment, JCS representatives were not aware of COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June 1967 which reported that as of 052015Z June, no Sixth Fleet units were permitted within 100 nm of Israel, Syria or Egypt, or within 25 nm of Cyprus. This message, which CNO received some 42 minutes before it was received in JCS(JRC), led CNO to press again for modification of LIBERTY's movements to conform at least to Sixth Fleet geographical restrictions. Subsequent discussions between JCS and CNO representatives led to JCS 080110Z June 1967 which canceled JCS 072230Z June 1967 and limited LIBERTY's CPA to Israel, Syria or Egypt to 100 nm and to Cyprus, 25 nm.

This change in CPA to 100 nm was directed approximately two hours after the 20-nm modification.

Messages modifying LIBERTY's CPA & the
VAR to 100 nm were never received by the ship
because of communications delays and routing
errors. (See ^{entries for} JCS 080110Z and COMSIXTHFLT
080917Z, both June 1967, in Chronology of Events.)

LIBERTY had reported being orbited by three unidentified delta-wing,
single-engine, jet aircraft three times at 080650Z at position
31-27N/34-00E and had stated that no amplifying report would be submitted.
COMSIXTHFLT was not alarmed, for LIBERTY's indication that there would be
no further reports was interpreted to mean that the overflight was routine
and that there was no apprehension on the part of the ship.

At 081205Z, two or more unidentified jet aircraft, in five or six
attacks from various angles, conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary
attacks on LIBERTY while she was on course 283 true steaming at five knots
at 31-35.5N/33-29E. At 081235Z, the ship sustained a torpedo hit on the
starboard side amidships.

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28 April

CONSERVATION P 281502Z directed LIBERTY to depart Norfolk 2 May 1967 for operations off the west coast of Africa. The cruise was to include port visits at Abidjan, Luanda, Libreville, Monrovia and Las Palmas ~~and~~ and return to Norfolk on 25 August 1967.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Paper

Chronology of Events

- 15 May (U) Egyptian armor dug in on Israel's southern frontier.
- 22 May (U) After serving as the bumper force which had separated the Arabs and Israelis for a decade, the U. N. Emergency Force, having been elbowed out of the Sinai Peninsula, was finally withdrawn from Egypt.
- 23 May (U) President NASSER of Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba, blockading Elath, Israel's only southern port. All vessels of Israeli registry and oil tankers of all nations were to be denied passage into the Gulf of Aqaba.

~~to~~

~~(C)~~ In order to augment coverage in the area, requested JCS(JRC) to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to Rota, Spain, in preparation for deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean.

~~(C)~~ JCS 232127Z/JCS 6057 approved diversion of LIBERTY recommended in _____ and passed the _____ message to CINCLANT for action.

- 24 May ~~(C)~~ COMSERVRON 8 240020Z directed LIBERTY to depart Abidjan as soon as possible and proceed to Port Said via Rota, Spain.

~~(C)~~ 240530Z. LIBERTY departed Abidjan. ETA Rota 312000Z. (USS LIBERTY 241732Z.)

- 29 May ~~(C)~~ JCS requested CINCLANT to chop operational control (opcon) of LIBERTY to USCINCEUR upon ship's arrival at Rota, Spain, on or about 31 May. Additionally, JCS requested USCINCEUR to make preparations for extended deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. (JCS 291602Z/JCS 6499.)

~~(C)~~ requested JCS approval of suggested operating areas for LIBERTY and proposed Area 3 as the initial area, subject to "adjustment as necessary for operational or safety reasons."

Note: ~~(C)~~ Operating areas submitted: _____ for JCS approval are charted in Annex B.

~~to~~

- 30 May (C) CINCLANTFLT ordered COMSERVLANT to direct LIBERTY to chop to USCINCEUR upon arrival Rota and to ensure that CINCLANT JRC and CINCLANTFLT were kept informed of LIBERTY movements. (CINCLANTFLT 300040Z.)
- (C) COMSERVRON 8 directed LIBERTY to chop to USCINCEUR upon arrival Rota. (COMSERVRON 8 300202Z.)
- (C) LIBERTY advised USCINCEUR: position at 300500Z May 1967 was 26-00N/14-15W; proceeding Rota 15 knots; ETA Rota 010900Z June 1967, at which time LIBERTY would chop to USCINCEUR. (USS LIBERTY 300608Z.)
- (C) USCINCEUR requested CINCUSNAVEUR to assume opcon of LIBERTY as the ship passed the sea buoy inbound to Rota. (USCINCEUR 300932Z/ECJC/JRC 08588.)
- 31 May (C) 310800Z. LIBERTY position 31-16N/010-24W; position of intended movement (PIM) coastal, northerly, 15 kts. (USS LIBERTY 310828Z.)
- (C) CINCUSNAVEUR directed LIBERTY, upon chop to CINCUSNAVEUR, to enter Rota for fuel and loading, then to depart for the Eastern Mediterranean. (CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z.)
- 1 June (C) USCINCEUR requested JCS guidance regarding LIBERTY schedule, operating area and special requirements. Requested CINCUSNAVEUR to establish reporting procedure to ensure SITREP's and PIM's from LIBERTY and reports of any incidents as soon as possible in accordance with reconnaissance reporting instructions. (USCINCEUR 010035Z/ECJC/JRC 08685.)
- (C) JCS requested USCINCEUR to hold LIBERTY at Rota until otherwise directed. (JCS 010309Z/JCS 6714.)
- (C) USCINCEUR directed CINCUSNAVEUR to hold LIBERTY at Rota pending arrival of additional personnel being provided by DIRNAVSECGRU. (USCINCEUR 010419Z/ECJC/JRC 08686.)
- (C) LIBERTY 0800 position 36-30N/06-46W; PIM 055, 16 knots; ETA Rota 010845Z. Final report until departure from Rota. Will chop to CINCUSNAVEUR at 010900Z and remain Rota awaiting further orders. (USS LIBERTY 010712Z.)
- (C) LIBERTY was directed to delay sailing until NSA personnel and NAVEUR and SIXTHFLT publications were aboard, and to submit position reports as of 2400Z daily, including PIM for next 24 hours. (CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z.)

←G→ JCS requested USCINCEUR to deploy LIBERTY on 2 June from Rota, Spain, to Area 3 and stipulated a closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya and the UAR of 13 nautical miles (nm) during the transit. Upon arrival in Area 3 on or about 9 June, the CPA stipulated by JCS was to be 12.5 nm to the UAR and 6.5 nm to Israel. (JCS 011545Z/JCS 6724.)

←G→ CINCUSNAVEUR advised USCINCEUR that the additional personnel and technical support material were aboard LIBERTY at Rota, but that the ship's departure was being delayed for repair of antenna control hydraulic system. (CINCUSNAVEUR 012120Z.)

2 June ←G→ LIBERTY directed to depart Rota when JCS 2 June.
(CINCUSNAVEUR 020717Z.)

←G→ LIBERTY reported that temporary repair of TRSSCOMM system had been completed; system operational. RFS and ETD Rota 021230Z. (USS LIBERTY 021132Z.)

←G→ 021230Z. LIBERTY departed Rota. (USS LIBERTY 022108Z.)

←G→ 022400Z. LIBERTY position 36-12N/003-29W; PIM coastal, easterly, 15 kts. (USS LIBERTY 022108Z.)

3 June ←G→ CINCUSNAVEUR advised COMSIXTHFLT that LIBERTY would be conducting independent surveillance operations in Eastern Mediterranean and requested logistic support. Pertinent instructions to LIBERTY to be provided by COMSIXTHFLT. (CINCUSNAVEUR 031016Z.)

←G→ 032400Z. LIBERTY position 37-10N/004-03E; PIM coastal, easterly, 15 knots. TRSSCOMM hydraulic system again failed; leaks beyond capacity of ship's force to repair until spare parts received next port of call. (USS LIBERTY 032028Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 231620Z June 1967.)

← 061800Z. LIBERTY position 34-18N/024-06E; PIM 107/16.
(USS LIBERTY 061844Z.)

← LIBERTY declared her intention to chop to CONSIXTHFLT at
070001Z. (USS LIBERTY 062036Z.)

← JCS outlined procedures to be followed in developing
LIBERTY schedules while the ship was operating in V. STANKEUR's
area of responsibility. (JCS 062050Z/JCS 7206)

← LIBERTY NOVEREP formally announced chop to CONSIXTHFLT
at 070001Z. (USS LIBERTY 062001Z.)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Note: ~~(C)~~ This message was not delivered to addressees. It was transmitted by LIBERTY to the Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMSTA, Morocco, where it was received at 040359Z June 1967. There is no evidence that the message was refiled in common-user, i.e., GENSER, channels. (CINCUSNAVEUR 231620Z June 1967; Court of Inquiry.)

4 June ~~(C)~~ 042400Z. LIBERTY position 37-22N/011-15E; PIM 106/15 until 050130Z, thence 106/15. (USS LIBERTY 042050Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 231620Z June 1967.)

Note: ~~(C)~~ This message was not delivered to addressees. It was transmitted by LIBERTY to the Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMSTA, Morocco, where it was received at 050530Z June 1967. There is no evidence that this message was refiled in common-user channels. (CINCUSNAVEUR 231620Z June 1967; Court of Inquiry.)

5 June (U) At approximately 0700Z, Israel initiated a land and air attack against Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces.

~~(C)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR canceled previous geographical guidance for employment of Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 60) and instructed that ships and aircraft be operated no closer than 100 nm from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria and the UAR, and no closer than 25 nm from the coast of Cyprus. (CINCUSNAVEUR 051352Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 051850Z.)

Note: ~~(C)~~ LIBERTY was not an addressee of these messages. At the time these messages were released, LIBERTY was under opcon of CINCUSNAVEUR. The following day, CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume opcon of LIBERTY and directed LIBERTY to chop to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z June.

~~(C)~~ COMSIXTHFLT directed Sixth Fleet units to observe CPA to Lebanon, Syria and UAR of 100 nm, and to Cyprus, 25 nm. (COMSIXTHFLT 052015Z.)

~~(C)~~ 052400Z. LIBERTY position 35-20N/019-10E; PIM 106/15. (USS LIBERTY 051934Z.)

6 June ~~(C)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume opcon of LIBERTY in order to "facilitate command and control and possible requirement for protection during Mid-East hostilities" and directed LIBERTY to chop to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z. (CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z.)

~~(C)~~ USCINCEUR requested LIBERTY SITREP's and PIM reports be forwarded with immediate precedence as of 1800Z. (USCINCEUR 061410Z/ECJC/JRC 08941.)

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(U) COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z issued opcon orders to LIBERTY which became effective 070001Z.

Note: ~~(S)~~ This message was not received by LIBERTY until after the attack. Although it had been transmitted by NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 070529Z on the JRTT broadcast as JR NR 2077, LIBERTY personnel do not recall receiving it. (Court of Inquiry.)

7 June

~~(S)~~ 070001Z. LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT.

~~(S)~~ 070800Z. LIBERTY position 33-06N/028-54E; PIM 109/16.5 kts until 072300Z; thence stationary within 30 nm of 31-45N/33-30E. (USS LIBERTY 070908Z.)

~~(S)~~ COMSIXTHFLT message to JCS stated that at 052015Z June 67, the operating area for Sixth Fleet units was expanded to include all of the Eastern Mediterranean except that no operations, either surface or air, were permitted within 100 miles of Israel, Syria, or Egypt, or within 25 miles of Cyprus. (COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z.)

Note: ~~(S)~~ At 052015Z LIBERTY was under CINCUSNAVEUR opcon. Chop to COMSIXTHFLT was effected at 070001Z.

~~(S)~~ requested JCS to take immediate action to change LIBERTY's operating area to Area 2 in order to satisfy tracking requirements.

~~(S)~~ In view of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, JCS gave USCINCEUR authority to vary LIBERTY operating area as local conditions dictate, and changed CPA to UAR and Israel to 20 nm and 15 nm, respectively. (JCS 072230Z/JCS 7337.)

Note: ~~(S)~~ LIBERTY did not receive this message until after the attack. The Department of the Army Communications Center (DACC), which serves the JCS, misrouted the message to NAVCOMSTA Philippines via the DCS relay station at Kunia, Hawaii, for delivery to LIBERTY. NAVCOMSTA Philippines relayed to DCS major relay station at Davis, California, at 081700Z. The message was eventually received by NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 082125Z (9 hours and 22 minutes after the attack) for transmission to LIBERTY. (Court of Inquiry.)

8 June

~~(S)~~ JCS sent a message to USCINCEUR (INFO USS LIBERTY) canceling JCS 072230Z and requesting that LIBERTY comply with the CPS established by COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z; i. e., not closer than 100 nm to Israel, Syria, or Egypt, or 25 nm to Cyprus. (JCS 080110Z/JCS 7347.)

I am sending the message to DACC via Manila. It was received by NAVCOMSTA Philippines via Manila.

Note: ~~(46)~~ LIBERTY did not receive this message. ~~It was erroneously routed by DACC to Kunia.~~ It was received by NAVCOMSTA Philippines from Kunia at 080400Z. NAVCOMSTA Philippines relayed to NAVCOMSTA Guam at 080449Z, whence it was forwarded to Kunia with instructions to relay to Morocco. Kunia routed it to DACC, in error, where it was received at 080502Z. DACC routed it to NSA. NAVCOMSTA Asmara never received the message for transmission to LIBERTY. (Court of Inquiry.)

~~(46)~~ DACC routed the message to NSA, where it could not be relayed via GENSER circuits. NSA did not return it to DACC, but filed it without action. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

~~(46)~~ Other circumstances surrounding delivery of JCS 080110Z June 67 are particularly significant.

LIBERTY's proximity to the Sixth Fleet geographical limits necessitated swift action. At 072350Z the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer had contacted the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "via secure voice" and requested him to have LIBERTY comply with the geographic restrictions established by COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June 67. Brevity of time was given as the reason for the call. This action was contrary to customary usage in that it by-passed USCINCEUR in going directly to the component commander, CINCUSNAVEUR, and employed voice rather than record communications to initiate an action. When questioned, the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer did not have a DTG to quote, but he stated that a message would follow later.

At CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters there are three collocated duty officers: the Duty Captain; the Command Center Duty Officer; the Operations Duty Officer (i.e., the N3 Duty Officer). It was the Operations Duty Officer who had taken the call. He subsequently informed the Duty Captain, and, at the latter's direction, drafted a message for release to COMSIXTHFLT. The Duty Captain and the Command Center Duty Officer briefed the Deputy Chief of Staff who directed that release of the message be deferred pending receipt of a message or other authoritative indication that the JCS(JRC) action had been approved, and further, that the Command Center Duty Officer call the USEUCOM staff to apprise them of the facts and request that they call JCS(JRC) to confirm the verbal directive and obtain the DTG of the confirming message. (CINCUSNAVEUR policy requires that no movement of ships or aircraft be effected in response to oral communications from higher authority unless transmitted by a flag or general officer, or if evidence is provided that a record directive (message DTG or cite number, etc), has, in fact been approved and released and is beyond recall by other than official cancellation.)

Five message ready by 072350Z

James M. Ennes

The Command Center Duty Officer placed a call to USEUCOM headquarters at 080030Z and gave all the facts to the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer who stated that he would call back. At approximately the same time, the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer called USEUCOM headquarters and advised the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer of the verbal directive to CINCUSNAVEUR and explained that USCINCEUR had been by-passed in the interest of saving time and that the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "had promised to take action." Almost immediately thereafter, the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer called the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer to inform him of the call from the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer. On the basis of the call from the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer and his statement that the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "had promised to take action," the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was misled into believing that CINCUSNAVEUR had acted or would act. Both USEUCOM personnel assumed that no further action was required; none was taken.

Approximately three hours had passed without action or additional communications between CINCUSNAVEUR and USEUCOM headquarters on this matter, when, at 080325Z, the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer called USEUCOM and was put in contact with the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer. With the CINCUSNAVEUR inquiring first, each duty officer asked the other what action was being taken by his respective headquarters. The USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR action was being withheld pending a return call from USEUCOM in response to CINCUSNAVEUR's earlier call which had requested a confirming DTG of the JCS message. It was suggested that he call JCS(JRC) requesting the DTG of the JCS message or provide a USEUCOM DTG. The call terminated. Prompt action was then taken by the USEUCOM JRC Duty officer who called the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer, obtained the DTG of the JCS message (JCS 080110Z June 67), and passed the information to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer, who at the same moment received the JCS message via normal Navy channels (sometime between 080325Z and 080355Z).

At 080410Z, CINCUSNAVEUR in a teletype conference, passed JCS 080110Z to COMSIXTHFLT, advised him to take it for action and followed up with a formal tasking message, CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z June 67. Meanwhile, at 080425Z, USCINCEUR had directed CINCUSNAVEUR by telephone to take JCS 080110Z for action and followed up with a confirming message, USCINCEUR 080625Z June 67. Finally, COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 67 directed LIBERTY to proceed to a position within a 25-mile radius of 33-40N/32-03E and imposed a CPA of 100 nm to "UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon" and 25 nm to Cyprus.

(Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) 080425Z. USCINCEUR directed CINCUSNAVEUR by phone to take JCS 080110Z for action. Conversation was confirmed by subsequent message. (USCINCEUR 080625Z/ECJC/JRC 09045.)

(C) 080440Z. CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer finally succeeded in passing JCS message to COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, telling him to "be advised to take JCS 080110Z for action. Official message follows." (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 080110Z for action.

(C) 080507Z. COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer was advised by CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer that 080455Z was the DTG of the FORAC message. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) 080650Z. Two delta-winged aircraft orbited ship three times at 31-27N/34-00E. No identification visible. Estimated altitude 5,000 ft.; estimated distance, 2 mi. (USS LIBERTY 080742Z.)

(C) 080727Z. CINCUSNAVEUR received USCINCEUR 080625Z. (See 080425Z entry, above.) (CINCUSNAVEUR 132105Z.)

(C) 080800Z. LIBERTY position 31-45N/033-30E; PIM within 30 nm of above position. (USS LIBERTY 080634Z.)

(U) 080806Z. Another unidentified aircraft circled the ship. (Court of Inquiry.)

(C) COMSIXTHFLT directed LIBERTY to proceed immediately to operate within a 25-mile radius of position 33-40N/32-30E, and, until further notice, not to approach the coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 miles, and Cyprus closer than 25 miles. (COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z.)

Note: (C) LIBERTY did not receive this message until after the attack when it was "delivered by hand on 10 June 1967." NAVCOMSTA Morocco received the message from COMSIXTHFLT at 081050Z and entered it into DCS for delivery to NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 081100Z. DCS major relay Sevilla (San Pablo), Spain, transmitted to DCS relay station at Asmara at 081200Z (LIBERTY was attacked by aircraft at 081203Z.) Through operator error DCS station Asmara relayed to NAVCOMSTA Greece at 081215Z. NAVCOMSTA Greece sent it back to DCS station Asmara whence it was relayed to NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 081510Z for transmission to LIBERTY. In the meantime, LIBERTY's communications equipment had been destroyed during the attack. (Court of Inquiry; Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) 080926Z. Another unidentified aircraft circled LIBERTY. (Court of Inquiry.)

(C) U.S. ambassador in Cairo was authorized to evacuate all Americans if he deemed it necessary, was advised to consult friendly embassies (French, Italian) about arranging joint diplomatic action to prevent major attacks on westerners. (SECSTATE 080927Z / STATE 209179.)

It was placed on the JRTT broadcast at 081625Z.

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(U) 081158Z. Single aircraft sighted approaching ship from 135 degrees, relative, five to six miles distant, altitude approximately 7000 ft. (Court of Inquiry.)

(U) 081205Z. While on course 283, at speed 5 knots, at position 31-35.5N/33-29E, LIBERTY was attacked by unidentified fighters, six strafing runs. (USS LIBERTY 081715Z.)

Note: (U) The record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry fixes the actual time of the initial air attack at 08:203Z. This information was released to the press on 18 June 1967 by CHINFO.

~~(U)~~ Both the Court of Inquiry and the Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team recorded that LIBERTY was steaming in the vicinity of 31-25N/33-25E when she was attacked.

(U) 081225Z (approximately). Three torpedo boats, one identified as Israeli, approached LIBERTY on starboard quarter at high speed. (USS LIBERTY 081715Z.)

(U) 081235Z. LIBERTY sustained torpedo hit starboard side amidships. (Court of Inquiry.)

←

THIS SECTION CONTAINED EXCERPTS FROM USAF MOBILE ~~INTERCEPT~~ INTERCEPT STATION HAHN, GERMANY (STATION A556) OF ISRAELI BOATS, AIRCRAFT AND SHORE STATION AT NATSOR BETWEEN 1230Z AND 1312Z AS THEY CONDUCT ATTACK AND SEEM TO SEE AMERICAN FLAG FOR THE FIRST TIME AT 1312Z. THIS INTERCEPT HELPED PERSUADE SOME U.S. LEADERS THAT THE ATTACK MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGN IDE HQ DID NOT KNOW OF THE FLAG, NO NEED FOR BOATS & HELLS NECESSARILY TO KNOW, AND IN ANY CASE THE WHOLE EXCHANGE COULD HAVE BEEN STAGED.

T.K.

two copies

(U) 081235Z. USS SARATOGA (CVA 60) reported to CINCUSNAVEUR and COM-SIXTHFLT that a message from ROCKAWAY (LIBERTY) had been intercepted: "I am under attack. My position 31-32N/33-25E. I have been hit. Request immediate assistance." (USS SARATOGA 081235Z.)

(U) SARATOGA reported message from LIBERTY: "Unidentified gun boats approaching vessel now." (USS SARATOGA 081237Z.)

(U) 081245Z. SARATOGA reported interception of another LIBERTY message: "Under attack and hit badly." (USS SARATOGA 081245Z.)

(C) 081250Z. COMSIXTHFLT ordered USS AMERICA and SARATOGA to proceed to 31-23N/33-25E to provide fighter cover and defend LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 081250Z.)

(U) 081254Z. SARATOGA reported message from LIBERTY: "Hit by torpedo starboard side. Listing badly. Need assistance immediately." (USS SARATOGA 081254Z.)

(U) NAVCOMSTA Greece reported message from LIBERTY received via HICOM net: "LIBERTY hit by torpedo ~~starboard~~ ^{starboard} side at 081253Z. Listing badly. Req assistance immediately." (NAVCOMSTA Greece 081301Z.)

(I) 081305Z. COMSIXTHFLT advised LIBERTY of receipt of flash messages, stated that aircraft and surface units were on the way, and directed, "Keep SITREP's coming." (COMSIXTHFLT 081305Z.)

(S) 081316Z. CTF 60 directed AMERICA to launch four armed A4's, SARATOGA, four armed A1's, to defend LIBERTY. (CTF 60 081316Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 1 to CINCUSNAVEUR: --At 081252Z USS LIBERTY reported under attack at posit 31-23N/33-25E... hit by torpedo ... listing badly. TF 60 directed to report to proceed toward scene. AMERICA directed to launch four armed A4's and SARATOGA, four armed A1's with fighter cover to defend LIBERTY. ETA first aircraft on scene one hour 30 minutes after launch. Estimate launch 1345Z. COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z 081320Z

✓ (C) COMSIXTHFLT informed AMERICA and SARATOGA that forces attacking LIBERTY declared hostile, authorized use of force including destruction. (COMSIXTHFLT 081339Z.)

(The original message was received elsewhere)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR directed LIBERTY to establish immediate communications with any Mediterranean area communication station and directed NAVCOMSTA Morocco to take all available actions to establish communications with LIBERTY. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081340Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT issued CRITIC message: "LIBERTY at 31-23N/33-25E hit by torpedo starboard at 081230Z." (COMSIXTHFLT 081349Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR situation report Sum Total (01) to JCS, CNO and USCINCEUR quoted distress messages relayed from LIBERTY by SARATOGA at 081237Z and 081245Z. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081400Z.)

(C) CTF 63 recommended USS PAPAGO be diverted at maximum speed to 31-23N/33-25E to assist LIBERTY. (CTF 63 081410Z.)

(C) NAVCOMSTA Morocco advised CINCUSNAVEUR LIBERTY unable to identify attacking boats. After attack helicopter circled the ship, believed to be Israeli. (NAVCOMSTA Morocco 081412Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv reported that Israeli aircraft and MTR's erroneously attacked LIBERTY. Israelis send object apologies. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081414Z.)

(C) 081415Z. GEN CARTER, DIRNSA, telephoned CAPT COOK, DIRNAVSECGRU, to request that he pass by telephone to SECDEF McKAMARA info about LIBERTY and the number of personnel aboard. As CAPT COOK was not in his office at the moment, CAPT THOMAS, Deputy DIRNAVSECGRU, accepted the call. First attempts to reach Secretary McKAMARA personally by phone were unsuccessful.

CAPT THOMAS held the line until Secretary McKAMARA came to the phone at 081430Z.

(U) JCS authorized USCINCEUR to use whatever force required to defend LIBERTY from further attacks. (JCS 081416Z/JCS 7354.)

(U) CTF 60 081416Z to AMERICA and SARATOGA clarifies rules of engagement.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 2 advises of inability to communicate with LIBERTY on any circuit; briefs rules of engagement issued to pilots. (COMSIXTHFLT 081425Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 3 advises that communications with LIBERTY established by NAVCOMSTA Greece. (COMSIXTHFLT 081426Z.)

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(U) NAVCOMSTA Morocco reported message received from LIBERTY via his command (NCOM) voice net "... LIBERTY unable to identify attacking craft. After attack a helicopter landed the ship. Believed to be Israeli." (NAVCOMSTA Morocco (CAMS) 081428.)

OB1430-372. Secretary McNAMARA came on the line and CAPT THOMAS provided the following information directly to him via unclassified telephone:

Allowance

NAVSECGRU	officers;	enlisted
GENSER	9 officers;	151 enlisted
Total	officers;	enlisted

Three NSA civilian personnel (not in uniform) aboard. additional enlisted augmented over the allowance, above.

Unclassified mission of the ship from OPNAVINST 05727.1B:

"To conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy electronics research projects which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications."

Confirmed that satellite communications are unclassified.

Confirmed location of incident at approximately 13 miles off shore.

SECDEF inquired whether JCS had directed retirement to 100 miles. Could not confirm.

(Op-94G1 memo of 21 June 1967.)

Note: The cryptologic personnel figures provided to SECDEF were actually the on-board count as of 3 June 1967: officers; enlisted plus additional for a total of enlisted; three civilians; grand total, . . . Technically speaking, the allowance of cryptologic personnel at the time was officers, enlisted. (See Appendix II to Annex A.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT recalled all Sixth Fleet aircraft in view of USDAO Tel Aviv report that Israelis erroneously attacked LIBERTY and subsequently had sent abject apologies. (COMSIXTHFLT 081439Z.)

7:30
8:15
L

(U) CONSISTANT Follow up NR 1 and Final to URM.
USDAO Tel Aviv received word that Israeli aircraft and
UTB's erroneously attacked ~~US~~ as 08:200Z position
31-25N/33-33E. They to Navy since Israeli helicopters
conducting rescue operations. Israeli send object
apologies. (CONSISTANT 081521Z.)

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APPROXIMATELY 4:00 PM

(U) 031440-452. CAPT THOMAS briefed Op-94, RADM WEEKS, on the conversation with Secretary McNAMARA.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 5 reports LIBERTY underway at 081430Z at 8 knots, course 340. (COMSIXTHFLT 081455Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 6 advises that he has directed that two DD's (names to follow) proceed at maximum sustained speed to assist LIBERTY, and that air cover will be provided when DD's approach Egyptian coast within 100 miles. (COMSIXTHFLT 081502Z.)

proposed that _____ be deployed for operations Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean "...to insure continuous on station coverage to replace USS LIBERTY..."

(U) COMSIXTHFLT reports that LIBERTY "has carried out emergency destruction of all crypto pubs and key cards," and that the only communications are via CINCUSNAVEUR (MCOM Voice Net EO4.04 (COMSIXTHFLT 081514Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR advised COMSIXTHFLT that SECDEF VANCE directed that all news releases on LIBERTY affair will be made at Washington level. No releases to be made on ship. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081517Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT was directed to have LIBERTY proceed, if possible, "on northerly course in order that rendezvous with assisting ships is as far from shore as possible." (CINCUSNAVEUR 081518Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv advised JCS, CNO, et al., that Israelis were arranging helicopter for ALUSNA to overfly LIBERTY to attempt to communicate. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081528Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 7 reports COMDESRON 12 in USS DAVIS (DD937) with USS MASSEY (DD778) proceeding at best speed to rendezvous with LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 081552Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT canceled his 081339Z which declared forces attacking LIBERTY hostile and authorized use of force. States use of force no longer authorized. (COMSIXTHFLT 081609Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 8. **L** LIBERTY damage: flooding stopped; nine-degree list; torpedo hit amidships starboard; radar, gyro, fathometer inoperative. **Z** Casualties (approximate): four dead, three severely wounded, 50 wounded. **J** LIBERTY position 081600Z, 31-35N/33-32E; course NW; speed 10 knots. (COMSIXTHFLT 081621Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 9. All aircraft from AMERICA and SARATOGA recalled and accounted for. USS PAPAGO (ATF 150) diverted to render assistance. (COMSIXTHFLT 081649Z.)

that ship unable to carry on. miss. Reported that

(U) LIBERTY reports the situation following air attack. Described attack. Stated photos of aircraft and boats taken. Estimated casualties: dead, 10; seriously wounded, 15; total wounded, 75; missing, undetermined. (USS LIBERTY 081715Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv reports ALUSNA overflight of LIBERTY in Israeli helicopter for inspection and attempted contact nonproductive, except to observe ship underway approximately 8 knots, northerly course, 60 degrees west of Ashkelon, Israel, at 081930Z, listing approximately ten degrees to starboard. Israel's willing to respond in rescue, if asked. (USDAO Tel Aviv 082100Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP. LIBERTY proceeding course 140, speed 10 knots. COMDESRON 12, DAVIS and MASSEY will rendezvous approximately 090400Z. AMERICA to close to help range to 100 off serious wounded and remains of deceased. LIBERTY continues without classified communications, radar and gyro. All communications are via CINCUSNAVEUR HCOM Voice Net and E2A aircraft airborne to act as communication relay and navigation aid between fleet commander and LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 082230Z.)

(U) Department of State Arab-Israeli situation summary reports that Secretary RUSK strongly expressed U.S. dismay over LIBERTY incident to Israeli Ambassador Harman, although he said U.S. appreciated the speed with which the Israeli government moved up to the action. (STATE Operations Center 082355Z/STATE 311C.)

9 June (U) 090425Z. COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 10: DAVIS and MASSEY rendezvoused with LIBERTY at position 33-01N/31-59E. Medical personnel boarded LIBERTY at 090455Z. AMERICA 138 miles from LIBERTY; closing speed, 30 knots. (COMSIXTHFLT 090513Z.)

(U) COMDESRON 12 in DAVIS (CTG 60.5) alongside LIBERTY. Material damage under control. Damage control and medical teams aboard. (CTG 60.5 090544Z.)

(U) LIBERTY reports Research Radio I, Coordination Center and Crypto received direct torpedo hit; spaces currently flooded; 23 research personnel dead or missing. (USS LIBERTY 090550Z.)

(U) CTG 60.5 ready to transfer 15 serious wounded, 9 dead. Based on inspection major damage area and opinion of LIBERTY CO, it is believed impossible that any personnel in flooded spaces are alive. Bulkheads firm and flooding contained; therefore, decided not to attempt to plug torpedo hole and dewater at sea. LIBERTY completely mobile to 10 knots. CO has leg wound; CTG 60.5 considering relieving him. XO dead. DAVIS transferred 10 engineering and deck ratings to LIBERTY and assumed all communications guards. Estimated getting underway 090915Z. Services MASSEY no longer required upon arrival PAPAGO. (CTG 60.5 090708Z.)

HICOM

Harman

James M. Jones

40 Prime Minister ESHKOL of Israel forwarded message of condolence to President JOHNSON via U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv. (AMEMBASSY Tel Aviv 090810Z/Tel Aviv 4024.)

(U) DAVIS clear. LIBERTY underway. CO LIBERTY will not require relief. (CTG 60.5 090852Z.)

(U) 090915Z. First LIBERTY patient received aboard AMERICA. Helicopter transfer of injured and dead had commenced when AMERICA closed to within 70 miles of LIBERTY. (USS AMERICA 092143Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT requested diplomatic clearance for LIBERTY to enter SOUBA BAY, Crete, for survey of damage. (COMSIXTHFLT 090903Z.)

(U) 090930Z. AMERICA rendezvoused with LIBERTY. (SECDEF 091812Z.)

(U) 091200Z. COMSIXTHFLT, VADM W.I. MARTIN, made personal inspection of LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 091635Z.)

(U) 091233Z. Evacuation of injured and dead completed: 50 wounded plus all recovered remains to AMERICA; 8 wounded to USS LITTLE ROCK (CLG 4). (COMSIXTHFLT 091635Z.)
Flooded spaces 90 percent full of water and oil.

(U) Pages of highly classified material observed floating out of hole. Pick up and efforts to prevent further loss directed. (CTF 60 091334Z; CINCSNAVFUR 091459Z; COMSIXTHFLT 091655Z.)

(U) 091500Z. PAPAGE joined LIBERTY; MASSEY detached. (CTG 60.5 091900Z.)

8 June 45 IDF Assistant Army spokesman, LCOL Michael BLOCH, telephoned to ALUSNA, Tel Aviv, seven points of "further information on yesterday's incident with the American ship." (USDAO Tel Aviv 091520Z.)

Note: 45 The Israeli government set forth these seven points of rationale to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY. The legal opinion and other comments on each which were written into the proceedings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry follow.

Point 1. The ship was sighted and recognized as a naval ship 13 miles from the coast.

Comment. From 0849 on 8 June LIBERTY was steaming in international waters on a track generally parallel to the coast of the UAR. At one point, the ship was, in fact, 13.6 miles from the coast.

Point 2. The presence (of a neutral-nation naval ship) in a fighting area is against international custom.

Comment. The duties of a neutral under international law do not include a duty to ensure that its ships or personnel leave or refrain from entering an area of hostilities or an area adjacent to an area of hostilities. Nationals of a neutral country who may happen to be in belligerent territory nevertheless retain their right to protection by their neutral home state; and a belligerent must grant to neutral diplomatic envoys, including those accredited to the enemy, the right to pass the territory unmolested. A neutral nation, in this respect alone, thus has a legitimate reason and a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities, in fulfillment of its obligation to protect its nationals and to evacuate those who desire evacuation. It was in fulfillment of such a mission that LIBERTY was engaged. Far from being contrary to international custom, the presence of neutral ships on just such missions as LIBERTY's is a common, if not a universal, incident of situations involving the outbreak of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her. Action by such a neutral ship to repulse an unlawful belligerent attack by force, where the neutral has not first attacked the belligerent, does not constitute "hostilities" against the belligerent and does not constitute an abandonment or a violation of neutrality.

Point 3. The area (where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) is not a common passage for ships.

Comment. Given the conceded proposition that a ship of a neutral is steaming in international waters, the question of whether or not such waters are a "common passage" is totally irrelevant to its right to be there.

Point 4. Egypt (an opposing belligerent) had declared the area (where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) closed to neutrals.

Comment. Closing certain adjacent waters including those otherwise considered to be high seas, has some precedent in history as a belligerent practice, notably in World Wars I and II when most of the belligerents, including the United States, declared "war zones", "military areas" and "defensive sea areas" and either attempted to close such areas completely or to severely circumscribe passage through them as a neutral. The consistent position of the United States has been to reserve generally all of its rights in the premises, including the right not only to question the validity of such "war zones" but to present demands and claims in relation to any American interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, by virtue of their enforcement. As a general proposition, except for a

previously announced blockade or other leg' into maritime control measure, using or attempting to restrict any portion of the high seas has not been recognized in international law as a belligerent right.

Point 5. LIBERTY resembles the Egyptian supply ship EL QUSEIR.

Comment. While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive hull markings of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criterion as a justification for attack, any ship resembling EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy.

Point 6. The ship was not flying a flag when sighted.

Comment. LIBERTY flew a size nine (approximately five feet by eight feet) U. S. ensign from her foremast throughout the morning of 8 June and until it was shot down by the Israeli air attack. At least five minutes prior to the torpedo attack, a size seven ensign (approximately seven feet by thirteen feet) was hoisted at the main yardarm. At 0849 LIBERTY changed course from 130T to 253T. At 0905 LIBERTY reduced speed to five knots and continued to steam at that speed until after the initial air attack. At 1122 LIBERTY altered course to 283T and continued on this course until after the ship was attacked.

Point 7. The IDF Navy had earlier reports of bombardment of El Arish from sea.

Comment. It is inconceivable that either the IDF Navy or Air Force would associate LIBERTY with her four 50-caliber machine guns, or EL QUSEIR, armed with two three-pounders, with a shore bombardment.

← Fleet Maintenance Officer inspected damage and submitted report. (COMSIXTHFLT 091954Z.)

← DIRNAVSECGRU stated view that for security reasons Navy-oriented yard at Malta would be preferable to civilian yard in large cities of other countries. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 092020Z CRITICOM.)

← 1320 to 1600 Soviet DDG 626/4 in vicinity of LIBERTY under constant surveillance. Not observed to stop in immediate vicinity of LIBERTY nor to recover anything. (CTG 60.5 092119Z.)

← JCS requested CINCLANT to initiate action to complete as soon as possible and to order to Rota, when RFS. Requested to provide requirements to CINCLANT for Atlantic, CINCUSNAVEUR for Mediterranean, operations. (JCS 092121Z/JCS 7542.)

(U) AMERICA status report of LIBERTY casualties submitted to SECNAV. (USS AMERICA 092143Z.)

(U) CNO directed RPIO Norfolk to cease further shipments of RPS material to LIBERTY. (CNO 091844Z.)

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... ..

(G) CTG 60.5 SITREP 10: Total DAVIS personnel on Liberty: two officers, 15 enlisted. Acting XO, LCDR PETTYJOHN, COMDESRON 12 Chief Staff Officer. Accomplishments of combined crews itemized. List reduced to three degrees. (CTG 60.5 092230Z.)

(G) JCS Fact Finding Team appointed "to examine the circumstances relating to the command and control and communications actions and procedures associated with events preceding attack on USS LIBERTY." MGEN Joseph R. RUSS, USA, Chief, Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, OJCS, designated senior member of a team of five members. (JCS 092301Z/JCS 7578.)

10 June

(G) JCS Fact Finding Team interviewed AONO(COMM) and NAVSECGRU representatives. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(G) In order to provide complete support to JCS Fact Finding Team, DIRNSA requested ADN and ADP to prepare a report of command and control relationships and tasking of LIBERTY. (DIRNSA memo of 10 June 1967 and report to DIRNSA in reply thereto of 11 June 1967.)

(G) Upon the recommendation of COMSIXTHFLT who had visited LIBERTY and had given full consideration to material and security factors and was also interested in expediting recovery of bodies, CINCUSNAVEUR directed that LIBERTY proceed direct to Malta for dry-docking rather than go to Souda Bay first. (CINCUSNAVEUR 100025Z.)

(G) PAPAGO recovered twelve log sheets containing Secret codeword material which was returned to LIBERTY. (CTG 60.5 100548Z.)

(G) CTG 60.5 SITREP 12: "... LIBERTY riding higher in water. Top of hole out of water and list almost corrected. Oil negligible." (CTG 60.5 100550Z.)

(G) CTG 60.5 SITREP 13: "... DAVIS arranging to obtain LIBERTY pay records and will pay prior entry port ... No further material loss overboard. Oil reduced to seepage leaving thin film in wake. No black oil. List now negligible due fuel transfer..." (CTG 60.5 101100Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT directed limited access to Secret codeword material recovered from the sea and required a log be maintained of all personnel exposed. (COMSIXTHFLT 101242Z.)

(G) DIRNSA issued instructions to HQ NSAEUR concerning support of NSA personnel who were aboard LIBERTY.

~~CG~~ CTG 60.5 SITREP 14: CO LIBERTY "resting comfortably. Shrapnel removed today. ... Water level in third deck space of LIBERTY approximately ~~100~~ feet below overhead... Several bodies in sight, but heavy oil, fumes and debris make recovery hazardous and will not attempt. DAVIS maintaining all guards and passing to LIBERTY." (CTG 60.5 101750Z.)

~~CG~~ JCS 102140Z/JCS 7642 announces composition of Fact-finding Team:

MCEN Joseph R. RUSS, USA
RADM Francis J. FITZPATRICK, USN
COL William A. GARRETT, USAF
CAPT William D. OWEN, USN
MAJ Harlan E. PRIDDLE, USAF

~~CG~~ 102600Z. At the direction of CINCUSNAVEUR, a Court of Inquiry convened at Headquarters, CINCUSNAVEUR, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on LIBERTY. Membership:

RADM Isaac C. KIDD, Jr., USN
CAPT Bernard J. LAUFF, USN
CAPT Bert M. ATKINSON, USN
CAPT Ward BOSTON, USN
LCDR Allen FEINGRSCH, USN

President
Member
Member
Counsel for the Court
Assistant Counsel for the Court

(Court of Inquiry; CINCUSNAVEUR 111311Z Jun 67.)

11 June (C) CINCUSNAVEUR outlined tasks concerning LIBERTY dry-docking. Primary objectives upon pumping out of dry dock: recovery of bodies; security of documents, equipments and spaces. Requested support from COMFAIRMED, COMSERVFORSEXTFLT, JMWB Malta. (CINCUSNAVEUR 110225Z.)

(C) CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 15-67 issued to activate TF 100 at 12000Z. RADM RENKEN (COMSERVLANT) to be CTF 100. Mission: to supervise dry-docking of LIBERTY at Malta in order to prevent disclosure of classified information and equipment to unauthorized personnel. Upon arrival Malta, LIBERTY to report to CINCUSNAVEUR and be assigned to CTF 100, who will supervise dry-docking, removal of remains, protection of classified material, and will ready the ship for repair by COMSERVFORSEXTFLT. (CINCUSNAVEUR 111031Z.)

(C) CTG 60.5 SITREP 17. Two bodies recovered: WALTON, F.J., CT1, by LIBERTY from spaces; THORNTON, T.R., CT3, by PAPAGO from wake. (CTG 60.5 111112Z.)

(C) Inasmuch as it was unknown whether the designated communications guard ship would be cleared

(DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 111442Z.)

(C) CTG 60.5 SITREP 18: PAPAGO divers examined hole in LIBERTY estimated to be 39 ft. wide at bottom and 24 ft. high. Net rigged to cover after two thirds of hole. Net washed away after ten minutes underway. Soviet AGI GS-43 joined forces 081430Z and is trailing. (CTG 60.5 111601Z.)

(C) CTG 60.5 SITREP 19: PAPAGO recovered additional body, MENDLE, A.P., CT2. Soviet AGI dropping back. (CTG 60.5 111800Z.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRUEUR announced composition of TG 100.4:

CAPT C. M. SMITH
CDR E. H. PLATZKE
LCDR B. M. BISHOP
LT P. G. FIRESTONE
LT R. H. LEE
LT M. H. BENNETT
CTC A. J. PAWLIKOWSKI

DIRNAVSECGRULANT, CTG 100.4
NAVSECGRUHQ (G42)
NAVSECGRUEUR
NAVSECGRUEUR
NAVSECGRULANT
Senior NSG officer in LIBERTY
NAVSECGRUEUR

Surviving and able NAVSECGRU officers and CT's of LIBERTY.
(DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 111931Z.)

Sp/ce

(*) CO LIBERTY requested assistance from Norfolk
Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests for
repair of damage. Preliminary estimated
requirements: Six months yard availability; ~~cost~~
~~cost~~ \$2.5-3 M in funds. (USS LIBERTY 110900Z.)

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_____ concurred in arrangements proposed by DIRNAVSEC-GRUEUR for CRITICOMM service _____ 'Poa TF 100; however,

12 June (C) Director, CIA, sent formal expression of sympathy to DIRNAV-SECGRU and DIRNSA concerning LIBERTY tragedy. (CIA letter of 12 June 1967.)

(C) DNC made CDR D. B. WENGER of NAVSECGRU available to JCS Fact Finding Team as Op-94 representative and point of contact regarding the LIBERTY incident. (Op-94 memo 017-67 of 12 June 1967.)

(C) CINCLANT requested JCS to reconsider deployment of to EASTLAN/MED areas in light of LIBERTY incident. (CINCLANT 121414Z.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRU message to LIBERTY expressed sympathy on behalf of the Director and NAVSECGRU. (DIRNAVSECGRU 122109Z.)

(C) TF 100 was advised of arrangements made to handle NAVSECGRU and related message traffic for TG 100.4 (Security); names of contacts given. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 122220Z.)

(C) JCS requested _____ to review his proposal to deploy to Med. Terranean as replacement for LIBERTY, in view of comments in CINCLANT 121414Z June 1967, the reservations that Department of State would very likely have on _____ operations in the Mediterranean, and the fact that a quick turnaround of _____ would require emergency dry-docking which would disrupt established shipyard schedule. (JCS 122130Z/JCS 7779.)

(C) CAPT W. H. CRAVEN, Jr., USN, Op-03R, designated OPNAV contact point on command, control and related communications matters concerning LIBERTY incident. (DIRNAVSECGRU 122226Z.) _____ CRITICOMM,

11 June (U) 130020Z. JCS Fact Finding Team departed Washington for London. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRU acknowledged CIA letter expressing sympathy. (DIRNAVSECGRU letter of 13 June 1967.)

← CTF 100 SITREP 1. Task Organisation:

CTF 100	RADM H. A. BENKEN, USN
CTG 100.1 Medical	HMC R. V. BROOKS, USN
100.2 Docking and Repair	CAPT R. L. ARTHUR, USN
100.3 Public Affairs	CAPT E. L. CASTILLO, USN
100.4 Security	CAPT C. M. SMITH, USN
100.5 Supply	LCDR E. B. UNDERHILL, SC, USN*
100.6 Communications	CAPT H. G. LEAHY, USN
100.7 USS LIBERTY	CDR W. L. MCCOY, USN
100.8 Administration/Coordination	CAPT F. L. HORNE, USN

*Subsequently replaced by a CDR CARLEK

Plans for docking at Malta completed. (CTF 100 130934Z.)

← Sensitive material recovered by PAPA on 13 June of sufficient quantity to fill four large manila envelopes. Material transferred to LIBERTY. (CTF 60.5 131332Z.)

← Chief of Staff, Israeli Defense Forces, General RABIN, appointed an official court of inquiry to investigate LIBERTY incident. (USDAO Tel Aviv 131335Z.)

← Director, GCHQ, and Director, NSA, sent formal expression of sympathy to DIRNAVSECGRU. (DIRNSA 131420Z/DIR 060-67 CRITCOMM.)

← AMERICA developed negatives of photographs of LIBERTY attack and forwarded them to NRTSC. (USS AMERICA 131503Z.)

← 131550Z. Soviet AGI GS43 passed up starboard side of LIBERTY at 800 yards. (CTG 60.5 131632Z.)

← LIBERTY acknowledged receipt of COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 1967 and 062349Z June 1967 on 10 June and 13 June, respectively. (USS LIBERTY 131628Z.)

← Movements and position of LIBERTY prior to attack forwarded to USCINCEUR by CINCUSNAVEUR. (CINCUSNAVEUR 132105Z.)

← In reply to JCS 122130Z/JCS 7729 June 1967, reassessment indicated collection capability under existing CPA restrictions would be limited

14 June ← 140530Z. LIBERTY arrived Malta. (CTG 60.5 140500Z; CTF 100 140630Z.)

(C) CTF 100 SITREP 4.

141300Z. LIBERTY entered dry dock.

1st
apb.

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141430Z. Canvas mat in place; commenced pumping out.
141730Z. Commenced search and removal of bodies.
141815Z. Dry dock dry.
142100Z. Twelve bodies accounted for and encased.

Torpedo damage

Shell: hole centered at Frame 60 extending 24 feet downward from just below second deck and longitudinally from Frame 53 to Frame 60 (39 feet).

Interior structure: outboard 15 feet of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck frames buckled from Frame 52 to Frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet.

Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck, Frames 52 to 78, entire width of ship.

Keel straight and apparently not damaged.

June 14, 1967
(CTF 100 150200Z; USS LIBERTY 150710Z)

(C) DAVIS established at Malta as guard ship for LIBERTY. All messages for TF 100 to be directed to DAVIS via Navy channels. (AMEMBASSY Valletta 141335Z/Valletta 540.)

(C) To expedite repair to LIBERTY's electronic system, NAVSHIPENGCEN announced planned visit to Malta of REWSON personnel accompanied by contractor representatives. Attendance by NAVSECGRU and NSA representatives invited. (NAVSHIPENGCEN 141551Z.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRU 141604Z (CRITICOMM) advised all concerned of US EYES CRITICOMM capability with TG 100.4.

(U) SECDEF stated that DOD would have no further comments on LIBERTY until Court of Inquiry has had an opportunity to obtain full facts. (SECDEF 141747Z/DEF 7890.)

(C) 141800Z. LIBERTY safely dry-docked. CTF 100 SITREP 3. (CTF 100 142116Z.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRU requested CTF 100 to forward still photos which would be of use in compiling historical file regarding LIBERTY. (DIRNAVSECGRU 142209Z.)

(U) JCS stated detailed mission of Fact Finding Team. Fact-finding study to include:

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Means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the JCS to LIBERTY.

Specific orders issued to LIBERTY between 1 and 8 June and to which LIBERTY responded during those same periods.

Circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their nonreceipt.

Report to include any official U.S. public statements which bear on findings. Findings and recommendations to be reported to JCS. CINCUSNAVEUR Court of Inquiry will inquire into administrative, disciplinary and internal matters within that command which are not within scope of examination by Fact-Finding Team. Team will not infringe upon prerogative of Court of Inquiry. (JCS 142258Z/JCS 7964.)

15 June (U) LIBERTY reported status of remains. Identified bodies recovered during dry-docking. Transferred remains to Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy, for further preparation (19 bodies: 15 identified, 4 unidentified, one head; one arm). (USS LIBERTY 150710Z.)

~~(C)~~ Commodore ERELL, Commander in Chief, Israel Defense Forces Navy, requested ALUSNA to call upon him early evening 14 June and expressed regret regarding LIBERTY incident on behalf of Israeli Navy and stated he was preparing letter to CNO, USN. ERELL declined further comment until Israeli Court of Inquiry had reported its findings. (USDAO Tel Aviv 151130Z.)

~~(S)~~ CTF 100 SITREP 5 and final. Bodies of five of the missing personnel have not been found. "It is reasonable to assume that the five not found were lost at sea through the 24-by-39-foot hole caused by the torpedo explosion." TF 100 dissolved at 151500Z. (CTF 100 151406Z.)

~~(S)~~ USDAO Tel Aviv forwarded to Court of Inquiry chronology of events surrounding LIBERTY incident as observed and recorded by ALUSNA Tel Aviv, CDR E. C. CASTLE, USN. (USDAO Tel Aviv 151615Z.)

(U) CNO 152106Z is message of condolence to LIBERTY.

~~(S)~~ DIRNAVSECGRU 152152Z advises NAVSECGRU area directors of decision not to convey expressions of condolence to dependents of casualty victims, for security reasons. NAVSECGRU Bulletin ^{would} ~~will~~ be the vehicle for DIRNAVSECGRU expression of sympathy and concern.

16 June (U) CINCUSNAVEUR 161033Z was a personal message of condolence from ADM John S. M-CAIN, Jr., to CDR W. L. McGONAGLE,

(U) 161645Z. Court of Inquiry was closed to deliberate and prepare findings of fact. (Court of Inquiry.)

←(U) CINCUSNAVEUR MOVORD 8-67 directed COMSIXTHFLT to cisco PAPAGO to CINCUSNAVEUR. PAPAGO to relieve DAVIS as LIBERTY communications guard. When RFS, LIBERTY to depart Hants for CONUS in company with PAPAGO. (CINCUSNAVEUR 161815Z.)

17 June ←(U) LIBERTY reported no additional remains found. (USS LIBERTY 170950Z.)

18 June ←(U) USDAO Tel Aviv provided synopsis of findings of Israeli Court of Inquiry, although findings not yet reviewed by Israeli JAG. Synopsis provided by LCOL EFLOR, aide to MGEN ~~ITZHAK~~ Itzhak RABIN, IDF Chief of Staff.

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- (U) 182045Z. JCS Fact Finding Team returned to Washington.
(Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)
- 19 June ~~(S)~~ Airlift of all nonessential LIBERTY research personnel commenced. (USS LIBERTY 191512Z.)
- ~~(S)~~ DIRNAVSECGRU furnished a list of LIBERTY casualties for the information of NAVSECGRU personnel. (DIRNAVSECGRU 192252Z.)
- 20 June ~~(S)~~ LIBERTY submitted a report concerning the loss of RPS material. (USS LIBERTY 200735Z.)
- ~~(S)~~ Thorough examination damaged area conducted by Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer, NNSY representatives and Malta dock personnel following removal all classified material. (USS LIBERTY 201540Z.)
- (U) Spaces thoroughly searched and no additional remains located. (USS LIBERTY 201832Z.)
- 21 June ~~(S)~~ Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff, by JCCRG memo 189-67 of 21 June. Concludes that delays in communications and headquarters actions resulted in late delivery or nondelivery of certain time-critical communications, timely receipt of which would have reduced the probability of the LIBERTY incident. Includes 17 recommendations. (JCS 2308/378-1 of 29 June 1967.)
- 23 June ~~(S)~~ CTF 100 submitted report of LIBERTY dry-docking. LIBERTY was dry-docked at Malta 14 June. Security Safeguards were maintained until classified matter in damaged areas was properly secured on 19 June. Removal of remains of 20 men in flooded compartments completed 15 June; remains shipped to Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy, for positive identification and further disposition. (CTF 100 letter Serial 0063 of 23 June 1967.)

19 June (S) CAPT SMITH, USAF, submitted
report on LIBERTY security situation.
All classified material remaining in
Research Department is covered and
secured. Copies furnished to us, but
much RPS material is not. Much material
subjected to all sorts of mutilation
and could not be read.
(DIRNSSECGRUEK 191326Z June 1967 CRITICAL)

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28 June (S) DIRNSA requested LIBERTY
to submit by immediate
message, the identification
of all ADONIS ORESTES and
JASON key material ^{unaccounted for}
(DIRNSA 283035Z / 59/0257 June 1967.)

29 June (S) LIBERTY submitted to DIRNSA
a list of ADONIS, ORESTES and JASON
key material ^{unaccounted for}
(USS LIBERTY 291006Z June 1967.)

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30 June (S) Due to compromise of JASON
material, DIRNSA requested CNO
to take supersession action
on specific material involved.
(DIRNSA 302025E/S/462 June 1967.)

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Note: (U) The summary of security actions included in this report was prepared by CTC 100.4. (See following entry.)

← CTC 100.4 submitted to CTF 100 report of security actions taken. In summary, "...considered possible that compromise of classified matter may have occurred prior to the ship's arrival at Malta, to an extent not possible to determine, but not thereafter. That all material then on board has been recovered and is in safekeeping and adequate action taken to avoid compromise while at Malta or in transit. The security clearances of all officers and men participating in the security action were appropriate for the level of classification involved." (CAPT Carl M. SMITH, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, letter of 23 June 1967.)

27 June ← forwarded to DIRNAVSECGRULANT a list of equipment which was on loan to LIBERTY

28 June (U) CHINFO announced press release of narrative account of Court of Inquiry and statement by CO, LIBERTY. (CHINFO 281930Z.)

30 June ← Mr. L. W. GOSS, of G43, NAVSECGRU Representative in NAVSHIP-ENGCEN fact-finding group and inspection party, submitted report of trip 19-23 June to LIBERTY to make preliminary assessment of damage to the electronic system aboard. Recommended that no consideration be given to salvage of electronic equipment in flooded spaces other than racks and miscellaneous hardware. All equipment in Radio spaces and below was completely submerged in water and oil for five days. While restoration of receivers might be possible, the cost would be prohibitive and probability that they would provide reliable service thereafter is highly unlikely. (NSGH/G43/kd memo 0399-67 of 30 June 1967.)

← CINCUSNAVEUR recommended LIBERTY for Presidential Unit Citation. (CINCUSNAVEUR 301304Z.)

← CO, LIBERTY, recommended for Medal of Honor. (CINCUSNAVEUR 301306Z.)

← Rep. T. P. O'NEAL (D-Mass.) visited LIBERTY 1030-1245Z accompanied by Ambassador FELDMAN and CDR J. K. FREEMAN, U. S. Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air, U. S. Embassy, Malta. Given brief guided tour of ship including area damaged by torpedo. Attack discussed in general terms. No substantive queries made. (USS LIBERTY 032005Z.)

(S) reviewing LIBERTY electronic installation requirements and planning to provide detailed information and recommendations.

3 July (U) NAVSECGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage
given to CNO Flag Pat (20 persons).

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5 July (U) CO, LIBERTY recommended 204 crew members for Purple Heart award. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

Note: (U) The figure of 204 applies to both military and civilian casualties and includes 34 deaths. (See Annex H.)

(U) GEN Lyman L. LEMNITZER, USA, USCINCEUR, expressed to CO LIBERTY, "deep admiration for the outstanding performance of the officers and crew of LIBERTY." (USCINCEUR 050716Z/ECCC 10529.)

~~(S)~~ LIBERTY repairs progress report: all bulkheads, racks and framing in place, welding 75 percent complete; estimate undock 12 July, completion 14 July. Projected cost: \$61,000. (USS LIBERTY 051515Z.)

6 July (U) RADM W. H. WEEKS, ACNO (Communication), COMNAVCOMM, expressed gratitude on behalf of all naval communicators to ADM G. W. ANDERSON, USN (Ret.), former CNO, for stating the facts in his letter to the editor of the Washington Post published 6 July under the title "The 'Liberty' Case". (See Annex I.) (RADM R. H. WEEKS letter of 6 July 1967.)

~~(S)~~ In view of projected completion date 14 July, LIBERTY announced plans to conduct main plant tests and dock trials 15 July and when RFS 16 July, depart Malta en route Norfolk, Va., with PAPAGO in company, ETA Norfolk 29 July 1967. (USS LIBERTY 061730Z.)

~~(S)~~ Joint action on LIBERTY incident communications recommendations commenced. Action officer: CDR McQUILLIN, Deputy Assistant Commander (Ops), Staff, COMNAVCOMM. (CNO 062137Z.)

7 July ~~(S)~~ COMSERVLANT advised that NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, was preparing time and cost estimates for repair and replacement of damaged equipment. Availability of replacement electronics equipment to restore LIBERTY to operational status as yet unknown. Planning to restore LIBERTY to configuration existing before battle damage. Intending to berth ship at Naval Station, Norfolk, to await status of replacement equipment. Requested cost estimates from NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, by 14 July 1967, and advice from Naval Ships Systems Command regarding availability of replacement equipment. (COMSERVLANT 071450Z.)

8 July ~~(S)~~ CNO advised CINCUSNAVEUR to initiate recommendations for the Purple Heart and other awards, as appropriate, regarding LIBERTY casualties. (CNO 081600Z.)

10 July ~~(S)~~ The June-July 1967 issue of the NAVSECGRU Bulletin was distributed. Coverage of LIBERTY incident was featured.

(U) CDR E. H. PLATZEK, USN, of G42, the NAVSECGRU staff representative and member of TC 100.4, submitted to DIRNAVSECGRU a report of the trip to Malta. (NSC/G42/cat memo 00362-67 of 10 July 1967.)

←(C) Op-61B advised that Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. Department of State, Navy and Marine Corps representatives coordinating claims, personal and governmental, for ultimate presentation to Israel by State. State preparing questionnaire to be forwarded to personnel injured and to next of kin of those killed. (Op-61B memo of 10 July 1967.)

12 July ←(C) LIBERTY reported all shell plates in place; final welding, radiography in progress. Estimated undocking 16 July. (USS LIBERTY 121230Z.)

13 July ←

14 July ←(C) In reply to CONSERVLANT 071150Z July, 1967, NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, estimated four months required to restore LIBERTY to predamage configuration at estimated cost of \$1,250,000, exclusive of costs of electronic equipment and antennas, certain allowance items, and repairs accomplished at Malta. (NAVSHIPYD NORVA 141905Z.)

←(C) CNO directed President, Inspection and Survey Board (PRESINSURV), to conduct survey of LIBERTY upon ship's return to CONUS to determine whether ship is fit for further naval service or can be made so without disproportionate costs. (CNO 141949Z.)

←(C) CINCLANTFLT advised CNO that he agreed with concurrent accomplishment of battle damage repair, overhaul and conversion to MSTS of LIBERTY if, in fact, conversion were decided upon; however, he questioned conversion to MSTS manning for ships such as LIBERTY which are exposed to enemy reaction. Stated that if LIBERTY had not been manned with a naval crew and thoroughly trained in damage control principles, the ship might have been lost. Proposed: if conversion decision, equipment availability and repairs delayed more than 30 days after LIBERTY arrival at Norfolk, consider lay up LIBERTY in reduced manning status pending decisions; if decision taken against conversion to MSTS, commence ordering personnel required to support regular overhaul; if decision taken to convert to MSTS, deliver LIBERTY soonest to conversion activity or appropriate naval shipyard for decommissioning and berthing until commencement of conversion. (CINCLANTFLT 142202Z.)

←(C) TC 100.4 and LIBERTY reported over 165 large canvas bags of assorted oil-and water-soaked paper and paper-like material recovered from damaged Research Operations Department spaces. LIBERTY RPS holdings were approximately 1000 items much of which unaccounted for. CNO proposed joint survey team of representatives from WIC, NSA and NAVSECGRU meet LIBERTY, sample residue, determine whether sorting possible and make recommendations for disposition of material. CDR D. F. YODER designate Op-94 action officer. (CNO 142227Z.)

11 July (U) NAVSEGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage
given to CNO Fleet Plot (50 persons).

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NAVY DEPARTMENT ARCHIVES

17 July ~~(S)~~ NSGH/G43 memorandum 0424-67 of 17 July 1967 provided information relating to the status of restoration of LIBERTY and advised that unless otherwise directed, G40 would plan to restore LIBERTY over an 18-month period which would include MSTTS conversion and redesign of mission equipment (6M dollars estimated) to meet requirements

~~(S)~~ 170800Z. LIBERTY position 37-45.2N/07-41.5E; PIM coastal, 180700Z 36-47N/00-45.5E, 15 knots. (USS LIBERTY 170700Z.)

~~(S)~~ 180800Z. LIBERTY position 36-47N/00-06W; PIM coastal, 35-36N/07-15W, 14.6 knots. (USS LIBERTY 180800Z.)

(U) PRESINSURV advised COMSERVLANT that LIBERTY survey scheduled for 14-18 August and that assistance from DIRNAVSECGRU would be requested. (PRESINSURV 181558Z.)

~~(S)~~ In reply to CINCLANTFLT 142202Z July 1967, CNO advised that the 6.1M dollars previously listed in FY68 FMP for modernization of LIBERTY was reprogrammed at apportionment time to fleet maintenance; PCR submitted to OSD to convert ACTR's to MSTTS manning as yet not addressed by OSD; decision not expected before August. Earliest start date for conversion to MSTTS manning estimated as June 1968 due to lack of plans. LIBERTY scheduled for survey. OPNAV re-examining conversion decision. Stated that the only feasible course of action was to berth LIBERTY at Naval Station, Norfolk, and retain full crew aboard pending solutions to problems, and unless otherwise directed place LIBERTY in reduced manning status 1 September 1967. (CNO 182115Z.)

~~(S)~~ NAVSHIPSYSCOM stated that determination of equipments for LIBERTY research area had not been made by higher authority. Believed that estimated engineering effort involved would exceed 30 days proposed in CINCLANTFLT 142202Z July 1967. Concurred in CINCLANTFLT reduced-manning proposal. (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 182152Z.)

19 July ~~(S)~~ Chief of Naval Personnel recommended to CNO that personnel recommended by CO, LIBERTY, be awarded Purple Heart. (Chief of Naval Personnel first endorsement of 19 July 1967 on USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

18 July (e) NAVSICGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage
given to NSA COMSEC ~~staff~~ and NAVSICGRU
G60 staff (28 persons).

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... ..

21 July (U) NAVSHIPSYSKOMHQ estimated scrap value of LIBERTY at 75 to 90K dollars. (NAVSHIPSYSKOMHQ 211944Z.)

(U) LIBERTY was directed to conduct informal survey of all electronic and electromechanical equipment, less RPS material, remaining in Research Radio Room No. 1 and was authorized to dispose of that equipment in accordance with findings of survey. (NAVSHIPSYSKOMHQ 212053Z.)

(U) Regarding disposal of equipment by LIBERTY, CNO directed that all mission-oriented equipment be disposed of by jettisoning in deep water prior to arrival in Norfolk. (CNO 212324Z; CNO 220150Z July 1967.)

22 July (U) Hostile fire pay authorized for LIBERTY crew members: prorated from 1 June 1967 for those killed; for entire month of June for those wounded; members hospitalized entitled to draw until hospitalization terminated or 30 September 1967, whichever earlier. (CINCUSNAVEUR 221158Z.)

23 July (U) 230800Z. LIBERTY position 35-07.2N/034-53W; PIM RH (thumb line route) 35-00N/042-00W, 14.1 knots. (USS LIBERTY 231006Z.)

24 July (U)

25 July (U) Estimated cost of replacing LIBERTY with similar hull and same characteristics, 13.5M dollars, assuming reuse of LIBERTY equipment where economically advantageous. Estimated cost of overhaul and repair, 9.65M dollars, including refurbishment and replacement of electronics equipment and restoring research spaces to original configuration. (NAVSHIPSYSKOMHQ 251530Z.)

26 July (U) 260800Z. LIBERTY position 35-10N/55-03.3W; PIM RH 35N/62-17W, 14 knots. (USS LIBERTY 261110Z.)

(U) DIRNAVSECGRULANT was informed that following personnel would visit LIBERTY for one-day visit on 3 August 1967 to observe blast effects on crypto equipment:

CDR D.L. COOPER
Mr. G.F. VAN WINKLE, GS-14
Mr. D. BINDER, GS-14 (Alternate)
Mr. J.L. HATFIELD, GS-13

NAVSECENGRFAC
NAVSECENGRFAC
NAVSECENGRFAC
NAVELECSYSKOMHQ

27 July (c) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ briefing on LIBERTY damage
given to Deputy Director, NSA, for COMSEC
and key staff ~~etc~~ (four persons).

CONFIDENTIAL

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28 July
2 August

Mr. G.G. SCHLAPO, GS-12
Mr. J.M. TRAVERS, GS-11

NAVELECSYSCOMHQ
CNO

(CNO 271534Z.)

(U) CINCLANTFLT 271846Z described LIBERTY homecoming arrangements. Welcoming party to include VADM F.L. ASHWORTH, Deputy CINCLANTFLT; local city officials; CAPT BEERS, Chief of Staff, COMSERVANT; Miss NORFOLK and/or Miss HOSPITALITY and Mrs. McGONAGLE to board the ship as soon as the brow is over, for informal welcome on quarterdeck, with no speeches. CO, welcoming party and press retire to wardroom for interview and coffee.

28 July (C) CNO approved the award of the Purple Heart to military personnel recommended by CO, LIBERTY. Award action for civilian personnel to be accomplished by separate action. (CNO second endorsement Serial 0119P09B2 of 28 July 1967 on USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

29 July (C) LIBERTY MOVREP; LIBERTY and PARAGO arrived Little Creek, Va., 292100Z. (USS LIBERTY 292100Z.)

31 July (C) Joint survey team met aboard LIBERTY to make sampling of bagged residue of classified material. Team membership:

CDR D.F. YODER	NAVSECGRU (G12)
LT J.J. BURKE	NAVSECGRU (G50)
LTJG D.R. MCGUIRE	NAVSECSTA N60* (G60)
CT1 J.L. JETT	NAVSECGRU (G60)
CT1 W.A. BRUDEL	NAVSECSTA N60* (G60)
CT2 F.M. DURST	NAVSECGRU (G50)
CT3 D.H. WILSON	NAVSECGRU (G50)
Mr. B.(n) DURHAM, CG-14	NSA (S)
LT J.T. MCTIGHE	NSA (G)
S/A J.C. BOHLER	NAVINSERVO Norfolk**
S/A J.C. DUNTON	NAVINSERVO Norfolk**
LT R.A. HUTCHINSON	CINCLANTFLT

* Representing G60
** Representing NAVINTCOM

(NSG/G12 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967; USS LIBERTY 021630Z August 1967.)

2 August (C) Regarding survey of classified material conducted 31 July 1967, LIBERTY reported that bagged, oil-soaked and mutilated residue inspected; estimated 80 percent of material unidentifiable, some identifiable; some partial and complete RPS publications recovered. Survey team recommended: no attempt be made at bag-by-bag search for sole purpose of identifying classified

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material; CO, LIBERTY, request authority to destroy bagged material on board; in process of burning, effort be made to dump each bag to determine whether identifiable RPS items can be accounted for prior to destruction. Accordingly, CO, LIBERTY requested authority to destroy without further reporting or investigation the bagged residue held and requested guidance concerning disposition of identifiable but damaged RPS items. (USS LIBERTY 021630Z; NSG/G2 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967.)

3 August (U) Trip report was submitted by CDR D.F. YODER concerning visit to LIBERTY by the survey team which sampled the residual classified material (NSG/G12 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967.)

5 August ~~(S)~~ CNO requested DIRNSA concurrence in authorizing LIBERTY to destroy classified material discussed in USS LIBERTY 021630Z August 1967. (CNO 050015Z.)

7 August ~~(S)~~ ALUSNA Tel Aviv^v received lengthy English translation of findings of Israeli Court of Inquiry reported by USDAO Tel Aviv 181030Z June 1967. Court found that no individual culpability exists. IDF desires no publicity regarding inquiry or proceedings and requests U.S. Navy handle report as confidential information to preclude publicity in the U.S. IDF representative stated that findings fully and candidly admit some confusion and ineptness of IDF Navy which IDF particularly does not want revealed for national security reasons. Stated "The report leaves the IDF Navy naked." A copy of findings being forwarded to Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C., but the only copies being forwarded to any U.S. government agency were the two copies given to ALUSNA (Tel Aviv). IDF would answer any questions but requested they be forwarded via ALUSNA. (USDAO Tel Aviv 080810Z August 1967.)

Note: A synopsis of the findings of the Israeli Court of Inquiry has been included in the entries under 18 June.

8 August (U) Certain NAVSECGRU key personnel reviewed the original report of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

~~(S)~~ DIRNSA concurred in the destruction of bagged classified material residue held by LIBERTY. (DIRNSA 081648Z/ADN/112-67.)

10 August ~~(S)~~ NSG/G42 memorandum 00399-67 of 10 August 1967 to NAVSECGRU programmers reported that the program to convert Navy AGTR's to MSTIS operation was no longer active; therefore, funds programmed for that purpose appear to be the logical source of money needed to restore LIBERTY or to activate a similar hull, depending on findings of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Recommended that NAVSECGRU begin the work of restoring or replacing LIBERTY as soon as practicable.

NAVSECSTAG

put in and equipment

~~(S)~~ CNO authorized LIBERTY to destroy bagged residue of classified material; requested inventory of documents held as well as those identified in the destruction process; identifiable RPS items to be held for pickup by NAVSECSTAG and made available for inspection by DIRNSA. (CNO 102136Z.)

~~(S)~~ COMNAVINTCOM concurred in LIBERTY destruction of bagged residue of classified materials. (COMNAVINTCOM 102231Z SPINTCOM.)

14 August (U) A survey and material inspection of LIBERTY commenced in accordance with CNO 141949Z July 1967. (PRESINSURV speedletter Serial 914 of 18 August 1967.)

15 August ~~(S)~~ NSG/GD memorandum 0286-67 of 15 August 1967 to G40 indicated that to restore LIBERTY, NAVSHIPS should prepare a PCR which includes all costs associated with the restoration. Costs would include an input from G40 giving NAVSECGRU requirements.

16 August ~~(S)~~ LIBERTY completed destruction of bagged residue of classified material. Each bag ripped open and contents perused prior to burning. No additional RPS items found. (USS LIBERTY 181412Z August 1967.)

17 August (U) LIBERTY won the Atlantic Fleet Battle Efficiency Award for fiscal year 1967. (CINCLANTFLT 171126Z.)

18 August (U) PRESINSURV speedletter Ser 914 of 18 August 1967 reported that a survey and material inspection of LIBERTY was conducted 14-17 August 1967. It is the opinion of the Board that LIBERTY is fit for further service, and, if refitted with equivalent or up-dated electronic equipment, would be able to carry out all assigned missions and tasks.

(U) LCDR A.F. HIMMERICH of G42, NAVSECGRU representative on the Board of Inspection and Survey, submitted a trip report on his visit to Norfolk to participate in the survey and inspection. (NSG/G42 memorandum 419-67 of 18 August 1967.)

21 August (U) A group interment service was held at Arlington National Cemetery for the following personnel who lost their lives on board LIBERTY:

- CT1 James Mahlon LUPTON
- CT3 Jerry Lee GOSS
- CTSN Carl Christian NYGREN
- CTSA Lawrence Paul HAYDEN
- CTSA David Walter MARLBOROUGH
- SGT Jack Lewis RAPER


The remains were enclosed in a single casket. Catholic and

James Mahlon Lupton

Vertical text on the right edge of the page.

31 August (ex) Op-2 memorandum No. 01396.2-67 of
31 August to Op-94 recommended inactivation
of LIBERTY, and initiation of programming
action to restore ~~LIBERTY~~ the lost ASB
capability in FY69 by replacement or
repair of damage.

Jr. Research Paper



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1 September (~~(S)~~ NAVSECENGFAC requests) CNO
for disposition instructions regarding
LIBERTY cryptographic equipment
referred to in CNO 102136Z
August 1967. Informal liaison
with NSA indicated that NSA
had no further interest in
the equipment with the
possible exception of the KAW1.
(NAVSECENGFAC 01449Z.)

6 September (1954) COMSEC material ^{which} ~~was~~ ~~was~~ removed from LIBERTY and held by A'PS was reviewed by NSA which requested that removed from KUI-37 be transferred to NSA, and concurred in destruction of the remainder of COMSEC aids and equipments (DIRNSA 0620367 / S110332.)

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Protestant services were held in Fort Myer Chapel at 0945, followed by interment with full military honors. (BUYERS ~~page~~ of 17 July 1967.)
Under 41 211.1000

- 24 August ~~(C)~~ CNO (Op-04) memorandum Serial 0653-434P of 24 August 1967 to Op-03 via Op-94 recommended, in view of lack of funds to restore LIBERTY to its configuration prior to battle damage, that the ship be inactivated commencing as soon after 1 September 1967 as is feasible. The only alternative is to leave the ship in a reduced-manning status until problem areas are resolved.
- 25 August ~~(C)~~ CNO (Op-94) memorandum Serial 063-67 of 25 August 1967 to Op-03 expressed nonconcurrence in Op-04 recommendation to inactivate LIBERTY. Recommended ship be placed in reduced-manning status on 1 September 1967 until major problem area of funding is resolved.
- 29 August ~~(C)~~ CO, LIBERTY, submitted to CNO, a list of material sighted during destruction of residue of classified material. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 005 of 29 August 1967.)
- 30 August ~~(C)~~ DIRNAVSECGRU forwarded to COMNAVSHIPSYSKOM an inventory list of LIBERTY equipment, including costs, presumed lost. (NSG/G42 transmittal sheet Serial 054029 of 30 August 1967.)
- 31 August ~~(C)~~ CO, LIBERTY, submitted to CNO, a list of material still held on board LIBERTY. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 009 of 30 August 1967.)
- 1 September (U) COMNAVSHIPSYSKOM forwarded to JAG cost estimates for the repair of damages inflicted on LIBERTY by Israeli air and naval forces on 8 June 1967. The estimated cost of restoring LIBERTY and equipment to same condition existing prior to the attack: \$5,424,202. (COMNAVSHIPSYSKOM letter Serial 527-1450 of 1 September 1967.)
- 8 September ~~(C)~~ NAVSECGRU attempts to find funds for restoration of LIBERTY raised the question of essentiality of this particular ship. A strong statement of essentiality was requested (DIRNAVSECGRU 082228Z.)
- 14 September ~~(C)~~ Final disposition of LIBERTY RPS material: certain items forwarded to NSA; NAVSECSTA authorized to destroy all RPS material recovered from LIBERTY. (CNO 141319Z.)
- 15 September (U) An ad hoc committee met to commence evaluation of lessons learned from the LIBERTY incident. (G30 memorandum Serial PP00257-67 of 5 September 1967.)
Serial

26 September (e) Change in policy limiting RPS
holdings in AGTR's and T. AG's to
effective positions plus three months
ROB unless conditions are such
that holding during displacement
is impossible. (COMNAVCO: 261457Z.)

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26 September (c) Op-94 advised Op-03 that Liberty
was a team resource provided in
response to a national requirement,
~~and~~ therefore Op-94 ~~is~~ does not
have the authority to direct
investigation. In ~~the~~ light of
essentiality of this resource
assigned, a PCR is being prepared
to attempt to limit restriction
of Liberty. FBI is about
to be advised in this regard.
(Op-94 memorandum Serial 01903074 of
26 September 1954.)

26 September (e) Change in policy limited RPS
holdings in AGTR's and 7-AG's to
effective editions plus three more
ROB unless conditions are such
that supply during deployment
is impossible. (COMNAVCOM 261487Z)

Jr. Research Paper

JAMES W. LEMMES

Study Materials

30 September
1 October

19 September (U) Representative RARICK (D-La.) stated that "the attack on the LIBERTY warrants a full and complete investigation by the Congress... This should be done promptly to avoid another such incident that could be made to serve as a Pearl Harbor for World War III." He inserted several articles and an American Legion resolution on the incident in the Record. (Digest of Items of Interest, Congressional Record No. 147, 19 September 1967, submitted as OLA Congressional Information Report No. 160 of 20 September 1967.)

20 September (G)

Fulfillment

25 September (G) advised that a PCR was being prepared to obtain funds to overhaul and repair LIBERTY as soon as possible. Final action awaits DOD action on PCR. (CNO 2522492.)

4/17/68


3 October (G) OSD decision on the Navy program submission for AGTR's directed that the five AGTR's continue to be Navy manned rather than be converted to MSTC operation, with the proviso that the proposed conversion to MSTC manning could be submitted in the next programming cycle without prejudice. Current OPNAV planning is to retain all five AGTR's as fleet units. (CNO 0312552.)

5 October (G) Regarding LIBERTY restoration costs, CNO requested CHNAVHAT to provide essential cost data for: cost of restoration in accordance with original characteristics; cost of restoration with up-dated electronic configuration; cost of conversion of a replacement VICTORY hull with up-dated electronic configuration. Estimate breakdown to include specific cost of following aspects: structural, electrical, piping, sheet metal, machinery, electronics (including all radio research areas), antennas (including AN/SRR-20 pedestal and antenna). (CNO 0519172.)

James M. Jones

Research Papers

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CAPTAIN WILLIAM LOREN MCGONAGLE
UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain William L. McGonagle was born in Wichita, Kansas, on November 19, 1925. He attended high school in Coachella Valley, California; he also attended the University of Redlands, and the University of Southern California. He received his commission as an Ensign in the U. S. Naval Reserve upon graduating from the University of Southern California in June, 1947.


During the late 1940's and early 1950's he served at sea aboard the destroyer USS FRANK KNOX, the minesweeper USS KITE, the heavy cruiser USS ROCHESTER, and at the U. S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany, where he was in charge of minesweepers clearing the Baltic and North Seas of mines planted during World War II.

From 1957 to 1959 he commanded the fleet tug USS MATACO. In July 1961, after an assignment as an NROTC Instructor at the University of Idaho, he took command of the submarine tender USS RECLAIMER.

Following a tour of duty on the staff of the Commander, Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, he assumed command of the intelligence ship USS LIBERTY in April 1966. He was in command of the LIBERTY when she was attacked and damaged by jet aircraft and torpedoes in the Sinai Peninsula on June 8, 1967. At present, Captain McGonagle is the prospective Commanding Officer of the ammunition ship USS NILAUPA, now under construction.

Captain McGonagle is married to the former Emma Jean Steinhilber of Glendale, California. They have three children: Cindy Lou, Sandra Sue and William Loren McGonagle, Jr. Their official home address is Indio, California.

The Congressional Medal of Honor



Presentation by
The Honorable Paul H. Ignatius
Secretary of the Navy
to
Captain William Loren McGonagle
United States Navy

★
ADMIRAL LEUTZE PARK
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
HEADQUARTERS FOR THE COMMANDANT
NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON

★
1130 Tuesday, 11 June 1968

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Annex A

Historical Sketch of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

(U) The USS LIBERTY began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May, 1945, by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Oregon, and served in the Atlantic and the Pacific during World War II and in Suyong Bay, Pusan, during the Korean conflict. She was subsequently moth-balled by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Selected by the Navy for conversion to a technical research ship, she was delivered to the Willamette Iron and Steel Company, Portland, Oregon, in February, 1963. The conversion culminated in commissioning on 30 December 1964, at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, as the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5), named in honor of ten U.S. cities and towns of the same name.

(U) The ship was internally organized into five departments: Operations, Research Operations, Deck, Engineering, Supply. The Research Operations Department was further functionally divided into four divisions

(U) LIBERTY departed Bremerton in January, 1965, transited the Panama Canal at which time she joined SERVRON 5, a Squadron subordinate to COMSERVLANT, and arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, her permanent home port, on 23 February 1965. Fleet trials and training were successfully completed in April, 1965, in the Guantanamo Bay area.

(U) The waters off the coast of West Africa became LIBERTY's operating area, where four deployments were completed. It was during the fifth deployment to these waters that the ship was diverted on 24 May 1967 to the Eastern Mediterranean due to the Middle East crisis.

(U) Unclassified statement of mission: To conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy electronic research projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems, such as satellite communications.

(U) Personnel Allowance

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
General Service	9	151
Research Operations Department	—	—

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(U) Ship's Characteristics

Length	455 ft.
Beam	62 ft.
Draft, Full Load	29 ft.
Displacement, Full Load	11,500 tons
Maximum Speed	18.5 kts.

Appendices


Appendix I: Photograph of USS LIBERTY

Appendix II: Research Operations Department Personnel Information

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APPENDIX II to Annex A

Research Operations Department Personnel Information

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
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The area shaded in orange indicates the operating areas assigned to LIBERTY by JCB (JCB 0115452/JCB 0726 June 67 and JCB 0779308/JCB 7937 June 1967).
 Lines between points A, B and C were intended LIBERTY track during forenoon and afternoon watches 8 June 1967. On arrival, point C reverse course to B, to A and then back and forth along these lines during entire stay in operating area. JCB's had verbal orders that at no time was ship to be to the south of a line connecting these points.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 ANTALYA KORFEZI
 TO
 ALEXANDRIA
 INCLUDING
 CYPRUS

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Appendix I to Annex B

Time Zones

<u>ZONE +4</u> <u>LOCAL TIME</u> <u>WASHINGTON, D.C.</u>	<u>ZONE +0-</u> <u>GREENWICH MEAN TIME</u>	<u>ZONE -2</u> <u>LOCAL TIME</u> <u>MID-EAST</u>
2000 DAY BEFORE	0000	0200 SAME DAY
2100 DAY BEFORE	0100	0300 SAME DAY
2200 DAY BEFORE	0200	0400 SAME DAY
2300 DAY BEFORE	0300	0500 SAME DAY
0000 SAME DAY	0400	0600 SAME DAY
0100 SAME DAY	0500	0700 SAME DAY
0200 SAME DAY	0600	0800 SAME DAY
0300 SAME DAY	0700	0900 SAME DAY
0400 SAME DAY	0800	1000 SAME DAY
0500 SAME DAY	0900	1100 SAME DAY
0600 SAME DAY	1000	1200 SAME DAY
0700 SAME DAY	1100	1300 SAME DAY
0800 SAME DAY	1200	1400 SAME DAY
0900 SAME DAY	1300	1500 SAME DAY
1000 SAME DAY	1400	1600 SAME DAY
1100 SAME DAY	1500	1700 SAME DAY
1200 SAME DAY	1600	1800 SAME DAY
1300 SAME DAY	1700	1900 SAME DAY
1400 SAME DAY	1800	2000 SAME DAY
1500 SAME DAY	1900	2100 SAME DAY
1600 SAME DAY	2000	2200 SAME DAY
1700 SAME DAY	2100	2300 SAME DAY
1800 SAME DAY	2200	0000 NEXT DAY
1900 SAME DAY	2300	0100 NEXT DAY

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Annex C

Command and Control Relationships

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Appendix I to Annex C

Scheduling in CINCLANT's Area of Responsibility

(C)

Planning and Approval of Routine Monthly Schedules

states requirement to CINCLANT.

CINCLANT passes to CINCLANTFLT for planning action.

CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for planning action.

COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for planning action.

COMSERVRON 8 prepares plan to fulfill requirements including dates, areas of operations, CPA's in transit, and passes to COMSERVLANT for approval.

COMSERVLANT requests CINCLANTFLT approval.

CINCLANTFLT requests CINCLANT approval.

CINCLANT requests JCS(JRC) approval.

JCS(JRC) obtains CNO concurrence, approves proposal and passes to CINCLANT for action.

CINCLANT sends message to CINCLANTFLT directing action.

CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for action.

COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for action.


COMSERVRON 8 issues sailing orders to AGTR's.

Changes to Approved Schedules

states requirement to JCS(JRC).

JCS(JRC) obtains CNO concurrence, approves change and requests CINCLANT to take action.

CINCLANT sends message to CINCLANTFLT directing action.



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CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for action.
COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for action.
COMSERVRON 8 issues sailing orders to AGTR's.

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Appendix II to Annex C

Scheduling in USCINCEUR's Area of Responsibility

← JCS 062050Z June 1967 prescribed procedures for developing schedules while LIBERTY was operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

Planning and Approval of Routine Monthly Schedule

state requirements to CINCUSNAVEUR including recommended ports of call.

CINCUSNAVEUR to prepare schedule to fulfill requirements including dates, areas of operations, CPA's, ports of call for logistics and pass the plan to USCINCEUR.

USCINCEUR to review and pass schedule to JCS(JRC) for approval. Proposed schedules were required by JCS no later than 20th of the month for which the schedule was submitted.

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval or modifications.

USCINCEUR to pass for action.

CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

Modification of Approved Schedule Due to Changes in Technical Tasking

state requirement to JCS(JRC).

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of modification.

USCINCEUR to pass for action.


CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

Modification of Approved Schedule Involving A Change of More Than 48 Hours for Operational Reasons

CINCUSNAVEUR was to pass proposed modification to USCINCEUR.

USCINCEUR to review and pass to JCS(JRC) for approval.

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval.



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USCINCEUR to pass for action.

CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

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Appendix III to Annex C

Pertinent Messages

Note: A gisting of each message is included in the Chronology of Events. All messages 1967.

COMSEVVRON 8 281502Z April

COMSERVRON 8 240020Z May

USS LIBERTY 241732Z May

JCS 291602Z/JCS 6499 May

CINCLANTFLT 300040Z May

COMSERVRON 9 300202Z May

USS LIBERTY 300606Z May

USCINCEUR 300932Z/ECJC/JRC 08588 May

CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z May

JCS 010309Z/JCS 6714 June

USCINCEUR 010419Z/ECJC/JRC 08686 June

USS LIBERTY 010712Z June

CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z June

JCS 011545Z/JCS 6724 June

CINCUSNAVEUR 012120Z June

CINCUSNAVEUR 020717Z June

USS LIBERTY 022108Z June

USS LIBERTY 032028Z June

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION E.O. 13526-1
DOES NOT APPLY

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USS LIBERTY 042050Z June

USS LIBERTY 051934Z June

CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z June

USS LIBERTY 061844Z June

USS LIBERTY 062000Z June

USS LIBERTY 062036Z June

JCS 062050Z/JCS 7206 June

COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z June

USS LIBERTY 070908Z June

COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June

JCS 072230Z/JCS 7337 June

JCS 080110Z/JCS 7347 June

USCINCEUR 080625Z/ECJC/JRC 09045 June

COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June

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Annex D

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Annex E

Communications Arrangements

Communications capabilities which existed within the Research Operations Department spaces of the USS LIBERTY known as Crypto I and Crypto II

With the exception of those low-level authentication and operational code systems held by Radio Central or CIC personnel, all classified communications were conducted within Crypto I and II by appropriately cleared personnel. The various cryptographic systems were common to with designated keying material control and distribution normally providing limitation and segregation of the functions; i.e., the NAVSECGRUDEPT used the same system as GENSER counterparts but with different key lists.

The available equipment included teletype (TTY) components for processing incoming and outgoing traffic, receivers, converters, comparators, as well as associated power supplies, patch panels, and multicouplers.

Circuit capabilities included point-to-point TTY circuits, both medium-frequency and high-frequency, and Technical Research Ship Special Communications (TRSSCOMM) (moon relay). GENSER broadcast receive terminals were controlled in Crypto I; those of the Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Broadcast, in Crypto II. An off-line ADONIS capability was provided for "backup."

Status of communications from reports available to COMNAVCOMM (G20)

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR recommended that a ROMULUS-covered, point-to-point coordination circuit be established between LIBERTY and G20 favored keeping the one ROMULUS equipment available for OPSCOMS use, assuming LIBERTY would soon receive the necessary keying material, and therefore recommended the use of ORESTES on the LIBERTY- circuit.

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requested permission to operate a "send-only" ORESTES CIRCUIT to LIBERTY to alleviate the overload on the OPINTEL Broadcast and to increase its traffic-handling capability. DIRNAVSECGRUEUR concurred. No evidence was received by G20 that this additional capability was ever employed.

reported daily schedules via TRSSCOMM would be kept following temporary repairs at Rota. Alternate communications were to be via NAVSECGRU circuits. Continuous guard was maintained on the XOPI Broadcast. GENSER coverage was the KRTT broadcast and the ship advised that a shift to a JRTT broadcast was scheduled commencing at 070001Z.

advised that TRSSCOMM was down for an indefinite period due to hydraulic trouble. Daily communications schedules were being maintained with . . . An attempt was to have been made in GENSER channels to activate a circuit with . . . on or about 6 June.

requested an "on-call" circuit to be established via NAVCOMMSTA Greece, contingent upon adequate facilities being available at NAVCOMMSTA's Greece and Morocco.

advised "TRSSCOMM: HYDRAULIC TROUBLE REPAIRED, EXPERIENCING TROUBLE POWER SUPPLY. COMPLETION REPAIRS UNKNOWN. SKEDS WITH PATCHED THROUGH NAVCOMMSTA GREECE. CANCEL CKT REQ WITH . . ."

Note: The cancellation of the request for a circuit with . . . apparently refers to the mention made of such a circuit in CRITICOMM, for no evidence of a request in GENSER channels was received by G20.

advised that . . . was keeping a daily schedule with using a RATT ROM/LUS circuit.

Communications Officer (LT ALLEN) advised that the last TRSSCOMM schedule was from the period 061315Z-0160435Z with eight messages received. Although a schedule was set for 7 June, no contact with the LIBERTY via TRSSCOMM was made after 6 June.

GENSER communications following the departure of LIBERTY from Rota

Initial reception via "covered broadcast" was of the KRTT from NAVCOMMSTA Morocco. Liberty advised on 2 June that the broadcast guard would shift to JRTT from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 070001Z. Commencing at that time (070001Z), GENSER traffic of a classified nature up to Secret would then be routed on point-to-point circuits to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for introduction into the broadcast.

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COMSIXTHFLT requested LIBERTY to advise whether keying material was available to copy the Broadcast one of the few GENSER broadcasts cleared for Top Secret information. LIBERTY did not receive COMSIXTHFLT's message until 13 June upon arrival at Malta, nor did LIBERTY have the necessary keying material aboard.

Pertinent extracts from EASTLANT TACOMREPT's submitted daily by NAVCOMMSTA Morocco to a predesignated list of addressees

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO FROM BEGINNING OF RADAY TO 0615Z..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 020351Z June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO FROM BEGINNING OF RADAY TO 0738Z..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 050230Z June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO 0338Z secured 1136Z..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 060230Z June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO 0750Z-1140Z WITH NCS GREECE PASSING KEYING BOTH WAYS IN SUPPORT OF THIS TERMINATION..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 070215Z June 67 GENSER.)

Note: Although the reports for the radio day 7 June did not mention a termination with LIBERTY, it is assumed that the ship did hold a schedule, for USS LIBERTY 070908Z June 67 GENSER (the ship's 070800Z position report) was received locally at 030052Z.

"...USS LIBERTY INVOLVED IN DISTRESS CIRCUMSTANCES DURING WHICH CAPABILITIES LIMITED TO ONE TRANSMITTER. NCS GREECE MAINTAINED DIRECT VOICE COMM THROUGHOUT THE INITIAL PERIOD OF DISTRESS. OTHER COMSTAS ALERTED TO PROVIDE SUCH ADDITIONAL COMM ASSISTANCE AS NECESSARY. DISTRESS TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED BY MOROCCO/GREECE WAS RELAYED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY VIA CAMS/CALS CIRCUITS..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 090140Z June 67 GENSER.)

Summary

The LIBERTY operated in the normal manner up to the time of the attack. Communications were on a scheduled basis with ~~NAVSECGRU~~ passed on the NAVSECGRU point-to-point circuit from the ship. The ship was not in continuous communications with her, rather, for several hours daily, as scheduled. These schedules are normally held at times when the probability of interference (by the ship's transmitters) with her is reduced. Broadcasts were used as the primary means for command and control coordination.

Apparently, the ship guarded tactical voice nets in Radio Central and employed this capability after the attack. The initial reception of the message (voice) which reported the attack was on the EO4.04 circuit, the CINCUSNAVEUR High Command Net. Since the frequencies assigned for this ~~net~~

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circuit are in the 2-30-megacycle spectrum, it is presumed that the URC-32 transmitter was employed for all communications immediately following the attack.

Appendix I: Explanation of Terms

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Appendix I to Annex E

Explanation of Terms

JRTT Designator for the general service (GENSER) broadcast controlled at NAVCOMMSTA Asmara. Cleared for Secret.

KRTT Designator for the GENSER broadcast controlled at NAVCOMMSTA Morocco. Cleared for Secret.

OPINTEL Broadcast Operational Intelligence Broadcast. An on-line, 100-word-per-minute broadcast

RADAY Radio Day.

SCT Single-channel teletype.

TACOMREPT Tactical Communications Report. A report submitted daily, covering a 24-hour period, generated immediately following the end of the RADAY covered, by those NAVCOMMSTA's controlling various ship-to-shore facilities, including broadcasts, point-to-point terminations, transmitter or receiver facilities, etc. Reports include information concerning individual units terminating circuits, specific details of support of the fleet by shore stations, broadcast conditions, number of units copying broadcasts, etc. NAVCOMMSTA Morocco is the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) control.

TRSSCOMM Technical Research Ship Special Communications. A system which employs ultrahigh frequencies (1800-2600 megacycle range) and requires special receiving and transmitting equipment. The capability is currently limited to five shipboard installations, including that aboard LIBERTY.

Asmara, Ethiopia.

U. S. Naval Security
Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA Morocco.

U. S. Naval Security
Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA Washington.

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USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

XOPI or XRI

Short titles for the OPINTEL Broadcast controlled
from NAVSECGRUDEPT, NAVCOMMSIA Morocco.

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Annex F

RPS Matters

An attempt is made in this annex to report the RPS situation aboard LIBERTY at the time of the attack and to describe efforts expended to account for all registered material after the attack.

The nature of LIBERTY's operations made normal resupply of RPS material somewhat difficult and at times impossible. In March, 1965, LIBERTY requested and obtained from CNO, authority to hold six months of reserve-on-board (ROB) RPS material. As a result of the attack, the arrangement which had proved so beneficial to the ship became a liability, for 727 items of RPS material had to be accounted for.

Upon receipt of LIBERTY's initial damage reports, CNO directed RPIO Norfolk to withhold further shipments of RPS material to LIBERTY (CNO 091944Z June 1967). Initial and early amplifying reports generated optimism regarding the possibility of accounting for the RPS material without too much difficulty; however, many messages were to follow, the forerunner of which was DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 101316Z June 1967 CRITICOMM, which would indicate the seriousness of the situation from the standpoint of accountability of the vast amount of RPS material held by LIBERTY.

USS LIBERTY 200735Z June 1967 was the initial compromise report submitted to DIRNSA. The degree of loss and disarray was apparent when the ship included in its message a request that NAVSECSTA forward as soon as possible a copy of LIBERTY's current inventory of RPS holdings. On 23 June, DIRNSA requested LIBERTY to identify the material which could not be accounted for; LIBERTY complied on 29 June. NSA was particularly concerned that much of the fleet broadcast JASON material was unaccounted for and informed CNO that this material had been declared compromised and directed supersession action (DIRNSA 302025Z June 1967). CNO took appropriate follow-up action.

From this point until mid-July, DIRNSA, CNO, NAVSECSTA and LIBERTY were involved in an all-out effort to reconcile the ship's RPS records but without success. On 14 July, CNO recommended that a joint survey team meet LIBERTY upon her arrival at Norfolk to take a sampling of the residue of RPS material aboard to determine whether sorting were possible, and to submit recommendations for further action or disposition of the material. Between 14 July and 2 August, arrangements were made for a joint survey team of representatives of NSA, NAVSECGRU, NIC and NAVSECSTA to visit LIBERTY. A survey was conducted on 31 July, the results of which were reported by USS LIBERTY 021630Z August 1967. It was estimated that 80 percent of the residue of RPS material was unidentifiable and a recommendation was submitted that no attempt be made to conduct a bag-by-bag

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search for the sole purpose of identifying classified material. LIBERTY's commanding officer requested authority of CNO to destroy the bagged residue without further reporting or investigation and requested guidance concerning the disposition of any identifiable but damaged RPS items discovered during the process of destruction. CNO 050015Z August 1967 requested concurrence in this proposal by NSA and NIC. DIRNSA concurred in LIBERTY's proposal and further recommended that all remaining COMSEC material aboard LIBERTY at the time of the attack, excluding that which was bagged, be forwarded to NSA for examination (DIRNSA 081648Z August 1967). On 10 August, CNO authorized LIBERTY to destroy the bagged residue of classified material and requested that identifiable RPS publications and equipment be held for pick-up by NAVSECSTA. The equipment was to be further transferred to the Naval Security Engineering Facility (NAVSECENGFAC) where it would be available for inspection by NSA. LIBERTY destroyed the bagged material on 16 August. On 1 September, NAVSECENGFAC requested disposition instructions from CNO regarding the cryptographic equipment. DIRNSA 062036Z September 1967 concurred in the destruction of the equipment and CNO 141319Z September 1967 authorized destruction of all remaining LIBERTY RPS publications and equipment, bringing to a close all attempts to account for LIBERTY RPS holdings.

As a result of the LIBERTY RPS problem, it was decided to reduce TRS holdings to effective editions plus three months of ROB material in all cases in which it is possible to resupply ships of this type during a cruise. COMNAVCOMM 261437Z September 1967 advised all AGTR's and T-AG's, fleet commanders in chief and service force commanders of the new RPS policy.

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

(U)

Annex G

Damage and Restoration

(U) Initial reports of the attack on LIBERTY indicated that she was listing badly. COMSIXTHFLT reported (SITREP 8/081415Z) that a torpedo had struck amidships on the starboard side, flooding had been stopped, the ship had a nine-degree list, and the radar, gyro and fathometer were inoperative. A fleet ocean tug, USS PAPAGO (ATF 160), was diverted to assist LIBERTY. LIBERTY advised that she was unable to carry out her mission: extensive superficial damage topside had been sustained; lower deck spaces forward had been destroyed; drydocking and extensive refitting would be required. Research Radio I, the Coordination Center and Crypto had taken the direct torpedo hit and spaces were flooded.

(U) At 090425Z, USS DAVIS (DD937) and USS MASSEY (DD78) rendezvoused with LIBERTY. DAVIS came alongside and provided effective damage control assistance; however, an oil leak persisted. COMSIXTHFLT personally inspected the damage at 091200Z at which time flooded areas were reported to be 90 per cent full of water and oil. PAPAGO joined the escort unit at 091500Z and took station in LIBERTY's wake; MASSEY was detached.

(C) The first damage survey by the Fleet Maintenance Officer was reported in COMSIXTHFLT 091954Z June 1967.

Flooding between frames 52 and 78 (36-inch frame spacing) below the second deck, including the first and second platform decks for the entire width of the ship. Flooded area included lower two levels of research operations spaces.

Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13 by 15 feet with the top of the hole at the waterline.

SPS-10 radar was destroyed by the crew during the attack; radar consoles probably beyond repair.

Most communications were down due to lack of antennas; equipment may require minor repairs.

Flash fire on starboard wing of the bridge; no major damage.

Flash fire due to ruptured gasoline drums port side 01 and 02 levels amidships; exterior superficial damage; no interior damage.

Twenty-one-foot motor whale boat lost; 33-foot personnel boat received minor damage; virtually all life rafts destroyed.

Cannon holes from two inches to one foot in diameter throughout the topside area, with associated cable damage.

Watertight boundaries established at frames 52 and 78 and at second deck level.

Second deck hole in diagnostic room and at the skin of the ship; bulkhead bulged forward from explosion, but in good condition.

Bulkhead at frame 78 (forward bulkhead of the engineering spaces) in excellent condition; no indication of damage.

No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room. Gyro, engine order telegraph, rudder angle indicator, fathometer, sound-powered phones, and bridge steering control in operation. (Note: Previous and subsequent reports indicate that the gyro and fathometer were inoperative and had been repaired.)

Ship in process of removing list; list presently 4-5 degrees. Anticipate zero list on arrival in port.

(C) By late 9 June, the combined crews of DAVIS and LIBERTY had restored the diesel generator, emergency switchboard, gyro, IC switchboard, LMC system, electrical fire pump and the running lights. Furthermore, power had been restored to additional radio equipment, replacement damage control equipment brought aboard, and the list reduced to three degrees.

(C) Prior to arriving at Malta, LIBERTY's commanding officer requested assistance from the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests for the repair of damages estimated to require approximately five months yard availability and which might cost from two and one half to three million dollars.

(C) LIBERTY was dead in the water for three hours on 11 June to allow PAPAGO divers to examine the hole, which they estimated to be 39 feet wide at the bottom and 24 feet high. A net which the divers rigged to cover the after two thirds of the hole washed away ten minutes after the ship got underway.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers
11 June 1967
1040
LIBERTY

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Memorandum

MSG/G42/dtc

Memo 00658-67

DATE: 27 DEC 1967

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosures and physical removal of caveat

FROM : G40

TO : G30

SUBJECT : History of Action Pertaining to Damages to and Restoration of USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5); submission of

Encl: (1) Narrative Account
(2) Message Summary
(3) Correspondence Summary

1. Enclosures (1), (2), and (3) are submitted in the rough in accordance with your verbal request and previous agreement with LT P. E. MATCHETT (G4232).
2. The narrative account and summaries have been compiled from messages available in G42 files. Messages and correspondence referenced are included with the appropriate summary except where it is known that a message, letter or memo is held by G30.
3. This completes G40 action pertaining to USS LIBERTY battle damage and restoration history with the exception that G40 will ensure G30 is advised of action taken on the Budget amendment currently under review by OSD.

W. C. White
W. C. WHITE
Acting



S.F.
FILE

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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factually a no UIC
1517
NARRATIVE ACCOUNT

See DTG file

14 JUN 67
CNL 081209Z Jun
USS LIBERTY

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James M. Ernest Papers

1. Initial reports of the attack on the USS LIBERTY indicated that severe damage had been inflicted and that the LIBERTY was unable to carry out its mission. (CNL 081209Z Jun) and (USS SARATOGA 081257Z Jun). The LIBERTY's position at this time was 31-25E (COMSIXTHFLT 081349Z Jun). The next reports told of inoperative Navigation Equipment and a starboard list of 9 to 10 degrees and indicated that flooding had been stopped. (COMSIXTHFLT 081621Z Jun and USS LIBERTY 081715Z Jun). By approximately 0300 on the 9th of June, the USS DAVIS had joined the LIBERTY and was providing damage control assistance which appeared effective, except for an oil leak that persisted. (CTG 60.5 090544Z Jun, CTG 60.5 090708Z Jun, CTG 60.5 090852Z Jun, CTG 60.5 091042Z Jun, and CTG 60.5 091900Z Jun). Spaces opened to flooding by the torpedo hit were about 90% full of water and oil. (COMSIXTHFLT 091635Z Jun).

2. The first survey of damages by COMSIXTHFLT Maintenance Officer was reported in COMSIXTHFLT's 091954Z Jun and stated that:

- a. Flooding between frames 52 - 78 below second deck and including first and second platform decks entire width of ship.
- b. Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', with top of hole at the water line.
- c. SPS-10 Radar destroyed, probably beyond repair.
- d. Most of the communications down due to lack of antennas.
- e. Flash fire starboard wing of bridge, no major damage.
- f. Flash fire port side O1 and O2 levels amidships, exterior superficial damage, no interior damage.
- g. 21 Man Motor Whale Boat lost, 33' personnel boat received minor damages, and virtually all life rafts destroyed.
- h. Cannon holes from 2" to 1" in diameter throughout topside area with associated cable damage in way of holes.
- i. Second deck-hole in diagnostic room and skin of ship. Bulk-head bulged forward from explosion but in good condition, No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room.

T DAVIS

3. At about 0900 on the ninth, the USS PAPAGO joined in escort of the USS LIBERTY (CTG 60.5 091900Z Jun 1967). By 2200 on the ninth, combined damage control crews (USS PAPAGO and USS LIBERTY) had restored several vital systems including Gyro, Running Lights, Diesel Generator, Electrical Fire Pump, IMC System, and power to the Radio Equipment (GENSER). They had also reduced the list to 3 degrees. (CTG 60.5 092230Z Jun).

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Enclosure (1) to NSG/42/47
Ser. 60658-67 of 27 DEC 1967

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4. Reports received during the next few hours re-affirmed previous damage estimates, and estimated the torpedo hole to be a tear-shaped hole about 13' x 15', with the top of the hole at the water line. (COMSIXTHFLT 092347Z Jun, CTC 60.5 101100Z Jun, CTC 60.5 101750Z Jun)

5. The CO USS LIBERTY requested assistance from the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests to repair damages estimated to require 5 months yard time and \$2.5M. (USS LIBERTY 110900Z Jun)
At about this same time, the LIBERTY stopped dead in the water in an attempt to close off the upper part of the hole now determined to be 39' x 24' (CTG 60.5 111122Z Jun and CTG 60.5 111601Z Jun). This effort later proved to be futile and the LIBERTY made for MALTA at a speed of 5 knots (CTG 60.5 121930Z Jun).

6. CAPT R. L. ARTHUR was appointed as CTC 100.2 within CTF 100 as OIC of Docking and Repair at MALTA and by 0900 of the 15th had completed plans for docking. (CTF 100 130934Z Jun). The LIBERTY was drydocked at 1400A on the 15th and cleanup commenced immediately. (CTF 100 150200Z Jun). Damages were then described as:

a. Hole centered at frame 60 and extending 24' downward from just below the second deck, and longitudinally from frame 53 to frame 66 (39'). Hole was teardropped shaped as previously reported, and larger at bottom.

b. Outboard 15' of first platform deck and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck and frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and inboard about 15'. (Frame spacing is 36").

c. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck frames 52 to frame 66 for the entire width of the ship.

d. Lower research compartments have equipment mixed with mass of twisted wreckage. 321 shell and fragment holes in hull, 250 attributed to aircraft cannon. Estimate MALTA repairs to take 3 weeks. (CTF 100 151406Z Jun) *OK*

7. Personnel from Naval Ships Engineer Center, NSA, NSG, P & M SYSTEMS (Electronic Equipment Sub-Contractor for original conversion) and LTV ELECTRO SYSTEMS visited LIBERTY to inspect damages and make preparations for final repairs in CONUS. Various reports of repair progress were received during the next few days, and preliminary estimates had LIBERTY ready for sea on 7 Jul. (CINCUSNAVEUR 161715Z Jun).

8. By 15 Jun it had been determined that the Electronics Equipment in the third and fourth decks including Radio 1, Crypto operations, Coordination Center and TTY repair ship were a complete loss. The possibility that equipment in Radio 2 and R & D spaces on the second deck could be

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restored was stated. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 191326Z Jun). Repairs which were to be accomplished by the yard at MALTA were described by the Fleet Maintenance Officer as:

- a. Replace shell from below turn of bilge to average 26' water line, frames 50 through 68.
 - b. Replace main traverse bulkhead at frame 52 from starboard shell inboard 45' between 18' and 26' waterlines.
 - c. Replace extensive areas in tank tops, frame 52 through 60.
 - d. Replace first platform deck from starboard shell inboard 20' at frames 52 through 50 (believe this letter should have been FR 52 - 60)
 - e. Replace non-tight bulkhead at frame 60 from starboard shell inboard 40' between tank top and first platform and second deck.
 - f. Replace centerline and starboard longitudinal non-tight bulkheads complete and lower 8' port longitudinal bulkhead between tank tops and first platform, frames 52 through 60. An estimate for 70 tons of replacement steel, \$150,000, and 3 weeks time was reported. (USS LIBERTY 201540Z Jun).
9. USS LIBERTY 241205Z. Repair progress report:
- a. Ripout 80% complete.
 - b. Repairs to Tank Svan Bulkhead 70% complete.
 - c. Tank top repairs 70% complete.
 - d. Frame 52 replacement bulkhead being fitted, repairs 25% complete. Plate of ship in process of pre-fabrication. Interior bulkheads, shell frames, shell plates, and deck plates approximately 20% complete.
10. provided a list of equipment on loan to the USS LIBERTY from that activity. As of 6 Oct 67, only one item on that list has been located, and that (an AN/TNH-11 ser 2594) is recommended for survey.
11. USS LIBERTY 290222Z Jun. Repair progress report: *= top*
- a. Ripout completed.
 - b. Fuel Oil tank and tank top repairs complete.
 - c. Frame 52 Main Traverse Bulkhead 85% complete.
 - d. All non-tight bulkheads between tank top and first platform erected, boundary welding 25% complete.

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- b. Significant damage to almost all antenna lead-ins.
 - c. Only minor damage to TRSSCOM antenna system.
 - d. AN/SRR-20 ESV Tracking system may be repairable.
 - e. All of _____ positions (RR-1) destroyed or damaged (blast, oil and salt water) beyond economical re-use.
 - f. All equipment and material in P & R spaces, transcribing area, maintenance shop and crypto room similarly damaged.
 - g. All equipment in other areas i.e. _____ (second deck) received severe shock though most of it does not show surface damage.
 - h. Complete re-wiring in RR-1 will be required.
 - i. This inspection was only superficial (by observation vice equipment testing) and closer inspection will probably find further damage.
 - j. Informal estimate of \$6.0M submitted.
16. Since funds to restore LIBERTY had not been identified, the MSTTS manning proposal had not yet been acted upon, and no knowledge of the "when or how much" would be paid by the ISRAELI Government for damages, OP-04 in a memo to OP-03 via OP-94 (ser 0653-43P of 24 Aug 1967) recommended complete de-activation of the LIBERTY. OP-94 did not concur, but instead proposed reduced manning (OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 063-67 of 25 Aug 1967). OP-03 concurred with OP-04 in recommending de-activation and suggested that OP-94 should initiate program action on the future status of the LIBERTY. (OP-03 memo to OP-94 Ser 01396M of 31 Aug 1967). OP-94's reply (OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 019030P94 of 26 Sep 1967) stated that since LIBERTY was a Navy resource in response to National tasking, the (OP-94) did not have the authority to direct de-activation, but instead were preparing a PCR in an attempt to locate funds in FY 1968 for restoration without reprogramming action.
17. The President, Board of Inspection and Survey stated that the NNSY estimate of \$1.25M was probably only about half of what would be needed since experience showed that estimates prior to an INSURV were usually only 50% of actual costs to correct INSURV deficiencies. (PRES INSURV WASH DC message 251700Z Jul). Similarly, unofficial estimates were climbing and by the 10th of August had risen to \$9.65M to restore LIBERTY, or \$13.5M to outfit another victory hull (C42 memo to CD Ser 00399-67 of 10 Aug 1967) of which one was available (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 251530Z Jul, CNO 281437Z Jul and NAVSHIPS 031844Z Aug).
18. A compiled list of damages, repair costs to date, and estimated future costs was forwarded to the Judge Advocate Office by NAVSHISYSCOM letter Ser 527-1450 of 1 Sep 1967. The total estimate came to \$5,424,202

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and then was qualified by a statement to the effect that escalation of this estimate is insured because:

- a. Estimates are based on current labor costs.
- b. Original equipment purchase costs were used.
- c. Elimination of a shaft rubbing problem was not included because no reliable estimate could be made without disassembly of the shaft.
- d. Belief that all damage to electrical cables were not yet known.

The cost breakdown was:

a. Services performed at MALTA	162,605.00
b. NNSY Personnel Travel	7,000.00
c. Actual cost of oil removal	9,750.00
d. Cost of Electronics System Restoration (Est)	3,901,187.00
e. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical	1,261,459.00
f. Equipage and Allowance items	141,656.00
g. Labor of LIBERTY Personnel in excess of normal	128,500.00

19. The INSURV report was published under cover letter of PRESIDENT, BOARD of INSPECTION and SURVEY, CHIEF of NAVAL OPERATIONS 232/mbs AGTR-5 ser 948 of 13 Sep 1967. In addition to damages as a result of the attack, this report included all deficiencies noted which will surely increase costs of rehabilitation to \$10+M. The report does find the LIBERTY to be sound and fit for further service upon correction of the deficiencies.

20. A complete inventory of equipment on board the LIBERTY was made by Director, Naval Security Group Atlantic and from this inventory, lists were compiled which identify equipment as to (a) missing, (b) in need of repair, (c) operable without repairs, (d) found, not on allowance, and (e) recommended for survey. (DIRNAVSECGRULANT letter 85/RHL/cc Ser 01029 of 15 Sep 1967).

21. The continuing efforts by OP-94G staff to identify funds for LIBERTY restoration was beginning to falter, and it became increasingly apparent that funds would not be obtained without a firm re-statement of the requirement. Therefore, DIRNAVSECGRU's 082228 Sep 1967 advised of the lack of progress in obtaining funds and requested that a PCR be restated the requirement. This did in their 2021137 Sep 1967. CNO responded by advising that a PCR was being prepared for LIBERTY restoration.

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22. On 5 Oct 1967, CNO (CNO message 0519177 Oct) requested the Chief, Naval Material to provide detailed cost data for restoration of the USS LIBERTY to its pre-attack capability, for an up-dated electronics capability, and for replacement of the LIBERTY with another hull.
23. Naval Ship System Communications in replying for CNM (NAVSHIPSYSCOM 1717207 Oct) provided substantial data in response to CNO's request. It did not, however, provide sufficient detail on the electronic suit, thus a trip to F & M Systems Company, Dallas, Texas was required to develop the necessary electronics equipment shopping list. MR GOSS (of G43) and MR PREECE (of NAVSHIPS) made the trip, and with the assistance of F & M Systems personnel developed the required shopping list for restoration with a new electronics suit. G42 personnel then prepared a shopping list for restoration to pre-attack capabilities, and a rationale in support of restoration, recommending restoration with the up-dated electronics suit.
24. Based upon the information supplied by NAVSHIPSYSCOM, G42, G43 and GD prepared a budget amendment for submission to the Secretary of Defense (Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense Ser 006874 of 4 Dec 1967). This amendment is currently undergoing review by OSD and a decision as to whether to support it is anticipated by no later than 22 Dec 1967.

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MESSAGE SUMMARY

- ✓ CNL-081209Z Jun: Initial report of attack relayed from USS SARATOGA indicated the LIBERTY was badly damaged and requesting immediate assistance.
- ✗ -081812Z Jun: Reported LIBERTY was unable to carry out mission, extensive superficial topside damage and lower deck forward spaces destroyed.
- ✗ USS SARATOGA-081254Z Jun: Relayed report from LIBERTY "Hit by torpedo starboard side, listing badly, need assistance immediately."
- ✓ COMSIXTHFLT-081349Z Jun: Re-affirmed torpedo hit, stated position of LIBERTY as 31-25N, 33-25E.
- ✓ COMSIXTHFLT-081621Z Jun: Reported flooding stopped, 9 degree list, Radar/Gyro/Fathometer inoperative.
- ✓ USS LIBERTY-081715Z Jun: Reported details of attack, 10 degree list to starboard, watertight boundaries established and holding.
- ✓ CTG 60.5-090544Z Jun: Reported rendezvous of USS DAVIS with LIBERTY, material damage under control.
- ✓ CTG 60.5-090708Z Jun: Bulkheads firm, flooding contained but oil leaking; capable of 10 knots.
- ✓ CTG 60.5-090852Z Jun: Oil leak remains (SITREP 6)
- ✗ CTG-60.5-091014Z Jun: SITREP-7, Oil leak same. Recommend (Tide Water) have carbonized sand or detergent available.
- ✓ COMSIXTHFLT-091635Z Jun: Flooded spaces 90% full of water and oil. SERVFORSIXTHFLT Material Officer making survey of damage.
- ✓ CTG 60.5-091900Z Jun: NSS PAPAGO joined escort. Oil leak continues.
- ✓ COMSIXTHFLT-091954Z Jun: Fleet Maintenance Officer report follows:
- Flooding between frames 52 - 78 below second deck and including first and second platform decks entire width of ship.
 - Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', with top of hole at water line.
 - SPS-10 Radar destroyed by crew during attack, probably beyond repair.
 - Most communications down due to lack of antennas.
 - Flash fire starboard wing of bridge, no major damage.

Enclosures (2) to 131/10 22/40
Ser 131/10 01 22/40

f. Flash fire possible side O1 and O2 levels amidships, exterior superficial damage, no interior damage.

g. 21 Man Motor Whale Boat lost, 33' personnel boat, minor damage, and virtually all life rafts destroyed.

h. Cannon holes from 2" to 1' in diameter, throughout topside area with associated cable damage in way of holes.

i. Second deck hole in diagnostic room and at skin of ship. Bulkhead bulged forward from explosion but in good condition. No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room.

✓ CTG 60.5-092230Z Jun: Combined Damage Control crews have repaired several electrical wires, re-routed some electrical circuits and VTR board, placed diesel generator in commission, restored power to radio equipment and IC switchboard, put Gyro back on line, repaired running lights, restored LMC system electrical fire pump, and reduced list to 3 degrees.

✗ COMSIXTHFLT-092347Z Jun: SERVFORSIXTHFLT Material Officer completed damage summary.

a. Flooding between frames 52 and 78 below second deck.

b. Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', top at waterline.

c. SPS-10 Radar inoperative

d. Communications antennas down

e. 21' MWB lost, all life rafts destroyed.

✗ CTG 60.5-101100Z Jun: Oil leak reduced to seepage. List, negligible.

✗ COMSIXTHFLT-101634Z Jun: ETA MALTA 130715Z.

✗ CTG 60.5-101750Z Jun: Reports LIBERTY now stable, hole is tear-shaped and may be over 15' at bottom.

✓ USS LIBERTY-110900Z Jun: Requested NNSY (NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD) assistance in preparing work requests for repair damage. C.O. estimated 5 months yard time and \$2.5M. Recommended repairs be combined with conversion to ASTS.

✓ CTG 60.5-111127 Jun: LIBERTY attempting to close off upper part of hole with canvas.

✓ CTG 60.5-111601Z Jun: LIBERTY stopped dead-in-water to allow USS PAPAGO divers to examine hole and rig covering net. Hole estimated 39' wide by 24' high. Oil leak negligible.

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- X CTG-60.5-111624Z Jun: Coordination center and crypto-one on third deck are empty of equipment, starboard Maintenance shop also clear.
- ✓ CTG 60.5-121930Z Jun: SOA 5 knots. Forward bulkhead flexes 7 inches in 8 foot span. Paint is flaking. ETA Malta now 132000A.
- ✓ CTF 100-130934Z Jun: Plans for docking completed. Identified members of CTF 100. CTG-100.2, CAPT R. L. AURTHUR, USN in charge of Docking and Repair.
- X CTG 60.5-131000Z Jun: ETA MALTA 140800A. LIBERTY riding well.
- ✓ CTF 100-142116Z Jun: LIBERTY drydocked MALTA at 141900A.
- ✓ CTF 100-150200Z Jun: LIBERTY entered drydock at 1400A, 15 Jun 1967. Canvas mat in place at 151530A and pump-out commenced. Damage from torpedoes:
- a. Hole centered at FR-60 and extending 24' downward from just below second deck, and longitudinally from FR-53 to 66 (39'). Hole teardrop shaped and larger at bottom.
 - b. Outboard 15' of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck and frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and inboard 15'. (Frame spacing is 36").
 - c. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck frame 52 to 78 for entire width of ship.
- ✓ CTF 100-151406Z Jun: Lower research compartments have equipment mixed with mass of twisted wreckage. 821 shell and fragment holes in hull, 250 attributed to aircraft cannon. Estimated MALTA repairs to take 3 weeks.
- X NAVSHIPENGGEN-151810Z Jun: Following personnel will visit ship to review research electronic system damage.
- MR Daniel R. PREECS (NAVSEC)
 - LT Allan W. DE PREY (NSA) (Reported to be FM NAVSEC in the message)
 - MR Irving W. GOSS (NSG)
 - MR Charles M. SLOAN (F & M Systems)
 - MR Howard J. ALSOP (F & M Systems)
 - MR Roger E. WHITE (F & M Systems)
 - MR Boyce L. DUBOIS (F & M Systems)
 - MR William A. EVANS, JR. (F & M Systems)
 - MR Cecil L. BYROM (LTV Electro Systems)
 - MR L. D. TURNER (LTV Electro Systems)
- X CINCUSNAVEUR-161715Z Jun: LIBERTY est RFS 7 Jul.
- X NAVSHIPSYSCOM-162209Z Jun: Comments on combining restoration of LIBERTY with conversion to MSTC. (Note this latter is uncertain.)

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Admiral Eugene SHECK to above list to visit LIBERTY.

- X CINCUSNAVEUR-171106Z Jun: Disestablished CTF 100.
- X USS LIBERTY-290222Z Jun: Repair progress report:
 - a. Ripout completed.
 - b. F.O. Tank and Tank top repairs complete.
 - c. Frame 52 Main traverse bulkhead 85% complete.
 - d. All non-tight bulkheads between tank top and first platform erected, boundary welding 25% complete.
 - e. Traverse bulkhead at frame 60 between first platform and second deck 60% erected, boundary welding 40% complete.
 - f. All plate shop prefab complete except for shell plates, 20% complete.
 - g. Estimate undock 12 Jul, final completion 17 Jul.
 - h. Final cost estimated at \$165K.
- X USS LIBERTY-061225Z Jul: SRR-20 Antenna pedestal and dish took several direct hits. Exact condition of Gyro units doubtful.
- X USS LIBERTY 061730Z Jul: Projected completion date of 14 Jul. Intend dock trials 15 Jul and depart MALTA 16 Jul. ETA NORVA 29 Jul.
- X _____ Listed updated suit recommended for LIBERTY:
- X NAVSHIPYD NORVA 141905 Jul: Estimate 4 months and \$1.25M to restore LIBERTY to pre-attack condition. Does not include
 - a. Renewal of accommodation ladder and fittings.
 - b. Replacement of watertight doors.
 - c. Replacement of metal joiner bulkheads and doors.
 - d. Replacement of furniture, ventilation, bulkhead insulation and deck covering.
 - e. Replacement of electronic cables and equipment below main deck.
 - f. Checking out, repair or replacement of electric cables and equipment on main deck and above.

1- CINCLANTFLT 142202Z Jul: Recommended delaying timing of industrial work until funds and work package defined. Concur with proposal to combine repairs and conversion to MSTs if latter is approved but questions validity of idea since LIBERTY would doubtlessly be on the bottom if MSTs manned.

X CINCLANTFLT 151548Z Jul: Re-transmitted NAVSHIPYD NORVA 141905Z. -

X NAVSHIPSYS COMHQ 162209Z Jul: Recommended combining LIBERTY restoration with conversion to MSTs.

X PRES INSURV WASHDC 181558Z Jul: Scheduled INSURV for 14 - 18 Aug.

X CNO 192115Z Jul: Stated that \$6.1M in FY 1968 for LIBERTY reprogrammed at apportionment to FLEET MAINTENANCE. Earliest start date for conversion to MSTs is Jun 1968 due lack of plans, recommended reduced manning status on 1 Sep 1967.

✓ NAVSHIPSYS COMHQ 182152Z Jul: Concurred with CINCLANT's 14220Z which proposed reduced status pending decisions.

✓ USS LIBERTY 171555Z Jun: Estimates completion of cleanup 190700Z. Topside repairs underway.

X DIRNAVSECGRUEUR-191326Z Jun: Equipment in third and fourth decks including Radio 1, Crypto, Coordination Center and TTY maintenance shop total loss. Second deck including Radio 2 and R & D can be made serviceable.

✓ USS LIBERTY-191512Z Jun: Flooded areas cleared. Topside repairs progressing rapidly.

✓ USS LIBERTY-201540Z Jun: Fleet Maintenance Officer Report:

a. Yard directed to accomplish following:

(1) Replace shell from below turn of bilge to average 26' waterline, frame 50 - 68.

(2) Replace main traverse bulkhead at frame 52 from starboard shell inboard 45' between 18 and 26' waterline.

(3) Replace extensive areas in tank tops frame 52 - 60.

(4) Replace first Platform deck from starboard shell inboard 20', frame 52 - 50.

(5) Replace non-tight bulkhead at frame 60 from starboard shell inboard 40' between tank top and first platform and second deck.

(6) Replace centerline and starboard longitudinal non-tight bulkheads complete, and lower 8' port longitudinal bulkhead between tank tops and first platform frame 52 - 60.

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b. Require approximately 70 tons replacement steel, estimated \$150,000 and 3 weeks time.

- X DIRNAVSECGRUEUR-211244Z Jun: Indicated electronics equipment damage extensive. Stated requirement for comprehensive inspection of OPS spaces upon return to CONUS.
- X AMEMBASSY VALLETTA-211415Z Jun: Recommended complete repairs to LIBERTY be accomplished in MALTA.
- X COMSERVIANT-221424Z Jul: Concurred with repairs outlined in LIBERTY's 2015407.
- X USS LIBERTY-241205Z Jun: Repair progress report:
 - a. Ripout 80% complete
 - b. Repairs to Tank Swash bulkhead 70% complete.
 - c. Tank top repairs 70% complete.
 - d. Frame 52 replacement bulkhead being fitted, repairs 25% complete. Plate of ship in process of pre-fabrication of interior bulkheads, shell frames, shell plates, and deck plates approximately 20% complete.
- X _____ Jun: Inventory of sponsor furnished equipment and status thereof.
- X _____ Jun: List of equipment on loan to USS LIBERTY.
- ✓ NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 211944Z Jul: Scrap value is \$75 - 90K.
- X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 212053Z Jul: Authorizes local survey and destruction of damaged equipment.
- X CNO 220150Z Jul: Advised LIBERTY that CNM was being requested to authorize local survey action of all equipment damaged.
- X _____ Jul: Authorized DNSG conduct survey of equipment on loan to LIBERTY.
- X CINCPACFLT 242254Z Jul: Battle damage in electronic spaces was very heavy.

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- X PRESINSURV WASHDC 251007 Jul: Stated NAVSHIPYD NORVA estimates unreliable for planning and expects costs to double upon completion of INSURV. (Double would be 2.5M)
- X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 251530Z Jul: Listed the PIERRE VICTORY, MARSHFIELD VICTORY and WEST LINN VICTORY available for replacement hulls.
- X CNO 281437Z Jul: Stated that PIERRE VICTORY not available.
- X NAVSHIPS 031844Z Aug: Stated MARSHFIELD VICTORY not available.
- X DIRNAVSECGRU 082228Z Sep: Capsulated status of LIBERTY restoration
- X -
- X CNO 252249Z Sep: Advised DIRNSA that PCR is being prepared to overhaul LIBERTY.
- X CNO 051917Z Oct: Requested CNM to provide cost data for restoration of USS LIBERTY in sufficient detail to prepare a PCR.
- X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 171720Z Oct: Provided cost data requested above. Basically amounted to: \$9,375,000 for restoration to original configuration, \$10,385,000 for up-dated suit, and 15M for activation of a new hull and installation of an up-dated electronics suit.
- X DIRNAVSECGRU 031333Z Nov: Requested additional information regarding LIBERTY restoration, i.e. how long, when and where, and life expectancy after restoration.
- X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 071340Z Nov: Reply provided following:
 - Probable shipyard: NAVSHIPYD PHILA
 - First Availability: Dec 68
 - Time Requirements: Planning - 3 months; Design - 5 months; Production - 6 months; Sea Trials - 1 month; Total time - 15 months
 - Life expectancy: 10 years after restoration

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✓ MR SHECK and LT DEPNEY trip report: Describes Radio Research Department damages as:

- a. All antennas either destroyed, damaged or burned except the TRSSCOMM antenna.
- b. Significant damage to almost all antenna lead-ins.
- c. Only minor damage to TRSSCOMM antenna system.
- d. AN/SRR-20 ESV tracking system may be repairable.
- e. All of _____ positions (RR-1) destroyed or damaged (blast, oil and salt water) beyond economical re-use.
- f. All equipment and material in P & R spaces, Transcribing area, Maintenance shop and crypto room similarly damaged.
- g. All equipment in other areas _____ (second deck) received severe shock though most of it does not show surface damage. Probably recoverable except for recorders.
- h. Complete re-wiring in RR-1 will be required.
- i. This inspection was only superficial (Observation) and closer inspection will probably find further damage.
- j. Informal estimate of \$6.0M made.

✓ CNO letter to CNM ser 019829P94 of 21 Jul 67: Request LIBERTY be given authority to dispose of equipment in compartment 3-60-0-C (RR-1).

✓ F & M SYSTEMS letter of 13 Jul 67 to NAVSHIPSYSCOM: Submitted a preliminary unsolicited proposal to restore LIBERTY. Estimated \$3,574,551 based upon current costs, time frame of 1 year and no overtime. Does not include ship's hull repair and allowance items but directs itself to restoration of electronics only.

✓ G20 Memo to G2U ser 0370 of 13 Jul 67: Lists LIBERTY communications capability requirements as:

a. SENSER COMCENTER

- (1) Secure Voice
- (2) Tactical Voice LF/MF/HF/UHF/VHF
- (3) Ship/Shore "CW" send/receive
- (4) Type "N" Crypto System (M/C BCST)

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Approved (3) to _____
of 2050

b. RESEARCH OPS COMCENTER

- (1) Ship/Shore TTY (ROMULUS) FDUX
- (2) Ship/Shore TTY (ORESTES) FDUX
- (3) SHIP/SHORE TTY (ORESTES) FDUX
- (4) OPINTEL BCST RECEIVER (with KG-14 for untwinned operation)
- (5) TRSSCOMM (with two channel capability)
- (6) VFTG system outlined in OPNAV INST 02303.36

- X G42 memo to GD Ser 00399-67 of 10 Aug 67: Capsulated events concerning LIBERTY restoration, shows varying cost estimates ranging from \$8.0M for electronics to 9.65M for entire ship. Also quotes \$13.5M to convert another VICTORY hull, indicated possible source of funds and requested comments. (GD replied that possible source of funds indicated was not valid.)
- X OP-04 memo to OP-03 via OP-94, #0653-434P of 24 Aug 67: Stated that funds to restore LIBERTY had not yet been identified (only \$900K for regular scheduled overhaul avail), MSTIS manning not yet resolved, and when or how much ISRAELI Government will compensate is not known. Recommended in-activation as soon after 1 Sep 67 as is feasible.
- Y OP-94 memo to OP-03 #063-67 of 25 Aug 67: Do not concur with OP-04 recommendation to inactivate LIBERTY, but recommended reduced manning until funding resolved.
- Y OP-03 memo to OP-94 #01396M-67 of 31 Aug 67: Stated that OP-94 should initiate program action to future status of LIBERTY, and since no foreseeable solution to funding problem exists, concurred with OP-04 to inactivate LIBERTY.
- X OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 019030P94 of 26 Sep 67: Stated LIBERTY is a Navy resource in response to a National Requirement and suggested OP-94 does not have the authority to direct inactivation. Also, stated that a PCR to attempt funding of LIBERTY restoration in FY-68 is being prepared.
- 1 CO NAVSHIPSISCOM letter ser 527-1450 to JAG 1 Sep 67: Provided estimate to restore LIBERTY and equipment to pre-attack condition, i.e. \$5,424,202. Breakdown is:

a. Services performed at MALTA	162,608.50
b. NNSY Personnel Travel	7,000.00
c. Actual cost of oil removal	9,750.00
d. Cost of Electronics System Restoration (EST)	3,901,187.00

e. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical	1,261,459.00
f. Equipage and Allowance Items	141,656.00
g. Labor of Liberty Personnel in excess of normal	128,500.00 -

Went on to state that these estimates will probably be escalated since they are based upon current costs, cost of original purchase of equipment, costs to eliminate rubbing of shaft (could not be estimated without disassembly of shaft) and uncovering of unknown damage to electrical cables.

X DIRNAVSECGRU ATLANTIC STAFF, CINCLANTFLT letter ser 85/RHL/cc Ser 01029 of 15 Sep 67: List of equipment (a) missing, (b) in need of repairs, (c) operable, (d) not on allowance and (e) recommended for survey.

X President, Board of Inspection and Survey letter AGTR-5 Ser 948 of 13 Sep 67: INSURV Board inspection report listing all deficiencies found in LIBERTY. In general it stated that the LIBERTY was sound and would be fit for further service if re-fitted with equivalent or updated electronics equipment, and listed deficiencies corrected.

X Commander Service Squadron Eight speedletter N-1 8000 Ser 078 of 29 Aug 67: Proposed reduced manning scheduled for 1 Sep 1967 be held in abeyance pending resolution of LIBERTY restoration. Also gave proposal for reduced manning status during yard overhaul if approved. CINCLANT concurred. G13 noted the reduced manning recommended did not include CT personnel.

X Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense ser 006874 of 4 Dec 67: Submits budget amendment proposal for restoration of LIBERTY. Recommends restoration with an up-dated suit, provides a shopping list for an updated suit and the original suit, and a cost estimate for each of three proposals which are:

- a. Restoration of LIBERTY with an up-dated suit (recommended)
- b. Restoration of LIBERTY with a suit similar to pre-attack conditions.
- c. Replacement of LIBERTY with another Victory hull and an up-dated suit.

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Annex H

Casualties


←(O) The Bureau of Naval Personnel Casualty Report was received by the Naval Security Group on 19 June 1967. It listed a total of 94 casualties including both military and civilian personnel.

	RESCHOPSDEPT					GENSER			Grand Total
	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Enlisted (Marine)	Civilians	Subtotal	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Subtotal	
Killed	1	22	2	1	26	2	6	8	34
Serious Injuries	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	11
Minor Injuries	2	24	1	1	28	2	19	21	49
Totals	4	48	3	2	57	4	25	29	94

←(O) On 5 July 1967, 204 military and civilian personnel killed, or wounded or injured to some extent were recommended by the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY, for the Purple Heart award. Many of these personnel had returned to duty almost immediately; consequently, their names did not appear on the casualty list issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

	RESCHOPSDEPT					GENSER			Grand Total
	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Enlisted (Marine)	Civilians	Subtotal	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Subtotal	
Killed	1	22	2	1	26	2	6	8	34
Injured	4	74	1	1	80	7	83	90	170
Totals	5	96	3	2	106	9	89	98	204

←(O) While there is no legal bar, the policy of the Secretary of the Navy has been not to award military decorations to civilians. The Department of State is considering the development of a separate civilian medal for award under circumstances similar to those prescribed for the Purple Heart. Accordingly, Purple Heart recommendations for LIBERTY's two civilian casualties were submitted with the understanding that the Department of State medal, if developed, could be considered for award.



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(U) On 28 July 1967, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Purple Heart awards for the 202 military casualties. By separate action, the matter of awards for civilian casualties was referred to Op-09B where it is pending.

Appendix I: Research Operations Department Casualties

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Department of Government Operations

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Appendix I to Annex H

Research Operations Department Casualties

Deaths

LT James C. PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462

CTC Raymond E. LINN, USN, 571 13 74

CTC Melvin D. SMITH, USN, 493 95 96

CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 24

CT1 Warren E. HERSEY, USN, 903 67 11

CT1 James M. LUPTON, USN, 511 31 28

CT1 John C. SMITH, Jr., USN, 237 77 94

CT1 Frederick J. WALTON, USN, 236 31 86

CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL, USN, 586 13 23

CT2 Robert B. EISENBERG, USN, 776 09 85

CT2 Richard W. KEENE, Jr., USN, 778 82 75

CT2 Anthony P. MENDLE, USN, 777 62 87

CT3 William B. ALLENBAUGH, USN, 484 49 96

CT3 Jerry L. CONVERSE, USN, 724 79 44

CT3 Jerry L. GOSS, USN, 773 61 55

CT3 Duane R. MARGGRAF, USN, 773 96 50

CT3 Thomas R. THORNTON, USN, 997 97 91

CT3 Philippe C. TIEDTKE, USN, 914 32 84

CTSN Lawrence P. HAYDEN, USN, 870 53 70

CTSN Alan (n) WIGGINS, USN, 788 62 97

CTSN James E. LENAU, USN, 997 56 58

CTSN David W. MARLBOROUGH, USN, 810 04 80

CTSN Carl C. NYGREN, USN, 788 37 16

SGT Jack L. RAPER, USMC, 1994072

PL Edward E. REHMEYER, III, USMC, 2120919

Mr. Allen M. BLUE, GG-7, NSA

Serious Injuries

LT James G. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615

CT1 Joseph C. LENTINI, USN, 594 81 55

CTSN Leroy BENNETT, USN, 998 13 79



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Minor Injuries

LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610

LT Maurice H. BENNETT, USN, 628125/1610

LT James M. ENNES, USNR, 653840/1615

CTC Carlyle F. LAMKIN, USN, 518 69 45

CTC James A. MATTHEWS, USN, 345 18 52

CTC Harold J. THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37

CT1 Reginald N. ADDINGTON, USN, 349 53 80

CT1 Richard K. BAKER, USN, 486 80 12

CT1 Lowell T. BINGHAM, USN, 521 38 68

CT1 Richard C. CARLSON, USN, 444 13 12

CT1 Jeffrey R. CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05

CT1 Lewis D. ECKHART, USN, 922 69 34

CT1 Ronald G. KUKAL, USN, 539 00 34

CT1 Carl L. PEASANTS, USN, 535 78 10

CT1 Charles L. ROWLEY, USN, 458 48 03

CT2 Timothy P. AMEEN, USN, 774 03 95

CT2 Glen L. BLOKHAM, USN, 774 37 52

CT2 Larry L. BOWEN, USN, 796 85 24

CT2 Calvin L. CHADSEY, USN, 580 65 82

CT2 Frederick M. CLEVELAND, USN, 353 80 14

CT2 James R. DAVIDSON, USN, 699 64 72

CT2 Marvin F. DODD, USN, 599 79 51

CT2 Dennis M. EIKLEBERRY, USN, 914 81 10

CT2 Charles R. HENDRICKS, USN, 685 56 42

CT2 Frederick K. JOHNS, USN, 794 91 14

CT2 Calvin L. LANDIS, USN, 777 52 31

CT2 Anthony J. LEEFIELD, USN, 776 10 30

CT2 Philip L. LONG, USN, 692 84 63

CT2 John L. MASSENGALE, USN, 695 14 21

CT2 David L. McFEGGAN, USN, 774 71 98

CT2 Stephen E. MEYER, USN, 771 42 03

CT2 David W. PAGE, USN, 904 28 51

CT2 Garland W. PAYNE, USN, 772 94 77

CT2 John C. POPIELSKI, USN, 778 80 00

CT2 Robert J. SCHNELL, USNR, 542 55 84

CT2 Dennis C. SNADER, USN, 776 28 26

CT2 John R. SUTTER, USN, 795 24 58

CT2 Gregory L. WELCH, USN, 694 46 31

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CT3 Joe D. ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77
CT3 James V. BRONG, USN, 913 41 23
CT3 Ronald D. BUCK, USN, 918 25 71
CT3 Kenneth R. GAUTHIER, USN, 771 37 90
CT3 David W. HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49
CT3 John S. HORNE, Jr., USNR, 692 96 29
CT3 Melvin P. JOHNSON, USN, 997 32 29
CT3 Loren W. KREUN, USN, 538 49 74
CT3 Terry L. McFARLAND, USN, 795 25 54
CT3 David V. MYERS, USN, B40 65 88
CT3 Maurice B. SHAFER, USN, 695 94 86
CT3 Harold E. SIX, USN, 777 58 53
CT3 Ralph B. SWEET, USN, 775 06 25
CT3 Charles J. THOME, USN, 789 48 42
CT3 Sammy M. UBER, USN, 917 08 36

CTSN Edward H. BECHTEL, USN, B40 15 47
CTSN Nathan D. BENEDICT, Jr., USN, 139 55 74
CTSN Rodney L. DALLY, USN, B20 04 91
CTSN Dale E. DANIELS, USN, B60 44 52
CTSN Kenneth B. EAKINS, USN, 794 04 69
CTSN Kenneth P. ECKER, USN, B51 36 48
CTSN Ronald F. GRANTSKI, USN, B80 16 19
CTSN James P. KAVANAUGH, USN, 418 51 32
CTSN Eugene H. KIRK, USN, 918 81 30
CTSN Terry W. LEHMAN, USN, 914 59 44
CTSN Patrick H. McANDREWS, USN, B11 44 21
CTSN Frank (n) McINTURFF, III, USN, B61 44 71
CTSN Donald W. PAGELER, USN, B60 58 17
CTSN Herbert J. PARKER, USNR, 138 54 18
CTSN Herbert C. PESTOM, USN, 797 04 78
CTSN Robert A. SPARBOROUGH, USN, 788 80 10
CTSN David A. SHAW, USN, 904 39 56
CTSN Jerry D. SMITH, USN, 915 81 02
CTSN Robert S. VANDEVENTER, USN, 916 69 27
CTSN Robert M. WALTZ, USN, B40 69 13
CTSN Daniel B. WOOD, USN, 796 87 55
CTSN Robert R. ZAGAR, USN, B40 63 62

SSGT Bryce F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 1859856

Mr. Donald L. BLALOCK, GG-7, NSA

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Annex I

News Media Coverage

When news of the LIBERTY attack reached the Pentagon, CINCUSNAVEUR was advised by telephone that Deputy Secretary of Defense VANCE had directed that all news releases would be made at the Washington level.

At midday on 8 June 1967, the Department of Defense announced that a U. S. Navy technical research ship, the USS LIBERTY, had been attacked at about 0900 EDT that day. The release reported LIBERTY's movements for the preceding two days and stated the ship's purpose for being positioned 15 miles north of the Sinai Peninsula was to assure communications between U. S. government posts in the Middle East and to assist in relaying information concerning the evacuation of U. S. dependents and other U. S. citizens from the Arab-Israeli war area. Ship's characteristics and personnel allowance were included in the announcement. The story was published that evening in the late-edition newspapers with little deviation from the DOD release.

Morning editions on 9 June carried essentially the same story reported the previous evening. The Washington Post carried an additional story concerning use of the hot line to inform Moscow that U. S. Sixth Fleet aircraft were being scrambled to protect a U. S. ship which was under attack. That evening, late editions began to hint that LIBERTY was used for electronic snooping. Such speculation was undoubtedly prompted by an Associated Press story of 9 June "Aboard the Carrier America" by Bob HORTON which stated that an officer had said, "to put it bluntly, she was in there to spy for us. Russia does the same thing." We moved in close to monitor the communications of both Egypt and Israel. We have to. We must be informed of what's going on in a matter of minutes." The USS AMERICA claimed that the alleged statement quoted by Mr. HORTON was not based on any contact with an official spokesman nor was it attributable to any of AMERICA's officers. AMERICA expressed the belief that the copy was not transmitted via naval communications and that it probably was sent ashore by COD flight which departed AMERICA for Athens at 091030Z.

Newspapers on 10 June seized upon the snooper story and thereafter speculation was rampant concerning the LIBERTY mission. An aggravating influence was an honest account in the Baltimore Sun concerning the death of Allen M. BLUE which identified him as an NSA employee.

Three official press interviews were conducted aboard AMERICA: four walking wounded LIBERTY crew members were interviewed on 9 June; SN Kenneth P. ECKER, another injured crewman, on the 11th; COMSIXTHFLT, VADM W. I. MARTIN, held a press conference on the 15th subsequent to his visit to the LIBERTY. The ECKER interview was widely publicized on 12 June, most newspapers giving it human-interest treatment, stressing that ECKER's life was saved because he was wearing a steel helmet.

Beginning 12 June, newspapers carried the story of LIBERTY's progress en route Malta and gave extensive coverage to the ship's arrival there on the 14th. Photographs of external damage appeared and reports attributed to crewmen were published, claiming that the attack was not accidental and that the ship had been reconnoitered by the Israelis prior to the attack.

On 16 June, syndicated columnist Drew PEARSON wrote that the LIBERTY was a CIA ship.

An article by George WILSON in the Washington Post on 18 June stated that "NSA was running things in the bowels of the ship." WILSON erroneously described the functions of most of LIBERTY's antennas.

The Washington Post, on the 20th quoted a story from an Arab newspaper which charged that LIBERTY took active part in the fighting on the side of the Israelis.

On 28 June, DOD released a summary of the proceedings of the U. S. Navy Court of Inquiry which investigated the circumstances surrounding the attack on LIBERTY. The same day the text of a letter from crew member SA Robert REILLY to his mother, giving a colorful account of the attack, was published in the Navy Times.

The 6 July issue of the Washington Post included a letter to the editor from Admiral George W. ANDERSON, USN (Ret.), former CNO, which took exception to the Post editorial of 30 June entitled "Not Good Enough." (See Appendix I.) The letter pointed out that the editorial failed to acknowledge that operating forces are assigned to unified commands and joint agencies which would not in this case be under command of the Navy. Also, that communications channels involved no longer are under control of the Navy but, often, and in this case did, pass through non-naval links; thus, LIBERTY paid part of the cost of excessive centralization. The admiral's final remarks were that the important point which should have been emphasized by the editorial was that LIBERTY definitely was operating in international waters and was attacked without provocation, in violation of any valid concept of international law, and, further, that the editorial itself was "not good enough."

From mid-July until her arrival in Norfolk, Virginia, on 29 July, LIBERTY passed from the news scene. Her return to the U. S. sparked renewed press interest as reflected by a long article in the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot on 30 July, the James J. KILPATRICK write-up in the Washington Star on 1 August and a short item in the August 9th issue of the Navy Times.

A seven-page article, "June 8, at 1400 hours", by James Jackson KILPATRICK, appeared in the 5 September issue of the National Review. The story is based largely on the summary of proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry released to the press. KILPATRICK has many unanswered questions which he states "nag for answers."

A collection of articles clipped from the following newspapers and periodicals is appended:

Alexandria Gazette
Baltimore News-American
Baltimore Sun
Boston Globe
Chicago News

Chicago Tribune
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Electronic News
Laurel News Leader
Life
Los Angeles Times
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times
Malta News
Malta Times
The National Observer
National Review
Navy Times
New Rochelle Standard Star

Newsweek
New York News
New York Times
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
Philadelphia Inquirer
Portland Oregonian
Portland (Me.) Times
Providence Journal
San Diego Union
San Francisco Examiner
Seattle Times
Stars and Stripes
Time
U. S. News & World Report
Washington News
Washington Post
Washington Star

Appendix I: Index of News Clippings

Appendix I to Annex I

Index of News Clippings

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9 June	Los Angeles <u>Times</u>	"Israel Attacks U.S. Navy Ship in Error; 10 Die"	3
	New York <u>Times</u>	"Israelis, In Error, Attack U.S. Navy Ship"	4
	Philadelphia <u>Inquirer</u>	"10 Americans Killed as Israelis Attack U.S. Ship by Mistake"	5-6
	Washington <u>Post</u>	"U.S., Russia Turn to 'Hot Line' in Crisis"	7-8
		"100 Injured in Torpedo, Jet Attack"	9-10
	Washington <u>Star</u>	"U.S. Ship's Toll May Reach 31"	11
10 June	Baltimore <u>Sun</u>	"Fort Meade Man Among Missing"	12
		"U.S. Defends Use of Snooper Ship"	12
	New York <u>Times</u>	"Death on the Liberty"	13
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	<u>Washington Post</u>	"Israel Vows Amends for Ship Attack"	17
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	<u>New York Times</u>	"Crippled Liberty on Way to Malta"	21
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
3801 NEBRASKA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20390

24 NOV 1982

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in further reply to your FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request for material pertaining to the attack on the USS LIBERTY. An explanation is in order so that you will understand exactly what has been involved in responding to your request.

You initially asked for records contained in a file labeled "HQNAVSECGRU 5750/1 Liberty Incident," which you claimed was filed in permanent storage at our facility located in Crane, Indiana. Our people at Crane forwarded to us a copy of every record which they could identify and locate as being related in any way to the Liberty attack. A number of records were retrieved, but the file you referred to was not among these documents. Virtually all of the records forwarded from Crane were classified, and with the exception of one or two messages, all were originated and classified by Naval elements other than this Command. It was therefore necessary to refer these documents to the original classifiers for a declassification review. We are pleased to advise you that almost 100% of the message traffic involved has been declassified.

After hearing from you in February of this year, we undertook a search of the historical records maintained by this Headquarters to see if we could locate a file such as the one you described. This task was complicated by the fact that our historian, Mr. Raymond Schmidt, was no longer an employee of the Naval Security Group and thus was unavailable to assist in this search. After an arduous review of Mr. Schmidt's records, we have been successful in finding the file to which you have been referring. This file was an informal record which Mr. Schmidt was compiling in anticipation of one day preparing a written history of the Liberty attack. The file was never maintained at Crane and very few persons were even aware of its existence. This file is currently being reviewed to determine declassification and releasability and we will be in contact with you again as soon as this review has been completed.

At this posture in our response to your request, we are able to provide you with copies of the messages as discussed above, as well as several memoranda originated by the Naval Security Group. All of these materials are contained in enclosure (1).

We have found no messages or references or any other forms of communications or documents between the American Embassy Tel Aviv and the Department of State.

FOLDER 19

Also, we have found nothing dealing with failure of protection, lessons learned, or decisions to cover up or to release a distorted version of the attack to the press or the public.

We have made an extra effort to provide you with copies which are as legible as possible. However, as is often the case, some parts of some documents are illegible. In cases where our copy was readable, but would not reproduce legibly, we have hand-printed the contents so that what you receive will be more meaningful. In these cases, we have also included a copy of the same page before it was hand-copied, so that you may see what the record looked like before our efforts to improve comprehensibility.

This has been an exceptionally long and drawn-out process, and your patience, understanding, and cooperation is sincerely appreciated. A determination has been made that the processing and reproduction costs associated with the enclosed documents be waived. Accordingly, no fees will be assessed you in connection with the furnishing of these materials.

Sincerely,



G. G. HENRIKSEN
Director for Security
By direction of the Commander
Naval Security Group Command

Encl: (1) USS LIBERTY documents

James M. Ennes

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DIRNAVSECGRU 081338Z JUN 67

NAVSECGRU Memorandum G14/sje Ser 00492-67 dtd 6 Jul 1967
Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Communication Station, Spain
ltr NR/30/35:jj 2230 Ser 0433/NSGD dtd 23 Jun 1967 with enclosure

MOST DOCUMENTS IN THIS
COLLECTION ARE
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

B. BY REF C, CINCUSNAVEUR PASSED OPCON TO COMSIXTHFLT, MOVEMENTS OF LIBERTY WERE STILL CONTROLLED BY JCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B.

C. AT 072104Z DIRNSA, BY REF D (NOT RECEIVED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS UNTIL 080930Z), REQUESTED JCS TO MOVE LIBERTY WEST TO SATISFY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS.

D. BY REF E, DTG 072230Z, AND NOT RECEIVED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS UNTIL 081642Z, JCS INCREASED LIBERTY'S CPA TO COAST OF ISRAEL AND UAR AND INDICATED FOR FIRST TIME THAT OPAREA IN REF B WAS FOR GUIDANCE ONLY.

E. AT 072350Z, CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM DUTY OFFICER, JRC WASHINGTON, DIRECTING THAT USS LIBERTY COME Y WITH NEW COMSIXTHFLT OP AREA RESTRICTIONS DELINEATED IN LAST SENTENCE PARA TWO OF REF F AND NOT TO PROCEED CLOSER THAN 100 MILES TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR UAR, THIS WAS AN ORAL COMMUNICATION WITH NO DTG OF MESSAGE DIRECTIVE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUESTED BY CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER. THIS DIRECT PHONE CALL FROM JRC, DIRECTING A MOVEMENT WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE UNIFIED COMMANDER, WAS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE.

F. AT 080030Z, THE USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER WAS CALLED AND APPRISED OF THE PHONE CALL DIRECT FROM THE JRC TO CINCUSNAVEUR BY JRC DUTY OFFICER. HE WAS REQUESTED TO CONFIRM THIS DIRECTIVE AND TO OBTAIN THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF THE JCS MESSAGE DIRECTIVE THAT WOULD FORMALIZE THE PHONE CALL, THE DUTY OFFICER SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK.

G. AT 080325Z USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER WAS CONTACTED AND ASKED WHAT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE LIBERTY. IN TURN HE ASKED WHAT ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR HAD TAKEN AND WAS ADVISED THAT HE WERE STILL WAITING A CALL FROM THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER CONTACTED AT 0030Z. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER THAT HE CALL THE JRC DUTY OFFICER AND GET A DATE-TIME GROUP OR GIVE US A DIRECTIVE FROM USCINCEUR. THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER CALLED BACK SHORTLY WITH THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF REF B WHICH DIRECTED LIBERTY TO PROCEED 100 MILES FROM THE COAST, AT THE SAME TIME REF G ARRIVE AT THE CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND CENTER BY NORMAL MEANS.

H. AT 080410Z, CINCUSNAVEUR ESTABLISHED A COVERED TELETYPE CONFERENCE WITH COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER, RELAYED REF G TO HIM AT 080440Z, AND TOLD HIM "BE ADVISED. TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC - OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS." THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF REF H WAS ALSO PASSED AT THIS TIME.

I. AT 080455Z, CINCUSNAVEUR SENT IMMEDIATE MESSAGE, REF H, TO COMSIXTHFLT DIRECTING HIM TO TAKE REF G FORAC.

J. AT 080727Z CINCUSNAVEUR RECEIVED USCINCEUR MSG, REF I, DIRECTING CINCUSNAVEUR TO TAKE REF G FORAC.

K. AT 080917Z, COMSIXTHFLT SENT A MESSAGE, REF J, DIRECTING LIBERTY TO COMPLY WITH REF G AND REMAIN 100 MILES FROM COASTS UAR, ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND SYRIA. LIBERTY WAS INFO ADDEE ON REF G, SENT AT 080310Z, WHICH DIRECTED HER TO REMAIN 100 MILES FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS. SHE WAS ALSO AN INFO ADDEE ON REF E WHICH INCREASED HER CPA'S BELLIGERENT COASTS.

L. DUE TO COMMUNICATION DELAYS OR MISROUTING, IT HAS BEEN

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
019636/4/RG	2		3	14/0250Z	132105Z JUN 67

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Handwritten notes:
- "Duty Officer" (with arrow pointing to E)
- "Action" (with arrow pointing to F)
- "Date-time group" (with arrow pointing to G)
- "See report" (with arrow pointing to G)

Watermark: Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ESTABLISHED LIBERTY DID NOT RECEIVE EITHER REFS E, G, OR J WHICH
DIRECTED HER FURTHER SEAWARD FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS OR TO
PROCEED 100 MILES FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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CONTROL NO.	PAGE OF PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C49636/4/RG	3. 3	14/0250Z	132105Z JUN 67

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHI
081316Z JUN 67
FM CTF SIX ZERO

TF 60 = FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE

TO: USS AMERICA
USS SARATOGA
COMSIXTHFLT
TASK FORCE SIX ZERO

UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENSE USS LIBERTY

1. FOR AMERICAN LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S ASAP TO PROCEED TO 31-23N9/33-25E3 TO DEFEND RPT DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK BY GUNBOATS, PROVIDE TANKERS AND FIGHTER COVER.
2. FOR SARATOGA LAUNCH 4 ARMED A1'S ASAP SAME MISSION, ADVISE LAUNCH TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECT A1'S RELIEF ON STATION OVER LIBERTY.
3. FOR ALL PLAN TO RELIEVE ALL ACFT ON STATION OVER USS LIBERTY AS REQUIRED.
4. DEFENSE OF USS LIBERTY MEANS EXACTLY THY. DESTROY OR DRIVE OFF ANY ATTACKERS WHO ARE CLEARLY MAKING ATTACKS ON LIBERTY. REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. DEFEND YOURSELF IF ATTACKED.

COMSIXTHFLT 081337Z/JUN 67 OVERRIDES THIS MSG,
SEE CTF 60 081416Z/JUN.

Q. J. [unclear]
157

M/P THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

33/81 ... COG
SN(4) JO(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) 1P(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATHAP(1)
OPA(1) + 34 94

03420C

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CONTROL NO. C11518/2/08	PAGE 1	OF 1	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT 081425Z	DATE TIME GROUP 081316Z JUN 67
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Decks IAW
CIUSCNAVZUR London UK
msg. 191904Z Mar 82

Enclosure (44) to CNSG-It
SER 612/17 of 8 FEB 1982

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645

V CWG595 I
000022 RUENAAA
ZNY [REDACTED] ZOV RUTPH
ZFH-2
V QAC657KRE4573
000022 RUTPRC
DE RUIKRE 069 1591416
ZNY [REDACTED]
Z 281416Z JUN 67
XM CTF SIX ZERO
TO ZEN/USS AMERICA
RUCKRF/USS SARATOGA
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

007 001 5 10 02

J/W

BT UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENDERS OF LIZORTY
1. COMSIXTHFLT 281339Z APR 67 APPLIES AND OVERRIDES MY 007 001 5 10 02 ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

BT

INFO: G521... G58... G52 ... G5...

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Declass IAW
ENCUSNAUEUR London UK
msg. 191904 Mar 82

Enclosure (46) to COMSIXTHFLT

612/17 of 3 FEB 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVSU 5216/5 (7-6) S/N 0104.904.1760

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

614/sje
Ser 00492-67

DATE : 6 JUL 1967

Enclosure (4)

Memorandum

FROM : G10

TO : G30 *DDM 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7*

SUBJECT : Allowance and Personnel information for USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5) (U)

Encl : (1) DIRNAVSECGRU Confidential ltr NSGH/G14/war Ser 05136 of 7 Apr 1967

1. Following information is provided for use as background in the preparation of the study relating to the attack on USS LIBERTY:

a. Allowance of the Research Operations Department based upon the current billet allocations letters is 6 officers and 125 enlisted. Detailed breakdown of billet allocations is contained in enclosure (1).

b. On board count of personnel as of 3 June 1967 (Taken from USN 855 PUR 0306352 Jun 1967) 6 Officers 123 Enlisted 3 Civilians

(1) PCS

(a) Officers 6

Name	Rank/Desig	Billet Title
David E. LEWIS	LCDR/1610	Head, RESCHOPDEPT
M. H. BENNETT, Jr.	LT/1610	Operations
J. G. O'CONNOR, Jr.	LT/1615	Non Morse Intercept
L. C. PATTER	LTJG/1105	Processing & Reporting
J. M. ENNIS, Jr.	IT/1615	Elect/Material
J. C. PIERCE	LT/6462	Communications

(b) Enlisted 107 118

(2) TAD

(a) Officers None

(b) Enlisted 16

Name/Rate	Perm DUSTA
CT2 C. R. HENDRICKS	ADNSG
CT2 S. E. MEYER	ADNSG
CT3 J. L. GOSS	ADNSG
CT3 D. W. HAWKINS	ADNSG
CT3 A. (n) HIGGINS	ADNSG
CT3 M. P. JOHNSON	ADNSG



S.F. File

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly

Declassified by authority of Executive Order 12356

On 03 NOV 1982

By COMNAVSECGRU

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GLA/sjo
Ser 00492-67
6 JUL 1967

<u>Name/Rate</u>	<u>Perm DUSTA</u>
CT3 C. J. THOME	ADNSG
CT3 T. R. THORNTON	ADNSG
CTSN L. R. BENNETT	ADNSG
CTSN C. C. NYGREN	ADNSG
See note #1	

CT1 R. K. BAKER	USN 856
CT1 J. M. LUFTON	USN 23
SGT B. F. LOCKWOOD	USN 40
SGT J. L. RAPER	2nd PADBN
CPL E. E. REINBEYER	2nd PADBN
CT2 A. P. HENDLE	USN 23
See note #2	

*Due to an error on the data card CT1 BAKER was believed to be an Arabic linguist and was ordered TAD on that assumption. However, subsequent examination revealed that he was Hebrew qualified instead.

(c) Civilians 3

<u>Name/Grade</u>	<u>Perm DUSTA</u>
Mr. A. M. BLUE, CG-7	NSA
Mr. D. L. BLALOCK, CG-7	NSA
Mr. R. L. WILSON, CG-7	NSA

c. Casualties within the RESCHOFDEPT:

(1) Killed

(a) Officers 1

1. LT James Cecil PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462, Comm Officer

(b) Enlisted 4

1. CT3 William P. ALLENPAUGH, USN, 684 49 96
2. CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL, USN, 586 13 23
3. CT3 Jerry L. CONVERSE, USN, 794 79 44
4. CT2 Robert P. EISENBERG, USN, 776 09 35

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GI4/sjo
Ser 00492-67

6 JUL 1967

5. CT3 Jerry L. GOSS, USNR, 773 61 55
6. CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 24
7. CTSN Lawrence P. HAYDEN, USN, B70 53 70
8. CT1 Warren E. HERSEY, USN, 903 67 11
9. CTSN Alan (n) HIGGINS, USN, 788 62 97
10. CT2 Richard W. KEMME, Jr, USN, 778 82 75
11. CTSN James I. LENAU, USN, 997 56 58
12. CTC Raymond E. LINN, USN, 571 13 74
13. CT1 James M. LUPTON, USN, 511 31 28
14. CT3 Duane R. MARGGRAF, USN, 773 96 50
15. CTSN David W. MARLBOROUGH, USN, B10 04 80
16. CT2 Anthony P. MENDLE, USN, 777 62 87
17. CTSN Carl C. NYGREN, USN, 788 37 16
18. SGT Jack I. RAPER, USMC, 199 40 72
19. CPL Edward E. REHMEYER, III, USMC, 212 09 19
20. CT1 John C. SMITH, Jr., USN, 237 77 94
21. CTC Melvin D. SMITH, USN, 497 95 96
22. CT3 Thomas R. THORNTON, USN, 997 97 91
23. CT3 Philippo C. TIEDTKE, USN, 914 32 84
24. CT1 Fredorick J. WALTON, USN, 236 31 86

(c) Civilian 1

1. Mr. Allen M. BLUE, GG-7 TEMDU from NSA

(2) Seriously Injured

(a) Officers 1

1. LT James G. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615

(b) Enlisted 2

1. CTSN LeoRoy BENNETT, USN, 998 13 79
2. CT1 Joseph C. LENTINI, USN, 594 81 55

(c) Civilian None

(3) Minor Injuries

(a) Officers 2

1. LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610
2. LT James H. ENNIS, USNR, 653849/1615

(b) Enlisted 0

1. CT1 Roginald N. ADDINGTON, USN, 349 53 80

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GI/sjo
Ser 00192-67
8 JUL 1967

2. CT3 Joe D. ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77
3. CT1 Richard K. BAKER, USN, 486 80 12
4. CTSN Nathan D. BENEDICT, JR., USN, 139 55 74
5. CT3 James V. BIRNG, USN, 913 41 23
6. CT1 Richard C. CARLSON, USN, 444 13 12
7. CT1 Jeffery R. CARPENTER, USN, 539 14 85
8. CT2 James R. DAVIDSON, USN, 699 64 72
9. CTSN Kenneth F. EAKINS, USN, 794 04 69
10. CT3 David W. HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49
11. CT2 Charles R. HENDRICKS, USN, 685 56 42
12. CT2 Frederick K. JOHNS, USN, 794 91 14
13. CT3 Melvin P. JOHNSON, USN, 997 32 29
14. CTSN Eugene H. KIRK, USN, 918 81 30
15. CT3 Loren W. KIRBY, USN, 538 49 74
16. CTSN Terry W. JERMAN, USN, 914 59 44
17. SGT Bryce F. LOCKWOOD, USMC,
18. CT2 David L. MC FEGGAN, USN, 771 71 98
19. CT2 Stephen E. MEYER, USN, 771 12 03
20. CT1 Charles L. ROWLEY, USN, 458 48 03
21. CTSN David A. SHAW, USN, 501 39 56
22. CT3 Maurice B. SHAFER, USN, 695 94 86
23. CT3 Harold E. SIX, USN, 777 58 53
24. CTC Harold J. THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37
25. CTSN James P. KAVANAGH, USN, 918 51 32

(c) Civilian 1

1. Mr. Donald L. BLALOCK, GG-7 TEMDU from NSA

Note #1 - Boarded USS LIBERTY in April 67 at Norfolk, Virginia for deployment to West Coast of Africa, 2 May 67. (remained on board when LIBERTY was diverted to Med.)

Note #2 - Boarded USS LIBERTY late May/early June 67 at Rota, Spain prior to LIBERTY movement to Eastern Med.

Jackson L. Koon
JACKSON L. KOON

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

20

WHITE HOUSE

—
LBJ's SCHEDULE

—
RELATED PAPERS

—
2 PRESS CONFERENCES

THE COMPLETE FILE IN
THE HOOVER LIBRARY IS
ABOUT 500 PAGES INCLUDING
PHOTOGRAPHS, PROOF SHEETS OF
ALL PHOTOS IN CRUCIAL
MEETINGS, ~~AND~~ DIPLOMATIC
NOTES (DUPED ELSEWHERE)
AND MY HEAVY CORRESPONDENCE
WITH LBJ LIBRARY

↑ FOLDER 20 ↓

WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

President began his day at (Place) The White House - Washington, D. C.

Day THURSDAY

LINDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

Time		Telephone (or)		Activity (include visited by)	Exp. (or) (or) (or)
In	Out	In	Out		
				Bright sunny day a.m. temperatures 65 degrees WARM	
7:45am				Breakfast on tray - in bedroom Creamed - Chipped beef and hot tea Marvin Watson on 2d floor - out at 9:43am	
8:08am		t		Sen. Mike Mansfield	
8:13am		t		Secy McNamara	
8:18am		t		Sen. Everett Dirksen	
8:30am		t		Sen. Wayne Morse - (the President had asked Op. to get Sen. Morse at 8:11am) The President took this call in Dirksen's office - Sen. was with the Dentist... and was ended at 8:30a)	
8:38am		t		Secy McNamara	
8:41am		t		Judge A. W. Mourning - thru Ranch Board - Johnson City, Texas	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
 FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-744-735

Page No.:

WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
BY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

President began his day at (Place)

The White House - Washington, D. C.

Day THURSDAY

Time	Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	Legend
	In	Out		
8:49am	t		Atty Gen'l Ramsey Clark	COPY LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY
9:08am	t		Sen. Jacob Javits	
9:20am	t		Director Charles Schultze	
9:45am	t		The Attorney General	
9:21am	f		George Christian - PRESS SECRETARY - GEORGE	
9:48a			"hot line" - Kolygin to Johnson - status of cease-fire	
9:49am	f		Walt Rostow - NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR	
10:00am	t		Secy Robt McNamara	
10:09am	t		Tom Johnson (pl) - W. THOMAS JOHNSON, AIDE	
10:10a	t		midr (pl) - "Get me in twenty minutes how many states I have been in since I became President, broken down by years." The President then changed his mind and said to eliminate '64 and get only 65, 66, and 67.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-166-131

Page No.: 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Date June 2, 1967

President began his day at (Place)

The White House - Washington, D.C.

Day THURSDAY

LIBRARY

Time		Telephone (or)		Activity (include visited by)	Lapse for LIBRARY
In	Out	Lo	LD		
10:12a		t	✓	Hon. Farris Bryant, Director, Office of Emergency Planning	COPY LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY
10:14a			✓	Mr. Walt Rostow asked for the President--he was on the telephone--Did not talk	
10:18a		t	✓	Robert E. Kintner (pl)	
10:20a		f	✓	Hon. McGeorge Bundy	
10:24a		t	✓	Walt Rostow (pl) -- returning his call	
10:25a			✓	The President was taken a run-down on the states in which he had been, as he had requested of midr r... at 10:10am. As of 3 June 1967: 1965=14, 1966= 27, 1967=7 (since becoming President, he has been in all states except Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota and South Dakota.)	
10:58a		t	✓	Barefoot Sanders (pl)	
11:00am		t	✓	Walt Rostow (pl)	
11:00am		f	✓	Hon. McGeorge Bundy (Op. reports that Tom J answered and said he would put the President right on the line. At this time however, the President was on the pl to Mr. Rostow according to the pl lights.)	
11:00a				"hot line" - Johnson to Kosygin - re USS Liberty	
11:35a				"hot line" -- Johnson to Kosygin - cease-fire actions	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 O-766-715

Page No.: 3

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 5, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day

~~Saturday~~

Thursday

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	Legend Initials Code
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
	11:45am				The President returned to the oval office w/ Marvin Watson	
	11:45	11:46			mary s in--The President said for her to see that every morning there is a typed card w/ his schedule of the day on his desk in the oval office & little office & in the	
	11:46a		t		George Christian (pl)	
	11:48am				George Christian	
	12:00n		t		Director Charles Schultze--when reported to the President it was also reported that Sen. Russell was on the line. The President said he would take the call to Senator Ruchard Russell and to tell Schultze he would call him back. DID NOT TALK	
	12:00n		t		Senator Richard Russell of Ga.	
	12:08	12:09	t		George Christian (pl)--GE in Marvin's office. so talked to Tom Johnson (Sen. Russee:l on hold)	
	12:13p		t		Tom Johnson (on GC pl)	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964 O-166-719

Page No.: 5

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	Signature Code
	In	Out	To	LD		
	12:14p		t		mary a "Get Charlie Schultze for me now." -- before this could be done Secy Rusk	sk.Caller
	12:14p		f		Secy Dean Rusk	
	12:15p		f		mldr "Two pages of the briefing are here." -- she took them in	
	12:15p		t		Director Charles Schultze, Director BOB	
	12:15p	12:37			Secy John Gardner	
		12:37p			Hon. Doug Cater	
		12:23p			Hon. George Christian	
		12:23p			Hon. Walt Rostow	
	12:20p				"hot line" -- Kosygin to Johnson - USS Liberty	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 O - 304-734

Page No. 60

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Thursday

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	Presidential File Code
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
✓ 12:37p					The President departed the oval office w/ Marvin Watson George Christian and was met by Maj. Hugh Robinson, Army Aide to the President to walk to the Diplomatic Reception Room to meet His Ex. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi The Hon. Aleke Banda, Minister of Development and Planning The Hon. Joseph M. A. Mwaika, charge' d'affaires ad interim of Malawi Hon. Joseph Palmer, Asst Secy of State Mr. Thomas W. McElhiney, Country Director, Dept of State Amb. Symington introduced members of both parties to each other, and then the President escorted President Banda via the garden to his office.	LYNDON B. JOHNSON
✓ 12:45p					The President walked across the Rose Garden w/ President Banda Under Secy Katzenbach Major Hugh Robinson Chief of Protocol James Symington and the remainder of the delegation	
12:46p					To the oval office w/ President Banda ---introduced mjdr who was in at the time straightening the	

The White House
 President LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	E L Y D O J L I B R A R Y
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
					papers on the end table by the rocking chair. add the "Juanita you might get the President a coke or some coffee or some root beer." and invited His Excellency to have a seat "while I finish reading this report." (report was last 5 pages of Christian's morning press briefing). President Banda chose to have coffee.	
	12:59p				Under Secy of State Nicholas Katzenbach joined	
	1:10p				To mansion w/ President Banda of Malawi	
					Before going upstairs for LUNCHEON, the President stopped on the ground floor of the mansion for a quick picture and handshake, with Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Congo	
	1:12p				To second floor - Yellow Oval Room w/ President Banda	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1965 O - 344-715

Page No.: 80

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)
	In	Out	In	Out	
	1:12p				MJDR - pl (President was calling from the West Hall. The President of Malawi (he explained) was in the bathroom and he wanted to take that opportunity to check out a name in his toast --- Gibbon --- also find out who he is and where he lived why he said "the first of earthly blessings" (a call to Kintner's office (Evelyn) let to Erv. Duggan (already in the mansion as a guest for the luncheon) who was reached through the Usher's office. Duggan said this was a reference to Edward Gibbon (rhyme with the famous English Historian who wrote the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire and that while he could not say for sure, he did believe that the quote was from that book. No contact was made with Hamilton who did the first draft, but the Duggan information was immediately relayed to the President who was then in the Yellow Oval Room.
					THOSE ON SECOND FLOOR FOR COCKTAILS AND GIFT EXCHANGE: The Vice President, the Secy of State, Ambassador Symington Hon. Aleke Banda, Min of Development and Planning Hon. Joseph M. A. Mseka - Charge d'Affaires The Vice President Secretary Park
					Autographed photo in sterling silver frame - "To His Excellency, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, with high esteem and warm best wishes, Lyndon B Johnson"
	1:29p				Down the stairway w/ President Banda Photos in lobby
					Then to East Room to receive guests - President in receiving line w/ Vice President Humphrey and Minister Banda, along w/ President Banda
	1:50p				State Dining Room for ^{Mr} LUNCHEON honoring H. E. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi

check to DT

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone (or)		Activity (include visited by)	Expand.
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
13					At the President's table, reading from his right President Banda Secretary Rusk Dr. <i>John A.</i> Logan, President of Hollins College, Virginia Mr. William H. Beatty, Jr., Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank Mr. <i>Marcus L.</i> Bernardi, actor - NBC Cong. John Brademas Mr. <i>M. L. Y.</i> Kwengwalo, Member of Parliament Judge Thurgood Marshall Mr. <i>Frank White</i> Banda, Minister-Development and Planning (on pres left)	EXPANDED LYNDON B. JOHNSON
	2:35			TOA:TS		
	2:51p				The President walked President Banda to the South Portico - to say goodbye This departure unusual in contrast to usual departure from North Portico because of large crowds of demonstrators--Arab and Israeli--surging back and forth on Pennsylvania outside Northwest Gates.	
	2:55p				MW to the mansion -- saying, "they tell me the luncheon is just breaking up."	
	3:01p				The President to the second floor w/ The Vice President George Christian, MW VP out at 3:26p, GC out at 3:45p (MW departed at 3:25p)	
	3:10p		t		W Rostow (pl)	
	3:24p		f		McGeorge Bundy	
	3:29p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)	
	3:31p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)	

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY
 COPY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone (or)		Activity (include visited by)
	In	Out	In	Out	
5					3:36p Johnson to Kossygin - via "hot line" - re USS Liberty
	3:38p		t		Tom Johnson (pl)
	3:44p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)
	3:50p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)
	3:51p		t		Q MW (pl)
	3:54p		f		Walt Rostow
	3:56p		t		George Christian (pl)
	3:57p		t		McGeorge Bundy
	4:05p		t		George Christian
	4:06p		t		George Christian (pl)
	4:11p		t		George Christian (pl)
	4:13p		t		John Gonella (pl)
	4:16p		t		MW (pl)

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1964 O-700-725

Page No.: //

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	COPIES BY LBJ
	In	Out	In	Out		
	4:30p		t		mjdr (pl) -- to instruct length or procedure to go in getting back a personal letter for his desk. <i>See folder in cabinet</i>	
	4:32p		t		MW (pl)	
	4:35p		t		Tom Johnson (pl)	
	4:38p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)	
	4:44p		t		MW (pl)	
	4:50p		f		Barefoot Sanders	
	5:10p				To Oval Ofc - accompanied by Jim Jones, saying "Did you get that letter?" to mjdr. The President handed to mjdr a folder -- described on top of page 14	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-764-155

Page No. 12

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
diary page	entry for 5:10p (partially restricted)	7/8/67	C


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Daily Diary, June 8, 1967

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

The President began his day at (Place)

Entry No.	Time		Telephone (or)		Activity (include visited by)	COPY EXTEND- LYNDON B. JOHNSON
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
	5:11p	6:00p			To Cabinet Room for meeting OFF RECORD <i>Amish Forest Park</i>	
					with:	
					Secretary Robert S. McNamara	
					Deputy Secy Cyrus R. Vance	
					Under Secy of Army, David E. McGuffert	
					Secy of the Navy Paul H. Nitze	
					Secy of the Air Force Harold Brown	
					Asst Secy of Defense Thomas G. Morris	
					Asst Secy of Defense Robert Anthony	
					Asst Secy of Defense Paul R. Ignatius	
					Dr. Finn J. Larsen, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering	
					JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	
					General Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman	
					General Harold G. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA	
					Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations	
					General John P. McConnell, USAF, Chief of Staff, USAF	
					General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps	
					Charles Schultze	
					Ellis Veatch, Deputy DOD Chief, Military Affairs <i>Chief Military Affairs in DOD</i>	
					Joseph Califano	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD
 FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-761-715

Page No.: 3

WHITE HOUSE

Date June 8, 1967

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DAILY DIARY

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone (or T)		Activity (include visited by)
	In	Out	Lo	LD	
					at 5:10p The President had with him (when he returned to the office) a folder, indicating he was through with the contents:
					Rostow memorandum covering Ambassador Bunker's weekly telegram. RESTRICTED
					Rostow note transmitting report from Gov. Harriman of June 8, 12:35p Rostow note re Kosygnin response - not classified - re ship incident CIA daily briefing for June 8 the 6:15 a. m. White House sit-in regular report
	6:00p				To Sun. Office. saying he was going to the barber shop.
	6:03p				To the barbershop Joined there by Barefoot Sanders When I took the Pres the first 6 pages of the briefing, the Pres looked at Steve Martini, and said, "Now, I have to read this, when can I do it? Now? You know, I used to have a [] barber in Austin who could let me get my hair cut w/ my glasses on. He'd cut my sideburns, and then let me read the rest of the time. But he died." All this in an effort to get a reaction of some sort from Martini, but none was forthcoming.

The President began his day at (Place)

Entry No.	Time		Telephone (or t)		Activity (include visited by)
	In	Out	Lo	LD	
	6:35p				To Oval Office, stopping in Fish Room to pick up Cong Wilbur Mills then to little lounge w/ Cong Mills, MW, and Barefoot Sanders
	6:40p				mf took in last pages of briefing -- Pres and Cong Mills were alone in lounge office
	6:55p		t		MW (pl)
	7:10p				To Situation Room - w/ Chairman Mills and MW See page 18 for attendance
	7:20p				Chairman Mills departed the White House

LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY
 E. S. ...
 ...

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White house

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time		Telephone for		Activity (include visited by)	E. J. di.
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
	7:45p				The President returned to the Oval Office	COPY LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY
✓	7:46p	8:05p			Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler Secy Fowler asked to see the President "about Chairman Mahon, Chairman Mills, Sen Russell Long, plus a variety of other pieces."	
	7:55p				The President asked for Director Schultz -- he was at the Sheraton Carlton -- "never mind"	
	7:59p		t		MW (pl)	
✓	8:00p	8:50p			Hon. James Webb, Administrator, NASA	
	8:06p		t		MW (pl)	
✓	8:20p		t		General William "Bozo" McKee	
✓	8:29p		t		Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force	
✓	8:34p				McGeorge Bundy	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1966 O-344-121

Page No. 16

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)	COPIES of this diary
	In	Out	Lo	LD		
	9:00p	9:25p			Signing mail at desk - w/ mf and MW	LYNDON B. JOHNSON
	9:30p				To mansion, asking for Jay Taylor who was staying at the Sheraton (mf placed call, no answer in room or to page -- left word)	
	9:32p 9:32p	11:40p			The President joined Mrs. Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. George Brown on the second floor	
✓	10:10p				DINNER w/ Mrs. Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. George Brown	
✓	10:33p			t	Dale Malechek - LBJ Ranch	
✓	10:54p			t	Jay Taylor - at Sheraton Carlton	
	10:56p				The President asked the operator to clear Jay Taylor to come in the Diplomatic Entrance	
✓	11:05p	11:40p			Mr. Jay Taylor to second floor to join	

THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
 DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place)

The White House

Day Thursday

LIBRARY

Entry No.	Time		Telephone		Activity (include visited by)
	In	Out	In	Out	
	11:24p		t		Tom Johnson
	11:41p		f		Mrs. Arthur Krim - New York City
	11:50p				Retired
					Today released exchange of ltrs between the President and Sen Mike Mansfield at 4:00p re the president's current views on the situation in the Middle East.
					ATTENDANCE - SIT RM mtg - tonight:
					Secy Rusk
					Secy McNamara
					Secy Fowler
					Hon. Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secy of State
					Gen. Earle G Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
					Director, CIA - Richard Helms
					Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Clark Clifford
					Under Secy of State, Eugene V Rostow
					Asst Secy of State, Lucius D. Battle
					President's Special Asst for Natl Security Affairs, Walt Rostow
					Spec Consultant to the President and Secy of Special Committee of Natl Sec Council, McGeorge Bundy
					Harold Saunders

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 ure
 Code

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-764-725

Page No: 180

^{COPY}
TO SIGNING TABLE THURSDAY, June 8, 1967

- signed* Ltr to Hon. Paul Findley, MC, responding to his teleg of views on crisis in Mid-East.
- signed* Ltr to Sen. Clifford P. Case responding to his ltr on Mid-East matter
- sent* ~~Ltr~~ to (Cardinal) Joseph Cardinal Ritter - St. Louis, responding to his teleg of concern about Mid-East
- signed* Ltr to Gov. of Md., Spiro T. Agnew responding to his ltr re Mid-East sit.
- signed* Commission for Alexander B. Trowbridge as Secretary of Commerce --
Sen. Confirmation June 8
- signed* Protocol of Buenos Aires with underlying report of the Secretary of State and message from the President to the Senate for the purpose of transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States.
- signed* Ltr of thanks to H. E. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, Pres of the Rep. of Costa Rica for ox cart ~~XXX~~.
- signed* Ltr To Sen. Mike Mansfield responding to his on current Mid-East situation
- Draft for reply to the Shah's message informing the Pres that he regretfully had to postpone his visit to the U. S.
- signed* Ltr to Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus in response to his on the 20th anniversary of the Marshall plan.

signed by the President
6/8/67
9:15p

SIGNING TABLE FRIDAY, JUNE 9, 1967 ---beginning: at 12:30p.m.

6/9/67 3:20P
Ltr to Sen. Mundt(drafted by Rostow) in response to one fr the Senator of some months ago.

6/9/67 3:20P
Ltr to H.S. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Pres of the Rep of the Philippines, Manila re equipment for 5 additional engineer battalions (Rostow draft & memo)

WR Memo (Rostow): U.S. -Mexico Commission on Border Development *6-9-67 3:20P*

Remaining on table from morning signing:

6/9/67 3:20P
Ltr to Congressman Ray A. Taylor (Rostow draft) responding to one from him support Pres's position re Gulf of Aqaba

6/9/67 3:20P
Memo fr Doug Cater and DeVier Pierson w draft message for Congress attached re communications ~~XX~~ satellite policy

6/9/67 3:20P
Enrolled Bill H. R. 6950 - restoration of investment credit and accelerated depreciation allowance sponsored by Rep Mills (D) Ark. -Last Day: 6

20/11/67
Personnel actions proposed by Doug Nobles via MW: Robert S. Smith for Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Africa and *subject to MW*
Philip J. Maloney for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mortgage Credit, HUD
MW see item 2

6/9/67 3:20P
Telegr. to Oscar Chapman who is sick in Methodist Hospital in Houston, Texas

Action item fm Walt Rostow - Secy Risk asks permission to curtail his participation at the NATO Ministerial mtg in Luxembourg next week.

Approved Disapproved See me

6/9/67 3:20P
Personnel actions proposed by John Macy via MW: Resignation of Berkeley Johnson Fed Rep to Pecos River Compact Commission June 30, 1967.; (letter) appointment of Mr. John W. Odell to replace Berkeley Johnson; (letter) two letters 1) to Gov of New Mexico and 2) to Gov of Texas informing them of this appointment as requested by legislation.

6/9/67 3:20P
Cyrus Vance ltr of resignation; nomination of Paul Nitze as /deputy secy of Defense to replace Cy Vance; nomination of John McNaughton, as Secy of Navy to replace Paul Nitze; Paul Warnke, to be Asst Secy of Defense, Int'l Security Affairs to replace John McNaughton - press release also separated and given to Geo. Christian by the President.

6-7-67

LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

ADD
Fm MW

6-9-67
4:00 p
6-9-67
4:00 p
6-9-67
4:00 p
6-9-67
4:00 p

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - another name, Walston C. Gallie to be considered for FDIC Sherrill vacancy Discuss w/me
Right in understanding rec'd negative fm Cecil Burney? Yes

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - Robt G. Miner as possibility for Amb to Sierra Leons. Submit alternatives.

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - re Amb to Ethiopia. Discuss w/me.

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - re Candidates to be Adm. of the Bonneville Power Administration 1) Gordon C. Culp 2) John J. Davis.
 Discuss w/me.

To table at 5:30 p. m.

signed
6-10-67
1:00 pm

Proclamation: Flag Day and National Flag Week

Nomination of James P. Grant of Virginia to be an Asst Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

To the table at 6:30 p. m.

Commission for Bill Leonhart to be special assistant to the Pres

signed
6-10-67
1:00 pm

Commission and Order for McGeo. Bundy to serve as Special Consultant to the Pres (order fixing rate of compensation).

signed
6-10-67
1:00 pm

CAB Order establishing a non-stop route between Montreal and Tampa-Miam. --and authorizing Northeast Airlines to service the route.

signed
6-7-67
11:30 p

Ltr to David Ginsburg - replying to one Mr. Ginsburg sent the President

copy
6-9-67
10:30 p

Wire to Mrs. B. K. Johnson - Pittsburgh, Pa. - regarding death of Mrs. Jessie Van (sent by Will Sparks) = Night letter 6/9/67

all
6-10-67
11:00 p

Wire to Mr. Archie Mellon - Lyndonville, Vt. - night letter 6/9/67 - re 100th anniv of Lyndon Institute. (sent by Will Sparks)

signed
6-9-67
1:00 pm

Ltr to Miss Brenda Sweatman, Piedmont, S. C. - on her ltr to Radio Station WQOK - on teenage view on VNam (sent by Will Sparks)

signed
6-10-67
1:00 pm

Ltr to Mr. Oscar Anderson, L.A., Calif - applauding his achievement to build school for Head Start children (sent by Will Sparks)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday - June 8, 1967

11:30am Secy John Gardner (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:00n Hon. Robert Henry McBride
Amb. - designate to the Congo (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:20pm Arrival of His Ex. Hastings Kamuzu
Banda - President of Republic of
Malawi (by helicopter at Ellipse)

12:25pm The President greets Pres. Banda
at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance

12:30pm Private Mtg w/Pres. Banda (Oval Rm Ofc)

1:00pm Stag Luncheon for Pres. Banda

5:00pm OFF RECORD: Secy McNamara,
Secy Resor, Nitze and Brown,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Schultze
and Joe Califano (Cab. Rm.)

5:30pm Steve Martini

6:00pm OFF RECORD: Chairman Wilbur Mills

COPY
LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

THURSDAY - June 8, 1967

11:30a Secy Gardner
(Oval Rm Ofc)

12:00n Hon. Robt H. McBride
Amb-designate to
Congo (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:20p Arrival of Pres.
Banda (by helicopter at
the Ellipse)

12:25p President greets
Pres. Banda of
Malawi (Diplomatic
Reception entrance)

12:30p Pri Mtg w/Pres.
Banda (Oval Rm Ofc)

1:00p Stag Luncheon for
Pres. Banda

5:00p

OFF RECORD:

Secy McNamara,
Secys Resor, Nitze
and Brown, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Schultze
and Joe Califano
(in Cabinet Room)

5:30p

Steve Martini

6:00p

OFF RECORD:

Chairman Wilbur Mills
(in Oval Rm Ofc)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THURSDAY - June 8, 1967

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Secys Resor, Nitze
and Brown, Joint Chief
of Staff, Schultze
and Joe Califano
(in Cabinet Room)

5:30p Steve Martini

6:00p OFF RECORD:
Chairman Wilbur
Mills (Oval Rm Ofc)

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday, June 8, 1967

- 11:30 Secretary John Gardner.
- 12:00 Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- 12:20 His Excellency Hastings Kamusa Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi arrives by helicopter at the Ellipse.
- 12:25 President Banda arrives at Diplomatic Reception Entrance.
- 12:30 Private meeting with President Banda of Malawi.
- 1:00 State luncheon for President Banda.

THE PRESIDENT'S AFTERNOON/EVENING
SCHEDULE THURSDAY, JUNE 8

- 5:00 (Secretary McNamara et al - list attached)
CABINET ROOM
- 5:30 (Mr. and Mrs. Steve Martini - ?)
- 6:00 (Chairman Wilbur Mills)
- 8:15 (Private dinner with Mr. and Mrs. George Brown)

Those to attend the 5:00 o'clock Cabinet Room meeting:

Secretary Robert S. McNamara

Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance

Under Secretary of Army David E. McGiffert

Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze

Secretary of Air Force Harold Brown

Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas D. Morris

Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Anthony

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul R. Ignatius

Dr. Finn J. Larsen, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering

Joint Chiefs of Staff:

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman

General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA

Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations

General John P. McConnell, USAF, Chief of Staff, USAF

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Charles Schultze and his assistant

Joe Califano

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EDDIE H. JOHNSON LIBRARY

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday, June 8, 1967

ok 11:30

Secretary John Gardner.

Gardner wants to discuss the National Institutes of Health.

This will be in the President's office.

ok 12:00

Picture with Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

This will be in the President's office.

ok 12:20

His Excellency Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi arrives by helicopter at the Ellipse.

ok 12:25

The President greets President Banda at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance ~~at 12:20~~ for pictures and the two Presidents then walk to the President's office.

ok 12:30

Private meeting with President Banda of Malawi.

This will be in the President's office.

ok 1:00

Stag luncheon for President Banda.

This will be in the Mansion.

ok 5:30

~~George Henry~~ **SEC HENRY FOWLER**
(OFF THE RECORD)

(This will be in the President's office.)

6:30

(Jim Marlow of Associated Press.) (OFF THE RECORD)

(This will be in the President's office.)

→ 6:00

(CLIFF ALEXANDER -- TO DISCUSS A
"SEE ME" MEMO ON PLANS FOR
PROGRESS.) (OFF THE RECORD)



THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78705

February 14, 1979

In reply refer to:
NLJ-79-5, Ennes

NSC PRIMARY INTEREST

Mr. William Price
FADRC, Room 1239
2201 C Street, NW
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Price:

Under the provisions of Section 3-501 and 3-504, Executive Order 12065, a researcher has requested the mandatory declassification review of the enclosed documents from our holdings. The enclosed document lists identifies the Library file which contains the documents.

Although you will be notifying the researcher of your decision, we request a copy of your response so that we may mark the documents appropriately. If you sanitize any documents, please provide us a copy. If subsequent appeal results in a decision to declassify more material, please inform the Library.

If there is any question concerning this request, please do not hesitate to contact us.


Sincerely,

Martin I. Elzy

Martin I. Elzy
Archivist

Enclosures

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS



THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 13, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

I have done some further research on your photograph request, and turned up these contact sheets of pictures which I believe were taken at the meeting in question. (The issue is clouded by the fact that there were two meetings in the Situation Room that day. I am relying on the clock on the wall, and the fact that Llewellan Thompson was present only at the morning meeting, to make the identifications.)

These contact sheets, for rolls A4250, A4252, and A4256, I am reasonably sure are the only ones from the morning meeting. These are all black and white photographs. I have indicated on each sheet which of the frames Mr. Okamoto edited as being the best of the lot. I realize that a xerox copy of a contact sheet is not the finest quality one might wish for, but perhaps these will be of some value to you in making a selection.

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist




THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

4000 GULF BLVD., SUITE 1000
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77056

March 9, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.



Dear Mr. Ennes:

I have ordered your two photographs, and will send them along when they are ready. Thank you for your check for \$9.30.

The unidentified man in A 4256-28a is not George Christian. It is Marvin Watson.

I have checked our record of the President's activities on the morning of 8 June 67 against the contact sheets for the day, and was unable to identify any pictures from that morning prior to the meeting.

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

4 February 1968

Mr. E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist
THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY
Austin, Texas 78705

Dear Mr. Scott:

Thank you for your letter of 24 January and for the xerox copies of file cards for 8 June 1967.

Unfortunately, all of the pictures represented on the cards you sent were taken after about 12:00 noon. I am looking for pictures taken during the morning, particularly during the 11:06 to 11:45am meeting in the situation room with Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Katzenbach, Thompson, Bundy and Walt Rostow.

Could you possibly identify any pictures that were taken during that period, or at any time between 10:00am and noon?

Sincerely,

James M. Eunes, Jr.



THE JAMES M. ENNES, JR. BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

January 24, 1976

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:


Enclosed are Xerox copies of the cards from our photo retrieval system for June 8, 1967, excluding the coverage of the visit of President Banda. This file includes the shots which were edited by the photographers as being the best taken on that day.

I have enclosed one of our price lists for your information. Photographs with serial numbers prefixed "A" are available in black and white only; those with "C" are available in color, or black and white glossy finish.

We normally require about two weeks to fill most orders for black and white photographs, three weeks for color. Should you wish to order any of these, please send the order to my attention, and make your check payable to "GSA-LBJ Library."

Please let us know if we can be of further service.

Very truly yours,



E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist



THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

January 12, 1978

Mr. James Ennes
[Redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

In response to your January 9, 1978 letter, I have not been able to locate a Clark Clifford report on the USS Liberty matter.

I have referred your photograph questions to our audiovisual archivist, Phil Scott.

Sincerely,

Martin I. Elzy
Martin I. Elzy
Archivist

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

January 12, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Martin Elzy has passed along to me a copy of your letter of January 9, in order that I might reply to your questions about photographs.

The pictures you ask about are indeed a part of our collection, and you may order prints of them from us at the prices indicated on the enclosed list. These particular shots are available in black and white only. They are in the public domain; no rights need be purchased. We do have a chronological file of the photographs taken on June 8, in the event there are other shots you wish to ask about.

You may write to Mr. Okamoto as follows:

Mr. Yoichi R. Okamoto
5602 Roosevelt
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

REPLY 1/16/78
ASKED FOR COPY
OF THE CHRON FILE.

THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

1000 E. 11th Street
Austin, Texas 78702

December 22, 1977

Mr. James Ennes
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

In response to your December 21, 1977, telephone call, the President's Daily Diary for June 8, 1967, numbers 22 pages. The President's Appointment File for that date totals 46 pages exclusive of a folder devoted to the visit of President Banda of Malawi. There is also a 270-page folder labeled "June 1967 Middle East Crisis." You may order copies of the material at a cost of twenty cents per page. Please make your check or money order payable to the General Services Administration.

I have enclosed a list of other material on Israel. All of the series may have material on your topic. Because we may not select documents for any researcher, lest we later be charged with concealing or overlooking important information, you would need to come to Austin to investigate these files. Most of the closed and unprocessed material is security classified. We are engaged in a declassification program, but it will take decades to complete.

Please contact us again if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Martin I. Elzy
Martin I. Elzy
Archivist

Enclosure

CO 126

December 6, 1977, list of material on Israel in the White House files
of the Johnson administration

White House Central File, Countries 126 (Israel)
9" open, 9 items closed

White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 126
-1" open, -1" closed

White House Central File, National Defense 19(Wars)/CO 1-6 (Middle East/Near East)
2' 5" open, 4 items closed

White House Central File, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 1-6
-1" open, -1" closed

National Security File, Country File, Israel
1' open, 1' 9" closed or unprocessed


National Security File, Country File, Middle East
3", all unprocessed

National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis
4", all unprocessed

National Security File, National Security Council History, Middle East Crisis 1967
2' 7", all unprocessed

President's Staff File, DPT, Head of State Correspondence File, Israel
4", all unprocessed

Additional Israel material is scattered throughout the files,
but the location and nature of this material can best be discussed
with the researcher upon arrival at the Library.



UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EO 79-222

June 25, 1979

Dear Mr. Elzy:

This is in response to your letter of February 14, 1979, for three numbered documents (3 pages) requested on behalf of James M. Ennes, Jr., from the files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Case Number NLJ-79-5.

The NSC Staff has completed its review and made the following determinations:

- Documents 1 and 3 may be declassified and released.
- Document 2 remains classified in full under sections 1-301(b) and 1-302 of Executive Order 12065 and should be marked Confidential.

Sincerely,

Beverly Zweiben
Beverly Zweiben
Director
Freedom of Information

Mr. Martin I. Elzy
Archivist
National Archives and Records Service
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
2313 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURES

COPY
LBJ LIBRARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1

Thursday, June 8, 1967

Approved by President - 11:00 am.

Transmitted by US Molink - 11:17 am.

Received by Soviet Molink - 11:24 am.

To Chairman Kosygin

From President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

We have just learned that USS Liberty, an auxiliary ship, has apparently been torpedoed by Israel forces in error off Port Said. We have instructed our carrier, Saratoga now in the Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the scene to investigate. We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties are informed.

We have passed this message to Chernyakov but feel that you should know of this development urgently.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Auth: NSC Mr 6/25/78 e 1125-79-5
by MFE 7/11/79

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Thursday, June 8, 1967

Approved by President - 3:36 pm.

Transmitted by US Molink - 3:58 pm.

Received by Soviet Molink - 4:00 pm.

To Chairman Kosygin

From President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

I deeply appreciate your transmitting the message to President Nasser. We lost 10 men, 16 critically wounded, and 65 wounded, as a result of Israeli attack, for which they have apologized.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC Hx 6/25/28 MT-79-5
MIE 7/11/79

Copy - Lyndon B. Johnson Library

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FS
12

Brown Smith

10/3

- 1) Sorry to be late in returning this - I have been away from office for some time.
- 2) I received a copy of the time it came into Washington + immediately prepared my comments thereon for Joseph Clifford. I shall be glad to add additional comments ->

James M. ... Research Papers

COPY

Lyndon B. Johnson Library

COPY
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

to the President
Board of
and
Pat Coyne

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1

RECORD COPY

THIS COPY FOR _____

NEWS CONFERENCE #866-A

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN

11:18 A.M. EDT

JUNE 8, 1967

THURSDAY

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President of the Republic of Malawi will arrive by helicopter at 12:20. He will arrive at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance at 12:25. This will be press, stills, reels, no sound. There will be no remarks there.

The President will meet President Banda there and escort him to his office for a private meeting at 12:30. There is a Stag Luncheon at 1:00.

The President has nominated 38 Navy Captains for promotion to Rear Admiral. We will just give you the list.

I will take questions.

Q George, why has the United States called for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council this afternoon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have any comment on it at this point.

Q George, is Secretary Rusk in the building?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Seeing the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Senator Morse told reporters he was called away from the Hill for an "emergency meeting". I am quoting a reporter on the Hill. Is that true?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Secretary Rusk is here.

Q Back to this thing then. There is some grumbling on the Committee that he gave them short shrift and left suddenly. That is the same question phrased a bit differently.

MR. CHRISTIAN: The Secretary is here in the White House seeing the President.

Q Can you say anything more?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No, I can't.

COPIES
LIBRARY

Q Does it have anything to do with the meeting of the Security Council at the U.N. this afternoon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't say any more. The Secretary of State has been over here frequently in the past few days.

Q Are you aware of any emergency, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not going to comment on it.

Q Are others in the meeting also, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us who else is there?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know who is in the meeting.

Q George, can you tell us what the President has done this morning? What was the time he got up?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President retired fairly early last night. He was able to get through with his night reading before dinner. He was in bed by midnight and slept through until about 6:30 this morning.

Q I think the difficulty arises because I think this is the first time that the Secretary of State has broken off an engagement on the Hill to come down here. This is the first time that kind of a conflict has arisen. You can't give us any help on this situation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Do you think you might be able to later?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Carroll, we will have to see how things progress during the day.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting last night with Bundy?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The meeting last night was essentially an organization meeting with some preliminary plans.

Q Did the President attend?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President attended part of the session.

Q George, is there a meeting today of the U.S. National Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Is there a meeting of this special committee?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q What time is that?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Later today. I don't have the exact

COPY
LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

Q Are the President and the Secretary meeting in the Mansion now or the Cabinet Room?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Here in this part of the building.

Q George, on another subject -- why has Governor Endicott Peabody not yet been sworn in as Deputy Director of OEP after his confirmation back April 20, I believe?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Jack, I would have to check.

Q George, I may have missed this last night, but I don't think there was anything out of here on it. Does the White House have any comment on the action of the House yesterday in rejecting the Debt Limit Bill?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't add much to what Congressman Mills said yesterday. Of course, it is regrettable that the bill sponsored by Congressman Mills wasn't passed by the House.

Q George, when did you assume we would be able to find out why the U.S. called this emergency meeting of the Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I will give you as much information as I can here, Jerry. Ambassador Goldberg is handling the matter in the United Nations.

The President has been in frequent communication with the Ambassador during this period.

As I have said before, our full attention is on the United Nations deliberations.

Q George, can we complete that rundown?

Did the President have a meeting set this morning with Rusk and McNamara early? Or was there a previous meeting?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President expects to see and consult with Secretary Rusk during this period.

MORE

Q Can you give us the President's schedule this morning? I mean, before the official appointment. Was there a meeting in the Situation Room?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. The President has been working at the mansion until recently.

Q Is Mr. McNamara with the President also?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not sure.

Q Could you find out for us who else is involved in this meeting that is going on?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I told you that I would give you as much as I could on our activities here.

Q Did the President speak with Ambassador Goldberg this morning?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, the President has been more or less in constant touch with the Ambassador. I don't have a count on the number of times they have talked. I believe the President may have talked with the Ambassador four or five times yesterday.

Q George, can you tell us perhaps whether Secretary Rusk's arrival at the White House from the Hill is connected with the call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, I don't intend to comment on reasons for meetings during this period.

Q George, there is a report in the New York Times that the Administration is embarking on a plan where Cabinet members are going to visit with the Governors and then be followed up by State days in Washington next fall.

Is there any truth to this? Each Cabinet member will be given about four States to cover?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Sid, I don't know about the State days part of it. I do know that from the outset of his Administration the President has urged the Cabinet members to get out with the people, and not to remain here in Washington all the time.

The Cabinet members have moved around a great deal. Secretary Rusk just recently, as you will recall, has been in Iowa with Senator Hickenlooper, in Texas, Alabama, and some other places. Secretary Freeman has made a number of trips out around the country, and the other Cabinet members have too.

Of course, the President himself tries to go to as many places as he possibly can. He has been to seven States the first five months of this year, and about 27

Q The story indicates there is a concerted effort or a well-planned effort for better organized visits. Are you confirming that part of the story?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am confirming that the President urges Government officials to get out as much as possible -- as much as their duties permit.

Q That isn't what the story is about, Mr. Christian. This story says the President has farmed out the 50 States among the Members of the Cabinet and each will champion or ride herd on the Governors in his territory. Is that correct?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know anything about that part of it. I do know for the last three years the Cabinet Officers have moved around a great deal.

Q George, so far as you know, it is Texas next week and Los Angeles on the 23rd. Is it still on the schedule?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President still hopes to go to both places, yes.

Q George, there are to be two demonstrations this afternoon -- practically on the White House doorstep -- one, friends of the Jews, and one, friends of the Arabs.

What cognizance will the White House take of this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am sure cognizance will be taken, Ray.

Q Has the White House received a telegram that the Arabs say they have sent asking for a meeting with the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Do you know of any attention by White House Officials to leaders of these groups?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am certain there will be some contact with various individuals who want to talk with the Administration about their views.

Q Has this already been arranged?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Not that I know of.

Q Who would you think they would send out to confer with these people -- if they send someone out?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Do you think there is any chance we could see Secretary Rusk before he goes back to Capitol Hill or wherever he goes?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Bill, I don't know.

Q Can you make an effort to find out what Chuck Bailey asked: Who else is in the meeting?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am confident that Mr. Rostow and Mr. Bundy are involved in any meetings on the subject.

Q George, you told us about previous meetings being in the Situation Room. Is that the place where this one is being held, too?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know. I will check for you. The meetings have been in the Situation Room, in the Cabinet Room, in the President's office, and in the family dining room.

Q Are there any new developments in the Middle East you can tell us about at this time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q George, you said yesterday that Jordan had agreed to a cease-fire, but you hadn't heard from any other countries. Do we have any other word on a cease-fire?

MR. CHRISTIAN: For your BACKGROUND, the latest information I have is the Jordanian-Israeli cease-fire. I know of nothing else that has developed.

Q George, have we done anything specific to reopen the Canal? Have we requested formally, informally that it be reopened, discussed it with any other maritime countries?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have anything for you on it, Max.

Q Can we look for any news developments here today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: There is always a possibility.

Q George, have we had any discussions with the Israelis, or does this Bundy group have any indication as to what sort of peace terms they have in mind? Have we been in touch with the Israelis on this subject, A, and have they indicated in any way -- so as to put something before this Bundy group to work with -- what their peace terms might be? That is, what their preliminary idea of a peace would be?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. The group has done nothing more than organize yesterday. I don't have anything specific for you on their activities.

Q Have the Israelis communicated to us, as an interested party, what their wishes are?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't comment on any communications we have had with other governments involved.

Q Now that they have organized, George, can you tell us any more specifically what they are supposed to be doing? I am still confused about it.

MR. CHRISTIAN: I will refer you again to the President's statement of yesterday.

Q We know about the statement. Yesterday there were many questions whether this was short-term or long-term. The answer generally was that we would have to wait and see.

MR. CHRISTIAN: The committee will exist as long as it has a reason to function.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

AT 11:35 A.M. EDT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RECORD COPY

THIS COPY FOR _____

NEWS CONFERENCE #867-A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN

4:35 P.M. EDT

JUNE 8, 1967

THURSDAY

MR. CHRISTIAN: On the President's schedule tomorrow:

11:30, Mr. George Meany.

12:30, Secretary Orville Freeman.

1:00, Swearing-in Ceremony for Vicente Ximenes, as a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This will be in the Rose Garden or the East Room.

5:15, Lt. Governor Mark Hogan of Colorado.

Secretary Freeman is going to talk to the President on departmental matters and will present him with a copy of the Department's Policy Document on Conservation.

The call by the Lt. Governor is a courtesy call.

In addition to the schedule given you for today, the President had a lengthy visit with the Vice President.

Q What time, please, sir?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President saw him before and after the luncheon.

Q Can you tell us what it was about?

MR. CHRISTIAN: A general discussion.

Q Are there any plans for travel by the Vice President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know of anything specifically.

Q Is there something involved in this that you haven't told us?

Doesn't the President frequently visit with the Vice President?

MORE

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MR. CHRISTIAN: I just added him to the schedule.

Q Did you find for us about a meeting that was going on? At the time of the last briefing, you didn't know where it was. Did you ever get there and find out who was there, how long it lasted, and what they talked about?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The meeting with Secretary Rusk concerned the ship incident and the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Q Who was there? You told us about Rostow.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Those I said this morning, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Rostow, the Secretary of State.

Q Was McNamara there?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us what the President's feeling was about what you refer to as the "ship incident"?

MR. CHRISTIAN: First, the President talked to the Secretary of State this morning about it, of course. The Secretary of State called in the Ambassador, Mr. Harman, and delivered the protest to him. The Ambassador expressed apologies on behalf of his government. A formal United States protest is also being delivered to the Government of Israel.

Q Can you give us the President's reaction to the decision of the U.A.R. to accept the cease-fire?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President welcomes the statement to the Security Council by the representative of the U.A.R. that the government of that country is agreeable to a cease-fire. Now that the assurance has been given, the President hopes that there will be a prompt cessation of hostilities between the U.A.R. and Israel.

Q George, in the last couple of days there have been Congressional delegations over here under one guise or another. Has there been any contact with them today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President, as you know, has been talking the last two days with Senator Mansfield and has discussed the situation orally with him.

Q In person?

MR. CHRISTIAN: In person. Since this started, the Senator asked the President for an assessment of the present situation which the President has given to the Senator. I will make that available to you, this is a copy of the transcript. LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

Q Assessment of the Middle East situation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Will that be a written statement?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is a letter and I will make copies available to you.

Q When did the Senator get it; today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. He got a letter from the President today which I will make available to you.

Q Was there a Congressional delegation here today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I know that the President has talked to some Congressmen today, but I don't know anything specifically other than this contact with Senator Mansfield.

Q George, could I request -- and I am sure others feel the same way -- that the reproduction process be speeded as much as possible in view of the time element?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q What is your estimate?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I hope very shortly. I will try to get it as soon as I can.

Q George, we have reports from overseas that the hot line between here and Moscow has been used. Can you confirm that, yes or no?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said the other day, there have been a number of exchanges at the highest level between the President and other governments. This has transpired over several weeks time. I have been informed that the direct teletype link between Washington and Moscow has been used for a number of exchanges during this recent period.

Q Can you tell us when they began; what date?

Q Both ways?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Both ways.

As most of you know, this is not a telephonic communication. It has been commonly called a hot line. It is actually a teletype circuit which became operational on August 30, 1963.

Q Where is this physically located, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is physically located in the White House communications system.

Q The Washington end of it is HENRY B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Are you sure? Here or at the Pentagon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is tied into the White House communications system.

Q George, the actual terminal is in the Pentagon, isn't it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not advised where the actual terminal is. I was informed that it is part of the White House communications system.

Q George, I believe this is the first time the White House has acknowledged that it has been used. Is this the first time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Messages were sent between these units in Russian and English when it was put into operation in August 30, 1963. Messages were again sent on the anniversary date in 1964. And there have been messages exchanged each New Year in the interval since the unit went into operation.

Q Would it be fair to say this is the first serious use of the line?

Q Or operational use? Other than ceremonial? How is that?

Q Would it be fair to say this is the first use of this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Let me go on and explain a little bit about this line. The transmissions are in both languages. It does permit instantaneous transmission. It is in the language of the sender but, with fast translation, it is, of course, the fastest means of communication.

One reason it was installed, as you will recall, was to prevent misunderstandings or misinterpretations of government activities.

The first use during this period was on June 5 when the Soviet Union forwarded messages to this country which were responded to.

Q They initiated this use?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct. The first one was June 5.

MORE

Q When was the response, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The same day.

Q Did the message come from Mr. Kosygin?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. This morning, we informed the U.S.S.R. of the ship incident, notified them that we were going in to pick up the survivors in that incident.

Q You are skipping over now to today? In other words, that was the second time it was used?

MR. CHRISTIAN: This is the type of thing it is for.

Q Was there anything in between the June 5th and today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: There have been several exchanges.

Q Do you know how many?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know how many.

Q George, can you elaborate on our picking up survivors? We sent in other ships to pick them up?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Do you mean the wounded or did the ship sink?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Why was it considered necessary to use the hot line?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, the purpose is to prevent misinterpretation.

Q I wondered what they might misinterpret about our picking up survivors from our own ships.

MR. CHRISTIAN: We wanted to inform them that one of our ships had been struck.

Q Were Russian ships in the area at that time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q You talked about the translation. Would we send a message to Moscow in English?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q But we wouldn't send a Russian translation of it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: They would send a Russian translation of it.

Q Each translates the others language?

Q Do you have two keyboards, George, so you can use the Cyrillic as well as the Roman?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q I got the idea, from what you said before, that while the primary transmission from here would be in English that from here would also go on each message a translation into Russian.

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is not my understanding of it.

Q Can you tell us any more about the nature of that first message on June 5?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Not specifically. There have been a number of messages during this particular period.

Q Was our first response by the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Have all the messages on the hot line been signed by the heads of state?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Is it fair to assume that all exchanges since June 5 have been on the hot line?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. There are other means of communication besides this. This is only one means of communication.

Q George, from a physical standpoint, as I recall, when they were installed, the Russians sent their sending equipment over here and we sent our equipment to Moscow to match the machines we have here and the letters.

Is the Russian machine in the White House to receive the Soviet language? I am trying to find out whether that machine is here in the White House or over in the Pentagon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Sid, I do not know the precise details of how the messages are transmitted or from what point. I know that the teletype unit is within the White House communications system.

Q Both receiving and sending, Mr. Christian?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q Was today's message signed by the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Did he get a response?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q What is the total number of transmissions we have had since June 5?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have a precise number.

Q George, can you tell us what time of day the first message came?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. I think I have told you about all I can tell you about it.

Q George, was this helpful in avoiding misunderstanding and misinterpretation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I would assess the use of this communication system as an important means of avoiding misinterpretations.

For your BACKGROUND, this morning our aircraft went to the area of the ship --

Q Carrier-based planes?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. Carrier-based planes went to that area when we learned that the ship had been hit. That is why I mentioned this as one means of avoiding a misunderstanding.

Q So that they would have an idea of knowing why the aircraft was going into that area?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q George, did any of these exchanges deal with the U.A.R. charges that our combat aircraft had participated in the combat?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Phil, as I have told you the one use that I am aware of of the unit, I don't believe it would be proper to specify other types of messages that have gone back and forth.

Q George, do you know how much time is saved by the hot line over normal?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I do not.

Q Do you know if the terminal point in Moscow is the Embassy and whether the Kremlin is hooked in like the White House?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No, the terminal point is not the Embassy. It is the Kremlin.

Q George, you say the President signed today's message and you said there was a response. Was the response signed by Kosygin?

MORE

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MR. CHRISTIAN: Frank, I believe the President signed the message today, but I am not positive.

Q But you have established at least on occasion the Prime Minister and the President have signed messages?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q George, has the hot line been used in this situation in a conversational way, that is rather than prepared messages, that the two leaders have talked to each other by the teletype?

I am not quite clear. In other words, I know that in other cases, it is possible for the President to be in communication with people by simply dictating to an operator and receiving the messages back.

MR. CHRISTIAN: This isn't the way it is used.

Q George, did you say this was the first time it had been used in a crisis?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Was the first message before the hostilities began or after?

Q June 5th?

Q George, has it been used every day this week?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It has been used a number of times.

Q Before this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It has been used a number of times this week.

Q Mr. Christian, are you saying this is the first time it has been used for serious business since Mr. Johnson has been President or all times since it has been installed?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I have given you all of my knowledge on it.

MORE

You asked this morning about the groups outside. Some of you, I am sure, are already aware of this: Under Secretary of State Katzenbach and Mr. Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, went to the Northwest Entrance and there received Rabbi Norman J. Strizower of the Seaview Jewish Center in Brooklyn. They received petitions from Rabbi Strizower.

Under Secretary Katzenbach said that "even in times of crisis, when so much of the President's time and that of his advisers is devoted to efforts to bring peace in the Middle East, we are always happy to hear the views of our citizens."

At 4 o'clock, Under Secretary Katzenbach and Mr. Smith met with Dr. Mohammed T. Mehdi, Secretary-General of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations. He presented a statement to Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Smith. Secretary Katzenbach told him essentially the same thing, that we were always interested in receiving views.

Q What time was the first one?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Smith met with the Israeli group at 3:25.

Q At the time we used the hoc line this morning, did we know what agency had struck the ship?

George, at the time our message was sent today about this ship, was the possibility open that the damage to the ship could have been caused by the Russians and was it sort of a query to that effect?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The notification of the incident was sent on the initial report of the incident, prior to the time the Israelis advised this government that they had accidentally hit the ship.

Q We didn't know, then, at the time we communicated with the Soviet Union what had caused the incident? Right?

MR. CHRISTIAN: We knew that a ship had been damaged.

Q But, George, we didn't know who had hit it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: At that time the Israelis had not advised us. (NOT SO? NOT LINE WAS LEARNED ISR. HAD ATTACKED AT 1100.) VANTAGE POINT GAYS LES

Q Had our Navy advised who had hit the ship?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It was prior to the time we had information on what had happened.

Q That leaves the impression we might have thought it was the Russians?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't want to leave any impressions. We advised them of the incident, without knowing. COPY LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

Q Did we inquire of them whether they by any chance were involved, or was it to explain our planes' flight.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Jim, there was an advisory that something had happened to one of our ships and we were sending our planes in to see what was the trouble.

Q Did we do this because we had scrambled some of our planes off of our carriers and we wanted them to know that we wanted them to protect an American ship that was under attack?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is the reason.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

5:03 P.M. EDT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE NOTORIOUS PENTHOUSE
ARTICLE BY ANTHONY PEARSON

THIS ARTICLE IS 98% SPECULATIVE
AND 95% WRONG, AND SO IS THE
BOOK THAT FOLLOWED, BUT THEY GOT
A LOT OF ATTENTION

EXCERPTS FROM MEGARVEY
AND BARNET.

HOOVER COLLECTION INCLUDES
EXCERPTS FROM ABOUT 15
OTHER BOOKS, NOT INCLUDED HERE
AS THEY DO NOT ADVANCE
THE STORY

EXCERPTS FROM LTB'S
VANTAGE POINT

FOLDER 21

PENTHOUSE

May, 1976

THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. LIBERTY

MAYDAY! MAYDAY!

During the Six-Day War of 1967 a U.S. spy ship was attacked—in international waters and with devastating effect—by Israeli planes and torpedo boats. Although Israel claimed the attack was a mistake and the United States publicly accepted this explanation, both parties knew it was a lie. Here is the true story of what happened on that day—and why it happened.

BY ANTHONY PEARSON

Daybreak of June 8, 1967, was one of those mornings when the sunrise came vivid and warm, when there was little wind, and the sounds of battle had faded during the very last hours of darkness into an almost silent dawn. This was the third morning of the third Arab-Israeli war, which had begun at 7:45 AM on June 5 with the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force by Israeli planes.

By June 8, the war correspondents who had witnessed the dramatic capture of the Old City of Jerusalem and who had followed the Israeli paratroopers against the Jordanian Legion were all beginning to appreciate the efficient tactical and destructive power of Moshe Dayan's war machine. The battles had been land fought. The Egyptians had concentrated their warships in the Red Sea to support the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. The Russian Navy had a strong presence in the Mediterranean, but Soviet interference was blocked by the American Sixth Fleet, which had moved closer to the theater of war some two days before the fighting actually began.

Probably the heaviest close-order battles had been fought in the previous two days as the Israelis threw their crack paratroopers against the Jordanian Legion. On June 7, Jerusalem fell and by ten o'clock that night, the conquest of Jordan was complete. It was an amazing achievement of arms. We correspondents who had followed the Israeli soldiers through it could only marvel.

There were questions, of course. On June 8, as the Israeli push consolidated the conquest of the West Bank, I wondered, as did many other correspondents, why the Jordanian Legion had continued to fight in what was so clearly a lost cause. At the time, the answer was known only to officials at the highest levels of the Israeli and American governments. The Israelis, of course, were on the scene. The Americans received their information from a communications ship, the U.S.S. *Liberty*—whose fantastic intelligence-gathering capability was soon to be her undoing.

On the morning of June 8, the *Liberty* was steaming slowly off the Sinai Peninsula in a calm blue sea. The *Liberty* was no fighting ship. She was a converted civilian freighter built in the late 1940's, but faster than most ships of her class (her top capability being eighteen knots), and armed with a complicated system of radio antennae including a "Big Ear" sonar-radio listening device with a clear capability range of over five hundred miles.

On both the forecastle and the deckhouse aft of the bridge she carried two pedestal-mounted .50-caliber Browning machine guns

guns her only defense capability. The *Liberty* was strictly a communications vessel. In naval terms she was a ferret. In everyday language she was a spy ship. (The *Liberty* was in fact a sister ship of the *Pueblo*, which was to be captured by the North Koreans in January 1968.)

The *Liberty's* crew was composed of fifteen officers, 279 men, and three civilian technicians from the Department of Defense. Her captain, Commander William L. McGonagle, forty-one years old and a member of a large clannish family from Wichita, Kansas, was privy to exactly as much information about the ship's mission as he absolutely needed to know. He was directly responsible for her movement, direction, Sixth Fleet liaison, and any possible combat procedures, but communications outside regular naval channels were not in his jurisdiction. Certain sections of the *Liberty* were off limits to the entire crew, including the captain. These were the communications areas situated below decks at the center of the *Liberty's* waterline. They housed intricate computers and decoding and listening devices manned by linguistic experts and other personnel who could be changed according to the ship's mission. All this was under the direct control of one of the Pentagon technicians who had joined the ship at Rota in Spain. He was known to the crewmen simply as the "Major."

The Major was in his mid-forties, tall and dark, with a receding hairline and a New Jersey accent. As he climbed aboard at Rota, he was wearing civilian clothes, and although he subsequently wore khaki drill and fatigues they never carried rank insignia.

The *Liberty* had left Norfolk, Virginia, in November 1966 on her fourth tour of duty as a ferret. Immediately prior to this Mideast assignment, she had been off the Nigerian coast monitoring the events that were to lead to the bloody conflict over Biafran secession. In May 1967 the Nigerian Federation had broken up, the CIA, which was already deeply involved in the Congo and later, when the fighting began in earnest in July, took a prominent though covert part in supporting the Biafran breakaways, had moved the *Liberty* to an African station to assess developments needed for the structure of future policy. By the end of May this mission had been a total success. The *Liberty* was then reassigned to the Mideast with orders to refuel and reposition at Rota and accept some new personnel—who were all replacements in the communications staff. The *Liberty's* African experts and linguists were traded for Arab and Israeli ones.

Leaving Rota on June 2, the ship's orders were to hasten with all possible speed to a Mideast operational area designated as "north of the Sinai Peninsula."

Steaming through continuous twenty-four-hour watches along the direct North African coastal route, Commander McGonagle had the *Liberty* within communi-

ications range by the early hours of June 5. On June 8, they were off Gaza. It was a fine clear day and they could clearly see the minaret of the mosque at El Arish. The sea was calm and the sky blue and empty. Smoke rose in great pillars over Sinai, but otherwise there were no signs of the war being fought there.

After moving inshore, the *Liberty* was in a modified condition of readiness three times a day. This was a normal state during operations and meant the ship had a regular steaming watch plus one man on the forward machine guns and bridge lookouts ready to man the latter guns in an emergency.

At 5:50 A.M. the *Liberty* reached the eastern boundary of her operating area and turned on a south-westerly course. She was completing this turn when a single unidentified jet crossed her wake between three and five miles astern, circled the ship, and flew away toward the mainland. The plane made no signal to the ship and the ship no signal to the plane. A normal-sized American flag, five by eight feet, was flying from the masthead on the ensign staff; the name of the ship was painted large and clear on her stern, and she had large U.S. Navy letters and numbers on her bow.

The *Liberty* was moving at a speed of ten knots—an average cruising speed for a civilian freighter but slow for a noncombatant naval vessel in an alien war zone. Thus it was not too surprising that some hours later—at 10:56 and 11:26 A.M.—jet aircraft twice again circled the ship, being joined the second time by a slower propeller plane.

During this observation the *Liberty's* speed had been cut to five knots to allow close and careful monitoring operations and radar fixings, and she continued at this speed for the rest of the morning. No more planes were sighted. The blue sky remained quite empty.

From 1:10 until 1:48 P.M., the ship's crew engaged in routine procedures. There was no reason for McGonagle to place his men on combat alert.

The ship's officers had seen the planes and remarked on them, but they had failed to identify them through their glasses. Some of the deck crew had waved to them. In a war zone it is not unusual for reconnaissance aircraft to observe and study a ship, especially a foreign naval vessel. On the other hand, McGonagle understood that the mission of his ship was certainly not neutral and he could encounter some risk—most probably from Egyptian MIG's, if any remained. He thought about it for a moment, shrugged off any sense of alarm, and went below for coffee.

Sitting in the wardroom with the ship's doctor, Marine Corps Lieutenant Richard F. Kiepler of Brooklyn, New York, McGonagle sipped his coffee and didn't think too hard about the morning and the previous two days because they were not really his problem. He was a sailor. The man down below—the "Major"—was the analyst and

the intelligence expert. The Major had mentioned briefly to McGonagle that transmissions monitored by *Liberty* the previous day had caused him concern, but he hadn't gone into detail.

The officers, of course, had discussed the war in the wardroom. They knew that Egypt's President Nasser had blockaded the Straits of Tiran on May 22 while the grip was still down off Nigeria. They knew that Egyptian troops had been moved to Sinai. And they realized the confrontation Nasser had forced could only have ended in war.

McGonagle was slightly puzzled about the aerial surveillance of the morning. He had rightly assumed the aircraft were Israeli Air Force planes and he had carefully worked out a cover story with the Major in the event that the ship should be challenged by them. They would say that the *Liberty* was monitoring Soviet radar systems being used by the Egyptians.

The *Liberty* had also expected further orders from base, but since none had been received he assumed he was to remain at his designated station until the word came to withdraw. Unknown to him, that word had already been sent.

On the bridge, the deck officer, McGonagle's exec, Lieutenant Commander Philip Armstrong of Norfolk, Virginia, was just fixing *Liberty's* position by radar when one of the lookouts reported that the jet aircraft had been sighted in the vicinity and were turning toward the ship. Armstrong went to starboard and picked up the planes through his binoculars. He thought they were of the same type as those that had circled the ship earlier in the morning, but he was mistaken. The reconnaissance planes had been small Magisters of the Israeli Air Force. But these were Mirages, the fast Dassault French fighters that had wiped out the Egyptian Air Force three days earlier. There were three of them now and they were coming in fast and straight in an attack pattern.

Suddenly there was a loud explosion and the ship shook terribly. Inside the communications room the electronic equipment sparked and flashed on and off quickly. At that moment, the men in the crew quarters were being reassigned after the general assembly drill. Seaman Fred Kerner of Scranton, New Jersey, was partially thrown off his feet by the blast. "Jesus, the boiler room's gone!" he shouted. He ran toward the companion ladder with the others. Someone else was shouting that the boiler had blown up. Captain McGonagle leapt up the steps from the wardroom.

The captain and his men poured out into the sunshine. Some of the men who only minutes before had been standing on the open deck, working and laughing, were lying strangely still or crawling around crying and bleeding. From overhead very close, almost right above the ship's stack, came the whine of jets and the *putt! putt!* of gunfire. The decks splintered under the impact of heavy caliber bullets.

Then there were more explosions and the crash of falling superstructure.

Richard L. Weaver, a seaman, yelled that another jet was coming in and ran for cover inside the bulkhead. The quintre followed him and missed, but the shrapnel flying from its impact hit him squarely in the stomach. He staggered, fell, then got to his feet and tried to walk. Fred Kerner helped him down the steps to the sick bay. The deck was a confused mass of men and wreckage, canopied with smoke and strewn with debris from the shattered superstructure. As the jets whined in, guns rattling and rockets hissing, the 450-foot-long ship seemed to lurch and sway.

Rushing to the bridge, McGonagle yelled to Lieutenant Stephen Toth to get the jets outside to the lookout and identify the striking planes. Twenty-three-year-old Toth, the son of a retired naval captain, ran to his station. He arrived within seconds of a rocket that wrecked the forward bridge quarter and the lookout position. Toth died instantly.

McGonagle ordered Lieutenant Armstrong to jettison two blazing fifty-five-gallon cans of gasoline over the starboard side of the ship. Armstrong ran toward the cans yelling to Lieutenant Jim O'Connor to follow and help him. Just as they reached the companion ladder from the bridge, an explosion rocked the starboard quarter and blew the officers off their feet. O'Connor was wounded, Armstrong killed.

Captain McGonagle was shaken, but he stayed on his feet. He gave the order for maximum speed. Then he shouted to Lieutenant Maurice Bennett of Pittsburgh to report to the Chief of Naval Operations via the high command radio circuit that the *Liberty* was under attack from unidentified jets and immediate assistance was required. It was 2:10 P.M. At the same time, McGonagle decided to broadcast an open channel Mayday distress call. He was unsure about his communications capability for the jets were pounding his antennae. Their attack was precisely planned, accurate and designed to swiftly destroy all the ship's channels within minutes. Perhaps it was the *Liberty's* first lucky break that the open-channel message got through to the Sixth Fleet and the *Little Rock*: "Mayday! Mayday! Am under attack from jet aircraft. Immediate assistance required." That was all. The rockets and the machine guns had silenced the radio.

For the next two or six minutes, the Mirages made crisscross attacks on the ship, hitting her with more rockets and strafing her with heavy cannon fire. (A later count was to show 821 separate hits on the ship's hull and superstructure.) There seemed to be at least three aircraft, but the speed of the attack and its fury left the crewmen and officers too confused to make an accurate count. A naval court of inquiry later found that, "In five or six attacks from various angles two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket, and incendiary attacks."

Down in the communications room the men were concentrating on the one radar scanner still operating. It had picked up three boats moving at high speed toward the *Liberty*, and a report was sent up to the bridge just before the explosion that killed Lieutenant Armstrong rocked the starboard side. The captain was appraising this report when there was another explosion and shrapnel ripped through his right leg.

"I was not knocked off my feet," he said later. "I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my left starboard forearm and blood oozing on my right trouser leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries."

At that moment, McGonagle had already earned his Congressional Medal of Honor. Badly wounded, but determined to fight, he refused to leave the bridge and the control of his ship. It was now 2:24 P.M.

Still grimacing with pain, McGonagle heard the lookouts report that three high-speed motor torpedo boats (MTBs) were approaching from the northeast—on the ship's starboard quarter. They were heading for the *Liberty* in triangular formation at an estimated speed of from twenty-seven to thirty knots, "going like hell" and in attack formation.

The captain ordered a man to the forward starboard machine gun to bring the boats under fire. He told the men close to him to pass on the word "Stand by for torpedo attack!"

Concentrating hard between flashes of pain, Commander McGonagle carefully studied his course. He decided to hold fast. Turning the ship to port would bring it closer to land, while moving seaward would bring it broadside to the attackers and give them a better target. He also noticed that the flag halyard had been shot down, and he told a signaller to hoist the ceremonial ensign from the yardarm. This ensign, seven by thirteen feet, was the largest flag aboard.

The men on the ship watched the approaching MTBs, and knew there was little they could do but pray. The Browning machine guns could never hold off a determined attack, and three MTBs making a kill-run together could send the *Liberty* straight to the bottom of the Mediterranean.

Now the boats were less than a mile away and the one in the center was seen to be flashing a signal light. Because of smoke and flames billowing off his starboard bridge wing, Commander McGonagle was unable to read the signal. Staring hard through the smoke, he saw what he believed to be an Israeli flag. But he wasn't absolutely certain.

The *Liberty's* starboard signal light had been knocked out during the air attack, so McGonagle now tried to signal with a hand-held Aldis lamp, hoping that it might

be seen through the smoke but knowing that it was hardly powerful enough. The torpedo boats kept on coming and the forward machine gun on the *Liberty's* starboard opened fire. The gunner got off three long bursts before being killed by returning cannon fire from the MTBs. At the same time, the after machine gun opened up. This was a weird, ghostly action—its gunner was dead and flames had ignited the magazine belt. The gun was firing on its own—a firing that only stopped when the belt was spent.

The *Liberty* was under heavy fire from the MTBs. One of their bursts killed Quartermaster Francis Brown at the gun. As Brown fell, McGonagle saw a torpedo passing astern the ship and about twenty-five yards from it. Two minutes later, at 2:35 P.M., another torpedo struck on the starboard side immediately forward of the bridge and a few feet below the waterline. The ship shuddered under the impact of the explosion, which had torn a hole in its side that extended from just above the waterline to below the turn of the bilge. The hole was shaped like a teardrop and it was thirty-nine feet across at its widest point. The torpedo had hit the communications room almost dead center and this single blast was responsible for twenty-five of the final death toll of thirty-four. (According to survivors, the Major was one of those who was killed in the explosion. He had been reported on the ship's list as one of the three civilian technical experts. The only civilian fatality to appear in the final casualty list was Allen M. Blue, a "communications specialist.")

The *Liberty* immediately took a nine-degree list to starboard. Power and steering were lost. She came to a dead stop and lay crippled in the oily sea, waiting for the death blow. It was now 2:36 P.M.

As the *Liberty* stopped, the MTBs also stopped, less than half a mile astern. McGonagle watched them through his glasses. He expected a torpedo, but he saw only a lamp flashing out. "Do you need assistance?" Being unable to signal by lamp, McGonagle ordered a signaller to hoist the international sign for "not under control." The MTBs made no answer but continued to drift silently along with the *Liberty*.

Half an hour later, two helicopters bearing Star of David markings approached and circled the ship several times. Someone shouted through a loudspeaker that they carried medical orderlies and a military attaché from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv on board. McGonagle limped onto the open part of the bridge. "Go to hell!" he yelled. The helicopter voice shouted again, and McGonagle yelled back, "I told you to go to hell! You're not coming on my ship. Go to hell, you bastard!" The helicopters turned away.

Inside the *Liberty's* shattered hull the damage crew raced to patch up holes and the engineers worked fast to restore power. By 3:19 P.M. they had the engines turn-

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ing but they still couldn't fix the steering gear. McGonagle was determined to take his ship home, so he put some men in the after steering compartment to take rudder orders by telephone in order that the ship could be hand-steered. Slowly, the *Liberty* began to limp westward. At 4:15 a pair of Mirages circled the *Liberty* but made no further attempts to press an attack. The men on the ship didn't know the reason; but the Mayday message had gotten through to the carriers *Saratoga* and *America* six hundred miles to the northwest, and two flights of four jet-fighters each had been launched to drive off the Israeli planes and MTB's. The Israelis had monitored the transmission and had pulled back while there was still time to make the only excuse possible—error. Mistaken identity.

By four o'clock Commander McGonagle's wounds were giving him severe pain and he was suffering from loss of blood. He lay on the deck while a tourniquet was applied to his thigh. He wouldn't rest, he said, until his ship was safe.

At 6:45 an Israeli helicopter again appeared and hovered over the ship. Someone attempted to lower himself by ladder to the deck, but McGonagle signaled that he should stop. Ten minutes later, a calling card was dropped from the helicopter. It carried the name of a U.S. naval attaché with the American embassy in Tel Aviv. A message on the back read, "Have you any casualties?" Since there were at least three bodies still lying in full view of the helicopter, McGonagle made no serious attempt to answer and gestured to the helicopter to leave. As the sun set just after seven o'clock, the helicopter turned back toward the land.

Lieutenant Kiepler had asked McGonagle to go below to the sick bay, but he didn't insist in the face of the captain's violent determination to remain in command. Of McGonagle, Kiepler later said, "The commanding officer . . . was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves. To know that he was grievously wounded, yet having to conn and helm the ship through the night, calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men, 'We're going to live.' When I went to the bridge and saw this, I should say that I knew I could only insult this man by insisting that he be taken below for the treatment of his wounds."

When he felt faint, McGonagle lay on the deck of the bridge wing with his leg propped high and continued to conn the ship, sometimes by watching her white-water wake in the darkness. In this way, he steered the *Liberty* through the night—determined at all costs to get her home.

Inside the ship, Dr. Kiepler, aided by two corpsmen but having himself to bear the

weight of medical responsibility, was to struggle for twenty-eight continuous hours with a flood of seriously injured men. In the heat of battle, he had been able to do little more than give first aid, but now bleeding was stopped, men were given morphine and treated for shock, lung wounds were treated to ease breathing, and one blood transfusion after another was carried out.

Whenever the doctor needed one volunteer, he would have ten. If anything was asked, hands went up everywhere. If Kiepler asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, he would find some wounded man on an adjoining table saying, "Hey doc! If you need some, I have that type."

Whatever else the bullets, rockets, and torpedos had accomplished, they hadn't broken the spirit of the little ship. Miraculously, the *Liberty* was alive and limping home, burned and broken but still afloat, her engines still turning.

On June 14, escorted by the destroyer *U.S.S. Davis* and a Sixth Fleet tug, *Liberty* arrived in Malta under her own power. It had been her final mission, and that mission had been accomplished with honor, even if its cause and necessity may have been questioned. McGonagle and his men had followed their orders and they had brought their ship home. No one could ask or expect more. Their war was over.

Between June 11 and 17, a naval court of inquiry convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, conducted classified hearings in London and aboard the *Liberty* at Malta. Rear Admiral I. G. Kidd was president of a court that consisted of himself and Captains Bernard J. Lauff and Bert M. Atkinson of Admiral McCain's headquarters. The court's findings were presented to Admiral McCain and approved by him on June 18, 1976.

These findings were: "From the time of the first attack onward, attackers were well-coordinated, accurate and determined. Crisscrossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams and quarters effectively chewed-up the entire top-side including ship control and internal communications-sound powered-network. Well-directed initial air attacks wiped out the ability of the four .50-caliber machine guns to be effective."

The Israelis had officially announced that it was a mistake. They apologized. Soon after the attack, one of the crew of the MTB's, a reservist sailor called Micha Limor, was produced in Tel Aviv to give his account of the incident to journalists. He graphically described how his boat had attacked a ship "with high masts and weird antennae," and how they were sure it was the "enemy" until in the very last moments of the attack, a rubber lifecraft with the lettering "U.S. Navy" on its side had

dropped into the water. Then the helicopters came over and signaled to the torpedo boats. "They are raising the American flag!"

"It was crystal clear that we had hit friends," Limor said. He then went on to describe how his boat had tried to approach the *Liberty* to offer assistance, and how an officer had appeared on the bridge for the first time and screamed, "Go to hell!"

"Realizing they would not accept aid, we left," Limor said.

To support this explanation based on mistaken identity, the Israelis said that the *Liberty* had been mistaken for an Egyptian supply ship called *El Ouseir*. The Navy court of inquiry found: "While *El Ouseir* bears a highly superficial resemblance to *Liberty*, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. *El Ouseir* is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antennae array and distinctive hull marking of the *Liberty*. The location of the superstructure island, a primary feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria as a justification for attack, any ship resembling *El Ouseir* was in jeopardy." In other words, the Navy found that the Israelis could have attacked any merchant ship on the same pretext. The court of inquiry returned a final verdict that accepted Israel's apology for attack but did not accept her explanation.

In mid-July, the U.S.S. *Liberty* returned home. She was laid up in the yard at Norfolk for a while, then turned over to the Department of Commerce and shunted into their derelicts fleet. Last year, she was finally sold for scrap and broken up. It was the symbolic end of an incident that many parties in Washington wished to forget. But forgetting hadn't been easy. Voices had to be silenced in the Senate and questions dismissed in secret congressional hearings. The military were bound by security regulations. But the question remained: *Why had the Liberty been attacked?*

To find the answer, one must go back nine years, to May 1967. This was the month when the Mideast political pot, which had been simmering for so long, finally boiled over.

On May 22, 1967, Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran, the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea. This waterway was the gate to the strategically vital Israeli port of Eilat. The State Department and the Pentagon had mixed feelings about the whole business. Since President Kennedy's assassination, the White House had moved firmly away from an early 1960's policy of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation. Lyndon Johnson had poor personal relations with Nasser, and the State Department was suffering from severe anxiety over the increased Soviet presence in the Mideast and support of Egypt, plus pressures to provide greater American support for Israel. These pressures were being brought

to bear on the Johnson administration by such staunch friends of Israel as U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, presidential adviser Walt Rostow, and his brother, Eugene Rostow, in the State Department.

Walt Rostow was the most influential of this trio. His appointment as Special Adviser to the President on National Security had taken effect just one year before the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Like Johnson, he believed that the major problem of the moment, Vietnam, could only be solved by total American victory, and his views on the Israeli position in the Mideast conflict were similar. He constantly suggested to Johnson that America's policy toward Israel should directly balance Russia's support of the Arabs. Rostow's views had strong support from the American security agencies.

For two years, the CIA had been deeply committed to reshaping events in the Mideast to suit a whole new State Department policy calling for a reduction of Soviet influence in the area, the discouragement of leftist nationalism, and the reinstatement of American influence.

Richard Helms, the CIA chief, was still pursuing a policy of over ten years standing that allowed for all intelligence operations inside Israel to be conducted through Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency). There was no CIA station chief in Tel Aviv, and officers working under cover in the American Embassy there acted in full consort with officers of Israeli intelligence—each side supposedly having total access to the information of the other.

The man behind this cooperative plan was James Angleton, head of CIA counterintelligence, who had set up strong ties with the Israelis in the late 1950's following the abortive Anglo-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal. As part of the plan, Angleton helped supply Israel with technical assistance for developing nuclear weapons (as reported by Tad Szulc in the August 1975 issue of *Penthouse*). His partner and opposite number in Mossad was Ephraim "Eppy" Evron. In 1967 Evron was Deputy Israeli Ambassador to Washington. He had previously been one of the main conspirators in a plot to sabotage the growth of American detente with Egypt in December 1954. This was an operation planned by Mossad to blow up the American Embassy in Cairo and blame the attack on Egyptian nationalists. The mission fouled up. Nine Israeli agents were captured while laying the charges and brought to trial for sabotage by the Egyptians. Two were executed. A scandal followed in Tel Aviv: the Minister of Defense, Pinhas Lavon, resigned and Eppy Evron disappeared. In fact, he didn't make a prominent appearance again until May 1967, when Washington reporters noticed that he was involved in a lot of activity with the State Department and the White House and seemed to have greater significance at the Israeli Embassy than his chief, Avraham Harman. In the overall Israeli power structure, Evron was more im-

portant than Harman, and his presence in Washington as a spokesman to both the administration and the CIA for Israeli intelligence made him a vital link in a complex plan to overthrow Nasser.

Ever since the attack on the Suez Canal in 1956, Nasser had been increasingly leaning toward Moscow and also attempting to establish himself as the cornerstone of an emergent Third World. His influence in the Arab world—his charisma as a leader and his complete command of the most populous and politically significant Arab country—made him particularly dangerous to both the West and his own neighbors. The latter felt that inspired anarchy was ultimately a bigger threat than Israeli expansion.

In 1965, after President Nasser had exposed an illegal American arms deal to Israel, James Angleton conducted a number of meetings with Mossad officers to decide how and when to get rid of Nasser.

It was impossible to overthrow the president from within Egypt by any sort of coup. First, his charisma had to be undermined and his popular support destroyed. Nasser's constant and increasing threats against Israel and his assurances to his people that the Israeli menace would be defeated suggested to the CIA that an Egyptian loss of face could be achieved by calling Nasser's bluff—by actually making him confront Israel. The violently anti-Israel threats made from Cairo by Ahmed Shukeiry, the leader of the newly formed PLO, had laid the base for a decisive Israeli-Arab confrontation. Shukeiry promised the razing of Tel Aviv and the massacre of the Jews in Palestine. He had Nasser's full support.

At a series of secret meetings in Tel Aviv and Washington between CIA officers, the Israeli General Staff, selected Israeli politicians, and inner members of the Johnson administration it was decided to promote a contained war between Israel and Egypt—a war that would not affect the territorial lines between Israel and Syria and Jordan.

The plan was organized in Israel by a group that included Yigal Allon (Israel's present labor minister), Intelligence Chief Meir Amit, Aharon Yariv (head of army intelligence), Shimon Peres (deputy minister of defense), Ezer Weizman (head of army operations), Air Force Chief Mordecai Hod, David Hacohen (head of the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs), and Moshe Dayan, who soon would be minister of defense. Their liaison officer in Washington was Eppy Evron, who dealt directly with Angleton at the CIA and Eugene Rostow at the State Department.

In principle, they agreed that the situation of an increasing hardline by Nasser combined with the Soviet buildup in Egypt and Syria should be exploited to rouse maximum public opinion for war, and that the Israeli Army should be placed on full alert to induce action by either Damascus

or Cairo. In these circumstances, the Knesset would have to give its approval for war. And when this war was launched—the Israelis assured the Americans—it would be fought to a predesigned American plan of containment.

The plan of containment was important. It was designed to maintain relations with the anti-Nasserite Arabs, principally with King Hussein and King Faisal, while exploiting their strong feelings against Arab nationalism. The guts of the plan were outlined to Hussein by CIA officers in Amman and it was left to him to decide how he would act.

Hussein was immediately placed in a dilemma. Although he was suspicious of American motives, he was in a very precarious position. If the Nasserite movement continued to gain strength and improve its ties with Syria and Iraq, then Hussein might well be overthrown by a coup. That would end the Hashemite rule in Jordan that the king was pledged to support to the death, just as the revolution in Iraq had destroyed the Hashemites there. Egypt and Syria were as much his enemies as the Israelis; in fact, they were calling not only for the overthrow of the American-Israeli conspiracy but also for the downfall of the Arab "reactionary states." Nasser had refused to call a meeting of the Defense Council of the Arab League on the grounds that "Egypt is not prepared to reveal her military secrets to governments in the pay

of the CIA and British intelligence services."

Reluctantly, Hussein bowed to the inevitable and accepted an assurance from the U.S. Department of State that in return for his cooperation in helping to reshape and influence Arab policy in favor of the West after the forthcoming war, there would be no Israeli conquest of any of his territory—even if Jordan were forced into military confrontation with the Israelis in order to keep face with the other Arabs. His decision was passed through the American Embassy in Amman to Washington.

Hussein now had to find some way of pulling himself inside the Arab fold before fighting started, and Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the troop movements that followed gave him just the chance he needed. As the Arab press agitated for war, Hussein arrived in Cairo with his prime minister for a meeting with Nasser. This was May 30, and that evening a defense pact was signed between Jordan and Egypt—each pledging support to the other in the event of war with Israel.

That same day, Robert Anderson, an American special envoy, was sent to Cairo to talk with Nasser. He met the Egyptian president on June 1 and succeeded in persuading him to consider an option of détente with the United States. As a gesture of goodwill, Nasser said he would send his deputy, Zacharia Monieddin, to Washington on June 5. This message was

transmitted to Washington and, within two hours of its receipt by the State Department, the Israeli secret service knew every detail of it. That same day—June 1—the Israeli Knesset gave a majority vote for war and Moshe Dayan was appointed Minister of Defense.

The joint Israeli-CIA plan for war had aimed for an initial strike date in the second week in June. And the U.S. *Liberty* had been dispatched by the CIA to arrive at Sinai before planned hostilities began—in order to make certain that the Israelis didn't overstep the objectives of the containment plan.

In making their preemptive strike on June 5, the very day Monieddin was due to leave for Washington, the Israelis destroyed any possibility of U.S.-Egyptian détente. They had kept their plans totally secret to prevent any American interference.

Right up to the moment of attack, Eppy Evron was assuring his Washington contacts that Israeli troop movements were simply a precautionary measure against the buildup of Arab troops. Since the only American intelligence from Israel was through Mossad, Evron believed he could tell the American government anything he liked. He didn't know about the *Liberty* and her mission.

Thus, as war began, the listening devices on the *Liberty* were tuned to transmissions from both the Arabs and Israelis.

**COMING IN THE JUNE EDITION HOUSE
ON YOUR NEWSSTAND MAY 11
THE LIBERTY COVER UP**
The U.S. government was told by an Israeli officer that the
the second part of the story.

With radar monitoring it was possible to carefully map the movements and positions of troops, armor, and aircraft, showing the true progress of battle. All this information was being transmitted in full to the National Security Agency in Washington. Selected parts were also passed to the United Nations in New York.

It was clear to the observers on the *Liberty* that the decoding capabilities of the Arabs had failed to crack Israeli codes. But the Israelis had penetrated Egyptian and Jordanian codes from the moment the war began. There was nothing really unusual about this. It was good military intelligence management by the Israelis and caused no surprise or alarm on board the *Liberty*—except for several exchanges between King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser of Egypt. These concerned the strategy and progress of the Arab allies. To the *Liberty* they were clear enough,

but to the Arabs they were totally misleading. Somewhere between Amman and Cairo, in a relay station in Sinai, the messages were being blocked by the Israelis, then reconstructed and passed on so swiftly and effectively that there was no apparent break. In the language of intelligence this type of interference is called "cooking."

The first batch of these messages transmitted from Cairo advised Hussein of a bad military situation on the Egyptian front. The Israelis blocked these and reworded them, to misinform the king that three-quarters of the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed over Cairo and that the 300-plus aircraft he was now picking up on radar approaching Jordan were Egyptian jets raiding targets in Israel. (They were, of course, really Israeli aircraft returning from the destruction of Nasser's airfields.) These false messages encouraged Hussein to abandon a prearranged plan for fighting a defensive war and set his Jordanian Legion on the offensive.

Throughout the first day of fighting, the Israelis continued to cook messages in order to give both sides the impression that the war was going favorably for the Arabs. There was no chance of the plan going wrong, because Hussein had broken off diplomatic relations with Syria (over an allegation of sabotage by the Syrian Secret service) a week before the Israelis attacked and he was not in communication with Damascus. No Israeli interference with messages between Cairo and Damascus was necessary because the Syrians, although appraised of the bad situation in Sinai, were also being told their flank was still covered by the Jordanians. This encouraged them to withdraw troops from the Golan toward Damascus, in order to cover the road from Amman as a second line to the Jordanian Army.

Another group of "cooked" transmissions on June 6 and 7 falsely informed Hussein that the Egyptians were counterattacking in Sinai and needed support from Jordan in the form of an attack against the

Israeli positions in the Hebron area. To make this attack, Hussein had to withdraw his forces from a planned offensive that had been designed to cut Israel in two. The Egyptians were also misled into believing the Jordanians were making a successful attack in Hebron, and they in turn counterattacked during the early hours of June 8 and ignored a United Nations call for a cease-fire. The Israelis gained enough time from this to enable them to capture all the Jordanian territory they needed, to finish off the Egyptians in Sinai, and to move their troops right up to the east bank of Suez—immobilizing the Canal.

In Washington on the evening of June 7, Avraham Harman, the Israeli ambassador, had been called to the State Department and told by Eugene Rostow that the Israeli attack on Jordan and Egypt had to stop immediately and that no move was to be made against the Syrians on the Golan. A cease-fire was being implemented at the request of the Arabs by the U.N.

Harman argued his country was acting against Arab aggression, but Rostow told him the Americans knew that Hussein had been encouraged to fight beyond the containment plan by a deliberate "cooking" of his communications. No mention was made by Rostow of the *Liberty*, but four hours later in Tel Aviv orders were passed from the offices of the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Air Force to undertake a surveillance of an American communications ship operating off the Sinai coast. Then, four hours after the surveillance orders, at 1:30 P.M. Tel Aviv time, further orders were issued from the same sources to attack and sink the ship (Israeli officials, however, say that no written orders were ever issued). Aircraft were called upon to knock out all communications installations in the first strike. Subsequent strikes would completely immobilize the ship, preparatory to final torpedo hits from MTB's. It was imperative that the ship be destroyed.

For the Israelis, *Liberty* was an unknown factor. On June 8, Israel was still three days away from her final objectives. It was possible that drastic measures might have to be taken at any time. The Israeli leaders were afraid that the continued presence of the *Liberty* off Sinai, monitoring their activities for both the U.S. government and the United Nations, might wreck their plans. If the ship was sunk with all hands, the attack would be blamed on the Egyptians, or perhaps on Russian fighters from a Soviet fleet carrier. It would also serve the purpose of involving the Americans directly and committing them totally to Israel's side. It was a daring plan—a vicious plan—but certainly well-coordinated and well-executed. It seems surprising that it failed. Everything seemed stacked against the *Liberty*.

An hour before the first Israeli air surveillance, U.S. Navy intelligence reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Israeli monitors had broken into the *Liberty*'s coding

banks, deciphered her codes, and had transmitted a warning to Israel's military intelligence headquarters. The Americans were informed that the Israelis were reacting badly and might possibly take some sort of action against the ship.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately ordered a message transmitted to the *Liberty* warning her to withdraw to the Sixth Fleet at once. This message was rated by navy intelligence as "pinnacle" which meant that it had highest priority. It was to be sent through a CIA receiving and transmitting station in Asmara, Ethiopia. The *Liberty* was tuned to receiving messages from this station. (She transmitted messages to Washington via another station base at Naples.)

As the pinnacle message left Washington it became the first of three remarkable communications errors, if indeed they were errors. The *Liberty* should have received the message at 9:00 A.M. ship's time. She never did. The message was misrouted via Subic Bay in the Philippines and ended up hours later at the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, where it was filed away in a desk drawer and seemingly forgotten.

Within two hours, a second message to the *Liberty* was "misrouted." This one was dispatched from the Sixth Fleet Commander aboard the U.S.S. *Little Rock*, advising McGonagle of his dangerous position and ordering him to withdraw. It was a back-up message to the "pinnacle" sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it left the *Little Rock* at 11:17 A.M., again for Asmara. This message was misrouted via a CIA post-station in Morocco. It, too, ended up back at Fort Meade.

The third and final message lost in this strange tangle of confused misroutings left the *Liberty* for the *Little Rock* via Naples, advising the Sixth Fleet Commander of the extent of the attack then taking place. This was "pinnacle" and was sent by the *Liberty* at 2:10 P.M.—only seconds before her communications went out. It finally arrived at Fort Meade with the others, many hours later, via Subic.

In fact, the only message received that day was the open-channel Mayday sent immediately after the coded "pinnacle" to the *Little Rock*.

The Navy has never satisfactorily explained how three messages of such vital importance, rated red-urgent and sent via the "pinnacle" code route, could all have been misrouted. The vague explanation was "bad management." Soon after the attack on the *Liberty*, one naval statement announced that it had taken place because of "misplaced communications." No known official naval inquiry into the communications incident ever took place. In fact, the strangest part of the whole *Liberty* affair has increasingly seemed the United States government's anxiety to excuse and cover up an attack on one of its own ships. 

Next month: The Cover-up.

PENTHOUSE

June, 1976



Of course, remaining silent on vital issues is often what our political leaders do best. In *Conspiracy of Silence* (illustrated by Phil Hayes), Anthony Pearson concludes his controversial story of the *Liberty*—an American spy ship that was suddenly and deliberately attacked by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. Even though 164 Americans were wounded and thirty-four Americans were killed, our government aided and abetted Israel in sweeping the real facts about the *Liberty* under the carpet. Even when the Israeli government censored the *Liberty* captain's receipt of the Congressional Medal of Honor, nobody spoke up. The motives behind the American-Israeli obfuscation of the *Liberty* incident were uncovered by Pearson in the course of his investigation for *Penthouse*. And these unconscionable motives delineate one more appalling example of high government officials who worry more about their public images than about the real issues involving this nation's security—or even, as in the case of the *Liberty*, about the lives of those thirty-four dead Americans.

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

Although thirty-four Americans were killed when Israel attacked an unarmed U.S. ship in 1967, our government had left itself no choice but to help the Israelis sweep the entire matter under the rug.

June 7, 1967, was the fourth day of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. By that morning Jerusalem had fallen and Jordan was conquered. Israeli Mirages were masters of the air. The Egyptian air force had been destroyed in the early morning of the first combat day. Israel had been victorious within the first few hours. Now, on the fourth day, only Syria remained to be taken.

But the Arabs had not been the only targets. On the afternoon of June 8, an American spy ship, the U.S.S. *Liberty*, was hit in a coordinated raid by Israeli planes and torpedo boats. Thirty-four Americans were killed, and 164 were injured—including the captain, William L. McGonagle. The reasons for this attack were never fully explained. The Israelis claimed that it was an error, and the U.S. government accepted that explanation. But, as *Penthouse* reported last month, the attack was deliberate and both governments knew so at the time.

The *Liberty*, which was furnished with extremely sophisticated intelligence equipment, had been monitoring Arab and Israeli transmissions from her post off Gaza. Thus the communications experts on board had discovered that the Israelis were intercepting messages between the Arab leaders and then changing them and retransmitting them—a procedure known as "cooking." These cooked messages led King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser of Egypt to believe that the war was actually going well for the Arabs and encouraged them to continue fighting. This ploy gave Israel the time it needed to consolidate its growing victory. It allowed the Israelis to destroy the confused Arab armies and seize Arab territory.

BY ANTHONY PEARSON

What no one knew—except those at the highest levels of the Israeli and American governments—was that Israel was violating a predetermined plan formulated by the CIA, top officials of the Johnson administration, the Israeli General Staff and leading Israeli politicians. According to this plan, Israel should have fought a contained war with the Arabs—which would not have affected the territorial lines between Israel and Syria and Jordan. But the *Liberty* had discovered Israel's violation of this scheme, and on the evening of June 7 the Israeli ambassador in Washington was told that the attacks had to stop. Eight hours later orders were given in Tel Aviv to destroy the ship.

The attack would have been totally successful. It failed only because a "Mayday" distress call from the *Liberty* had reached the Sixth Fleet, six hundred miles to the northwest. Two flights of four jet fighters were immediately launched to save the ship. The Israelis intercepted the call and pulled back while there was still time to make the only possible excuse—error and mistaken identity.

On June 14 the *Liberty* limped into the harbor of Valletta, Malta. Dockworkers

counting 821 rocket, cannon, and bullet holes marveled that the ship still lived.

An inquiry court probing the attack had already been convened three days earlier in London. Its president, Adm. Isaac Kidd, now came aboard the *Liberty* to continue the investigation. It seemed to him, he told the officers, that the ship's survival was nothing short of a miracle. The job of the inquiry, he said, partially joking, was not so much to find out what had gone wrong but to record how it had all gone right—how McGonagle and his men had pulled themselves from the proverbial jaws of death.

But that did not matter. Heroes did not matter. Bravery had not changed the course of events. Whatever Kidd or Admiral John McCain, chief of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, or McGonagle or the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington or the crew of the *Liberty* thought—and they all knew damn well that they had been attacked in cold blood—because of the attack the Israelis had achieved their objectives. On June 10, 1967, they were masters of Sinai as far as the very eastern banks of the Suez Canal, of the Jordan West Bank of Jerusalem, and of a big chunk of the

Syrian Golan Heights. The attack on Syria had been almost as big a shock to the world as was the whole sudden war; it was significant that *Liberty* was the only neutral voice able to tell the United Nations in New York and the Defense and State departments in Washington that the Israelis were making moves to conquer the Golan Heights. The transmissions from *Liberty* exposing the Israeli Golan attack plans could have saved Syria if they had gone through. The Israelis were in violation of a U.N. negotiated cease-fire. The attack on the ship, however, severed communications, and the Israelis had their way.

"Jesus! They reshaped the whole strategic map of the Mideast," a friend in the American Embassy in Beirut told me three days after the war had ended. "They've sabotaged every plan the State Department had for reestablishing any sort of worthwhile dialogue with the Arabs."

For this reason, many professionals in the State Department's Near East section did not join the American press and people in rejoicing because little Israeli David had killed the sinister Arab Goliath. They were concerned about a future that now looked dark and twisted.

THE KGB CONNECTION

Immediately after Adm. William Martin, the commander of the Sixth Fleet, had dispatched planes to save the *Liberty*, Lyndon Johnson contacted Leonid Brezhnev, the Russian leader on the hot line. Johnson wanted to explain why there were American planes in the air. This incident raised the question of the Russian role in the planning of the Six-Day War—a role that was as crucial as that of Israel and the United States.

In 1967 a man called Sami Sharaf was probably the second most powerful man in Egypt. He was a close friend of President Nasser, and he was also Nasser's intelligence adviser. His title was Director of the President's Office of Information, but his actual job was running the KGB operation in Egypt. He was considered by both the British SIS and the CIA to be one of the most important Soviet agents in the world. His close allies in Egypt were Vice-President Ali Sabry, Interior Minister Sharawi Gomaa, and War Minister Mohammad Fawzi. He was determined to drag Egypt totally into the Soviet camp, and he was constantly troubled by Nasser's reluctance to give up all hope of reestablishing some sort of American-Egyptian détente.

After the CIA-inspired coup in Greece, which was supposed to bol-

ster NATO military advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean, the KGB began to dig hard into the overall tactical U.S. plan to subvert Soviet influence in the Mideast. They discovered that the American government had come to terms with the Israelis to attack Egypt, bring about Nasser's resignation or removal from office, and help in a right-wing military coup.

Sharaf and his associates agreed that if the Israelis did attack Egypt, Nasser would certainly be ousted. But Sharaf had total confidence in his own position. If anyone could take power, he and his group could, and Egypt would then be irretrievably in Soviet hands. This would give the Russians the ultimate military advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To manipulate the situation to his own advantage, Sharaf told Nasser that the Israelis were assembling three brigades on the Golan Heights against the Syrians and that the Egyptian army should be mobilized in Sinai as a countermeasure. But the whole story was a lie. The Israelis were on full military alert, but they had not marshaled any brigades on the Golan prior to May 22, when Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran and moved his forces into a Sinai confrontation.

The Egyptian troop movements alarmed the American security agen-

cies. When they learned the reason they were deeply shocked. The State Department dispatched two special envoys, Charles Yost and Robert Anderson, to Cairo to cool things. They had fairly agreeable meetings with Nasser, and the Egyptian president agreed to send his special envoy, Zacheria Mohelein, to Washington. Sharaf was in no mood to see cold water poured on his dangerous game which he saw a good chance of winning. Mohelein was due to leave for Washington on June 5. Somehow the Israelis found out. They had their own plans, and, likewise, they were in no mood to be thwarted by attempted Egyptian-American détente. So they made their preemptive strike.

The plan for a coup collapsed because the Egyptian people refused to accept Nasser's resignation after defeat. His charisma went beyond the assessments of both Russian and American political observers.

In September 1970, Anwar el-Sadat succeeded Nasser, who had died of a heart attack in May 1972. Sharaf and all his associates, including Sabry, Gomaa, and Fawzi, were arrested by the Egyptian authorities after an attempted coup against Sadat. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. Sharaf was originally sentenced to death, but Sadat commuted the order.

The *Liberty* had been only a small obstacle against a determined Israeli plan for reshaping the Mideast in Israel's own interests, and the attack on the ship was an indication of that country's determination to expand. To achieve their aims, the Israelis were prepared to push aside the restraining hand of their American ally with the same contempt that they felt for the threatening arm of their enemy. America had forbidden the conquest of Jordan. The *Liberty* attack was the Israeli reply. Old-timers in the State Department could well say, "We told you..." But the cost of thirty-four lives and so much pain and injury left a burning anger in many places. According to former CIA staffer Patrick McGarvey, who was coordinating intelligence reports for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the *Liberty* attack became evident, an order was immediately issued for an air strike against the Israeli torpedo base at Haifa, which had launched the torpedo boats. That order was quickly countermanded by the White House.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was in special session on the morning of the *Liberty* attack. Their reaction to the news was just as furious as that of the military, but it was motivated by different reasons and directed against different culprits. "It's the Russians," Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced. "They've escalated the war to direct confrontation," Sen. J. William Fulbright said.

How could they have been expected to realize the truth? Even two days afterward

it was hard to believe. A Pentagon spokesman was quoted as saying some "plausible explanation" could be found in human error. But immediately afterward Assistant Defense Secretary Phil Goulding rejected this saying, "We cannot accept an attack on a clearly marked noncombatant U.S. naval ship in international waters as plausible under any circumstances." An admiral in Naval Communications made the comment that the attack had been "another Pearl Harbor."

Cries of outrage were also heard in the House. Craig Hosmer, the Republican congressman from California, called the attack "high piracy" and demanded that the Israeli government make full reparations to both the United States and the families of the dead and injured. He also said that open proceedings should be taken against the men responsible for the attack order and those who carried it out.

Congressman Thomas Abernethy, a Mississippi Democrat, criticized the government's attitude. The Americans had taken the whole thing too lightly, he said. Washington was "as quiet as the tomb" about the whole event.


Of course Congressmen Abernethy and Hosmer, the Joint Chiefs, Goulding, and all the others who had criticized Israel's action had never been privy to the secret war plans of the CIA and the highest advisers of Lyndon Johnson. If they had, they might well have been appalled, but at least they would have understood the reluctance with which the government ap-

proached the problem. Its plan was simple. It had to cool everything—to cover up. There had been a little trouble at Vaneffa because no one had told the crew not to talk. Naturally they did. The press felt with the impression that whatever views Washington or the inquiry boards might take, the *Liberty* crew was in no doubt concerning the intentions of its attackers. One man, a Jewish boatswain's mate from Brooklyn, told how he had ripped the Star of David from his neck and had thrown it into the sea when he saw the blue and white Israeli flag. "The dirty murdering bastards" was all that he could say.

At home the story had received some publicity immediately after the attack, but there was a strange lack of interest shown in any follow-ups. Jack Anderson, the Washington columnist, raised questions about the *Liberty*'s role as a spy ship, expressed the opinion that the attack was no accident, and exposed the facts that initial congressional hearings on the matter were totally secret and apparently leak-proof, and that there was a good deal of friction among representatives concerning the issue. On the Hill and in the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community, the *Liberty* affair was suddenly shrouded in secrecy. A presidential citation was issued for the ship, and Commander McGonagle was cited for the Medal of Honor. Beyond that necessary routine there was silence.

On July 28 the *Zarephath* (N.J.) *Herald of Freedom* published a story headlined "The Rape of the U.S.S. *Liberty*," outlining details of the attack from the released unclassified record of the naval inquiry. In sifting through possible reasons for the attack, the newspaper suggested that it probably had much to do with Gen. Moshe Dayan. The suggestion was a fair shot in the dark. Dayan was, in fact, the "senior officer" in the Israeli Ministry of Defense who had helped coordinate the plan with Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service) to sabotage American-Egyptian relations in 1954, the so-called Lavon affair, in which Israeli secret-service agents tried to bomb the American embassy in Cairo. Nevertheless, he had never been publicly identified in this connection. He had also been party to the American-Israeli prewar planning discussions.

But the most emotional issue was swiftly becoming that of compensation. An organization had been formed in Linden, N.J., by Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Reilly, whose son Thomas, Jr., aged twenty, had suffered a fractured skull and had a piece of shrapnel lodged in his brain during the *Liberty* attack. The organization was called the Committee for Immediate Action—Families and Friends of Victims of the U.S.S. *Liberty*. Its intention was to extract whatever money the members considered the government of Israel owed them. The first positive move to force compensation payment was taken by Mr. and Mrs. Reilly.



"This is the last time I'll ever let you make the reservations!"

who lodged a suit against Israel for punitive damages of \$50 million, accusing the Israelis of murdering and maiming innocent persons. The suit was lodged with the World Court at The Hague. A representative of the State Department visited the Reillys and asked them to withdraw the claim, but they refused. They were told that the U.S. government was representing both them and the relations of other victims. Nevertheless, they still insisted on their own lawsuit. The court at The Hague ignored their request. It was subsequently suggested that it had done so at the coercion of the U.S. State Department. Because all things political are possible, it is significant enough that the Reillys were snubbed. They were not the only ones.

Congressman Craig Hosmer also attempted to pursue the *Liberty* mystery and its aftermath. On October 18, 1967 he told the House that he had written a letter to Dean Rusk twelve days earlier, asking for details of compensation payments. On the same day, October 6, he had also written to the secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara. Rusk, he said, had ignored him completely, and McNamara had returned a cursory note that read, "This matter is receiving attention, and you will be advised further as soon as possible." He never was. When I spoke to Hosmer about the matter last November, he shied away from the questions, claimed he dimly remembered the incident, but did admit that his inquiries never got off the ground for one reason or another. He would not specify what these reasons were.

Meanwhile the State Department and the Israeli government were thrashing out the settlement of the *Liberty*. The Israelis claimed that they were investigating the incident and that court-martial proceedings would follow. Initially, they refused to pay any compensation, claiming that the *Liberty's* presence in the war area was an aggressive act against Israel on the part of the U.S. government.

On November 16 a foreign-aid bill that was being passed in Congress included nearly \$5 million for various Israeli educational programs. Congressman Harold Royce Gross of Iowa demanded to know why the U.S. government was handing out multi-million-dollar grants to the Israelis when there had still been no reparation for the *Liberty* incident. He proposed an amendment to the bill providing that no funds would be paid to Israel in the Foreign Aid Program until the Israelis had made satisfactory compensation to both the U.S. government and the families of

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

the *Liberty* dead and wounded. The amendment was defeated.

Meanwhile State Department insurance assessors were evaluating the claims of *Liberty* families. Three of these were the dependents of Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, Lt. James Royce, and Lt. Stephen Toth. Armstrong had left a widow and five small children, as had Pierce Toth, who was unmarried, had lived at home with his parents. His father, a retired navy captain, was not satisfied when the State Department insurance men told him that the *Liberty's* compensation was being assessed against a train wreck in Ohio in 1959.

The insurance men told Capt. Joe Toth that while no figures had yet been settled, they thought compensation would be "adequate" and mentioned a sum of \$9,000. They asked that a release form for that amount be signed. Although the captain considered that he and his wife could never be adequately compensated for the loss of their only son, he thought that the widows and children of Armstrong and Pierce should be very well provided for. The State Department told Captain Toth not to make trouble. The issue was a sensitive one. The captain told them to go to hell, and despite a serious heart condition, he set off on a series of trips between Virginia Beach and Washington to bring a suit against the State Department. He found legal counsel at a firm of Washington lawyers, King and King, where his old friend John McWater was a partner. The State Department told Captain Toth that he was a troublemaker, but he had some strong support in the Pentagon from another old friend, Admiral McCain, and also from Admiral Kidd, who had conducted the *Liberty* inquiry.

Captain Toth wanted to know what the Israelis were doing to ensure those responsible for the attack, if as they said, it was an error. No one could tell him. The Israeli Ministry of Defense investigation had never gone beyond the bare statement that court-martial of the culprits was being set up, and inquiries in Tel Aviv about it were practically fruitless. Only one small tidbit of information, for which supporting proof could never be found, was passed onto the State Department for consideration.

According to one of the few small leaks that oozed out of the secret congressional hearings on the *Liberty*, this information was that two of the pilots involved in the attack had been Americans—ex-navy fliers. The story was not unlikely because the Israelis had employed, and still do employ, trained American military personnel who "immigrate" to Israel. A friend of mine now in the Dubai air police, who patrol the Gulf, told me that just before he had taken the job in October, 1973, the Israelis offered him a contract to fly as a helicopter pilot. He had been a trained Cobra gunship jockey in Vietnam. Although he never said precisely how much he had been offered, he was being paid in excess of \$60,000 a year, tax-free in the Gulf. He admitted that this was only slightly better than the Israeli pay. Also while I was in Damascus during the Yom Kippur War, the Syrians produced some captured pilots, two of whom were Americans. Israel does have a multinational migrant population, and these men do hold Israeli documents. These instances are no real proof that the Israelis employ mercenaries, although it is only logical that they do, because they are on permanent combat alert and need these professionals to maintain the high state of proficiency that makes the Israeli armed forces the very best in the world.

The possibility that Americans had flown the *Liberty* mission certainly makes the whole affair even more sinister. But we don't have to search for possibilities, there are now more than enough facts to confirm the early suspicions that the wall of silence masked a complex scandal and that the U.S. government had connived with the Israelis to hush things up.

One of the most outrageous aspects of this cover-up was the manner in which the American commendations for the ship and McGonagle's Medal of Honor were submitted to the Israelis. According to a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's staff at the time, the citations were censored by Israel before they were awarded. All reference to the nationality of

the attackers was deleted and McGonagle's citation read simply "jet aircraft and motor torpedo boats. The citation awarded to the ship referred only to "foreign jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats."

On June 11, 1968 Comdr. now Capt. William McGonagle received his Congressional Medal of Honor at the Washington Navy Yard at a full-dress ceremony presided over by Secretary of the Navy Paul Robert Ignatius. That was the final formal public reference to the U.S.S. *Liberty* by the military.

The Pentagon and the State Department would have been happy to let the matter rest there, but they could not. They were being subjected to demands for compensation, particularly from Captain Toth, whose lawyers were threatening to issue open-court writs if someone did not pay up quickly.

A hard fight ensued. John McWater, reminiscing about it last year, said that the State Department was "very difficult" and subjected both the lawyers and Captain Toth to "harassment." He declined to be specific and claimed that the files on the case no longer existed.

Mrs. Toth was more specific. "They killed my husband," she said. "First my son, then my husband. The harassment took the form of threats and claims that Joe was damaging national security, and there was surveillance and pressure from people like the IRS. It was too much for his bad heart. It took a year to kill him, but it did. We got \$40,000 finally, but it cost us half of that just chasing around. Joe was also claiming on behalf of the families of the other two officers, and he got them \$50,000 for each child, so each family got \$250,000 tax-free when the U.S. government finally made the Israelis pay up. I still don't believe it was enough. The compensation for the *Panay* was much more." (On December 12, 1937, Japanese shore batteries and aircraft shelled the American naval ship *Panay* in the Yangtze River. Three men were killed and forty-three sailors and five civilian passengers were wounded. Within four months "a large indemnity" was paid—it was said to be more than \$10 million.)

In May 1968 the Israeli government paid \$3.3 million to the families of the thirty-four *Liberty* dead. One year later they paid \$3.5 million to the 164 who had been injured. The U.S. government had also supposedly claimed \$7 million for the damage to the ship, but that claim slid away into the obscure mists of silence, along with the Israeli inquiry, the court-martial, and the records of the confidential congressional hearings. To those few press inquiries that were still being made, the official explanation for the *Liberty*'s mission was that she had been conducting research for "electromagnetic-propagation studies" and monitoring the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the war zones. The fuss over compensation had quieted down when the Toth claim was settled. None of the other fami-

lies were prepared to discuss it. They seemed frightened and admitted that State Department officials had ordered them to say nothing. They signed release forms for the money they received, which was apportioned "according to rank" and represented little more than regular veterans' benefits.

On Tuesday, September 12, 1972, John R. Rarick, a Democratic congressman from Louisiana with extreme right-wing opinions, brought up in the House the question of the still-unexplained attack on the *Liberty*. He demanded to know why it continued to be hushed up and why the families of the dead and injured had been treated so unfairly in regard to compensation. He got nowhere. When I spoke to him last November, he alleged that the Israelis had never actually paid a penny—that the money had been pushed through Foreign Aid as an extra. He also claimed that even as late as 1972 he was being harassed by the State Department and the security agencies for trying to stir up the whole business again. He said that nothing had been paid, other than regular benefits, and that claims for all punitive damages had been ignored except in special cases, such as Captain Toth's, in which there was a danger of dragging the U.S. government into the public courts.

"It's a double standard all the way round," he said. "The boys who survived will never discuss the money. It was as though they had been paid hush money or something."

In October and November last year, I spoke to a number of ex-personnel of the *Liberty* and relatives of the victims. Mrs. Toth said she had nothing to lose anyway, because her husband and son were both dead. The responses of the others were strange, hesitant, and fearful. Politicians had similar reactions. *Liberty* seemed to be a dirty word.

I had arrived in Washington in October, armed with a personal introduction from a friend in London to the secretary of the navy, Bill Middendorf. My friend also wrote Middendorf independently, explaining that I was working on a navy story and wished to see him. His secretary telephoned me and set a luncheon appointment. The conversation was amicable and enthusiastic. The secretary told me to telephone certain naval public-affairs personnel who would help me with my inquiries. I did, explaining my mission fairly fully. Two days later Middendorf's secretary telephoned back, saying that an appointment with the secretary of the navy would be impossible. She would not explain why.

Then I called an old acquaintance, Robert McCluskey at the State Department, reminding him of our last meeting during the 1973 war in Cairo, when Kissinger was jettisoning the Mideast and clinching deals. McCluskey had been in charge of compensation monies in 1968 and 1969. To whom were they paid, and what sort of figures were settled upon veri-

ous individuals? Bob didn't remember. I pursued him for a week and he turned up a man called Fabian Kwiatek, an assistant legal adviser in the International Claims Department of the Secretary of State's office. Mr. Kwiatek's statement was as follows:

"One hundred percent of them [*Liberty* families and survivors] agreed to accept the payment offered and the Israeli government paid all the claims. All the hospital expenses were paid by the U.S. government. Altogether, sums of between \$100 and \$300,000—\$200,000 no—perhaps it was nearer \$350,000 no—more like two hundred or thousand dollars were paid."

That's very good, Mr. Kwiatek. Do you have an exact record of what was paid to each claimant?

No. We don't keep those sort of records.

You mean to say the United States government pays out almost \$4 million compensation and does not record where it goes to?

A long pause. "Ah! Yes! I can't give you that information. It contravenes the intrusion-of-privacy bill."

Soon afterward I received a telephone call from an officer in the navy's public-affairs bureau.

"We must meet for a drink," he said (we had only talked by telephone). "I've become really interested in this *Liberty* business. What really happened? I suppose you must know it all, and I would be really interested to hear what you have."

You'll be able to read it soon enough," I said. That failed to amuse him, and he didn't telephone again.

Finally, I had a last, uneventful talk with Captain McGonagle in California. Loyal to his military pledges, he was saying nothing. He sounded weary. He sounded like a man who had taken enough.

I returned to the Mideast where I was finally able to establish that the Israeli investigation and court-martial announced in Tel Aviv on June 21, 1967, had never taken place. The U.S. State Department had agreed wholeheartedly with the Israelis that the entire affair be swept under the carpet. No one was eager to have the pilots involved give sworn testimony about who ordered their mission. For that matter, if there was truth to the stories that some of the pilots were American, any testimony might have been a severe embarrassment to both governments.

But what is most significant is that the United States was unable to expose Israel's connivances without exposing its own. And the Israelis, constantly fighting for the survival and dignity of their country, could only regard the destruction of the *Liberty* and the following cover-up as vital to the destiny of a whole people and of a country that is as much a holy vision as a home. Perhaps that is how those who were responsible for the attack can sleep and dream—but never remember. O—

CIA

The Myth and the Madness

PATRICK J. MCGARVEY

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nize the basic missions, and redefine the role of intelligence in United States national life. Any other approach is simply self-delusion. The age of evolutionary change went out the window with the dawning of the nuclear age. As the time required for destroying entire nations has diminished, the time for rectifying our national machinery of foreign policy has been compressed. Those who argue otherwise are luxuriating mentally in a former era.

A review of the better-known intelligence failures of the past ten years bears stark witness not only to the urgency with which national crises arise, but also to the spreading nature of intelligence problems. The U-2 incident in May, 1960, torpedoed chances of a summit meeting in a twinkling. The hastily gathered and inaccurate intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in 1964 was the basis for a costly, ineffective, four-year widening of that conflict. Yet, before the bombing decision was made, a CIA staffer who attended the White House sessions told me, "We knew it was bum dope that we were getting from the Seventh Fleet, but we were told to give only the facts with no elaboration on the nature of the evidence." The reason, in his words: "Everyone knew how volatile LBJ was. He didn't like to deal in uncertainties." The USS *Liberty*, an American intelligence ship, probed too closely to the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967, because a warning message had been "misrouted." This prompted an attack which destroyed the ship and killed thirty-four American men—an incident which could have sucked the United States into that war had the Joint Chiefs of Staff's impulsive advice, which I witnessed, been followed. They proposed a quick, retaliatory air strike on the Israeli naval base which launched the attack. The next year the North Koreans seized a similar ship, the *Pueblo*, and interred its crew. Again we were on the brink of war because of intelligence, the supposed secret arm of government. The JSC again recommended an air strike. The *Pueblo* incident was followed by the shoot-down of a United States reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea a little over a year later. And again the JCS

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SIDS
only

Dec. 1, 1983

U. S. S. Liberty Veterans Association
P. O. Box 8538A
Orlando, Florida 32856

Gentlemen:

For some years I have been studying the presidency of Lyndon Johnson on contract. My work has now resulted in the book The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, just published by University Press of Kansas as vol. II in its American Presidency Series.

One of the episodes that received an outsized amount of my attention was the Liberty attack. I could not go into it as far as I would have liked to, unfortunately, but I did give about three pages to the matter.

As a courtesy to your association, I enclose a Xerox copy of what I wrote. It is not possible to change it, at least for this printing. I hope it is not too flawed.

Do note that I have called for a congressional investigation, even at this late date. I intimate that further payments by Israel for the ship, at least, are in order. You may not care for my conclusion, based on present evidence, including my pile of Xeroxes from the White House files, that no prima facie case has been made for a deliberate attack ordered by top civilian and/or military authorities of Israel. By those who ordered it, however, it clearly was deliberate. And in my private opinion, the goal was total oblivion for ship and crew, a goal not fulfilled.

One of the things I could not account for was the ignorance, in the White House, for some hours, that there had been an air attack. Torpedoes got their attention, exclusively.

Also note my intimation that presidential silence was uncalled for, then and in following months. And I also blame the press for not probing the matter in press conferences. The hint is there that these silences were inspired by bias in both places based on religious considerations.

If you chance to see the book, I hope you will read and profit from it.

With good wishes for all of you, I am

Sincerely yours,


Vaughn Davis Bornet, Ph.D.
Cdr. USNR (Retired)

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AMERICA: CUSTODIAN OF THE WORLD

"one of the most remarkable jobs that I think has ever been done . . . ; without [him] there would have been a war between Greece and Turkey." This is memorable, for "few people in the world can say that they stopped a war." On another occasion, White House intervention at John Kenneth Galbraith's initiation saved the Greek scholar Andreas Papandreu from probable execution and helped to obtain his release from confinement. Such unqualified successes would not be numerous, however. An insider has said, "The Johnson years were obviously preoccupied with Vietnam, and the political niceties of Italy [for example] were only a secondary matter." Still, negotiations related to Vietnam could spill over to involve states in the Asian theater, for better or worse. There were, during the last days, 39,300 U.S. servicemen on 146 bases in Japan. Politician Johnson, strangely, told Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in November 1967, that the question of the complete reversion of Okinawa could not be settled until after the 1968 election. After one Asian negotiating trip, the president was told by his hand Averell Harriman that "the Manila Conference and your trip to Asia were well received everywhere—by the governments, and in the press."³⁶

During the post-World War II period the ancient enmities between Muslims and Jews accelerated with the creation of a new Israeli state, which incorporated shrines that were holy to both peoples. In June 1967 there erupted the sudden Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, in which the former attacked first because of concern over the closing of its avenue to the sea. The event was bound to evoke emotions in the United States, where Christians and Jews alike venerated the Holy Land. A president from a Democratic party that was financed noticeably by many Americans who had a deep personal interest in the security and welfare of Israel would predictably give the Middle East his full attention. Very early, in the fall of 1963, he told an Israeli diplomat: "You have lost a very great friend, but you have found a better one." On another occasion he observed, "I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and defending a modern nation against great odds and against the tragic background of Jewish experience." He seems to have given Arab concerns far less attention.

War in the Sinai, if it came, might spread to involve the great power, some thought. Since the United States was the leading arms supplier to Israel, any president would have had difficulty in being nonpartisan, of course. Israel's president had said almost to himself when he left the White House in early 1964, "I go back to Israel confident and cheered by the knowledge that the man in the White House is a friend of our cause."³⁷ When Egypt closed the crucial Gulf of

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Aqaba, an Israeli sea highway, the war then begun by Israel, which was said to be preemptive, became an immediate White House concern, not the least because Syrian involvement seemed likely.

Walt Rostow asserts that "Johnson tried hard, but failed, to keep Israel from initiating hostilities on June 5 [1967]." The fact of failure should be stressed. Faced with the difficulty of getting Nasser's Egypt to reopen the international waterway, Johnson leaned on Foreign Minister Abba Eban, especially in a meeting of May 26, telling him very carefully, "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone." This was repeated "very positively," in the hope of preventing an Israeli attack. "All of our intelligence people are unanimous," he unwisely added, however, "that if the UAR (United Arab Republic) attacks, you will whip hell out of them." Could this have been translated by the listener into: "If you proceed, you will easily prevail?" Israel wondered if the United States, the British, or maybe the United Nations would be able to achieve Israel's goals for it. There was this odd remark by Johnson: "I am fully aware of what three past presidents have said, but that is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress do not support the President." By this, Johnson meant, he says, that his own bitter experience showed that Congress might again "turn tail and run if the going got rough."

On the weekend of June 3, on the eve of the attack, Johnson had the opportunity to tell the heavily Jewish audience at a dinner given by the New York State Democratic party how unthinkable war was regarded by the United States. But he only referred to "concern" and said he was in "contact," adding, "To go beyond this tonight would not serve the cause of peace or would not be helpful." This was hardly a public demand for Israeli patience or a public notice that, one way or another, the straits would eventually be opened. So, Johnson deferred to Israel—with an eye on domestic politics—and he failed to preserve the peace. When it was all over and Israel had acquired vast new territories, Abe Fortas was one who said enthusiastically to Johnson: "You've handled the Israel-Arab problem magnificently." Much depended on one's point of view.

Johnson, Rusk, Rostow, and others seem to have thought they had a commitment from Israel to hold up action for two weeks. "During those trying days I used all the energy and experience I could muster to prevent war. But I was not too hopeful," claims the president. Many Vietnam doves would have had to convert themselves into Israeli hawks to get a resolution of support for executive action through the Congress, he says. He thought his position of weakness was one that the dynamic Israelis could easily sense. And they were uncertain if a four-nation task

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force would ever challenge the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba; they considered the UN ineffective, for the French were refusing to take a stand. Rusk candidly told our ambassadors in a cable that "Israel will fight and we could not restrain her." Why, then, did the attack begin? "Only the Israelis themselves can describe and assess the reasons for their decision," says Johnson, who was, not surprisingly, unwilling to call it "aggression."⁴⁰

Could a different American president, one less politically handicapped, have better conveyed the unacceptability of such a devastating and destabilizing strike? Possibly it is an illusion that a great power can control the ultimate policy decisions of any beleaguered but powerful small one. A State Department briefing officer said on June 5, "Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed." Then Dean Rusk had to add that the word "neutrality" absolutely did not involve "indifference"! The press was not satisfied. "Mr. Rusk, under our concept of neutrality, would it be a violation of one of the countries involved to raise funds by financing or floating bonds in this country in your judgment?" Rusk was noncommittal. "Are we neutral in thought, word, and deed?" The reply: "I don't, I think, need to get into particular phraseology that goes beyond what the president has said and what I have said. Thank you."⁴¹

A shocking event of the war, which got little attention then or later, until 1982, was the brutal Israeli attack on the United States communications ship *Liberty* in the Mediterranean on June 8. Final American casualties came to 34 dead and 171 wounded. At the time, the ship could have determined the order of attack in a possible war between Israel and Syria, and perhaps have ended the Israeli news blackout on the extent of conquests. The press quickly lost interest in the attack. Only one question was ever asked in a presidential press conference, with the commander in chief replying evasively, "I think you know about as much about it as we do." Johnson's memoir gives only the very low initial casualty figures and calls the event an "accident," an "incident," and an "error." But the State Department on June 11 told Israel, behind the scenes, that the attack was "quite literally incomprehensible" and showed "military irresponsibility reflecting reckless disregard for human life." Initially, the American dead were buried at Arlington with a plaque "Died in the Eastern Mediterranean," but this was changed under pressure in 1982 to "Killed—USS *Liberty*."

There is need for a carefully crafted professional book on this episode. A few facts were revealed in 1970, when Phil Goulding, former head of public affairs at the Pentagon, discussed it in his memoir.⁴² The United States court of inquiry convened by the navy stayed out of

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sensitive international questions, he admitted. The reason for tough orders given to ship's personnel to preserve permanent silence on the episode was *Liberty's* function as a technical research and electronic intelligence gathering (i.e., "elint") ship; this resulted in an effective cover-up. An article for a navy audience appeared in 1978, and the next year there was a little-noted book, *Assault on the Liberty*, complete with interviews and pertinent documents, prepared by the ship's angry cryptographic officer. Some documents were used at the Johnson Library, but much more exists.⁴⁹

The facts make for ugly reading. In execution of direct orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff the ship was in international waters, some fourteen miles off the coast (fifteen miles north of the Sinai Peninsula) and some fifty miles from Egypt. A change in orders specifying a move to a hundred miles from shore failed to arrive. *Liberty* was a former Liberty (merchant) ship now covered with sophisticated antennae, and over complement with a crew of more than three hundred. Its simple armament consisted of four machine guns. The number 675 appeared in very large letters (the figure 5 was ten feet high) near the bow; LIBERTY was on the stern. Speed was five knots, and the wind made the national ensign fly smartly in the breeze. Israeli planes had circled and inspected the ship thirteen times over a 16-hour period. The two-stage daylight attack consisted of a 20- to 25-minute strafing by Mirage and Mystere jets with rockets and napalm, followed by a torpedo-boat attack with torpedoes and deck guns. (During the attack a 7-by-13-foot flag was added but was perhaps obscured by smoke.) Helicopters and two extra jets hovered and circled overhead.

Communications were inhibited by the total destruction of normal gear, but it is said that when emergency gear was used, the Israelis heavily jammed the channels. Those aboard the *Liberty* had no idea what government was striving to obliterate it, nor did the Sixth Fleet when it first received sketchy details. Even the White House was ignorant for a time both of this and the attack by the aircraft, but the Israeli government hastened to admit responsibility, apologized, and offered to pay damages. The failure in official communications by the United States must be stressed, first to last. It was of a kind with the failure at Pearl Harbor; a similar case was the sinking of the U.S. cruiser *Indianapolis* in 1945 without word being spread appropriately. Messages received and memoranda created at the White House were error-filled and must have made for uneasiness from the beginning.

There is no doubt at all that Israel, engaged in waging war, used its air force and navy to try to totally destroy a ship near the war zone, one that was clearly marked and beyond the twelve-mile limit. It has become

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my opinion that no prima facie case has ever been made for the idea of an intentional attack on an identified ship on the orders of the Israeli civilian government. Given highly visible prior reconnaissance, it simply cannot be assumed that top military officials knowingly ordered an attack on this American ship, whatever the importance of possible gains in operational secrecy during the war. An investigation by Israel in a few days produced a number of plausible and rather fantastic reasons why the mistake could have happened without command error per se. Commenting on these to his superiors in a cable, the naval attaché of the United States in Tel Aviv at the time could scarcely contain his disgust and anger. He said that when he had been asked to comment informally, he had simply kept his mouth shut and made no reply, pretending he had not heard the question.

While indignant at all insinuations of deliberate wrongdoing, Israel quickly paid \$3,325,500 to next of kin of the thirty-four dead. A year later, under pressure, it also paid \$3,566,457 in claims to the wounded, although private lawyers took a noticeable share of this. For years there was no payment for the ship itself, but in the 1980s, with renewed publicity, Israel paid a niggardly \$6 million for destroying a sophisticated ship valued at some \$33 million. This long-delayed result can be partially explained by the public silence of President Johnson throughout and the handling of government protestations in June 1967 only behind the scenes at the State Department level. The contrast with the dramatic tactics that this president used in connection with Tonkin Gulf is marked. Perhaps the difference is attributable to certain realities in the financing of American political parties and the power of nationwide solicitude for a hard-pressed religious homeland. After all, as the Pentagon bitterly told the world on June 10, 1967, "the identification markings of U.S. naval vessels have proved satisfactory for international recognition for nearly two hundred years." All marking on the *Liberty* and the flag had been clearly visible, it insisted. Oddly, the Pentagon told all hands who had survived this awful event "that they were to pipe down." The public-affairs chief says that the attack "was no accident - mistaken identity perhaps, but no accident." Johnson used the hot line to tell an impressed Chairman Kosygin that we were sending aircraft to investigate the attack, even though we didn't. A prominent Israeli figure, Chaim Herzog, wrote in 1982 that the United States just "saw fit" to position an intelligence-gathering ship off the coast of a friendly nation in time of war without giving any warning whatsoever and without advising of the position of the ship. In final comment on this episode, we may want at least to consider the observation of a historian who is well versed in the episode: "Nations

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do not have 'friends.' They have only interests. . . . In any given set of circumstances nations are guided to action by what they perceive to best serve their own interests." Dean Rusk said in 1981 that the attack on the *Liberty* "was and remains a genuine outrage."⁴⁴ The conduct of the Johnson administration in reaction was not much better. Only a full congressional hearing, it appears, will ever reveal the full facts and clear the air on an episode that has been swept under the rug too long.

A tense moment in the Middle Eastern conflict occurred on June 10, when for a time in the Situation Room the staff thought that the movements and intentions of the Soviets were in doubt. On the hot line, Kosygin spoke of "a very crucial moment" having arrived, and warned of a "grave catastrophe." Israel must halt operations within a few hours, or the Soviet Union would take "necessary actions, including military." The word "military" was checked over and over for a possible error in translating by the Johnson team, who would remember that moment as a time of utmost gravity. CIA Director Richard Helms later recalled that personnel used "the lowest voices I've ever heard in a meeting of that kind." The United States fleet was ordered to change course, with confidence that the Russians would notice, and Kosygin was informed that Israel was indeed close to a cease-fire. This Soviet-American crisis was soon over, with Johnson later crediting the hot line for much of the result.

To a National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, 1967, the president was now ready to state what he called "Five Great Principles of Peace in the Middle East," which were: recognition of the right to national life; justice for refugees; maritime passage; limits to the arms race; and independence and territorial integrity for all. The parties concerned must learn to reason together. Rostow says that Johnson, to the end of his term, made it clear to Israeli officials that he regretted their decision to go to war on June 5, but that he did this "without rancor or moralizing." The partisan Middle Eastern policy of those years seems not to have been America's finest hour, especially since the president resisted efforts to draw the United States too deeply into the negotiating process.⁴⁵ This was a decision that the next Democrat to occupy the White House would reverse with a flourish.

The full dimensions of presumed American commitment against communism in the 1960s were impressive. The nation had treaty obligations, as Rusk testified in 1966; these were to 42 countries out of the 117 on the planet at the time. But the United States, he said, would "in the appropriate way" (meaning in the United Nations or elsewhere) "presumably give aid and support to those who are victims of the kind of aggression which would have worldwide implications." If we have a

THE VANTAGE POINT

Perspectives of the Presidency
1963-1969

LYNDON
BAINES
JOHNSON

HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON
New York Chicago San Francisco

The Six Day War

JUST BEFORE EIGHT O'CLOCK on the morning of June 5, 1967, the telephone rang in my bedroom at the White House. Bob McNamara was calling with a message never heard before by an American President. "Mr. President," he said, "the hot line is up."

The hot line is a special teletype circuit linking Moscow and Washington. The technicians call it M-link. Its purpose is to provide instant communication between the Soviet leaders and the American President in times of grave crises in order to minimize the dangers of delay and misunderstanding. The hot line was installed on August 30, 1963, but had been operated only to test its effectiveness and to exchange New Year's greetings. It had never been used for its intended purpose until now.

McNamara's words were ominous, given the background against which they were spoken. Three and one-half hours before, at 4:35 A.M., Walt Rostow had awakened me with the news that war had erupted in the Middle East. I had been fearing a Middle East conflict and working as hard as I could to forestall it. Trouble in that area was, in my judgment, potentially far more dangerous than the war in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam conflict, tragic and perilous as it was, was contained, and we were reasonably sure we could keep it from spreading. Conflict in the Middle East was something else. From the founding of Israel in 1948 we had supported the territorial integrity of all the states in that region. Our commitment was not inscribed in any treaty, but it was strong nonetheless. It was rooted in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which the United States, Great Britain, and France promised to oppose any effort to alter by force the national borders in the Middle East. Four Presidents—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and myself—had publicly reaffirmed this

pledge. Congress had supported it in the Middle East Resolution at Eisenhower's request in 1957, and again in 1961 at Kennedy's request.

I believe we had been fair over the years in Middle East matters. We acted in 1958 to preserve the territorial integrity of Jordan and Lebanon. Other Arab nations benefited from our protective influence throughout this period. But in the 1960s it was Israel whose territory was threatened by hostile neighbors.

In an effort to gain influence in the radical Arab states, the Soviet Union shifted in the mid-1950s from its original support of Israel to an attempt to push moderate Arab states toward a more radical course and to provide a Middle East base for expanding its role in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and in the areas bordering on the Indian Ocean. The Soviets used Arab hostility toward Israel to inflame Arab politics to the boiling point. Country after country had shifted to the Russian view. The expanding Soviet presence in this strategic region threatened our position in Europe. Soviet leaders called publicly for the withdrawal of our Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, as well as for the liquidation of NATO. If they gained control of the seas, the oil, and the air space of the vast arc between Morocco and Iran, all that had been done since President Truman's time to achieve stability and balance in world politics would have been endangered.

I had watched this process with growing concern. In the fall of 1966 I asked for a special study of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The work, directed by former Ambassador Julius C. Holmes, revealed a pattern of serious Soviet advances, sparked in large part by emotions generated in the Arab-Israeli confrontation and including the active expansion of Soviet sea power and missile capability.

The danger implicit in every border incident in the Middle East was not merely war between Israelis and Arabs but an ultimate confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States and its NATO allies. This was the danger that concerned me, as well as the tragedy of war itself, in these hours before dawn on June 5, 1967.

The backdrop to the war that began that day was crowded with the diplomatic maneuvering, pent-up tensions, and explosions of the past twenty years. The most important events, stripped to bare essentials, were these: War had erupted between Israel and the Arabs twice before, in 1948 and 1956. Both times Israeli military forces showed remarkable strength and ability. Both times hostilities ended because of pressures brought to bear in the United Nations, but there was no permanent settlement. In the 1956 war Israeli troops overran the Sinai peninsula. They agreed to withdraw from the area for two reasons: first, a UN decision to put in a peacekeeping force to patrol the borders between Israel and Egypt and, second, President Eisenhower's assurance that the Gulf of Aqaba,

Israel's only outlet to the Indian Ocean, would remain open as an international waterway. To symbolize this assurance, the United Nations sent forces to Sharm el Sheikh. These understandings were contained in public statements at the time as well as in diplomatic exchanges. They were handled this way to satisfy Nasser's sensitivity to the appearance of making peace, or even negotiating, with Israel.

An uneasy truce between the warring states prevailed until 1965. The next year a new radical government in Syria increased terrorist raids against Israel, sending Arab guerrillas across the borders of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Such acts are in flagrant violation of international law. Every state is as responsible legally for irregular forces or armed bands attacking a neighbor as it is for attacks made by its own army. Syria's goal was twofold—to force Israeli reprisals against Jordan and Lebanon, thereby helping to weaken or destroy the moderate, pro-Western governments of those countries, and to bring on war.

A most painful and revealing moment in the entire cycle occurred when the issue of Syrian raids was referred to the UN Security Council. Though Syria had boasted of its responsibility for the raids, the Soviet Union vetoed a mild and ambiguous resolution condemning such action. As the raids increased in intensity, Israeli forces retaliated. In November 1966 they struck the Jordanian town of Es Samu, which they believed had been used as a base by Syrian terrorists.

Retaliation had little effect. Syria and Egypt concluded a mutual defense agreement. Terrorist raids continued and tension increased into the spring of 1967. On May 12 of that year Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol warned that more terrorism would bring further retaliatory action. Reports spread in Damascus that the Israelis were mobilizing major forces on the Syrian frontier for full-scale action. We investigated, found the reports to be untrue, and informed the Russians and the nations bordering on Israel of this fact. UN Secretary General U Thant spoke publicly to the same effect.

At the same time, we received reports that Moscow had promised unlimited support to the Syrians. In Washington the State Department took this up with the Soviet Embassy. The Russians denied all knowledge of such a promise and said that Soviet policy was simply to keep the area "quiet." Nevertheless, the Russians were helping to spread the rumor that the Israelis were mobilizing with the intention of striking Syria in a few days. In mid-May a theme of Soviet propaganda was that Israel was about to attack Syria, "incited by American imperialist circles and foreign monopolies." Our reports indicated that the purpose of these rumors was to pressure Egypt into military support of Syria. The reports were confirmed later in statements made by President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Egypt had been trying to dominate the Arab world since Nasser came

to leadership in 1954. For a time, in the early 1960s, we hoped that he was beginning to concentrate instead on improving the lot of his own people. On this assumption, we gave substantial aid to Egypt, mainly wheat to feed the people in its teeming cities. In the end, Nasser persisted in his imperial dream. While his strained economy slowed down, he sent troops into Yemen to support revolutionaries trying to take over that country. To support his ambitions, he became increasingly dependent on Soviet arms. Nasser's attitude toward the United States grew more and more hostile and his speeches more inflammatory. It became impossible to maintain congressional support for even token assistance to Egypt.

Through it all Nasser's prestige in the Arab world declined. So even though initial reports indicated that he preferred not to fight, he was susceptible to taunts that he was failing to protect Syria in the face of an alleged Israeli threat to Egypt's ally. And once he moved, events had a tragic inevitability of their own. It was not clear in mid-May of 1967 that any government actually wanted war, but after May 14 the Arab states began to act in ways inconsistent with preserving peace.

On that date, May 14, 1967, Nasser mobilized his armed forces. Two days later Egypt asked the United Nations to withdraw its peacekeeping force in the Sinai. In an action that shocked me then, and that still puzzles me, Secretary General U Thant announced that UN forces could not remain in the Sinai without Egyptian approval. Even the Egyptians were surprised. Nasser's Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Mostafa Kamel, told us that his government thought and hoped that U Thant would play for time. But he did not, and tension increased.

We threw the full weight of U.S. diplomacy into an effort to forestall war. The first necessity was to persuade the Israelis not to act hastily. I knew they would feel anxious about the withdrawal of UN forces, but I also knew that if open conflict was to be avoided, the Israelis would have to remain cool. On May 17, 1967, I cabled Prime Minister Eshkol, spelling out our deep concern over the situation and urging restraint. "I am sure you will understand," I wrote, "that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted."

On May 18 UN forces withdrew. Egyptian troops entered the Sinai peninsula and took up positions on Israel's borders. Despite his ill-conceived first maneuver, U Thant then announced that he was going to Cairo to try to preserve peace. We fully supported his effort. As far as possible, I wanted the main thrust of our diplomacy to be through the United Nations. At the same time, I was prepared to use American influence in any way that might be effective and helpful. On May 22 I sent a message to Soviet Chairman Kosygin suggesting a joint effort to calm the situation. I wrote:

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The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria, with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action by the United Nations

On the 22nd, I also sent a letter to Nasser assuring him of America's basic friendship for Egypt and my own understanding of "the pride and aspirations of your people." I urged him to avoid war as his first duty and expressed the hope that "if we come through these days without hostilities." I could send Vice President Humphrey to talk to him and other Middle East leaders in a new attempt to find a solution to the old problems there.

That same day, after I sent my letter to Nasser but before it was actually delivered and while U Thant was flying to Cairo, the Egyptian government made its fateful announcement: Egypt was closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Although we cannot be sure, it seems likely that Nasser took this mortally dangerous action independently of the Soviet Union.

With UN troops withdrawn from the Egyptian-Israeli border, the settlement of 1957 was undone. On March 1, 1957, in a speech at the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge had affirmed a U.S.-Israeli understanding that Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was linked to free passage through Aqaba, and that any armed interference would entitle Israel to rights of self-defense under the UN Charter. I knew that on February 26, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles had informed President Eisenhower in a memorandum "that Israel has been assured that a purpose of the United Nations Emergency Force would be to restrain the exercise of belligerent rights which would prevent passage through the Strait of Tiran." I wanted to know precisely how Eisenhower had viewed the matter at that time, so I sought his views and invited any statement he might care to make. General Eisenhower sent me a message stating his view that the Israelis' right of access to the Gulf of Aqaba was definitely part of the "commitment" we had made to them.

There was no doubt that Israel regarded it as such. I believed we had an obligation to state clearly the continuity of our position on Aqaba and to give as much assurance to the Israelis as we legitimately could. In a statement on May 23 I charged that Nasser's blockade was "illegal" and "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." I also reaffirmed our support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations of the area.

Secretary of State Rusk briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that day. He told me later that he believed there was general agreement in Congress that the Arabs should not be permitted to drive the Israelis into the sea. He thought it was generally recognized that we could not stay

aloof from the problems of the Middle East. However, the Senators told the Secretary that they were against unilateral action by the United States. The problem, they thought, called for a multilateral solution, hopefully through the United Nations. We had been searching for a multilateral solution since the crisis began. My first hope was the United Nations. But I felt no great optimism.

"I want to play every card in the UN," I told my advisers, "but I've never relied on it to save me when I'm going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson* and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too."

When the UN forces withdrew from the Sinai, I instructed Rusk to find out how France and Great Britain viewed the pledge they had made under the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. He assured me the next day: "We are pressing both the French and the British for a firm answer reaffirming the principles of the declaration of policy."

Our Ambassador to France, Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, talked with officials in Paris and reported that the French believed it would be a mistake to invoke the Tripartite Declaration. The French were even wary of taking any moderating steps on their own. Bohlen concluded that they attached considerable importance to Soviet attitudes and were "playing a careful game."

The British, on the other hand, were actively seeking a way out of the crisis in full cooperation with us. On May 24 their Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson, met with Rusk and other State Department officials in Washington to discuss a proposal based on the commitments of the international community made in 1957 at the United Nations. The British proposed two steps. First there would be a public declaration, signed by as many nations as possible, reasserting the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. There was hope that the declaration might even be endorsed by the United Nations. Second, a naval task force would be set up, composed of as many nations as possible, to break Nasser's blockade and open the Strait of Tiran. During the next few days we explored the British proposal fully with key Congressmen and with other interested governments.

I was scheduled to go to Canada on May 25 for United States Day at Expo '67. I held off the decision to go until the morning of the 25th, when intelligence reports indicated that I could be reasonably sure the Middle East would not explode while I was gone. As a result of the delay, the only explosion was in the White House press corps. The reporters resented being called on short notice early in the morning to go on a trip they insisted we had known about for two days. They did not realize that we

* British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

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were in the middle of a fast-moving crisis and that it was impossible to have firm plans. Nor could we tell them.

On the evening of May 26 I met with Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who had just flown to Washington. Our conversation was direct and frank. Eban said that according to Israeli intelligence, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was preparing an all-out attack. I asked Secretary McNamara, who was present, to give Mr. Eban a summary of our findings. Three separate intelligence groups had looked carefully into the matter. McNamara said, and it was our best judgment that a UAR attack was not imminent. "All of our intelligence people are unanimous," I added, "that if the UAR attacks, you will whip hell out of them."

Eban asked what the United States was willing to do to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open. I reminded him that I had defined our position on May 23. We were hard at work on what to do to assure free access, and when to do it. "You can assure the Israeli Cabinet," I said, "we will pursue vigorously any and all possible measures to keep the strait open."

I pointed out that we had to try to work through the United Nations first. "If it should become apparent that the UN is ineffective," I said, "then Israel and her friends, including the United States, who are willing to stand up and be counted can give specific indication of what they can do."

I told him that I saw some hope in the plan for an international naval force in the strait area, but that before such a proposal could be effective I had to be sure Congress was on board. "I am fully aware of what three past Presidents have said," I told Eban, "but that is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress do not support the President." I knew from bitter experience that the situation would be worse if the Congress started out supporting Israel and then found excuses to turn tail and run if the going got rough. Some Senators who had been in the vanguard with me on Southeast Asia were already looking for a storm cellar, and I did not want a repetition of this faintheartedness in the Middle East.

State Department officials were working hard to win support for the British plan from other governments. I urged Israel to concentrate its efforts on that diplomatic task.

Abba Eban is an intelligent and sensitive man. I wanted him to understand the U.S. position fully and clearly, and to communicate what I said to his government. "The central point, Mr. Minister," I told him, "is that your nation not be the one to bear the responsibility for any outbreak of war." Then I said very slowly and very positively: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone."

He was quiet, and I repeated the statement once more. Toward the end of the session, choosing his words carefully, Eban asked: "I would not be wrong if I told the Prime Minister that your disposition is to make