However, wherever I have been, they say "op immediate coming through". Sometimes several times a minute - they still say it - they try.

Q. The point I am seeking, Captain, relates to the order in which these messages could expect attention by the individual who would first address himself to it after it left the machanical and electrical machines in order to first identify, in this case, an error in routing indicator.

A. The basic rule of communicators is "first in, first out by precedence". Thus, if there were twenty op immediates in process and the 21st came in, it would wait its turn and then move along.

Q. Does my recollection serve me correctly Captain, that during the period of time under consideration, the days preceding, and immediately following, the LIBERTY's attack, the circuits were relatively well choked; or perhaps that is an over-statement with FBIS intercepts and similar traffic transmitted at a very high precedence?

A. We were very busy with traffic of that nature, particularly with FBIS intercepts. All of which were at least op immediate. However, these conditions had little, if anything to do in directly causing the mis-routes.

Q. My point, Captain, is that a mis-routed message arriving - it seems to me would have to wait its turn to find the mis-route and identify it, is that correct?

A. You are correct, sir, it would wait its turn under the first in first out by precedence rule.

Q. My next question, Captain, relates to possible safeguards in the communications system wherein a message originated with a particular precedence and which experienced inordinate delay, what safeguards, if any are available for intermediate stations to raise the precedence where delays have been experienced up to the time of receipt where the delay is identified?

A. Here is where experience counts. An experienced communicator will notice this and do something about it. This is something you can't

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Q. Have you, in your career, had occasion to personally observe instances where precedences have been raised under such circumstances?

A. The assignment of a precedence is the responsibility of the originator, thus the communicators would not raise the precedence per se, however, depending on their experience, they could handle it in a manner as though it had a higher precedence; and this I have seen done often. For example, sir, in many cases there are either direct circuits or the NAVCOMOPNET available and messages can be sent over such circuits and taken out of competition with all other general traffic.

Q. Did Asmara, or does Asmara have such a NAVCOMOPNET?

A. Affirmative.

Q. I would gather then that the two critical messages in question did not enjoy this type of service, is that correct?

A. Certainly, the one message from COMSIXTHFLT was not routed over that circuit, it went over DCS circuits.

Q. Would the situation that we have just been discussing, Captain, come under the heading which you mentioned earlier, of lack of experience being a key to identifying a message that had been delayed, in this particular incident?

A. Possibly, sir, in the case of the COMSIXTHFLT message. This message was mis-routed by the Army's comm center in Asmara and sent to NAVCOMMISTA GREECE. The soldier who did the mis-route may have been inexperienced, or what have you, but then NAVCOMMISTA GREECE apparently was a little slow in getting this message back to Asmara and here experience might have been a factor. On the other hand, we know NAVCOMMISTA GREECE had been handling a lot of FDIS type messages and the delay could have been under the first in first out rule. Also, the NAVCOMMISTA GREECE personnel could have returned this message direct to NAVCOMMISTA ASMARA had the experience factor been present. Mind you, this business is surmised because I do not know the rate and enlistment time of the traffic handlers involved.

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relay stations, and centers involved to ascertain the reason for the delays experienced by the two messages under discussion.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The Court adjourned at 0250 hours, 11 June 1967, to be reconvened at the call of the President.

The President, Counsel to the Court and Reporter proceeded to Souda Bay, Crete and boarded USS LIBERTY at sea enroute to Malta. The Court met aboard LIBERTY at 0630 hours, 12 June 1967, but adjourned until arrival of LIBERTY at Malta to meet when full court.

-SECOND DAY-

At Malta, the hour 0755, the date 13 June 1967. This Court of Inquiry is now in session again. All persons connected with the Court who were present when the Court adjourned in London, England on 11 June 1967 are again present in Court except that the Assistant Counsel for the Court who is now present will be sworn.

The Assistant Counsel for the Court, Lieutenant Commander Allen Weingarten, U. S. Navy, was sworn.

Ensign David G. Lucas, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization, and present duty station.

A. Ensign David G. Lucas, First Lieutenant and Gunnery Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that this witness is being called out of order in order that he may be medically evacuated to a hospital ashore for removal of shrapnel from a face wound and eye injury and that he is experiencing considerable physical discomfort at this time.

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attack on the U. S. Naval vessel, USS LIBERTY, whichoccurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the court the circumstances of that incident that you recall?

A. Yes sir. We had a general quarters drill which secured shortly prior to 1400. After securing from the drill I came to the wardroom and was in the presence of Lieutenant Golden and Ensign Scott. Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we heard the word passed over the 1MC to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after that word was passed we heard what sounded like a very loud thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half jumped from our seats, we looked at each other, and both thought that the motor whaleboat had fallen from its davit onto the deck. We went to the closest porthole, pulled the curtains, and did see some dust and black smoke rising. It was at this time that the general quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew that we had been attacked. I went into the passageway outside the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the starboard side of the main deck and from there used the ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon arriving on the bridge I got my battle helmet and my life jacket from the starboard gear locker and was just getting ready to go to my general quarters station which is on the 04 level, the flying bridge. We were hit by what I assumed to be the second pass of aircraft. Another man was next to me. I think he was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three or four shells hit in our area. After that shelling had ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure it was too safe to go to the 04 level at that time. Another pass was made and everyone in the pilothouse hit the deck. When I did enter the pilothouse, the officer of the deck for general quarters, LT O'CONNOR, had already been injured and had been carried into CIC, which is just aft of the pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general quarters, LT EWING, was lying in the after portion of the

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of several phone talkers and a third class quartermaster, BROWN, was at the helm, which was his general quarters station. I left the pilothouse, came to the wardroom to learn the condition of LT O'CONNOR and LT ENNIS. Came down the ladder in the superstructure. When I got to the 02 level, the men were carrying the Executive Officer, LCDR ARMSTRONG, down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the time I saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale, and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNIS had gotten partially down - they were having difficulty carrying him down and he was in the passageway outside his stateroom, waiting for attention to his leg. I came into the wardroom and there were at least half a dozen casualties in there being treated. Several of the enlisted men had been in the spaces forward of the superstructure, in the IC shop and the emergency diesel room. These areas had been shelled very heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was not functioning either. I left the wardroom area. Somehow we received word that there was a fire burning on the 01 level, port side. It was in the vicinity where two 55 gallon drums of P-250 fuel was stored. Some enlisted men in the passageways got a hose and were putting out the fire. The fire had spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life rafts were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the exact amount of time that I did spend in the superstructure area. When I was in the passageways, I hear we did receive some more shelling. I returned to the bridge. To the best of my knowledge, when I did return to the bridge, the only people present were the Commanding Officer, one phone talker, who was lying on the deck in the chart room, quartermaster BROWN on the helm and myself. Before I went back to the bridge, we had received word over the phones that were working, we had very little communications as such, the 1MC was hit and not functioning. The only communications we had were via sound-powered phones. We had

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The torpedo hit and it seemed like within a matter of seconds we had a ten degree starboard list. Shortly after that the Commanding Officer called me to the starboard wing, asked me to get some glasses to try to help him identify the patrol craft. He had been using his binoculars and was also taking photographs of the aircraft and of the three patrol craft. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. I was able to read the hull number on one patrol craft as it passed abeam to starboard, going in exactly the opposite direction that we were going, and it was at this time I told the Commanding Officer what the number was. He said, "log it." Which I did, in the quartermasters notebook. At that time, there was no quartermaster available. This was the first entry that I made in the log. I continued to make entries for approximately the next 45 minutes. There were still just the four people on the bridge. This was the Commanding Officer, third class quartermaster BROWN on the helm, and seaman LAMAR on the sound-powered phones, and myself. The Captain warned us to take cover, the shelling started again. Everyone took cover as best we could. There were shells, or fragments of shells, flying in through the starboard hatch, which no one had been able to secure. A quartermaster, when these shells started flying, stepped back from the helm to get as much protection from the corner of the chart room as possible. He still had his hand, one hand on the wheel. I was two paces to his left, and two paces behind him. A fragment hit him, I think from behind. It must have come through the bulkhead in the chart room. He let out a gasp, fell backwards into the chart room, and within, say a minute, was dead. I grabbed the helm, noticed that I had no power at all, the gyro repeater was not functioning, the rudder angle indicator was not functioning. None of the instruments there were working. We had been attempting to get away from the area as fast as

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talker to contact after steering and shifted control to after steering. Even after control was shifted, the people back there were having a difficult time. I think to start with, they were steering by hand. There was some firing from the patrol boats. They had periodically fired at us. There was now a lull in the firing. And yet, it sounded as if the man at mount 53, this would be the 01 level starboard side aft of the pilothouse, it sounded as if they were firing at the patrol craft who at that time were within a thousand yards at an approximate relative bearing of 120. The Commanding Officer was on the starboard wing and had these patrol craft in view. He ordered me to tell the men on mount 53 to cease firing. A fire had started at this time on the starboard side. The hit had occurred somewhere in the vicinity of the bridge. The flames had gone back to the motor whaleboat, and it was burning rapidly at that time. I could not see mount 53 from the starboard side. I went out the port hatch. The first thing I noticed was mount 54 was vacant. The flames from the lifecraft and the F-250 fuel had reached mount 54 and cleared everyone out of there. I ran back to mount 54, looked over the skylight from the engineering spaces. Had a clear view of mount 53 from, say the waist level up, and there was no one on mount 53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were in the gun, or bullets that were in a ready service ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and firing. I ran back, reported to the Commanding Officer, that there was no one firing from mount 53, that the flames must be causing the bullets to cook off. Mount 51 and 52 on the forecastle had been long silent by this time. Many of the men, there were three assigned to each mount, many of the men were killed on the first strafing attack. When I first did look forward at the mounts, there was one man cut in half on mount 51, and it

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fire, which he did. I can recall no further firing from either side after that time. The Commanding Officer hollered "cease fire", and it was approximately at this time the patrol craft were bearing approximately 160 relative. One of them was trying to signal us. The smoke from the motor whaleboat almost completely obscured the patrol craft from us. There was a second class signalman, DAVID, on the starboard wing. None of us were able to determine what the signaling was - the smoke was too intense. Shortly after that, another patrol craft approached us from the starboard side and did manage to get clear of the smoke. The signalman took the message, "Do you need help?". The Commanding Officer told signalman DAVID to give a negative reply. We still did not know the identity of the patrol craft itself other than the fact that we had gotten the hull number earlier. This appeared to be one of the same three boats that had attacked us earlier. The patrol craft then appeared to rendezvous at two to three thousand yards astern of us, a relative bearing of 200. A helicopter was sighted, and then a second helicopter. Signalman DAVID who is very knowledgeable on aircraft and who had also been looking at Janes Aircraft several days prior to the attack, stated, "those aren't ours, they're Russian made, Sikorsky models". One of the helos came close to the port wing, came down to our level, and we tried to communicate with each other, but had no success. I was told to go to the forecastle to see if I could aid in a sling drop. It appeared as if they wanted to lower someone on the ship. We still could not get our signals straight. When I did get on the forecastle, I saw the Commanding Officer waving his arms in a negative sign. We waved the helicopter away from the area of the forecastle. It went back to the port wing again. Eventually, someone in the helo wrapped up a package of some sort and threw it to the people on the bridge. To the

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not the numbers of both helicopters in the quartermasters log. They were either "04 or D4" and "08 or D8". There also appeared to be a "Star of David" on the side of the helo. The helo was waved away shortly after the calling card was thrown over. We saw no more of the helos. Now it was the matter of still trying to get the ship out of the area. We had no idea whether we would be attacked again or not. The list had held steady at approximately ten degrees. After steering was able to keep us on somewhat of a northerly course, although we were weaving anywhere from 30 to 40 degrees either side of our chosen magnetic course of 000. I was getting the rudder angles to steer for awhile called back to after steering and then the Commanding Officer was giving them after that. The Commanding Officer had been injured in his right leg on what must have been the first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The Captain had been administered first aid and he had a belt tourniquet around his leg. He insisted on being everywhere that he could. He was on both wings, in and out of the pilothouse, taking pictures. I believe at the time I was giving orders to after steering the bleeding had started again on the Captain's leg wound. I'm just theorizing that the shell fragment that was lodged in the leg had been discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman, and the Captain was stretched out on the port wing, being administered first aid. He was still calling orders in to me to relay on to after steering. Bleeding did stop and the Commanding Officer once again was, well, this time he was placed in his chair on the port wing. He gave orders there for quite awhile. It was also a matter of identification. We, ourselves, were asking the question, "Who made the attacks?", "And why?". There was a time when I was in the

Things quieted down somewhat at this time. We still had no indication if we were still under attack or not. I know that there were several times later in the afternoon and early evening that we did take cover at the order of the Commanding Officer when some aircraft did approach at a distance. We were still doing the best we could to head dun North. We still had considerable deviation from the base course. I can't recall what speed we finally did attain. I think we tried to make turns for 8 knots, and found it too difficult at that speed to hold the course, and dropped back to all ahead 1/3. We had main control make turns for five knots. There were several times when we were almost dead in the water. Believe that just before or just after the torpedo attack we had no turns. Another time that I can recall that lube oil suction was lost. Both boilers were on the line. We had to wait until that situation was corrected. Seems as if there were several other occasions when it was not possible to get power. After the attack from the patrol boats had stopped, and before we had steadied up, or successfully steadied up on an approximate course of 000, I was checking the fathometer, which was the only piece of equipment on the bridge that I know was functioning and it was only functioning on the 100 fathom scale at the time. Our readings started decreasing rapidly. Commanding Officer ordered me to go to the forecastle, get some men and to standby to let go an anchor. We proceeded to the forecastle, had the starboard anchor ready for letting go, the bridge said "make the port anchor ready". We were trying to pick up the chain stopper, but the pelican hook was up almost against the stopper and we could not raise the stopper. I grabbed a bar of some kind, another man grabbed a sledge and we were pounding at the stopper to try to raise it. We received an order from the bridge that was shouted to us from the Commanding Officer to let go the port anchor, and we could not let go the port anchor. We finally pried the stopper up, this was maybe a minute later, the ship was backing down at that time all back 1/3. The readings were increasing, the fathometer readings. We received an order not to let go the port anchor. After backing down,

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getting a sufficient depth under the keel, we then came around to our northerly course again. After we got on our northerly course, the Commanding Officer came in to his chair inside the pilothouse and gave all orders to after steering. Later, this would have been perhaps 1800 or so, steering was shifted from after steering back to the bridge.

Rear Admiral KIDD:

Q. I'd like to interrupt and ask you a question at this point. Was the Commanding Officer on the bridge all this time?

A. The Commanding Officer never left the bridge, was there from the time GQ was sounded. Perhaps he had stayed there since the drill had secured. He did not leave the bridge until, I'd say 0400 the following morning to make a head call. He made two or three head calls in the course of the morning, but he did not leave the bridge until the DAVIS was alongside the following morning at 0700, on the morning of 10 June. We weren't positive that our magnetic compass was responding correctly. Every now and then the Commanding Officer would go out on the wing and would make minor course adjustments by sighting the North Star. Sometime after sunset, a message was delivered to the bridge from radio central and it stated that the attack had in fact been made by Israeli forces and that they had extended their apologies. Prior to this message, we had received word from the Sixth Fleet that help was on the way. I believe, initially, they just said, "help". Later on we learned that two destroyers were coming to rendezvous with us. During the night, as I said previously the Commanding Officer left the bridge only to make a head call and all during the evening, night, and following morning, until the arrival of the DAVIS, there was an officer with him at all times. Either LT BENNETT, LTJG PAINTER, or myself.

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. To your knowledge, was the Commanding Officer requested to leave the bridge by the doctor in order to obtain medical attention?

A. I didn't hear the order, it's quite possible, but it would have taken ten people the doctor's size to even begin to get him off the bridge.

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Q. How would you describe his reaction to his injuries?

A. He was in great pain, there were several times when he was still walking around, but it was obvious he was in great pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At several times felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he started to get dizzy, he would turn to me, or if Mr. BENNETT or Mr. PAINTER were there, he would say this is what course we're on, what speed to make. He would give instructions.

Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat, did you observe the Captain when he was initially wounded.

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And he continued on in this condition without stopping for assistance by medical?

A. That is correct. It was quite awhile before he did slow down enough to have the belt tourniquet put on the leg. I assisted with that. I used my belt, and after that a corpsman came up just long enough to adjust the tourniquet and take a look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want any further medical attention and he did not receive any more until the bleeding started a second time, when I think the shell fragment was worked loose.

Q. What period of time had elapsed?

A. Over an hour. I can't say for sure, but it had been at least an hour. How he managed to stay up on the bridge and keep on his feet, to keep the cool head the way that he did, is beyond me. He was giving orders to us in the pilothouse, he was taking photographs of the aircraft, the patrol craft, attempting to identify them with his binoculars, giving orders to the gun mounts when they were still manned, was directing the fire fighting parties, seemed like he was everywhere at one time. Also giving commands to get the ship out of the area, away from land as fast as we could.

Questions by Captain ATKINSON:

Q. Mr. LUCAS, approximately when did you receive word that the Israelis

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had attacked - about how long after the attack?

A. It was right around sunset.

Q. Until that time, you all felt you might be subject to re-attack?

A. That is correct.

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. At this point I would like to interrupt your narrative testimony in order to present this exhibit to the record. I have in my custody as Counsel for the Court, the quartermasters notebook, USS LIBERTY. I show you page 102 dated 8 June and ask you if this is the page you referred to when you testified to making entries in it?

A. That is the page, starting with the entry at the time 1446, and I continued making entries until 1655.

Q. Let the record also show that page 102 is considerably splattered with what appears to be blood.

A. It is.

I request the reporter to mark this exhibit number 6. At this time, the Counsel for the Court offers the quartermasters logbook into evidence, a true copy thereof will be substituted in its place.

Q. Will you please read this first entry?

A. "1446, one gunboat tentatively identified as number 206-17." And this was seen by both the Commanding Officer and myself from the starboard wing. I mentioned earlier, the patrol craft was going exactly the opposite direction that we were. This number was read when it was abeam to starboard at approximately 500 yards.

Counsel for the Court:

It is requested that the Court note page 138 of Janes Fighting Ships for 1966, which has Israli vessels described on that page 138. I will now ask the witness to identify the patrol craft on page 138, and ask if it is similar to the one he saw?

A. The patrol craft here, TIBERIAS, appears to be the exact same one that I identified. If I had had a camera and taken a picture of it, I would have gotten the same angle, same presentation, as is present here in this photograph. There is one slight difference, there is no dash between the first three and the last two digits, and what I thought to be 17,

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I found out later from Mr. [redacted], when I examined this book, that it was an Israeli symbol that looks like a 17, but is connected by a horizontal line at the bottom. It's quite possible that, well I know that, it was difficult to read the number, not because of the distance, but because of the bow wake coming over and obscuring the numbers.

Council for the Court: I will now ask the court members if they have any questions on the exhibits that have been introduced.

Captain ATKINSON:

Q. You say communications were bad. What communications were you referring to?

A. I don't know much about the communications or research setup at all.

Q. This is not the bridge communications?

A. That is correct. I believe that was outgoing communications from the transmitter room.

Q. Were there voice communications passed to the bridge?

A. Not from radio central. We had communications with main control, damage control central and after steering.

Q. In radio communications, do you know where the hicom net is?

A. We knew nothing of what was going on. All messages, outgoing and incoming were hand carried up to the bridge from the radio central personnel. We had been receiving, monitoring Sixth Fleet communications several days prior to the attack, but during the attack the only way we could get hold of somebody was after transmitter room and everything that was sent out or received came up to the bridge via handed message.

Q. Do you know specifically what circuits were being monitored when you said you were monitoring Sixth Fleet communications before the attack?

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A. I don't know the call signs of the ships involved or still on the status board in the pilothouse, I can't recall.

Q. You mentioned that there were fathometer readings decreasing. Where were you getting this information from?

A. The only fathometer that was working was in CIC, just aft of the pilothouse, and at that time it was only working on the 100 fathom scale.

Q. Do you recall the depth?

A. I believe they rapidly approached the middle teens. You see, we had no radar. This was knocked out, evidently, on the first air pass. We had to DR from our last fix to give an approximate 1400Z position. We included that position in the message requiring assistance.

Q. Were you in sight of land at about the time of the pass?

A. Yes, we were, After dinner, as is customary on here, we often go to the 01 level forward on deck chairs to soak up some sun.

Q. Excuse me, you mean noonday?

A. Noon. There were six officers on the 01 level forward until turn to at 1300. There was smoke visible from land off the port side and also during the general quarters drill. When I was on the 04 level more smoke was visible and the land itself was barely visible. This was through the telescope or high powered binoculars on the 04 level.

Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you mention shelling, what did you intend to convey by the word "shelling"?

A. The first hit, the first noise that LT GOLDEN and I heard when we were in the wardroom was obviously a heavy hit. I assumed this was aircraft and it sounded to us as if it hit on the starboard side. Like I said, we thought it was the motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the deck. I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge. This again, I would say was aircraft cause there was a whistling sound several seconds before the actual burst and noise itself came. After I had gone inside the pilot house and was on the deck, there was another series of whistling sounds preceding the hits. Here again, I assume it was aircraft. When I had

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come down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting the hose to fight the fire on the port side, there were more easily discernable whistling sounds, even in the passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two men who were handling the hose were keeping an eye out for aircraft. They would put out the fire until another plane came over and then they ducked back inside.

Q. Did the motor torpedo boats fire on you with ordnance other than torpedoes?

A. Yes, they did. This we could easily hear. I can recall it coming from the starboard side on several occasions. At the time quartermaster BROWN was on the helm, the fragment that caught him came from the starboard side and I can't be sure if it was from the gun boats or from our own shells baking off. I'm pretty sure it was from the gun boats. And there were several other occasions of obvious shelling from the torpedo or motor boats themselves.

Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were involved?

A. I did not actually see any of the aircraft. There were definitely three motor boats.

Q. Are you the Gunnery Officer?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. Do the surface lookouts come under your glance at general quarters?

A. There, at general quarters the lookouts are on the 04 level. The actual lookout training was done by the Navigator or another member of the Operations Department. They had received refresher training, this was sometime since we left Rota on the 2nd of June, and had been refreshed on reporting all surface contacts to include relative bearing, approximate range, and target angle. Had also been given refreshers on reporting aircraft properly, on elevation, what angle, other factors pertaining to properly reporting all surface and air contacts to the officer of the deck. This had been stressed heavily in the first week in June, before we did reach our operating area.

Q. Was their method of reporting via sound-powered telephone?

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A. When we were normally steaming at our modified condition three, the lookouts were on the port and starboard wings, so it was just a matter of shouting into the officer of the deck directly. We had stationed, or had one man in each of the two forward gun mounts. We had ammunition at the guns, but not actually in the breech. Those two men had sound-powered phones on. We could call them from the bridge anytime, but for them to call us on the circuit, they would blow a whistle and we would pick up the phone on the bridge. I can't recall what circuit it was, but at a toot of a whistle they could have someone on the bridge alerted to ~~pick up the phone and train~~ [illegible].

Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did you receive any lookout reports via sound-powered telephone?

A. During the attack?

Q. During the attack.

A. When I got up to the bridge, as I said I did not get to the 04 level which was my general quarters station. During general quarters, the two air lookouts were on the 04 level, but they had not made it up there either. I cannot recall seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge when I got there. The shelling from the aircraft had either injured them, or they had taken cover inside the pilothouse.

Q. During, and after the attack, did you have sound-powered communications with your gun mounts?

A. To the best of my knowledge, we never had contact with the gun mounts. Let me explain the connection there. My general quarters station is on the 04 level at gunnery control. To get an order to the gun mount, it was easier for the bridge to call a phone talker stationed on the 04 level. He in turn would convey the message to a second phone talker who had communications will all of the mounts. No direct communications from the mounts themselves to the pilothouse, and since no one was able to be on the 04 level, there was no direct communications. At one time, while the torpedo boats were firing at us, my man in charge of mount 53, seaman QUINTERO, hollered to me, "should I fire back?", and I gave him an

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affirmative on that. This was before he and the other men in mount 53 had been chased away by the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat, on the forward mounts. I said we had no communications up there. My third class gunner's mate, THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and to the members of repair two, which is located directly beneath mount 51, said that petty officer THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ sounded. He was below decks. His station is with me on the 04 level. Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up there. He went to the closest gun and from the account given by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got off half - box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow missed him on the first strafing attack. Several witnesses said that he had the aircraft under fire while it was circling for the second pass and it was during the second pass that he was cut in half by a rocket, but he had the aircraft under fire and got off at least half a box of 50 caliber ammo.

Q. Do you recall how long the Ensign was down?

A. I cannot recall for sure. From the first air attack, the radar was made inoperative, the antenna on the mainmast was damaged, obviously on the first air pass and the Ensign would be flying just below it and just aft of it. Evidently, the shelling that got the radarscope, well it could have very possibly severed the halyard lines at that time. I do not recall when the Commanding Officer saw the Ensign on the deck and told someone to pick it up, but I do recall going out on the starboard wing, looking up and seeing that there was an Ensign flying.

Q. Do you remember the time frame when you looked and saw the Ensign flying, was it during the surface or the air attack?

A. I can't set an exact time on it. I do believe that I recall that at this time the patrol craft was off our starboard side at an approximate bearing of 120. It seems to me that this might have been around the time when I investigated the firing coming from mount 53 and found it was bullets cooking off as opposed to men being there actually firing.

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Q. Did you look and see the Ensign flying before the torpedo hit, or was it after?

A. I cannot honestly recall whether it was before or after.

Q. When did you receive your injuries?

A. As soon as I had gotten to the bridge and put on the battle helmet, I mentioned what I assumed were rockets from the aircraft hit in the immediate vicinity. I hit the deck and picked up several pieces of shrapnel in my left arm. One of them was bleeding enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped it around my arm. The piece of fragment that hit me in the head occurred much later, after I had been to the wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after the quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The commanding Officer came from the port wing into the pilothouse, and he said "standby for another attack". I don't recall if it was surface, air, or torpedo. He said "take cover". I heard some firing, some ricocheting off the starboard side. I assumed it was from the patrol craft. I was in the rear portion of the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the water fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back when I felt something hit me just to the right of my right eye and it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off the sleeve of my shirt, put it over the wound and just continued on from there.

Q. When did you receive treatment for your wounds?

A. I didn't know that I had any metal in me, as such, the bleeding had stopped on the arm and also on my head. I had no pain. I would guess the first time that I was looked at was on the 10th of June. I went back to sickbay. The night before I had a little bit of swelling, so went back to have the doctor have a look at it. This was just the head injury. He took an xray and did find that there was a chunk of metal in there. I believe he said it was lodged between a muscle that controls the jaw, a vein, and the tear duct or tear gland.

Q. Do you recall that the patrol boats strafed the ship after the torpedo attack, and if so, how many times?

A. Sir, I cannot honestly answer that.

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Q. Let me put the question a little bit differently - earlier in your statement you observed that the patrol boats were attempting to communicate with flashing light?

A. This was definitely after the torpedo attack.

Q. The flashing lights from the boats were after the torpedo attack?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. I also understood from you that the ship was unable to respond to the flashing lights from the boats?

A. To the first signalling, that is affirmative, because of the smoke that was between the patrol craft and us.

Q. And I believe, also, the starboard wing 24-inch searchlight had been shot away earlier in the action. Is that not correct?

A. The only signalling light we had available was a small portable light, the face of which was approximately six inches in diameter.

Q. I believe that is called an Altis lamp and the intensity of that light, from personal knowledge, would probably be completely inadequate to penetrate the smoke?

A. Yes sir. All power to all of the other lights was off. Even if it had been on, there was only one operative light on either the 03 or 04 level. The only one that had not been hit.

Q. To the best of your recollection, after the motor torpedo boats signalled, were there any further attacks from them?

A. No, there were not. After this first signalling, I don't believe so. After they signalled "do you need help?", and we answered in the negative, I am positive there were no more attacks after that time.

Q. With regard to the signal from the torpedo boats, when did you first observe the signalling, with respect to the torpedo attack?

A. The first signalling that I observed was the unsuccessful attempts to determine what they were signalling us, and of course, we did not have a chance to answer back to them. This was after the torpedo attacks. The only other signalling that I recall seeing is when we did successfully receive their message and sent a negative answer to it.

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Q. Mr. LUCAS, did you bring with you any examples of ordnance or shrapnel recovered aboard USS LIBERTY subsequent to the attack?

A. With the exception of one fragment that was located this morning, the remainder of these fragments and shells were brought up to the pilothouse in the course of the evening and the following morning after the attack. These were turned in by various personnel throughout the ship. Several of these have been turned in since the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th.

Counsel for the Court: At this time it is requested that these examples be marked exhibit #1, that they be introduced into evidence and copies of photographs be made for record purposes.

President: Let the record also show that these fragments are but a cross-sectional sample of the type of bullets and shrapnel which "holed" the ship.

President:

Q. A question if you please - would you be kind enough to expand on the performance of duty of a young man mentioned earlier in your testimony, named LARKINS?

A. Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54, 03 level, port side, as his general quarters station. He was on that mount, and stayed on that mount, until the fire coming from the 01 level chased him away. He did recall seeing a plane approaching from the port side and lobbing a cylinder that was attached under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet long, approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder approached the 01 level port side in an end over end fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he climbed over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the gun crew there until the fire from the motor whaleboat drove all people away from that mount. I later personally saw him helping to extinguish the fire on the port side and still later, he, by himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer.

President: No further questions - before you leave to go to the hospital, the Court would like to express itself with a feeling of great pride to

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be associated with the service's uniform you wear, young man, and we thank you very much for your cooperation and fine testimony.

Mr. LUCAS: Thank you, Admiral.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The Court recessed at 1045 hours, 14 June 1967 from taking further testimony in order to examine exhibits received by the Board.

The Court opened at 1300 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in court.

Commander William L. McConagle, U. S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and present duty station.

A. Commander William L. McConagle, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that although the witness is experiencing considerable pain from shrapnel wounds in his leg, that he willingly appeared at this hearing.

Q. Captain McConagle, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed attack on the U. S. Naval vessel which you command, USS LIBERTY, which occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the Court the circumstances of that incident as you recall it?

A. At the time of the incident, LIBERTY was performing her mission in accordance with JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. At the time of the incident, the ship was operating under the operational control of Commander, U. S. Sixth Fleet. The ship had arrived in its assigned operating area on the morning of 8 June 1967 after having departed from Rota, Spain on 2 June 1967. The ship was steaming in international

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waters and was so at all times. A condition of readiness three modified was set. The condition three modified watch consisted of normal steaming watch with the exception that one man was stationed in the forward two 50 caliber machine guns 51 and 52. Lookouts on the bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and 54 in the event of surprise air or surface attack. Each machine gun had a box of ammunition attached to the machine gun with a round up to but not in the chamber of each mount. During the 0800 to 1200 watch on the morning of 8 June at about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship at about 10,000 feet three times at a distance of approximately two miles. It was not possible to identify any insignia on the aircraft and their identity remains unknown. A locating two report was submitted on this sighting. It is not known at this time whether the sighting report was transmitted from the ship or not. Records are not accessible at the time. It was also possible to see on the 8 to 12 watch in the morning the coastline of the Sinai peninsula. Aircraft activity of an apparent propeller patrol type flying at very low altitude and parallel to and over the coast in the vicinity of El Arish was noted. It is estimated that the altitude of this plane was approximately 500 feet. At no time did this plane approach the ship in any fashion. His distance remained approximately 12 to 15 miles. It was possible to visually sight the minaret which is quite conspicuous at El Arish. This was used as a navigational aide in determining the ship's position during the morning and afternoon of 8 June. It became visible at about 0930 and the ship's position was verified, and was within our established operating area. Radar ranges were taken on the nearest land on the same bearing as the minaret. The minaret was also identifiable by radar. There were no other conspicuous or outstanding navigational features in the area. At about 1056 in the morning of 8 June, an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. A locating three

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report was submitted. It is not known if this report was transmitted. This aircraft continued to return in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at 30 minute intervals. It was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown. This aircraft did not approach the ship in any provocative manner. It made no attempt to signal the ship. The ship made no attempt to signal the aircraft. At 1039B the Minaret at El Arish was bearing 180°T, 17 miles. At the time the ship was on a course of 253 at speed five knots. At 1132, the ship changed course to 283 true, speed five knots and was on this course and this speed at the time of the attack. At about 1310, 8 June, the ship went to general quarters for drill purposes to conduct training for a mandatory non-competitive exercise to exercise the crew in chemical attack procedures. The drill was performed in a satisfactory manner. Nearly all of the top-side personnel were exercised through the chemical decontamination station and were absent from their battle station for varying periods of time while performing this phase of the drill. After top-side personnel that had been designated to proceed through the decontamination station (these personnel were all gun crew personnel and secondary gun personnel) returned to their battle stations and the performance of the crew judged to be satisfactory the crew was released from battle drills at about 1350 and condition three modified was again set. At the commencement of the drill it was possible to see a large billowing cloud of black smoke rising from approximately 15 to 20 miles to the west of El Arish on the beach. The exact identity of the cause and the location of this explosion is not positively known, although it was believed to be near the beach in that area. This was noted at about 1300. At about 1330 a smaller cloud of black smoke was noted to the east of El Arish estimated five to six miles and also along the coastline. Before dismissing the crew from general drills, I gave the crew a short talk on the PA system, reminding them of the importance of expeditiously responding to general quarters and the setting of condition Zebra for drills and in the event

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of an actual attack. So that they would be impressed I pointed out to the crew at that time that the column of black smoke on the beach should be sufficient evidence that the ship was in a potentially dangerous location. I had no evidence or indication that an attack would actually be made on the ship at the time that statement was made to the crew. The statement was made to encourage them to get condition Zebra in a more expeditious manner than they had done for the drill held that afternoon. As I recall all battle stations were reported manned and ready within three minutes for the afternoon drill, but the report of condition Zebra had not been received on the bridge until about four minutes forty-five seconds after the drill commenced. This I considered to be excessive. After conducting general drills, it is my usual practice to go to the wardroom and have a cup of coffee and critique the drill with the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, the Engineering Officer, Lieutenant Golden, and the Damage Control Officer, Ensign Scott, if I have not been particularly satisfied with the drill. If the drill has been satisfactory, usually I contact the officers on an individual basis at some later time during the day and indicate to them that I was satisfied with the drill and point out some of the errors in which improvement could be made and point out also to them the things that I felt had been done properly. With the exception of the length of time that it took to get condition Zebra I was satisfied with the performance of the crew for the afternoon drill and did not assemble the above mentioned officers in the wardroom for a critique. After general quarters was over from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few minutes. As I recall, the following officers were present on the bridge: LCDR ARMSTRONG, LT ENNIS, LT O'CONNOR, who is normally officer of the deck during general quarters, LT TOTH, the Operations and Navigator, also Intelligence Officer. LTJG PAINTER came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume the watch as the officer of the deck. As he assumed the officer of the deck watch, he indicated that he was having difficulty in obtaining an accurate ship's fix. At that time, and the

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time was approximately 1400. I personally sighted the Minaret at El Arish to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5 miles. I do not know that this radar range can be verified from the records available at this time. I had also earlier in the day established a danger bearing on the Minaret at El Arish to be 119 degrees true from the ship. The danger bearing was established to insure that the ship remained clear of shoal areas to the south of the southwesternmost edge of our operating area. It was not known if the Minaret would still be visible when we approached the southwest corner of our operating area or not, but the danger bearing was established to be used if the Minaret was visible when the ship arrived at that location. At this point in the preparation of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's notebook. 12-1600 watch. Thursday, 8 June 1967. I referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected attack. The log shows that at 1355, LTJG PAINTER relieved LT O'CONNOR as officer of the deck. The log also shows that at 1355, ENS O'MALLEY, as junior officer of the deck under instruction assumed the con. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I shall relate in my own words and to the best of my knowledge and belief all events of which I have personal knowledge which occurred during that time frame. About 1400 the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135. Its position angle about 45 to 50 degrees. Its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this

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aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning furiously. It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'CONNOR was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. O'CONNOR and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead flank. Up to this time, the ship had one boiler on the line steaming at speed five knots. The other boiler was not on the line but pressure was being maintained in order to be able to respond to speeds in excess of that which is capable with one boiler, approximately 11 knots, should it be necessary. Earlier in the day, the Engineering Officer had requested permission to let number two boiler cool so that he could replace a steamline gasket. This permission had been granted and the boiler had started to cool from about 1200 on 8 June. I do not know whether the engine room acknowledged by the engine order telegraph the flank bell or not, but smoke immediately commenced coming out of the stack and I assumed that they did. It seemed to me that shortly there-

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I believe to have been LT BENNETT, to report to CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required. I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag or not. One helmsman was seriously injured in the starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by Quartermaster Third BROWN. I do not recall who had the helm at the time of the initial attack. The response of the crew to general quarters was very expeditious. I do not recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever arrived on station or not, but the public address system, the 21MC, and most sound powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial first or second of the total number of six to eight strafing attacks that occurred. It seemed to me that the attacks were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with each attack coming at approximately forty-five second to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a fire fighting party to put out the fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning furiously. It is estimated that the total air attack was completed in approximately five to six minutes. About midway during the attack, Ensign LUCAS was noted on the bridge and at that time he became my assistant and assisted me in every way possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the repair parties, to main control and other vital stations. Sometime after the starboard bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers right leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries. Shortly after this I opened the bridge safe and took out a camera which was maintained on the

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bridge to take pictures of foreign ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to the port wing of the bridge and there was able to take several pictures of the planes as they had passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort to obtain documentary evidence to establish the identity of the aircraft, I retained this camera in my possession throughout the remainder of the attack. Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which approached the ship after the attack was over. This film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for development and further disposition. On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this. In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course 283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during the air attack. It is believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats, the time was about 1420. The boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mount 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing

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Ensign from the yardarm. During the air attack, our normal Ensign was flying. Before the torpedo attack, a holiday size Ensign was hoisted. I [illegible] and knew at that I could [illegible] starboard. I did not have an accurate ship's position at this time, but I knew that to the left of the ship's course at that time lie shoal waters and by turning to the left I would be approaching land closer than had been given me in directives which I held in that instant in time. I realized that if I attempted to turn to starboard, I would expose a larger target to the torpedo boats. I elected to maintain a heading of 283 at maximum speed. When the boats reached an approximate range of 2,000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signalling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center torpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time, I yelled to machine gun 51 to tell him to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israli and the attack had been conducted in error. I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries. The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boats before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do. Instantly, on machine gun 51 opening fire machine gun 53 began firing at the center boat. From the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level, I observed that the fire from machine gun 53 was extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat. It was not possible to get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge. I sent Mr. LUCAS around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell QUINTERO, whom I believed to be the gunner on machine gun 53, to hold fire until we were able to clarify the situation. He reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53. As far

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were under fire from USS LIBERTY. At this time, they opened fire with their gun mounts and in a matter of seconds, one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time that this torpedo crossed the stern is believed to be about 1426. About 1427, without advance warning, the ship sustained a torpedo hit starboard side forward, immediately below the waterline in the vicinity of the coordination center. The ship immediately took a 9 degree list to starboard. Oil and debris were noted coming from the starboard side following the explosion. There was no major resultant fire from this explosion. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water. Steering control was lost. All power was lost. Immediately, I determined that the ship was in no danger of sinking and did not order the destruction of classified material and did not order any preparations to be made to abandon ship. It was my intention to ground the ship on shoal areas to the left of the ship's track to prevent its sinking, if necessary. I believed that, if the ship was in a sinking condition, we would not be able to reach sufficiently deep water to avoid recovery of classified material on board. Immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo, the torpedo boat stopped dead in the water and milled around astern of the ship at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signalled by flashing light, in English, "Do you require assistance"? We had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted code flag India. The signal intended to convey the fact that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty and that they should keep clear. Reports received from damage control central indicated the location of the torpedo hit and that flooding boundaries had been established and that the flooding was under control. During the strafing by the torpedo boats and immediately prior to being hit by the torpedo, quartermaster third [illegible], who was acting as helmsman at the time, was killed at his station. The mess decks were designated casualty collection station and casualties were taken to the

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crew able to assist. Following the torpedo hit, those personnal from the research area who were able to do so, left their stations. One of the torpedo boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. Pictures were taken of the torpedo boats prior to and subsequent to the attack. About 1515, two helicopters approached the ship and circled around and around the ship at a distance of about 100 yards. The ensignia the Star of David was clearly visible. Hull number on one of the helicopters was 04 or D4. The other had a hull number of 03 or D3. It was not known whether these helicopters intended to strafe the ship or not. However, they did not approach the ship in a hostile manner, but kept pointed parallel to the ship as they continued around and never made a direct approach as such. They were not taken under fire by Liberty, nor did they fire at us. The torpedo boats left the general area of the ship at about 1515. About 1537, after they had departed the ship and gone to a range of about five miles, they again headed toward the ship at high speed. Their intentions were unknown. At about this same time two unidentified jet aircraft were also noted approaching the ship from our starboard side, in similiar fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets disappeared from the scene. To further assist in identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted. Both boilers had been put back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this time is not known. About 1555, communications were restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing additional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the ship, was

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tourniquet being applied to my right leg at the thigh. A few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from loss of blood, and called for assistance of CT1 Carpenter to apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the con immediately upon the air attack and retained the con until rendezvous was effected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9 June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level. No bodies were noted in the area of ship following the explosion. Several life rafts, however, were released and placed into the water by various crew members whom I was unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene, and no fault can be found with their estimate, not having the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats might be needed at a later time, no additional lifeboats were placed in the water. Misinterpretation of the situation by personnel in combat following the order to prepare for torpedo attack to starboard also resulted in the ship's radar being purposely destroyed. Again, I find no fault with this action under the circumstances. At about 1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area without further signal or action. At this time, the ship was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being conducted from after steering. The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was made to steer and make good a course

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out. It was not known what the azimuth of the setting sun was, but this was used as a rough guide and it appeared that the magnetic compass had not been unduly affected. The ship's fathometer in combat was working following the attacks. At about 16½, the fathometer sounding reported approximately 26 fathoms under the keel. I realized at this point that the ship might be south of its track and could be approaching the shoal areas outside of our operating area. Since I was not positive of the ship's position, I ordered Mr. Lucas to round up as many personnel as he could, and proceed to the forecastle and standby to anchor. My intentions was to anchor until it became night so that I could visually sight the North Star to see whether the magnetic compass had been unduly affected or not. Once I was able to sight the North Star, then I would know in which direction the ship was actually proceeding. Mr. Lucas and personnel did go to the forecastle, and at one point I did order the port anchor to let go. But before the port anchor could be let go, I reversed my decision and backed all engines two-thirds to see if I could back clear of the apparent shoal area. I commenced backing the ship at about 1704 and continued backing until 1722, at which time the fathometer reading was approximately 48 fathoms under the keel. With the ship going ahead two-thirds and right full rudder we quickly came to a magnetic heading of about 330 magnetic and continued on to a heading of 023 magnetic about 1729. The ship was at this time making a speed of about 8 knots. At 1730, the ship lost lube oil to the main engines, and all engines were stopped. At 1731, the ship was on a heading of 022 magnetic with 50 fathoms of water under the keel. Lube oil pressure was regained to the main engines within a very short period of time, and the ship continued right to a magnetic heading of 040 at 1737, at which time 72 fathoms was indicated under the keel. At 1743, the ship's heading was 068 magnetic and 82 fathoms of water under the keel. At this time I considered the ship to have stood clear of the immediate danger of grounding and at 1748 increased speed to ten knots on a magnetic heading of 030. The ship remained at general

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quarters, and reports from damage control central were to the effect that all watertight boundary bulkheads were holding satisfactory. Dr. REITER, and the two corpsmen, were doing outstanding work in assisting injured crew members. They advised me from time to time of the number of casualties, the extent of injuries, and efforts being made. At 1750, a message was received from COMSIXTHFLT to the effect that escorts were on the way and that the ship was to proceed on a course of 340 magnetic at maximum speed until 100 miles from present position, then turn 270 magnetic. The ship attempted to carry out this directive. At 1757, COMSIXTHFLT advised that escorts were proceeding to rendezvous with us at maximum speed of destroyers. At 1841, an Israeli helicopter approached the ship and hovered at bridge level approximately 50 feet from the ship. They made various attempts to indicate by visual means that they wished to land a man on board. At one point, I considered granting the request, but considering the obstructions in the area of the forecastle, signalled a wavoff to them. Lettering on the tail of the helicopter was SA32K. On the fuselage were the numerals 06 or D6. At 1857, the helicopter dropped a message on the forecastle. The message was written on the back of a calling card, identified as Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attache for Air Embassy, USA. The message on the back read as follows: "Have you casualties". We attempted to advise them by flashing light with an Aldis lamp that, "affirmative", we did have casualties. It was evident that they were unable to understand what we were saying. After some ten to fifteen minutes of unsuccessful efforts to communicate between the helicopter and the ship, the helicopter departed from the area, at a time unknown, but as dusk was approaching the ship. Three musters were taken during the night to identify the dead, the seriously injured, and to determine those who were missing. It was believed that those initially reported as missing are entrapped in compartments in the forward part of the ship as a result of the torpedo explosion and resultant flooding. As of 1900,

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11 June, two of the persons previously reported missing, have been recovered. One by removing him directly from the space on board ship. The other was recovered by the PAPAGO, a Fleet tug steaming approximately six miles astern of the ship on the morning of 11 June. It is not known at this time whether any of the other individuals reported missing have drifted free of the space through the torpedo hole and vanished from the area. It will not be possible to determine until the ship has been drydocked and the compartment dewatered and remains recovered. Preparation of casualty messages were completed as expeditiously as possible upon the completion of the musters, and necessary message notifications sent.

The ship rendezvoused with the two destroyers on the morning of 9 June. Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve reported on board to inspect damage and confer with the Commanding Officer. Personnel from the USS DAVIS immediately boarded the ship to render assistance with damage control and treatment of injured personnel. I have no complaint to lodge against any officer or man on board USS LIBERTY for any acts of commission or omission during the attack and post attack phase. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for their courage, their devotion to duty, and their efforts to save the ship. As the result of my personal knowledge of the manner in which the following personnel performed their duties during the attack and post attack phase, I intend to commend Ensign LUCAS; Signalman DAVIS; Quartermaster Third BROWN; Lieutenant George GOLDEN, Engineering Officer; and Ensign SCOTT, Damage Control Assistant. I have requested the officers and the petty officers of the ship to advise me of any other individuals, who, to their personal knowledge, performed in such a manner as to warrant special recognition. I also intend to address a letter of appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Bill PETTYJOHN, Chief Staff Officer, COMDESRON TWELVE, for the outstanding manner in which he has assumed the responsibilities of assisting the Commanding Officer in sailing the ship from point of rendezvous to destination of Malta. A message of condolence from the ship has been sent to BUPERS with the request that it

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Washington 30 December 1964. The deployment initially commenced under the operational control of COMSERVRON EIGHT. The first port of call was Abidjan, Ivory Coast with a scheduled arrival of 22 May 1967. LIBERTY arrived at Abidjan, Ivory Coast on the scheduled date. LIBERTY was scheduled to spend four days in Abidjan, Ivory Coast to depart on 26 May 1967. The operation order was similar to that under which the LIBERTY had deployed on four previous occasions. On the morning of 24 May, approximately 0345Z, a message was received from COMSERVRON EIGHT with a dtg of 240020Z, May 67 in effect directing that LIBERTY get underway immediately and proceed to Rota, Spain for further operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Immediately upon receipt of this message, LIBERTY commenced preparations for getting underway. It was not possible to get underway, however, until about 0730 on the morning of 24 May 1967. The delay was due to awaiting for pilot, tug, and proper tide conditions for transit of the Vridi Canal. USS LIBERTY cleared the Vridi Canal approximately 0745, 24 May 1967, and set course via coastal route direct to Rota, Spain at best speed. An average of about 15 knots was maintained during the transit. During the transit from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Rota, Spain, operational control of LIBERTY was changed from COMSERVRON EIGHT to USCINCEUR. The reference for this operational control change is COMSERVRON EIGHT 300202Z May 1967. This reference is not immediately available to us. Operational control of LIBERTY was again shifted from USCINCEUR to CINCUSNAVEUR in accordance with USCINCEUR 300932Z May 1967. This change of operational control occurred as LIBERTY arrived at the sea buoy off the port of Rota, Spain at about 0930 local time, 1 June 1967. After completion of fueling, loading provisions, and accomplishing repairs to the special communications relay system (TRSCCOMM) the ship was RFS at about 1330, 2 June, and at that time got underway in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR move order 7-67, dtg of this move order was CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 311750Z May 67 modified by CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 011305Z June 1967. JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967 is considered pertinent in LIBERTY's schedule from the period 02 June until the time of the incident. This message gives departure date from Rota, route to

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follow, point to proceed to, and the operating area of Liberty during the period of 9 to 30 June 1967. Paragraph 1C of this message is particularly pertinent. At 0700012 June 1967, operational control of Liberty again changed from CINCUSNAVEUR to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 0613572 June 1967. This change of operational control was made by message in which Liberty indicated to COMSIXTHFLT that Liberty was reporting to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with the CINCUSNAVEUR message 0613572. This message also included Liberty endurance and provisions, dry, frozen, and chill. It indicated that the ship had on board approximately 85% fuel and utilized approximately 1% fuel per day while on station. The message also indicated that Liberty self-defense capability was limited to four 50 caliber machine guns. The dtg of this message is 0620362 June 67. USS Liberty was operating under the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at the time of the incident. No additional messages were in hand onboard Liberty concerning area of operation or other guidance for the performance of our mission than previously mentioned in the JCS message of 0115452 June 1967. COMSIXTHFLT message dtg 0809172 June 1967, which directed Liberty to proceed and operate within a 25 mile radius of 33.40 North, 32.30 East until further notice was not received until delivered by hand on 10 June 1967. Had this message been received anytime prior to the attack, Liberty would have attempted to open the range on the coast of the countries indicated in the message to at least be 100 miles specified. The existence of this message was not known by the Commanding Officer of the Liberty at the time of the incident and no action was taken to comply with it. During the four previous deployments of USS Liberty, the ship aroused unusual curiosity only during the first and second deployments. The configuration of the ship with unusual mast antennae arrangements and deckhouse structures caused, so I understand inasmuch as I was not on board as Commanding Officer at the time, some surveillance, primarily surface, from the Southwest African countries during its first two deployments. Lieutenant COLDEN, who was aboard at the time, may be

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able to provide the Board with additional details in this area. There are probably many reasons why the aircraft were unidentified. One reason would be that the distance, and the speed at which the aircraft flew, was such that it was extremely difficult to make out any distinguishing characteristics by personnel on board who do not normally observe any jet aircraft in the area of the ship's operation. The ship normally steams on independent duty along the West Coast of Africa. These countries do not have sophisticated air forces with the possible exception of Angola. Angola does have some jet aircraft but they have been noted to fly over the ship only on one occasion to the Commanding Officer's personal knowledge, while the ship was at anchor in Luanda Harbor. An occasional piper cub or helicopter working an oil rig along the coast and infrequently commercial jet aircraft is about the extent of air activity observed by personnel aboard LIBERTY. A recognition manual for Israeli, USR, aircraft and surface ships was not on board prior to proceeding to the area. General ship characteristic and plane characteristic recognition manuals are on board and were used to hold occasional recognition training sessions. These sessions were primarily devoted to ship recognition. It was not known whether any U.S. aircraft were in the area, but no known U.S. aircraft were sighted by anyone onboard at any time prior to or after the incident. On further recollection of the event involving machine gun 53 firing, the effectiveness of the firing leads me to believe that a person, whom I believe to be QUINTERO, Boatswain Mate Seaman, to have been on station at machine gun 53 and took the torpedo boats under fire. It is possible that he evacuated his station as a result of the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat prior to Ensign Lucas' arriving to determine who was on the mount. For clarification purposes, the 50 caliber machine guns that are onboard USS Liberty are Browning machine guns, M2, heavy barrel, with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. These machine guns are mounted on a pedestal and are aircooled weapons. Two men can effectively serve the gun. One as gunner, who uses

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an open sight; the other individual, the loader, who keeps ammunition up to the chamber. These machine guns are manually controlled. There is no director means of controlling the fire. The limiting stops for arc of fire of these weapons consist of piping, bent in a shape to prevent the gun barrel from being pointed at a direction which would harm the ship or any portion of its structure, and the outer edge of the gun tubs themselves which offer very limited splinter protection. The machine guns themselves do not have ~~any splinter~~ shields attached. These machine guns are not considered mounts in the normal Navy terminology of a mount. They should be considered more as pedestal mounted machine guns. The time gap in the Quartermasters notebook resulted from the fact that there were insufficient number of people in the bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events as they occurred and execute the orders of the Commanding Officer simultaneously. With communications to various stations limited various personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were used as messengers. At one time during this time frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were Quartermaster BROWN, who was on the helm, Ensign LUCAS, and Myself. Ensign LUCAS was busy relaying my instructions to the various battle stations. The smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present on the bridge throughout the entire incident and maintained his faculties at all times during the incident. At this time, I have related all of the events that are considered pertinent and should be brou to the attention of the Board of Inquiry. One additional fact, which should be noted by the board, is the fact that the chart used for plotting the ship's position and for laying out the operating area is identified as Portfolio A3239, Chart DC3924 Nov, Second Edition, September 30, 1963 (revised 5/4/64). This chart shows the approach to the operating area that the USS LIBERTY made, a diagonal transit from northwest to southeast. It lists point A, B, and C as the proposed southernmost limit of the operating area and the intended track of LIBERTY.

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Q. Captain, you mentioned in your testimony that a helicopter hovered over Liberty and that an object was dropped which you recovered. I show you this card, and ask you if you recognize it?

A. Yes sir, I do recognize this card. It is a calling card.

Counsel for the Court: I'd like to offer this into evidence as exhibit number 8, and to serve as identification, if there is no objection, I would like you to read it now?

A. I read from the card I now hold in my hand. It is a calling card from "Commander Earnest Carl Castle, United States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, Tel Aviv." This is on the face of the card. On the back of the card is written, "Have you casualties?" It's noted that this card is smeared with oil smudges on both sides.

Q. Thank you very much. You also mentioned in your testimony that you took a camera out of your bridge safe and were able to start to take some pictures. I show you developed pictures and ask you if you recognize them?

A. Yes, I recognize most of those pictures as having been taken by myself during the attack. Some had been taken by another individual unknown, but I do recognize the scenes depicted therein.

Q. Therefore, will you mark the back of the pictures for record purposes so that identification will be known? and I offer them in evidence as Exhibit 9.

A. Yes sir, I will mark them so that they, the scene or object depicted will be clearly indicated.

President: I'd like to, at this point ask the Captain -- did you not have wounded still lying about the deck at the time this helicopter was hovering over the ship?

A. Admiral, if you mean the helicopter which the attache was in, I'm not sure that the wounded were still lying around the deck, as such. By that time, most of our wounded had been taken to the casualty collection stations.

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But there were people that were wounded. Whether they were evident to the Naval Attache from his position in the helicopter I do not know. There were injured on deck, however.

Counsel for the Court: In amplification of the Admiral's question, was there not a considerable amount of blood on the decks that would be obvious from a reasonable distance?

A. That is correct. There were numerous blood streams the full length from the 01 level on the forecastle to the main deck, at machine gun mount 51, where one body was still lying. I do recall that now. With his head nearly completely shot away. As I recall now, there was also another body in the vicinity of mount 51. The seriously injured were cared for before those obviously beyond help were taken care of and removed from the place where they were hit.

Counsel for the Court: I'd also like to introduce in evidence at this point, separately from the chronological file of messages, DAO Tel Aviv 0321002, as Exhibit 10.

Counsel for the Court: You have in your custody, USS Liberty charts that were used on the day of 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: I request the recorder to mark such charts exhibits 11 and 12 and request photos be substituted in the record.

Counsel for the Court: Will you please read the information relative to this court?

A. From exhibit 12, this is a chart of the Mediterranean Sea from Antalya Korfezi to Alexandria including Cyprus. It is further identified by Chart No. BC3924 November, second edition, September 30, 1963, revised 3-4-64. This chart shows points A, B, and C. These three points limit the southern operating area in which Liberty intended to operate in carrying out the directives of the JCS message 0115452.

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Captain Luff: Do I understand those to be the southernmost limit of your operating area?

A. Those points represent a point greater, a distance from the beach, greater than that specified in the JCS message, but closely approximate those limits. The lines between point A, B, and C were the intended track of Liberty during the forenoon and afternoon watch of 8 June 1967. It was planned on arrival at point C to reverse course to the right and proceed again to point B, thence to point A, and continue a back and forth motion along these tracks during our entire stay in the operating area. It was planned to move point C to where longitude 33°E bisects the 100 fathom curve should it not be possible to obtain accurate fixes as the ship approached point C. The latitude and longitude of these points are as follows: Point A -- 31.27.2N 34.00E. This point is thirteen nautical miles from the nearest land. The coordinates of point B are: 31.22.3N 33.42E. This point is 14.6 nautical miles from nearest land. The coordinates of point C are: 31.3IN 33.00E. This point is 18 nautical miles from nearest land. Closest point of approach to nearest land on a line between points A and B is 13 nautical miles. The closest point of approach to nearest land between points B and C is 14.1 nautical miles. Verbal instructions to the officers of the deck were that the ship was not to be to the south of a line connecting those points at anytime. Exhibit number 12 is a chart. The course between point A and B is 253 true. The course between point B and C is 283 true.

Counsel of the Court: Do any of the members of the Court desire to question the witness?

No response.

Witness: Exhibit number 13 is a Mediterranean Sea chart of Egypt and coastline from Damietta to Alexish. This is further identified as chart No. 3973, seventh edition, March 1931, revised 2/3/64. This chart has on it the previously described points A, B, and C. It also has on it the danger

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bearing established on the conspicuous Hamarot at Alarish of 119 degrees true from the ship. The shoal areas of five fathoms or less are circled in red to easily call attention to their location.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you in your custody, a CIC log and the radar bearing book for USS Liberty?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 13 and the CIC log as exhibit number 14. I now offer these exhibits into evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Do any members of this Court desire to question the witness concerning the charts, exhibits 11 and 12, or the radar bearing book and the CIC log, exhibits 13 and 14.

No response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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Lieutenant Junior Grade Lloyd C. PAINTER, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank and organization?

A. Lloyd C. PAINTER, Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

Q. On 8 June 1967, at about 1400 hours, an incident occurred aboard USS LIBERTY in which the vessel was attacked. Would you please relate to this Court of Inquiry what you recall concerning that incident?

A. Yes sir. I was at this time, the officer of the deck. I had the 12 to 1600 watch that afternoon, and we had had a practice general quarters drill at 1300 and secured from that at approximately 1345, 1350. And during general quarters I left the bridge and went to my general quarters station, which is repair three, located on the mess decks. After this drill was over, I went back up to the bridge to relieve the watch, and when I came up to the bridge, I was

Q. What time was that?

A. Sir, I think it was 1350, thereabouts. I came back up to the bridge and relieved Mr. O'CONNOR who was the general quarters OOD, and assumed the watch. The first thing I was concerned with was getting a fix, and I remember distinctly checking the radar, and the nearest point of land on the radar at approximately 1355 was 17.5 miles. And I remember distinctly asking the Captain if I could come back to our base course, which I believe was set at about 14 and a half miles. We were about three miles outside of base course. About this time, it was around 1400, the Captain was on the starboard wing. He was watching some jet aircraft. The Captain was on the starboard wing, and he was looking up in the air at a couple of jet aircraft. He called me out there and said, "you'd better call the forward gun mounts." He said "I think they're going to attack," or words to that effect. So, I ran into the bridge area and tried to call the port and starboard gun mounts forward. I couldn't get them; I called them about three times, and about the third

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time I said, "bridge, gun mounts 51 and 52." They were hit. I can't testify exactly which one was hit first, port or starboard; they were both hit so fast. I believe the starboard one was hit first. At this time, I still had the phone in my hand, I was looking through the porthole at the gun mounts. I was looking through the porthole when I was trying to contact those two kids, and I saw them both; well, I didn't exactly see them as such. They were blown apart, but I saw the whole area go up in smoke and scattered metal. And, at about the same time the aircraft strafed the bridge area itself. The quartermaster, quartermaster third class POLLARD was standing right next to me, and he was hit, evidently with flying glass from the porthole. I don't know why I came out without a scratch. I was standing, as I said, right next to him. Finally, about this time they started strafing and we both hit the deck, as well as Mr. O'MALLEY, who was my JOOD at the time. As soon as the first strafing raid had been made, we sounded general quarters alarm. The Captain was on the bridge, he was in the pilot house at this time. I don't know whether he was hit then or not, I can't remember. It was so smokey. I took off for my general quarters station, which, as I said before, was repair three on the mess decks. On the way down I was running as fast as I could. By the time I got to the Chief's Lounge, the entrance through the lounge to the mess decks, I saw SPICER, our postal clerk, lying there cut in half with strafing and the hospital corpsman was applying mouth to mouth resuscitation. This I later found out failed. He died right there. Well, anyway, I got down to the mess decks and all my men were assembling there as fast as possible. They went to full battle dress, and so did I. I can't recall exactly how long we were waiting for the strafing raids to be over, but I believe it was approximately 20 minutes. At this time someone, I believe it was one of the quartermasters, came down and called me to the bridge. He said, "the Captain's hurt and the operations officer was dead, and the executive officer was mortally wounded." I ran up to the bridge. And when I got up there, the Captain was laying on the stretcher up there while trying to get underway. He thought for a while I think, I'm not sure, that he would pass out, and he wanted somebody up there to take over. He wanted somebody up there in case

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he did. I'm not sure, but I think that is why he had called me up there. I don't know whether he called me up there, or the quartermaster just took it on his own to get me up there. I never found out. So, I was up there for a few minutes and it looked like the strafing raids were over, and some of the people were coming out and looking around and my repair chief had come out to assess some of the damage. When I saw him on the 01 level aft, I told him to take over Repair Three as I would be on the bridge. Well, by this time, the Captain had regained consciousness and told me that I would best be needed in Repair Three.

Q. Was that the Captain?

A. Yes sir.

So I left and went back to Repair Three, and, I don't know how long, time was slipping by so fast at this time, after that we had our first torpedo attack. It came over, well the IMC was out, it came over the sound powered phones, "Prepare for torpedo attack starboard side."

So, we prepared for a torpedo attack starboard side, which we received in midships. I can't say exactly what time it was, maybe 1435.

Well, the ship at this time as soon as the torpedo hit midships, we began to develop a starboard list very quickly. So quickly that I felt as though we were probably going to lose it. At this time, the DC central passed the word to prepare to abandon ship. We then filed out to our life rafts which were no longer with us because they had been strafed and most of them were burned, so we knocked most of them over the side. At this time the torpedo boats, three of them, that had torpedoed us, were laying off, waiting for us to sink, I believe. Anyway, they didn't come near us at this time. However, we were able to maintain the ship and stablize it. It didn't sink. So the Captain said that everyone could go back to general quarters stations. At this time I went back to Repair Three on the mess decks along with the rest of my repair party. All during this time in Repair Three, my men were fighting fires and knocking burning liferafts, etc. So we were kept fairly busy down in Repair Three the whole time. Also they were checking bulkheads and shoring where needed. After I went back there, after the torpedo attack, we waited for what seemed like many, many hours, but I

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imagine it was only 20 or 30 minutes; and in that time we were checking out the torpedo hit midships and doing what was necessary to prevent further flooding. About 30 minutes later we had word from the Captain that torpedo boats were approaching us again and to prepare for another torpedo attack starboard side. And I know that if another torpedo had hit us, it would have sunk us, so I told the men to standby to abandon ship. We prepared to abandon ship in case we were hit the second time. At this time we were dead in the water with no steerage. However, we were able to regain our steerage by manual means and able to make approximately five to six knots. The pit log was out, we were just guessing by the number of turns that were being made. We tried to maintain a course, this time, I'm not really sure, it was either 300 or 320 to take us out of there. After we had gotten underway, an Israeli helicopter came out and asked us if we wanted aid; well, they didn't ask us, they just came along side and acted like they wanted to help, but we waved them off. We maintained this course as best we could throughout the night. I was up on the bridge most of the night with the Captain, up until the destroyer, DAVIS, I believe it was, came alongside the next morning. Repair three on the mess decks was designated a casualty station because the wardroom, which was the normal casualty station, was so badly strafed that we couldn't keep them up there. The mess deck was a bloody mess that night. People were dying. It was a ghastly sight. That's about all I have to say.

Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the national ensign flying?

A. Yes sir, IIdid. I saw the national ensign flying after the, it was at the time I believe when we were going to abandon ship. I ran out on the main deck to get the life rafts ready. I remember distinctly looking back up and seeing the Ensign flying. This was, I think, after the air raid, after the torpedo attack.

Q. Had you seen it earlier that morning?

A. I saw it earlier that morning when I came up, I don't know when it was.

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I came up on and off that morning checking a patrol plane that had been flying over us. The quartermaster, DAVID QM2, had told me that the night that he was wounded that he had put the flag up at 0730 that morning.

Q. So you, in recollection, recall seeing the flag flying in the morning and after the torpedo attack?

A. Yes, before and after the torpedo attack.

Q. Do you know whether or not it was the same flag?

A. I couldn't tell you sir. The way I thought at one time, what the heck was it, I noticed there was something funny about it. I might have seen the flag twice, because once I saw one that had been shot up and it was ragged, and the next time I looked at it I didn't notice whether it was ragged or not. I couldn't say either way whether it was the same flag.

A. Earlier in your testimony you mentioned that the LIBERTY was 17.5 miles from nearest point of land. How did you arrive at this?

A. By radar navigation.

Q. Did you take a fathometer check?

A. Fathometer checked, yes sir. Either 33 or 31 fathoms under the keel at this time.

Counsel for the Court: Does any other member of this Court have questions of this witness?

President: No further questions.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Ensign John D. SCOTT, U. S. Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your full name, rank, and organization.

A. John D. SCOTT, Ensign, USNR.

Q. Mr. SCOTT, you know that this Court of Inquiry is interested in the incident involving USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Would you please tell the Court what you recall of that incident?

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A. Yes sir. On the morning of the 8th, I had the 4 to 8 officer of the Dook watch on the bridge. It was a routine watch. The only thing out of the ordinary was we had one reconnaissance plane that flew by us and made a few circles off our port beam. He circled around about three or four times, then took off.

Q. About what time?

A. About 0515. I was not able to identify the aircraft. We looked at it with the binoculars. Due to the distance we could not see any markings or insignia of any sort on it.

President: That was local time, Mr. SCOTT?

A. Yes sir. The plane circled around several times then took off in a true direction towards Tel Aviv. About 30 minutes later I got a call from coordination, sir, and Chief CT SMITH was on the phone; wanted to know if I had an air contact that was fairly close in the last half hour.. I told him I did and he wanted to know which direction it went after it left the vicinity of the ship. I told him, "Tel Aviv." He said, "Fine, that's all I want to know." I did manage to take four pictures of the aircraft with the camera on the bridge. I didn't know what type it was. It was a double fuselage, twin-engine type. It looked somewhat like an old P-38 or a small flying boxcar. That's about the only significant thing that happened on the 4 to 8.

Q. Do you recall the flag or the national ensign flying?

A. Yes sir, it was flying. I noticed at first light that the ensign was flying. I looked up to it to check the wind direction just in the event I had to blow tubes and I wanted to have a favorable wind direction. That's about all I recall about the flag being up on the day and night while we were over here. I don't recall seeing it down at all. That's about all I have to say about the 4 to 8.

Q. Continue on during the day?

A. I wasn't aware of any aircraft overhead. I did notice that at about the noon hour there was smoke on the horizon. Could see results of bombing on the horizon. I had gone out and taken a picture. I wasn't aware of aircraft. After we secured from general quarters, I came in to

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the wardroom and I just left when I heard the first hit. With that, I took off running to DC central. I did not come topside again until about 0500 the following day.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Does any member of the Court?

President: Tell us a little bit about your damage control measures when the ship was hit from starboard,

A. Yes sir. When we were first hit, the first orders we got were, "two fires, one port side in the vicinity of the gas drums, one starboard side vicinity of the motor whaleboat." I ordered fire fighting parties out. Next we were ordered to pick up the wounded. We had a number of calls, repeated calls to pick up the wounded. I called back and said that every available stretcher was in use. They were using blankets and mattresses to haul the people back. After the fires were out, they burned for quite awhile before we got them under control. The next thing, we were told by the bridge to stand by for torpedo attack starboard side. The torpedo hit at approximately, somewhere between 1425 and 1445. As soon as the torpedo hit, I called main control. I don't keep a damage control log as such, my repair parties do. They log messages they receive in a book. Neither one of them, as soon as the attack started, kept a log. I kept message blanks coming into repair parties, but they were not timed. I had about ten or twelve message blanks prior to the torpedo hitting. I had the main damage, I had the large hole in the back berthing compartment, I had the hold in the diagnostic room, I had the two fires, the fires under control and one of them logged as out, But when the torpedo hit, the logroom in damage control central was in a shambles, the safe door blew open, logs went flying off the shelves, we were knocked on the deck, and shortly thereafter the order was passed down to set the destruction bill. And with that, we didn't bother to write down our messages anymore. Myself, my 1JV talker, and my 2J2 talker commenced burning all confidential messages and pubs in DC central.

Q. That's fine. Tell me a little about your shoring.

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A. It was necessary, after we investigated the diagnostic room, which is directly above the vicinity which the torpedo hit, I went in, it was next to DC central, I went in with the DC investigator from repair two. We saw the level of the water rising. I stuck my hand in the hole. It came out with black, black oil. With that I said, "It's still rising, we're going to have to shore-it." We brought shoring in and mattresses from the engineering berthing compartment and commenced shoring. We found another rupture out in the passageway and it was bulged out, but we had that area pretty well under control.

Q. To establish the watertight boundary after the torpedo attack, was there any question about anyone being left alive in the spaces below?

A. No sir. When I saw the black oil coming up, I knew it had ruptured the fuel tanks. I went down to main control. I called them first and told them I had ruptured tanks up here, and told them not to take inspections from these tanks. Later on in the morning, I went down to main control and told them to take inspections from starboard tanks but not those two to correct the list. We went over to twelve degrees, and came back to ten. About 0500 in the morning we were down to about a 6 degree list.

Q. Who was in charge of the forward repair parties at that time?

A. Ensign TAYLOR. He was the Repair Officer. He was hit before he ever got to the repair locker. He wandered off on his own. He came down the passageway, stuck his head in DC central. I could see he was hit very bad. He said, "Scottie, I've been hit." I said, "I can't help you, go to the mess decks. I'll call them and tell them you're coming." I don't have a plotter or messenger, and there were just three people in DC central, so none of us could leave. Next, there was Chief THOMPSON, and I got the word that he was hit, but not bad. A little later the bridge called wanting a signalman. Both my signalmen had been hit, and I called repair and asked them if they had any signalmen, anybody, even enlisted men. Chief THOMPSON volunteered and went to the bridge. Then DEMORI, shipfitter third, took over.

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A. Yes sir. And DEMORI was the on-scene leader.

Q. Is DEMORI still around?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Have you been to damage control school, Scottie?

A. Yes sir, I went ten weeks ago.

Q. Was it worth it?

A. Yes sir. I'd recommend it to anybody.

President: Scottie, I'm proud of you. Thank you very much, son.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant George H. GOLDEN, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. George H. GOLDEN, Lieutenant, Engineering Officer, USS LIBERTY.

Q. Lieutenant GOLDEN, you know that this Court of Inquiry has been convened to look into the circumstances incident to the attack on USS LIBERTY. Will you please tell the Court what, if anything, you recall about that incident?

A. Yes sir. At approximately 1145, I completed eating lunch, and went to the 01 level forward to sunbathe along with the Captain and some of the other officers. I have a lounge chair, most of us do have; while laying on my back sunbathing, I noticed a plane flying over. I dozed off, and approximately 25 minutes or so later on, I woke up and saw a plane circling again coming from the port beam, crossing the ship. While watching it, I glanced up and noticed it just crossing over the stack area, and I noticed a small amount of smoke coming out of my stack, and also the flag was flying.

Counsel for the Court: Was it extended?

A. Yes sir, there was a slight breeze blowing.

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Q. And it was standing out where it could be seen?

A. Yes sir. Not completely the full length, but it was standing out. At approximately 1255, I left the 01 level forward, and then went forward because I knew that the Commanding Officer was going to have a surprise chemical attack for a drill between the crew. We went to general quarters at 1310. Immediately after we went to general quarters, the Commanding Officer addressed the crew concerning setting Zebra. He explained to them that anything could happen at any time. It took us four minutes to set Zebra, we should improve on that time. He explained that there was smoke coming from the beach area, and that there was possible fighting in that area. After completing general quarters, I came from the engineering and went to the port side of the ship, the motor whaleboat started smoking instantly, and walked into the wardroom to have a quick cup of coffee before going to my office. I sat down in the forward part of the wardroom, and I had no more had set down when the word was passed to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing. Immediately, there was a bang, and the first thought came to my head that the whaleboat had been dropped into the water. I jumped to the porthole, looked out, and there was black smoke coming up from the side of the ship. I immediately ran to the door to the wardroom to go outside. The second I hit the door, I heard the word passed, "General Quarters, all hands man your battle stations." And then the alarm went off. Before I had gotten clear of the door, the word was also passed over the PA system, which sounded like the Commanding Officer's voice, telling radio central to notify high command that we were under air attack. When I hit the deck plate in the engineroom main control in front of the throttle board at 1405. I knew it was this time because the tachometers were ringing up at the same time flank speed. I had informed over the 1MC the Captain it would take me a couple of minutes to bring the other boiler on the line, as we had just secured it to repair a gasket. The Commanding Officer told me to get it on as soon as possible and give him all the

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was a hit and I lost electrical power. We went dead in the wate.,

Counsel for the Court; Lieutenant GOLDEN, how many years have you been in the naval service actively?

A. Twenty-six years sir.

Q. This Court has heard many instances of loss of life, and the Court has viewed the inordinate amount damage to the vessel. Would you please tell the Court the nature of your personal possession loss incident to the damage to your stateroom?

A. There were two shells which could be 20mm, I'm not sure. There was one six inches in diameter, and another one approximately 7 or 8 inches in diameter, just aft of the center of my stateroom. Fragmentation from these two shells damaged the stateroom considerably. One came through the overhead of the stateroom. Bullets of unknown caliber came through the closet where my clothes hanged. The bullets went completely through one of them through the other, ripping all of my clothing apart. Bullets entered the bottom of the room, into the drawers where I keep my shoes, tearing those up. The fire fighting water from where the repair party was fighting the fire on the starboard side of frame 80 came through these holes, both from the O1 level and the O2 level, and ruined the tape recorder which I had setting on my desk.

Counsel for the Court: Value of the tape recorder?

A. $219.00 sir.

President: Let the record show at this point that Lieutenant GOLDEN's testimony on his personal loss is introduced as being typical of the type of personal loss realized by the officers of the LIBERTY. The effectiveness of aircraft strafing and rocketry against the topside of the ship virtually eliminated the useability of any and everything inside the staterooms themselves.

Counsel for the Court: Mr. GOLDEN, as Engineering Officer, do you have in your custody, engineering logs?

A. Yes sir.

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A. Yes sir, I do. I have that one particular record with me at this time, sir.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the engineering log as exhibit 16, the gyro compass record as exhibit 17, and request they be accepted into evidence as 16 and 17.

Counsel for the Court: Would you please read pertinent extracts from these logs?

A. Aye, sir. In the engineering smooth log on the 12 to 1600 watch on 8 June 1967 - The log is signed by R. F. BROOKS, Machinist Mate Chief, at 1405, general quarters under attack. 1406, granted permission to fire room to light fires in number two boiler. At 1406, informed throttleman to manouver at various speeds, to draw steam no less than 400 pounds. 1407, reported condition Zebra set. 1408, secured number one and number two distilling units in order to have more steam or speed. 1435, lost electrical power due to hit believed to be torpedo. There was a vibration from this hit that knocked two people in the engine room off of ladders from the upper platform to the lower platform. It vibrated a light out of its socket. It knocked both generators off the line. Also lost communications to the bridge at this time. 1450, put number three generator to atmospheric ballast. 1453, generator on the line. During this period of time, there were both 20mms and two other smaller caliber bullets coming through the bulkhead from the starboard side from approximately frames 60 to 95. The last entry in the engineer's bell book was for 1405 when the bridge rang up for flank speed. There were no more entries in the engineer's bell book after 1405.

President: Tell me again, Lieutenant GOLDEN, how long your records or your memory indicates that you were without power after your circuit breakers tripped out and you lost the load?

A. From 15 to 20 minutes, I think sir.

Q. And your record shows that you lost the load at what time?

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desirable but unavailable. That the early rocket attack against this ship shot and stopped, in some cases permanently and in others only temporarily, ships clocks through the ship. This fact has become increasingly evident throughout testimony received as well as in informal discussions with LIBERTY personnel.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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Ensign Malcolm Patrick O'MALLEY, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank and organization?

A. ~~Malcolm Patrick O'MALLEY, Ensign, USS LIBERTY AGTR-5~~

Q. And your duty status?

A. Assistant Operations Officer and Ship's Secretary.

Q. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. Since January 13th, 1967.

Q. Approximately six months?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Mr. O'MALLEY, directing your attention to 8 June 1967, will you please tell this court what you recall of the attack.

A. Yes sir. I had the con on the 12 to 1600 watch. From 1220 to 1230 is when an Israeli twin-engine plane, well we didn't know it was Israeli, just a twin-engine plane very similar to a flying boxcar, circled us once in a long eliptical circle and they drew near. We found out on questioning, after they went away, Mr. ENNIS said the plane had come out almost periodically every 20 to 40 minutes, and would make one pass in a high circle and head back to land. At 13 19, I was relieved on the con by Mr. ENNIS, who was the JOOD for general quarters. Mr. O'CONNOR wasn't there to be stepped in the deck and relieved the con. When we went to general quarters, I went to my general quarters station in CIC. It was an extremely dull general quarters - we didn't do anything. We didn't have any contacts or anything significant to do. Some place between 1335 and 1350 I again assumed con from Mr. ENNIS. At about 1402, 03, or 04, something like that, I was looking at the radar screen and

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trying to get a fix. I noticed three contacts coming off the shore and I said, "Lloyd, I think I have three contacts here." He said, "I think I'll talk to the gun mounts on the phone circuits." He tried to talk to them, and before I knew it, just as he was about to say "gun mounts 31 and 32" a gun opened up. It was just, "boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom,boom," and all of a sudden I found myself down on one knee. Someone yelled general quarters, I yelled general quarters, and I left the bridge, and as I went passed, I noticed that the general alarm was sounding. I went into CIC. To return to what had elapsed, well, by the time I took over the con it was 12 o'clock, and the time I was relieved it was approximately 1345.

Counsel for the Court: Who relieved you?

A. Lieutenant James Ennis.

When we got up there, we only had one thing to shoot, and that was a tower, a signal tower. I can remember how it stood on the beach. What happened, was Mr. Painter and I were trying desperately to get a fix, to get an accurate fix, what we were trying to do was get a fix and we couldn't do it.

Counsel for the Court: Do you recall the national ensign flying?

A. No sir, I don't because we were not allowed to go to the 04 level, and from here I couldn't see it. I did see the torpedo boats when I came up to the bridge.

Captain ATKINSON: Are you also the CIC officer?

A. Yes sir

Counsel for the Court: Mr. O'MALLEY, do you have in your possession the DRT log?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Q. Do you have the radar bearing book of USS LIBERTY also?

A. Yes, I do.

Request the recorder to mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 18

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and the DRT log, exhibit number 19. I now offer them into evidence, and request Mr. O'MALLEY to read pertinent extracts from 1400 hours, on the 8th of June.

A. The radar in CIC went out on the first attack.

Q. Try 1200 hours.

A. I have at 1145 a bearing on 173 at 13.9 miles.

Q. Any subsequent entries? DRT from 1300 on hours?

A. Nothing from 1300 hours.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Does any member of the court desire to question the witness?

Captain ATKINSON: What was the last entry in the DRT log?

A. I believe it was 1500. 1300, yes.

President: What would be the reasons for no DRT entries after 1500?

A. I don't have any idea. Mr. Toth use to help me with the thing.

Q. What do you mean, he use to help you?

A. Well, he use to take charge of CIC.

Q. During General quarters?

A. No, not during general quarters. Actually, it was Mr. BENNETT's station. I was there in training. Mr. BENNETT wasn't there on that day.

Counsel for the Court: Mr. O'MALLEY, you indicated you were in the Navy for about six months?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Is this your first time at sea?

A. Yes sir, four months on the LIBERTY, sir.

Q. And your primary duty on USS LIBERTY is?

A. Ship's Secretary.

Q. Ship's Secretary?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Collateral Duty?

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A My collateral duty is Assistant Operations Officer with CIC.

Captain ATKINSON: Was the navigation plot maintained in combat?

A. No, we he maintained our navigational plot.

Q. Who's he?

A. COGNAVITCH did, but he was doing what he said was contour fixes and he was just checking if they agreed with the OOD on the bridge in the chartroom. You see, we had two charts. We had one in the chartroom and one in CIC. We did have fixes - like I had a 1220 fix spotted on the chart when the tower was bearing 148, 16.5 miles.

Q. In combat?

A. No, in the chart house.

Q. What happened to that chart?

A. There was an overlay.

President: Would you repeat that fix and time again, Mr. O'MALLEY?

A. At 1220 the tower beared 148 at 16.5 miles.

Q. Was it normally the ship's practice to use an overlay on a chart which they planned to use for a protracted period in a particular spot?

A. To my knowledge, no. This was the first time that I had seenit. As a matter of fact, he was putting it on when I came up.

Q. Have you ever been in a ship when it had a patrol station in a spot for a protracted period before this?

A. No, not really. We had gone up and down the coast of Africa, but that was not a patrol.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I may have missed what you said before. I'm not clear as to whether it's normal practice or not to maintain a navigational track in CIC?

A. The reason why we didn't have it up in CIC, the reason why we hadn't been doing it for a long period of time, was because we had just come in sight of land on the previous watch, and that is why.

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The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Counsel for the Court. The next witness will be LTJG Malcolm N. Watson, United States Naval Reserve.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Malcolm N. Watson, United States Naval Reserve, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: Will you please state your name, rank, and duty station.

A. Malcolm N. Watson, Lieutenant (jg), I'm NFA aboard the LIBERTY.

Q. Mr. Watson, did you know this Court has been convened in order to ascertain the circumstances attentative with the attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967? Would you please tell the Court what you recall of that incident?

A. Well, we had a practice GQ approximately 1310. My GQ station was the fire room down-in the engine room. When we had secured from the practice GQ, I had come up. I was standing by the wardroom pantry when the attack came. I ran back down the officer's ladder and went down to my station in the fire room. And shortly I was called up to sick bay. I'm narcotics custodian, and I had to open the narcotics locker. I came up from the fire room, went through the mess decks, up to sick bay. I got the key from the/first class corpsman, and a seaman KEHNER went with me back down to the mess decks, forward along the passageway, into the engineering berthing compartment, down the hatch, into the narcotics locker. I opened the locker, removed morphine, gave half of it to KEHNER and told him to go on back up and I took the other half and left the safe unlocked but closed. I locked the door behind me, I came back up. As I passed by DC central, I stopped in there and told them I had opened my fittings to get down to the narcotics locker and had reclosed it. At this time, DC Central is just forward of the diagnostic room,

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under which the torpedo hit. And at this time the torpedo had not hit the ship cause I would have known it because of the way the passageway was torn [illegible]. I went back up into sick bay with the morphine that I had, and gave the key back to the first class corpsman and told him what I had done and that I had left the locker open. There was a seaman laying on the operating table, and they didn't have too many people helping in sick bay at the time, so I helped them move the seaman off the operating table, and I helped move third class gunners mate EASON onto the operating table. The Doctor told me where to get two bottles that he wanted. I thought we were done. And I helped him prepare things for operation, and by that time more people had just come into the sick bay to help out. So I said, "If you don't need me, I need to go back to my GQ station." And he said at the time, "go ahead". So I went back down to my GQ station and from then on in we had one machinery casualty right after the other. High water, low water in the boilers, I lost the lube oil, just all kinds of machinery casualties. From there on out, I really don't know the sequence of events of anything that had happened. But I know that when I happened to think to look at my watch, it was 7 o'clock in the evening.

Counsel for the Court: Excuse me, any time prior to the attack, did you notice the national colors flying?

A. Yes sir. At lunch that day, we were discussing the situation and Mr. Golden made the statement that someone had said something about the ensign flying so the people would know who we were. Mr. Golden made the statement something like, "don't we have a bigger flag we can fly, maybe the holiday colors?" Then after lunch we went out on the 01 level forward and most of the officers were around there sunbathing immediately preceding 1300. At approximately 1245, an aircraft flew over approximately 5,000 to 8,000 feet, and his line of flight took it over the radar mast, and I was watching it and made a comment about it that it looked

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like a ship flying banner. And as it flew over the radar mast, the ensign was flying from the mast. I noticed that it was flying, at this time there was a breeze.

Q. Extended?

A. Yes sir.

President: Was it flying from the mast aft or the mast directly over the bridge?

A. The mast directly over the bridge, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Richard F. Pfeiffer, MC, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: Will you please state your full name, rank, and duty status.

A. Richard Frank Pfeiffer, Lieutenant Medical Corps, duty station U.S. Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Q. On 8 June 1967, where were you at this time?

A. I was speaking to my duties as medical officer, USS LIBERTY.

Q. Will you please tell this Court the circumstances as you recall them incident to the attack on the USS LIBERTY?

A. Well, we had secured from the General Quarters drill. I was standing in the passageway outside the galley, which is on the main deck. Suddenly, we heard a sonic as a jet plane flying low and the steward to whom I was talking and myself thought that something had happened to one of the steam lines. Immediately after that, we heard an explosion, and we sounded General Quarters. My General Quarters station is on the main deck: aft, the main battle dressing station. I went across the main deck, and at that point I saw another plane passing over the ship and letting loose its supply of rockets on the ship. It was passing from the starboard bow to the port side and aft. I went into the main dressing station as quickly as possible and awaited the flow of casualties that would come in. We sent the third class corpsman to the forward battle dressing station

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which was in the wardroom. In the main dressing station was the first class corpsman and myself. When I was in the main battle dressing station, we were relatively sealed off and we didn't hear very much of what was happening outside. At that point I would have thought it was a single or two planes that had strafed the ship once or twice. I didn't have an idea exactly how much had been done. And when they brought in the first aid patient who was a seaman with a collapsed lung, we thought he would be one of the few casualties that we got, and immediately took care of him, which involved an incision in his chest and packing of a pretty good sized chest cavity to remove the blood and air to make it possible for him to breathe again. We then found Mr. Watson, who had the combination to our narcotics safe in the medical storeroom. I sent the corpsman to get Mr. Watson to get me a supply of [illegible] and we started administering to the men. The time at this time was about a quarter to two, and it would be before the torpedo had struck. Someone told me that they wanted me on the bridge, and to get there I went through the mess decks which had a number of casualties there already, I passed the wardroom and found the forward battle dressing station was somewhat flooded by casualties, and went to the bridge where at that point, the Captain was the only person who was still functioning and the Captain had the helm. Again, the Captain had not been injured at that time. I took a look outside the bridge and saw two decks below the remains of our Navigator, Mr. Toth, The helmsman had died where he stood at the helm, and at that time there wasn't anything I could do for any of the men on the bridge except administer morphine to those who were injured and yet living and get men up with stretchers to evacuate them. It so happened the fire in the starboard side, the men had under control, and I returned to the wardroom where again we started caring for the casualties as best we could. We took care of the men in the wardroom and in the passageway on the main deck there were men wounded sitting shoulder to shoulder the full [illegible] of the passageway. On the port side in a stretcher was the executive officer who had compound fractures of three bones on one leg and two bones on the other leg, the senior research officer, Mr. Lewis, who had semi--flash burns of his face and had been temporarily blinded, and all the men that had been injured.

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I found our third class corpsman, Shulman, with our mail clerk, Spicer, who had suffered bullet wounds and shrapnel wounds of his face and neck and was having difficulty breathing. Shulman was performing, or had finished performing an emergency trachcotomy on him in an effort to help him breathe.

President: Shulman's a third class?

A. Yes sir.

And, one of the other men had his arm in a sling and was operating the foot-powered suction pump enabling him to activate the man's tracheam lungs to get the secretions from there.

President: Doctor, is this the foot- powered tracheam pump which supports the microphone into which you are speaking?

A. Yes sir.

Sir, in the chief's mess, we found another man, this was Payon, who was also having difficutly breathing. He had a wound of his chest, and at that time we did not have the facilities on board to care for a second trachcotomy or to do an insertion of a tube into his chest, so the only thing I could do at that point was insert my finger in his chest wall and to allow as much blood to be drained out of that as possible. There was another man with a broken leg who we were just able to splint. As it turns out the last thing that we bought before we left Norfolk was a supply of air splints that were just coming in and being used as many as we had, and we could have used more. Then I returned to the main dressing station. At this time again I was going through the mess decks and there were more people there. I got to the main dressing station and found people on the floor, people in the beds, in the isolation room, and the clean room. One of the men in the bed was Blanchard, a man who had sustained a shrapnel injury in his back. The first class corpsman and I had examined him and we realized that we might have to operate on him. At that point we had also agreed though, unless it was an absolute matter of being certain he would die otherwise, we would not do anything to him. Then someone told me in a moment that the wardroom had been hit, and that the Captain

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had been hit. We went by the wardroom and found fortunately that the hit had been away from where the people were being taken care of. A message while I was in the main battle dressingstation, they had announced to be prepared for a torpedo attack, and the torpedo hit and suddenly the ship started listing to starboard, rolled, becoming 9 degrees in a matter of a few seconds. At that time, Van Cleave and myself and as many people as we could get, we went down to the mess decks to try to evacuate anyone that we could from there in case the ship started going down. We were told that the destruction bill had been put into effect. The ship was stabilized after a couple of minutes and then I got the word to go to the wardroom and to the bridge. When I got to the bridge, the Captain had put a tourniquet on his own leg. He had lost a large amount of blood, but there was nothing I could do at this time. He was the only officer aboard at that time. The only other officer that I could find was Ensign O'Malley. I told him of the situation on the bridge, where the Captain had been injured and was the last officer I could find up there and suggested that he be prepared to go to the bridge if necessary. We then returned to the main dressing station, just in time to have a rocket land on the overhead near the clean room, and at this time the lights in the main dressing station went out. We decided at that time that we certainly couldn't care for the wounded in the situation that we were. We were told to brace ourselves for a second torpedo attack, and the only thing we could do was go inside and find a couple of the wounded on the floor to find places where they weren't wounded and lay across their bodies so in case the torpedo did hit they wouldn't be thrown around. I could hold on to one of the uprights, but they certainly couldn't. We decided at that time, that the only place where we could take care of the men was on the mess decks. The ship had stabilized. We went to the engineroom to find out what had happened, if the engines had been damaged, or, if it would be a point of moving the men to the mess decks and then having the ship go down than having them die there. We found that as far as it went that the damage had been brought under control. We evacuated the men to the mess decks. We had just that morning finished resterilizing supplies in the

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forward battle dressing station. They were still in the autoclave. When we went to the autoclave, we got as many men who could walk aposaible, took them to the main dressing station and gave them supplies, it was dark and we couldn't really see what we were handling then, and they took it to main deck and piled it on the table. At that time was the first time we could evaluate the condition of the wounded. There was no question of our ability to keep records or anything at that point. We just couldn't. The only way we could tell if someone had been given morphine, when we gave it to him, we stuck a needle through an article of clothing on him. We got some gauze and hung the bottles from the lights in the mess decks. At that time it became evident that many of the men were going to require further surgery, but we established in a major hospital surgery is something that is done by three doctors, two nurses, and a support team outside, and that here we would be able to have myself and one corpsman. We obviously weren't going to do any unless it was a life or death emergency. So we went on with it and tried to stablize the people who were in shock, giving fluids. Then I organized a couple of teams of men. At that time we still had not found out what had happened. The men were confused, they couldn't understand where was the Sixth Fleet or where was the Air Force. Someone had told us that there was an Israeli helicopter outside, and it bolstered our morale a little bit, but we tried to find out the answers to the question, "is anybody going to help us?" "Or can we get messages out?" "Does anyone know we're hit, and how badly?" At this time, sir, we had organized teams to start from one end of the mess decks, we'd gotten surgical soap and water, supplies of sterile dressings, and started cleaning the wounds again as best we could. I went up to the bridge to see the Captain. The Captain had lost a tremendous amount of blood and was showing symptoms of early shock. The men who were showing symptoms of shock, the people that we couldn't get fluids to had just overrun the medical facilities for the while. We had beengiving out water, salt pills, bicarbinate soda, just to replace the fluids with anything that we could.

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Now we had intravenous fluids that we were able to give them, but the Captain was showing the early symptoms. He said that he was feeling weak every time that he got up and was perspiring and was beginning to show one of the earlier signs of shock which is excessive anxiety. It's hard to think of how anxiety at that point could be described as excessive, but he had been talking about medical things that he had ascribed as a tremendous urgency to, and I just had interpreted this as a sign of shock. I told Mr. Lucas, the First Lieutenant, who was at the bridge about this and told him to be on the watch for this, dress the Captain's leg, remove the tournaquet, and went back below. There's not really much more tell of this, except how we should give the individual men, at that time someone had gotten a supply of brandy down to the men below and we were dispensing this to the men who were dazed or who were confused or anything, or excited. At one thirty it became obvious that Blanchard was not going to survive the night without an operation.

President: One thirty in the morning?

A. One thirty in the morning.

We went to the mess decks again, got some empty blood transfusion packes, collected two pints of blood from men who were his blood type, and took him to the wardroom to operate on him. Unfortunately, his wounds were such that any attempt s were hopeless. We determined this and closed the incision. We rendered final anesthetic which the first class and I administered, but he died during the operation. Again, after that, It was just a question finding, doing certain mechanical things for the men, getting them all cleaned, getting new dressings on, treating their pain if this was required, and awaiting the arrivalof holy.

Counsel for the Court: Of the many injured, was Blanchard the only one who died after an operation?

A. Blanchard was the only one that died. The Executive Officer died soon after having been brought to the mess decks but we had seen him on the main deck, and the next time I saw him on the mess decks was to

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pronounce him dead.

Q. How many other operations of a major nature did you perform?

A. Only this operation and the insertion of the tube in the man's chest.

Q. How long were you on your feet before you were able to rest?

A. 28 hours.

Q. Do you have a list of the personnel who died as a result of the attack?

A. Yes sir, I do..

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark this exhibit number 20. I now offer exhibit number 20 into evidence. Will you please read this for the record?

A. The following is a list of the dead personnel. The bodies' of these persons have been recovered.

LCDR	ARMSTRONG, Philip M.	569825/1100
SA	BLANCHARD, Cary R.	771 77 22
CT3	BROWN, Francis (n)	778 76 70
CT3	HIGGINS, Alan (n)	783 62 97
SN	HOAN, Carl	774 46 48
CT2	HUBBLE, Anthony	777 62 87
ICFN	SKOLAK, David	550 17 85
PO2	SPICHER, John C.	473 41 77
CM3	THOMPSON, Alexander	770 47 21
CT3	THORNTON, Thomas R.	997 97 91
LT	TOTH, Stephen S.	669613/1100
CT1	WALTON, Frederick J.	236 31 86

Q. Did you bring a list of personnel who were declared missing in action during the attack?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark the missing in action list as exhibit number 21. I now offer exhibit number 21 into evidence. Will you please read this for the record?

A. Personnel missing:

CT3 William D. ALLENBAUGH
CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL
CT2 Jerry L. CONVERSE
CT2 Robert B. EISENBERG
CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES
CTSN Lawrence P. HAYDEN
CT1 Warren E. HENSEY
CT2 Richard W. HERMIE
CT3N James L. LEWIS
CT3A David W. MARLBOROUGH
CTC Raymond E. LEE

CT3 Duane R. MARGRAF
LT James C. PIERCE
CT1 John Caleb SMITH
CTC Melvin D. SMITH
CT3 Phillippe C. TIBBLE
CT3 Carl C. HYGREN
CTL Edward E. REBMEYER
SGT J.L. RAPER
CT3 Jerry L. GOSS
CT1 James M. LUPTON

* Civilian Allen M. Blue

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Counsel for the Court: Did you bring a list of the injured with you that you treated during the attack?-

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: Request the reporter mark the injured list as exhibit number 22. I now offer exhibit number 22 into evidence and will you please read it?

A. ! Wounded Transferred

Name	Rate	Ser No.
PAYAN, Salvador	SH	796 66 15
REILLY, T.J.	SH	915 [illegible] 66
COOK, E.L.	S.I	999 55 71
HEROLD, Donald	SH2	609 22 48
DEMENT, Lee Roy	CTSN	998 35 79
HAZEL, David Carl	[illegible]	999 84 98
LEWAY, William Michael	[illegible]	775 55 21
LENTINI, J.C.	CT1	594 81 55
O'CONNOR, J.G.	LT 071765	
WARD, J.W.	[illegible]	775 76 78
WEAVER, R.L.	SH	999 88 63
BROMFIELD, V.L.	[illegible]	
LaTORUE, S.J.	ETN	914 75 09
LOCKWOOD, D.F.	SSGT	
LEWIS, J.M.	LT	
LEWIS, D.E.	LCDR	
TETERMAN, D.R.	ENS	
CARPENTER, J.R.	CT1	
TAYLOR, R.F.	ENS	
RANDALL, J.R.	ICI	
CASTER, W.E.	SH	(Deck dpt)
CONCEPCION, R.C.	SH	"
FOLLIN, D.F. JR.	SH	"
PIERSON, O.V.	SH	"
SLAVENS, L.J.	SH	"
SOPER, L.L.	SH	"
WILSON, G.W.	SH	"
DAVID, R.O. JR.	SH2	"
LOUR, JD	SH	
MEADORS, J.L.	SHSN	
POLLARD, F.H.	CT3	
LEMOND, T.W.	CTSN	
MARFIL, S.P.	TH	

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Name	Rate	Soc. No.
MATHEWS, James L.	SN	
ADDINGTON, R.N.	CE1	
ANDERSON, J.D.	CE3	
BENEDICT, H.D.	CE(N	
BROWN, J.V.	CE3	
CARLSON, R.C.	CE1	
CAMP ELLIS, J.R.	CE1	
DAVIDSON, R.C.	CE2	
DAVIES, K.B.	CE(N	
DORET, K.P.	CE(N	
HAWKINS, D.W.	CE3	
HILDEBRAND, C.R.	CE2	
JONES, F.K.	CE2	
KAWAUCH, J.P.	CE(N	
KING, E.H.	CE(N	
KNIGHT, L.W.	CE(N	
LENTZ, J.C.	CE2	
MCINTOSH, D.L.	CE2	
LUCAS, David L.,	SK3	716513/1107
McGONAGLE, W.L.	CE1	459467/1100
REESE, M.	EM	625163/1610
KIEFER, R.F.	EA(NC)	
THOMSON, H.J.	CE3	471 37 37
VAN OSTAVE, T.J.	EM1	020 39 72
SCHULMAN, S.L.	EM3	333 93 33
MCNIC, C.	EM	
PALMER, L.C.	EO3C	6[illegible]/110[illegible]
LASKLI, C.F.	CE2	510 00 45
DURKOWSKI, H.	CE3	046 03 16
GULINNA, T.A.	EM	7[illegible] 43 22
STOUDT, J.D.	EO3	570 41 42
CHILD, E.	EM2	549 36 04
ASHCRAFT, J.W.	EM	699 33 01
MCNELL, J.P.	EM3	775 00 93
THORN, L.D.	EM3	
HUNTER, W.D.	CM	913 44 09
FAGEOL, D.A.	CE3	504 30 77
DOTCHEV D.R.	EM	779 50 99
CORNISH, G.R.	EOCM	993 07 12
LaTORRE, L.J.		
CARLSON, D.M.	CE3	510 42 33
Kinicl, D.J.	EA	993 70 04
DISHER, G.R.	EM	370 02 23
BYRD, D.R.	EM	730 [illegible] 06
TRIPLETT, J.L.	EM	534 01 93
ANDERSON, R.E.	EA	531 01 30
SHIPSON" M.R.	EM	917 00 09
DOCCELLA, S.	CE3	703 37 03
BRAUNOWSKI, J.M.	EM	010 45 19
McELTUCY P.	CEM	561 44 71

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HAMAIO, J.A.	FN	916 20 0_
DALLEY, R.L.	CTSN	530 04 91
LOGASSO, G.F.	FN	796 18 85
VALDEZ, D.	SN2	570 92 58
BOOTH, J.E.	FN3	993 19 47
PERKINS, D.C.	SN3	773 42 83
GILSON, R.D.	RD3	794 71 33
WEDIC, G.J.	CT2	498 92 81
KUHAL, R.G.	CT1	532 00 54
DOWELL, L.L.	CT2	7[illegible] 85 28
SWEET, R.B.	CT3	773 03 25
McFARLIN, T.L.	CT3	7[illegible] 83 54
BLOXHAM, C.L.	CT2	774 27 59
SMITH, J.D.	CTSN	777 19 71
EDGEBERRY, D.M.	CT2	914 81 10
PLEASANTS, C.L.	CT1	555 78 10
DODD, M.F.	CT2	599 79 51
BUCK, R.D.	CT3	918 26 70
PETROSKI, M.C.	CTSN	797 04 78
SNAIDER, D.C.	CT2	773 28 26
POPLIELSKI, J.C.	CT2	773 80 00

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Do any members of the court have questions of this witness?

President: Approximately how many patients during this period did you have, Doctor?

A. At nearest number, 200.

Q. 200? How many men are on the ship, Doctor?

A. I think approximately 300.

Q. Then we had two thirds casualties, one way or another?

A. Yes sir.

Captain ATKINSON: Are you a surgeon?

A. Yes, I am.

President: From this very harrowing experience that you went through, do you have any thoughts or ideas that the Navy might find useful?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Q. What are they?

A. First, when we were on the mess decks, as I said, we had placed our equipment into a single pile, and in somewhat a disorganized fashion.

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When we would start a single intravenous transfusion on a person, what we would need was a bottle of intravenous solution, a supply of gauze to hang the bottle from one of the light fixtures overhead, a second set of tubing for this bottle, a needle through the man's shirt, some alcohol sponges to clean the area. This is a bottle containing a sweeter, a sterile dextrose, or sale and water which is administered intravenously. And, I think, many of these things are disposable, when they find themselves with the wrappers for them in their hands and no where to put them. One also finds with needles in hand there are some of the metal things that have been the seals that have been taken off the bottles. What I thought might be useful would be a vest sort of garment they could put on with large pockets in front with a supply of gauze, tape, needles, alcohol sponges, morphine syrettes, and a pocket in the back into which waste might be placed to enable one to more efficientl go through a large area and take care of more than one person on one trip. A second thing might be, as I put it out before, when we give an injection of morphine, about three hours later if the man was complaining of pain again, we would not know - we'd know if he had been given morphine, but we wouldn't know if he had been given it ten minutes before, and that his pain was still pain that he had because the morphine had not had a chance to be absorbed in his blood stream, or that it had been given three hours before and that his pain might just be a recurrent sort of thing, or that he had been given none and that his pain might be an early sympton of shock and at time the morphine might take away his body's protective mechanism. What I thought might be useful there would be a strip of copper with a oxidizing agent to it that could be taken off and pasted on the patient, that the mixture of copper and catalyst might be such that the copper would oxidize and thus change color from red to green in a specific amount of time, and that by then looking at the patient you would be able to tell; first, had he had morphine; second, how

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long ago had he had it. A red strip would tell you give him no more, but a green strip would be the green light to tell you to go ahead and give him some. And that something of the same sort of an oxidizing copper strip might be available for use with intravenous solutions. As we did when a patient received intravenous solution, we just left the bottle hanging over him so that at a glance you could tell that the person had received one liter, three liters. If the person had received sugar, solution, salt, plasma, or blood. But, again we'd probably do well to have the period in which they had been administered those.

President: Did you have enough medical supplies?

A. Yes sir, we did.

Another thing I forgot to mention was also during the night we broke into our supply of penicillin and the first class corpsman showed one of the seaman how to dilute this with sterile water and this man prepared a supply of diluted penicillin, and again we started all the men on antibiotics; so that by the time the other doctors from the Davis, and the Surgeons from the carrier came aboard, we could tell them that all the morphine had been taken care of. Everyone who was in shock had been taken care of. All the people had been started on antibiotics as a preventative measure for addiction.

Counsel for the Court: What was the primary cause of death?

A. Primary cause of death on some men was penetrating wounds of chest and lungs which made it impossible for them to breathe. Would to the heart, contracting injury with damage to brain. On The Executive Officer, I don't really know because of the way he died. Blanchard, the man on whom we operated, had massive injuries to his liver and to his right kidney, and he just died of blood loss and shock.

Q. Did you see many burns?

A. We had a moderate number of burn injuries. None of which were major burns.

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Q. Was there any substance similar to napalm causation?

A. Some persons may have been. I never inquired of anyone because again we had burns of hands, a few flash burns of face. But I didn't treated anyone that I would think of as having a napalm burn.

President: We have no further questions, Doctor. We have nothing but the highest admiration for the success which you enjoyed. It's my understanding that none of those you treated and evacuated has subsequently died. Is that correct?

A. That is true, sir.

President: This speaks volumes for your professional competence and the efficacy of your preliminary casualty treatment. Let me ask you one question here that just occurred to me. What did you do and who did you use to do it to get the dead out of the way so that they wouldn't clutter up your sick bay?

A. Well, anytime we needed one volunteer we'd get ten. That, if anything had to be done, people to be put on the stretchers, there were hands everywhere. When we asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on the adjoining tables who were saying, "if you need some, I have this type."

President: These were people already wounded?

A. These were people already wounded.

Q. What would you say about the morale subtribution on the ship during that trying period of the action and person of the Commanding Officer?

A. The Commanding Officer at that time was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves. To know that he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the con and the helm and through the night calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men, "we're going to live." When I went to the bridge and I saw this, I should say that I knew that I could only insult this man by suggesting that he be taken below for treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it.

Q. Although it was needed, medically?

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A. Yes sir.

President: Well, Doctor, I am very proud to be wearing the same uniform that you are. Thank you very much for your most informative, professionally competent, illuminating, and very valuable statement. I'm very grateful to you.

Doctor: Thank you sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Chief Communications Technician Harold J. Thompson, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your full name and rate.

A. Harold Jessie Thompson, Chief Communications Technician, U.S. Navy, USS LIBERTY AGTR-5.

Q. Do you know this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain facts incident to the attack on USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Would you please tell this Court the event you recall of this attack?

A. We had just secured from general quarters drill and I had gone on main deck with petty officer HAROLD to discuss training and some of the attitudes toward training, when I heard a rocket come past and hit. At this time, I wasn't sure it was a rocket. I thought it was a shore battery, and I was either knocked down or I ducked quick. Then I got up and started running across the deck to repair two locker which is inside the forecastle. I was knocked down again, but made it inside to start breaking out the damage control equipment, getting stretcher bearers on deck, and taking stock of the situation. The attack appeared to last, I would say about 20 minutes to half an hour. Time is difficult to recall. Then I was alone and word was passed over sound powered phones to DC Central to standby for a torpedo attack. This was passed two or

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three times, and I believe it was on the first time it was passed that we got hit. It seemed to take quite awhile for the torpedo to hit. The explosion wasn't too loud where we were. The deck lifted about a foot I'd day, and then we settled right away to a starboard list to about ten degrees. Although at the time it seemed a little greater. Then we were strafed at about the same time. I couldn't say whether it was before or after by the patrol boats. At first I thought it was the ammunition box over the repair locker where the ammunition had gotten hot and was exploding, then we determined that it was a strafing attack. The sound would coupled with my sighting of the torpedo boats later would indicate 50 caliber and 40 mm. There were several holes in the forecastle and the area around the repair locker. Nobody was hit inside. Later on the bridge asked for signalmen from various places on the ship. Nobody seemed to be available so I said I couldn't read flags but I could read light. They said they didn't need me at this time and that they wanted me to stay in the repair locker. Word was passed again to standby for torpedo attack starboard side and again the word went out for signalmen. Once again I told them I could not read flags, but if I could be of service. I was asked to report to the bridge, which I did. When I got up there, signalman David was attempting to rig a hand light. I assisted him. We went to the starboard wing of the bridge and one torpedo boat was making a run straight at us off the starboard beam while the other two stood off. At the Captain's directions, David sent, "US Naval Ship" "US Naval Ship." When they were about 500 yards off, the torpedo boat turned astern and came up on the stern on the starboard side and flashed, " do you need help?"

Q. Was this before the torpedo hit?

A. This was after the torpedo hit us, and we were surprised by the attack. The Captain was giving us word. He said, "no, thank you." We sent this back to the boat, and our steering was somewhat erratic and they came up on the port side then. David went across, I followed him, and saw on the last part of that message. David said, "Do you want us to

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standby?" I passed this word to the Captain. He said, "no, thank you." We sent this to the patrol boat. They came up along port side, I say roughly 100 yards off, flashed "good luck" and dropped astern along with the other two which had come up to the stern, to a mile or a mile and a half back, just about out of sight. Then they made one high speed run directly astern and somewhere between a quarter and a half mile back made a U-turn and disappeared. That was the last we saw of them. Shortly afterwards, and Israeli helicopter came, hovered off the bridge and tried to hand signal us, and dropped a note on the forecastle which was brought to the bridge. It was a card from the Naval Attache, U.S. Naval Attache in Tel Aviv, asking if we had casualties and could he come aboard. The Captain signaled to him, "Yes, we did have casualties, and no, he did not want him to come onboard." One time I forgot to mention is after the torpedo attack, before I went to the bridge, there was a pass made by an Israeli helicopter. One of the men in the repair locker stepped outside the forecastle and said it was a helicopter with a blue star on a white shield, I believe the colors are, and we determined it to be Israeli by this. I stayed on the bridge with the Captain and signalman David, who finally went below for medical assistance. We then posted a lookout and maintained a watch throughout the night. I was on the bridge off and on and on the mess decks.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions of this witness. Does any member have questions of this witness?

President: Have you been to damage control school, Chief?

A. Yes sir. I went the last in-port period.

Q. How long?

A. I went to one week basic, and one week advanced.

Q. Have all of the research personnel gone to damage control school?

A. No sir. We sent a number, I can't give any figures, but people who we assigned to repair parties as their GQ station, we sent them to either fire fighting or damage control school. We have to have a damage control

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two, and these people we always send to DC school and the others when we can, to fill out the ship's quotas for fire fighting school.

Q. What was the condition of the Captain during the period you were on the bridge?

A. When I arrived on the bridge, the Captain was lying on the deck by his chair on the port wing of the bridge with his leg propped up and they were applying a tourniquet. It seemed to me a rather large wound. He was perfectly rational, in command. He asked for the Executive Officer to report to the bridge and was told the XO was wounded, and he said, or indicated that he got the message. The Captain stayed on the bridge all night and propped himself in his chair. He'd get up periodically to insure circulation.

President: Thank you very much, Chief, I certainly appreciate your kindness.

Chief Thompson: Thank you very much, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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Carl Francis LAMKIN, CTC, USN, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, warned of Article 31, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. States your name, rank, organization and place of duty?

A. Carl Francis LAMKIN, CTC, USN

Q. You are aware Chief that this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain the facts concerning the attack on the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Would you please relate what took place on that day?

A. Yes, sir, I was secured from GQ drill shortly before the attack and at the time of the attack I was in the disbursing office, I noticed the initial shock and immediately headed for my GQ station which is repair three. As I was going to my GQ station the word was passed that we were being attacked by aircraft. Upon arriving to my GQ station I immediately started dispensing the gear, settling the men down.

Q. Your GQ station is where?

A. Repair Three. After there we got together. We had the men lay low on the deck, you could hear the strafing. At this time the word was passed that they had a fire in shaft alley and I took approximately four men and went down to shaft alley. The fire in shaft alley was under control in a matter of minutes. When I came back up they were calling for stretcher bearers and the men were dispensed for that. At this time they said they had a fire on the bridge in the motor whale boat and they were calling for assistance. I took repair three alpha plus some other men that were there and headed for the motor whale boat. As I was up on deck, portside by the U boat I was knocked down by some sort of explosion. I got up and went up and the men were already fighting the fire in the whale boat. It was pretty well destroyed at the time. As I was standing there we were strafed again and one of the men to my left fell. I don't remember his identity, he was picked up and drug inside. I turned to run forward when I came across the body of Mr. Toth who was pretty well messed up. I remember getting kind of sick at my stomach for a second or so. At this time I remember they had the fire pretty well under control. I went back down to my GQ which is repair three. I don't remember any of the time lapse during that time but I do remember them announcing to prepare for a torpedo attack starboard side. I told the men to brace themselves, to lay down on the deck if at all possible. The torpedo hit, it seemed like it was quite a while before the torpedo actually hit and the time we were told to prepare ourselves. The torpedo hit, there

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was an explosion, immediate smoke and immediate list. Again we sent parties forward to investigate the resulting damage, so on and so forth, and any assistance that was needed. At this time I went back up, I was going to radio central I asked the men there if any kind of message had gotten out and they said it had. I asked them if they had means of communication there and they said they hadn't a voice transmitter they could key there in the blind. They weren't keying it at the time. I told them to keep keying it in the blind as often as possible. They immediately did so. From this time on I just spent most of my time from repair three and the radio transmitter room. There was quite a time lapse, I don't remember exactly how long. The thing I do remember is I started out the door and I could hear the motor torpedo boats or at least one of them to our port side. I looked out, but all I could see was the top of it. I immediately came back in and told the men to hit the deck. There was no firing or anything like this which surprised me, because at the time I figured they were just coming in to finish us off. Again, I say I don't remember the time lapse, but I was in there quite awhile when I heard aircraft. They first announced that an aircraft was coming in our area. I told all men to stay inside and keep low.

Q. How did your men react to this?

A. The men reacted fantastic as far as I'm concerned in the repair party. We had men that had never had experience before. There was one occasion where a man panicked on me, he started crying and screaming. I gave him a hit, and he came out of it. I remember seeing one boy throwing up. He had evidently seen one of the bodies that they had brought down. Other than that the response was excellent. There seemed to be naturally the fear that you would expect, but no panic.

Counsel for the Court: Very good, are there any questions from members of the Court?

President: What can you tell me with a little more detail, chief, about this keying the transmitter? Who was in there in charge?

A. I can't remember his name sir, our second class radioman. I'm sorry, I can't think of his name. I remember the man explicitly, he was in there, there was a couple of radiomen in there, there was also an ET in there, working with the different transmitters. They told me they had them transmitting and a message had gotten out. The ET was doing everything possible checking the various transmitters. They only had one that was capable of transmitting voice at that time. I did tell them to keep keying it regardless. Each time he was keying it he noted that he was keying in the blind.

Q. But no receivers?

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A. Yes sir, no receivers. He did keep trying it continuously.
Q. What was he transmitting?
A. The exact words, I can't remember but he was transmitting, I don't remember the call, he was transmitting that we were under attack, we had been attacked by aircraft, we had sustained a torpedo hit, and the list I believe of the ship. Counsel for the Court: Did you hear any report of the possible jamming of the transmitter?
A. Yes, sir I did. I heard this later from Radioman Chief SMITH. He said that definitely that he had notice that the jamming was so loud that, the jamming was so loud that he thought at first that it was our transmitters which were malfunctioning but he noted, regardless of frequency, this loud jamming noise. At that time we weren't aware of what they were transmitting at radio central. This is one reason I stressed the fact that the men keep transmitting. Mr. Feingersonh: Do you know Chief what circuit they were trying to transmit on, which net they were on?
A. No sir I don't, all I know is that it was voice transmission and I really couldn't say. I did ask them if they had receiving capability and they said no they were transmitting in the blind.
President: What repair party had the responsibility of buttoning up up there in the research spaces?
A. The research spaces up forward, I believe that is repair two sir. But at this time there were men dispersed all over. I had repair three men up there, also repair three alpha, which is an assist party. They were dispersed. We were also fighting this fire.
President: What outfit was up there after the torpedo hit? Would that have been repair two?
A. We dispersed repair three then, immediately, I was trying to think because right after we sustained the hit, I believe it was petty officer Neece, which is one of damage control petty officers. I have two damage control petty officers, petty officer Neece and Smith, and to my recollection it was Neece who grabbed the men and went up there.
President: Thank you very very much. We certainly appreciate your kindness.

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The next witness will be Chief Wayne Smith.

Chief Wayne Smith, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Counsel for the Court: State your name, rate, and present duty station.

A. Wayne L. Smith, RMC, duty station aboard the USS LIBERTY.

Q. Chief Smith, as you know, this Court of Inquiry is investigating the circumstances of the attack on the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. Will you please tell this Court the facts that you recall on that date?

A. Yes sir. On that date at approximately 1400 local time, we had heard a loud blast. I was in radio central at the time with my second class who was on watch at the time. We immediately set Zulu and closed the porthole covers, and as soon as we had gotten them closed, the second blast sounded and the word was passed on the IMC to pass over hicom that we were being attacked, to any station. I immediately picked up the hicom transmitter which was on UIC 32, auxillary radio. We started to transmit with it. No station heard us, and five minutes or so later the transmitter was reported to have blown out. I immediately switched to a work two transmitter in the transmitter room, and we couldn't get out on that either, so, in between attacks by this time, I had went down to transmitter room and I found or discovered that somebody had accidently knocked the frequency dial one KC off. I corrected this and ran back to the radio shack and we got hold of stations schematics on which we passed the attack message. We did authenticate, and he authenticated correctly because he got a roger for it, my second class. Immediately after that, after we passed the word on the bridge that the message had got out, we had a power failure. After the power failure, I discovered that my control lines, remote lines were disconnected or in some way inoperable, so we passed control on the transmitter direct, but we still maintained a receiver on hicom. From that time on we passed all our traffic from the transmitter room and at 1227 they took control.

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Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the natio al colors flying?

A. Yes sir. At the time I ran out of the radio central space to the transmitter room.

Q. What time was this?

A. I would say about 1225, this was about two minutes either way. And this was Zulu time because I'm basing it on the log here. I had occasion to look at it because I was under the impression we were being attacked by UAR, and I wanted to see, and by the time that report came down to us from the bridge that they were Israelites, I wanted to check myself personally to see if our flag was flying because I couldn't understand it. For some reason I saw the flag flying at that time. If this was the original flag or not, I do not know sir.

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have with you today in your custody the radio log for the 8th of June 1967 for the USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I do. I have the original log from 1227Z on, and I have the smooth log covering the total time at 1158Z. At this time, from 1158Z to 1227Z, it is a reconstruction and we did not keep a log in radio central.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the original radio log exhibit number 23, and the smooth log exhibit number 24. I now request that they be admitted into evidence and request you read the pertinent times to the Court.

A. In our log 0430Z was the last entry, on hicom log. At 1158Z is when we started to call any station, this is ROCK STAR. We passed a Zulu precedence to this message. At 1200Z ROCK STAR was called by schematic saying "you are garbled". "Say again". We repeated three times to them that we were under attack. At 1204Z we had to switch transmitters. We called at 1208Z schematic and repeated three times tha. we were under attack. Immediately after 1208Z, still in the same minute, they rogered for the message. At 1209Z we repeated again we are under attack and this time we added "we need immediate assistance". At this time schematic asked ROCK STAR for authentication, at which time we gave them the correct

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authentication. At 1214Z they rogered that. About 1217Z we called schematic again saying "be advised that we have been hit by torpedo, listing about 9 degrees, request immediate assistance". At 1220Z this message was received and rogered for. At 1224Z three unidentified air raft approached the ship. We told this to schematic. At 1227Z they rogered for that message and that's when we had our power failure. We immediately shifted to the transmitter room.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Which hicom?

A. E4.4.

Q. You're sure chief - the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net - E4.4?

A. Yes sir. E4.4.

At 1235Z we had placed the emergency destruction bill in effect and I took it upon myself, not having any communications with the bridge, to hold emergency destruction. I only started emergency destruction on phase 1 and phase 2, which does not include unclassified matter. It only included KPD material that I had on hand. Well, we started to burn, and then the word came down from the bridge, finally, that there was never any order given to do this, so I had them halt and replaced all the ashes and the foreign material in the weighted bags.

Q. Did you throw anything over the side?

A. No sir. Nothing was thrown over the side. I have everything that we had up there. From 1233Z until 1323Z no signals were sent or received via hicom. All the traffic that we wanted to get out was out by the time the attack was over. At 1355 power was restored, passed down from radio central that the phone was inoperable and we shifted the control to transmitter room complete. By this I mean we had the receiver earlier. We gave them the receiver too.

Q. Did you note any jamming on the hicom circuit?

A. Yes sir. We did have jamming in my estimation. I was unable to determine this exactly, but every time it seems when an attack was made on us, or a strafing run, it was preceded by, anywhere from 25 to 30 seconds, carrier on our hicom circuit, and I had ascertained to check

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this by calling the transmitter room and they said that they had not keyed the transmitter. This prevailed during the attack and quite a bit after the attack, intermittently.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Chief, can you tell me ordinarily what circuits are you normally up on?

A. We're normally up on hicom, and we carry 500KCS receive only for distress and our 243.0 and 121.5 distress. On this occasion we had 339.4 set up, which, I'm not sure what frequency it is but it's a CONSIXTHFLT frequency.

Q. This is in addition to the hicom?

A. This is in addition to the hicom, yes. And we did have 277.8 fleet common up at the time.

Q. How do you normally handle your ship-shore traffic that's classified?

A. All traffic went out from down below except those they couldn't get on regular skeds. In which case they would off-line and we would send them out CW and this was no schedule, this was just on a case basis.

Q. The ship's general communication spaces doesn't have on-line capability?

A. No sir, they pass all traffic from down below on these circuits.

Q. What do you mean by down below?

A. I mean crypto one and crypto two. They had the equipment.

Q. I assume you copy fleet broadcasts in your spaces?

A. No sir, we do not. They copy fleet broadcasts down below.

Q. Do you know when the ship shifted from KR to JR?

A. This I have no knowledge of at all.

Q. You said that at the time 1204, I understood you said that prior to that time you had transmitted an attack report to schematic?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did they acknowledge?

A. I am not able to say right now.

Q. And you said that you did not authenticate under initial transmission?

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A. No sir, we did not.

Q. Authentication took place at time 1214?

A. That's when they rogered for it, yes sir. We authenticated at 1209.

Q. Were you challenged?

A. Yes sir, we were challenged by schematic.

Q. And at 1214 they rogered for your authentication?

A. Yes sir. The first rogered transmission was at time 1208 and the first rogered authenticated transmission was at time 1214 on the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net between LIBERTY and schematic -- CTU 60.2.9.

Counsel for the Court: As Counsel for the Court, I hereby submit exhibit number 25, which is a statement by Captain R. J. Arthur, Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer. I now offer it into evidence and will read it.

" 1. A preliminary estimate of the time required to make permanent shell repairs and repairs to necessary associated interior strength members is two to three weeks.

2. A firm estimate will require a detailed survey, not expected to commence until 15 June."

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THIRD DAY

Let the record show that the Court reconvened at 0820 on 15 June 1967, and the first witness having already been sworn and duly warned will be Eugene Aiken Platzek. Commander would you be kind enough to state your name, rank, and duty station.

A. Eugene Aiken Platzek, Commander, United States Navy, 633533. Counsel for the Court: Commander this Court is convened to look into the prior circumstances and aftermath matters related to the incident involving the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. It is the Court's understanding that you arrived at the scene in Malta in a technical capacity. If that is correct, will you tell the Court the capacity in which you are currently on board?

A. I'm currently on board as the representative of the Director of the Naval Security Group, OPNAV, and I am part of the Task Force 100, designated as 100.4, under Captain Carl M. Smith.

President: Commander, the first question this morning, we will handle separately and introduce this part of your evidence into the medical portion of the report. In order to provide a record that is not disjointed, we will introduce you a second time, formally, and place that testimony in the material side if this is agreeable with you?

A. This is agreeable.

Q. The first and only question, then, relative to the medical side has to do with your personal continuing participation in the recovery of those in compartments which were flooded by the torpedo explosion and the question goes like this -- You were in the space the whole time assisting in the recovery of the remains. This was from my personal observation. From those remains recovered by you what in your judgment was the possibility of any of those remains having been alive after the initial torpedo explosion?

A. There was no possibility of any being alive after the initial torpedo explosion.

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Q. As I understand it, Commander, the degree of dismemberment and conditions of the remains are the facts which cause you to arrive at this conclusion. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Maurice H. Bennett, United States Navy was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Do you think anyone could have survived after the torpedo struck the compartment?

A. There is no possibility of any of the people being alive after the torpedo hit. This conclusion was reached, or is based on the degree of dismemberment and conditions of the remains upon recovery.

President: Thank you very much Lieutenant Bennett.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Material Section

Commander PIATZEK was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

President: You, in your technical capacity, are knowledgeable on installation and acquisition costs of the technical equipment in LIBERTY at the time of the attack, which now will require replacement, and/or rehabilitation of remaining equipment where possible. Would you be kind enough to address yourself to this area and give the Court of Inquiry your best estimate at this time of how long it would take to reacquire LIBERTY's technical capability through the acquisition of long-lead time procurements, new purchases, and rehabilitation of old equipment, in terms of time and dollar cost, if you please?

A: The equipment aboard the LIBERTY is relief equipment as much as it is research equipment. The length of time it would take to acquire this equipment would be approximately one year. The cost of this equipment, in my opinion, would be approximately six to eight million dollars. This

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does not include the installation costs of this equipment. This is strictly procurement dollars.

President: Thank you Commander PLATZEK. Does any other member of the Court have questions at this time to which Commander PLATZEK might address his particular technical competence?

Counsel for the Court: Will the repairing of this equipment be done in the United States?

A. The repairing of this equipment will have to be done in the United States. I don't believe anyone else has the technical capability.

Q. What would be your estimate of completion date of repairs needed?

A. This I couldn't say until such time as I found out the extent of damage by actually taking equipment and testing, but I presume with all of the shocks that this equipment has taken, that it would have to be completely remanufactured or procured new.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court: Captain Russell L. ARTHUR, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, UCMJ and examined as follows.

Q. Captain, would you be kind enough to state your name, rank, and duty station, and the reason why your technical competence finds itself here on this scene at this time?

A. Captain Russell L. ARTHUR, 415894, my permanent duty station is Fleet Material Officer, Service Force, COMSIXTHFLT, I have been ordered here in connection with the repairs to LIBERTY and have been designated as Task Group 100.2.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, Based upon your preliminary estimate of both the topside structural and internal damage resulting from the attack on 8 June, what is your estimate in terms of time and dollar cost for the complete restoration of LIBERTY into the condition she enjoyed prior to the attack in question?

A. Admiral, including ripout restoration of all structure, foundations, cabling, and on the assumption that the equipment that is necessary to

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install is pierside at the time we require it during the period of the reconstruction program, I would estimate that we could restore everything to the condition existing prior to the attack in approximately four months for a cost of about two million dollars. This includes everything except the cost of the equipment, installation, checkout, testing, and restoration of all of the habitability features that were existing.

President: Captain, as a professional shipbuilder, would you be kind enough to explain in simple terms for the Court of Inquiry how Commander PLATZEK's estimate of one year for long-lead and procurement relates to your statement just made of four months for accomplishment of the repairs. How, in the shipbuilding business is this time separation or apparent disparity accommodated?

A. Generally, on new construction ships, of course, this is planned so that the equipment is dockside in accordance with the erection schedule. In this case, the ship would be immobilized and unable to carry out its mission until the equipments were actually provided, and the estimate that I gave was based strictly on the structural and the reinstallation of existing items before. But the only way we could accommodate this is to delay the ship which would add to the cost of the repairs.

Q. Let me see if I understand this now, in simple terms, your estimate of four months presupposes availability before you start, of everything that is going to be in the ship at the time you finish?

A. Yes sir.

President: Do the other members of the Court have any questions?

Counsel for the Court: Your figure did not include cost of equipment?

A. No sir, not at all.

Q. For record purposes, the cost to repair the damage to the ship itself is would be the figure you stated?

A. Yes sir, approximately two million dollars.

Q. In four months?

A. Yes sir.

Captain ATKINSON: And this includes all equipment plus hull repair exclusive of research equipment, is that correct?

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A. Yes sir.

President: Now for the summary which I feel might be appropriate at this time, as I understand it, Captain, we would properly add your two million to Commander PLATZEK's [illegible] to eight million and come up with a high figure of ten million dollars and one year loss of the capability of this ship?

A. Yes sir, that's correct, Admiral.

Q. That's the way you do this, is that correct?

A. Yes sir.

Counsel for the Court: One last question, Captain. At the last meeting of the Court, not knowing you would be a witness before this Court, I had a statement received from you entered in the record, in which you indicate that it would be two or three weeks time to make the necessary shell repairs in order for this vessel to proceed back to the United States. What is your estimate of the cost of temporary repairs being made in this shipyard?

A. About fifty to sixty thousand dollars, and I have received no estimates from the yard. This is a rough estimate based upon the knowledge of how much general costs are in this area.

President: So that three week period and sixty thousand dollars would be additive to your two million and six month figure, is that correct?

A. Two million and four months, yes sir, that is correct.

President: Any further questions?

President: Thank you very much, Captain. Before you leave, would you be kind enough to confirm my understanding that you and Commander PLATZEK are having photographs taken, under your personal supervision, of the internal torpedo damage and the external hull damage, significant parts thereof, for inclusion in the record which we will introduce upon processing of the film?

A. Yes sir, that's being arranged now, Admiral.

President: Thank you very very much, Captain. We certainly appreciate your time. (The witness was duly waived and withdrew).

Let the record show at this point that for completeness, this Court of

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Inquiry does not consider itself competent at this time, with witness available, to address itself to such hidden cost as salaries of personnel, Gratuities to those lost, loss of service of personnel injured, hospitalization costs, loss of use of the vessel, and similar cost which are incalculable based upon available information, but which should and must be included if there is an effort made to arrive at a total dollar value loss of this particular attack against the United States Navy.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION

The witness took the stand, was duly sworn, and advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and examined as follows:

Counsel for the Court: Please state your full name, rate, and present duty station.

A. Joseph Paul Carpenter, 794 84 55, CT2, USS LIBERTY.

Q. You have been called before this Court of Inquiry to give information which you may possess concerning an incident which occurred on 8 June 1967, namely the attack on USS LIBERTY. I now turn over questioning to the Assistant Counsel for the Court.

Q. CARPENTER, I understand that the ship maintains, other than distress frequencies, that basically communications topside here consists of the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net, unclassified voice hicom net. I'm curious, if you can tell me what broadcast you were copying upon inchop to the Med, and then whether or not you shifted to any broadcast there, and what broadcast you shifted to?

A. When we came into the Med, we were copying XR broadcasts and KR broadcasts, and then, I can't remember the exact day but I think it was approximately 4 June, we shifted to JR broadcasts.

Q. It's significant when you shifted to JR, and I'd like you to try and be sure, and if you're not sure, then I think we may have to try and research a little bit and come up with a specific time of shift. Now, after you switched to JR, do you recall any dificulty in copying the Asmara fleet broadcasts?

A. Sir, every time I was on watch, the JR broadcast was up five by, we had no missing numbers.

Q. Now, you say every time you were on watch, do you remember what time frame we're talking about commencing with 070001Z June?

A. On 7 June, I had the evening watch, that was from 1600 to 2330 that night and then I had the day watch which started at 0630 in the morning.

Q. Now when you came on the watch at 071600 local time, were you missing any numbers since shift time according to your records?

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A. Well, sir, to my knowledge, we had no missing numbers at that time.

Q. Could you tell me what your procedures are when you are missing numbers?

A. When we're missing a number, the first thing we do, we have a missing number sheet, we mark it down on that sheet. And it stays on there until it comes back again, and then we will cross it off, we will mark how it came back, whether we serviced it or whether it was a rerun, but on JR broadcast they have so many reruns that everything came back. We never had to service it.

Q. What would you estimate on an average, was the period of time that you are actually missing a number until it was rerun without a rerun request?

A. Is this on a JR broadcast?

Q. JR.

A. On the JR broadcast we'd usually wait about a day and a half because they rerun so much. We found out that on that broadcast they'd rerun as many as two to three times each day.

Q. I don't understand what you mean by a day and a half. Do you wait a day and a half, then if you didn't get a rerun you would request it?

A. Yes sir, because they would rerun three times. We figure if we're going to miss it three times, we better service it then.

President: Let me ask a layman's question here. Does this mean that the JR, and I'm really addressing this question to Commander FEINGERSCH, in his technical communications competence, does this mean that the load of Asmara would be so low as far as units are served that they could afford the luxury of rerunning a whole schedule three times, is that what he's saying?

A. Yes sir, Admiral. Asmara only has a handful of subscribers and they can run up to a thousand messages a day and they're probably running in the neighborhood of two or three reruns.

President: At this point let the record show that the accommodation of communication traffic in LIBERTY was physically arranged where the torpedo hit has eliminated records to which the present witness and the following witnesses on the matter of communications, might logically be expected to

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refer to. Therefore, any hesitancy or inability of communication witnesses must necessarily be viewed and read with this fact in mind. They are dealing entirely from personal memory. That's true?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You say that while you were on watch you had no trouble of copying JR?

A. On the JR broadcast, we never had very much. Down by Africa we had trouble.

Q. No, I mean while you were in the Med?

A. While in the Med, we, just when the actual changeover, we had a little bit of trouble first getting it in. Just what I've been told, I was not actually on watch.

Q. More specifically, getting to the 8th of June, let us say from 0300012, do you recall whether you were missing numbers on that particular day?

A. I recall one time when I was down there that WALTON, CT1 was down there, and he mentioned that he had no missing numbers at that time. I believe that was the day before the attack. He was the one that was primarily watching the broadcast at that time because we were so busy in the other room. We had such a backlog.

President: Where's WALTON now, son?

A. He's dead now, he was trapped in crypto.

Q. Do you recall missing very many numbers on the 7th of June on JARAD?

A. I don't recall, sir. There might have been a few KR numbers but no JR numbers.

Q. Getting away from the broadcast for a moment now, on your ship-shore termination, what type terminations did you establish, how often, and with whom?

A. Well, for the past few days we had come up anytime we were able to, and we would come up ship-shore to Greece most often because they were the best as far as ship-shore ORESTES were concerned. We had one sked, I believe, in the last two days we were out and it was with NAVRADCEN Morocco, and we went through Greece, using their transmitters and their antennaes in passing it from there to Morocco.

Q. I understand that you do not maintain a permanent ship-shore termination neither ORESTES nor VFTO. Is a ORESTES circuit that it that

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you come up with when you have traffic periodically?

A. Yes sir. And then only real hot traffic.

Q. Without stating the reason, are there reasons why you, at certain times, can't come up on ORESTES ship-shore circuit due to what the ship may be doing?

A. Definitely, sir.

Q. Definitely there are reasons why you cannot?

A. Yes sir.

Q. During these periods when you cannot come up are they usually extensive periods of time, specifically can you recall on the 7th and 8th of June having extensive periods of time, where because of what the ship was doing, you could not come up and terminate the circuits and request missing broadcast numbers if you wanted to do so.

A. Yes sir, there were some times, it wasn't necessarily a long period of time that we couldn't come up, it's just that we didn't have enough time in between to get everything set up and get going before they would tell us to shut down again.

Q. What the ship was doing?

A. Yes sir.

President: As I understand it, young man, these limitations on ability and inability to come up on a transmitter whenever you might wish to deal in this area of your technical research. As I recall, Admiral MARTIN mentioned you did some work on wave propagation, and from a layman's point of view, would it be reasonable to even assume that a transmitter of high power would affect your wave propagation research efforts?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Then, to be sure we're perfectly clear on this point, on missing numbers on the 7th and 8th of June, very possibly could have not been requested because of the transmitter interfering with the ship's research mission?

A. Well sir, we got all the general service out on the 7th. Every general service message that we had that I can remember.

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Q. I'm talking about broadcast traffic missing numbers coming in from Asmara, particularly on the 8th?

A. You mean we wouldn't be able to service this?

Q. You wouldn't have asked for a rerun because the ship was involved in its research mission, and you couldn't just come up on a transmitter because you were missing, say five numbers?

A. No sir, we probably couldn't have.

Q. Then, you would wait for the second or third rerun, which could take maybe 24 to 36 hours, in lieu of disrupting what the ship was doing?

A. Yes sir.

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Q. Do you recall any missing numbers on the 8th, JARAD?

A. No sir, I don't.

President: Young man, in this procedure that you have described typical of the condition that exists aboard this ship anywhere you might be operating?

A. Yes sir, it is.

Q. In other words, this is not something new?

A. No sir.

Q. In other words, you have never felt compelled to service a number immediately, you have always felt comfortable in waiting for a rerun whether it was coming from Asmara, Anapolis, Philippines, Guam, or wherever, is that correct?

A. The only time we would service immediately is if we had had an outage of a period of time, say ten, fifteen, twenty minutes, as quite a few numbers would have been missed.

Q. You mean a receiver outage?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And you had no such receiver outage?

A. No sir.

Q. Let me put that question - it will be the same question, son, but put a little bit differently. You have had no cause for concern to feel compelled to take extraordinary measures such as telling somebody you had to stop listening to the moon, for example, in order to get a service on Asmara. Is that correct?

A. No sir, we never did.

Q. You never had to do that?

A. No sir. We did it once when we had some flash traffic to send out, and some immediate traffic we'd tell them what we had to get out; and then they would...

Q. I'm talking just about traffic you would be receiving; I'm not talking about outgoing traffic.

A. As far as traffic we were receiving, they never bothered us at all.

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Q. Ordinarily, how many KW37's do you have on a broadcast simultaneously?

A. We have two KW37's and we try to keep both of them on different signals so if one will drop out we have the other one as a backup. At that time I don't believe we did because we couldn't handle more than two signals and we had those two in diversity.

Q. Ordinarilly, you have no reason to suspect copying two freqs on the same broadcast simultaneously. You have no reason to suspect that your're going to miss a number?

A. We had no reason at that time to suspect that we were going to because they were so five by.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I have nothing else.

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on the average since LIBERTY chopped in the Med, what was your daily traffic addressed to LIBERTY?

A. Addressed to LIBERTY. I would say around - well, it would vary from day to day. I'd say at the most we would get 25 and at the least we would got 7 or 8.

President: Would this be a comparably normal load, sen?

A. That would be a normal load, yes.

Q. For any day, any place?

A. For any day, any place, sir.

President: Does any member present have for the record a feeling toward the number of subscribers of Asmara?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Yes sir.

Q. Is it in the hundreds?

A. No sir, just COMIDEASTFOR basically. No sir, it's KR they use ordinarily. And a ship like the LIBERTY, very few. Five or six, not even a dozen, sir. Very few, except if we had a contingency in the Red Sea and we sent additional ships down.

President: Is this your first ship in the Navy?

A. Yes sir, this is my first ship.

Q. So you have nothing to compare, equipment-wise, from personal experience, the equipment on this ship with any other ship?

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A. Well, I've been in the radio shack in other ships.

Q. What would be your opinion as to the comparability of the equipment that you were using in LIBERTY and the equipment as far as being modern, up to date, and the equipment in some of the other radio shacks you've been in?

A. I guess I could best describe that by what I heard a workman say when he came down there. He said "you have the best equipment I've ever seen in any radio shack anywhere."

President: Thank you very much.

Assistant Council for the Court: I have one more question that may be pertinent, Admiral. Do you recall ever getting much off-line encrypted top secret traffic on JAKUB or KR aboard LIBERTY?

A. As long as I have been on here, we have never received anything off-line. Top secret off-line, never on JA broadcast. We never even received anything off-line.

Q. How long have you been aboard the ship, son?

A. This was my third cruise.

President: Put on your thinking cap, son. Try to remember back, what you had till midnight on the 7th?

A. My watch on the 7th was the evening watch from 1600 local to 2330.

Q. On the 7th?

A. On the 7th, yes sir.

Q. And did we establish that when you came on watch, you did or did not have any known missing Asmara numbers?

Q. From a technical point of view again, we're using Commander FEINGERSCH as a technical expert. Would that JARAD number have been transmitted by 1600 on the 7th?

A. Yes sir. Probably for the second time.

Q. Probably for the second time?

A. Yes.

President: And the witness indicates that to the best of his knowledge,

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person of Commander FELDSCH, what could be an explanation for this apparent non-delivery?

A. To be perfectly honest, Admiral, there is none. A message receives a signed broadcast number, and then each subsequent message gets a consecutive number. Asmara has their logs where here, of course, they've been destroyed. Asmara has checked their logs and has said this number, and it's a repeat though garbled, was transmitted at such an such a time. I think we have to assume that Asmara, since he does have his logs, that this message was in fact sent at this time and the ship in fact did miss it.

President: I do not accept that. Just because I'm hard headed. I will accept it if we can find two other users of Asmara who can prove to this Court that they received that number prior to this young man coming on watch at 1600 on the 7th. And that alone will satisfy me that that message went on the JARAD as advertised. And the reason for my doubt is because we already know that Asmara has made critical errors before.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: We can, if you so desire, sir, verify this.

President: Make that so, by phone, this morning to CINCUSNAVEUR.

Captain ATKINSON: One final question - did you have any missing numbers w when you were relieved?

A. As far as I can remember, there was no change in status on relief.

President: Now, from a layman's point of view and in anticipation of there being other laymen vis a vis communications, reading this record, what way does a subscriber have of knowing that there is a message for him that he has missed?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: He does not know the missed number is specifically addressed to him, sir. He only knows that he has missed a message and he is required to maintain a continuous file of numbers. So, he must someway, somehow, get that missed number and then he can determine whether or not if it is for his info or action. By the number itself, there is no way. He must see the message.

President: Let the record show at this time that the lack, as the result

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Lieutenant GOLDEN, the ship's communications officer, that if LIBERTY missed a JARAD number, and for example, had outgoing traffic to send, of both a technical nature relating to her mission and operational nature, all of this type of traffic had been and would have been in the hypothetical case being discussed, packaged together and sent to a single addressee for action, namely Naval Security Group Morocco. It is the Court's understanding that the burden would then be on the Naval Security Group Morocco to sort out the traffic received from LIBERTY, transmitted during one of the periods she could afford to transmit without interference with her technical mission, and then the recipient, Naval Security Group Morocco, in the case of missed JARAD numbers, would have informed radio Asmara via NAVCOMSTA Morocco of LIBERTY's requirements. This is going to be possibly germane to this Court's inquiry to determine whether or not such was done, and the time delay experienced in Morocco which station is understood to have been saturated during this period of Middle East Tension, despite the fact that radio Asmara, by virtue of few subscribers, would have had a relatively low operationally load.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant Maurice H. Bennett, Jr., United States Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. Maurice H. Bennett, Jr., Lieutenant, USN, 628125, present duty station USS LIBERTY.

Q. Lieutenant Bennett, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain the circumstances attendant with the attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. The Assistant Counsel for this Court will now ask you a few questions pertinent to the attack and to the duty station

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Q. Do you recall whether any JAIC ma[illegible] were missing on the 7th and 8th. Was it reported to you that any members were missed?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no members were missing. I was not the communications officer at the time of the incident, therefore, I have no reason to have direct knowledge of any missing members.

President: Who was the communications officer, Lieutenant Dehart?

A. Lieutenant James C. Pierce, who is now deceased. He was killed in the attack.

Q. Was the mission of the ship such on the 7th and 8th that it would have disrupted the mission of the ship if you had transmitted the messages at this time?

A. Excessive transmissions would. It might all, however, the very nature of the situation dictated that we did come up in communications more frequently than normal in order to pass pertinent high precedence traffic originated by the ship.

Q. Why did you pass this traffic to on the 7th and 8th?

A. On the 7th and 8th of June, due to the inability to contact [illegible] Morocco, the majority, if not all, of the high precedence traffic was off-line encrypted and passed to [illegible] Morocco for further delivery.

Q. During these periods of transmission, if you were in fact aware of the missing number, would you have queried it at that time?

A. In most instances, no, because it was an individual message which dictated that this message go out, and again going back to the mission of the ship, to preclude undue interference with the mission, we only were on long enough to get the one or two high precedence messages out and then the transmitters were shut down.

Q. Why did you shift the JAIC on the 7th of June?

A. I don't know the exact reason. It was my understanding that was necessary, and where I heard it from I don't recall. But, in accordance with instructions from whom I don't know, there is a designated point that you shift broadcasts.

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Q. This is 100% true. It is in [redacted] 159. I was just curious if you were directed to shift to [redacted] for any particular reason, or if you shifted just as a matter of normal communications procedure?

A. To the best of my knowledge we shifted in accordance with the [redacted] communications procedure. And, again to the best of my knowledge, [redacted] in accordance with past known practices, Mr. Pierce who was the communications officer, notification of the shift is usually made only, I would presume within 24 to 48 hours in advance.

President: I'd like to ask a stupid question. I just don't understand it why, then you're in the Eastern Mediterranean, you listen to [redacted] which, even to my unpracticed eye, is Turkish, and you [redacted] talk to somebody, you go to Morocco, and everybody I've heard certainly indicates that they have had difficulty copying Moroccо. How, is Ankara incapable of listening?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: No sir, Ankara is not incapable of listening, but in the case of this particular ship, and the type of research traffic they are passing, the traffic is destined, or initially destined, to go to [redacted] Morocco. It would serve no purpose to the ship to send it to Ankara because Ankara first of all would have to be off-line encrypted because Ankara would not be permitted to read it, and Ankara would have to relay it to [redacted] Morocco, it would have to be decrypted, and would just introduce many many delays. It would serve no advantage in the case of this particular ship to send it to anyone but [redacted] Morocco.

President: Now, would you expect on that a facility like ours and that of the Navy Radio Naval [redacted] like this picture, which is still more close than Morocco but not as close as Ankara?

A. In the case of this ship they had initially, I understand, in establishing their on-line secure circuit with [redacted] Morocco. Consequently, they terminated a circuit with Greece and they had [redacted] transmitters to take this circuit and pass it on to [redacted] Morocco. So the signal is going through [redacted] original classified [redacted]

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a boost, so to speak, at Greece, but it still winds up in Morocco. If it's general service traffic that Greece personnel can read, they would have terminated the circuit, which they did on high priority general service type traffic.

President: But, not always?

A. But, not always.

Q. In other words, this package [illegible] that we talked about [illegible] go to Morocco off-line encrypted?

A. If it went to CINCSOUTH it would have went on-line and [illegible], because the proper people are [illegible] in the [illegible] a mixed package as recalled.

President: Does the Court have any further questions of Lieutenant Bennett?

No Response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Communications Technician Second Class Tracy L. Long, United States Navy, took the stand as a witness was duly warned, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and testified as follows.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. State your name, rate, and present duty station.

A. My name is Tracy L. Long, CTC, present duty station is this Command.

Q. Long, you've been called before this Court of Inquiry today to testify concerning circumstances attendant with the attack on the USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. The Court is very interested to ascertain certain information that you might possess. Would you now answer questions that the Assistant Counsel for the Court will put before you.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you stand watch as far as this [illegible] concerned on the evening of 7th and 8th of June?

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A. Yes, I did sir. On the morning of the 8th I had the mid watch. I got off work at about 7 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Do you recall any difficulty in copying the JARAT broadcast from Asmara during that period of time?

A. No sir. It was fairly clear. There were a couple times that we had some problems because some equipment went down and we had to get out material man to repair it, but on the whole it was a good signal and we were able to copy it.

Q. When you say equipment, did you drop out of sync?

A. No, it was the printer. The page print was being garbled because of some malfunctions within the gear.

Q. Were you getting the tape?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And the tape was five by?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When you relieved the watch, do you recall any report or any indication that any numbers on the JARAD broadcast had been missed?

A. There were some that had been missed. I'm almost positive.

Q. Do you have a feel for the volume. Was it a matter of a few, or was it a matter of a whole block indicating maybe you dropped out of sync for an hour?

A. It appeared to me, as I remember, it may have been four or five, or maybe six messages that had been missed through some malfunction.

Q. Now, this is on the morning of the 8th, do you recall whether these messages were basically missing over a period of 12, 24, 48 hours, I know it's hard but generally speaking, do you have any feel for that?

A. No sir. The ones that I remember, there was a blank space on the message number log that we kept.

Q. As best your memory serves, while you had the watch and you had some trouble, can you recall at the time you were relieved of the watch, whether or not any numbers were missed during your time of watchstanding,

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from 080001 to 7 or 8 o'clock in the morning?

A. I don't believe we did, sir, because when we came on watch, we thought that we would very possible be very busy, and we switched - we were using the reprinter from one place and the page print from another place, so that we could use the good page print for running off copies that had to be distributed. We did this right at the beginning of the watch. We had some malfunction with the page printer, but we checked the tape to see how many of the messages that we did not have page prints on were to us.

Q. Under normal procedures when you come on watch or you've just been relieved, do you more or less depend on your log of consecutive numbers - take a glance at that to see if there were any missing numbers, or is it usually passed word of mouth, or just how do you know when you come on watch whether or not you're missing numbers on any particular gear regardless of what broadcast you're copying?

A. If the message had been missed that day, there would be blank spaces on the message number log. If it had been prior to that day, there was another page where numbers of all missing messages were noted, and when we got out a message or received a repeat on it, if we did not need it then it was logged out that we didn't need it; if we did need it, then it was copied down.

President: Then, on this sheet which was sort of a backlog sheet for time prior to the watch, were there any numbers on that backlog sheet for a couple, three days before?

A. Yes sir, there were. When we first picked up the JR broadcast, we were having bad copy with them it would keep going out and we missed several numbers.

Q. When you say, it would keep going out, we're not communicators, what's going out?

A. The signal was fading. The transmission was weak. We were just having trouble from the weak signals we were receiving. And we just don't know if there were some missed because of that. It would be good for awhile and then it would fade out. It would become too weak for awhile. It would go good and it would go bad. It just kept doing that.

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Q. Now here's a real hard one - during the period of 6, 7, and 8 June; or I should say 7 and 8 June, could you give us any feel for what percentage of reliability JARAD was having, was it 50% reliable, was it 90% reliable, what would be your feelings?

A. It seemed to me that it was 85 to 90 per cent reliable. It was very good. I had the day watch on the 7th and I didn't lose the signal once. I copied it all day and didn't have trouble.

Q. On the 8th when you had the watch, did you establish a ship-shore termination to pass traffic to the beach on ORESTES. Do you know if one was established when you had the watch?

A. On the 7th, they tried to, but there were some problems that came up and they never did get established as far as I know.

President: I just haven't got a feeling for what I heard. Now you said that you copied solid on the 7th when you had a day watch. You had a readable signal throughout.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now, does that mean that you had no missed numbers on your watch?

A. I cannot remember any, sir. To the best of my knowledge, there were none.

Q. There were no missed numbers on the day watch. That would have covered what period of time, on the 7th?

A. The day watch started -- we relieve about 6:30 to 6:45 local in the morning and we relieve for lunch at approximately between 11 and 11:15. We ate and came right back. I don't know exactly what time that was but we ate and came right back to work. We were relieved again approximately 4:30 in the afternoon.

Q. So, from 6:30 you can testify to the best of your knowledge you had no missed numbers on JARAD?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And when you came on watch in the morning, there were some missed numbers, is that correct?

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A. I seem to remember some.

Q. How many on that missed number sheet could you recall checking off on the reruns that occurred during your watch?

A. None, sir, because the JR broadcast was sending reruns from a period before we started the copying. They had not reached the missing numbers that we had.

President: I see. Well this is interesting then. The rerun repeats that we hear Armara has been able to do two or three times in a 24-hour period does not necessarily constitute 100% reruns?

A. No sir. The numbers we were receiving on the rerun were numbers from earlier in that month.

Q. Earlier in the Month?

A. Before we had started copying the other broadcasts.

Q. Now, a technical question, a procedure question for Commander Feingersch (asst counsel), How does a transmitting station decide what they're going to rerun. Are they requests from users?

A. That's one source. They'll be requested from various people then during certain periods of the day when they feel that their propagation is at the least bit of efficiency, they will take the numbers that were run during that period of day without any requests and rerun those if capacity of work units permits. If they run 500 numbers and they have a capacity of 900, there's no reason why they shouldn't take 400 of those 500 and rerun them anyway. The transmitters there, traffic's off the air. But it's requests, and it's to their professional knowledge of propagation and location of ships, how many minutes do we run, what numbers do we run.

Q. One last question, son. When you were relieved of the watch, and turned over to your relief these sheets of paper showing missed numbers, I want to ask you again, had you added to that list in your handwriting, during your period of time on watch?

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A. I don't believe that I had, sir. If I did, I might have added some numbers while we were having trouble with the page print and then I remember I went back and I checked the reproof tape and read on to see if it was for us and checked them off.

Q. So, you didn't add any new ones. You don't remember whether you checked off any old ones?

A. I know that I did not check off any old ones.

Q. You did not check off any old ones, and as I understood you that was because what they were rerunning was stuff before you even picked up the broadcast?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When you assumed t watch on the 8th, you said there were some numbers missing before they shifted to the JARAD broadcast. KR numbers you said. Do you recall after shifting to the Asmara broadcast of anyone taking any action to get the, regardless of the number, missing KR numbers?

A. No sir, I don't. I was not on watch when they changed broadcast. They changed broadcast they were copying while I was in between strings of watches. I was out on a break when they changed, so I do not know if they took any action of if they did, what action they took.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Chief Warrant Officer Jack E. WICKHAM, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, UCMJ and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Please state your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. Chief Warrant Officer Jack E. Wickham, 537928/7742, I am the assistant salvage and diving officer for Commander Service Squadron Eight, Norfolk, Virginia.

Q. You are well aware this Court of Inquiry has been convened to ascertain

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certain information attendant with the attack upon USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967. You have been called as a witness, to answer certain questions you may be able to answer. At this time, the President, Admiral Kidd would like to ask you a few questions.

Q. Mr. Wickham, your reputation is known to me in the salvage business, and if I recall correctly you have been involved in salvage operations, the recovery of the remains, and lengthy details incident to marine salvage for some 20 years. Is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. The question that I am going to ask you will be included in the medical portion of this report, and it goes like this. In your professional experience and based thereon what would be your opinion, from your duties yesterday incident to the recovery of the remains from the torpedoed compartment of the USS LIBERTY, as to the possibility or probability of any of those remains having been alive after the explosion?

A. In my experience with explosion of this type aboard naval vessels, I have no doubt of any kind that any person could have survived the initial explosion down there. I think death was instantaneous for every person in the immediate area.

Q. Now, to extend just a bit. Some of the people down there got out. There is the ever present possibility in the minds of next of kin, that in our determination to button up the ship quickly, that we might inadvertently trap men below. Now, would you comment on this aspect of this situation. As I understand it, from what you said, those who got out, got out because they were able to get out, and the rest were dead on the explosion?

A. Yes sir, that is my opinion.

Q. And from previous discussions with you, I understand that this opinion derived from the degree of dismemberment and like facts which caused this conviction?

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A. Yes sir. Every body that I observed down there, there is no doubt in my mind that that person was dead at the time of the explosion.

President: Thank you very very much, Mr. Wickham.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Commander William L. McConagle, was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Captain, did you bring with you today the gyro compass record for USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. Is this it?

A. Yes sir, it is.

I request the recorder to mark this as exhibit number 26 and offer it into evidence as exhibit number 26.

Q. Will you please read pertinent extracts from that.

A. The ship's gyro was last inspected by the USS VULCAN qualified gyro inspection and repair personnel on 30 March 1967.

Q. Is that 30 March 1967 a timely inspection?

A. Yes sir, it is. The ship's gyro is required to be inspected whenever possible by tender or yard personnel specifically trained in this responsibility once each quarter. I would like to indicate that the log shows that the error at the time of this inspection was .1° westerly.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions. Does any member of the Court desire to question the witness?

President: Captain, in our previous discussions, you told me a story which I have since come to identify as remarkable humility and self-effacement on your part which I presume has caused you not to mention in testimony the way you navigated this ship out of dangerous waters after the attack. Will you please tell the Court how, while lying on your back, with no compass except the magnetic compass, and based upon your recollection of

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your magnetic compass error in relation to the gyro compass book, you used the sun and subsequently the North Star to clear the area.

A. Admiral, after a time on the bridge, when I had received minor injuries, I lost considerable blood and attempts to stem the flow of blood by self-help were unsuccessful, I noticed myself beginning to lose consciousness. I immediately layed down on the deck flat on my back on the port wing and raised the bleeding leg as high as possible, resting it on my port bridge chair, and there a first class communications technician by the name of Carpenter and other persons who I don't recall at this time, applied a tourniquet to my right leg which effectively stopped the flow of blood. I, at no time, lost consciousness and had my full faculties at all times. I realized by that time I had lost considerable amounts of blood because it was sloshing in my shoes and my right leg was completely soaked with blood. They cut the right pant leg off to get it out of the area of the wounds. I looked at my wounds at that time and they still did not appear to me to be serious and since the flow of blood had been stopped I gave no further consideration to - I didn't consider I had any more problem in that area. I asked them to bring me coffee, fluids, a couple of salt tablets, and so forth. I conned the ship by looking aft and by being able to see the wake of the ship I was able to tell after steering which way to apply the rudder and how long to leave it on to attempt to average out the best course that I felt the ship should travel on to stand clear of possible shoal areas. I remained on my back for approximately an hour and a half. I then felt that I had regained sufficient strength that I was able to get up from the deck and con the ship from the wing of the ship and from the pilot house. I couldn't get my leg in a comfortable position so I moved from one place to the other. I couldn't stay in any one place for too long a period of time. It seemed to me that my remaining on the bridge, this would be able to lessen the shock that the rest of the crew had received.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, predicated on your testimony at the last hearing in which you testified, the Court propounded certain questions for you to answer. Will you please now give the Court the answers to those questions?

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A. Yes sir, I will. The questions concern the following:

Q. The basic directives for your operations in the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be those contained in JCS message 011545Z which indicated you would operate south of 32ON during the period 9-30 June. Did you receive any directive to commence these operations before 9 June?

A. Directives received both before and subsequent to JCS 011545Z indicated the urgency of initiating operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as possible. For example: COMSERVRON 8 message 240020Z directed LIBERTY to depart Abidjan immediately and proceed at best speed to Rota for logistics and subsequent employment in the Eastern Mediterranean. My 241732Z indicated ETA Port Said area about 061400Z June. This estimate allowed five hours at Rota to fuel, reprovision, and again get underway. Heavy seas and a boiler casualty delayed LIBERTY's arrival Rota. Repairs to an antenna system were undertaken at Rota and the ship was directed to remain at Rota until repairs were completed. On the basis of telephone authorization LIBERTY departed Rota at 021230Z for the Eastern Mediterranean and reported that best speed would be utilized enroute (LIBERTY 022108Z).

LIBERTY 021330Z indicated that the ship would arrive at 32-00N 33-00E at 080300Z and commence operations within 50 miles from 32-00N 33-30E.

LIBERTY SITREP 070908Z indicates that pim would be stationary at 072300Z and operations would be within 30 miles of 31-45N 33-30E.

CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z, which refers to both LIBERTY 021330Z (MOVREP) and 022108Z (SITREP on departure Rota), directed that COMSIXTHFLT operate LIBERTY to derive maximum benefit from special capabilities.

LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT by message at 070001Z.

No messages were received which would indicate that the expressed intentions of LIBERTY was at variance with the implied desires of all higher commands concerned to effectively employ the unique capabilities of LIBERTY at the earliest possible time. Daily SITREPS/PIM reports were

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submitted LIBERTY messages: 0320202 June, 0420302 June, 0519342 June, 0618442 June, 0709082 June, 0806342 June pertain.

Inspite of the fact that outgoing transmissions were undesirable for research purposes in view of the operational importance of these messages to the ship's technical/operational commanders I directed that the SITREPS that these messages be sent irregardless of their undesirable effects on the effectiveness of the research mission, especially in view of the increased precedence for transmission directed and prior length of time to obtain DOD for further routing of the SITREPS submitted 3, 4 and 5 June.

JCS 0520502 June Priority (TOR 08/0555Z Jun) contains procedure to be utilized in developing and promulgating LIBERTY schedule and changes while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. Note that LIBERTY is not included in the framework of developing the schedule or changes and a specific note was included in paragraph 3 of that message to the effect that "... on all messages pertaining to skeds for (sic or) sked changes ... USS LIBERTY is not an addee on these msgs." Since LIBERTY was not privy to background of schedule of changes there was no reason to believe that the reported actions and intentions of LIBERTY were not acceptable to operational/technical commanders nor was there any way to know that they were considering revisions to that schedule until a message is received which directs the ship to change its area of operation.

President: During your testimony yesterday, in relation to the loss of your quartermaster, the loss of your navigational capabilities, and related circumstances making it difficult to reconstruct navigationally and cronologically exactly what occurred, you were asked to develop in conjunction with your ships officers and through the assistance of any other assets available, such as your engineer's bell book, the CIC log, recollections of ships personnel the best available story, cronological in words and pictorial on charts and whyfors what happened. Have you done this?

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A. Yes sir, we have.

President: Would you be kind enough to submit into evidence at this time, those documents?

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have the cronological listing of events relative to USS LIBERTY on 8 June.

A, Yes sir, I do.

Q. Would you provide it, please?

A. Here it is.

Counsel for the Court: Request this be marked exhibit number 27 and request that it be introducted into evidence. Will you please now read exhibit number 27 to the Court?

A, Exhibit number 27 is COMDESRON TWELVE Secret Message 150016Z JUN 67 to CINCUSNAVEUR.

FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT _____ _____ _____, YOUR 141732Z NOT RCVD AS OF 142355Z; HOWEVER REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:

A. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-00E (POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE TO 31-31N 33-00E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED, SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES, IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED TO HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 100 FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 100 FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL STEAMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS WERE FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME

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AND THE SHIP DID NOT EVEN EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING THE DEPLOYMENT

2. ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

ØØ54 STEAMING ON 13ØT, SPD 1Ø KNOTS

ØØ49 PASSED THROUGH POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T

ØØ5Ø SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3 - 5 MILES - CIRCLED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR

RADIANT. LOCATING TWO TRANSMITTED (LIBERTY ØØØ742ZJUN).

ØØ5Ø INCREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS

1ØØ6 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH

1126 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP LOCATING AGREE DRAFTED FOR TRANSMISSION AT Ø81Ø22Z (BUT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED)

1132 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T

131Ø EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL

1348 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL.

1351 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,ØØØ YARDS BEARING ØØ82T - REPORTED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT

1353 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.

1358 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE 5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7ØØØ FT.

A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP

14Ø3 LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS

14Ø5 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85, Ø1 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.

14Ø5 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.

14Ø5 - 141Ø SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR A

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ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE ϕ1 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.

141 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS.

1424 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD

BEAM DISTANCE 4 -5 MILES

1426 NOTICED NORMAL STEAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK

HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDARM.

1428 MTB SIGNALLING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STBD QUARTER. LIGHT OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.

143ϕ ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD FIRE.

1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT SIDE OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING

1431 WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.

MTB COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP

1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.

1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.

TWENTY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB STRAFING FIRE.

1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.

1436 LOST STEAM PRESSURE - SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS - MANY GUAGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED OUT. TORPEDO HIT IN RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT G.Q. STATIONS. THESE SPACES FLOODED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THIS SPACE DIED OF EITHER BLAST OR DROWNING. NO SIGNS OF LIFE EMINATING FROM COORDINATION CENTER AND ADJACENT SPACES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPENED WITHOUT

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DANGER OF FLOODING OTHER SPACES.

1440 MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER 206-17

1503 ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALLED "DO YOU NEED HELP" IN ENGLISH C.O. SIGNALLED "NEGATIVE"

1505 MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE

1507 HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVID MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP, PORT SIDE, HOVERING AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.

1508 SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.

MARKINGS ON HELICOPTERS ARE 04 AND 08 OR D4 AND D8. HELICOPTER MADE REPEATED PASSES AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT OBSERVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.

1519 POWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT RUDDER DID NOT ANSWER - CONTINUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.

1536 MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT. DURING NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP _____ MOVES AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER THE HORIZON.

1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STEB SIDE AND RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.

1620 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSE AT SPEEDS VARYING FROM 0 TO 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN THE WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE FIGHTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING CASUALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER STEERING.

1845 ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP - CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD AND ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL - THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER SOMEONE TO THE DECK - C.O. CONSIDERED RECEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE BUT RULED THIS OUT AS TO HAZZARDOUS, REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO

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COMMUNICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AID AT 1852 COPTER DROPPED A MESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE, THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING CARD OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU CASUALTIES" SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT TEN MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD, THE MUTILATED BODIES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED FROM THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE SUNSET (ABOUT 1905) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO RDVU WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT

3. FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK, CIC LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/ GUN OFF/BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR

GP-3

BT

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Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today your readiness file and your gunnery procedures?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: This will be exhibit number 28, the modified condition of readiness three. Exhibit number 29 will be the guide for gunnery officers. I request that they be admitted in evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today another chart which was requested by the Court of your projected track in relationship to the prescribed areas of operation.

A. Yes sir, I have, and the information requested by the Court has been plotted thereon.

Counsel for the Court: I request this chart be marked by the reporter as exhibit number 30 and be admitted in evidence at this time. I also request that the reporter mark the following three exhibits, 31, 32, 33, exhibit 31 and 32 are maneuvering boards, exhibit 33 is bullet and projectile mark photographs. I request that those exhibits be entered into evidence as exhibits 31, 32 and 33.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you information as to the number of bullet marks on USS LIBERTY as a result of the attack on 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I have had a topside inspection of the ship made and have recorded the numbwr of projectile hits in various areas of the ship.

President: What was the total number of hits you took, Captain?

A. We took a total of 821 plus one torpedo hit.

Counsel for the Court: That does not include shrapnel marks?

A. No sir, that does not include shrapnel marks which are innumerable.

Counsel for the Court: Does the Court desire to question this witness further?

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on your open fire doctrine, what is your open fire doctrine?

A. The open fire doctrine is that, except in a melee, all fire will be controlled by the Commanding Officer through his normal gunnery control organization. At surprise air and surface attacks, the gunnery personnel

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on the mounts are authorized to open fire if they are unable to communicate with gun control or the bridge.

President: Let the record show at this point that the grizzly business of recovery of remains from the torpedoed compartments yesterday and last night resulted in starting out looking for 22 unrecovered bodies. We actually recovered 18 of whom we are reasonably confident that we identified accurately 15. Wholesale ~~dismemberment~~ resulting in many remains virtually being blown to bits made the recovery particularly difficult and identification even more complicated. It cannot be conclusively determined that the four missing of the 22 being sought are not in pieces in the spaces themselves. On the other hand, it is possible that we did lose four floating free after the attack or we may have lost those four immediately at the time of the attack dropping through the hole in the bottom. The degree of dismemberment was so extreme as to be typified by the fact that the last few cases we packed in the small hours this morning contained for example, a head, and an arm in one and similar partial bodies.

The Court recessed for lunch at 1200 hours on 15 June 1967.

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After recessing at 1200 hours on 15 June, the Court met again at 1330 hours on 15 June 1967.

Counsel for the Court: All persons who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. The Captain, USS LIBERTY is still on the stand and under oath. Commander, do you have anything else you'd like to present?

Commander McGonagle: I gave the list of recommendations to the yeoman and I hadn't completed writing out the last one, but the last one in substance that I would recommend that ships that are engaged in special operations of this type or others of which I'm not aware but that may be of critical importance that they be advised of the decisions of higher authority which are under consideration and could be of value to the ship in being able to respond to the desires of higher command in more timely fashion.

Counsel for the Court: Do any of the members have questions of this witness?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Yes, I have a question, Captain, if I may. In general, could you tell me what the normal everyday procedures are, as relates to determination of when to come up on a transmitter for the purpose of establishing a ship-shore circuit.

A. Usually, the number of messages - of course, we have no way of knowing what the contents of a missing message number is. I check with the communicators, it is my usual practice to go to the research spaces every morning. At about 0815 there, I receive a sort of informal briefing on the research operations, I review the special traffic. The general service board is usually brought to me before I go down to the research spaces. And, the decision as to whether to come up on a transmitter or not would depend on the urgency of the message that I wanted my superior to be aware of. Generally, I try to deal with routine messages to the maximum extent possible. There are many items which cannot be handled at this level of course. With our defcon operation there were times where there would be only a few hours difference when it was working between coming up on a normal transmitter and reducing our research effectiveness, or waiting a matter of a couple of hours until we got noon time to relay via the moon. In this case I might say wait and send this one by the tricon if possible. There were a couple of times after minimize was imposed in the area where I felt that I could send a

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message not meeting minimize criteria by the trascom system because it would not involve any of the mediterrancan ships that were a transmitter receive station. I was discussing the matter of that I had authorized release of a routine message which would not normally qualify for transmission under minimize conditions. I specifically put on the bottom of this message "transmit via trascon equipment only" and it was for a spare part for the trascon system and we know that this would go from the ship direct to Washington via the moon in fact the relay station.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I was wondering, Captain, in your routine scanning the traffic, was it a normal function for the Comm officer or what have you some personnel to inform you or to keep you cognizant about numbers of missing messages from broadcast files?

A. Not an an everyday occurrence. I did check to see what the backlog of outgoing messages were, sometimes two or three times a day. As usual there would be many times when we would have a backlog of several messages without specifying the number. They would usually let me know in the morning also what the backlog of messages for the night was. This leads me to believe that if we were able to get out we usually had no problems with incoming traffic.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Would there have been any reason, Captain, on the days of 6,7, and 8 June for it to be unwise to transmit on a ship-shore circuit terminating with a NAVCOMMSTA?

A. I'm not sure what you mean by unwise.

Q. You are steaming along doing your job, at 1500 on June 7th, let us say, would it have hurt things if all of a sudden you came up with a 500 watt transmitter on the line?

A. .I can't answer that question specifically because I'm not an expert in that area, although my research officer requested that we hold the number of transmissions to an absolute minimum because we did know that whenever we transmitted our research capability was reduced, and I did this for the most part and the primary exception was the messages which I directed to be sent, PDM reports specifically, that I new my operational and technical commanders were vitally concerned with receiving in a short period of time. I directed

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the transmitters come up and transmit those messages regardless of the consequences upon the research function.

Q. The comm officer is deceased, I understand?

A. Yes, he is.

Q. Was he an Ensign?

A. No sir, he was a Lieutenant. A very capable individual. He had been in his particular specialty for a considerable period of time, the exact number of years I'm not sure, but he had been associated with tem for ten or fifteen years anyhow. The last seven or eight as an officer, and he had been on the ship approximately 11 months at the time.

Q. He was more of specialist than an operational type of officer, is that right?

A. Yes, he was and LDO and quite competent in his duties, and very thorough and conscientious.

Q. President: Captain McConagle, before you is a message (Defense Attache Tel Aviv 091520) provided by the Court of Inquiry, purporting points advanced by the Israli Government as justification for their unprovoked attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June. Would you be kind enough to address yourself to those points.

A. Yes sir, LIBERTY never approached the nearest land closer than 14 NM. The ship was in international waters at all times prior to, during and after the unprovoked attack. To my knowledge there was no declared war zone recognized or sanctioned by the United States Government. I had heard on VOA various statements broadcast by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Goldberg in the UN to the effect that the U.S. attitude of the U.S. Government was neutral in the conflict between Israel and UAR and did not intend to take a position for or against either side. The VOA broadcast and BBC indicated that Israel indicated a willingness to abide by the cease fire that the UN had asked for to be effective about 072000 local time. The above considerations coupled with the right of innocent passage recognized in international law refutes this allegation categorically.

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As Counsel for the Court, I have in my possession a file containing messages from the official records of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. I received these messages from the communications officer, CINCUSNAVEUR, and they are available for the use of the Court relative to this case. Do any of the Court members desire to examine this file at this time?

Captain ATKINSON: This file contains all pertinent messages concerning USS LIBERTY operations from 24 May to 11 June, is this correct?

Counsel for the Court: Yes.

The President of the Court adjourned the Court at 1445 hours, 13 June 1967, and will meet at his call in London, England.

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FOURTH DAY

Counsel for the Court: This Court of Inquiry is in session again after having adjourned on 15 June 1967 on board USS LIBERTY in Malta. Today the date is 16 June, the time is 1345, the place is London, England Headquarters Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

Captain Leonard Robert RAISH was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court:

Q. Captain RAISH will you now advise the court of information that you have to present in amplification of your prior testimony.

A. At the beginning of the court of inquiry I was directed by Admiral KIDD to prepare sets of questions to obtain detailed information on the attack of the LIBERTY. I did prepare sets of questions for NAVCOMSTA PHILIPPINES, NAVCOMSTA GREECE, NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO, Army Communication Facility Asmara, and NAVCOMSTA ASMARA and I produce now the messages that answered the questions.

Counsel for the Court: These messages that I have received from Captain RAISH will be marked by the reporter as exhibits numbers 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,43, I now offer them into evidence, and hand them back to you Captain RAISH to read to the court.

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMSTA PHILLIPPINES CONFIDENTIAL 141631Z JUN 67

SUB: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 072230Z JUN AND JCS 080110Z JUN FOR RELAY?

IF ANSWER TO 1 IS YES:

B. FROM WHOM AND AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE THEM? TO WHOM DID YOU RELAY THEM AND AT WHAT TIME?

2. SUBMIT REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMSTA PHILLIPPINES TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150346Z JUN 67

A. YOUR 141632Z JUN 67

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B. JCS 072230Z JUN 67

C. JCS 080110Z JUN 67

D. NAVCOMMSTA PHIL 130041Z JUN 67

1. REF B OR 133I/08 FROM NAVTELSTA KENYA TOD 1700Z/08 TO DCS TELSTA DAKIS

2. REF C TOR 0400Z/08 FROM NAVRELSTA KENYA TOD 0449Z/08 TO NAVCOMMSTA GUAM

3. REF D TRACER ACTION BY NAVCOMMSTA PHIL PERTAINING TO REF C.

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE CONFIDENTIAL 141629Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF [redacted] COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. FROM WHOM DID YOU RECEIVE COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67? AT WHAT TIME?

B. WHO WAS NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TO PROTECT FOR IN REGARD TO THIS MESSAGE AS ASSIGNED BY THE ROUTING INDICATORS?

C. WHAT ACTIONS DID YOUR PERSONNEL TAKE WITH REGARD TO COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z?

D. HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR YOUR PERSONNEL TO RECOGNIZE THAT COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN HAD BEEN MISROUTED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AND START ACTION TO RECTIFY?

E. COULD YOUR PERSONNEL, ONCE THE MISROUTE WAS RECOGNIZED, HAVE RECOUPED SOME OF THE LOST TIME BY REROUTING DIRECTO TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? IF SO, WHY DIDN'T THEY?

F. HOW DOES THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC HANDLED BY NAVCOMMSTA GREECE FOR THE WEEK 3-9 JUN 67 INCLUSIVE COMPARE WITH THE PREVIOUS WEEK (I.E., 29 MAY - 2 JUN INCLUSIVE) AS REGARDS VOLUME AND PRECEDENCES USED? HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO A REPRESENTATIVE WEEK, SAY IN FEB 67?

G. WHAT IS THE PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? HOW MANY DO YOU HAVE ON BOARD?

H. WHAT IN GENERAL IS THE LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN MESSAGE HANDLING OPERATIONS?

I. SUMMARIZE IN NARRATIVE STYLE COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED AND ACTIONS OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INCIDENT TO AND FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

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FROM: NAVCOMSTA GREECE TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150731Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS

A. YOUR 1416292 JUN 67

1. LAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO FORWARDED. SUB-PARAGRAPHS KEYED TO REFERENCE.

A. COMSIXTHFLT 0809172 RECEIVED FROM NAVCOMSTA ASMARA (AEZ) AT 081238Z.

B. NAVCOMSTA GREECE WAS INADVERTANT RELAY POINT. NORMAL DELIVERY PATH FROM ORIGINATOR TO ADDEE WOULD HAVE BY-PASSED THISTA. ONCE RECEIVED, HOWEVER, NAVCOMSTA GREECE HAD TO PROTECT FOR EUCOM NAVCOMSTA ASMARA. THIS WAS THE ONLY ADDEE IN THE ROUTING LINE WHEN RECEIVED THISTA.

C. HANDLED AS ANY OBOE MSG ALONG WITH OTHERS OF EQUAL AND HIGHER PRECEDENCE. DCS RELAY HANDLED 251 FLASH MSGS ON 08 JUN RADAY. OBOE TRAFFIC COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER, ESTIMATE 1500. EXACT COUNT WOULD REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS EFFORT. TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED ON THIS TORN TAPE RELAY ON 08 JUNE WAS 5718 MSGS.

D. NO PERSONNEL RECOGNITION OR SPECIAL ACTION REQUIRED ON THE PARTICULAR MSG AS IT CARRIED A VALID ROUTING MULTIPLE ADDRESS PROCESSING UNIT (MAPU) AUTOMATICALLY RE-ROUTED MSG BACK TO NAVRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) SEND POSITIONS. MAPU IS A MEMORY CORE DEVICE PROGRAMMED WITH PRE-DETERMINED ROUTING INDICATORS. ALL NAVY TRAFFIC, REGARDLESS OF RECEIVE ORIGIN, WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE AEZ SEND POSITIONS BY THIS DEVICE.

E. DUE TO EXTREMELY HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSENT (NOT MISROUTED) MSG WAS EVER CONSIDERED FOR RE-ROUTE ACTION. THIS HANDLES MANY OBOE MSGS TO NAVCOMSTA ASMARA WITHOUT REQUIREMENT TO PASS VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. DIRECT CIRCUITRY CARRIES A DIFFERENT ROUTING THAN DCS COMMON USER CIRCUITRY AND DELIVERY MEANS IS DETERMINED BY THE ORIGINATOR; NOT THE RELAY STATION. RE-ROUTE TO DIRECT TO NAVCOMSTA ASMARA WOULD HAVE INITIALLY [illegible] A NEW PLOT [illegible] BY HAND, THEN PASSING TO A COMPLEX [illegible] RELAY (NAVCOMSTA [illegible] NAVCOMSTA FOR DELIVERY VIA DIRECT [illegible] CONSIDER NEA[illegible] LOOP OF LOST TIME BY THIS METHOD.

F. TRAFFIC VOLUMES 29 MAY - 2 JUN WERE APPROX THREE-FOURTHS AS HEAVY AS PERIOD 3 - 9 JUN. PRECEDENCES 29 MAY - 2 JUN MUCH LOWER. VERY LITTLE FLASH AND OBOE TRAFFIC PASSED. VOLUMES FEB VERSUS JUNE LESS THAN TWO-THIRDS AS HIGH. NO HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC OF CONSEQUENCE IN FEB. DIRECT COMPARISON FIGURES CAN BE FURNISHED BUT WILL REQUIRE TIME FOR COMPILATION.

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G. TOTAL PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE FOR NAVCOMSTA GREECE IS 299. ON BOARD COUNT IS 292. KG/CYN COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE IS 175. ON BOARD 139. THESE ALLOWANCE FIGURES ARE FOR BOTH RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER SITES. CONTROL/TRAFFIC PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN IN A THREE SECTION WATCH STATUS FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS.

H. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL CONSIDERED MARGINAL BUT NOTHING LACKING IN ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM. EXAMPLE: 54 RM ALLOWED, 27 ON BOARD; 12 RMSN ALLOWED, [illegible] BOARD.

I. AT 081234Z JUN NAVCOMSTA GREECE INTERCEPTED INITIAL LIBERTY ATTACK REPORT FROM THE USS SARATOGA ON THE CINCUSNAVEUR EO4,O4 VOICE HI-COMM NET. THIS WAS PUT IN TTY FORMAT AND RELAYED VIA NAVCOMMUNPAT AND XRA BCST AS A NO DTG MSG, NAVCOMSTA GREECE TIME OF FILE 1239Z/8 JUN. SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL REPORT, SARATOGA AND NAVCOMSTA GREECE PASSED ALL AMPLIFY INFO OBTAINED VIA XRA BCST, HI-COMM NET, AND DIRECT TTY CIRCUITRY. DUE LIBERTY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM SHIP WAS LIMITED TO VOICE TRANSMISSIONS. AFTER INITIAL ATTACK REPORT THISTA SHIFTED TO BEAMED ANTENNAS USED/RECEIVE TO IMPROVE SIGNAL QUALITY UNDER EXTREMELY NOISY CKT CONDITIONS. RELIABLE COMM WITH SARATOGA AND LIBERTY WERE MAINTAINED BY THIS ACTION ALTHOUGH CIRCUIT DEGRADATION OCCURED TO OTHER STATIONS ON THE NET. NAVCOMSTA GREECE ASSUMED RELAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LIBERTY AND COORDINATED SPEED, COURSE, AND ESCORT RDVU INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMSIXTHFLT. COMDESRON 12, ASSIGNED AS ESCORT, TERMINATED FULL PERIOD ORESTES THISTA AT 0030Z/9 JUN AND RDVU [illegible] 9 JUN. COMDESRON 12 ASSUMED COMM GUARD FOR LIBERTY AND MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PASSED AFTER RDVU WAS VIA DIRECT SHIP/SHORE TERMINATION.

2. COMDESRON 12 REMAINS TERMINATED NAVCOMSTA GREECE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO CONFIDENTIAL 141623Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORMULATED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

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A. AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 072230Z, JCS 080110Z, AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z ALL JUNE AND FROM WHOM?

B. FOR WHOM WAS NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO ASSIGNED TO PROTECT ON THESE MESSAGES? HOW AND WHEN DID YOU DELIVER THEM?

C. DID YOU RECEIVE THESE MESSAGES FOR DELIVERY TO USS LIBERTY? IF SO, AT WHAT TIME AND FROM WHOM?

D. WHAT WAS THE GENERAL COMMUNICATION LOAD FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA DURING THE WEEK OF 4 JUNE? HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO AN AVERAGE WEEK OF, SAY, FEB 1967?

E. WHAT IS YOUR WATCH SITUATION? IF ANSWER IS LESS THAN 1 IN 4, HOW LONG HAS IT BEEN AT THIS TEMPO?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. CP:

FROM:NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 142255Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

A. YOUR 141628Z JUN 67

B. MY 1316592 JUN 67

C. MY 0917452 JUN 67

1. IAW REF A, THE FOLLOWING SUBMITTED:

A. JCS 072230Z INITIALLY RECEIVED FROM SAN PABLO AT 0805232. RECEIVED AGAIN FROM WASHDC 0819592. JCS 080110Z RECEIVED FROM WASHDC AT 080430Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM COMSIXTHFLT AT TPZ.

B. JCS 072230Z: NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMSIXTHFLT ON INITIAL RECEIPT AND SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080724Z. SECOND RECEIPT, MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIBERTY AND CTF 67. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA AT 082012Z FOR LIBERTY, AND TO NAPLES FOR DELIVERY TO CTF 67 AT 082135Z. JCS 080110 MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMSIXTHFLT. SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080639Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z: MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR USS LIBERTY. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA 081100Z.

C. JCS 072230Z: AS NOTED ABOVE SECOND RECEIPT WAS FOR LIBERTY AT 081959Z FROM WASHDC. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED 081050Z FROM COMSIXTHFLT.

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D. DURING PERIOD 4-10 JUNE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TOTALS MOUNTED RAPIDLY WITH PEAK OCCURRING 8 JUNE. DUE TO IMPOSITION OF MINIMIZE BY USCINCEUR ON 5 JUNE THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WHICH PARTIALLY COMPENSATED. AS NOTED IN REFERENCE B, FLEET RELAY TRAFFIC WAS ALMOST THREE TIMES THAT OF AN EQUAL PERIOD IN FEBRUARY 67.

E. COMMENCED ONE IN THREE WATCHES ON 5 JUNE IN ANTICIPATION INCREASED COMM LOAD.

F. REF C REFERS ALSO. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO USASTRATCOMFAC ASMARA CONFIDENTIAL 141627Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. ON BEHALF OF AND TO ASSIST NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION PLEASE FURNISH ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. AT WHAT TIME WAS COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? AND FROM WHOM?

B. WAS YOUR STATION HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUNE 67? IF SO, STATE ROUGHLY THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER A ROUTINE DAY.

C. AT WHAT TIME DID YOUR STATION RELAY COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67 TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE IT BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RELAY IT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA?

2. REQUEST REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. COMMENTS IN ADDITION TO ABOVE QUESTIONS INVITED. GP-4

FROM: CO USASTRATCOM FAC ASMARA ETHIOPIA TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 150520Z JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

REF: CINCUSNAVEUR MSG 141627Z JUN 67 (PASEP)

1. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THIS STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081200Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR RELAY STATION SEVILLE SPAIN.

2. THIS STATION WAS HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUN 67. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC RATE

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FOR A ROUTINE DAY AND 8 JUN 67:

	ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67) NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	8 JUNE 67 NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	PCT OF INCREAS
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5	INDETERMINATE
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2388	30.2	268
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3860	49.0	117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3	-85
TOTAL	5109		7893		54

3. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 0809172 JUN 67 WAS RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 0812152 JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 0815032 JUN 67 AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 0815[illegible] JUN 67. GP-4

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA CONFIDENTIAL 1416262 JUN 67

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. AT WHAT TIME WERE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR PLACING ON THE NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA BOST BEING GUARDED BY USS LIBERTY:

(1) JCS 0722302 JUN 67?

(2) JCS 0801102 JUN 67?

(3) COMSIXTHFLT 0809172 JUN 67?

B. FROM WHAT RELAY STATION DID YOU RECEIVE THE MESSAGES IN QUESTION AND AT WHAT TIME?

C. WHAT WERE YOUR "IN-HOUSE" HANDLING TIMES FOR THE ABOVE MESSAGES?

D. ACCORDING TO YOUR INFO, AT WHAT TIME DID USS LIBERTY SHIFT TO THE ASMARA FLEET BROADCAST (JRTT)?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

FROM: NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA TO CINCUSNAVEUR CONFIDENTIAL 1419562 JUN 67

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS

A. YOUR 1416262 JUNE 67

1. LAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED

A. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 0821252 JUN 67

B. JCS 0801102 JUN 67 CANNOT LOCATE ANY RECORD WHICH WOULD TEND TO INDICATE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO DATE. HAVE INSPECTED FILED PAGE COPIES AND TAPE REELS OF ALL CIRCUITS TERMINATING THISTA FROM

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0800002 TO DATE WITHOUT SUCCESS.

C. COMSIXTHFLT 1009172 JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 0815102.

2. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WERE RECEIVED FROM THE MAJOR DCS RELAY STATION ASMARS (U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, ASMARA) AT THE TIMES LISTED PARAS 1A AND C ABOVE.

3. IN HOUSE HANDLING TIMES WERE:

A. JCS 072230Z JUN 67 — 10 MINUTES

B. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67 — 15 MINUTES

4. USS LIBERTY SHIFTED TO JRTT AT 070001Z JUNE 67.

GP-4

BT

Q. Captain, will you now give your conclusions drawn from [redacted] answers received from your queries?

A. Yes sir, the queries have confirmed information already available that the LIBERTY did not receive JCS 080110Z; that JCS 072230Z, being a priority message in competition with all the FLASH and OP IMMEDIATE messages, did not get on the Asmara Broadcast until too late; that COMSIXTHFLT's 080917Z also did not get on the Asmara Broadcast until too late. I conclude also that there was a tremendous surge of high precedence traffic injected into the communication system. For example, on 8 June alone NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 250 Flash messages, about 1500 operational immediate messages, and a total of 10,499 of all types of messages. Although the communication system was heavily loaded, it did not breakdown and undoubtedly we had reader saturation rather than communications saturation. My final conclusion is that the queries confirm previous information as regards personnel in that the communication system continues to be short in both manning level and experience level.

CAPT RAISH: Gentlemen, in addition to the foregoing, I have here additional information that was assembled at the request of the JCS Fact finding group headed by MGEN Russ. This information is in the form of complications of messages handled by NAVCOMMSTA Greece, NAVCOMMSTA Morocco, NAVCOMMSTA Asmara, NAVCOMMUNIT London. This information was compiled for the first 12 days of June for comparison purposes. We have compiled similar information for a similar period, namely 1-12 Feb. This is to give you an illustration of the burden on the system during this critical time as compared to normal operations, for example for the first 12 days in February NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 69,122 messages, for the first 12 days in June NAVCOMMSTA Greece handled 1,190 flash messages. Gentlemen, the same comparison is made on all the stations and the objectives is to demonstrate to you the strain on the system at this time. I shall now read these into the record.

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MEMORANDUM FOR RADM KIDD DATED 16 JUNE 1967 FROM CAPT L. R. RAISH, USN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS.

1. ENCLOSED ARE COMMUNICATIONS MESSAGE HANDLING FIGURES FOR SELECTED NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN AREA DURING THE PERIOD 1 JUNE-12 JUNE 1967. FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES A COMPILATION HAS BEEN MADE FOR A SIMILAR PERIOD IN FEBRUARY 1967.

2. THE ATTACHED INFORMATION WAS ASSEMBLED AT THE REQUEST OF THE JCS FACT FINDING GROUP HEADED BY MGEN RUSS. IT IS FORWARDED TO YOU AS A MATTER OF INTEREST.

Very respectfully,

/s/ L. R. RAISH
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
COMMUNICATIONS

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NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION GREECE

I. MESSAGE HANDLED

1 FEB	5,901	1 JUN	10,178
2 FEB	6,775	2 JUN	10,702
3 FEB	6,240	3 JUN	10,119
4 FEB	5,506	4 JUN	8,213
5 FEB	3,892	5 JUN	8,414

6 FEB	5,160		6 JUN	9,906	
7 FEB	5,941		7 JUN	9,750	
8 FEB	6,521		8 JUN	10,074	
9 FEB	6,539		9 JUN	9,959	
10 FEB	6,935		10 JUN	10,499	
11 FEB	5,293		11 JUN	8,073	
12 FEB	4,419		12 JUN	7,835	
TOTAL	69,122		TOTAL	13,622	

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	96
6 JUN	206
7 JUN	114
8 JUN	251
9 JUN	182
10 JUN	341
TOTAL	1,190

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	134
6 JUN	218
7 JUN	182
8 JUN	181
9 JUN	181
10 JUN	179
TOTAL	1,055

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION MOROCCO

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB	7,596		1 JUN	11,317	
2 FEB	7,663		2 JUN	10,871	
3 FEB	8,083		3 JUN	9,991	
4 FEB	7,870		4 JUN	8,049	
5 FEB	6,283		5 JUN	8,794	

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6	FEB	6,943	6	JUN	9,636
7	FEB	7,361	7	JUN	9,512
8	FEB	8,153	8	JUN	11,195
9	FEB	8,058	9	JUN	9,878
10	FEB	8,355	10	JUN	9,192
11	FEB	7,393	11	JUN	7,722
12	FEB	5,205	12	JUN	8,771
TOTAL		87,963	TOTAL		114,928

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	25
6 JUN	16
7 JUN	25
8 JUN	124
9 JUN	12
10 JUN	3
TOTAL	203

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	109
6 JUN	107
7 JUN	133
8 JUN	258
9 JUN	52
10 JUN	90
TOTAL	749

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION SPAIN

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1	FEB	6,873	1	JUN	9,023
2	FEB	7,182	2	JUN	9,418
3	FEB	7,639	3	JUN	8,184
4	FEB	6,645	4	JUN	5,990
5	FEB	4,467	5	JUN	7,224
6	FEB	5,906	6	JUN	7,073
7	FEB	6,620	7	JUN	7,191

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8 FEB	7,351		8 JUN	8,409	
9 FEB	7,796		9 JUN	7,342	
10 FEB	7,716		10 JUN	6,768	
11 FEB	6,909		11 JUN	5,885	
12 FEB	4,999		12 JUN	6,561	
TOTAL	80,103		TOTAL	89,068	

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	37
6 JUN	29
7 JUN	31
8 JUN	95
9 JUN	13
10 JUN	18
TOTAL	223

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5 JUN	163
6 JUN	155
7 JUN	219
8 JUN	89
9 JUN	73
10 JUN	93
TOTAL	692

NAVAL COMMUNICATION UNIT LONDON

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1 FEB	968		1 JUN	1,538	
2 FEB	927		2 JUN	1,705	
3 FEB	969		3 JUN	1,278	
4 FEB	872		4 JUN	909	
5 FEB	846		5 JUN	1,406	
6 FEB	842		6 JUN	1,717	
7 FEB	695		7 JUN	1,648	
8 FEB	704		8 JUN	1,775	

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9	FEB	818	9	JUN	1,589
10	FEB	858	10	JUN	1,382
11	FEB	914	11	JUN	1,030
12	FEB	934	12	JUN	1,268
TOTAL		10,367			17,245

II. FLASH MESSAGES HANDLED

5	JUN	2
6	JUN	2
7	JUN	20
8	JUN	17
9	JUN	8
10	JUN	28
TOTAL		77

III. SERVICE MESSAGES HANDLED

5	JUN	153
6	JUN	148
7	JUN	176
8	JUN	292
9	JUN	201
10	JUN	244
TOTAL		1,214

NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION ASMARA

I. MESSAGES HANDLED

1	FEB	1,019	1	JUN	1,568
2	FEB	1,233	2	JUN	1,891
3	FEB	1,229	3	JUN	1,696
4	FEB	1,054	4	JUN	1,652
5	FEB	974	5	JUN	1,570
6	FEB	828	6	JUN	1,575
7	FEB	1,039	7	JUN	1,579
8	FEB	1,094	8	JUN	2,228
9	FEB	955	9	JUN	1,837

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10 FEB	880	10 JUN	1,430
11 FEB	772	11 JUN	1,394
12 FEB	925	12 JUN	1,275
TOTAL	12,002	TOTAL	19,695

Captain RAISH was asked the following questions from court members:

Q. What is the significance relative to the Naval communications system's capability of this increased volume of message traffic?

A. This reflects in my opinion the manner in which the Navy personnel rise to the occasion when called upon because this tremendous traffic load was handled by the same personnel without augmentation. The gratifying thing is that under this surge of traffic I am not prepared to say how much of a surge we could have taken before the system had become saturated; however, considering the circumstances, the communication system was clearly responsible to the operational requirements of the time.

CAPT RAIS: Gentlemen, to assist you in evaluating all these high precedences from ACP 121, an official Defense Department publication, is available.

COUNSEL TO THE BOARD: This will be marked exhibit 46 and received into evidence as exhibit 46. Captain Raish, I will not ask you to read exhibit 46 as it will be appended to the record.

CAPT RAISH: I would like to call your attention to one point to illustrate what I mean by definint flash. Flash is reserved for initial enemy contact messages of extreme urgency, brevity is mandatory.

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If one station handles 231 flash messages in one day it is obvious that the use of precedences is being abused. I call this subject to your attention because it was not unusual for high precedence messages to be of a very lengthily character going back to the queries and answers a conclusion can be drawn that is confirmed that the experience level and the manning level is low in the NAVCOMMSTAs probably academic throughout the services and must be taken into account when a crisis developes.

Questions from Capt Lauff:

Q. Of the total traffic load indicated of Radio Asmara during the period 4 to 9 June approximately how many of those messages had to be introducted on to the JIATT circuit which provided the principle means of communications with the USS LIBERTY?

A. The JIATT broadcast was relatively light during this time and had no more than 500 messages that is 300 to 500 total first run traffic daily during that period.

Q. Even though the load on the broadcast Asmara was light this does not mean in itself that a priority message would get on that broadcast in a priority fashion. Such a message would first have to compete with all the flash and op immediate traffic and priorities ahead of it in the system before it gets to Asmara.

Captain Raish was warned not to discuss his testimony and excused.

CDR C.C. JOHOENSEN? USN? Staff CINCUSNAVEUR was called as a witness, was sworn in and advised of his rights pursuant to Article 31, UCMJ and testified as follows:

Q. What is your duty on CINCUSNAVEUR Staff?

A. I am a Command Center Duty Officer, sir.

Q. Directing your attention to 8 June 1967 at or about 2330 through 0300, where you at this time?

A. I was the Command Center Duty Officer.

Q. In the capacity of Command Center Duty Officer were you apprised of any incident involving the USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I ask you now if you have a chronological incident report of the

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watch that you stood on that day?

A. I have a chronological run down of incident to the LIBERTY.

Q. Request the reporter mark this exhibit 47 and I introduce it into evidence as exhibit 47. CDR will you now read exhibit 47.

A. MEMORANDUM From: Contingency Watch Team, To: CINCUSNAVEUR, VIA: Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 12 June 1967/NO2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant L.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES	EVENTS
072350Z	Major BREELOVE, JRC WASHDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VOCON and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071532Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 12 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later. LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.
080001Z	LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.

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TIMES	EVENTS
080010Z	CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT. CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group of a message and had by-passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.
080030Z	The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.
080325Z	The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR. LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 080110Z. As he was relaying this information the Duty Yeoman handed the JCS 080110Z message, which had just been received, to CDR JORGENSEN.

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TIMES	EVENTS
0803252 (cont'd)	The Command Center Duty Officer then had communications set up a Telecon to COMSIXTHFLT so that he could talk to COMSIXTHFLT's staff duty officer.
0803352Z	Considerable delay was caused by atmospheric difficulties. After being unable to establish a Telecon circuit CDR JORGENSEN had the radio operator [redacted] get COMSIXTHFLT by SSB and request a Telecon with the Staff Duty Officer as soon as possible.
0804102Z	Two way Telecon was established, with COMSIXTHFLT still having difficulty receiving CINCUSNAVEUR. CDR SLUSSER, COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, informed CDR JORGENSEN they did not hold JCS 080110Z. CDR JORGENSEN passed it to him three times before receiving an acknowledgment at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a Wirenote "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS." CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.
0805072	CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.
0805152	After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

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TIMES	EVENTS
0305Z12	Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and comments as the events as they took place. Signed: CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN CDR G.D. JORGENSEN, USN

LT E.L. GALAVOTTI, USN

The witness was duly warned and, withdrawn.

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Gentlemen: The JAG Manual provides that the responsibility of Counsel for the Court is to exploit all practicable sources of information and to bring out all facts in an impartial manner without regard to the favorable or unfavorable effect on persons concerned.

I believe that the record of proceedings of this Court of Inquiry will reflect that all facts and information which are available concerning the unprovoked attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967, have been brought to your attention.

The only remaining responsibility which I have, while this Court is in session, is to give summation of the evidence introduced observing the caveat that the summation must be an impartial argument and not amount to partisan advocacy.

Even though I intend to temper my remarks within the perephrial limits of such a guide line, I must confess however, that after living intimately with the facts of this case for the past week, I have become more and more appalled that such a tragedy should have ever occurred. Therefore, I shall attempt to synopsize those salient facts which have influenced my judgement in this summation.

You have heard testimony and viewed incontrovertible documentary evidence which established the following factual setting:

USS LIBERTY, pictured, defined and described in Janes Fighting Ships as an unarmed U.S. Navy technical research ship, deployed to the Mediterranean pursuant to official orders and, on 8 June 1967, was on station in accordance with such orders. However, the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY, had not been appraised that LIBERTY's orders had been modified, apparently because of the Middle East War so, instead of the previously assigned area of operation being ininternational waters contiguous to the coast of the United Arab Republic, the modification provided for removal to an area of operation 100 miles from the coast. The evidence clearly reflects that any dereliction for USS LIBERTY not having knowledge of the modification in orders is not attributable to LIBERTY. Nor is there any evidence of probative value establishing culpability in non-receipt.

Accordingly, no matter what conclusions are reached as to the cause of the incident, the horrendous impact of the effect should disturb even the most impassioned.

I will not depict again the awesome combined firepower of the aircraft and torpedo boats which was brought to bear on this helpless vessel resulting in inordinate injuries and loss of life to her personnel.

In conclusion, I respectfully submit that USS LIBERTY wrote another chapter in the great heritage of Navy gallantry and that her personnel from Commanding Officer to the most junior seaman, deserve the highest accolades and acknowledgement it is possible to bestow for their valor and acts of courage.

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No further witnesses were called and the President closed the Court at 1645, 16 June 1967 in order to deliberate and prepare findings of fact.

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PROCEEDINGS

The Court of Inquiry experienced no unusual difficulties incident to conducting the subject proceedings except for the necessity of investigating such a major naval disaster of international significance in an extremely abbreviated time frame. However, because of the high degree of cooperation and assistance rendered by USS LIBERTY personnel in conjunction with the outstanding performance of duty evinced by clerical personnel assigned to the court, it was possible to complete the preparation of the record of proceedings in the allotted period of time. In regard to the aforementioned exemplary performance by clerical personnel, special recognition is given to Jerry SPENCER, YNC, CINCUSNAVEUR Staff and Robert W. JOHNSON, YN2, COMFAIRMED Staff.

The following FINDINGS are enumerated as a recitation of those facts established by the evidence of record; however, in those areas of interest wherein the Court could not affirmatively establish a fact per se, an ostensible supportable inference was stated.

The Court, after inquiring into all the facts and circumstances connected with the incident which occasioned the inquiry, and having considered the evidence, finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Available evidence combine to indicate the attack on LIBERTY on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity.

2. The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American Flag difficult to identify.

3. The ship's westerly heading at the time of attack - in the general direction of Egyptian ports may have reinforced elements of doubt in the minds of the several Israeli pilots who looked the ship over in the forenoon.

4. The colors were shot down early in the action and were replaced prior to the PT attack.

5. The immediate confused milling around astern followed by peaceful

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overtures by the attacking surface forces after launching only two torpedoes of the six presumed available (two on each PT boat), indicate these craft may well have identified the colors for the first time when they got in close enough to see clearly through the smoke and flames billowing, at times above the mast head.

6. There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U. S. Ship.

7. LIBERTY's position at the time of the attack has been previously ordered changed farther to seaward by JCS; however, the messages relating to these changes were not known to the ship before the attack took place. The reasons these messages were not known to the ship can be determined in all instances except for one. Since LIBERTY records and knowledgeable personnel were lost in the action, it is impossible to determine the disposition of the message.

8. The communication delays and mis-routing errors which caused these several non-deliveries combined with delays in initiating follow-up actions on operational instructions received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware of plans and decisions made for her repositioning. A detailed accounting of the five pertinent messages are attached as appendicies one through five.

9. The absence of any identifiable threat to the ship apparently caused the foregoing referred to operational actions to be taken and implemented in routine manner, i.e., without resorting to highest precedence (Flash) traffic.

10. USS LIBERTY was assigned technical research tasks to be performed in the eastern Mediterranean by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. LIBERTY first became aware of this new tasking when she received sailing orders from Abidjan on the Ivory Coast on the 19th day of May 1967. The precise tasking by which LIBERTY was ordered to depart Abidjan is significant. In this tasking language, LIBERTY was directed to proceed [redacted] new operating area in the eastern Mediterranean via Rota for pick-up of specifics at "best speed."

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11. LIBERTY received her basic operational and navigation guidance from the JCS through her new operational chain in JCS 011945Z. LIBERTY proceeded to comply.

12. The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY conducted the operations of his ship in accordance with the intent of directives received by him. The operating area of LIBERTY on 8 June was in accordance with the announcements of intended movement promulgated by the Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY. Such operating areas were normal to the accomplishment of LIBERTY's mission. These announcements were addressed to and presumably received, by all echelons in the chain of LIBERTY's operational command. LIBERTY received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles from the coastline of the UAR.

13. LIBERTY responded to her newly assigned mission by departing Abidjan promptly within some four hours from the time of receipt of her sailing orders. LIBERTY experienced minor engineering difficulties enroute Rota which caused her arrival there somewhat later than originally planned. On departure Rota, LIBERTY filed her movement report and declared therein her intention to make best speed in compliance with the JCS detailed tasking assignments set forth in JCS message dtg 011945Z June 1967. It is significant to note that in this JCS tasking, two time frames were identified, one covering the period between 1 June through 8 June, the second covering the period 9 June to 30 June. During the first period (1 through 8 June), LIBERTY's movements were prescribed by the JCS to cover her transit along the north African littoral and therein were prescribed minimum closest points of approach allowed to national maritime boundaries. The terminal point in this 1 through 8 June time frame was to be a navigational position at latitude 32 North, longitude 33 East. The second time frame addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assigned LIBERTY an operating area bounded on the North by latitude 32 North, the north African/Israeli littoral on the south and between l[redacted]itudes 33 East and 34 East. It might well occur to some that LIBERTY's attack occurred on 8 June, which would have placed her considerably farther to the North of the African coast, had she conformed explicitly with the aforementioned JCS directive. However, as LIBERTY proceeded eastward through the Mediterranean from Rota, she filed three separate message

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reports of position and intent which warned superiors of her plans to anticipate arrival on station - that is, to arrive somewhat earlier than prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In every case, LIBERTY advised superiors of her specific intentions to proceed to a position in the closer of the two areas to the north African coast - that is south of latitude 32 north. Finally in this regard, LIBERTY reported her arrival at her final destination to appropriate addressees.

14. It is understood from representatives of the JCS Fact Finding Group that it was receipt of LIBERTY's 7 June SITREP/POSIT report which stated her final destination which prompted concern in the JSC as to her proximity to the African coast on the night of June the 8th. This concern by responsible authorities, who initially has tasked LIBERTY, resulted in follow-on actions and directives to the ship which were either never received or were transmitted on the fleet broadcast from [redacted]STA Command after the attack has taken place.

15. Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of communication conditions regarding the LIBERTY during the period 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have received at least five messages that prior to the attack, each of which was not only important but, in that respect, critical to which terminated in the aforementioned attack on the ship on June the 8th.

16. Higher authority notified LIBERTY's original operational guidance between June first and the attack on the eighth, which, if she had received it, would have resulted in her being further off shore.

17. Combination and compounding of many delayed communication deliveries related to LIBERTY incident denied the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made prior to the attack which, among other things, would have caused the ship, as a minimum, to be heading further off-shore from her 0312002 actual position.

13. Pre-attack overflights of LIBERTY:

(First air attack occurred at 1103 local)

Unidentified aircraft circled LIBERTY at:

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0930 (3 hours 13 minutes prior to attack) (0930Z refers)

1056 (3 hours 7 minutes prior to attack)

1126 (2 hours 37 minutes prior to attack) 1126Z refers

hull markings were clean and freshly painted - ensign was flying from a forestay halyard.

19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY.

Attack initiated by single aircraft, making a run similar to previous overflights. First warning that this aircraft had attacked ship was a rocket explosion abaft the bridge, port side. [redacted] five of [redacted] attacks from various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks.

20. Motor Torpedo Boat at ask on LIBERTY.

Twenty minutes following air attack, MTB's closed ship to a position 3000 yards on starboard quarter and signalled ship by flashing light. At this time ship had been making turns for FULL speed for 9 minutes (Estimated SOA 15-17 knots). Holiday ensign was flying from the starboard yardarm for at least five minutes before torpedo attack was launched. LIBERTY 50 cal. guns opened fire while the MTB was signalling. The torpedo attack was launched shortly after the MTB was fired upon, and MTBs manned the ship with planing gun fire as, at least, one MTB passed down the starboard side.

21. Offers of assistance.

Post air attack signalling by MTB: (before torpedo attack), may have been an offer of assistance.

Thirty minutes after attacking LIBERTY the MTBs signalled in English, "Do you need help?"

Two hours and 10 minutes after torpedo attack (3 hours 40 minutes after air attack) an Israeli ship apparently offered assistance.

Israeli defense forces reported they conducted air and surface searches for survivors at the scene of the attack responding to a U. S. request.

22. Groups of up to five and three jet and propeller aircraft broke radio

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out from shore and circling ship at altitudes ranging from 500 up to several thousand feet at about [illegible] hundred local on day of attack. Planes in question were otherwise active over el Arish on Sinai north coast which was plainly visible from the ship some sixteen miles off shore.

Ship's navigation was sound and practical, using bearings on minaret in El Arish and radar range to beach at that point.

23. The ship had exercises at full C. Q. and secured only a short time prior to the unprovoked attack. After securing from G. Q. the Commanding Officer had announced all hands over the PA system that l[illegible] billowing clouds of black smoke ashore were evidence of intense military activity, therefore, crew should be "heads up ball players" as long as ship was in that close.

24. From the time of first air attack onward, attackers were well coordinated, accurate and determined. Cewa-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams, and quarters effectively covered up entire topside including ship control and internal communications (sound powered) network. Well directed initial air attack had wiped out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns to be effective.

25. PT attack first developed from starboard side and was identified as a high speed [illegible]. Center and lead PT began flashing signal light and very shortly thereafter the Commanding Officer identified the Star of David flag on this lead boat. LIBERTY's signal light had been shot away requiring dependence upon an Aldis lamp to try and penetrate the smoke on the bearing of the PTs.

26. The Commanding Officer had passed word to stand by for torpedo attack and the forward starboard 50 cal. fired a very short burst in the direction of the boats on the gunner's own initiative. Having seen Israeli flag on the PT, the Commanding Officer waved to the forward gunner to cease firing. The after starboard gun, opened up at this point, with apparently no one pulling the trigger. The bridge could not see this gun for [illegible] and flame on the starboard side, so the Commanding Officer sent a runner to tell him cease fire. Before this runner could reach the after starboard

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gun, effective high volume fire from this gun was peppering the water around the middle PT. It appears as though 50 cal. ammunition was cooking off from intense fire. The gun was seen to be firing with no one manning it.

27. The reaction of all three PTs immediately after launch, when they stopped and milled around close aboard LIBERTY and then offered help by signal light, combine to indicate this was the first time the U. S. large colors flying were actually positively identified. Not having signal lights available, the Commanding Officer then made the international flagHoist meaning, "Not Under Command."

28. Flat, calm conditions and the slow final patrol speed of LIBERTY in forenoon when she was being looked over initially may well have produced insufficient wind for steaming colors enough to be easily piloted.

29. USS LIBERTY had installed communications equipment whose reliability and degree of sophistication produced a feeling of maximum confidence in operators, the Communications Officer, and the Commanding Officer regarding the reliability of reception on fleet broadcasts which minimized the number of missed numbers.

30. In amplification of the preceding statement, the superior communication capability inherent in LIBERTY's embarked element for technical research purposes combined with interests of economy in personnel have dictated that during LIBERTY's operation in her present configuration she used the best embarked equipments and personnel available to serve both her technical research requirements as well as operational and administrative requirements for the ship itself. The resulting consolidation of functions found LIBERTY organized internally in a way such that, in the person of a single officer we find both LIBERTY's Communication Officer and the Assistant Director of Technical Research. This system had worked well. After the attack, those LIBERTY personnel [redacted] alive who had been serving in combined capacities of this sort reported their conviction that such practices should continue.

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31. The aforementioned facts relative to communication procedural peculiarities unique to ships of LIBERTY's mission resulted in the ship transmitting under the scheduling control of the research department. This practice permitted optimum performance by the research department, scheduling outgoing transmissions during lull periods of research activities; furthermore, when available research lull periods were short, the practice had grown up, quite naturally, to combine in single transmission packages all of the outgoing traffic which had accumulated. Such procedures necessitated transmission of each ships communication package under a classification applicable to the highest classification of any single element within the package itself. Such transmission packages would frequently contain research material, ship position reports, and, periodically, requests for messages missed on the regular ship broadcast schedule. A built-in delay factor exists in this procedure however, inasmuch as not all shore-based terminals are equipped to accommodate research material. In the case of LIBERTY during the time period under consideration, the closest available eligible terminal for LIBERTY research material was NAVSPECWARDEVGRU Morocco, rather than NAVCOMSTA Asmara, which happened to be serving LIBERTY as a subscriber at the time of the attack. The above conditions are detailed to point up occurrence of delays which must be anticipated in any such system. In summary, if LIBERTY had a normal outgoing message requesting missing sked numbers, it would first have to wait, under normal circumstances, for transmission during a lull period. It would next, by virtue of leaving the ship as part of a package containing research data, go to NAVSPECWARDEVGRU Det Morocco where the combined communication package would be broken down in its component parts; thirdly, the element of the package requesting retransmission of missed fleet broadcast numbers would then have to be sent from NAVCOMSTA Morocco back to NAVCOMSTA Asmara for action, Asmara being the transmitting station serving LIBERTY at the time.

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32. Detailed questioning of available surviving communication witnesses disclosed that LIBERTY had never before found missing messages, subsequently requested and received, to have been critical to the ship's operational commitments.

This fact was explained by ship's personnel as being due to the very few messages ever missed. This condition was attributed to superior equipment in the ship coupled with the fact that the ship operated independently as a regular practice and had not found herself [redacted]ting at any time previous.

33. It is important to be aware at this point that there are no logs and/or records available in LIBERTY. There are no communication officers left alive with first hand knowledge of the missed message backlog on 8 June. It could only be determined from testimony that the ship had been copying transmissions from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara with no apparent difficulty from 1700Z12 and the time of the attack. One witness who was on watch on the Asmara broadcast between the hours of 0645 and 1615 on 7 June stated that he had logged no missed message numbers during the period of his watch and that the reception of the JEAIT broadcast was excellent.

34. LIBERTY's technical mission was one that made it necessary, in exercising the aforementioned close cooperation, to use minimum electronic transmissions and radiations on certain frequencies - radio transmissions particularly. LIBERTY was continually subjected to and used to the prejudicial effects such transmissions would have on the degree of efficiency of her primary functions. In summary on this point, ships of LIBERTY's configuration, like submarines, are members a "silent service" all their own.

35. It is found that it has been, and continues standard practice, in ships of this type to cultivate great patience with regards to desires to get electrical traffic off the ship because of the prejudicial effect on the ship's mission.

36. It is evident that communications procedures for ships of this type would be improved were they to be considered in a communication category analogous to submarines.

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37. On the matter of operational control of LIBERTY vis a vis the precise directives to the ship governing the application of her embarked capabilities, it is important to understand LIBERTY's situation as a mobile platform, under naval command, transporting capabilities belonging to a service or agency other than the Navy. This condition and situation, while not unique to naval platforms, requires a complete awareness and understanding of the very close coordination and cooperation between those responsible for operation of and positioning of the platform itself in relation to those responsible for the embarked capabilities. Detailed testimony discloses that LIBERTY found absolutely no difficulties accomodating to this condition, unique within the navy to ships of this particular type.

38. The on-line crypto capability has engendered a dangerous willingness to send more classified traffic than in days of manual decoding without required proportionate increase in experienced supervisory personnel to ride herd on traffic queues increases. Conversely, we find often very inexperienced personnel being the first to give attention to misrouted messages such as those in question.

39. Key messages critical to international relations were not in this case, paralleled on other circuits.

40. High precedence of operational messages is too often not enough to overcome circuit choking resulting from large volume of such as is of the same precedence competing for inexperienced operator attention at the same time.

41. LIBERTY's embarked "warning" capabilities apparently gave no indication of impending danger during the period prior to the attack.

42. LIBERTY had experienced periodic reconnaissance on this and other operating stations which tended to create a feeling of "acceptance without undue concern" condition as they were on 8 June 1967. Reconnaissance experiences known to LIBERTY and other ships of LIBERTY's class in other parts of the world minimized concern by LIBERTY personnel

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[illegible] recon efforts on 8 June.

43. Commanding Officer LIBERTY appropriately reported recon early on A.M. of 8 June through her "locating two". This report was transmitted promptly by ship despite temporary interruption of her mission, at the direction of the Commanding Officer.

44. Up to the time of the attack, testimony disclosed no reasons to abort LIBERTY's mission in accordance with paragraph 1A of Appendix B to CNO 676-66 of 19 August 1966.

45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and surface attacks first to wipe out defense and shipboard capabilities followed by the crippling blow of a torpedo.

46. The Israeli aircraft rockets penetrated topside steel easily, leaving roughly five inch holes, with innumerable shrapnel pock marks on the inside of spaces penetrated.

47. The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer, officers and men of the LIBERTY was exceptional. The Commanding Officer is being recommended for the Congressional Medal, and the ship for an appropriate unit citation. These planned actions are fully supported by testimony to the Court.

48. LIBERTY apparently experienced a phenomenon identified as electronic jamming of her voice radio just prior to and during air attacks. This jamming was described as a steady carrier without modulation.

49. Disparities in reported times relating to sequenced events [illegible] will be attributed to the number of ship's clocks on board keeping poker and often stopped from shock at various times. It was necessary to reconstruct time sequences because QM notebook was incomplete from 1355 to 1446 since the QM was killed during the first attack.

50. Extent of Damage. The [illegible] material damage to LIBERTY resulted from the torpedo explosion, as follows:

A. SHELL DAMAGE: Hole centered at FR 60 and extending 2½ ft downward from just below second deck and longitudinally from from 53

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to frame 66 (99 feet). The hole was teardrop in shape, larger at bottom.

B. Interior structural damage: Outboard 15 feet of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck (tank top). Second deck and frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet.

C. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads b[illegible] second deck frame 52 to 78, entire width of ship.

In summary of above, the two research compartments, which extend the entire width of the ship, suffered severe structural damage and were flooded. Installed equipment and fittings were reduced to twisted wreckage.

Topside damage resulting from aircraft strafing and rocket attacks and from MTB strafing (ship was hit by more than 821 shells and rockets, many of them incendiary) summarized as follows:

Pilot house and signal bridge forward deck house, all gun tubes, many antennas including radar antenna, numerous bulkheads and decks holed by explosive rockets. Whale boat destroyed in davits by incendiary rockets and many life rafts holed or burned in their stowages. Flag bags burned and numerous fires resulting from incendiary munitions.

The gyro compass, air conditioning plant and many minor items of equipment, located in superstructure spaces, were damaged or destroyed. Numerous living spaces and personnel effects damaged by holing, shrapnel and wetting during firefighting.

Cost estimated - Value of destroyed research equipment $6-8 million, 12 months lead time. Structural repairs to ship and ship's equipment $2-4 million, 3-4 months.

51. The Israeli government set forth 7 points of rationale to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY in USDAO Tel Aviv message [illegible] 091520Z. Legal opinion and other comments on each is appended hereto (Appendix VI).

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58. That any killed or wounded personnel attached to the USS LIBERTY during the attack are eligible for the Purple Heart under the provisions of SECNAVINST. F1650.1C Chapter TWO SECTION THREE ARTICLE 231 PARA 12 b. sub-paras (4) and (5). The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY is preparing a listing of eligible personnel to be recommended.

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[redacted]
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President

Bernard J. LAUFF
Captain, U.S. Navy
Member

Kurt E. ATKINSON, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Member

Leslie C. [redacted], Jr.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President

Ward BOSTON, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Navy
Counsel for the Court

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That at 062349Z June 67 COMSIXTHFLT in part directed that LIBERTY would:

A. Maintain a high state of vigilance against attack in view of the Arab/Israeli situation.

B. Report by Flash precedence any threatening or suspicious action directed against LIBERTY.

C. Advise if local situation dictates change in area of operations assigned by JCS 011345Z June 67.

D. Report contact with ships, aircraft, and submarines which are unidentified, hostile or engaged in harassment.

E. Copy the KRATT fleet BOST.

This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Received at Naval Communications Station Morocco from COMSIXTHFLT at 070115Z.

B. Naval Communications Morocco entered the msg into the DCS for delivery to NCS Asmara at 070131Z.

C. DCS Seville (San Pablo) transmitted to DCS Asmara at 070300Z. DCS Asmara claimed message was received from DCS Seville (San Pablo) at 070550Z (2 hours and 50 minutes time difference is unexplained).

D. DCS(STRATCOM) Asmara relayed to Naval Communications Station Asmara at 070525Z.

E. Naval Communications Station Asmara transmitted message on JRATT as JR NR 2077 at 070529Z.

F. COMIDEASTFOR reports message was received at approximately 070531Z as JR NR 2077.

G. LIBERTY personnel do not recall receiving message.

APPENDIX I

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That at 072230Z JUN 67 JCS directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 20 and 15 MM respectively and modified his basic directive concerning LIBERTY operations (JCS 0115452 JUN 67), "Ref for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Dept of the Army communication center (DACC) erroneously routed message to NAVCOMSTA Philippines. This error resulted in critical time [redacted] being expended for identification, recovery and correction.

B. Received at Naval Communications Station Philippines at 081330Z from DCS relay Kenia.

C. Naval Communications Station Philippines relayed to DCS relay DAVIS at 081700Z.

D. Message was received at Naval Communications Station Asmara at 082125Z for transmission to LIBERTY.

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APPENDIX II

That at 080110Z JUN 67 JCS directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 100 NM. This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Dept of the Army Communication Center (DACC) erroneously routed message to Naval Communications Station Philippines. This error resulted in critical time being expended for identification, recovery and correction.

B. Received at Naval Communications Station Philippines at 0804002 from DCS Relay KUMIA.

C. Naval Communications Station Philippines relayed to Naval Communications Station Guam at 0804492.

D. Received at DACC at 0805032.

E. DACC routed message to NSA.

F. Naval Communications Station Asmara never received message for transmission to LIBERTY.

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APPENDIX III

That at 0306252 JUN 67 USCINCEUR officially confirmed by message a telephone conversation between the USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officers for CINCUSNAVEUR to take JCS 0801102 JUN 67 for action. This message was transmitted on the JCATT EOST at 0810592 as JR NR 2402. LIBERTY personnel have no knowledge of receipt of this message.

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APPENDIX IV

That at 0809172 JUN 67 COMSIXTHFLT directed that LIBERTY CPA to UAR and Israel be changed to 100 NM in response to CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z JUN 67 which directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 0801102 for action. This message was not received until after the attack for reasons as follows:

A. Message received at Naval Communications Station Morocco from COMSIXTHFLT at 0810502.

B. Naval Communications Station Morocco entered the msg into the DCS for delivery to NCS Asmara at 0811002.

C. LCS Sevilla (San Pablo) transmitted to DCS Asmara at 0812382. DCS Asmara reports receipt at 0812502.

D. DCS Asmara erroneously relayed message to Naval Communications Station Greece at 0812152.

E. Naval Communications Station Greece returned message to DCS Asmara at 0815032.

F. DCS Asmara relayed message to Naval Communications Station Asmara at 0815102 for transmission to LIBERTY.

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APPENDIX V

Comments on the seven points provided by ISF FLO, LCOL MICHAEL BLOCH, as "Futher Information on Yesterday's Incident with the American Ship".

Point 1 - Ship was sighted and recognized as a naval ship 13 miles from coast.

Comment - From 0849 on 8 June LIBERTY was steaming in international waters on a track generally parallel to the coast of the UAR. At one point the ship was, in fact, 13.6 miles from the coast.

Point 2 - The presence (of a neutral-nation naval ship) in a [redacted] area is against international custom.

Comment - The duties of a neutral under international law do not include a duty to ensure that its ships or personnel leave or refrain from entering an area of hostilities or an area adjacent to an area of hostilities. Nationals of a neutral country who may happen to be in belligerent territory nevertheless retain their right to protection by their neutral home state; and a belligerent must grant to neutral diplomatic envoys -- including those accredited to the enemy -- the right to quit the territory unmolested. A neutral nation, in this respect alone, thus has a legitimate reason and a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities, in fulfillment of its obligation to protect its nationals and to evacuate those who desire evacuation. It was in fulfillment of such a mission that USS LIBERTY was engaged. Far from being contrary to international custom, the presence of neutral ships on just such missions as LIBERTY's is a common, if not a universal, incident of situations involving the outbreak of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her. Action by such a neutral ship to repulse an unlawful belligerent attack by force, where the neutral has not first attacked the belligerent, does not constitute "hostilities" against the belligerent and does not constitute an abandonment or a violation of neutrality.

APPENDIX VI

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Point 3 - The Area (Where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) is not a common passage for ships.

Comment - Given the [illegible] proposition that a ship of [illegible]eutral is steaming in international waters, the question of whether or not such waters are a "common passage" is totally irrelevant to its right to be there.

Point 4 - Egypt (An opposing Belligerent) had declared the a[illegible] (here LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) closed to neutrals.

Comment - Closing certain adjacent waters including those otherwise considered to be high seas, has ample precedent in history as a belligerent practice, notably in World War I and II when most of the belligerents, including the United States, declared "war zones", Military areas", and "defensive sea areas" and either attempted to close such areas completely and to severely circumscribe passage through them as a neutral. The consistent position of the United States has been to reserve generally all of its rights in the premises, including the right not only to question the validity of such "war zones" but to present demands and claims in relation to any American interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, by virtue of their enforcement. As a general proposition, closing or attempting to restrict any portion of the high seas has not been recognized in international law as a belligerent right.

Point 5 - LIBERTY resembles the Egyptain supply ship EL QUSEIR.

Comment - While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY she does not closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive hull markings of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria alone justification for attack, any ship resembling EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy.

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APPENDIX VI

Point 6 - Ship was not flying flag when sighted. She moved at high speed westward toward enemy coast.

Comment - LIBERTY flew a size 9 (approx 5 feet by 8 feet) U.S. ensign from her foremast throughout the morning of 8 June and until it was shot down by the Israeli air attack. At least 5 minutes prior to the torpedo attack a size 7 ensign (approx 7 feet by 13 feet) was hoisted at the main yardarm. At 0849 LIBERTY changed course from 130°T to 253°T. At 0905 LIBERTY reduced speed to 5 Knots and continued to steam at that speed until after the initial air attack. At 1132 LIBERTY altered course to 283°T and continued on this course until after the ship was attacked.

Point 7 - IDF Navy had earlier reports of bombardment of El Arish from sea.

Comment - It is inconceivable that either the IDF Navy or Air Force would associate LIBERTY's with her 4-50 caliber machine guns, or EL QUSEIR, armed with two 3 pounders, with a shore bombardment.

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KXC156VV AGB832V

YUFPII
COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED GARBLED.
GO RUDLVD MESSAGE IS IN SERVICE. CORRECTED COPY WILL BE
DE RUTPPC 052 16 1205Z JUN 67 ROUTED WHEN RECEIVED. W2/RB/10JUN 67
ZYB CSUSS //CORRECTED COPY//
O 081205Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUDLVD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPP/COMDESRON TWELVE
RUTPP/USS LIBERTY

DESTROY ALL OTHERS

(A) CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67
(B) JCS 080110Z JUN 67
(A) ZEKEN FOR ACTION
ACCORDING TO CO USS LIBERTY, REF (B) AND ALL ASSOCIATED USSS
TO PASS CONTENT OF REF (B) WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY
PRIOR TO ATTACK.
GP-3
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC:TR/W 2/13 JUN 67

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DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV Navo Secy 0090 32/131
on 29 June 76 OK Grain 21 June 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
JAG Sec Cent
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Ex 5

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON	
TOR	
SSN	10/2337
SSN	

DTG 101205Z JUN 67

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1124

SHIP _____ FOX DESIGNATION _____ DATE _____

AT PASSAGE FOR _____

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
	[illegible]
1200	AT CLEARED BEARING [illegible]
12	SET COURSE [illegible]
1214	[illegible]
1215	AT CAPACITY ON COAST [illegible]
1216	COMMENCE ANTI-AIR [illegible]
1230	SIGHTED EXPLOSION ON COAST [illegible]
	[illegible]
131	AT STATION [illegible]
1345	SIGHTED [illegible]
	[illegible]
1355	[illegible]
	ONE GUNBOAT [illegible]
	[illegible]
1500	TURN ON COURSE [illegible]
1500	STARBOARD 10° ON WEAK [illegible]
	[illegible]
1503	ONE MORE BOAT SIGHTED [illegible]
1505	ONE MORE ALREADY [illegible]
1506	DELIGHT THE LOOKOUTS AS USUAL [illegible]
	SACCHARIN MORE ALREADY SUN OUT SIDE
	500 YARDS.
1508	SECOND HELICOPTER SIGHTED
1510	STARBOARD 10° [illegible]
	[illegible]
1511	HULL OF ONE HELICOPTER IDENTIFIED AS [illegible]
	OF TH. SECOND HELICOPTER [illegible]
1523	LOST ON SIGHTS LOST AFTER [illegible]
	BEARING FULL [illegible]
1530	STARBOARD 20° [illegible]
	[illegible]
1531	[illegible]
	STARBOARD, [illegible]
	BOATS
1540	[illegible]
1545	[illegible]
	[illegible]
1555	SLOT MESSAGE FROM TRANS [illegible]
1600	[illegible]
	[illegible]
1617	[illegible]
1630	[illegible]

EX. 6 (1)

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[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] FOOD DESCRIPTION ... DATE ... (Day) (Mon) (Month) ... 19 ...

AT PASSAGE FROM ... TO ...

TIME	RECORD OF ALL EVENTS OF THE DAY
1633	[illegible] AND THE OTHER COAST CLOSE
	AHEAD TO PORT [illegible] SAID "BOATS
	DON'T CEASE TO BE ISRAELI"
1635	C/C TO 300 MAGNETIC C/S [illegible] TO
	SUBMIT THIS RECOMMENDATION, BUT
1641	C/S TO AVE 3/4 CANNOT CONTACT SHIP AT PRESENT
1642	STBD LOST SIGHT OF TOP OF MOUNTAIN, 12° ON
	BOTTOM
1645	HEAD DECIDED FOR CONSTANT TURN DISTANCE
	IS OF THE WAY
1655	[illegible]
1700	[illegible]
1701	[illegible]
1702	[illegible]
1703	[illegible]
1705	[illegible]
E	[illegible]
1	[illegible]
1721	[illegible]
1726	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
1707	[illegible]
1712	HEADING 321° MAGNETIC
1713	[illegible]
1714	[illegible]
1716	322° MAGNETIC HEADING
1717	[illegible]
1718	[illegible]
1719	[illegible]
1721	HEADING 325° MAGNETIC
1722	[illegible]
1723	[illegible]
1724	HEADING 325° MAGNETIC / 18 PER HOUR THE EQUATION
	HEADING 330° DIA
1726	NEW HEADING 335° / MAGNETIC
	NEW RADIUS 8400 MAGNETIC
	25 PERCENT UNDER THE KEEL
	HEAD 360° MAG
	355° MAG
	360° MAG

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IDENTITY COURT OF INQUIRY
EXHIBIT 6(2) to CIR
Ex 6(2)

7530-633-0873 ENVELOPE PHOTOGRAPHIC NEGATIVE

No._____ Unit_____

Date Taken_____ By_____

Neg. Size_____ Classification_____

Location, Altitude, Orientation, Focal Length of Lens, etc., as applicable.

_____

_____

OFFICIAL NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

COMPLETE TITLE AND DESCRIPTION OF PICTURE

(Occasion, action, make, model, type, name, rank, rate, initials, address, serial, etc.)

_____

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If released for publication, Officer releasing sign below.

_____ Rank_____ Date_____

Filed in Section

★

of Alphabetical Print File

*THIS SPACE FOR APPROPRIATE FILING LETTER (SEE ARTICLE 0708-2, MANUAL OF NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHY)

Ex. 7 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

PHOTO OF SHELL FRAGMENTS

52



Ex 7

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

CALLING CARD OF

CDR ERNEST CARL CASTLE

LOOK ON REVERSE SIDE

EXHIBIT 8 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

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PHOTO 65 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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James M. Hines Jr. Research Papers

PHOTO 67 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO G.E of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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Photo 69 of Ex. 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 70 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 71 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 72 of EX. 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 73 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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
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

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

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

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



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





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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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PHOTO 12 of EX 9 - LIBERTI



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PHOTO 11 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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5



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PHOTO 9 of Ex 9 - L. Bell



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PHOTO 5 of Ex 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 4 of EX 9 -- LIBERIA



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PHOTO 3 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 2 of EX 9 - LIBERTY



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

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

LEGEND

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZC [redacted]
OO RUFLKD
DE RUFNDA [redacted]
ZNY [redacted]
FM [redacted]
[redacted] LEGEND -- [redacted] SG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDRESSES [redacted]
FM [redacted]
TO RUFPNK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUFNAAA/CNO
RUEDMKA/CINCLANT
RUEDMKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLYE INCUSNAVEUR
RUFGCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFGCF/CTF 64
RUFGCF/USS LIBERTY
RUFMAS/HOMEPORT
RUFMAS/NSAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUFPMS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ARLINGTON VA
RUFPNYA/DIRNAVINTSPECIALWARCEN
RUFIDIA/DIRNAVSECGRUDET [redacted]
ZEN [redacted]
FM [redacted]
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7317/071803Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (PCTAL)
1. (U) CINCSTRIKE REF A.
2. (TSC) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW CP ARES DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by OTCS 10 Nov 76

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COPY 23 OF 27 COPIES

ORIGINATOR SECTION

[redacted]

CINCUSNAVEUR

ACTION [redacted]

INFO

ECU LONDON

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CCN

TOR 1812Z

SSN

SGF

2 0 11 JUN 67

[redacted]

(WHEN FILLED IN)

33

Liberty

[illegible]
DE RUEKDA 0830 1530940
ZNY SSSSS
O P 031503Z JUNE 67 ZFF1 [illegible]
FM JCS
TO RUEPEK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUEPNE/CNO
RUEMAL/USS LIBERTY
RUDLAM/[illegible]
RUEPAC/[illegible]
BT

[redacted] JCS7931 J-3 SUNDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7937/300116Z JUN 67
[redacted] B. CINCUSNAVEUR 030902Z JUN 67
[redacted] C. CINCLANTFLT LANT 031736Z JUN 67
[redacted] D. CONSIXTHFLT 020917Z JUN 67
JCS [redacted] (C) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBJECT INCIDENT, REQUEST ENDUSE THE FOLLOWING INFO:
1. TIME OF RECEIPT:
(1) REPS A, B, C, AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REPS A, B, AND C BY CONSIXTHFLT.

Declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
by OTS
10 Nov 76

2. TIME OF DISPATCH:
(1) REP C BY CINCUSNAVEUR.
(2) TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION INCLUDING HOME RELAY STATION:
(1) REP B TO CONSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY.
(2) REP C TO CINCUSNAVEUR, CONSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REP D TO USS LIBERTY.
3. (C) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REP B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO
BT-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(PAGE 1 OF ____)			
CCN			
TOR	0346/10		
DUR			
DTG	FC		

DTG: 091936Z JUN 67

3 [redacted]

DA FORM NCU LCN 2103/3 (REV 10-63)

Doc. 30 x YP Liberty

[redacted]B I UZCHGB329
[redacted]ZOV RUFPBNA
[redacted]DTG 2[redacted]
[redacted]RUHZCSNA093
[redacted]PSNA
[redacted]S JSCC 1582241
[redacted]
[redacted]2352Z JUN 67
[redacted]FM
[redacted]/USCINCEUR
[redacted]/C ECCPOSTFOTKAUNCLAN
[redacted]/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI/CINCSTRIKE
[redacted]/USCINCTIFLT
[redacted]OTF 67
[redacted]/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
[redacted]/CINCPAC LIBERTY
[redacted]/AMBASSADOR
[redacted]/SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
[redacted]/CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
[redacted]/DIR DIA WASHDC
[redacted]/DIR NSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
[redacted]/DIR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHDC
[redacted]/DIR NSCC SUITLAND MD
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

DISCLOSURE SHEET

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED. CONTACT NAVCOMSTAT FOR [illegible] CONTROL OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES.

	DATE	SIGNATURE	PAGE/ALL
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			

22 -27

COPY 6 of 20 COPIES

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EX 3

NNNXNV

[redacted] UU [redacted] C 1521548 TMB426
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPJS [redacted] CC 1521548
ZNY SSSSS
O [redacted] 67 ZFF3
FM JCS [redacted]
IO RUFPBKK/UIC CINCEUUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/NOCCCINCLANTFLT
[redacted]/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUIPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 64
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPWS/CIRVGA
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
BT
[redacted] JCS CP(U) JA3 SENDS
SHED USS LIBERTY SKED (U)
REF DIRNSA G/104/311516Z MAY (NOTAL-BOY)

FROM P RUFPJS 0010 S E C R E T
1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST S/IL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING
SKED:

A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.
B. 2-8 JUN. ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
SAFE
AV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO NATA
3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5NM
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)
CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS,
DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.
GP-3
BT

LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RE
ALL ADDEES
SERVICE NUMBER 1775 1521306

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by [redacted] 10 Nov 76

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EX 1

CSN
TOR 01511Z
SSN
SSN

01535 TU

INFORMATION SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
CINCUSNAVEUR
OO OI OS NI NS NS N4 NS NC NT CITE SDO
DDR DOS FOCSS DI 013 014 015 016 017 414 ADO
NSU LONDON

NNNNCZCKDB110ZCNGB329
PP RUDLKD
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
CNAD197
ZCZCBNA111ZCBKA093
PP RUFPBNA
DE RUEPJS 130C 1582241
ZNY CCCCC
P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/C ECZDROZFZROTYAUHNCLAN
RUEDNKA/CVWTBBXPFFNMDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUIPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUMFCR/CTF 67
RUMECR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQ NASAEUR
RUFNAS/NASAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR
BT
[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED. OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM, GF-4
BT

Draft Sample

Liberty

Declassified by OJCS 10 Nov 76

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

DOC. 14 Ex 48-Lit.

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
USGE 13
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SEI OF
CON
TOR 11421
BSH
SDN
DTG 072230Z Jun 67
[redacted]
207



EXHIBIT 11 to LIBERTY
COURT OF INQUIRY
1-35 MM
COLOR SLIDE

7530-633-9673 ENVELOPE PHOTOGRAPHIC NEGATIVE

No. _____ Unit _____

Date Taken _____ By _____

Neg. Size _____ Classification _____

Location, Altitude, Orientation, Focal Length of Lens, etc., as applicable.

Filed in Section

*

of Alphabetical Print File

*THIS SPACE FOR APPROPRIATE FILING LETTER (SEE ARTICLE 0708-2, MANUAL OF NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHY)

OFFICIAL NAVY PHOTOGRAPH
COMPLETE TITLE AND DESCRIPTION OF PICTURE

(Occasion, action, make, model, type, name, rank, rate, initials, address, serial, etc.)

If released for publication, Officer releasing sign below.

Rank _____ Date _____

52

Ex 11

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7530-833-5373 ENVELOPE, PHOTOGRAPHIC NEGATIVE

No._____ Unit_____

Date Taken_____ By_____

Neg. Size_____ Classification_____

Location, Altitude, Orientation, Focal Length of Lens, etc., as applicable.

_____ _____

_____ _____

OFFICIAL NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

COMPLETE TITLE AND DESCRIPTION OF PICTURE

(Occasion, action, make, model, type, name, rank, rate, initials, address, serial, etc.)

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

If released for publication, Officer releasing sign below.

_____ Rank_____ Date_____

Filed in Section

[*]

of Alphabetical Print File

*THIS SPACE FOR APPROPRIATE FILING LETTER (SEE ARTICLE 0708-2, MANUAL OF NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHY)

EXHIBIT 2 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

1-35MM COLOR SLIDE OF OP. AREA

52



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

309

8 JUNE

TIME	BEARING EL ALCH	RANGE N.L	POINT
1003	~~310~~ 3	14.4/14	
	~~212~~ 214.5	14	EL ARISH
	164	17.5	N. L
	154	24.1	NIGHTINGALE
	164	29.6	RT. TGT
	203	24.1	RT. SIDE MTN.
	216		PT.
1039	~~162~~ 164		
	184	17	EL ARISH
		14	N.L.
1112	162	13.6	
	172	14.0	EL ARISH
	~~174.5~~ 174	25.4	EL ARISH
	(LAND)		
1145	173/178.9		
	160		

RADAR BEARING
L.O.G

1 MINUTE 13 TO LINGERING

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8 JUNE 1967

COD LT O'CONNOR

0300 C/C TO 190°(T)

0335 CHANGE BOX HEADING

COD LT SCOTT

0335 Assumed The Watch. Steaming As Before.

1053 C/C TO 190°(T) To Blow Tubes

1615 C/C TO 255°(T)

1800 C/C TO 123°(T)

1832 Set Condition One

1900 C/C

1930 Increased Speed To Best Speed

1934 C/C TO 180°(T)

2130 C/C TO 253°(T)

2400 Set Condition Two

1132 C/C To 283 °(T)

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D.L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

EXHIBIT 14 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

E v 311/14

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[illegible]

[illegible]

1317 [illegible]

1324 [illegible]

1325 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1400 [illegible]

1417 [illegible]

1424 [illegible]

1430 [illegible]

1431 [illegible]

1432 [illegible]

1435 [illegible]

1440 [illegible]

1446 Torpedo Boats Have Not Left Dock
FIRED

1517 Volunteers Friendly

1529 Power Restored [illegible] Does Not
Answer

1520 [illegible]

1524 Condition Zebra Reset

1536 Torpedo Boats Have Been Identified

1539 Appears to Be Destroyer Escort Boats

1543 Torpedo Boat

1554 Motoring Code Light [illegible]
(Channel 16)

1542 Torpedo Boats Requesting Code Letters
To Be Broken

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D.L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

312

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[illegible]

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D.I.. BURSON

ENGINEER'S BELL BOOK - ALL VESSELS
NAVSHIPS 516 (Rev. 11-56)

ATTESTED TO BE A TRUE COPY

ENGINEER'S BELL BOOK

(SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE)

U S S [illegible] (DD-[illegible]) SHAKEDOWN — DATE [illegible]

From noon to [illegible] to 2400

Record of all "BELLS," SIGNALS, and ORDERS received regarding movement of propeller this date

TIME ZONE DESCRIPTION -7 Zone + 8 Hrs. Clocks to be set [illegible] hrs. [illegible] min. [illegible]

(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R P M	(4) COUNTER OR PITCH SET	(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R P M	(4) COUNTER OR PITCH SET	(1) TIME	(2) SIGNAL	(3) R P M	(4) COUNTER OR PITCH SET
0000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]								
0100	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]								
0200	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]								
0300	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]								
Lo[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]									
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]									
[illegible]											
[illegible]											
[illegible]	

ENGINEERING LOG - ALL SHIPS — I DO CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES ON THIS LOG ARE A TRUE COPY — DAY — MONTH — 19 42 — PAGE K 2 1

U. S. S. [illegible] (CT-5)

AT—OR ENROUTE FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

NOTES: * TO TENTHS; USE WHOLE NUMBERS FOR OTHER ITEMS — BLANK SPACES IN HOURS FOR DATA WHEN CLOCKS ARE SET BACK
** ON GETTING UNDER WAY AND ANCHORING — BEGIN NEW SERIES OF PAGE NUMBERS EACH CALENDAR YEAR
USE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

TABLE 1			TABLE 2 - ENTRIES IN GALLONS										
				FUEL OIL		WATER				LUBE OIL		
	AVERAGE REVOLUTIONS	SPD IN KNOTS	ITEM	HEAVY	DIESEL	POTABLE	FEED	SURF	OTHER	DIESEL	STEAM	OTHER
01	45.0	10.5	BROUGHT FWD AT 0000	661580	4162	35455	45922			35	50	6.5
02	45.0	10.0	REC'D TODAY									
03	45.0	10.0	INCREASE BY INVENTORY									
04	45.0	10.0	DISTILLED TODAY	XXXX	XXXX	7810	4020			XX	XX	XX
05	45.0	10.0	TOTAL RECEIPTS	661520	4102	43305	53942			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
06	45.0	10.0	EXPENDED OR USE	2647		28866	6307					
07	45.0	10.0	EXPENDED BY INVENTORY									
08	45.0	10.0	TOTAL EXPENDED	2647		28866	[illegible]					
09	45.0	10.0	ON HAND AT 2400 TODAY	658873	4102	14439	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10	30.1	9.0										
11	[illegible]	9.0										
12	[illegible]	[illegible]										
13	[illegible]	[illegible]										
14	[illegible]	[illegible]										
15												
16												
17												
18												
19												
20												
21												
22												
23												
24												

USE EXCEPTIONAL CARE TO WRITE THIS LOG LEGIBLY AND KEEP IT CLEAN

TABLE 3

DISPLACEMENT	FORWARD	AFT	MEAN	TONS
	FT IN	FT IN	FT IN	
	FORWARD	AFT	MEAN	TONS
	FT IN	FT IN	FT IN	

MILES - (0000-2400) TOTAL DISTANCE THROUGH WATER FROM NAVIGATOR'S DATA (NOT DISTANCE MADE GOOD)

ENGINE MILES - (0000-2400) FROM TABLE 1 SUM OF HOURS TIMES ENGINE SPEEDS 115 — DAYS OUT OF DOCK [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

The Engineering Log may be written with pencil or pen, as most convenient. The ORIGINAL writing is the LEGAL RECORD and must be preserved. It is not necessary to make a copy, except when one or more pages are sent away from a ship in commission.

Table 1 and the REMARKS must be written at the time events occur. Other tables may be written before noon the following date.

REMARKS shall be written by "watches" underway; and by "day's duty" at anchor. They shall be signed by the Engineer Officer of the Watch or Day before going off duty.

Remarks shall be a chronicle of important events. They shall include: First, boilers in use; second, engine combination in use; third, major speed changes, such as "one-third," "standard," "full"; fourth, casualties to personnel or material within or under the cognizance of the engineer department; fifth, special entries required by Navy Regulations, Bureau of Ships' Manual, instructions and letters of the Bureau of Ships.

ALTERATIONS OR ERASURES ARE NOT PERMITTED. NECESSARY CORRECTIONS SHALL BE MADE ONLY IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY ART. 1035 NAVY REGULATIONS.

DISPOSITION

For disposal of this record see current [illegible] disposal instructions for vessels of the U. S. Navy.

IF WAS - USE REVERSE SIDE — CLOCKS SET — TIME ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible] — BACK OR AHEAD [illegible] — [illegible] MINUTES AT

[illegible] log [illegible] from Navy Yard, Bremerton to be used
450 RPM for 10.0 Knots Standard speed use not at 600 RPM;
" 130.0 Knots TE [illegible] machinery [illegible]

ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (WHEN FILLED IN)

EXHIBIT 16 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY — Ex 16 — 315

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REMARKS (ARE) (ARE NOT) CONTINUED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET (NAVSHIPS 1174) PAGE NO 828 INITIALS C.F.H.

NOTE: C.O. SIGN "REVIEWED" ONCE A MONTH ON LOG OF LAST DAY AND ON THE LOG OF THE DAY BEFORE DETACHMENT.
ENGINEERING OFFICER SIGN "REVIEWED" BY NOON OF FOLLOWING DATE.

REVIEWED SIGNATURE AND RANK	REVIEWED SIGNATURE AND RANK
USN COMMANDING	[signature] USN ENGINEER OFFICER

NAVSHIPS 117 (REV. 10-61)

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316

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ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY PAGE 8-2.8

NAVSHIPS 17A (1-55)

U.S.S. Inlet (PC-16-5) DATE 8 June 1967

[illegible] Tested and found satisfactory. Tested and found satisfactory [illegible] Tested and found satisfactory [illegible] Tested and found satisfactory [illegible]

FILED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

APPROVED: SIGNATURE AND RANK
USN COMMANDING

CORRECT: SIGNATURE AND RANK
[illegible] LT USN ENGINEER OFFICER 31

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:
G.J. Billington Mate

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION
NAVSHIPS 1171A (1-58)
U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5)
PAGE 830
DATE 8 Dec 1967

08-12. (Contd) C/E at sea. Secured Port C/E which was load-operating on the line paralleled with No. 3 ship service turbo-generator on the line. Secured No. 3 ship service turbo-generator off the line. Secured No. 3 ship service turbo-generator in parallel supplying ship service load, secured lighting and ship service load. Split No. 1 electrical load from C/E and put ship service turbo-generator supplying ship's load on the line. Secured No. 3 ship service turbo-generator with the governor set at 1200 R.P.M. Tested the overspeed trip on No. 3 ship service turbo-generator, tripped at 1320 R.P.M., tested satisfactory. Placed No. 3 ship service turbo-generator on the line paralleled with No. 1 ship service turbo-generator supplying ship service load. Secured No. 1 ship service turbo-generator from the line. Secured No. 1 ship service turbo-generator with the governor set at 1200 R.P.M. Tested overspeed trip on No. 1 ship service turbo-generator, tripped at 1320. Tested satisfactory. Placed No. 1 ship service turbo-generator with No. 3 ship service turbo-generator supplying ship service load. Secured No. 3 ship service turbo-generator with the governor set at 1200 R.P.M. Tested overspeed trip on No. 3 ship service turbo-generator, tripped at 1320. Tested satisfactory. Placed No. 3 ship service turbo-generator with No. 1 ship service turbo-generator supplying ship service load

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION — CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY — PAGE 531

NAVSHIPS 1/A (1-55)

U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5) — DATE 8 June 1967

08-12 (Contd) hubs, pressure not granted. @1035 Charged and cleared manifold on #1 boiler. @1109 Received pressure from the ship's allied tube on #2 boiler. @1109 Commenced steaming #1 boiler. @1110 Took #2 ships service turbo-generator off the line placing #1 and #2 ships service turbo-generators paralleled supplying ships service, vital and lighting bus ties. @1115 Set the R.P.M.'s on #2 ships service turbo-generator with no load at 1200 R.P.M.'s. Tested the overspeed trip on #2 ships service turbo-generator, trip out at 1320 tested satisfactory @1120 placed #2 ships service turbo-generator @1123 placed #2 auxiliary condensate pump @ as placed #2 auxiliary circulating pump @1125 Completed steaming tests on #1 hub. @1130 Light off inspected and placed the 4 burners on the new register, #1 and #2 ships service turbo-generator. Made Routine visit and inspection. Condition normal.

B.J. Abrahamson

12-16 Loading as before except @1155 Tested and dropped 4-74-3-W into 5-19-0-W. Tested at 650 p.s.i. @1200 shifted distribution of #1 switching unit from 3-95-0-W to 4-74-3-W. @1210 Secured generator and @1213 Set Condition yellow. @1214 Set Condition yellow. @1255 Secured from steaming on the ship's ... @1400 Secured all hands ... @1405 Secured all ... @1415 Set ...

APPROVED: SIGNATURE AND RANK — USN COMMANDING

CORRECT: SIGNATURE AND RANK — USN ENGINEER OFFICER

320

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
J.D. Billingsley, USN

ENGINEERING LOG CONTINUATION SHEET
NAVSHIPS 1172A (1-55)

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U.S.S. [illegible] (DE-173)

DATE 8 June 1943

(2) 12.14 (Cont) and a Limited Operational Test was conducted on the Ship's Gyro Compass System. Observations were made of the Gyro Compass Repeaters and the Gyro Compass Stand. The Gyro Compass System was found to be operating satisfactorily. Gyro Compass Repeaters were found to be synchronized with the Master Gyro Compass. Gyro Compass Repeaters were found to be operating satisfactorily. Gyro Compass Repeaters were found to be operating satisfactorily. All Gyro Compass Repeaters were found to be operating satisfactorily.

(3) 12.21 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(4) 12.35 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(7) 12.50 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(9) 13.00 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(11) 13.10 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(13) 13.20 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(14) 13.25 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(16) 13.35 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(17) 13.40 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(45) 16.00 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(48) 16.15 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

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(50) 16.25 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(51) 16.30 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(52) 16.35 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(53) 16.40 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(54) 16.45 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(55) 16.50 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(56) 16.55 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(57) 17.00 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(58) 17.05 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(59) 17.10 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(60) 17.15 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(61) 17.20 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(62) 17.25 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(63) 17.30 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(64) 17.35 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(65) 17.40 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(66) 17.45 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(67) 17.50 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was started and placed in operation. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily.

(68) 17.55 Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was secured and placed in standby condition. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's Service Diesel Generator #2 was found to be operating satisfactorily. Ship's

		(Illegible)		
		LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR [illegible]		
		ARRIVED AT [illegible], SECURED COMPASS		
		LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR [illegible]		
	1400	ARRIVED AT IDKAR, SECURED COMPASS		
		LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR LEAVING PORT		
	1900	GYRO FAILURE, SECURED COMPASS		

G/KC LCG

Enc

22 DEC 1966	1330	ARRIVED AT ABIDJAN, SECURED COMPASS		
24 DEC 1966	1330	LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR LEAVING PORT		
25 JAN 1967	0830	ARRIVED AT LIBERIA, SECURED COMPASS		
26 JAN 1967	1630	LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR LEAVING PORT		
15 FEB 1967	0730	ARRIVED AT MONROVIA, SECURED COMPASS		
16 FEB 1967	0930	LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR LEAVING PORT		
[illegible]	[illegible]	ARRIVED AT [illegible], SECURED COMPASS		
14 MAR 1967	1430	LIT-OFF COMPASS FOR LEAVING PORT, FOR SEA TRIAL		
[illegible]	[illegible]	ARRIVED [illegible]		
1 APR 1967	0900	LIT OFF FOR SEA		
3 APR 1967	1000	GYRO TUMBLED - DIRECTIONAL TIPPED OUT		
21 APR 1967	0650	SECURED GYRO FOR [illegible]		
23 APR 1967	2230	LIT OFF GYRO FOR SEA		

REPLACED (1) 20 AMP FUSE & (1) 2 AMP FUSE	9981	

TIME				
1003				
		210.3		
		164	19	
		154	17.5	
		164	24.1	
		205	29.5	
		211	24.1	
1034		215		
		154		
		215		
		159	17	
			14	
1102		162	13.6	
		158.2		
		094.5	25.4	
		LAND		
1145		173/189		
		180		

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CERTIFIED TO E A TRUE COPY OF THE USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) BEARING LOG

D. L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

EXHIBIT 18 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY EX-18 323

8 JUNE 1967

DATE	TIME	LAT.	LONG.	ZI T	REMARKS
	0000	31°59'N	32°24'E	AFK	
	0100	31°59'N	32°55'E	AFK	
	0200	31°58.5'N	32°47'E	AFK	
	0300	31°58'N	33°01'E	AFK	
	0400	31°58'N	33°10'E	AFK	
	0500	31°47'N	33°20'E	AFK	
	0600	31°41'N	33°30'E	AFK	
	0700	31°38.5'N	33°33'E	AFK	
	0800	31°34'N	33°50.5'E	AFK	
	0900	31°27'N	33°51'E	AFK	
	1000	31°21'N	33°51.5'E	AFK	
	1100	31°24'N	33°41'E	AFK	
	200	31°22.5'N	33°41.5'E	AFK	
	1300	31°23'N	33°35'E	AFK	

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) DRT LOG

D.L. BURSON
COMMANDING OFFICER

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EXHIBIT 19 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY EX 19 324

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE DEAD PERSONNEL.
THE BODIES' OF THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN RECOVERED

LCDR	ARMSTRONG, PHILIP M.	569825/1100
SN	BLANCHARD, GARY R.	771 77 22
QM3	BROWN, FRANCIS (n)	778 76 70
CT3	HIGGINS, ALAN (n)	788 62 97
S[redacted]	HOAR, CARL	774 46 48
[redacted]2	MENDLE, ANTHONY	777 62 87
[redacted]FN	SKOLAK, DAVID	B50 17 83
P[redacted]2	SPICHER, JOHN C.	473 41 77
GMG3	THOMPSON, ALEXANDER	770 47 21
CT3	THORNTON, THOMAS R.	997 97 91
LT	TOTH, STEPHEN S.	669613/1100
CT1	WALTON, FREDERICK J.	236 31 86

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EX. 20

EXHIBIT 20 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 3-5

PERSONNEL MISSING

CT3 WILLIAM B. ALLENBAUGH 684-41-96 USN.
CT2 CONNIE J. CAMPBELL 586133 USN
CT2 JERRY L. CONVERSE
CT2 ROBERT B. EISENBERG 776[illegible] USN
CT1 CURTIS A. GRAVES 595[illegible] USN
CISN LAWRENCE P. HAYDEN 770[illegible] USN
CT1 WARREN E. HERSEY [illegible] USN
CT2 RICHARD W. KEENE [illegible] USN
CISN JAMES L. LENAU [illegible] USN
CISA DAVID W. MARLBOROUGH [illegible] USN
CTC RAYMOND E. LINN [illegible] USN
CT3 DUANE R. MARGRAF [illegible] USN
LT JAMES C. PIERCE [illegible] USN
CT1 JOHN CALEB SMITH [illegible] USN
CTC MELVIN D. SMITH [illegible] USN
CT3 PHILLIPPE C. TIEDTKE [illegible] USN
CT3 CARL C. NYGREN [illegible] USN
CPL EDWARD E. REIMEYER [illegible] USMC
SGT J.L. RAPER
CT3 JERRY L. GOSS
CT1 JAMES M. LUPTON [illegible]

CIVILIAN ALLEN M. BLUE · [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EX 21

EXHIBIT 21 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

RESEARCH WOUNDED

The following is a list of the wounded Research Department personnel. Personnel are listed in alphabetical order according to name, and contains the rate and service number of each.

OFFICERS

LT. ENNES, James M.	653840/1615
LCDR. LEWIS, David E.	584572/1610
LT. O'CONNOR, James G.	671765/1615

ENLISTED

CT1 ADDINGTON, Reginald N.	349 53 80
CT3 ANDERSON, Joe D.	771 76 77
CT1 BAKER, Richard K.	486 80 12
CTSN BENEDICT, Nathan D.	139 55 74
CTSN BENNETT, Lee R.	998 [illegible] 79
CT3 BRONG, James V.	918 41 23
CT1 CARLSON, Richard C.	444 13 05
CT1 CARPENTER, Jefferie R.	535 14 05
CT2 DAVIDSON, James R.	699 64 72
CTSN EAKINS, Kenneth B.	794 04 69
CTSN ECKER, Kenneth P.	B51 36 48
CT3 HAWKINS, David W.	118 73 49
CT2 HENDRICKS, Charles R.	685 56 42
CT2 JOHNS, Fredrick K.	794 91 14
CT3 JOHNSON, Melvin P.	997 32 29
CTSN KAVANAUGH, James P.	918 51 32
CTSN KIRK, Eugene H.	918 81 30
CT3 KREUN, Loren W.	538 49 74
CT1 LENTINI, Joseph C.	594 81 55
#SSGT LOCKWOOD, Bryce F.	185 98 56
CT2 McFAGGEN, David L.	774 71 98
CT2 MEYER, Stephen E.	771 42 03
CT1 ROWLEY, Charles L.	458 48 03
CT3 SHAFER, Maurice B.	695 94 36
CTSN SHAW, David A.	904 39 56
CT3 SIX, Harold E.	777 58 53
*CTC THOMPSON, Harold J.	471 37 37
ET3 TIMMERMAN, Barry R.	770 11 63

CIVILIAN

BALLOCK, Donald L.

# Denotes United States Marine Corps
* Denotes Personnel retained on board

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Ex 22(a)

Exhibit 22(a) to Liberty Court of Inquiry 301

GENERAL SERVICE
WOUNDED LIST

ENGINEERING DEPT

EM2	LEMAY, William M.	773 35 21
IC1	RANDALL, John K.	517 81 45

DECK DEPT

SN	CASPER, Willaim E.	796 40 74
SN	CONCEPCION, Rodney C.	674 38 09
SN	COOK, Eddie L.	997 59 71
SN	FOLLIN, Donald F. Jr.	917 66 74
GMG3	HAZEN, David C.	696 84 98
SN	JACKSON, Thomas.F.	689 15 99
SN	PAYAN, Salvado (n)	796 66 15
SN	PIERSON, Gerald A.	794 07 20
SA	RIELLY, Thomas J. Jr.	913 50 66
SN	SLAVENS, Larry T.	916 92 00
SN	SOPER, Larry L.	698 89 98
BMSM	WARD, Jerry W.	775 76 67
SN	WEAVER, Richard L.	999 88 63
SN	WILSON, George W.	529 34 49

OPS DEPT

YN3	BROWNFIELD, Virgil L.	794 23 49
SM2	DAVID, RUSSEL O.	683 33 65
SN	LAMAR, John D.	779 56 36
SMSN	MEADORS, Joseph L.	B71 04 56
QM3	POLLARD, Floyd H.	353 55 47

SUPPLY DEPT

SH2	HEROLD, Donald (n)	609 22 48
SN	LEMOND, Thomas W.	917 49 31
TN	MARFIL, Sofronio P.	776 90 09
SN	MATHEWS, Jimmy L.	998 21 92

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Ex 22 (b)

EXHIBIT 22(b) to LIBERTY COURT OF INQ.

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-)
FPO. NEW YORK 09501

Wounded Transferred

Name	Rate	Ser #
[illegible]AN, Salvador	SN	796 66 15
REILLY, T. J.	SN	913 50 66
[illegible]OOK, E.L.	SN	997 55 71
[illegible]ROLD, Donald	SH2	609 22 48
[illegible]ENNETT, Lee Roy	GTSN	998 13 79
HAZEN, David Carl	GM3	969 84 98
LEMAY, William Michael	FM3	773 35 21
LENTINI, J.C.	CT1	594 81 55
O'CONNOR, J.G.	LT	671765
WARD, J.W.	BM3	775 76 78
WEAVER, R.L.	SN	999 88 63
BROWNFIELD, V.L.	YN3	
LaTORRE, S.J.	EMFN	914 73 89
LOCKWOOD, BF	SSGT	
ENNES, JM	LT	
LEWIS, D.E.	LCDR	
TIMMERMAN, B.R.	ET3	
CARPENTER, J.R.	CT1	
TAYLOR, R.P.	ENS	
RANDALL, J.R.	IC1	
CASPER, W.E.	SN	(Deck dpt)
CONCEPCION, R.C.	SN	"
FOLLIN, D.F.JR.	SN	"
PIERSON, G.V.	SNSS	"
SLAVENS, L.J.	SN	"
SOPER, L.L.	SN	"
WILSON, G.W.	SN	"
DAVID, R.O.Jr.	SM2	
LAMAR, J.D.	SN	
MEADORS, J.L.	SMSN	
Pollard, F.H.	QM3	
LEMOND, T.W.	OTSN	
MARFIL, S.P.	TN	
MATHEWS, James L.	SN	
ADDINGT[illegible] P. N.	CT1	
ANDERS[illegible] J.D.	CT3	
BENE[illegible]ICT [illegible].D.	CTSN	
BRONG, [illegible]	CT 3	
CARLSON, [illegible]	CT1	
CARP EN[illegible] R.	CT1	
DAVIDSON [illegible]	CT2	
EAKINS K.E.	CTSN	
ECKER K.P.	CTSN	
HAWKINS D.W.	CT3	
HENDRICKS, C.R.	CT2	
JOHNS, F.K.	CT2	
KAVANAGH, J.P.	CTSN	
KIRK, E.H.	CTSN	
KREUN, L. W.	CTSN	
LENTINT, J.C.	CT1	
MCPEGGAN, D.L.	CT2	

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

EX 22(c)

EXHIBIT 22(c) TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

WOUNDED PERSONS STILL ON BOARD

LUCAS, David L., ENS		710515/1105
McGONAGLE, W.L., CDR		494467/1100
BENNETT, M., LT.		625125/1610
KIEFER, R.F., LT(MC)		
THOMPSON, H.J., CTC		471 37 37
VAN CLEAVE, T.L.	HM1	298 39 72
SCHULMAN, S.L.,	HM3	353 96 33
BOSTIC, [illegible]	FN	
PAINTER, L.C.	LT(JG)	692274/1105
LAMKIN, C.F.	CTC	518 69 45
DURZEWSKI, H.	SH3	546 83 16
QUINTERA, T.A.	SN	796 43 22
STOUDT, J.D.	BT3	B70 41 42
OWENS, E.	BT2	549 85 6[illegible]
ASWORTH, J.W.	FN	699 33 81
NEWELL, J.P.	BT3	776 08 93
THORN, L.B.	MR3	
HEANEY, W.D.	SN	918 44 65
PATTEN, D.A.	CS3	904 30 77
BOTCHER, D.R.	FN	779 52 59
CORNISH, G.R.	MMFN	998 07 12
LaTORRE, L.J.		
CARNAHAN, D.N.	CS3	B10 42 33
KISIEL, D.J.	SA	998 70 04
BISHER, G.R.	FN	B10 [illegible] 23
BYRD, D.R.	FN	290 54 86
TRIPLETT, J.L.	FN	354 81 55
ANDERSON, R.E.	FA	B51 81 36
SIMPSON, M.R.	FN	917 52 [illegible]8
BOCCELLA, S.	CS3	796 [illegible]7 68
HRANKOWSKI, J.M.	FN	B10 43 15
McINTURFF P.	CTSN	[illegible]51 44 71
MARAIO, J.A.	FN	916 29 05
DALLEY, R.L.	CTSN	B20 04 91
LOSASSO, G.F.	FN	796 18 83
VALDEZ, D.	SK2	370 92 58
BOOTH, J.E.	MM3	998 19 47
PERKINS, E.G.	SK3	776 42 83
GILSON, R.D.	RD3	794 71 33
WEDIG, G.J.	CS2	428 92 84
KUKAL, R.G.	CT1	539 00 34
BOWEN, L.L.	CT2	796 85 28
SWEET, R.B.	CT3	775 06 25
McFARLIN, T.L.	CT3	795 25 54
BLOXHAM, G.L.	CT2	774 27 59
SMITH, J.D.	CTSN	777 19 71
BIKLEBERRY, D.M.	CT2	914 81 10
PLEASANTS, C.L.	CT1	535 78 10
DODD, M.F.	CT2	599 79 51
BUCK, R.D.	CT3	918 25 70
PEETOOM, H.C.	CTSN	797 04 78
SNAIDER, D.C.	CT2	776 28 26
POPLIELSKI, J.G.	CT2	778 80 00

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3910-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder [illegible] NSN 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5	VARIOUS	VAR.	BICO 1	~~5 MCS~~ 11256.5 KC

TIME	TRANSMISSION
0000Z	NEW RADIO DAY....FREESE RM3..Freese
0430Z	SEC TWO OFF TO SEC ONE....FREESE RM3..Z.
0430Z	SEC ONE ASSUMED GUARD THIS FREQ / BRYAN RM2
~~1137Z~~	AS DE RS K
~~1138Z~~ 1138Z	AS DE RS Z K
	AS DE RS • WE ARE UNDER ATTACK, BE ADVISED WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
	RS DE SM U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K
	SM DE RS I SAY AGAIN WE ARE UNDER ATTACK , WE ARE UNDER ATTACK INT CRK K
	RS DE SM U ARE STILL GARBLED SAY AGAIN K
	SM DE RS WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
	AS DE RS WE ARE UNDER ATTACK DO U READ ME K
~~1136Z~~	SWITCHING XMTRS BUT NO LUCK,
1204Z	AS DE RS K
	RS DE SM K
~~1207Z~~ 1208Z	SM DE RS WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (REPEATED ABOUT 3 TIMES) K
~~1209Z~~	RS DE SM R R AR
~~1211Z~~	SM DE RS K
1209Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS WE ARE UNDER ATTACK AND NEED IMMED ASSIST. K
	RS DE SM R WILCO ZNB (ETC..) K
	SM DE RS ZNB (ETC.) K
	RS DE SM ZNB CORRECT AS I AM STANDING BY FOR FURTHER TRF K
1214Z	
~~1146Z~~	SM DE RS R R AR
~~1150Z~~	SM DE RS K
1219Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO LISTING ABOUT 9 DEG REQUEST IMMED ASSIST K
1220Z	
~~1152Z~~	RS DE SM R R AR
~~1154Z~~	SM DE RS K
1224Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING THE SHIP K
~~1157Z~~	RS DE SM R AR
1227Z	
1233Z	DESTRUCTION BILL IN EFFECT
1323Z	LOST POWER
1355Z	COMM BACK UP
1433Z	C.C TO 340° SPD 8 KTS.
1445Z	FM CSF ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY.
1540Z	LOST ALL POWER IN RADIO CENT

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3014-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSU Cog "I" Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY AGTR-5	VARIOUS	VAR	6721 KCS	

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1923Z	T.....O.....L.....E./JH/
1939Z	RS DE BC — RDO CK K
	BC DE RS — R K
1940Z	RS DE BC — R AR
1941Z	RS DE BC — K
	BC DE RS — K
	RS DE BC — R REQUEST U CONFIRM NR OF MEN SERIOUSLY WONDED AND NR JUST WOUNDED K
1943Z	BC DE RS — R AS AR.
1945Z	BC DE RS — K
	RS DE BC — K
	BC DE RS — REF UR LAST 10 DEAD, NR SERIOULY INJURED 15 - 25 AND NR JUST UNJURIED 100 K
	RS DE BC — R I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED)
	BC DE RS — R XX K
1950Z	RS DE BC — R AR
1951Z	RS DE DTG — K
	RS DE SM — BQ ADVISED DTG CALLING U K
	DTG DE SM RS — REQ U SAY AGAIN K
	RS DE DTG — (GARBLED) K
	DTG DE RS — AS AR
	SM DE RS — REQ U ACK AS RELAY FOR ME K
1953Z	RS DE SM — R AR
1954Z	DTG DE RS — R UR LAST K
2018Z	RS DE SM — K
	SM DE RS — U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K
	BC DE RS — K
	RS DE BC — R K
	BC DE BC — REQ U AST AS RELAY BETWEEN SM AND ME K
	RS DE BC — R AR
	RS DE BC — SM NEG TRF K
2019Z	BC DE RS — R AR
2023Z	RS DE FC — K
	FC DE RS — K
	RS DE FC — (GARBLED) K
	FC DE RS — BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BEARELY READABLE AS AR
	BC DE RS — REQ U RELAY FOR SM FC K
	RS DE BC — I PASS FROM FC FM FC TO RS STFEL JAW 702 WILL BE AIRBORNE 2100Z TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION BT K
2030Z	BC DE RS — R AR
2031Z	RS DE BC — K
	BC DE RS — K
	XX XX XX
	RS DE BC — INT SERIOULY WOUNDED 15 -25 INCLUEDED IN NR WOUNDED 100 K

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OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-68) Continued

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2031Z	T....O....L....E/JH/
	BC DE RS — C K
2033Z	RS DE BC — R AR
2038Z	RS DE BC — K
	BC DE RS — K
	RS DE BC — I PASS FROM TOP HAND - REQ LIST OF MEN WOUNDED AND DEAD, NOT BY ANY INST BUT JUST NAME OF MEN DEAD AND WOUNDED
2040Z	BC DE RS — R AR
2041Z	RS DE JTG — K RDO CK K
	JTG DE RS — U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K
2042Z	RS DE JTG — R AR
2201Z	FC DE RS — O K
	RS DE FC — K
	FC DE RS — -T-O-082202Z FM ROCKSTAR TO SECNAV INFO SUPERS, CHIEF BUMED, NAVFINCEN CLEVELAND, COMFIVE, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR CINCLANFLT, COMSIXTHFLT, COMSERVLANT COMSERVRON EIGHT U/C C/ FILES BT K
2305Z	RS DE FC — R AR
0000Z	NEW RADIO DAY.....09 JUNE 1967...FREESE RM3
0020Z	RS DE BC — RDO CK K
	BC DE RS — I GOOD AND READABLE K
	RS DE BC — R OUT
0136Z	RS DE SM — RDO CK K
	SM DE RS — U GOOD AND RADABLE K
0139Z	RS DE SM — U GOOD AND RADABLE ALSO NEG TRF AR

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3615-1 (Rev. 11-56) Recorder from Pg [illegible] Stock 0107 708 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	WARD, RM2	SECT TWO	HI COM	11256.5

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
1[illegible]7Z	1 - 0 - 2 E	ESCORTOR MAY TO ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF
1750Z	FM COMSIXTHFLR TO LIBERTY	- POSSIBLE CONT CUS 3[illegible] MAG MAN SPD
1655Z	FM CSF TO R S ESCORT TRACK NINE	UNKN 100 MI FM PRINT POSIT TAKN TURN 270
1[illegible]02Z	FM CS TO R S	REQ UR 1800Z EST POSIT K
1[illegible]03Z	SCHEMATIC DE R	RGR UR EST FROM FAST, CHARGER AR
	RS DE FF	K
	FF DE RS	K
	RS DE FF	B ADVISED STA BELMONT IS CALLING U
	FF DE RS	UR WEAK AND BRLY RDABLE UNABLE TO READ BELONT K
16[illegible]4Z	RS DE FF	R ZUJ AR
	RS DE CP	K
	CP DE RS	K
	RS DE CP	CALL SIGNS OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE AND BIG DIPPER K
1800Z	CP DE RS	R AR
1815Z		
1620Z	RS DE DR	EX PASS FM FC DESTRYOERS EXPECT TO
	[illegible]F [illegible]Z/[illegible]8	RENDEVOUS WITH YOU AT 0700Z
		TOMMORROW K
	DR DE RS	R R
	RS DE CP	IND U TOR JCS MSG 080110Z K
	CP DE RS	OUR FILES WERE D ESTROYED AND WE
		ARE UNABLE TO GET TO THEM WE DO NOT
		ACKNOWLEDGE RECPT OF THIS MSG K
1829Z	RS DE CP R	RGR AR
1715Z	C P DE RB	000 K
	RS DE C P	K
	C P DE R S	00-081715Z (SEE FILES)
1742Z	R S DE C P	QSL UR 081715Z AT TIME 1742Z K
1743Z	C P DE R S	R AR
1800Z	R S DE CP	K
	CP DE RS	K
	[illegible]P [illegible]E [illegible]8	
	RS DE CP	GAY TIME GOLF ETA 0600Z HOLD EMPRS
		DOROTHY 081612Z K
	CP DE RS	I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K
	RS DE CP	C WA DOROTHY TO READ 081612Z K
1805Z	CP DE RS	R AR
1806Z	SM DE RS	K
	RS DE SM	INT TOR COMSIXTHFLTI 081917Z K
	SM DE RS	INT CORR TOR COMSIXTHFLT 081917Z K
	RS DE SM	C WA COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z K
1[illegible]07Z	SM DE RS	R AS AR
1[illegible]08Z	SM DE RS	K
	RS DE SM	K
	SM DE RS	UNABLE TO LOCATE DUE TO CARPT SEALED
		OFF K
1[illegible]10Z	RS DE SM	R AR

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OPNAV FORM 2810-1 (Rev. 11-58) Continue

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
1812Z	T...O.....L....E/JH/	
1812Z	RS DE SM	K
	SM DE RS	K
	RS DE SM	REQUEST YOU STEAR COURSE 300 DEG FOR RENDEZOUS MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT RPTS THIS NET K
	SM DE RS	REQ U SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS K
	RS DE SM	R I SAY AGQIN AA RENDEZOUS (REPEATED)
1817Z	SM DE RS	R AR
1819Z	SM DE RS	K
	RS DE SM	K
	SM DE RS	WE ARE STEARING 300 DEG MAGNATIC
1824Z	RS DE SM	AND ALSO WE ARE UNABLE TO GIVE POSIT R AR
1830Z	RS DE SM CP	INT TRFC K
	CP DE RS	NEG K
1833Z	RS DE CP	R AR
1842Z	RS DE DR	K
	DR DE RS	K
1843Z	RS DE DR	RR AS AS AR
1844Z	RS DE DTG	K
	DTG DE RS	U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE REQ U REPAY THRU STA CP K
1845Z	RS DE DTG	R AR
1850Z	RS DE FC	K
	FC DE RS	K
	RS DE FC	INT U HAVE CAPABILITY OF SWIFTING FREQS K
	FC DE RS	BELIEVED ZUE HOWEVER IF NOT HEARD 15 MIN REQ SWIFT BACK TO THIS FREQ K
	RS DE FC	R DO NOT SWIFT FREQS YET, I WILL CONTACT NCS K
1853Z	FC DE RS	R AR
1856Z	RS DE DR	K
	DR DE RS	K
	RS DE DR	INT KNOW FREQ 4B K
	DR DE RS	C K
1859Z	RS DE DR	R AS AR
1901Z	ATTEMPTING TO QSY	
1915Z	QSY CONPLETED	
1918Z	AA DE RS	RDO CK K
	DE BC	(GARBLED) K
	AA DE RS	SAY AGAIN AND GIVE LONG COUNT K
	RS DE BC	U GOOD AND READABLE K
1923Z	BC DE RS	R AR
	RS DE BC	RDO CK K
	BC DE RS	R K
	RS DE BC	R AR
	RS DE CP	RDO CK K
	CP DE RS	R K
	RS DE CP	R AR
	RS DE FC	RDO CK K
	FC DE RS	R K
	RS DE FC	R AR

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

NAVEXOS FORM 5810-1 (Rev. 11-50) Recorder from FPSO Log 1 Stock 0107 70E 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	VARRIOUS	VAR	HI COMM	11256.5 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION
ØØØ1Z	NEW RDO DAY NEW LOG Ø8 JUN 67 ------ E. FREESE, RM3
Ø43ØZ	SECT TWO OFF TO SECT ONE E. FREESE, RM3
Ø43ØZ	SECT ONE ASSUMED WATCH THIS FREQ
115[illegible]	ANY STA DE RCK STR K
	A S DE R S Z K
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
12ØØZ	R S DE SCHEMATIC U ARE GARBLED, SAY AGAIN K
	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK WE ARE UNDER ATTACK K
	A S DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK DO U READ ME K
12Ø4Z	SWITCHING XMITRS BUT NO LUCK
	A S DE R S K
	R S DE SCHEMATIC K
12Ø8Z	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK (RPTED ABOUT THREE TIME
	R S DE S M R R AR
	S M DE R S K
12Ø9Z	R S DE S M K
	S M DE R S WE ARE UNDER ATTACK AND NEED IMED ASSIST K
	R S DE S M R INT ZNB (ETC..) K
	S M DE R S ZNB (ETC..) K
	R S DE S M ZNB CORRECT AS I AM STANDING BY FOR FURTHER TRFK K
1214Z	SM DE R S R R AR
	S M DE R S K
	R S DE S M K
1217Z	S M DE R S BE ADVISED WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY TORPEDO LISTING ABOUT NINE DEG REQUEST IMED ASSISTANCE K
122ØZ	R S DE S M R R AR
	S M DE R S K
1224Z	R S DE S M K
	S M DE R S THREE UNIDENTIFIED A/C APPROACHING SHIP K
1227Z	R S DE S M R AR
1233Z	EMEG DESTRUCT BILL IN EFFECT.
1233Z	FROM 1233 TO 132 Z NO SIGS RECVD OR SENT
1323Z	POWER FAILURE LOST POWER THROUGHT SHIP
1355Z	POWER RESTORED , PATCH PANELS IN RDO CENT INOPP. SHIFTED CONTROL TO XMITR ROOM
1355Z	XMITR ROOM ASSUMES CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS, WARD, EM2 SUPVSR.
1356Z	HAVE HI COMM XMITR ON AIR BUT HAVE NO RCVR IN POSITION.
14ØØZ	FST CHARGER DE R S Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND WE ARE UNDER ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH SPD SURFACE CRAFT I SAY AGAIN Z Z Z I PASS IN THE BLIND WE ARE UNDER ATTACK BY A/C AND HIGH SPD SURFACE CRAFT K
14Ø2Z	AT THIS TIME WE HAVE COORDINATION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN XMITR ROOM AND RDO CENTRL RDO CENTRL HAS RCVR AND WE HAVE XMITR IN LOCAL POSIT. WE PASS THE OIL XMITR AND RDO RELAYS OTHER

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3910-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder Issue FF — S/N 0107-708-1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	WARD, R W2	SECT TWO	HI COM	11256.5

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1600Z	T - 0 - TZ
1750Z	FM COMSIXTHFLR TO LIBERTY - POSSIBLE CONT CUS 948 MAG MIN SPD UNTIL 100 MI FM PRINT POSIT THEN TURN 270
1855Z	FM CSF TO R S
1902Z	FM CS TO R S REQ UR 1800Z EST POSIT K
1923Z	SCHEMATIC DE R RGR UR LST FROM FAST CHARGER AR
	RS DE FF K
	FF DE RS K
	RS DE FF R ADVISED STA BELMONT IS CALLING U
	FF DE RS UR WEAK AND ERLY RD/BLE UNABLE TO READ BELONT K
1647Z	R DE FF R ZUJ AR
	RS DE CP K
	CP DE RS K
	RS DE CP CALL SIGNS OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE AND DIG DIPPER K
1809Z	CP DE RS R AR
1815Z	
1820Z	RS DE DR ZX RPTD FM FC DESTROYERS EXPECT TO
	ØR/ØE/ØS RENDEVOUS WITH YOU AT 0700Z TOMMORROW K
	DR DE RS R R
	RS DE CP IND U TOR JCS MSG 180110Z K
	CP DE RS OUR FILES WERE D ESTROYED AND WE ARE UNABLE TO GET TO THEM WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECPT OF THIS MSG K
1829Z	RS DE CP R RGR AR
1715Z	C P DE RS 000 K
	RS DE C P K
	C P DE R S 00-081715Z (SEE FILES)
1742Z	R S DE C P QSL UR Ø81715Z AT TIME 1742Z K
1743Z	C P DE R S R AR
1800Z	R S DE CP K
	CP DE RS K
	CP ØE ØZ
	RS DE CP GAY TIME GOLF ETA Ø6ØØZ HOLD EMPRS DOROTHY Ø81612Z K
	CP DE RS I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K
	RS DE CP C WA DOROTHY TO READ Ø81612Z K
1805Z	CP DE RS R AR
1806Z	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM INT TOR COMSIXTHFLTI Ø81917Z K
	SM DE RS INT CORR TOR COMSIXTHFLT Ø81917Z K
	RS DE SM C WA COMSIXTHFLT Ø80917Z K
1807Z	SM DE RS R AS AR
1808Z	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS UNABLE TO LOCATE DUE TO CARPT SEALED OFF K
1810Z	RS DE SM R AR

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Plain Text

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OPNAV FORM 2010-1 (Rev. 11-88) Continued

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1402Z	T O L E
	STATIONS ANSWER, ADVISE OR INQUIRY.
1405Z	FAST CHARGER DE R S ZZZ K
	R S DE F C K
	F C DE R S BT REQ IMMED ASSISTANCE. TORPEDO HIT STBD MIDSHIP. FLOODING. LIST WAS AT NINE DEG. APROX CASUALTIES FOUR DEAD, THREE SERV WOUNDED, FIFTY SIX WOUNDED. RADAR, FATHOMETER, AND GYRO INOP. WILL REQUIRE NAV AID CONSISTING OF SEA AND AIR ESCORT. LAST KNOWN POSIT, TIME 1405Z THIRTY ONE DEG THIRTY FIVE POINT FIVE MIN NORTH, THIRTY THREE DEG TWENTY NINE MIN EAST BT K
1410Z	R S DE F C R R AR
1410Z	FROM 1 10Z TO 1 [illegible]Z NO SIGS RCVD OR SENT
43 Z	F C DE R S CHANGED CUS TO 340 DEG AT EIGHT KTS K
1434Z	R S DE F C R AR
1445Z	R S DE F C K
	F C DE R S K
	R S DE F C ASSISTANCE IS ON THE WAY K
1447Z	F C DE R AR
1447Z	SOMETIME BETWEEN 1405Z AND 1445Z ET S HAVE BROUGHT A R390 RCVR TO POSITION IN XMIT ROOM AND NOW IS TUNED AND IN OPERATION XMITR ROOM NOW ASSUMES ALL COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL .. JPW
1500Z	LOST ALL POWER
1520Z	APPROX TIME . . POWER RETURNED ALL XMITRS INOP EXCEPT XMRT-2 NUMBER TWO .. ALL RADARS DESTROYED OR INOP EXCEPT PORT TUBER
1550Z	R S DE S M K
	S M DE R S K
	R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT ON WAY TO ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF POSSIBLE CONT CUS 340 MAGNETIC AND MAX SPD UNTIL 100 MILES FROM PRESENT POSIT THEN TURN TO 270 DEG K
1552Z	S M DE R S R AR
1555Z	R S DE S M I PASS FM FAST CHARGER BT ESCORT PROCEEDING AT MAX SPD DESTROYERS K
1555Z	S M DE R S R AR
1602Z	R S DE CACTUS PETE K
	C P DE R S K
	R S DE C P I PASS FM F C BT REQ UR 1800Z FST POSIT K
1602Z	C P DE R S R ZUJ AR
	R S DE FF(FANFARE) K
	FF DE R S K
1604Z	R S DE F F BE ADVISED STA BELMONT CALLING U K
	F F DE R S UR WEAK AND BARELY READABLE . UNABLE TO READ STA BELMONT K
1604Z	R S DE F F R ZUJ AR
	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S K
	R S DE C P CALL SIGSN OF ESCORT ARE MATADORE AND BIG DIPPER K
1609Z	C P DE R S R AR

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3810-1 (Rev. 11-68) Facsimile from FFS | 1 Block 0107 703 1000

ACTIVITY	ON BOARD	CRYPTO	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	WARD, RM2	TWO	HF COMM	11356.5 KC

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1609Z	T O L E
1611Z	C P DE R S K
	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S PASS TO F.C MY 1800Z POSIT 31°35'N 33° 32'E NORTHWEST AT 10 KTS K
161[illegible]	R S DE C P R AR
[illegible]0Z	JFW
162[illegible]Z	R S DE DERAIL K
	D R DE R S K
	R S DE D R I PASS M F C BT DESTROYERS EXPECT TO RENDEZVOUS WITH U AT APPROX 0703Z TOMJOR OX
1621Z	D R DE R S R AR
1622Z	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S K
	R S DE C P . PASS FROM FAIRFARE BT INT TOR JCS MSG 030110Z K
1623Z	C P DE R S ZUJ AR
1625Z	CP DE R S K
	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S PASS TO FAIRFARE BT OUR FILES WERE DESTROYED DURING BATTLE WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG RPT DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG K
1629Z	R S DE C P R AR
1710Z	C P DE R S DOU K
	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S -O-031715Z (SEE FILES)
1742Z	R S DE C P CSL UR 031715Z AT TIME 1712Z K
1743Z	C P DE R S R AR
R S DE C P	K
	C P DE R S K
1800Z	R S DE C P GAY TIME GOLF ETA 0600Z HOLD E PRESS DOROTHY 031612Z K
	CP DE R S I READ BACK FOR PO S COR (REPEATED) K
	R S DE C P C RA DOROTHY TO READ 031612Z K
1805Z	C P DE R S R AR
1806Z	R S DE S M K
	S M DE R S K
	R S DE S M INT TOR COMINXTHFLT 031917Z K
	S M DE R S INT CORR INT TOR CINCPAC 031917Z K
	R S DE C P C WA C S F 030917Z K
1807Z	C P DE R S R ZUJ AR
1810Z	C P DE R S K
	R S DE C P K
	C P DE R S COMMUNICATIONS SPACES DESTROYED DURING BATTLE, UNABLE TO LOCATE SUBJ MSG DUE SPACES SEALED OFF DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF SUBJ MSG K
1310Z	R S DE C P R AR

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OPNAV FORM 3810-1 (Rev. 11-78) Continued

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1810Z	T O L E ...../JH/
1812Z	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM REQUEST YOU STEER COURSE 300 DEG FOR RENDEZOUS MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT REPORTS THIS NET K
	SM DE RS REQ U SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS K
	RS DE SM R I SAY AGAIN AA RENDEZOUS (REPEATED) K
1817Z	SM DE RS R AR
1819Z	SM DE RS K
	RS DE SM K
	SM DE RS WE ARE STEERING COURSE 300 DEG MAGNETIC AND ALSO WE ARE UNABLE TO GIBE POSIT K
1824Z	RS DE SM R AR
1830Z	RS DE CP INT TFC K
	CP DE RS NEG K
1833Z	RS DE CP R AR
1842Z	RS DE DERAILS K
	DR DE RS K
1843Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1844Z	RS DE GAY TIME GOLF K
	GTG DE RS U ARE VERY WEAK AND BARELY READABLE REQUEST U RELAY THRU STA CP K
1845Z	RS DE GTG R AR
1850Z	RS DE FASTCHARGER K
	FC DE RS K
	RS DE FC INT U HAVE CAPABILITY OF 8K SHIFTING FREQS K
	FC DE RS BELIEVED ZUE, HOWEVER IF NOT HEARD 15 MIN REQ SHIFT BACK TO THIS FREQ K
	RS DE FC R DO NOT SHIFT FREQS YET, I WILL CONTACT NCS K
1853Z	FC DE RS R AR
1856Z	RS DE DR K
	DR DE RS K
	RS DE DR INT KNOW FREQ 48 K
	DR DE RS C K
1859Z	RS DE DR R AS AR
1901Z	ATTEMPTING TO QSY 48
1915Z	QSY COMPLETED
1918Z	ANY STA DE RS RDO CK K
	RS DE BLUECAT (GARBLED) K
	BC DE RS SAY AGAIN AND GIBE LONG COUNT K
	RS DE BC U GOOD AND READABLE K
1923Z	BC DE RS R AR
1924Z	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS R K
1925Z	RS DE BC R AR
1930Z	RS DE CP RDO CK K
	CP DE RS R K
1931Z	RS DE CP R AR
1932Z	RS DE FC RDO CK K
	FC DE RS R K
1933Z	RS DE FC R AR

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3910-1 (Rev. 11-68) Supersedes Form NAVSO P-1000 S/N 0107-708-1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	HALMAN RM2	ONE	HI - COM	6721.5KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
1933Z	T.....O.....L.....E/JH/	
1939Z	RS DE BC	RDO CK K
	BC DE RS	R K
19[illegible]Z	RS DE BC	R AR
19[illegible]Z	RS DE BC	K
	BC DE RS	K
	RS DE BC	R REQUEST U CONFIRM NR OF MEN SERIOUSLY INJURED AND NR JUST WOUNDED K
1943Z	BC DE RS	R AR
1945Z	BC DE RS	K
	RS DE BC	K
	BC DE RS	REF YOUR LAST - 10 DEAD, NR SERIOUSLY INJURED 15 TO 25 AND NR JUST INJURED 102 K
	RC DE BC	R I READ BACK FOR POSS CORR (REPEATED) K
1950Z	BC DE RS	R AR
1951Z	RS DE GTG	K
	GTG DE RS[illegible]	K
	RS DE [illegible] SM	BE ADVISED GTG CALLING U K
	GTG DE [illegible]	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE SAY AGAIN K
	RS DE GTG	(GARBLED) K
	GTG DE RS	AS AR
	SM DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY FOR ME K
1953Z	RS DE SM	R AR
1954Z	RS DE SM	(GARBLED) K
	SM DE RS	U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE K
	BC DE RS	K
	RS DE BC	R K
	BC DE RS	REQ U ACT AS RELAY BETWEEN SM AND ME K
2016Z	RS DE RS	R AR
2017Z	RS DE BC	SM NEG TRF K
2018Z	BC DE RS	R AR
2923Z	RS DE FC	K
	FC DE RS	K
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K
	RS DE FC	(GARBLED) K
	FC DE RS	BE ADVISED U ARE WEAK AND BARELY READABLE AS AR
	BC DE RS	REQ U RELAY FOR FC K
	RS DE BC	I PASS FROM FC FM FC TO RS STEEL JAW 702 WILL BE AIRBORNE 2100Z TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION K
2030Z	BC DE RS	R AR
2031Z	RS DE BC	K
	BC DE RS	K
	RS DE BC	INT SERIOUSLY WOUNDED 15 TO 25 INCLUED IN NUMBER 100 K

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3010-1 (Rev. 11-58) Recorder from FPSC

Back 0107 /08 1000

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	RECORDER
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)	FREESE RM3	T/O	HI-COMM	6721.5KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION
ØØØ1Z	NEW RADIO DAY..... Ø9 JUNE 1967 /... FREESE RM3
ØØ2ØZ	RS DE BC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS GOOD AND READABLE K
ØØ21Z	RS DE BC R AR
Ø[illegible]3Z	RS DE SM RDO CK K
	SM DE RS U GOOD AND READABLE K
Ø1[illegible]9Z	RS DE SM U GOOD AND READABLE ALSO NEG TFC AR
Ø2ØØZ	SHIFTED MOST TFC TO FLEET COMMON UHF
Ø2Ø1Z	STATION BC CONTINUED TO GIVE RDO CKS EVERY 15 MIN.
Ø5ØØZ	SECURED FROM THIS CIRCUIT, STATION MATADOR ASSUMED GUARD THIS FREQ / HALMAN RM2..

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(over)

DATE Ø9 JUNE 1967

PAGE NO 1 OF 1

June 1967

Statement by Captain R.L. Arthur, 41/894/1901,
Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer

1. A preliminary estimate of the time required to make permanent shell repairs and necessary associated underwater strength members is two to three weeks.

2. A firm estimate will require a detailed survey, not expected to commence until 15 June.

R.L. Arthur

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EXHIBIT 25 TO LIBERTY COURT OF ENQUIRY

Ex 25



EXHIBIT 26 H LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

CH XLVPYWZFIA ILCY
O RUQKRQ
E RUQKRM 001DLV 166001G
IY SSSSS
150016Z JUN 67 ZFF1
COMDESRON ONE TWO
O RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR

E C R E T
R ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT BREAKFAST.
REF TELECON, YOUR 141740Z NOT RCVD AS OF 142355Z; HOWEVER
QUESTED 8 JUNE CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:
APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING
URS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE
PNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT
NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-00E
OINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE
31-31N 33-00E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK
TIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED. SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS
ACK LINE AT ALL TIMES. IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY
TAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED
HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 100 FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED
D THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NOPTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND
RTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 100 FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL

27

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E TWO RUQKRM ØØ1DLV S E C R E T
AMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS
E FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT.
RE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME
D THE SHIP DID NOT EVEN EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING
DEPLOYMENT
ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED
4 STEAMING ON 130T, SPD 10 KNOTS
9 PASSED THROUGHT POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T
0 SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3-5
ES - CIRCLED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR
NLAND. LOCATING TWO TRANSMITTED (LIBERTY Ø80742ZJUN).
5 DECREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS
6 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH
6 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP LOCATING THREE DRAFTED FOR
NSMISSION AT Ø81022Z (BUT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED)
2 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T
0 EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL
8 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL.
1 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,000 YARDS BEARING
T - REPORTED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT

E THREE RUQKRM ØØ1DLV S E C R E T
3 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.
8 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE
MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 2000-FT.
PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP
3 LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS
5 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85
LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.
5 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.
5-1410 SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR
E A/C MAKING COORDINATED STRAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS
P SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF
P WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE
LED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR A
ACK. ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED
MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM
NDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED
WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE Ø1 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY
E WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE
AS FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.
9 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS .

E FOUR RUQKRM ØØ1DLV S E C R E T
4 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD
AM DISTANCE 4.5 MILES

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URED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BU ING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.
ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE UN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD F E.
MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT
OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING
WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.
COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP
TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.
TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.
TY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB
FING FIRE.
LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
LOST STEAM PRESSURE- SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS -
GUAGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED
TORPEDO HIT IN RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE
OXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT G.Q. STATIONS. THESE SPACES

FIVE RUOKRM 001DLV-S E C R E T
DED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THIS SPACE DIED OF
ER BLAST OR DROWNING. NO SIGNS OF LIFE EMINATING FROM COORDINATION
ER AND ADJACENT SPACES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPENED WITHOUT
ER OF FLOODING OTHER SPACES.
MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER
-17
ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALLED "DO YOU NEED HELP"
NGLISH. C.O. SIGNALLED "NEGATIVE"
MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE
HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVIS MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP,
SIDE, HOVERING AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.
SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.
INGS ON HELICOPTERS ARE D4 AND 08 OR D4 AND D8. HELICOPTER
REPEATED PASSES AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT
RVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.
POWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT RUDDER DID NOT ANSWER -
INUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.
MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT.
NG NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP
RAL TIMES AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER

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E SIX RUQKRM 0001 V S E C R E T
HORIZON.
S TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STBD SIDE
RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.
0 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSE AT SPEEDS
YING FROM 0 TO 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN
WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE
HTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING
UALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER
ERING.
S ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP- CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD
ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL - THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER
EONE TO THE DECK - C.O. CONSIDERED REFEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE
RULED THIS OUT AS TO HAZZARDOUS. REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO
MUNICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AND AT 1852 COPTER DROPPED
ESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE. THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING
D OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU
IALTIES" SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT
MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO
ICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD. THE MUTILATED
ES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED

E SEVEN RUQKRM 0001LV S E C R E T
M THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE
ICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE
SET (ABOUT 1905) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO
U WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT
FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK,
LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/
OFF/BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR
3

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled)
by authority of OPNAV/NAVMAT Sec. COMD 32/151
on 27 June 1976 OPNAV/IAG Sec Gen
(Date) (Name)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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Copy 4 of 4 copies
EX 27 345

05 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: All OOD/JOOD/CIC Personnel

Subj: Modified Condition of Readiness Three and Unidentified Contacts

1. Effective immediately, two men will be stationed on the forecastle as additional lookouts/gun crews to establish and maintain a modified Condition of Readiness Three Watch on a twenty-four hour basis until further notice. All .50 caliber machine guns are to be kept on station with ammunition in mount tray. (Rounds to be next to but not in chamber). Lookouts and forecastle gun mount personnel are to man mounts on engaged side and defend the ship in the event of surprise air/surface attack while regular General Quarters teams are being assembled. Control of fire to be IAW LIBERTY Gunnery Doctrine.

2. Any unidentified surface contact approaching the ship on a collision or near collision course at a speed of 25 knots or more is to be considered acting in a hostile manner and condition of Readiness One is to be set immediately.

3. Any unidentified air contact(s) directly approaching the ship on an apparent straffing/bombing/torpedo attack attitude is (are) to be considered acting in a hostile manner and condition of Readiness One will be set immediately.

4. When any craft - surface/air/sub-surface is sighted and identified as enemy, condition of Readiness One will be set immediately to engage enemy and repel attack.

5. Maximum effort must be made to minimize personnel/material damage, safeguard the watertight integrity of the ship, and continue performance of primary mission. It is better to set general quarters in doubtful cases than to be taken by surprise and be unable to fight the ship. Take immediate action as may be required by the situation, then advise me of what steps have been taken.

Respectfully,
W. L. MCGONAGLE

Copy to:

Executive Officer
Gunnery Officer

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Ex 28

EXHIBIT 28 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

GUNNERY DOCTRINE

1. ORDNANCE INSTALLATIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

The ordnance installation aboard the USS LIBERTY consist of four single mount .50 caliber machine guns located port and starboard on the O1 level frame 37 and port and starboard on the O3 level frame 89. These guns are .50 caliber Browning Machine Guns, M2, Heavy Barrel with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. The guns have a firing arc of 220° in the forward mounts port and starboard and 140° in the amidships mounts, all mounts have limit rails installed to prevent the guns from shooting in to the ship's superstructure. They may be used to defend against either low flying aircraft or small surface craft, but their primary function is to act as a deterent to any attempt by hostiles to board the ship.

2. STANDARD COMMANDS AND REPORTS.

In order for the .50 caliber mounts to be as effective as possible, there must be a thoroughly understood and standardized system of commands and reports utilized.

a. Standard Procedures. The following actions will be carried out when General Quarters is sounded:

1. Gun crews proceed immediately to stations bringing the topside if not already mounted.

2. When sufficient personnel are on station, the station will report "Manned" to Gun Control over the 5JP circuit.

3. When ready to open fire at a reduced rate with sufficient personnel on hand, each station will report "Ready".

4. When the station is in a fully ready condition with sufficient personnel to service the station at a normal rate, and ammunition is nearby, the station reports "Manned and Ready".

5. During peacetime when conditions do not require the breaking out of ammunition, the reports of "Ready" and "Manned and Ready" will be modified by the words "Except for Ammunition".

b. Ammunition Commands.

1. "Ammunitions Type"(followed by a type such as armor piercing or ball) is a command to gun crews to designate the type of ammunition.

2. "Replace Ammunition" is a command to replace all ammunition expended from ready stowage. A report of completion is made when the ammunition has been replaced.

c. Firing Commands.

77

1. "Standby" is the command for loaders to prepare to load.

2. "Load" is a command to load the guns. This command may be omitted, in which case the guns are loaded at the command "Commence firing".

3. "Commence Fire" is the command from the controlling station to load and open fire on previously specified targets or to resume fire after a command to "Check Fire".

EXHIBIT 29 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 29

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c. Firing Commands. (Cont'd)

4. "Check Fire" is the command to discontinue fire, usually temporarily. All other functions of the control parties and gun crews continue. Loaded hot guns must be fired as soon as possible on safe bearings in accordance with established procedures.

5. "Silence" is a command used in case of a serious or potentially serious casualty. It may be given by an observer or by any other person. At the command Silence every man in the vicinity freezes in his tracks and remains there without noise or confusion until further orders are given.

6. "Carry On" is the command to continue normal battery operations that have been interrupted by the command "Silence".

7. "Cease Fire" is the command to stop firing. A command to cease fire does not signify the end of an action or mission. As soon as "Cease Fire" is given, hot guns are unloaded on safe bearings as soon as possible. Immediately after "Cease Fire" all guns will report any casualties to material or personnel experienced during action and the status of the gun, whether loaded or clear followed shortly by an accurate account of ammunition expended.

8. "At Ease" is the command given to allow the men at stations to relax when they must remain at stations.

d. Open Fire Doctrine.

The command to "Commence Fire" will normally come from the Commanding Officer via the Gun Control Officer. Exceptions to this are made during wartime as follows:

Surface Target	Gun Control	Mt. Operator
a. submarine or periscope, not previously identified as being friendly, sighted.	X	
b. torpedo or wake directed toward ship.	X	
c. positively identified enemy close aboard during a melee.	X	X
Air Target		
a. Plane(s) making a threatening approach.	X	
b. Plane(s) making surprise attack.	X	X
c. Any plane attacking after an air engagement has started.	X	X
d. Radio control bomb or Rocket approaching.	X	X

3. TARGET DESIGNATION AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.

a. Bearing: All reports of bearing are given in three digits. All ciphers in bearing reports are pronounced "zero". For example bearing 050 is reported "zero five zero".

b. Range: 1. When the range is an even hundred or thousand, it is reported as the number of hundreds or thousands as in the following example:
"Range eight hundred"(800)
"Range three thousand" (3000)

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3. TARGET DESIGNATION AND ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.

2. When the range is below 1000 and not an even hundred each digit is pronounced. For example:
"Range nine seven hundred" (970)

3. When the range is above 1000 and ends in an even hundred it is reported as follows:

"Range four seven hundred" (4700)

c. Altitude: The absence of height finding radar makes an estimate of altitude largely guess work and since there is no automatic or mechanical fire control it is largely unimportant.

d. Position Angle: The angle above the horizon of and aircraft in degrees as follows: "Position angle one" (1 degree)
"Position angle forty seven" (47 degrees)

e. Due to the limited ordnance capabilities of LIBERTY the primary responsibility for target acquisition is with the mount operator. Initial target designation may come from gun control, but as indicated in Open Fire doctrine, it may be initiated by the mount operator.

4. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE-SURFACE.

a. Type and method of fire. Rapid continuous fire is accomplished in short bursts (three to five rounds per barrel) until hitting gun range is established, at which time a shift is made to normal rapid continuous fire.

b. Spotting is direct and will be corrected by the individual gunner.

c. Maximum range of opening fire is 2000 yards.

d. Type of projectiles API, API-T, and Incendiary.

5. FIRE CONTROL DOCTRINE - ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE.

a. Type and method of fire - All firing is continuous fire. Fire is interrupted only when the target is obscured.

b. Maximum range of open fire is 2000 yards.

c. Type of projectile - API, API-T, and Incendiary.

d. Priority of targets - based on best estimate of enemy capabilities or threats.

6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST.

Prior to operation of the .50 caliber machine gun the following items must be checked by the mount operator. A similar inspection will be held after firing.

a. Check the general appearance of the weapon.

b. Pull the bolt to the rear, release, and check for smooth operation.

c. Check the cover latch and be sure that the spring has enough tension to keep the cover securely latched.



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6. PREFIRING CHECK OFF LIST (Cont'd)

d. Raise the cover and check the functioning of the cover detent pawl.

e. Move the belt feed lever from side to side and make sure the belt feed mechanism moves in its full travel in both directions.

f. Check the back plate latch and lock.

g. Check to see if the bore is clear.

h. Check the head space.

i. Check timing.

7. FIRING SECTORS AND FIRING ARC.

The mount firing sectors are as follows: Mount 51 from 000° to 090°R; mount 52 from 270°R to 360°R; Mount 53 from 090°R to 160°R; Mount 54 from 200°R to 270°R. Any target in these arcs or sectors is the responsibility of the respective mount.

The mounts firing arcs are limited as follows: Mount 51 from 320°R to 160°R; Mount 52 from 200°R to 040°R; Mount 53 from 020°R to 160°R; Mount 54 from 200°R to 340°R.

Mount 51's firing sector is designate Sector I, Mount 52's firing sector is designated Sector II, Mount 53's firing sector is designated Sector III, Mount 54's firing sector is designated Sector IV.



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

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EXHIBIT 31 TO
DEPOSITION OF
U.S. COURT OF INQUIRY

Published at Washington, D.C.
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BY DIRECTION OF THE NAVY

5TH ED., JULY 1961 H.O. 2665-10



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1 of 50
865-10





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6TH ED., JULY 1951 H.O. 2665-10



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Price $1.00
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H.O. 2665-10

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF STEEL HITS, BOTH HOLES AND DENT HITS THAT DID NOT PENETRATE SHIP:

BELOW MAIN DECK	PORT	36
	STBD	171
MAIN DECK	PORT	65
	STBD	160
01 LEVEL DECK HOUSE		91
01 LEVEL FWD + AFT		52
FORECASTLE		26
02 LEVEL DECK HOUSE		53
03 LEVEL (BRIDGE) AND 04 LEVEL (THIS INCLUDES STACK AND MACHINERY CASING AREA)		164
		821

STBD. SIDE BELOW MAIN DECK TORP. HIT EXHIBIT 33 to LIBERTY COUNT OF INQUIRY (EX 33) 36

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CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY: J. Francis | APPROVED BY: CAPT L. R. RAISH | PHONE EXT. NO. 250 | 14 JUN 67 | T-1

PRECEDENCE	FI	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION			ppp		
INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA PHILIPPINES

INFO:

N5			FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY
N5A/M			
N5L			
N51			MESS CUTTER
N52			PROOF READER
N53			COMPD
N54	N552		
N55	N55M		AMPD
N551			
DISPOSAL CODE			
FILE			

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 072230Z JUN AND JCS 080110Z JUN FOR RELAY?

IF ANSWER TO 1 IS YES:

B. FROM WHOM AND AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE THEM? TO WHOM DID YOU RELAY THEM AND AT WHAT TIME?

2. SUBMIT REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4.

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV Merc Sec001 D324/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Ct (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY
g 21 Jun 76

2100.1

34

ORIGINATOR SECTION	ACTION DEPARTMENT	CINCUSNAVEUR	000	001	002	003	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	000	001	002	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A14	A00	NCU LONDON
N5	N5		X	X	X	X		X							X													

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR			
ESK	1196		
SGN		XB	

XB

DTG 141631Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LCN 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

EX 34 35

EXHIBIT 34 to LIBERTY/COURT OF INQUIRY

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NNNNCZCKDB352ZCEGA732
PP RUDLKD
DE RUMFCR 088B 1660809
ZNY CCCCC
[illegible] 150346Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. YOUR 141632Z JUN 67.
B. JCS 072230Z JUN 67.
C. JCS 080110Z JUN 67.
D. NAVCOMMSTA IHIL 130041Z JUN 67.
1. REF B OR 133E/08 FROM NAJRELSTA KUNIA
TOD 1700Z/08 TO DCS RELSTA DAGIS
2. REF C TOR 0400/08 FROM NAJRELSTA KUNIA
TOD 0449Z/08 TO NAVCOMMSTA GUAM
39 REF D TRACER ACTION BY NAVCOMMSTA PHIL PERTAINING
TO REF C.
BT



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Classification (cancelled) (changed to
by authority of OPNAV/NAVIG Ser 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 [illegible] 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT
N5

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	CITE	SOO
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NCU LOG

(PAGE 1 OF)

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TOR	15/1202		
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SOH			

DTG 150346Z JUN 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LOG 2300/2 (REV 10-65)

EXHIBIT 35 TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

3
5
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357

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED J R Raish | DRAFTED BY CAPT L. R. RAISH | PHONE EXT NO 250

14 JUN 67 | T-1

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION			PP		
INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

INFO:

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of CNO OPNAVINST 5510.1H
on 29 Jun 76 R Rykun JAG Sec Asst
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. FROM WHOM DID YOU RECEIVE COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67? AT WHAT TIME?

B. WHO WAS NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TO PROTECT FOR IN REGARD TO THIS MESSAGE AS ASSIGNED BY THE ROUTING INDICATORS?

C. WHAT ACTIONS DID YOUR PERSONNEL TAKE WITH REGARD TO COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z?

D. HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR YOUR PERSONNEL TO RECOGNIZE THAT COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN HAD BEEN MISROUTED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AND START ACTION TO RECTIFY?

E. COULD YOUR PERSONNEL, ONCE THE MISROUTE WAS RECOGNIZED, HAVE RECOUPED SOME OF THE LOST TIME BY REROUTING DIRECT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? IF SO, WHY DIDN'T THEY?

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

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PROOF HEADER	
CENPCO	
CWO	

DISPOSAL CODE

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N5

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N5

CINCUSNAVEUR

CON	
TOR	
SSN	1194
DTG	141629Z JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2

5100.1

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT 36 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

36

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

F. HOW DOES THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC HANDLED BY NAVCOMMSTA GREECE FOR THE WEEK 3-9 JUN 67 INCLUSIVE COMPARE WITH THE PREVIOUS WEEK (I.E., 29 MAY - 2 JUN INCLUSIVE) AS REGARDS VOLUME AND PRECEDENCES USED? HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO A REPRESENTATIVE WEEK, SAY IN FEB 67?

G. WHAT IS THE PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? HOW MANY DO YOU HAVE ON BOARD?

H. WHAT IN GENERAL IS THE LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN MESSAGE HANDLING OPERATIONS?

I. SUMMARIZE IN NARRATIVE STYLE COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDED AND ACTIONS OF NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INCIDENT TO AND FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SSN 1194
141629/JUN67

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

359



DECLASSIFIED
Changed to
by OPNAVINST 5510.1D
on 24 Jun 76 (Date)
JAG Letter of 21 Jun 76
(Signature) (Rank)
PER JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

NNNNVV KXC080 BBM698
PP RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 4337 1660731
ZNY CCCCC
P 150731Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS
A. YOUR 141629Z JUN 67
1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO FORWARDED. SUB-PARAGRAPHS KEYED TO REFERENCE.

A. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) AT 081238Z.

B. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE WAS INADVERTANT RELAY POINT. NORMAL DELIVERY PATH FROM ORIGINATOR TO ADDEE WOULD HAVE BY-PASSED THISTA. ONCE RECEIVED, HOWEVER, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE HAD TO PROTECT FOR RUQPNA NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA. THIS WAS THE ONLY ADDEE IN THE ROUTING LINE WHEN RECEIVED THISTA.

C. HANDLED AS ANY OBOE MSG ALONG WITH OTHERS OF EQUAL AND HIGHER PRECEDENCE. DCS RELAY HANDLED 251 FLASH MSGS ON 08 JUN RADAY. OBOE TRAFFIC COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER. ESTIMATE 1500. EXACT COUNT WOULD REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS EFFORT. TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED IN THIS TORN TAPE

PAGE TWO RUQKC 4337 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RELAY ON 08 JUNE WAS 5718 MSGS.

D. NO PERSONNEL RECOGNITION OR SPECIAL ACTION REQUIRED ON THE PARTICULAR MSG AS IT CARRIED A VALID ROUTING. MULTIPLE ADDRESS P PROCESSING UNIT (MAPU) AUTOMATICALLY RE-ROUTED MSG BACK TO MAJRELSTA ASMARA (AEZ) SEND POSITIONS. MAPU IS A MEMORY CORE DEVICE PROGRAMMED WITH PRE-DETERMINED ROUTING INDICATORS. ALL RUQP TRAFFIC, REGARDLESS OF RECEIVE ORIGIN, WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE AEZ SEND POSITIONS BY THIS DEVICE.

E. DUE TO EXTREMELY HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MISSENT (NOT MISROUTED) MSG WAS EVER CONSIDERED FOR RE-ROUTE ACTION. THISTA HANDLES MANY OBOE MSGS TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WITHOUT REQUIREMENT TO PASS VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. DIRECT CIRCUITRY CARRIES A DIFFERENT ROUTING THAN DCS COMMON USER CIRCUITRY AND DELIVERY MEANS

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



DTG 150731Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

EXHIBIT 37 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

EX 37

IS DETERMINED BY THE ORIGINATOR, NOT THE RELAY STATION. RE-ROUTE ACTION DIRECT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA WOULD HAVE ENTAILED CUTTING A NEW PILOT ON THE MSG BY HAND. THEN PASSING TO A COMPLETELY SEPARATE RELAY (NAVCOMMOPNET) AT THISTA FOR DELIVERY VIA DIRECT CIRCUITRY. CONSIDER NEGATIVE RECOUP OF LOST TIME BY THIS METHOD.

F. TRAFFIC VOLUMES 29 MAY-2 JUN WERE APPROX THREE-FOURTHS AS HEAVY AS PERIOD 3-9 JUN. PRECEDENCES 29 MAY-2 JUN MUCH LOWER. VERY

LITTLE FLASH AND OBOE TRAFFIC PASSED. VOLUMES FEB VERSUS JUNE LESS THAN TWO-THIRDS AS HIGH. NO HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC OF CONSEQUENCE IN FEB. DIRECT COMPARISON FIGURES CAN BE FURNISHED BUT WILL REQUIRE TIME FOR COMPILATION.

G. TOTAL PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE FOR NAVCOMMSTA GREECE IS 299. ON BOARD COUNT IS 292. RM/CYN COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE IS 175. ON BOARD 139. THESE ALLOWANCE FIGURES ARE FOR BOTH RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER SITES. CONTROL/TRAFFIC PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN IN A THREE SECTION WATCH STATUS FOR THE PAST 14 MONTHS.

H. LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL CONSIDERED MARGINAL BUT NOTHING LACKING IN ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM. EXAMPLE: 54 RM2 ALLOWED, 27 ON BOARD; 12 RMSN ALLOWED, 25 ON BOARD.

I. AT 081234Z JUN NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INTERCEPTED INITIAL LIBERTY ATTACK REPORT FROM THE USS SARATOGA ON THE CINCUSNAVEUR E04.04 VOICE HI-COMM NET. THIS WAS PUT IN TTY FORMAT AND RELAYED VIA NAVCOMMOPNET AND XRA BCST AS A NO DTG MSG, NAVCOMMSTA GREECE TIME OF FILE 1239Z/8 JUN. SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL REPORT, SARATOGA AND NAVCOMMSTA GREECE PASSED ALL AMPLIFYI

O INFO OBTAINED VIA XRA

BCST, HI-COMM NET, AND DIRECT TTY CIRCUITRY. DUE LIBERTY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO/FROM SHIP WAS LIMITED

FINAL PAGE of 2 150731Z JAN 67

TO VOICE TRANSMISSIONS. AFTER INITIAL ATTACK REPORT THISTA SHIFTED TO BEAMED ANTENNAS SEND/RECEIVE TO IMPROVE SIGNAL QUALITY UNDER EXTREMELY NOISY CKT CONDITIONS. RELIABLE COMM WITH SARATOGA AND LIBERTY WERE MAINTAINED BY THIS ACTION ALTHOUGH CIRCUIT DEGRADATION OCCURED TO OTHER STATIONS ON THE NET. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE ASSUMED RELAY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LIBERTY AND COORDINATED SPEED, COURSE, AND ESCORT RDVU INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMSIXTHFLT, COMDESRON 12, ASSIGNED AS ESCORT, TERMINATED FULL PERIOD ORESTES THISTA AT 0030Z/9 JUN AND RDVU AFFECTED 0424Z/9 JUN. COMDESRON 12 ASSUMED COMM GUARD FOR LIBERTY AND MAJORITY OF TRAFFIC PASSED AFTER RDVU WAS VIA DIRECT SHIP/SHORE TERMINATION.

2. COMDESRON 12 REMAINS TERMINATED NAVCOMMSTA GREECE INTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

GP-4

BT

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
	CAPT L. R. RAISH	ACTION			PPP		
14 JUN 67 / T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 250	INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO

INFO:

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV/NAVCOMPARS Ltr. 00134/
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER
PROOF READER
CCWPO
CWO

POSAL CODE

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE JCS 0722302, JCS 0801102, AND COMSIXTHFLT 0809172 ALL JUNE AND FROM WHOM?

B. FOR WHOM WAS NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO ASSIGNED TO PROTECT ON THESE MESSAGES? HOW AND WHEN DID YOU DELIVER THEM?

C. DID YOU RECEIVE THESE MESSAGES FOR DELIVERY TO USS LIBERTY? IF SO, AT WHAT TIME AND FROM WHOM?

D. WHAT WAS THE GENERAL COMMUNICATION LOAD FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA DURING THE WEEK OF 4 JUNE? HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO AN AVERAGE WEEK OF, SAY, FEB 1967?

E. WHAT IS YOUR WATCH SITUATION? IF ANSWER IS LESS THAN 1 IN 4, HOW LONG HAS IT BEEN AT THIS TEMPO?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4

PAGE 1 OF 1

CCN	F
TOR	1193
SSN	
SRN	

DTG 141628Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N5 —
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N5
CINCUSNAVEUR
SDO
NCU LONDON

2100.1

EX 38

EXHIBIT - 38-hb 113217

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNSUVV KXC020 APB348VV APH478VV PCD 098
PP RUTPRQ
DE RUTPC 232 1652255
ZNY CCCCC
P 142255Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
TO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)
A. YOUR 141628Z JUN 67
B. MY 131659Z JUN 67
C. MY 091745Z JUN 67
1. IAW REF A, THE FOLLOWING SUBMITTED:
A. JCS 072230Z INITIALLY RECEIVED FROM SAN PABLO AT 080523Z. RECEIVED AGAIN FROM WASHDC 081959Z. JCS 080110Z RECEIVED FROM WASHDC AT 080430Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED FROM COMSIXTHFLT AT TPZ.

B. JCS 072230Z: NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO ALIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMSIXTHFLT ON INITIAL RECEIPT AND SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080724Z. SECOND RECEIPT, MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIBERTY AND CTF 67. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA AT 082012Z FOR LIBERTY, AND TO NAPLES FOR DELIVERY TO CTF 67 AT 082135Z. JCS 080110 MOROCCO HAD

DELIVERY RESPONSIBILTY FOR COMSIXTHFLT. SENT TO COMSIXTHFLT VIA DIRECT CIRCUIT AT 080639Z. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z: MOROCCO HAD DELIVERY RESPONSIBILITY FOR USS LIBERTY. SENT TO SAN PABLO FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO ASMARA 081100Z.

C. JCS 072230Z: AS NOTED ABOVE SECOND RECEIPT WAS FOR LIBERTY AT 081959Z FROM WASHDC. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z RECEIVED 081050Z FROM COMSIXTHFLT.

D. DURING PERIOD 4-16 JUNE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TOTALS MOUNTED RAPIDLY WITH PEAK OCCURRING 8 JUNE. DUE TO IMPOSITION OF MINIMIZE BY USCINCEUR ON 5 JUNE THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC WHICH PARTIALLY COMPENSATED. AS NOTED IN REFERENCE B, FLEET RELAY TRAFFIC WAS ALMOST THREE TIMES THAT OF AN EQUAL PERIOD IN FEBRUARY 67.

E. COMMENCED ONE IN THREE WATCHES ON 5 JUNE IN ANTICIPATION INCREASED COMM LOAD.

F. REF C REFERS ALSO.

GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969032
By authority of SNAU Ltr Ser 009D32/73!
on 29 Jun 76 DKeguin NSSecGrp 9 21 Jun 76

James M. Eagles Collection
In Research Papers

EXHIBIT 39 to Liberty Court of Inquiry

39

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) **NAVAL MESSAGE**

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
	CAPT L. R. RAISH	ACTION			PPP		
14 JUN 67 / T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 250	INFO			PPP		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USASTRATCOMFAC ASMARA

INFO: CG USASTRATC[illegible]-EUR

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)

1. ON BEHALF OF AND TO ASSIST NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION PLEASE FURNISH ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. AT WHAT TIME WAS COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA? AND FROM WHOM?

B. WAS YOUR STATION HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUNE 67? IF SO, STATE ROUGHLY THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER A ROUTINE DAY.

C. AT WHAT TIME DID YOUR STATION RELAY COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67 TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RECEIVE IT BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE? AT WHAT TIME DID YOU RELAY IT TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA?

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	PROOF READER
	CCWPO
	CWO
DISPOSAL CO.	
FCF	

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of CNO/Navy Sec'y D32/f31 & 21 Jun 76 on 28 JUNE 76 by [illegible] (Signature) (Date) OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EX 40 to LIBERTY Court of Inquiry

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	NI	NE	N3	N4	N5	N6	NIT	CITE	BDO
NS		X	X	X	X	X							X
ACTION DEPARTMENT		001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	AIG	ABO	NCU
NS															

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

COX	
TOR	
SSN	1192
SSN	RB

DTG 141627Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

2. REQUEST REPLY ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. COMMENTS IN ADDITION TO ABOVE QUESTIONS INVITED. [redacted]-4.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SSN 1192
141627 / JUN 67

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

365

CZCKDA250ZCMGA300
OO RUDLKD
DE RUQPC 50[illegible] 1670335
ZNY CCCCC
O R [illegible]050ZZ JUN 67
FM CO USASTRATCON FAC ASMARA ETHIOPIA
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO EUCAB/CG USASTRATCOM-EUR HEIDELBERG GER
RUFSAR/CO USASTRATCOM-EUR SIG GP/MED LECHORN ITALY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASM 716703
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (C)
REF: CINCUSNAVEUR MSG 141627Z JUN 67 ZFD (PASEP)
1. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THIS STATION FOR RELAY TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081203Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED FROM NAVAL RELAY STATION SEVILLE SPAIN.
2. THIS STATION WAS HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUN 67. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC RATE FOR A ROUTINE DAY AND 8 JUN 67:

	ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67)		8 JUNE 67		
	NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	PCT OF INCREASE
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5	INDETERMINATE
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2388	32.2	268
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3060	49.9	117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3	-85
TOTAL	5109		7893		54

3. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 080917Z JUN 67 WAS RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081613Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT 081503Z JUN 67 AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081510Z JUN 67.
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED
Classification cancelled/changed to
by authority of OPNAVINST 5513.1D
on 21 Jan 76 OR Spain
(DATE) JAG Sec Cnsl
SERVICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

41

(PAGE 1 OF ____)
CON
TOR 150655
SIG
DCM

DTG 150520Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Ex 7 to Liberty Court of Inquiry

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
	CAPT L. R. RAISH	ACTION			PRP		
14 JUN 67	T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 250	INFO				

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (G):

1. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FORWARDED ON BEHALF OF COURT OF INQUIRY NOW IN SESSION:

A. AT WHAT TIME WERE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES RECEIVED AT YOUR STATION FOR PLACING ON THE NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA BCST BEING GUARDED BY USS LIBERTY:

(1) JCS 072230Z JUN 67?

(2) JCS 080110Z JUN 67?

(3) COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67?

B. FROM WHAT RELAY STATION DID YOU RECEIVE THE MESSAGES IN QUESTION AND AT WHAT TIME?

C. WHAT WERE YOUR "IN-HOUSE" HANDLING TIMES FOR THE ABOVE MESSAGES?

D. ACCORDING TO YOUR INFO, AT WHAT TIME DID USS LIBERTY SHIFT TO THE ASMARA FLEET BROADCAST (JETT)?

2. SUBMIT REPLIES ASAP BY PRIORITY MESSAGE. GP-4.

N3	
N5A/M	
N56	
N51	
N52	N52
N53	
N54	
N55	N552
N551	N553
DISPOSAL CODE	
FILE	

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CSWPO
CWO

DECLASSIFIED
(cancellation (canceled) (changed to
by authority of OPNAV Ltr Ser D09B3/
on 21 Jun 76 LRSpain T318 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature: JAG Sec Off (rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

42

ORIGINATOR SECTION	N5
ACTION DEPARTMENT	N5

CLASSIFICATION: X

2100.1 RB

COM	1
TOR	
DTG	141626Z JUN 67
SRN	RB

Ex 42 CONFIDENTIAL

Exhibit 42 to Court of Inquiry - USS LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

VV -- KXC258T
RU[illegible]NARQ
RUQPNA 067 1651956
ZNY CCCCC
P 141956Z JUN 67
XAONAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
TO RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS
A. YOUR 141626Z JUNE 67
1. IAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED
   A. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 082125Z DDN 67
   B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 - CANNOT LOCATE ANY RECORD WHICH WOULD TEND TO INDICATE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO DATE. HAVE INSPECTED FILED PAGE COPIES AND TAPE REELS OF ALL CIRCUITS TERMINATING THISTA FROM 080000Z TO DATE WITHOUT SUCCESS.
   C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THISTA AT 081510Z JUNE 67.
2. JCS 072230Z JUNE 67 AND COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 WERE RECEIVED FROM THE MAJOR DCS RELAY STATION ASMARA (U.S. ARMY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY, ASMARA) AT THE TIMES LISTED PARAS 1A AND C ABOVE.
3. IN HOUSE HANDLING TIMES WERE:

PAGE 2 RUQPNA 067 C O N F I D E N T I A L
   A. JCS 072230Z JUN 67 - 10 MINUTES
   B. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUNE 67 - 15 MINUTES
4. USS LIBERTY SHIFTED TO JRTT AT 070001Z JUNE 67.
GP-4RK
BT

N1	
N1A/M	
N2	
N51	N51
N52	N51J
N53	
N.H	
N5[illegible]	N552
N[illegible] 1	N553
DISPOSAL CODE	
FILE	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OP NAV MSG SECDEF D32/T31
of 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank) of 21 Jun 76
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

| | | |

16 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RADM KIDD

1. Enclosed are communication message handling figures for selected Naval Communication Stations in the European area during the period 1 June - 12 June 1967. For comparison purposes a compilation has been made for a similar period in February 1967.

2. The attached information was assembled at the request of the JCS Fact Finding Group headed by MGEN [redacted]. It is forwarded to you as a matter of interest.

Very respectfully,

J. R. RAISH
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Communications

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

44

EXHIBIT "44" TO LINER'S COURT OF INQUIRY

EX 44

Naval Communication Station Greece

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	5,901		1 Jun	[redacted]	10,178
2 Feb	6,775		2 Jun	[redacted]	10,702
3 Feb	6,[illegible]0		3 Jun	[redacted]	10,119
4 Feb	5,[illegible]		4 Jun		8,113
5 Feb	3,8[illegible]		5 Jun		8,414
6 Feb	8,160		6 Jun		9,906
7 Feb	5,941		7 Jun		9,750
8 Feb	6,521		8 Jun		10,074
9 Feb	6,539		9 Jun		9,959
10 Feb	6,935		10 Jun		10,499
11 Feb	5,293		11 Jun		8,073
12 Feb	4,419		12 Jun		7,835
Total	69,122		Total		113,622

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	96
6 Jun	206
7 Jun	114
8 Jun	251
9 Jun	182
10 Jun	241
Total	1,190

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	134
6 Jun	218
7 Jun	162
8 Jun	181
9 Jun	181
10 Jun	179
Total	1,055

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Station Morocco

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	7,596		1 Jun	11,317
2 Feb	7,663		2 Jun	10,871
3 Feb	8,083		3 Jun	9,991
4 Feb	7,870		4 Jun	8,049
5 Feb	6,283		5 Jun	8,794
6 Feb	6,943		6 Jun	9,636
7 Feb	7,361		7 Jun	9,512
8 Feb	8,153		8 Jun	11,195
9 Feb	8,059		9 Jun	9,575
10 Feb	6,355		10 Jun	9,193
11 Feb	7,393		11 Jun	7,722
12 Feb	5,205		12 Jun	8,771
Total	87,963		Total	114,928

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	23
6 Jun	16
7 Jun	25
8 Jun	124
9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Jun	3
Total	203

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	109
6 Jun	107
7 Jun	133
8 Jun	258
9 Jun	52
10 Jun	90
Total	749

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Station Spain

I. Messages Handled

1	Feb	6,873	1	Jun	9,023
2	Feb	7,152	2	Jun	9,418
3	Feb	7,639	3	Jun	8,184
4	Feb	6,645	4	Jun	5,990
5	Feb	4,467	5	Jun	7,224
6	Feb	5,906	6	Jun	7,073
7	Feb	6,620	7	Jun	7,191
8	Feb	7,351	8	Jun	6,409
9	Feb	7,796	9	Jun	7,342
10	Feb	7,716	10	Jun	6,768
11	Feb	6,909	11	Jun	5,885
12	Feb	4,999	12	Jun	6,561
Total		80,103	Total		89,068

II. Flash Messages Handled

5	Jun	37
6	Jun	28
7	Jun	31
8	Jun	25
9	Jun	13
10	Jun	18
Total		223

III. Service Messages Handled

5	Jun	163
6	Jun	155
7	Jun	119
8	Jun	69
9	Jun	73
10	Jun	93
Total		692

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Unit London

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	868		1 Jun	1,538
2 Feb	827		2 Jun	1,705
3 Feb	869		3 Jun	1,278
4 Feb	872		4 Jun	909
5 Feb	846		5 Jun	1,406
6 Feb	842		6 Jun	1,717
7 Feb	695		7 Jun	1,648
8 Feb	704		8 Jun	1,775
9 Feb	816		9 Jun	1,589
10 Feb	858		10 Jun	1,382
11 Feb	914		11 Jun	1,030
12 Feb	954		12 Jun	1,268
Total	10367		Total	17,245

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	2
6 Jun	2
7 Jun	30
8 Jun	17
9 Jun	6
10 Jun	28
Total	77

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	153
6 Jun	148
7 Jun	176
8 Jun	292
9 Jun	201
10 Jun	244
Total	1,214

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Station Asunra

1. **Messages Handled**

1	Feb	1,019	1	Jun	1,568
2	Feb	1,233	2	Jun	1,891
3	Feb	1,229	3	Jun	1,696
4	Feb	1,054	4	Jun	1,652
5	Feb	974	5	Jun	1,570
6	Feb	828	6	Jun	1,575
7	Feb	1,039	7	Jun	1,579
8	Feb	1,094	8	Jun	2,228
9	Feb	955	9	Jun	1,837
10	Feb	880	10	Jun	1,430
11	Feb	772	11	Jun	1,394
12	Feb	925	12	Jun	1,275
Total		12,002	Total		19,695

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3/14

EX 45

CZCKDMG 50ZCMGA300
CO RUDLKD
DE RUDPC 501 1670535
ZNY CCCCC
R 2355?Z JUN 67
FM CO USASTRATCOM FAC ASMARA ETHIOPIA
TO RUEKDO/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPAC/CG USASTRATCOM-EUR HEIDELBERG GER
RUSAG/CO USASTRATCOM-EUR SIG GP/MED LEGHORN ITALY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASN 716703
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY COMMUNICATIONS (U)
REF: CINCUSNAVEUR MSG 1416?7Z JUN 67 ZFD (PASEP)
1. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 0809?7Z JUN 67 WAS RECEIVED BY THIS STATION
AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081200Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED
BY RELAY STATION SEVILLE SPAIN.
2. THIS STATION WAS HANDLING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF HIGH
PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON 8 JUN 67. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MESSAGE
TRAFFIC RATE FOR A ROUTINE DAY AND 8 JUN 67:

	ROUTINE DAY (4 MAY 67)		8 JUNE 67		
	NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	NR OF MSGS	PCT OF DISTR	PCT OF INCR
FLASH	0	0	198	2.5	INDETERMIN.
IMMEDIATE	649	12.7	2338	29.6	260
PRIORITY	1778	34.8	3260	41.3	117
ROUTINE	2682	52.5	1447	18.3	-85
TOTAL	5109		7893		54

3. COMSIXTHFLT MSG 0809?7Z JUN 67 WAS RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT
0815?0Z JUN 67. IT WAS RECEIVED BACK FROM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE AT
0815?0Z JUN 67 AND RELAYED TO NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA AT 081510Z JUN 67.

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of: OPNAV 5510.1C Ser 0091D32 1131
on 29 Jun 76. [signature] 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, NAVY

EX 45 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

45

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N5
CINCUSNAVE
DO DI D2 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE DTG
RCU
PAGE 1 OF
CON
TOR 16/0655
SSN
BGN
150520Z JUL

EX 45

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Ex 46 to Liberty Court of Inquiry 46

[redacted] relating to
[redacted] of national/allied forces
[redacted] addressee(s).

(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

(6) [redacted]

(7) [redacted]

(8) [redacted]

(9) [redacted]

(10) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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3Ri

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FF1-3
N62
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Contingency Watch Team
To: CINCUSNAVEUR
Via: Deputy Chief of Staff

Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JCS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander G.L. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES	EVENTS
072350Z	Major BREELOVE, JRC WASHDC, called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VOCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTHFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTHFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.
	LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTHFLT.
080001Z	LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTHFLT.
080010Z	CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTHFLT.
	CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group

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Ex 47 to LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY 3rd

of a message and had by passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC and get us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further stated that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

0800302 The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

0803252 The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group 080110Z. As he was relaying this information the Duty Yeoman handed the JCS 080110Z message, which had just been received, to CDR JORGENSEN.

The Command Center Duty Officer then had Communications set up a Telecon to COMSIXTHFLT so that he could talk to COMSIXTHFLT's staff duty officer.

0803552 Considerable delay was caused by atmospheric difficulties. After being unable to establish a Telecon circuit CDR JORGENSEN had the radio operator contact COMSIXTHFLT by SSB and request a Telecon with the Staff Duty Officer as soon as possible.

0804102 Two way Telecon was established, with COMSIXTHFLT still having difficulty receiving CINCUSNAVEUR. CDR SLUSSER, COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, informed CDR JORGENSEN they did not hold JCS 080110Z. CDR JORGENSEN passed it

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to him three times before receiving an acknowledgement at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a wirenote "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.

0805072 CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.

0805152 After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OPAREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. WAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

0805212 Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as possible.

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of all logs kept by each individual watch team member and constitutes the events as they took place.

CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN CDR C.D. JORGENSEN, USN LT E.L. GALAVOTTI,

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- RELAY

Liberty

VV KXC241DE CNL VV AGB349VV NYC907 173 1DZ
ZZ RUDLAM
DE RUTPRC 105 1591455
ZNY CCCCC
Z 061455Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
ST
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CONFFLASHSITREV 06005 COMSIXTHFLT 081YTEZ
1. FOLLOWING MSG REC FROM USDAO TEL AVIV.
QUOTE: ALUSNA CALLED TO FLOAT TO RECEIVE REPORT.
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT
08 1200Z. POSITION 31-25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF
HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND
ABJECT APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR
COAST. UNQUOTE.
2. AT 081430Z LIBERTY REPORTED UNDERWAY AT EIGHT(8) KNOTS,
340 DEGREES MAGNETIC.
GP-4
BT

mc/oc

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV ltr ser 09B1/132/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG Sec'y (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION

(PAGE 1 OF)

CO:	
TOR	1516Z
ESN	
SSN	2C

DTG 081455Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2130/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 68 Ex 48 Liberty

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 0 3 42 AM '67

VV KXC224VV AGB724VV HYC807
CO RUDLKD
ZNY CCCCC DTG RUTCRC 553 1670725
***ZZ RUFPBK RUENAAA RUEPJS RUFRF RUTPP RUFPBWL RUFPAG RUDLAK
RUDLKA RUDLKD
DE RUTCRC 151 1591477
ZNY CCCCC
Z 081447Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT - TO CINCUSNAVEUR
RUENAA/CNO
RUEPJF [illegible]

[illegible]
RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT [illegible]
BT
GATYCHHOUPGSBVS VPPPRMLOXMTAZJN JRIBROSASXWJFF UP

[illegible] FOLLOWING FROM LIBERTY (AGTR 5) [illegible]
RLPRX/COMSIXTHFLT// 01
QUOTE: DURING THE PERIOD [illegible] THE AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE VESSELS
BELIEVE TO BE ISRAELI MEL OPERATING THAT CIRCLED THE SHIP AFTER ATTACK.
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE. WILL HAVE TO BE MADE FROM SHIPS
PHOTOGRAPHS. UNQUOTE
CP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
[illegible] (Cancelled) (Changed to)
By authority of OPNAV ltr Ser 009D32/131
dtg 21 Jun 76
21 Jun 76 QRSpain JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE Navy

LOGAN FILE LIBERTY

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(PAGE 1 OF _____)

ORIGINATOR SECTION				
ACTION DEPARTMENT				
N3				

CIRCUIT DESIGNATOR: 00 01 02 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE SOC
001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 A14 A00
NCU LONDON

CON				
TOR	09/1323			
SSN				
SBN				

DTG 081447Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 69 Ex 48 Liberty

:NNNVV KXCR2BVV AGB542VV PRC076
ZZ RUDLAM
E UTPRC 096 1591426
NY SSSSS
081426Z JUN 67
M COMSIXTHFLT
O RUFFBK/USCINCEUR
NFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)
UENAAA/CNO
UEPJS/JCS
UFRF/COMFAIRMED
UTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
UTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT. TWO
T

E C R E T

ECRET, FLASHSITREP 06003 COMSIXTHFLT 081424Z JUN.
. REESTABLISHED COMMUNCATIONSLITH LIBERTY THROUGH NAVCOMMSTA
REECE. ATTACKING UNITS UNIDENTIFIED.
. LIBERTY REPORTS THAT HELO'S THAT FLEW OVER AFTER REPEAT AFTER
ITACK, HE BELIEVES WERE ISRAELI. HOWEVER, POSITIVE ID NOT
ET MADE.
5.

Med
Liberty
ncl a c

8 JUN 67 1130Z

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...sification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV ltr Ser 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG (Rank)
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR	145P18		
SSN			
SGN		RC	

DTG 081426Z JUN 67

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ORIGINATOR SECTION

TTY & AVEUR	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	018	019	020	021	022	023
	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X														
										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

EUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc 71 - Ex 48 - Liberty

RELEASED NO COPY to DOC

0 JUN 67 1442

WW RXCSDEATUVV AGB536VV HRC875
ZZ RUDLAN
DE (illegible) 1KDS936/S
ZNY SSSSS
Z 061402Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPDK/USCINCEUR
INFO AIR NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)
RUSNAA/CNO
RUFPJS/JCS
RUFPDK/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFPP/CONFAIRMED
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 968032/T31
By [illegible] NARS, Date 2 JUN 76

DTG 241[illegible]Z JUN 67
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

mclc

DT
S E C R E T
SECRET FLAGSHIP 06002 COMSIXTHFLT 03[illegible]Z
UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH USS LIBERTY ON ANY CIRCUIT.
2. THE FOLLOWING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS: QUOTE: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. DO NOT USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED. DO NOT PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARD LAND FOR REPRISAL PURPOSES. PURPOSE OF CONTER-ATTACK IS TO PROTECT LIBERTY ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, ALL PILOTS BRIEFED THAT EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL LIMIT ONLY TWELVE (12) MILES AND LIBERTY PLOTTED ON EDGE. DO NOT FLY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE EXCEPT AS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF ABOVE. FIGHTER COVER PILOTS BRIEFED THAT ANY ATTACKS ON ATTACK AIRCRAFT, LIBERTY, OR THEMSELVES IS HOSTILE ACT AND ABOVE APPLIES. UNQUOTE.
GP 3
DT

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION COMPETENCY
13
CINCUSNAVEUR
OOI OOP OOS OOSD OIS OIP OIO OIT AIO AOO MCU

(PAGE 1 OF 1)
COR
TOR 1442Z
SSN
SEN C

DTG 081425Z JUN 67

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Dec 72 E.O. 11652 Exempt 385

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY		UNCLASSIFIED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
[illegible]		J. F. Lynch	ACTION	XXX				
8 JUN 1967		PHONE EXT. NO.	INFO	XXX				

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TOR:

INFO: JCS/CNO/INCINCEUR"

N/A

ATC 996//DIA//CIA/DIRNSA

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLAS/JOTREP/SUM TOTAL/001/CINCUSNAVEUR/081239Z

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGES RELAYED FROM USS LIBERTY BY USS SARATOGA AT 081237Z: THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR(LIBERTY) QUOTE 3 UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS APPROACHING VESSELS NOW UNQUOTE. AT 0812452 QUOTE UNDER ATTACK AND HIT BADLY UNQUOTE. AT 0812452 QUOTE HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE

ARR

2. MESSAGES NOT AUTHENICATED.

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (changed) (cancelled) per authority of DepSecDef memo 5200.9 dtd 27 May 70
on 29 Jun 76 by JAG Sec Ltr dtd 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc. 77 Ex 48-Liberty

ORIGINATOR/SECTION: CINCUSNAVEUR

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3

NCU: LONDON

000	001	002	003	004	005	006	007	008	009	010	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A14	A00
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1259		
SGN			

DTG 081400Z JUNE 67

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV. 10-65)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Liberty

VV PRC010
.....ZZ RXFEC RUFPAG RUFPDK RUTPRQ RUFPDW RUTPRG RUFRF RUEDNKA
RUDLKD RUEPNAA RUEDPSA RUTKRE RUTPCR NO Relay ltr
DE RUTPRC 094 1591417
ZNY CCCCC
Z 031417Z JUN 67 — Rec'd
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPDK/USCINCEUR
~~RUFPAG~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
RXFECXUSNMR SHAPE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAFE
RUFPBW/CINCUSAREUR
RUTPRG/OCA SLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
~~RUDLKD~~/CINCNORAD — ZOV
RUEPNAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUTPCR/CINCSTRIKE
RUEDPSA/USCINCMEAFSA
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
031349Z JUN 67 — ORIG
FM CMSIXTHFLT
TO DIRNSA
BT
~~SECRET~~ C O N F I D E N T I A L
CRITIC
USS LIBERTY POSIT 31-23N 33-25E. HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD AT 081230Z
THREE UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS IN VICINITY. LIBERTY LISTING BADLY.
MESSAGE FROM LIBERTY AUTHENTICATED.
GP-4
C FT 1598342 DTG 081349Z CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
BT

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST S5090.32/TS1
on 29 Jun 76. DKGruis 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
CINCUSNAVEUR
OOI OO2 OO3 OO4 OO5 OO6 OO7 OO8 OO9 OIO CTE ADD
OOI OO2 OO3 OO4 OII OI2 OI3 OI4 OI5 OI6 OI7 AIG ADD
NCU

C
Copy 7 of 17

PAGE 1 OF
CON
TOR 142318
SSN
DGM C

DTG 081349 Jun 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-66)

Doc 79 Ex 48 Liberty

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Doc. 65 Ex 49 Liberty

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DR.	PHONE EXT. NO.	PRECEDENCE	PLA	TIMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
6 JUNE 1967	ZOOL	454	ACTION	ZZZ				
			INFO	ZZZ				

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: JCS//CNO//USCINCEUR

INFO: AIG 996//OOA//OIA//OIANEA

Classification (cancelled/changed to CONFIDENTIAL) by authority of CNAV/MEMO Ser 00T032/76 of 21 Jan 1976 on 29 Jan 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG Section (Rank) OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER PROOF READER CWO

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLAS/JOPREP/SUMTOTAL/OOZ/CINCUSNAVEUR

A. MY SUM TOTAL CONFID COMMCS JUN 67

1. USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) WAS ATTACKED UNDER ATTACK BY UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS AT 31-23N, 33-29E AT 0814Z. SHIP HAS BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO AND IS LISTING BADLY. ATTACKING FORCES HAVE BEEN DECLARED HOSTILE. DIRECTIONS FOR PILOTS AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. NOT TO USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED. NOT TO PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARD LAND. PURPOSE OF COUNTER ATTACK IS TO PROTECT LIBERTY ONLY."

2. CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS LIBERTY'S MESSAGES AUTHENTICATED.

3. USS ALBANY (CVA-66) HAS LAUNCHED FOUR ARMED A-4'S AND USS SARATOGA (CVA-60) HAS LAUNCHED FOUR ARMED A-1'S WITH FIGHTER COVER TO DEFEND LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF LAND. ETA FIRST AIRCRAFT ON SCENE 1515Z.

4. REPORT RECEIVED AT 1402Z FROM NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO QUOTE 1. USS LIBERTY UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING BOATS AFTER ATTACK HELICOPTER CIRCLED THE SHIP ASSUMED TO BE ISRAELI. UNQUOTE.

5. USDAO TEL AVIV ADVISED BY MFA 0314142 THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB WRONGFULLY ATTACKED LIBERTY AT 0830Z.

6. ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN RECALLED. LIBERTY REPORTED FOUR DEAD AND TEN VERY WOUNDED. PROCEEDING ON COURSE 340° AT 8 KNOTS.

(PAGE 1 OF ___)

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1054		
SBN			

DTG 081515Z JUN 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 44 Ex 44 LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N342

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: C

PRECEDENCE: O

ROUTING: 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040

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on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) 21 Jun 76 JAG Sec Ctr (Rank)
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DOC. 2 EX 4P-LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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VV KXC169E0VV ACC442VV PP RUEPJS
DE UTPRC 082 1581505
ZNY SSSSS
Z 0 071905Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUEPJS/JICS
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUTPRO/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFPDR/USCINCEUR
RUFPDB/CINCUSAFE
RUEPJS/DIA
RUEKNH/NSA
BT
S E C R E T
A. COMSIXTHFLT 070626Z JUN 67
1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A. --
2. PRIOR TO 0520152 JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 30E OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 100 MILES.

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 8 12 09 AM '67

///CORRECTED COPY///
UNDERLINED PORTION OF PARA 3.
CORRECTED PER ORIG. 071905Z.
DESTROY ALL OTHER COPIES. EH-W-3

SECRET

(K) F C

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT (13)
CLASSIFICATION
PAGE 1 OF 2
COM
TOR
DTG 071905Z
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NAVEXOS 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

DOC. 12-EX 48-LIBERTY

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 882 S E C R E T
03 2100Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 100 MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.
3. ON 5 JUNE BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1133Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM 1028Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED AIR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER.
4. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECIEVED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 200 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING

P. 2 of 2. 07153 E

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 882 S E C R E T
LINES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECIEVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.
5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1 ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.
GP-3
BT

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: OINAV memo Ser 009D 36/T
of 21 Jun 96

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



Doc. 28 Ex V# LIBERTY

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NAVEDTRA NCU 10A 21068/22 (5-85)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIORITY 131620Z JUN 67

FM: USS MASSEY

TO: COMDESRON ONE TWO

CONFIDENTIAL
A. COMSIXTHFLT 121107Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 130726Z UUN 67
1. VOICE RADIO LOG CKT E04.04 DURING PERIOD 8-9 JUN 67. ALL TIMES B

TIME	TO	FROM	TEXT
8 JUNE 1967			
2255	DEPUTY	(GARGLED)	PROVIDE TO (RBJTDK) (XRGYRP) (NP) AT 16 KNOTS TO REMAIN VICINITY DESTINATION. INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW.
2312	DERAIL	FAST CHARGER	REQUEST YOU ADVISE ME WHEN STEEL JAW IS AIRBORN.
2322	ROCKSTAR	BLUE CAP	WILL YOU SEND LIST OF CASUALTIES THIS CIRCUIT
2323	BLUE CAP	ROCKSTAR	BE ADVISED I WILL SEND LIST OF CASUALTIES THIS CIRCUIT
2335	CACTUS	PETE DERAIL	ACCORDING TO ROUTING OF JOINTCHIEF STAFF 080110Z WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUBJECT MESSAGE HELD BY ROCKSTAR.
9 JUL 67			
0005	FAST CHARGER	ROCKSTAR	(ROCKSTAR 082202Z JUN 67)

2. COMPLETE LOG SENT 130800Z JUN 67
GP-4

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by authority of OPNAV name Ser 09B32/T31
on 25 Jun 76 by CR Spain of 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Cont (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

STAFF---IN
VIA--KR NR 9433
TOR--131955Z JUN 67
[redacted]-PT
MS[redacted]NR --70

CONFIDENTIAL 131620Z JUN 67

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PRIORITY 1314Ø Z JUN 67

FM: CTF 61

TO: COMDESRON 12

CONFIDENTIAL

VOICE RADIO LOGS
A. COMSIXTHFLT 130721Z JUN 67
1. VOICE RADIO LOGS ON CIRCUIT E[illegible] NOT MAINTAINED DURING SUBJECT PERIOD.
2. INTERROGATION OF RADIO PERSONNEL REVEALS THAT LIBERTY WAS HEARD ON CIRCUIT AND THAT ONE INFORMAL MESSAGE WITH NO DATE TIME GROUP CONCERNING LIBERTYS INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH COMSIXTHFLT WAS RELAYED BY CTF 61 TO NCS GREECE.

GP-4

REF A: VOICE RADIO LOG TO BE FWD TO CDS-12

STAFF--IN
VIA----KRHR 9273
TOR----1629Z
W/U----DH
MSG:NR-51

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1314ØZ JUN 67

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PRIORITY
ROUTINE

131072Z JUN 67

FM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: NCS ASMARA / USS MASSEY / CINCUSNAVEUR / NCS GREECE / NCS MOROCCO
CTF 67 / NAVRADSTA LONDONDERRY / NCS SPAIN / CTF 61

INFO: COMDESRON ONE TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

VOICE RADIO LOG
A. MY 121107Z JUN 67

1. TO EXPEDITE RECEIPT REQ FWD PERTINENT PORTIONS VOICE RADIO LOGS REF A TO COMDESRON 12 VIA MSG. COMPLETE COPY STILL DESIRED VIA MAIL IAW PARA 1 REF A.

GP-4

REF A...REQ FWD ASAP COPY YOUR VOICE RADIO LOGS....ETC....

STAFF..IN
VIA....KRNR 09092
TOR....131108Z JUN 67
W/U....HK
MSG NR.22/13

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on 31 Jan 76 JAG Sec Cont of 21 Jan 76
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131072Z JUN 67

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///C O N F I D E N T I A L///

PRIORITY 121057Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL

FM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: CTF 60 / USS AMERICA / USS SARATOGA

INFO: COMDESRON 12

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIBERTY INCIDENT
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 111311Z JUN
1. REQ FWD ASAP TO COMDESRON 12 AND COMSIXTHFLT COPIES ALL INCOMING/OUTING RADIO MESSAGES INCLUDING VOICE CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION REF A COVERING PERIOD 0800Z/12Z TO 1210ØØZ.
2. FOR COMDESRON 12: UPON RECEIPT DELIVER MESSAGES TO RADM KIDD.

GP-3

****REF A: OF HIGHER PRECEDENCE, TO SEE COME TO RADIO.****

RIR TO SWO

STAFF---IN
RVIA----KRNR 8420
TOR-----1208Z/12 JUN 67
W/U-----DH
MSG NR--43

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on 25 Jun 76 (Date) JR Sprecher (Signature) JAG Sec Cont (Rank) of 21 Jun 76
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121057Z JUN 67 402

Doc. 48 Ex. 48 Liberty

d48

From: Operations Officer, USS DAVIS (DD 937)
To: Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve
Subj: Hi Comm traffic, Liberty Incident

1. Logs were not maintained. However, the following attached messages were received over the HICOMM NET on 8 and 9 June and are considered pertinent.

2. Guard of the HICOMM NET was commenced at 0816505.

3. UHF communications on 277.8 MCS was established at 0901305 with USS LIBERTY.

Glen W. SMITH
LT USN

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Doc. 43 Ex 48-Liberty

408

[redacted] E D

[redacted] 822022Z JUN 67

11

FM: CTF 67

TO: COMDESRON 12

INFO: COMSIXTHFLT

UNCLAS

1. REQUEST FOLLOWING INFO, BY HOUR OR WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED EARLIEST.

2. REQUEST EST INJURIES TYPE AND NUMBER FOR TRANSFER.

A. BURNS
B. FRACTURES HEAD AND SPINE
C. FRACTURES EXTREMITIES
D. CHEST INJURIES
E. ABDOMINAL
F. OTHER
G. AMBULATORY

3. ADVISE QUANTITY O NEGATIVE BLOOD REQUEST FOR EARLIEST DELIVERY FROM COURAGE.

4. ADVISE IF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR HOSPITAL CORPSMAN REQUIRED PRIOR TO OR DURING PATIENT TRANSFER IF DIRECTED.

5. RECOMMEND TYPE TRANSFER.

[redacted]
VIA [redacted]
TOR: 082202Z JUN 67
[redacted]
[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] 822022Z/JUN 67

404

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UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE 081715Z JUN 67

FM: USS LIBERTY

TO: NAVCOMSTA GREECE
UN

UNCLAS
SITREP FOLLOWS AIR ATTACK
AT TIME 081245Z SHIP CUS 283° SP 5 KTS. POSITION 31°35.5N 33°29E
SHIP ATTACK WITH UNID JET FIGHTERS BELIEVE ISERIAL APPROX. 6 STRAFING
RUNS MADE ON SHIP TIME 081225Z 3 TORP BOATS SEEN AS ISERIAL APPROACHED
STARBOARD QUARTER AT HIGH SPEED NOT L NUMBER BOAT 206 17 APPROX 081427Z
100K TORP BOAT UNDER FIRE 2000 YDS LAUNCHED TORP ATTACK AND
STRAFING RUN. 1 TORP PASSED APPROX 75 YARD ASTERN. 1 MIN LATER TOOK
TORP HIT STBD SIDE. SHIP HAS 10° STBD LIST. WDY BOUNDRY ESTABLISHED
AM HOLDING. AFTER ATTACK TORP BOATS CLEARED TO EAST ABOUT 5 MILES
CLEARING AREA AT 10 KTS
2. PHOTO OF A/C AND BOATS TAKEN AFTER ATTACK COMPLEATED 2 ISER.
REID ORBITED SHIP AT 500 YDS. TIME 081255. ISER. INSIGNIA CLEARLY
VIS. PHOTO TAKEN SEVERAL PROJ. RECOVERED FROM TOP SIDE AREA.
NUMBER DEAD IST 10 SEVERLY WOUNDED 25, TOTAL WOUNDED 75. NUMBER
MISSING UNDETERMINED.
3. SHIP UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION. ALL PERSONELL CASREPS ASAP
4. EXTENSIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE TOPSIDE DAMAGE. DAMAGE LOWER DECKS FORWARD
DESTROYED.
5. COMM CAP LIMITED WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJ. AS DIRECTED
SHIP WILL REQUIRE DRY DOCK AND EXTENSIVE REPAIRS.

SHIP STAFF INFO
VIA.. CIC
TOR.. 081750Z JUN 67
NR.. 18

ESG NR 75/68

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UNCLASSIFIED 081715Z JUN 67

Cdr Roem 4 48

NNNNVV KXB346ZCZCDBA025PBD 015P8D 015
PP RUFOLKD
DE RUFPBK 095 0881435
ZNY EEEEE
P 281430Z MAR 67
FM USCINCEUR
INFO CINCUSNAVEUR
R 241212Z FEB 67
FM USCINCEU
TO CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CUSASAEUR
BT
UNCLAS E F I O EGJCO 02056. USAFE FOR OTR, USNAVEUR FOR N-32, USAREUR FOR AEAGC-A, USASAEUR FOR OPN-E. SUBJ: MESSAGE ADDRESSEES:
1. REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES ON YOUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATERE AND REQUIRING AN OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BE LIMITED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AND THOSE IN-THEATER AGENCIES ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. ALL PAR PLANS AND PROGRAMS REQUIRED BY CURRENT DIRECTIVES TO BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL ARE EXAMPLES OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC REQUIRING AN OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

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2. AS APPROPRIATE, THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST APPROVAL, COORDINATE WITH, OR INFO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND/OR OTHER MAJOR COMMANDS ON THEATER PAR PLANS AND PROGRAMS
BT

SECRET C.S.

Doc 46 Ex 48 Liberty

NAVEUR NCU LCM 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

23

PAGE 1 OF 1
CAN 29 B 346
YGM 1915
SGM
DGM IC
DTG 241212Z FEB 67

UNCLASSIFIED

4/06

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTED BY: RADM, I.O., USN

17 JUN 67

PRECEDENCE: FLASH | IMMED | PRIORITY | ROUTINE | AIR MAIL

ACTION

INFO

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER

PROOF

RELEASED

CWO

FM CNO

TO CINCPACFLT

SECRET

1. YOUR 251613Z MOST APPRECIATED. FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS FROM WASHINGTON REQUIRE ANY FURTHER DOPE YOU CAN PROVIDE AS BY NOON SUNDAY ON FOLLOWING:

A. SOURCE OF POPE PASSED BY COL KLOCK THAT EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.

B. WHAT EFFORT ARE YOU MAKING TO FOLLOW UP ON THE ALLEGED QUERY REGARDING LOCATION OF US SHIPS IN EASTERN MED REPORTED IN YOUR 0920 JUNE

OP-09

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Date 29 Dec 76 Signature JA Secunt (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc. Y.Y Ex 48-LIBERTY

PAGE 1 OF

COM

FOR

DTG 1084Z

SECRET

17 JUN 67

KADM

VADM

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VV KKC131VV QAA015
PP RUCPNAR
DE RUFNAA 330 1600625
ZNY EEEEE
P 081625Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
TO RUCPNAR/CINCUSNAVEUR

UNCLAS E F T O
MIRENOTE FOR CAPT RAISH
A. YOUR U/N 081711Z JUN 67
B. MY U/N 081501Z JUN 67
C. COMSIXTHFLT 060917Z JUN 67
1. THIS SUPPLIES REF B.
2. PRELIM TIMES DELAY IN DELIVERY REF C REVEALS FOLLOWING:
   A) COMSIXTHFLT TOT 06/1106Z
   B) AEZ (USS STRATCOM AC) CLAIMS RECEIPT 06/1206Z
   C) AEZ TOT TO NCR (NCS GREECE) 06/1215Z (ERRONEOUSLY)
   D) AEZ CLAIMS REF A RECEIVED BACK FROM ACN AT 06/1506Z
   E) TOR AT THISTA 06/1502Z
   F) TOT DRTT BOST BY THISTA AT 06/1505Z
3. POSSIBLE DISCREPANCIES IN ABOVE TIMES, RECD THRU PRELIM INVES, COULD BE CLEARED UP BY TRACER ACTION.
BT

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DOC #1 EX #8 LIBERTY 408

[redacted] C O N F I D E N T I A L

VOICE CIRCUITRY T[redacted] ALL STATIONS EXCEPT [redacted] WHICH
OCCURED SHORTLY AFTER INITIAL REPORT DUE TO [redacted] UTILIZING
[redacted] ANTENNAS BOTH WAYS TO THE LIBERTY. IN ADDITION, [redacted]STA
[redacted] ESTABLISHED DIRECT VOICE CIRCUIT BETWEEN CTG AND USS AMERICA ON
FD4.21A.

3. AS YOU KNOW, OUR PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT IS OPTIMIZED. YESTERDAY
I TOOK MY "BATTLE STATION" AT THE MI-COMM NET CONTROL SPOT AND
REALLY APPRECIATED THE CAPABILITIES OF REAL TIME COMMUNICATIONS.
I WAS ABLE TO KEEP RIGHT UP TO THE MINUTE ON WHAT HAD BEEN
PASSED TO WHOM AND AT THE SAME TIME HAVE [redacted] REPORTS
TO [redacted]. IN ADDITION, IT WAS INTERESTING
AND HELPFUL TO BE AWARE OF WHAT WAS BEING DISCUSSED ON XRAJ
AND CR, AS WELL AS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION EXCHANGED ON OUR
MULTIPLEXED

DIRECT CIRCUITS.

4. CIRCUIT DISCIPLINE ON THE FD4.24 NET LEFT SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED.
A DIRECTED NET WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AND MANY UNNECESSARY
RETRANSMISSIONS ENSUED. NAVCOMMSTA GREECE PROVIDED RELAY RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR THE LIBERTY AND HAD TO FREQUENTLY TELL OTHERS TO
CEASE TRANSMISSION BECAUSE OF HANDLING THEIR TRAFFIC. [redacted]
EXAMPLES: NAVY 1021. PASSING PROTOCOL TRAFFIC TO CLEAR CIRCUITRY DURING

PAGE THREE RUSNC 2535 C O N F I D E N T I A L

A PERIOD WHEN IDENTIFICATION OF FORCES AT [redacted] LIBERTY WAS
BEING ATTEMPTED.

5. AS PREVIOUSLY HAVE CREATES TERMINATION WITH COMDESRON 12. ESCORT
DESTROYERS MASSEY AND DAVIS BOARDED LIBERTY AT 0-0340/9 JUNE. MAJORITY
TRAFFIC TO/FROM NOW BEING PASSED VIA [redacted] MEANS BUT MAINTAINING
EXCELLENT VOICE COMM WITH DAMAGED SHIP.

6. THIS SITUATION WAS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL IN THAT ONLY VOICE COMM
AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, IN FUTURE INSTANCES OF THIS TYPE, STRONGLY
RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTED NET. NET CONTROL
COULD NORMALLY BE CINCUSNAVEUR BUT IT COULD BE DELEGATED
IF CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE.

7. NOW SUDS. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR WELCOME ABOARD VERENDTE.
BEST REGARDS. THORSON.

[redacted]-4

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4DA

NNNNVV KYC337TKTBZVV CAA013
PP RUQPNARQ
DE RUQPNA CS3 1672116
ZNY EEEEE
P 162116Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
TO RUQPNARQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO ZEN/COMIDEASTFOR
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
FOR JCS FACT FINDING TEAM USS LIBERTY INVESTIGATION
A. YOUR 161450Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67
C. COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z JUN 67
1. IAW REF A FOLL DATA IS SUBMITTED
2. REF B AND REF C DID IN FACT APPEAR ON ASMARA JRTT BCST.
JR MONITOR TAPE REELS (RECEIVED "REAL TIME" FROM XMTR SITE
RADIATED SIGNAL) CONFIRMS PARA 3 BELOW.
3. SERIAL NO. AND T. O. I.
A. REF B - JR NO. 2017 AT 070529Z
B. REF C - JR NO. 2043 AT 081525Z
4. RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE REFS B AND C WERE RERUN. AM RERUNNING ALL
MONITOR REELS FROM 070529Z TO C818C0Z TO VERIFY. WILL ADVISE.
5. NO UNUSUAL TRANSMISSION CIRCUMSTANCES BT

ACTION TAKEN:

ISSUED 21 0172

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Doc 41 Ex 48 - Liberty

440

DCA SUR DE DCA MEA AND I GOT A WIRENOTE FOR U ALL THERE AND CAN

I GO AHEAD ANS SEND IT NOW PLSE KKKKK

PP 141111Z
FM TUSLOG DET 115 ANKARA TURKEY
TO DCA EUROPE VAIHINGEN GERMANY 14 JUN 1967 11 49
BT
UNCLAS E F T O 115/M400/239
INQUIRY ON COMMSIXTHFLT MSG
A. COMMSIXTHFLT DTG 080917Z JUNE RESPONSE TO:
1. ORDER WIRE INQUIRY TO DCS STATION ASMARA REGARDING REFERENCE
A. BEING SENT TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE RATHER THAN NAVCOMMSTA
ASMARA WAS THAT MESSAGE MISSENT TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE DUE TO
OPERATOR ERROR. ASMARA RECEIVED MESSAGE ON 9C53 AND MISSENT IT
ON H730. IT WAS RETURNED TO THEM ON C373 AND THEN SENT TO
NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA VIA CABLE (NO CCSD).
BT

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411
Doc. 40 Ex 48 Liberty

NNNN

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 17 8 03 AM '67

Copy given to SSG for fact finding tom.

LIBERTY

ZCZCXDA725ZCMGBGD1
PP RUDLKD
ZNY EEEEE ZFH1
ZCCSB568ZCHND919
ZCHND919SVV NAA147 PNA013
PP RUDLKD
DE RUQPNAA 013 1680530
ZNY EEEEE
P 170530Z JUN 67
FM COMIDEASTFOR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
FOR JCS FACT FINDING TEAM
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 161402 JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67
C. COMSIXTHFLT 063917Z JUN 67
1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUBMITTED:
A. REF B APPEARS IN JRT FILES OF THIS STATION AS JR NR
77 WITH APPROX. TOR 070531Z. JRIT FILES FOR PERIOD 070000Z
TO 070559Z INDICATE NO UNSUAL RECEPTION ENCOUNTERED.D
B. REF C APPEARS IN JRIT FILES OF THIS STATION AS JRNR
2443 WITH APPROX TOR 081527Z. ACTION ADDEE USS LIBERTY IS
PRECEDED BY ROUTING INDICATOR RUTPP INDICATING MESSAGE MAY
HAVE BEEN SENT ORIGINALLY TO NAVCOMMSTA MORROCCO FOR RELAY.
JRIT FILES FOR PERIOD 080000Z TO 082359Z INDICATE NO UNUSAL
RECEPTION PROBLEMS.

C. BOTH REF A AND B WERE RECEIVED AS FIRST RUN TRAFFIC.
NO RECORD OF REF A OR B BEING RECEIVED AS RERUNS.
BT

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Dec. 39. Ex VF - Liberty

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CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
	CDR W. O. [illegible]	ACTION			PP		
10 JUN 67	T-1 PHONE EXT. NO. 231	INFO					

USCINCEUR

USCINCEUR

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF READER _____

GROUP _____

CWO _____

CONFIDENTIAL

A. JCS 7531 DTG 091936Z JUN 67

B. MY 10141 DTG JUN 67

C. USCINCEUR ECJC/JRC 09045 DTG 080625Z JUN 67

1. REPLY REF A CONTAINED REF B. IN ORDER TO BE PREPARED TO ANSWER FURTHER INQUIRIES RECOMMEND YOUR HEADQUARTERS INITIATE PRIOR ACTION TO DETERMINE REASON FOR NON-RECEIPT REF C BY USS LIBERTY .

GP-4

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009032/73
on 21 Jun 76 M Epstein JAG Sec Cntr of 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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ORIGINATOR SECTION: J56

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N5

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

DTG: 101411Z JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 1

CON		
TOR		
ESN	1067	
DAH		13

Doc 38 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	WORDS	PRIORITY / ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
	CDR W. J. LONGHI	ACTION		XXX		
10 JUN 67	T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 231		INFO		XXX		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: JCS

INFO: USCINCEUR // CNO // USS LIBERTY // COMSIXTHFLT

SECRET

A. JCS 7531 DTG 091936Z JUN 67

B. NMC 092161Z JUN 67 NOTAL

C. NMC 080455Z JUN 67 NOTAL

1. IN REPLY TO REF A THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

(A) JCS 7347 DTG 080112Z . . RECEIVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT 0445Z/08 FROM CINCUSNAVEUR. [redacted]

[redacted]

(B) CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z. RECEIVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT 0516Z/08 FROM NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO. THIS MESSAGE NOT ADDRESSED TO USS LIBERTY.

(C) USCINCEUR 080525Z. RECEIVED BY COMSIXTHFLT AT 0735Z/08 FROM NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO. RECEIVED BY CINCUSNAVEUR AT 0827Z/08 FROM DOS MAJOR RELAY CROUGHTON ENGLAND. [redacted]

[redacted]

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF READER _____

CENTCO _____

CWO _____

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible] (cancelled) [illegible] by authority of OPNAVINST Sec 00[illegible]32/7:

[illegible] 21 Jun 96

(Date) (Signature) (Title)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N55

ACTION DEPARTMENT: [illegible]

IMMEDIATE

CON	1		
TOR			
ESN	1063		
ERN			

10 1410Z JUN 67

Doc 32 Ex VF-Liberty

4H

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

TYPE WITHIN BORDERS ONLY

SECRET

CONSIDERABLE 080917Z. NEVER RECEIVED BY USS LIBERTY SINCE IT WAS

PLACED ON NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA BROADCAST UNTIL 152[illegible]Z/08. SEE REF B

FOR DETAILS.

2. REF C WAS READDRESSED BY NMCC 080626Z TO USSINCOMF, JCS, CNO

AND CINCLANTFLT FOR INFO. REF C RETRANSMITTED BY NMCC 100626Z TO

JCS AND CNO IN REPLY TO PARA 2, REF A.

3. ACCORDING TO CO, USS LIBERTY, JCS QUERIES AND [illegible]

NSCS [illegible] CONTENT OF REF B WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY

PRIOR TO ATTACK.

4. REF B CONTAINS ALL INFO KNOWN AT THIS TIME CONCERNING JCS

QUERIES AND CONSIDERABLE 080917Z. FURTHER ACTION HAS BEEN

INITIATED AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN

RECEIVED.

GP-4.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SECRET

45

K
NNNNVV XXC297
VV [illegible]198VV CBC30
DO RUQ[illegible]
DE RUQKR[illegible] 181[illegible]V 1511332
ZNY CCCCC
O 101332Z JUN 67
FM COMDESRON TWELVE
TO RUQKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 101036Z JUN 67
PASSED REF A TO LIBERTY AT 1345Z. NO ONE ON BOARD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF PRERECEIPT INFO CONTAINED THERIN.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (canceled) ~~changed to~~
by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 28 Jan 76 [signature] of 31 Jan 76
(Date) JAG Sec Coff (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
2
ACTION DEPARTMENT
4.5
CINCUSNAVEUR
PAGE 1 OF
CSN
TOR 101230Z
SSN
DTG 101330Z JUN
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
Doc 36 - Exhibit - Liberty

VV KXC15CVV AGB832V
BW
YUFPII
CO RUDLKD
DE RUTPPC 052 1611205
ZNY SSUSS
O 1612052 JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPP/COMDESRON TWELVE
RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
BT
S ZRC R E T
REF (A) CINCUSNAVEUR 1818362 JUN 67
(B) JCS 0801182 JUN 67
1. REF (A) ZEKLN FOR ACTION.
2. ACCORDING TO CO, USS HERTY, REF (B) AND ALL ASSOCIATED MSGS TO PASS CONTENT OF REF (B) WERE NOT RECEIVED ONBOARD LIBERTY PRIOR TO ATTACK.
GP-3
BT

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED GARBL MESSAGE IS IN SERVICE, CORRECTED COPY WILL ROUTED WHEN RECEIVED, W2/RBA 10JUN67

//CORRECTED COPY//

DESTROY ALL OTHERS

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) changed to
by authority of SECNAV memo Ser 00L03/T31
on 21 Jun 71 by JAK Sec Con
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED PER ORIG SVC: TR/W-2/15 JUN 67

ORIGINATOR SECTION: REF
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
OO 01 02 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N17 CITE DTG
001 002 003 004 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 A16 ADD
HRN 10 0004 SIZE X

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR
ESN 167337
SCN
FM
TO 101205Z JUN
SECRE
(WHEN FILLED
DOC 35 - EX 48 - LIBERTY

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

VV KXC148VV AGB831VV NYC087
OO RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 048 1611132
ZNY CCCCC
O 101132Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
ST
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY (U)
A. YOUR 101031Z JUN 67.
B. USCINCEUR 080625Z JUN 67.
1. REF B RECEIVED AT 0735Z/08 JUN 67 FROM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO VIA NAVCOMOPNET.
GP-4
BT

DECL

OPNAV memo Ser 00NP32/T31
of 21 Jun 76

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION: REF
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N5
CLASSIFICATION: C
PRECEDENCE: O O O1 O2 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 CITE SDO
ACTION: 001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 AIG ADD
INFO: NCU UNKNOWN
SEQ OF 1
CON
TOR 1611Z
SSN
CCT
DTG 161132Z Jun 67
CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)
Dec 2X Exmo Liberty

RELEASED BY

WHEN FILLED IN

CLASSIFICATION: NAVAL MESSAGE

DTG	PAGE	PRECEDENCE	PLACE	TIME FILED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
29 JUN 67	1-1	PAGE EXT. NO. 232	ACTION / INFO	29 P			

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: CNO

INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

SECRET

USS LIBERTY (U)

1. JCS 0301102 JUN 67

2. USDOCOMER 0306292 JUN 67

1. REQUEST LITERNER IF USS LIBERTY RECEIVED REFS A AND B. IF SO DESIG DTG AND MEANS OF RECEIPT.

2. SINCE COMM RECORDS MAY HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND IDENTIFICATION BY DTG IMPOSSIBLE SUG FOLLOWING OFFERED AS MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION:

A. REF (A) WAS TOP SECRET MULTIPLE ADDRESS MSG INCLUDING USS LIBERTY REQUESTING LIBERTY CEASE NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO [illegible] Arabia, Egyptian and Syrian coast.

B. REF (B) WAS MULTIPLE ADDRESSED CONFIDENTIAL MSG ACTION TO CINCUSNAVEUR INFO ADDS INCLUDED USS LIBERTY. MSG TOLD CINCUSNAVEUR TO TAKE JCS 0301102 FOR ACTION.

3. REQUEST LIBERTY RADIO RESTRICT FREQUENCY THIS MESSAGE.

GP-4

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N53

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N5

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DTG 101036Z JUN 67

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

DOC. 33 EX #8 - LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

			PRECEDENCE	FL	INITIALS	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	SPECIAL
			ACTION					
20 JUN 67	[illegible]	PHONE EXT. NO. 225	INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT

INFO:

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF READER _____

CLASS _____

C/O _____

CONFIDENTIAL

1. USCINCEUR COG 032M JUN 67

2. JCS 0915263 JUN 67

3. CINCUSNAVEUR HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO TAKE ACTION FOR ACTION BY USCINCEUR.

4. REQUEST YOUR TOR OF NLT A MID MARCH OF RECEIPT IN ORDER TO COMPLETE ETO REQUIRED BY PARA 3.

5. CINCUSNAVEUR HAS BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE ANY ETO AVAILABLE AT RECEIPT OF FORCES NOT IN USS LIBERTY.

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by Authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 23Jun76 DR Spain OP-09B5 Cmt of 21Jun76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION	005
ACTION DEPARTMENT	00

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

00	01	02	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	CINCUSNAVEUR	SDO
001	002	003	0004	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	110	ADO	ACO 0003

(PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES)

CON			
TOR			
SCN	170		
SGN			

DTG 101031Z JUN 67

EAT CONFIDENTIAL

(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc. 32 Ex 98-Liberty

[illegible] HXC019 ACS7 [illegible] KYVSSC 0
CO RUEHRC
DE RUTPRV 162 1602352
ZNY CCCCC
O 092332Z JUN 07
FM COMSIXTHFLTO
TO RUFPSK/USCINCEURO
INFO RUEHRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUENAAA/CNO
C3T
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY (U)
A. JCS 7501 DTG 021552Z JUN 67
1. REXMA OF REF A RECD 041452Z/06 FROM CINCUSNAVEUR.0
2. REP B OF REX A RECD 051027/06 FROM NCS MOROCCO.
3. REP C OF GEXMA RECD 070522Z/06 FROM NCS MOROCCO.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
By OPNAV Navy Sec 005032/731
NARA, Date 31Jan76 QR Brown
(Date) (Signature)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR ACTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 1 OF 1
CCN
TOR 021552Z
GCN
FCN
DTG 092332Z JUN 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
DOC 31 EX YR LIBERTY
NAVEXOS 2100/2 (REV. 10-63)

VV [illegible] APR0279VV [illegible] OOJAY

CO RUTPRO
DE RUTPRO 167 1601745
ZNY CCCCC
O 091145Z JUN 67
FM AMYOCONSTA MONOCCO
TO RUTPRO/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPRO/COMSIXTHFLT
RUSNC/AMYOCONSTA CADIZ CC
RUSPNA/AMYOCONSTA ASMARA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
NOS TRACER ACTION
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 251102Z JUN 67
B. JCS 2[illegible]2 JUN 67
C. COMSIXTHFLT 2[illegible]2 JUN 67
1. CAN NOT A FOLLOWING REPORT ON HANDLING OF NOS AND C.S DERIVED MACH LOCC, OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL TRACER ACTION FOR STATIONS LISTED:
2. REF B RECEIVED AMYOCONSTA MADA AS ON [illegible] AR NUMBER AT 30/2143Z. ADDED TO RUTPRO BY ORIG. MSG FOR DELIVERY [illegible] (RUTPRO).
PROVIDED TO RUTPRO AT [illegible] AS APPROPRIATE [illegible] ALERTS MACH LOCC
[illegible] DIRECT C[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

W. J. LONCH, CDR

JUN 1967 | PHONE EXT. NO. 231 | ACTION | INFO | PLAIN | PRIORITY | OOO

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: NAVCOMMSTA NEASCOG

INFO: WLENOTE FOR CAPT BURNEY COD BAKER

UNCLAS EFTO

A. DCS 060R0 2 JUN 67

1. REF A WAS ADDRESSED TO SEVERAL ADDEES INCLUDING USS LIBERTY. IMPORTANT TO ASCERTAIN THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS IN FACT RECEIVED BY LIBERTY. ASSUME DELIVERY WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER [illegible] BROADCAST. REQUEST CHECK AND ASCERTAIN THAT MESSAGE WAS PLACED ON BROADCAST AND ADVISE IF YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION LIBERTY ACTUALLY RECEIVED. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

Ref. Best Regards Capt Lynch

FOR COMMUNICAT USE ONLY

CUTTER

PROOF READER

COMPO

CWO

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DTG 081711Z JUN 67

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 27 Ex VP Liberty

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(Classification) [redacted]

(Subject) OPNAV memo Ser 00:032/131

to 29 Jun 76 (Date) RR Spain JAG Sec Cont of 21 Jun 76

(Name) (Official Title)

Doc 26 Exhibit

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND Project NND 0090 32/T 31

By OR Spaun NARS, Date 12 Jan 76

(Date) (Signature) (Title)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 25 Ex 48 Liberty



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED
(Authority for action (cancelled) [redacted])
by authority of OPNAV memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 29Jan71 [signature] DAG-Sec Cte of 21Jan76
(Date) (Signature) (Title)
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department

Doc 24 Ex Y.B. LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED

(Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAVNOTE 5511 009D32/131
on 21 Jun 76 ORSpain JAG Secretary
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Dec 23 Ex 78-Liberty

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAVNOTE 5511 Ser 009D32/F31
on 21 Jun 76 (Date) [illegible] (Signature) JAG Sec Ctr (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

D02.22 Ex 48 LIBERTY

DECLASSIFIED
(Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to)
By authority of CNAU MEMO 00/1032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 [signature] 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Doc. 21 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV/NAVJAG 5040.32/13.5
on 24 Jun 76 R.E. Spell 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature: (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc. 20 Ex V8-4 (Insert)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECLASSIFIED

[illegible] (Change 10
[illegible] DEPNAVINST S5[illegible]
on 21 Jun 76 CRSyrin 21 Jun 76
(Date) [illegible] (Signature)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DOC. 19 EX 48 - LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Liberty

NNNNVV KXC152WW AGB520VV PRC065
00 RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 052 1590917
ZNY SSSSS
O P 080917Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
INFO RUEPJS/JCS
RUEPBK/USCINCEUR
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLXD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFND/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIJUA/HQ NSAEUR
RUFHOL/NSAEUROFF GERMANY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUEPWS/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEPWS/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFK/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
47500/CTF SIRSZERO
RUFRF/CTF SIX-SEVEN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (canceled) (Changed to)
by authority of CNAV ltr Ser 00102/T3/-
on 21 Jun 76 (Date) 21 Jun 76 (Signature) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 052 S E C R E T
S E C R E T
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS
A. JCS 079545Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
C. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67
1. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED IMMED TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40N0/32-30E8 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.
2. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE.
GP-3
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION

PAGE 1 OF ___
CON
TOR 1108Z
SSN
DAN 12
DTG 080917 JUN 67
SEC
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 18 Ex 48 LIBERTY

Liberty

NNNNVV VV KXC124VV BBM965VV KCA064

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to ———)
by authority of CNO/JAG memo Ser 009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 & KSpain & 21 Jun 76
Jr/G Sec Cont
(Grade) (Signature) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. NAVY

MC/8

2 3/4 hour
Good

ZOV

OO RUQKRQ
DE RQQC 2145 1590805
ZNY CCCCC
O 0806342 JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO
RUQKRQ/NSAEUR
RUQKRQ/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTKRE/CTF 60

PAGE TWO RUQKC 2145 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUFRD/CTF 64
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
1. 080800Z6 POSIT 31-45N3 033-30E9. PIM WITHIN 30NM OF ABOVE POSIT
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
NSG 6 N3
CLASSIFICATION
OO OI O2 NI N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 NIV CITE
001 002 003 004 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 ALL ADD
NCU

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
CON
TOR 091618
SSN
BSN 12
DTG 080634Z : JUN 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 17 Ex 48 Liberty

454

Liberty

REF F

CINCLANTFLT CNO 180/6 Ch.

VV KXC121ZCZCDKA035VV TVA824
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPBK 011 1590628
ZNY CCCCC
O 080625Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHELT
RUEEFJS/JCS
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
ZEN/NSAEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ECJC/JRC 09045 USNAVEUR FOR N-32 & D N 31, JCS FOR JRC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF A. PHONECON LTC RUSSELL THIS HQ, AND CDR JORGENSON, DUTY OFFICER, NAVEUR, 080425Z JUN 67. REF B. JCS 7347, 080110Z JUN 67.
(C) THIS CONFIRMS REF A TO TAKE REF B FORAC. CP-1
BT

DECLASSIFIED

(cancelled) (marked) to
by authority of OPNAV Msg ltr 09D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 DR Spain & 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (OTJAG Sec Cod)

Liberty 2

ORIGINATOR SECTION: REF
ACTION DEPARTMENT: 13
CINCUSNAVEUR

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 080425Z JUN 67
SSN
SGN

DTG 080625Z JUN 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 16 Ex 48-Liberty

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED	DRAFTED	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
R D Stiles		ACTION		0000			
08 JUN 67	PHONE EXT NO. 454	INFO					

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT

INFO:

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

YAPE CUTTER _____

PROOF READER _____

CSWAO _____

CWO _____

TS
as Liberty ??
yes

UNCLAS EFTO

A. JCS 0801102 JUN 67

1. TAKE FORAC.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DOC 15 EX 4B-LIBERTY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR	Z	XX									X
X3		00	01	02	NI	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	SIG
ACTION DEPARTMENT		001	002	003	003B	011	013	015	016	018	019	AIG
X3						X						

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON			
TOR			
SSN	1016		
SCN			

DTG 080455Z June 67

UNCLASSIFIED

436

TVV KXC007 BBM929V KCA011
OO RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 1972 158[illegible]16
ZNY CCCCC
O 070908Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAA/CNO
RUEDNA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCTSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCISA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUQKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBX/USCINCEUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO
RUOKRQ/NSAEUR
RUQRQ/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUFNF/COMFAIRMED
RUTBBZ/CTF SIX ZERO

Liberty 314
MC SDO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. Tcs. Rev. Deleted ... Exemption ...
By authority of QUAU Memo Ser 009D32/T31
Date 6 Jun 76 OR Spain 8 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Conf
(Date) (Initials)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1972 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUFRL/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. USCINCEUR 0614-0Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
1. 070800Z5 POSIT 33-06N2 28-54E9. PIM 109/16.5 UNTIL 072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.
2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTD AS OF 0800Z8
IAW REF A.
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
NSGE
SURFACE NCU
CO OI O2 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE DTG
001 002 003 004 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 ABO
NCU LOG
(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 07/2355
SSN
BOH
DTG 070908Z JUN 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 11 Ex 48 - Liberty

437

NNNVV KXC008VV ( ) BBM930VV KCA017

PP RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 1994 1582133
ZNY CCCCC
P 0620362 JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUERDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUQKRQ/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUQKRQ/HQ NSA EUR
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO

Liberty

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JUN 5 10 44 AM '67

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of DNA dumemo Ser 209032/73
on 29 Jun 76 DK Spain 8 21 Jun 76
(Date) JAG Section (Initial)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION: REF
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3 NSGE
CIRCUITWORK
OD OI O2 NI N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE SEQ
001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 A14 A80
NCU LONDON

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

(PAGE 1 OF 2)
CON
TOR 07/2356Z
SSN
SEN
DTG 062036Z JUN 67

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DOC 10 - EX 48 LIBERTY
438

438

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1994 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUQKRD/COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)
USCINCEUR FOR JRC
JCS FOR JRC
CINCLANT FOR JRC
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66
1. REPORTING YOUR OPCON IAW PARA 2 REF A AT 070001Z JUN 67.
2. FUEL STATE EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT. NORMAL CONSUMPTION WHILE ON STATION APPROXIMATELY ONE PERCENT PER DAY.
3. ESTIMATED PROVISION ENDURANCE/DAYS:
A. DRY/10
B. FROZEN/35
C. CHILL/75
4. HAVE ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE MODIFIED. SELF DEFENSE CAPABILITY LIMITED TO FOUR .50 CALIBER MACHINGE GUNS AND SMALL ARMS.

PAGE THREE RUQKC 1994 C O N F I D E N T I A L
5. CURRENT TERM - PROMULGATING MESSAGE NOT HELD. PARA 8B ANNEX DELTA REF A PERTAIN.
6. REPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC REPAIRMEN ON BOARD WILL BE SUBMITTED SEPARATELY.
7. ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.
8. REQUEST ADVISE TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED AND OTHER NECESSARY DATA.
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

439

Liberty

XC 10

FM RUTPRC 129 1572349
ZNY CCCCC
O P 062349Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
INFO ~~RUTPRG~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
~~RUDLKD~~/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIJUA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
~~RUDLKD~~/CNO NSAEUR
RUFRF/COMFAIR
D
RUCILLA/COMSERVLANT
RUCIJUA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIJUA/NFOIO

XC/OC

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Class section (cancelled) (Changed to)
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on 21 Jun 76 [signature] 21 Jun 76
JAG Sec Cont
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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PAGE TWO RUTPRC 129 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUTPP/CTF SIX THREE
RUFRF/CTF SIX SEVEN
RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUTPM/NAVCAMS MOROCCO
RUTKC/NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL
B. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB
C. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL
D. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67 NOTAL
E. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66 NOTAL
F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL
1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF. B, C AND D.
2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF UAR ACTIONS. MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR

062349Z

ORIGINATOR SECTION	[illegible]
ACTION DEPARTMENT	USNE N3

CINCUSNAVEUR

CON	
TOR	01327
SSN	
SGN	1 TC

DTG 061349Z JUN 67

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 9 - Ex 48 - LIBERTY 440

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PAGE 20.
2 of 62.

THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY DIVERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.
3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.
4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.
5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN SIXTHFLT.
6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS. PT EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.
7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

A. COPY KR BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY XRA BCS.
B. IF PERMENANT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.
C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIREBSM
D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.
8. ACKNOWLEDGE.
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DE RUQKC 1666 1571915
ZNY CCCCC
O 061844Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUQNRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNRA/CINCLANT
RUEDNRA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/CONSERVLANT
RUEPSDN/CONSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUCIHSA/NFJIO
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUQNRC/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV Ltr Ser OP07D52/T31
on 24 Jun 76 & 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JPG Sec Cnt (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1666 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUFHD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. YOUR 061357Z JUN 67
1 061800Z5 POSIT 34-18N6 024-06E2. PIM 107/16
2. MY 032028Z5, 042050Z1, AND 051934Z9 ARE
DTG PRIOR PIM REPORTS. REF A PERTAINS. SUBSEQUENT
PIM REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO COMSIXTHFLT.
3. TEMPORARY REPAIRS HAVE RETURNED TRSSCOMM.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TO SATISFACTORY
OPERATIONS.
GP-4
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION — ACTION DEPARTMENT — NSGE 43
CINCUSNAVEUR — 000 001 002 003 003A 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 A14 A00 — NCU

CON	
TOR	210216
SSN	
SGN	TC

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

061844 Jun 67

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Doc 8-Ex 48 Liberty

Liberty

NNNNCZCNBA267ZCGGD244
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPBX 049 1571411
ZNY CCCCC
O 061410Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFORADAC/USS LIBERTY
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
ZEN/NSAEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ECJC/JRC 00941. USNAVEUR FOR N-31 AND N-32. JCS FOR JRC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF: A. MY ECJC/JRC 00567, 010035Z JUN 67. B. CINCUSNAVEUR 011300Z JUN 67.
1. (C) REF A REQUESTS SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z DAILY. REF B DIRECTS THE USS LIBERTY TO SUBMIT THE DAILY SITREP MESSAGE AS OF 2400Z HOURS AT PRIORITY PRECEDENCE.
2. (C) RECEIPT OF USS LIBERTY SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS AT THIS HQ HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY BEYOND TIME REQUESTED IN REF A. REQUEST THESE REPORTS BE ASSIGN
RLZ PRECEDENCE OF IMMEDIATE
AND BE SUBMITTED DAILY AS OD 1800Z. GP-4.
BT

mc-SDO

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to) by authority of CPNAVMSGNO Ser009D32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 CK Lewin 21 June 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Lant (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 7 - Ex 48 - Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
CLASSIFICATION
NCU LOGGED

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 061559Z
SSN
SSM
DTG 061410Z JUN 67

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

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NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE EXT NO.	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
MJ Stanley 6 JUN 67	GDR FULLINWIDER	263	ACTION			XX		
T-1			INFO				XXX	

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT//USS LIBERTY

INFO: USCINCEUR FOR JRC//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//CINCLANTFLT//
DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRUEUR//ASTDIRNAVSECGRU//
DIRNAVSECGRULANT//NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED//COMSERVLANT//
COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//CTF SIX FOUR//NFOIO//
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//CINCLANT FOR JRC//COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT

Ref B

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TAPE CUTTER
PROOF READER
COMPD
CWO

017 GL
N2 L
212 M/L
21 CB

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL (U)

A. MY 3111750Z MAY 67 (LIBERTY MOVORD 7-67, WITH CH-1)

B. MY 0310162 JUN 67

C. USS LIBERTY 021330Z JUN 67 (MOVREP)

D. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 (USS LIBERTY SKED)

E. USS LIBERTY 022108Z JUN 67

1. FOR COMSIXTHFLT. TO FACILITATE AREA COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING MIDEAST HOSTILITIES, USS LIBERTY WILL BE CHOPPED TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z JUN 67. OPERATE LIBERTY IAW REF D TO DERIVE MAXIMUM BENEFIT FROM SPECIAL CAPABILITIES. REF D MAY BE MODIFIED FOR SAFETY REASONS AND AS POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR PROTECTION

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of OPNAVNOTE 5004032/1318 25 Jun 76

29 Jun 76 (Date) JR Spain (Signature) JAG Sec Coll (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE N

Doc 6-Exh Liberty

(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES)

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N314
ACTION DEPARTMENT
CINCUSNAVEUR
OO OI OS NI NP NB NM NG NH NT CITE S
NCU

CON
YOR
SSN 1068
SBN

ADD: 44

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

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AS DICTATED BY THE LOCAL SITUATION.

A. REQUEST CHANGE PIM REPORTS (REFS A AND B) TO AS OF 1800Z, CHANGE PRECEDENCE TO IMMEDIATE AND CHANGE ADDEE FOR USCINCEUR TO USCINCEUR FOR JRC.

2. FOR USS LIBERTY. CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z BY MESSAGE.

A. PIM REPORT NOT RECEIVED SINCE REF B.

GP-3

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1068

061357Z

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES CONFIDENTIAL

NAVEUR HCU LDN 7100/22 (3-65)

445

NNNNCZCKDB450ZCMGB519
PP RUDLKD
DE
RUTPL 334 1570824
ZNY CCCCC
P 051934Z
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHTT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUWTATA/NFOIO
RUDLSB/NSAEUR
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRF/CCOMFAIRMED
RUTKRRE/CTF 60

PAGE 2 RUTPL 334 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUFFRD,/CTF 64
R[illegible]PM/NAVCOMMSTTA MOROCCO
BT

C O N F I D E N TT I A L
..S PASSS TO JRC
CINCLANNT PASS TO JRC
SSITREP/POSIT
:. 2400Z POSITT 35-20N0 019-110E! PIM 106/115
2. ASSUMEDD CONDITION OF REAADINESS THREE MOD

GP-4 BT IFIED.

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Classification (cancelled) (~~Changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAV DENIAL 5 007032/731
on 29 June 76. OK Ennis 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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LIBERTY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3 NSGE
CIRCUITAVEUR
NCU LONDON
(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 061544
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SER
DTG 051934Z JUN 67
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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

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by authority of CPNAVMEMO009D32/131
29 Jun 76 [illegible] 21 Jun 76
(Signature) (Rank)
[illegible] JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

447

DOC 3 - EX 48 - LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	INDICO	PRIORITY	ROUTING	ANI M
ACTION		CO			
INFO				SR	

DTG: 1 MAY 67 | T-1 | PHONE EXT. NO. 377

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS [illegible]

READD: SN 1209/DJH/W3/01 JUN67/N314
R 011856Z JUN 67
FM: CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO: CINCLANT FOR JRC

INFO: [illegible]//CNO//DIRNSA//COMSIXTHFLT//
CINCLANTFLT//DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRUDET//
ASSOCIATE NAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRULANT//NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED
COMAIRMEDITERLANT//COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//CTF SIX FOUR
POINT//NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//

CONFIDENTIAL

READD:SSN 1031/DJH/W3/03JUN67/N314
R 030939Z JUN 67
FM: CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO: COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR MOVORD 7-67 (U).

A. USNAVEUR 300932Z MAY 67 NOTAL

B. COMSERVRON EIGHT 240020Z MAY 67 NOTAL

C. DIRNAVSECGRU 311351Z MAY 67 NOTAL

D. CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 50-66 NOTAL

E. CINCUSNAVEURINST 4235.3D NOTAL

F. CINCUSNAVEUR/USCOMEASTLANTINST 02000.1B NOTAL
(CONAPLAN)

G. NAVEUR/COMEASTLANT MANUAL OF 1 JUN 66 NOTAL

H. CINCUSNAVEURINST 03120.5L NOTAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969032
By [illegible] NARA, Date 12-28-98

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PHOOF READER
CSWPO
CWO

ORIGINATOR SECTION: 324
ACTION COMPLETED UNIT
CINCUSNAVEUR
[illegible]

(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES)
CON
TOR 1794
SSN
SGN

DTG 311750Z MAY 67

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

MARGIN ONLY ( )

1. [illegible] CHOP TO CONCURRENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, [illegible] FOR FUEL AND LOADING TECHNICAL/LOGISTICAL [illegible], DETAILED IN REF B.

2. [illegible] COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING; (AFTER [illegible] OF AMMO/MISSILES AND FUEL BEING DELIVERED [illegible] AND WILL BE ABOUT 1 JUNE; DEPART [illegible] TO BE LOCATED MEDITERRANEAN FOR EXTENDED [illegible] OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IAW [illegible] DIRECTED SEPARATELY.

3. [illegible] IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS DURING TRANSIT AND [illegible]. [illegible] ATTENTION DIRECTED APPENDIX VIII, ANNEX [illegible] OF ALLIED RED TERRITORIAL SEAS.

4. [illegible] IAW REF E.

5. [illegible] IAW REF F.

SSN 1194
311750/mar67

[illegible] AS NOTED IAW REFS G AND H.

[illegible] AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

[illegible] CLASSIFIED CODE

[illegible] TO CHARLIE, INFORMATION TO

[illegible] ETC 64,

[illegible] 24 HOUR PERIOD

[illegible]

[illegible] (C-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

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NNNNCZCKDA585ZCGGA355
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEDSPA3804 1440019
ZNY CCCCC
O 240023Z MAY 67
FM COMSERVRON EIGHT
TO RUTPH/USS TIBERTY
INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVTANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/DRC
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCIHSA/ASST DIRNAVSECGRU
RUDLKD/CINCSSNAVEUR
RUTKC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
BT
C O N F D E N T I A L
A. MY 2815022 APR 67

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Passed to USCINCEUR

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on 21 June 76 DLSpain 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) (Rank)

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE TWO-RUEDSPA3804 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MOVEORD CHANOE
1. CANCEL PARAS 3Q AND 4 REFERENCE A.
2. MAKE IMMEDIATE PREPARATIONS TO GET UNDERWAY. WHEN RFS ASAP DEPART ABIDJAN AND PROCEED BEST POSS SOA TO ROTA SPAIN TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIALBXPE
3. WHEN RFS PROCEED TO OP AREA OFF PORT SAID. SPECIFIC AREAS WILL FOILOW.
4. REMAINDER REF A UNCHANGED.
GP-1
BT

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

N3

CINCUSNAVEUR

00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CIVE	S.O.
X	X	X		X		X					X

001	002	003	005B	011	013	013	014	016	016	017	AIG	ABO	NCU
				X									

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR	0318/24		
SSN			
SGN			

DTG 240020Z MAY 67

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 110 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

PAGE TWO RUTJC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUQNC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 021330Z9 LIBERTY AGTR-5, PQXX
ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 02//
ETD P ROTA SPAIN, 021330Z9 CO 015.0K6 03//
VIA L 35-57N0 005-35W3, 021730Z3 CO 015.0K6 04//
VIA L 37-00N0 012-00E3, 050330Z1 RH 015.0K6 05//
ETA L 32-00N5 033-00E6, 080300Z1 06//
MOD IND 32-00N 1033-30E9 080300Z1 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECOPS, CINCUSNAVEUR
311750Z7, 07//
RCT C 3 AG KILO ROMEO TANGO TANGO, LIBERTY, 070001Z8 JULIETT ROMEO TANGO
TANGO, LIBERTY, 08//
CFN 021330Z9, 021330Z9, 015.0K6, ETATUN0, 005-35W3, 021730Z3, 015.0K6,

PAGE THREE RUTJC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L
37-00N0, 012-00E3, 050330Z1, 015.0K6, 32-00N5, 033-00E6, 080300Z1,
32-00N5, 033-30E9, 080300Z1, 311750Z7, 070001Z8, 09//END
CP-4
BT

Page 2 of 2 021350Z Jun 67

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

Liberty

NC/500

DECLASSIFIED

(cancelled) (changed to
by authority of CNO NAVMSG 061032/T31
on 21 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG Secty (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

WKNMCZCKDB590ZCYGCC74
PP RUD
KD
DE RUCIJUA 300 1450245
ZNY CCCCC
P 241730Z MAY 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUEDSPA/COMSERVR
R FIGHT
INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCIHSA/SSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPAC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
ET
C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. YOUR 240023Z MAY 67
1. DEPARTED ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST 240530Z MAY. SOA 15 KTS. ETA ROTA 312000Z MAY. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS WILL BE NECESSARY TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERS AND REFUEL. THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSANDS GALLONS NSFO WILL BE REQUIRED. ETA OPAREA OFF PORT SAID 261400Z JUN 67. REF A PERTAINS
2. DO NOT HOLD ANY COMSIXTHFLT INSTRUCTIONS/OPLANS/OPORDERS/TAPV NOTES/ETC. IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO HAVE THEM DELIVERED ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
3. UNODIR WILL INCLUDE FOLLOWING COMMANDS AS INFO ADDEES ON DAILY PIM REPORT AFTER ENTRY INTO MEDITERRANEAN: CINCUSNAVEUR/COMSIXTHFLT/ DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.
GP-4
ET

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

#

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

N3
NSG

CINCUSNAVEUR

001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	114	000
X	X	X		X	X	X		X				X
				X						X		

NCU LONDON

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR	0352/25		
SSN			
SSN			

DTG 241732Z MAY 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 109 Ex 48 Liberty

Liberty File

MCISDO

NNNNCZCKDA959ZCEGB267
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEDNKA1344 1441921
ZNY CCCCC
O 241922Z MAY 67
FM CINCLANTFLT
TO RUDKND/ALUSNA MADRID
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUCDBM/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCIHSA/ASST DIRNAVSECGRU
~~RUDERS~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
RUDKMD/CHJUSMG SPAIN
RUTKC/PORT SERVOFF ROTA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
PORT VISIT
1. REQUEST ARRANGE FOLLOWING VISIT:
A. ROTA, SPAIN
B. OPERATIONAL
C. USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
D. NON-SALUTING
E. CDR W L MCGONAGLE, USN
F. 13 OFF/295 ENL
G, ARR 31 MAY, DEP DATE TO BE DETERMINED

PAGE TWO RUEDNKA1344 C O N F I D E N T I A L
H. LENGTH 455 FT, DRAFT 24 FT
2. REGRET LATE NOTIFICATION. REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (changed to
Per authority of ORDNAV Secy 5510.10A/T31
on 24 Jan 16 NKGrein & 21 Jun 16
(Date) (Signature) JNGSecGrp (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF)

ORIGINATOR SECTION	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	N9 N3OC
CIRCUIT DISPOSITION	00 01 02 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE 00 001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 A10 A20 NCU LORAN

CON	
TOR	
DTG	241922Z
ROH	

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 108 Ex XP Liberty

James M. Eagles, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNCZCKDA220ZCCMA950
00 RUCCKD-
ZNY EEEEE ZFH-1
CZCCSB4372CCSB257
ZCXCSB257
00 RUCCBM RUCIHSA RUDLKA RUEDNKA RUENAAA RUFPBNA RUTKC RUTPRC
ZNY EEEEE ZFH-1
CZCCSB432ZCDKA074
ZCDKA074
00 RUCCBM RUCIHSA RUDLKD RUEDNKA RUEDNWFS RUENAAA RUFPBNA RUTKC
RUTPRC
DE RUDKMD 3264 1450804
ZNY EEEEE
O 250805Z MAY 67
FM ALUSNA MADRID
TO RUEDNWFS/CINCLANTFLT
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCCBM/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCIHSA/ASST DIRNAVSECGRU
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROAT
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
ZEN/CHJUSMG SPAIN
RUTKC/PORT SERVOFF ROTA
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
1. YOUR 241922Z
2. REF A. ACKNOWLEDGED AND DIPL CLNC GRANTED.
BT

Liberty Files

mc/...

#

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION: P&E
ACTION DEPARTMENT: NSGE 43
CINCUSNAVEUR

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR	0845/25		
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DGM	12		

DTG 250805Z MAY 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 107 Ex #6 Liberty 3

RUHNCZ CHDB97ZCECB577
PP RUDLKD
DE RUEDNKA1454 1451450
ZNY EECSE
P 251355Z MAY 67
FM COMSERVLANT
TO RUIPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEGCNC/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUIPRE/COMSERFORSIXTHFLT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVPON EIGHT
RUQPNA/KSS LIBERTY
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
MED PUBS
A. USS LIBERTY 241732Z MAY 67
DELIVERY QUESTIONABLE IF FORWARDED BY COMSERVLANT. THEREFORE REQ
YOU TAKE PARA 2 REF A FOR ACTION.
BT

Melspo Liberty

#

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR			
SSN	25/1835Z		
BBN	DJ		

ORIGINATOR SECTION: X0 EF
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3
CIRCUIT: RUEGCNC

00	01	02	NI	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	SOO
001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A14	A00

NCU

EFTO

DTG 25/1355Z MAY 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 106 Ex VB Liberty
456

TV K50340NCZCKDA424 JEGC088
PP RUDLKDA
DE RUEDSLA3515 1501925
ZNY CCCCC
P 301925Z MAY 67 — T/C
FM MRC NORVA
TO RUDLKDA/MRO LONDON
P 291300Z MAY 67 — ORIG
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG SEVEN EIGHT — N/A
INFO RUEHAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUCPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
RUKKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
C O N F I D E N T I A L, PPP MOVREP 291300Z5 LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF
240800Z4 011 07//
SRC SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 08//
POS LIMA 22-13N 8[illegible]17-01W9, 291200Z4CO 015 0K6 09//
ETA P ROTA SPAIN, 010900Z0 10//
CFN 291300Z5, 240800Z4, 011, 22-13N 8, 017-01W9, 291200Z4,
015, 0K6, 010900Z0, 11//END
GP-4
BT

READD: SSN 1010/DJ/W2/31MAY67/MRO
R 310501Z MAY 67
FM MRO LONDON
INFO COMICEDEFOR
USCOMEASTLANT.....
CINCHOMEFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR.....
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
CTF 69
NAF NAPLES
NAVCOMMSTA(CALS)SPAIN
NAVSUPPACT NAPLES
COMNAVACTS SPAIN

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) [illegible]
by authority of OPNAVINST 5511.35K 009032/T31
on 29Jun76 DRSpain 21Jun76
(Date) Signature (OJAG)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION
CINCUSN
000 001 002 NIT NIB NIB NIB NIB NIB NIT CITE DDO
001 002 003 003B 011 013 015 014 016 016 017 A14 ADO
NCU

PAGE 1 OF
CON
TOR
SSN 31/0501Z MAY
SEN

DTG 291300Z MAY 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 105 Ex 48 Liberty

IMMMCEOMDB3S72CEGD301
PP RUEDMS
DE RUEDMKA #7301 1530[illegible]
ZNY CCCCC
P 3[illegible]Z MAY 67
FM CINCLANTFLT
TO RUEDMKA/USERVLANT
INFO RUEDMAA/CFC
RUEDMKA/CINCLANT
RUEDMJA/JCS/JRC
RUEDMS/USCINCEUR
RUEDMS/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDMS/DIRNSA
RUEDMCA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDMKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDMKA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUEDMKA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUEDMKA/USS LIBERTY
RUEDMKA/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
USS LIBERTY CHOP (U)
A. CTG 2916[illegible] MAY 67
B. COMSERVRON EIGHT 2400Z0Z MAY 67
1. IAW REF A DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL ROTA FOR OPS PER REF B.
DD. ENSURE CINCLANT JRC AND CINCLANTFLT KEPT INFORMED LIBERTY MOVEMENTS.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST Sec 0090 32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 [illegible] 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Coll (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
1 SIGE

CINCUSNAVEUR | 00 | 01 | 02 | N1 | N2 | N3 | N4 | N5 | N6 | N7 | CIVILIAN | S.O. | 001 | 002 | 003 | CNO | 011 | 012 | 013 | 014 | 015 | 016 | 017 | A14 | A00 | NCU
X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 0800130
SSN
DGN C

WC 300040 : HL

E/P CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

DOC 103 EX #8 LIBERTY

CZCKDA193ZCE6B669
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEDSPA4216 1590201
ZNY CCCCC
O 282202Z MAY 67
FM COMSERVRON EIGHT
TO RUTPP/USS LIBERTY
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
INFO RUEDNKA/CINCLANFLT
~~RUSLKD~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUCIHSA/ASST DIRNAVSECGRU
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
~~RUEPNA~~/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUTPRE/COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

PAGE TWO RUEDSPA4216 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. MY 281502Z APR 67 NOTAL
B. CINCLANTFLT 300042Z MAY 67 NOTAL
1. FOR COMSERVLANT: ORIG TAKES REF B FORAC.
2. FOR LIBERTY: CANCEL THE UNEXECUTED PORTION OF REF A.
.. CHOP TO USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
3. KEEP CINCLANT/JRC AND CINCLANTFLT INFORMED YOUR MOVEMENTS.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of CNO/PNU ltr ser 009D32/174
on 24 Jun 74 (Date) [illegible] (Signature) JAG Section (Mark)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
NSGE

CINCUSNAVEUR

OO OI O2 NI N3 N5 N6 N8 N9 NIY CIE S..

001 002 003 003B 011 013 015 016 018 01Y A10 A00

NCU LONDON

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR			
BSN	34/0095		
S&N			

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILED IN)

NAVEUR NCU.LON.2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 102 Ex 48 Liberty

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNCZCYDA343ZCNGB082
PP [redacted]
DE RUFPSK 031 1501150
ZNY CCCCC
P 3[illegible]Z MAY 67
FM [redacted]
TO [redacted]/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
ZEN/[redacted]NSAEUR
RUEAAA/CNO
RUEDMA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEANK/COMSERVLANT
RUEPAC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDMA/COMSERVRON 8
RUCIULA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPNE/DIR [illegible]
RUEPUS/ASDTRNAVSECGRU
RUEPUS/ASDTRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ECJC/JRC 03588. [redacted]EUR FOR N-32. SUBJ:
USS LIBERTY (L) REF JCS 6499 29/1602Z MAY [illegible] (NOTAL).
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF, REQUEST YOU ASSUME [illegible]ON OF USS LIBERTY WHEN

PAGE 2 RUFPSK 031 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHIP PASSES SEA BUOY INBOUND TO ROTA 0/A 31 MAR 67 AND PREPARE FOR
EXTENDED OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MED. GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV Ltr Ser 009P32/131
on 29 Jun 76 OR 6 Jun 76 21 Jun 76
(Event) (See Last) (Date)
(Clerk)
OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CK

(PAGE 1 OF _____)

CON			
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

DEPARTMENT 13

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

00	01	02	NI	NB	NB	NC	NB	NG	NH	CITE	500
001	002	003	USS	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	ADD	INCU

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEXOS 3611/1 (REV. 10-65) S/N 0107-LF-013-6700

DTG 141552Z MAY 67 = CINCUSNAVEUR

VV KXC027ZCDKA009 VV TVB004
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPBK 002 1520115
ZNY SSSSS
O 210035Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
ZEN/NSAEUR
BT
S E C R E T ECJC/JRC 08685. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-32 AND N-31. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A: USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
B: CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67
1. (S) FOR JCS. REF A STATES THAT USS LIBERTY EXPECTS TO BE RFS 011400Z JUN 67 FROM ROTA. INTEND SHIP PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN EAN WHEN READY AS OUTLINED REF B. AWAITING YOU GUIDANCE WITH ESPECT TO SCHEDULE, OPERATING AREA AND ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
2. (C) FOR USNAVEUR. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND ARRANGE FOR LIAISON OFFICER TO MEET USS LIBERTY WITH DOCUMENTS AS REQUESTED REF A. SCHEDULE AND OPERATING AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP. FURTHER REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH REPORTING PROCEDURE TO INSURE

Reporta Actions OK

PAGE TWO RUFPBK 002 S E C R E T
SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z DAILY, AND THAT ANY INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED ASAP IAW CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. GP-4.
BT

DECLASSIFIED
(Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV/NSAM 009D32/173
on 29Jun76 LR Gross 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Soc Grd (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	P1	02	NI	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N17	CITE	DTG
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3		001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A14	A20	NCU LON

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR			
BSN	01/0307Z		
SSN	LB		

DTG 060035Z JUN 67

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc 100 Ex 48 Liberty

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNVV KXC108ZCDKA015
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 070 1520326
ZNY EEEEE SUN
O 010309Z MAY 67 ZEF3 LEDGEND ZFF3.. INFORM ME WHEN THIS MESSAGE IS RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES ANS BY 68
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCCNCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUFMAS/NSAEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
BT
UNCLAS E F T O 6714 J3 SENDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD THE USS LIBERTY AT ROTA, SPAIN UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE.
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
CIRCUMVENT
OO OI O RI NI N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 CITE DTG
001 002 003 003B 011 013 014 015 016 017 AIG ADD
NCU
(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 0634Z/6
SSN
DRN
DTG 010309Z : JUN 67
UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 99 Ex 48 Liberty 46

NNNNVVV XXC098
ZCZCCXA02007301TVV T' 109
CO RUDLKD
DE RUFPSX 011 1520430
ZNY SSSSS
O 0134192 JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS
RUEP[illegible]S/DIRNSA
RUCL[illegible]/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUDL[illegible]/DIRNAVSECGREUR
ZEN/HQ NSAEUR
RUDAC/USS LIBERTY
BT
S E C R E T ECJC/JRC 08686. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-3; AND N2.
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A. JCS 6714, 010309Z MAY 67
B. DIRNSA K12/596-312213Z MAY 67
1. (S) PER REF A, REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA PENDING ARRIVAL OF THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BEING PROVIDED BY DIRNAVSECGRU ACTION, AS OUTLINED REF B.
2. (S) REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ WHEN PERSONNEL ARE ABORD AND SHIP'S PLANNED DEPARTURE TIME. GP-4
BT

1 Jun 67 0518

Do Not Sail until Directed Otherwise
Modified per Vocom from CINCEUR.

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAV ltr ser 009032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 D.K. Spain of 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Section (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

| ORIGINATOR SECTION | C-INCUSNAVEUR | X | X | X

[illegible]
OO RUEHLD
DE RUEHFL 304 [illegible]
ZNY CCCC
O 010102Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUEHSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEHLA/CINCLANT
RSDB[illegible]/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDMA/COMSERVLANT

RU[illegible]A/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUSPAA/USCINCEUR
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
PIM
1. [illegible] POSIT 36-30 NORTH 06-46 WEST
PIM 303 16 KT. ETA ROTA [illegible]
010400Z. THIS IS FINAL REPORT UNTIL DEPARTURE FROM ROTA.
2. NEW SUBJ: WILL DROP WITHOUT REPORT TO CINCUSNAVEUR AT 210500Z. WILL REMAIN ROTA AWAITING FURTHER ORDERS.
CF-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classified (Cancelled) (~~Changed to~~
) by authority of OPNAVINST Ser 009032/T31
on 29Jun76 DK Spain 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
JAG Sec Gnd
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATING SECTION: NS
ACTION DEPARTMENT

CINCUSNAVEUR | 00 | 01 | 02 | N1 | N2 | N3 | N4 | N5 | N6 | N7 | CITE | B.O. | NCU LOG NO.
001 | 002 | 003 | 003B | 011 | 012 | 013 | 014 | 015 | 016 | 017 | A14 | A00

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR
SSN 20/04/13
SGN R

DTG 010712Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
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USAVEUR NCU LOG 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 97 Ex 48 - Liberty

[illegible]
FM [illegible]
[illegible] 212 [illegible]
ZNR [illegible]
P [illegible] JUN 67
FM USSINCGNP
TO RUEL[illegible]/COMINCEUNAVEUR
INFO RUEPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCTJCA/USS LIBERTY
BT
UNCLAS E[illegible] JRC 0676: NAVEUR FOR N-2. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY
(U). REF: A. [illegible] 0115452 JUN 67.
REF A [illegible]
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

CINCUSNAVEUR | 00 | 01 | 02 | N1 | N2 | N3 | N4 | N5 | N6 | N17 | CITE | 000 | X

001 | 002 | 003 | 0038 | 011 | 012 | 013 | 014 | 015 | 016 | 017 | AIG | 000 | NCU LONDON | X

13

'EUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON			
TOR	0635/01		
SSN			
SBN			

DTG 012030Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc. 96 Ex. V. LIBERTY

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
1 JUN 67	CDR FULLINWIDER	ACTION			XX		
T-1	PHONE EXT. NO. 263	INFO			XX		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS LIBERTY

INFO: USCINCEUR//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//COMSIXTHFLT//
CINCLANTFLT//DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRUEUR//
ASTDIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRULANT//NSAEUR//COMFAIRMED
COMSERVLANT//COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//CTF SIX FOUR
NFOIO//NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//CINCLANT FOR JRC

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY
TAPE CUTTER
PROOF READER
COPIED
CWO

CONFIDENTIAL

CINCUSNAVEUR MOVORD 7-67 CHANGE ONE (U)

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 PASEP

1. MODIFY REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. DELETE PARA TWO.

B. INSERT NEW PARA TWO. QUOTE. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING; AFTER RECEIPT OF NAVEUR/SIXTHFLT MED PUBS BEING DELIVERED BY COURIER (REF C); AFTER PERSONNEL INDICATED DIRNSA 312213Z MAY 67 (OTHER MEANS ~~SOURCE~~) HAVE REPORTED; AND WHEN RFS; REPORT READINESS FOR OPERATIONS. WHEN DIRECTED, DEPART ROTA AND PROCEED

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N314
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3
NSGE

CINCUSNAVEUR

00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	CITE	SIG
X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X

001	002	003	004	011	012	013	014	015	017	AIG 14	AIG
				X					X		

NCU

(PAGE 2 OF 2)
COPY
TOR
SSN 1632
SGN

DTG 011345Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

Ch 1 Enclosure (2)
Doc. 95 Ex 48 - LIBERTY
CLASSIFIED BY DIRNSA 009 DTG 171...
Classification (changed) (cancelled) by authority of CNO/DIRNSA
by 21Jun76 ARR/Unscent
(Name)
(Signature)
COPY OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED IAW TECH SPECS ISSUED SEPARATELY. OPAREAS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE PROVIDED. UNQUOTE.

C. ADD NEW PARAGRAPH SIX. QUOTE. 6. REPORTS.

A. CONTACT REPORTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IAW REF H.

B. SUBMIT CLASSIFIED SITREP AND POSIT REPORT AS OF 2400Z DAILY. USE PRIORITY PRECEDENCE UNLESS CONTENT WARRANTS INCREASED SPEED. INCLUDE PIM FOR NEXT 24 HOURS AND COMMENTS/STATUS AS APPROPRIATE. ADDRESS ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR, INFO ADDEES SAME AS THIS MESSAGE. UNQUOTE.

CP-3

Ø1/1305Z JUNE 67

1092

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CONFIDENTIAL

467

RELEASED BY

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTED BY	PHONE EXT. NO.
CDR D.B. [illegible]	454
T-1	

	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION				PPP		
INFO				PPP		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: U.S LIBERTY

INFO: [illegible]CNO//JCS FOR JRC//CNO//DIRNSA//COMSIXTHFLT//CINCLANTFLT//
DIRNAVSECGRU//DEPNAVSECGRUEUR//AST DIRNAVSECGRU//DIRNAVSECGRULANT//
[illegible]EUR//COMAIRMED//COMSERVLANT//COMSERVRON EIGHT//CTF SIXTY//
[illegible]STK FOR//NPOIO//NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO//CINCLANT FOR JRC//

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67

B. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67

C. JCS 0[illegible]5452 JUN 67

1. WHEN R[illegible] TWO JUNE DEPART ROTA, SPAIN AND PROCEED IAW REFS B. C.

[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to

by authority of CNO NAVCOMINCINST C5090.32/T3/

on 29 Jun 76 [signature] & 21 Jun 76

(Date) (Signature) JAG Yeoman

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 94 Ex 48 - Liberty

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TAPE CUTTER

PAPER READER

CCMPO

CMO

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CDR			
TOR			
SSN	1037		
SGN			

DTG 040712Z Jun 67

ORIGINATOR'S SECTION: N3

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3 N3 N5

CINCUSNAVEUR

00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	BBD		
001	002	003	003	011	013	014	015	016	716	017	AIG	BBD	
				X						X			

NCU [illegible]

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNCZCKDA538ZCMGA048
OO RUDLKD
DE RUTKC 101A 1531132
ZNY CCCCC
O 021132Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TY
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUEPJS/JCS

RUENAAA/CNO
RUEFGR/IRNGA
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUSDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSEFGRU
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUTKRE/CTF SIXTY
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO

2 Juin 67 1 3 3 3

nc/ac

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
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on 29 Jun 76 (Date) [signature] (Rank) 21 Jun 76
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE TWO RUTKC 101A C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUEDNKA/CICCLANT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS FOR JRC - CINCLANT FOR JRC
RFS (U)
A. YOUR 011305Z JUN 67.
1. TEMPORARY REPAIRS MADE TO TRSSCOMM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. SYSTEM CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL.
2. RFS AT 021230Z. WILL DEPART ROTA AT THAT TIME AND PROCEED BEST SPEED IAW REF A. MOVREP SEPARATE.
GP-4
BT

021330Z

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
CINCUSNAVEUR
000 001 002 NI1 NI2 NI3 NI4 NI5 NI6 NI7 CITE DDD
001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 AIG ABC
NCU

(PAGE TWO)
CON
TOR 1539Z67
SSN
SGN

DTG: 021132Z JUN 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL
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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Dx. 93 Ex. 48 LIBERTY

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE EXT. NO.
3 JUNE 1967	T-1	263

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMED	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION				XX	
INFO				XX	

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT//COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT

INFO: USS LIBERTY

CONFIDENTIAL

USS LIBERTY OPS (U)

A. MY 311750Z MAY 67 PASEP (MOVORD)

B. MY 011305Z JUN 67 PASEP (MOVORD CH. ONE)

C. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTAL (SKED)

D. USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY

1. USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5) WILL BE CONDUCTING EXTENDED INDEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN MED IAW REFS A THRU C. ADDEES MAY BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OR OTHER ASSISTANCE DURING THESE OPERATIONS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT LIBERTY WILL MAKE SHORT PORT VISITS IN THE EASTERN MED AT 3 TO 4 WEEK INTERVALS ALTHOUGH HER ENDURANCE EXTENDS WELL BEYOND THIS TIME.

2. LIBERTY HAS RECEIVED A MED PUBLICATIONS PACKAGE LESS THE

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of DEPNAVINSGEN SECNAVINST 5510.30A/13
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Cpt (Rank)
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PROOF READER
CSWPO
CWO

G
N31

F

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

CSN	
TOR	
DTG	1046
SRN	

DTG 031016Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N314
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N3
CINCUSNAVEUR

DOG-91-EK-VE-LIBERTY

TYPE WITHIN MARGIN ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. REFERENCE TO THIS LIST SHOULD ASSIST IN REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING SHOULD ANY BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT LIBERTY.

A. COMSIXTHFLT INST: 5370.1A, 5720.6A, 5840.1, 6000.1, 05510.2

B. COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT INST: 4000.1C, C3180.1A

3. REQUEST COMSIXTHFLT PROVIDE COPIES OF THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS TO LIBERTY BY MAIL.

GP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SSN: 1046
DTG: 031016ZJUN67

NAVEUR.NCU LON 2100/22 (9-65)

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNVV KXC[illegible]TX

PP RU[illegible]RQ OVV B2[illegible]926VV KCB701(?
DE RU[illegible] 1978 1582052
ZNY CCCCC
P 0620002 JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG TWO FOUR ZERO--TO MRO LONDON--INFO USCOMEASTLANT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUGKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUGKRC/NSAEUR
RUGKRC/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIC
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRE/COMFAIRMED
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPHA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 06200028 LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF 021500Z9 011 10//
ORG SO LIBERTY AFTR-5, 11//
CHG CHP 07000128 COMSIXTHFLT, 12//
CFN 06200028, 07000128, 13//END
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST 5513.1D and SecDef 5200.32/31
on 21 Jun 74 ORGuin JAG Sclent 21 Jun 74
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Diberti

KC 105

mc
Capt Ennis tell
delays he has
2711

27 Nov 67 to
Pentagon
Jurisdiction

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3 NSGE
CINCUSNAVEUR
OOI OOR NI NR N3 N4 N5 N6 NIY CITE SDO
OOI OO2 OO3 OOSB OII OI2 OI3 OI4 OI6 OI6 OI7 AIG AMO
NCU LON
NRO

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

PAGE 1 OF
COR
TOR 07/236Z
SIGN
ACK
062000Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Doc 90 Ex 48 Liberty

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] NR 0972 :0307Z16
ZNY CCCCC
O 070307Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUTPAG/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAA/CNO
RUEDNA/CINCLANT
RUEDNA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPOR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUMRRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUSDNRA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNRA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPEN/USCINCEUR
RUCIHSA/NTOIO
RUCNRC/USNAVEUR
RUCNRC/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTHRE/CTF SIX ZERO

PAGE TWO RUCNRC 1972 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUFPAL/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPOR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. USCINCEUR 0514-0Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
1. 070300Z5 POSIT 33-36N2 28-54E9. PIM 109/16.5 UNTIL
072300Z. THENCE STATIONARY WITHIN 30NM OF 31-45N3 33-30E9.
2. SUBSEQUENT PIM/SITREP WILL BE SUBMITTD AS OF 080028
ZEN REF A.
CP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of OPNAVNOTE 5511 OP09B32/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) JAG Sec Cnt (Signature) 21 Jun 76 (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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NAVEUR NCU LCN 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

(PAGE 1 OF ____)
CON
TOR 070355Z
SSN
SGN
DTG 070308Z JUN 67
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Doc. 89 Ex 98-Liberty

Restricted

IXNRVV KKC176NNJ IGVV. BBM978V KRF 385 8 Jun 67 1255Z

OO RUQKRQ
DE RUQKRF 050 1591235
ZNY EEEEE
O 081235Z JUN 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUQKRC/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT
UNCLAS E F T N
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR
I AM UNDER ATTACK MY POSIT 31 23N 33 25E. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE
BT

nclc

E 4.4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION N3
DEPARTMENT
NCU

(PAGE 1 OF)
CSR
TOR 1205Z
SIN
SON

DTG 081235Z Jun 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Doc. 87 Ex. YE. Lindsey

NAVEUR NCII 1/CN-2100/1 (REV. 10-65)

Liberty

-2- G 8 1 2 3 7 2

FM CTU 60.2.9

// CORRECTED COPY //

TO CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO COMSIXTHFLT
CTG 60.2
CTF 60

BT

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM USS LIBERTY THREE UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS APPROACHING OUR POSITION NOW.

BT

TOR: 1310Z/8 JUNE 1967/SSB/EAL CALL FROM MOROCCO/

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#

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

PAGE 1 OF

CON			
TOR	1310Z		
SSN			
DCN			

DTG 08 1237Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 86 EX 48 LIBERTY

8 Jun 67 #3 01z

VV KXC179VV BBH979V KJF386
OO RUSKRQ
DE RUSKRF 851 1591237
ZNY EEEEE
O 081237Z JUN 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUSKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR ON CINCUSNAVEUR SINGLE SIB-
QUOTE . UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS APPROACHING VESSES NOV UNQUOTE
BT

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
SCHEDULE CLASSIFICATION
DD DI DE NI NE NS NA NB NC NW CITE D.D.
DOI DOE DOS DOI DOE DOS DOI DOE DOS AIA AOO
NCU

PAGE 1 OF
CDR
TOR 1301Z
SIN
DCN 12

DTG 081232Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LDM 5100/1 (REV. 10-66)

Doc 85. Ex 49 Liberty

NNHNVV KXC173VV BBM97 KCAB
***ZZ RUQKRQ
DE RUC 2194 1591639
ZNR UUUUU
Z NO DTG
FM USS SARATOGA
TO RUQKRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
BT
(NO CLASS RECD)
FOLLOWING RECD FROM USNS LIBERTY.
"I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33.25E 31.23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQ IMMED (MISSED PORTION)
NOTE: NO AUTHENTICATION RECEIVED. INTERCEPTED E04.04 FROM
USS SARATOGA.
BT

8 Jun 67 1247Z

nc4/0c

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Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
CINCUSNAVEUR
FYI

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
FROM
TOR 1247Z
DTG 08/1239Z Jun 67

UNCLASSIFIED

AVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 84 Ex 48 Liberty 407

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

:NNNVV BBH979V KJF386 0 JUN 67 1302Z

)C RUQXRQ
)E RUQKRF 051 11 C/1180VV BUM080VV KRF387
''''ZZ RUQKRQ
)E RUQKNF 053 1591245
:NY EEEEE
: 081245Z JUN 67
:M USS SARATOGA
:O ~~RUQKRE/~~CINCUSNAVEUR
:NFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
:UTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
:UTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
:T
)NCLAS E F I O
'HE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR:
)NDER ATTACK AND HIT BADILY
)T

nc/oc

liberty

:INATOR
:TION
:TION
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3

(PAGE 1 OF)
:DH
TOR 1302Z
SOR
DOR
DTG 081245Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 EXEMPTION

9 JUN 67 | 1 3 0 4 Z

VV KXC181V BBM981VV KRF38B
...*ZZ RUQKRQ
DE RUQKRF 052 1591254
ZNY,EEEEE
Z 0812542 JUN 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO ~~RUQKRQ~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR
HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY NEED ASSISTANCE
IMMEDIATLEY
BT

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Liberty

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
CIRCUIT NO.
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024
NCU

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
COM
TOR 1304Z
SIG
DCO R

DTG 081254Z JUN 67
UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 82 Ex 48 Liberty 4/19

Libe. 5

0 JUN 67 13.05Z

VV KXC182VV . BBM982VV KCA089
ZZ RUQKRQ
RUQKC 2201 1591301
UUUUU
081301Z JUN 67
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
QKCF/CTF SIX ZERO
~~QKRQ~~/CINCUSNAVEUR

NCLAS
OLLOWING RCVD VIA VOICE HICOM FROM QBM ROCKSTAR
UOTE
T 081253Z AT 081253Z WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO
IDE SIDE LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY
NQUOTE
T

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

N3

CINCUSNAVEUR

00	01	02	N1	N8	N5	N4	N6	N9	N7	CITE					
001	002	003	008	011	013	014	016	010	017	A10	A00				

NCU

CON		
TOR	1305/8	
BSM		
SOM		C

DTG 081301Z JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 81 Ex 44 LIBERTY

NCS GREECE RELAYED FOLLOWING OVER EØ[illegible]

FM: CTU 6Ø.2.9

TO: ALL STATIONS THIS NET

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM USS LIBERTY

UNDERATTACK NEED ASSITANCE POSIT 31.23N 33.25E

HIT BY TORPEDO STARBOARD SIDE LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATLY.

BT

TOR: 0132

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

P3

PRECEDENCE

(PAGE 1 OF)

COM			
TOR	1313Z		
SSN			
SSM		12	

DTG 08/1313 JUN 67

FILE TIME

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc 80 Ex 48 Liberty

8 Jun 67 14 30 Z

VV KXC237VV BBM989
ZZ RUQKRQ
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUQKC
EFTI-2 THIS MSG PASSED TO YOU FOR INFO
VV KRF3
ZZ RUTPRC
DE RUQKRF 054 1691358
ZNY CCCCC
Z 081358Z JU 67
FM USS SARATOGA
TO UTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
THIS STATION RECEIVED ATTACK REPORT FROM STATION ROCK STAR AT
1200Z WE CHANNELGED WITH WS ROCK STAR AUTHENTICATED CORRECTLY WITH
Op. PUB USED WAS KAA 33.
GP 4
BT
E

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (canceled) Confidential
by authority of CNO Alnav Ser 009032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) 21 Jun 76 Sec Cond (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACT OR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFICATION
(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 1436Z
SIN
DSN
DTG 081358Z Jun 67
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)
Doc. 28 Exhibit

~~072355Z29. SOVIET CRUISER DDGA 159 VIC TG FARON 08(1529 UUNTIL~~
~~G262FM SOVIET PCE YP. I NTIFIED VIC TG 08072342Z. SOVIET DDGS~~

~~S [illegible]TIFIED VIC TG 080700Z25. R.E. BYRD AND SAMPSON AS EEAAAWWWWWWW~~
~~WWWWVV RXC202~~

33
ZZ RUDLKD
RUTPCR

0814Z JUN 67
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
UDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

0806Z JUN 67 ZZ

MC/OC

CONFIDENTIAL
USS LIBERTY UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING BOATS
HOUSEEEEEEEEEE BOATS AFTER ATTACK HELICOPTER CIROLED THE SHIP
IEVED TO BE ISRALIE.

DECLASSIFIED
[illegible] (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAVINST S5000.10C/31
on 29 Jun 76 ORiginal 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION ACTIVITY
J3
CIRCUITS/SERVICES
NCU LON

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 14778
SSN
DAN C

DTG 081412Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

JUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 76 Ex 48 LIBERTY

VV KXC317VV AP[illegible]1VV NYC918

OO ~~RUTPRQ~~
DE RUTPRC 116 1591921
ZNY CCCCC
O 0815217 JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
~~RUTPRQ~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
RXFEC/USNMR SHAPE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAFE
RUFPDW/CINCUSAREUR
RUTPRG/OCA SLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT
RUFRF/COXAOWMED
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUED
NA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLKD/CINCNORAD
RUEPNAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUTPCR/CINCSTRUKE
RUEDPSA/USCINCMEAFSA
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
~~Z~~ 0813492 JUN 67 — ORIG
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO DIRNSA
BT

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of NAVMAG 009052/131
on 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Court (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 111 N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L
N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOLLOWUP NR 1 AND FINAL TO COMSIXTHFLT CRITIC 1-67
1. USDAO TEL AVIV RECEIVED FROM ELO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTBS ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED US SHIP AT 081200Z, POSIT 31-25N, 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT APOLOGIES. SIXTHFLT SENDING ASSISTANCE.
GP-4
BT

A — PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CAT B ENCRYPTION. PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DTG PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.

ORIGINATOR SECTION: CINCUSNAVEUR
ACTION DEPARTMENT: N2
OO DI DZ NI NB NC ND NU NIY CITE
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040

Liberty

0 JUN 67 1430Z

INT QSL PLS

VV KXC203WKEVV BBM988
ZZ ~~RUQKRQ~~
DE RUQXC 2226 1591420
ZNR UUUUU
NO DTG
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
INFO ~~RUQKRQ~~/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
SNCLAS
FOLLOWING RECVD VIA VOICE HICOMM
PUOTE
FASTCHARGER DE ROCKSTAR
BT
1. WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE VESSELS. BELIEVE TO BE ISREALI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED THE SHIP AFTER ATTACK
BT
2. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT MADE. WILL HAVE TO BE MADE FROM SHIPS PHOTOGRAPHS -4-4Z
SNQUOTE
3. NCS GREECE COMMENTS: NOT AUTHENTICATED.
BT
E

NNNN

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

23

TOR	1130Z
DSN	
DSN	

DTG 08/1420Z Jun 67

3

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

495

Doc 73 Ex. 48 Liberty

V RXL 253

0 JUN 67 1382

AGB548VZCZCWWNA974PPNC694VV APH365VV TPM343

ZZ RUTPRQ
DE RUTPN343 159143
ZNY CCCCC
Z 061428Z JUN 67
FM NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO (CAMS)
TO RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUENAAA/CNO
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
1. RECEIVED OVER VOICE HICOM FROM US ZLIBERTY.
USS LIBE[illegible] UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING CRAFT.
AFTER ATTACK A HELO CIRCLED THE SHIP BELIEVED TO
BE ISRAELIAN.
GP-4
BT

MC/9C

DECLASSIFIED
[illegible]ation (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAVINST SecNav 5009.D32/TS1
24 Jun 76 BRGrun JTB Sec Cat 21 Jun 76
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3
CINCUSNAVEUR
000 001 002 NI1 NI2 NI3 NI4 NI5 NI6 NI7 CITE 800
001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 414 400
NCU LONDON

C

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
TOR 153Z/8
SSN
BBN 12
DTG 081428Z JUN 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

VEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc 70 Ex 48 Liberty

Liberty

NNNNVV KXC279VV AGB560V NYC911
CO COOKSDE RUTPRC 114 1591511
ZNY CCCCC
O 061514Z JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA G
LECE
RUQPNA NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
RUTKC/NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN
RUDLKD/NAVCOMD LONDON
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L -
1. USS LIBERTY APXISES SHE HAS CARRIED OUT EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF ALL CRYPTO PUBS AND KEY CARDS.
2. ONLY COMM VIA CINCUSNAVEUR HICOM E04.04.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST S5511.35 009032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 ltr from JAG Sec Ctr 21 Jun 76
(Date)
(Signature)
(Office Code)
ASSISTANT GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

ORIGINATOR SECTION	CINCUSNAVEUR	00	01	02	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	CITE	SDO
DEPARTMENT CO NS	RUDLKD	001	002	003	003B	011	012	013	014	015	016	017	A14	A50
	NCU LONDON					X						X		

(PAGE 1 OF)

CON	
TOR	165821 68
SSN	
BGN	

DTG 061514Z JUNE 6

5 CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Def. Exhibit Liberty

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to
by authority of CNO/JAG Ser 0091032/T31
on 24 Jun 76 DEOjam SP6 Sec [illegible] 24 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Doc. 63 Ex VB Liberty

DE RUFPEX 005 16:1115
ZNY SSSSS
P 161845Z JUN 67 ZFF SSS
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
INFO RUDLXD/USNAVEUR
BT
S E C R E T CDO 00200, SUBJECT IS LIBERTY
1. (S) HAVE REVIEWED AVAILABLE DATA WITH RESPECT TO LIBERTY WITH CINCUSNAVEUR IN GENERAL FRAM OF CHRONOLOGY BEFORE ACCIDENTAL ATTACK, DURING ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT THERETO. WE BOTH HAVE MANY VERY PERTINENT AND AS YET UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AS WE APPRECIATE WASHINGTON HAS. AT SAME TIME, MUST BE RECOGNIZED CREW MEMBERS OF LIBERTY FROM WHOM ANSWERS MUST BE GOTTEN ARE AT POINT OF EXHAUSTION, SUFFERING FROM WOUNDS AND SHOCK, DEAD OR MISSING. IT SIMPLY DOES NOT MAKE SENSE, LEGALLY OR OTHERWISE, TO INITIATE BARRAGE OF UNCORRELATED QUESTIONING VIA LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS AT THIS TIME. OBVIOUSLY FACTS MUST BE DEVELOPED INVOLVING ACTIONS AND JUDGEMENTS OF CREW, LIBERTY COMMAND AND CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND ALSO LEGAL BASE MUST BE ESTABLISHED FOR POSSIBLE CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THEREFORE, I STRONGLY ENDORSE ESTABLISHMENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY BY CINCUSNAVEUR AS PROPER PROCEDURE TO ESTABLISH

PAGE 2 RUFPEX 005 S E C R E T
WHAT HAPPENED AS BASIS FOR ANY APPROPRIATE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS, ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT TIME-CONSUMING AND CREATE IMPATIENCE AMONG THOSE WHO DESIRE MORE RAPID ANSWERS.
2. (S) WHILE I BELIEVE WE ARE ASKING FULL RANGE OF PERTINENT QUESTIONS, SUGGEST WASHINGTON AGENCIES COMPILE AND FORWARD ALL QUESTIONS INTO WHICH THEY WANT SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO INSURE COURT OF INQUIRY DOES FULLY RESPONSIVE JOB. MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE IN HOLDING OFF STREAM OF QUESTIONS TO SATISFY PRESS OR OTHER INTERESTS UNTIL FACTS CAN BE PROPERLY AND FORMALLY ESTABLISHED. INFORMATION FOR NOTIFICATION NEXT OF KIN AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DATA WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE BE FURNISHED ASAP.
3. (S) WE FORESEE A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO COURT OF INQUIRY. IN VIEW OF ASSIGNED MISSION IT MUST BE A CLOSED COURT. ANTICIPATE PRESSURES FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH SURVIVORS, OPEN COURT AND PUBLIC SPECTACLE WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF COURT APPOINTMENT. SUGGEST WE GO AHEAD AND ANNOUNCE THAT A COURT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO INQUIRE INTO ALL ASPECTS OF LIBERTY AFFAIR, THUS IMMUNIZING ALL MEMBERS OF LIBERTY FROM FURTHER PRESS CONTACT, AND IF PRESSED FOR OPEN COURT OR PREMATURE PRESS INTERVIEWS, SUGGEST ANSWER THAT LIBERTY, IN SUPPORTING U. S. COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS IN EASTERN MED WAS PART OF

PAGE 3 RUFPEX 005 S E C R E T
OVERALL OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THEREFORE PART OF OPERATIONS WHICH ROUTINELY CLASSIFIED. AS IN VIETNAM, WE DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC OPERATIONAL INFORMATION OF A CLASSIFIED NATURE.
4. (U) REQUEST GUIDANCE.
BT
#4.

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to SECRET
by authority of OPNAVINST 5510.1D32/73
on 21 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
(Title of the Judge Advocate General)

DOCUMENT NO. Ex. 48 LIBERTY

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

1033 1257Z

VV KXC165
ZTC
ETG
D GVV SBX175VV KCA515
OO RUQKCQ
DE RUQKRN 011DLV 1611150
ZNY CCCCC
O 101100Z JUN 37
FM CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
TO RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUQKCF/CTF SIX ZERO
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUENAAA/CHINFO
RUCKRD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFLC/CINCEUR
RUTPRE/CTF SIX THREE
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUQKCF/USS AMERICA
RUQKRD/USS TIDEWATER
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SITREP THIRTEEN
1. MY 120003 POSIT 34-17N/5 30-06E/3
2. FUEL STALS DAVIS 60 PAPAGO 47 LIBERTY 79
3
DN DAVIS ARRANGING TO OBTUYN LIBERTY PAY RECORDS AND WILL PAY PRIOR ENTRY PORT.
4. DAVIS MEDICAL STORES AND DAMAGE CONTROL CONSUMABLES AND

PAGE TWO RUQKRN 011DLV C O N F I D E N T I A L
EQUIPMENT SERIOUSLY REDUCED. BY SEPERATE ACTION PRIORITY REQ. BEING SUBMITTED. MOST ITEMS SHOULD BE AVAIL. TIDEWATER
5. NO FURTHER MATERIAL LOSS OVERBOARD. OIL REDUCED TO SEEPAGE LEAVING THIN FILM IN WAKE. NO BLACK OIL.
6. LIST NOW NEGLIGABLE DUE FUEL TRANSFER.
7. SUBJECT FIRST PRIORITY TO PROVIDE ESCORT AND ALL OTHER SERVICES TO LIBERTY REC. BRIEF STOP SUDA FOR DAVIS ASAP TO:
A. EXAMINE/REPAIR BOILER. DAVIS 100934Z NOTAL REFERS.
B. REPL MEDICAL AND DAMAGE CONTROL. PARA 4 ABOVE REFERS
C. PICK UP TORPEDO MK 44 ASSIGNED BY CTF 60.6.
IF LIBERTY DESTINATION OTHER THAN SUDA BRIEF STOP COULD S
-53 76 EMP DIVERT AT INCREASED SOA LEAVING PAPAGO AS ESCORT UNTIL REJOIN.
8. DAVIS CAN DIVERT TO EXAMINE EAST CRETE ANCORAGE BY GOING NO MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE MILES AHEAD LIBERTY. WILL NOT DO SO UNLESS DIRECTED.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Dec. 60 Ex VP-LIBERTY

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to)
By authority of OPNAV Ltr Ser 009D32/T3
on 29 Jun 76 & 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG (N3-N)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NUNNVV KXC183DTVJVV BBM187V KCA325K
00 RUQKRQ
DE RUQKRM 615DLV 1611256
ZNY CCCCC
O 1712562 JUN 67
FM [redacted] DLVT
TO [redacted]/CI COSNAVEUR
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. YOUR 1310362 JUN 67
B. JCS 0801102 JUN 67
C. USCINCEUR 0806292 JUN 67
REF C PASSED TO LIBERTY VIA HAND. TOR 1034552 JUN 67
ALL FIELES IN FLOODED SPACE. WILL PASS REF A TO LIBERTY TO FACILITATE IDENTIFICATION. REFS B AND C BY TESXT TO DETERMINE PRERECEIPT. WILL ADVISE.
GP-4
BT

ACTION TAKEN:
JUN 10 4 10 PM '67

LIBERTY

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Classification (canceled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV MSG DTG Ser 009032/T31
on 29 Jun 76 (DRB ltr of 21 Jun 76)
(Date) (Name) JAG Sec Ctr (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
NS
CINCUSNAVEUR
001 002 003 003B 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 ALL ADD NAVY LONDON
EUR

(PAGE 1 OF 1)
CLAS TOR SSN DTG
TOR 161256
DTG 161256Z JUN 67

CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

Doc. 59 Ex VP-LIBERTY

KIDD

ZOB - take no further action for processing unit

ACTION TAKEN
JUN 16 5 16 PM '67

NMNNVV KXC231TN
HIT E
WVV WSM831VV KC8237
PP RUDKRC
DE RUSNRN 0060LV 161PW
ZNY EEEEE
P 160206Z JUN 67
FM UFS DAVIS
TO AUDKPC/CINV
SNAVEUR
BT
UNCLAS E F T O
RADM KIDD MPS TRAFFIC
A. YOUR 142058Z JUN 67
B. YOUR 141405Z JUN 67
C. YOUR 151540Z JUN 67
D. YOUR 151405Z JUN 67
1. [illegible]S ALFA THRU DELTA RECEIVED BY DAVIS AND CTG 50.5.
AFTER DEPARTURE RADM KIDD.
2. U.ODIR ZOS.
BT

MC/SEP

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Doc 58 Ex VP - Liberty 492

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FOR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 56 - EXVB - LIBERTY

SUS DUPE

IKR#866

NNNNCZCKDB452ZCNGB810
PP RUDLKD
DE RUTKC 048A? 1540927
ZNY CCCCC
P 2213302 JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG 240
INFO RUEPJS/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED

PAGE TWO RUTKC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
RUQKC/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 02133QZ9 LIBERTY AGTR-5, PGXX
ORG SP LIBERTY AGTR-5, 02//
ETD P ROTA SPAIN, 02133QZ9 CO 015.0K6 03//
VIA L 35-57N 005-35W3, 02173QZ3 CO 015.0K6 04//
VIA L 37-00N 012-00E3, 0503332Z1 RH 015.0K6 05//
ETA L 32-00N5 033-00E6, 0803QQZ1 06//
MOD IND 32-00N525:9-0E9 0803QQZ1 50 MILE RADIUS-SPECOPS, CINCUSNAVEUR
31175QZ7, 07//
BT 3 BG KILO ROMEO TANGO TANGO, LIBERTY, 07000IZ8 JULIETT ROMEO TANGO
TANGO, LIBERTY, 08//
CNL 02133CZ9, 02133QZ9, 015.0K6, ETATUNG, 035-35W3, 02173QZ3, 015.0K6,

PAGE THREE RUTJC 048A C O N F I D E N T I A L
37-00N3, 012-00E3, 0503330Z1, 015.0K6, 32-00N5, 033-00E6, 0803QQZ1,
32-00N5, 033-30E9, 0803QQZ1, 31175QZ7, 07000IZ8, 09//END
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAVINST 5511.36 Ser 009D32/131
on 29 Jun 76 (Date) (Signature) 21 Jun 76 JAG Sec Conf (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

MC/

DUPE

Ø3 B-429/
W-3/
63

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

#4

Doc. 54 Ex 45 LIBERTY

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN
Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR
To: Major General Russ

Subj: Communication Problems

1. During the period of 5-10 June 1967 inclusive, the records of the Command Center indicate that 610 FBIS messages were received. Of these, 317 were OPIMMED, and 15 were FLASH precedence. The percentage of OPIMMED and FLASH was thus approximately 54%.

2. 19AF Seymour Johnson AFB AEO 00349 DTG 301730Z May 1967 is an oplan concerning CINCSTRIKE's operation "BRISK POINT" for evacuation of certain countries in the Middle East. Its precedence is PRIORITY. It contains 28 pages. It is addressed to 83 addressees from California to the Indian Ocean and 21 of these addressees are in Europe.

3. The CINCAFSTRIKE oplan for the "BRISK POINT" evacuation is CINCAFSTRIKE DPLWEH 88847 DTG 280051Z May 1967. It contains 46 pages. It is addressed to 81 addressees. Its precedence is PRIORITY.

4. I do not have at hand Changes 1 and 2 to the CINCAFSTRIKE oplan.

5. Change 3 to the CINCAFSTRIKE oplan is CINCAFSTRIKE DPLWEH 88862 DTG 020024Z June 1967. It contains 10 pages. It is PRIORITY.

6. Interim Change 4 to the CINCAFSTRIKE oplan is CINCAFSTRIKE DOPCBR 00007 DTG 060725Z June 1967. It contains 1[illegible] pages. Its precedence is OPIMMED.

J. C. WYLIE

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Classification (cancelled) (changed to
) by authority of OPNAV Memo Ser 009D32/F31
29 Jun 76 NK Grain 21 Jun 76
(Date) JAG Sec'y (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE PAC 53 Ex 4 & 8 - Lindley

James M. Eanes Jr. Research Papers

SECRET

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN M. J. HANLEY, USN

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, CINCUSNAVEUR

(For the JCS Fact Finding Team and the Court of Inquiry)

Before getting into the details of what happened on the night of 7-8 June, it may be of assistance if I clarify my position on the staff; particularly as regards the movements of ships under CINCUSNAVEUR's operational control or, in the case of the USS LIBERTY, under CINCUSNAVEUR's operational cognisance (my definition).

During the present upheaval in the Middle East, the movements of U. S. Navy ships have assumed a political and diplomatic sensitivity that has naturally resulted in a close screening of all ship moves prior to the time that they are made. During the night no ship moves which have not been previously scheduled and about which CINCEUR has not been informed are made without calling me. It is my responsibility to determine whether the move is of such significance that it should be reported to and approved by either CINCUSNAVEUR or the Deputy CINCUSNAVEUR. Standard practice is to make no moves however insignificant without informing the USCINCEUR duty officer. This is as a result of both written directives from USCINCEUR and informal understandings with their senior officers.

On the night of 8-9 June our battle watch was set in the Operations Control Center and, at a time that I did not notice, I received a phone call from Commander Jorgenson, the Command Center Duty Officer, about a proposed unscheduled movement of the LIBERTY. Commander Jorgenson informed me that a major in the JRC had called him and stated that they wanted the LIBERTY to move out to at least one hundred miles from the coast to conform to the restrictions which CINCUSNAVEUR had originated on ship movements in the Eastern Mediterranean and which COMSIXTHFLT had reported to the JCS as policy restrictions on ship movements.

I asked Commander Jorgenson if, to his knowledge, USCINCEUR knew anything about this direct phone call from the JRC to CINCUSNAVEUR inasmuch as this was not a normal procedure. Generally we are informed of this type of movement by USCINCEUR. He replied in the negative. I did not ask Commander Jorgenson if he had asked for an authentication on the phone call.

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (canceled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV Navsec 009032/131
on 21 Jun 76. OR Spain 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Lieut (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SECRET

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Doc 52 Ex 48 - Liberty

I instructed him to inform the USCINCEUR Duty Officer in the premises of the call. I further instructed him to tell the USCINCEUR Duty Officer that we were ready to carry out any directive on moving ships that USCINCEUR should so order. However, in this case, the movements of the ship were being controlled by the JCS directly and we would like to have the date-time group of the JCS directive to include in our message to the SIXTH Fleet. We were dealing with a ship on a recognizably sensitive mission which was operating under a carefully drawn and very detailed JCS directive which had received a great deal of attention on our staff. He informed me that the messages directing COMSIXTHFLT to comply were already drafted and that he would get the JCS date-time group and release the messages to COMSIXTHFLT.

In this instance, because the LIBERTY was being moved from a recognized high risk area incident to her sensitive mission to an area that was not high risk, I did not consider it necessary to inform my superiors.

I might point out that our staff is particularly sensitive to directives to move ships by phone calls during this critical period without some indication that a written directive is being forwarded. Only the previous day, or perhaps the day before, we had as a result of a phone call sent out a flash message directing the amphibs to sortie from Malta only to cancel this within the hour by another flash message as a result of another phone call. This is but the latest in a series of similar incidents which would indicate that phone calls are sometimes not completely staffed. CINCUSNAVEUR policy is that we request the date-time group of substantiating messages for telephone-directed actions to move ships unless the call is received from a flag or general officer or higher authority. This does not mean that we have to receive the written message but only an indication that it has been staffed and released. In this case I was frankly disturbed that a major was the agent directing the movements of this very sensitive ship.

The LIBERTY represented an unusual ship as far as the normal ship that operates under CINCUSNAVEUR. While COMSIXTHFLT supposedly had her under his opcon, this was a misnomer. Her movements were not being directed by COMSIXTHFLT but by the JCS in view of her recognized high risk mission.

James M. Ennes III Research Papers

SECRET

I have knowledge of one other fact that bears on the LIBERTY incident as regards some of the communication difficulties. It is a matter of record that CINCUSNAVEUR recommended that minimize be instituted in the Mediterranean area. A modified form of minimize was adopted in the European area. Minimize as we interpret to assist fleet communications was not adopted.

M. J. HANLEY, JR.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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James W. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PHOTO 27 OF Ex 49 - LIBERTY



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

703

PHOTO 24 OF EX 49. LIBERTY



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.



James M. Lemos Research Papers


08



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

James W. Ernest, Jr. Research Papers

PROV 18 OF EX 46 - LIBERTY



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PHOTO 12 OF EX 49-LIBERTY



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PHOTO 16 OF EX 29 - CLARK



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



James M Zunes Jr. Research papers

PHOTO 14 OF EX 49-LIBERTY



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PHOTO 13 OF EX 49-LIBERTY



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

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PHOTO II OF EX 49 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 10 OF



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PHOTO 9 OF EX VO[illegible]



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PHOTO 8 OF [illegible]



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PHOTO 7 OF EX VG-LINENTX



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PHOTO 6 of EX 49 - LINEARITY



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PHOTO 5 OF EX 49-LINDER

523



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PHOTO 4 of EX 49 - Cont.



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PHOTO 3 OF EX #9 - LIBERTY



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PHOTO 2 OF EX. 49-A



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2

PHOTO 1 of EX 49 - 2.





James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3

Mr Battle

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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RUMC/DEPT STATE
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RUEDPSA/CINCST
RUQLNO/CINCNAVEUR
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INFO JUPJTUA
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RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USELCON
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ST
S E C R E T 0945 JUN 67.
AIO 13002THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPTOED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS QUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS
INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNAZIONAL
REGZON.
3. THE AREA IS KOTTA COMMON PASSAGE
OF SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOCOTA
CE QLAREOTTAZA CLOSE
IT WIZWALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL QUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 C/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2
ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13JUN67

SECRET

528

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. 1 AT 1130 AT
[illegible] HIGH SPEED [illegible] WESTWARD TIOTOARD ENEMY COAST.
[illegible] OF NAVY HADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARDMENTOOF
[illegible]-ARISH FROM SEA.
GWYE
TI 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FR A LABEL FOO TH STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY TIREABLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY AND
WOULD BLOCH CALL
BACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR WA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY NOF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEUR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE; IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

AY'S RROEOUS ATTACK
RESULTED FROM TO
EGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTUON OF
THE GRAZ VICTORY BEING SHARED BY UOF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SEEN. GP-3.
BT
NNNN

ACV TO...NMCC OSD 2 OF 2 57883

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Authority NND 5-18999/NDS
By [illegible] NARS, Date 11 Nov 1976
16 Nov 76 DK Spain RADM USN
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SECRET

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O [redacted] 091520Z [redacted] 67
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TO RUEPWV/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUERNAA/CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUGKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIK
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RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
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RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZETO
PT
S E C R E T 084 JUN 67.
AT 09/1300Z THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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Authority (cancel all Changes to
) by authority of OPNAV 5511.18 AND DIR 5-19,966
on 16 Nov 1976 OPNAV JAG Sec Mgr. EOS: 3A of
(Date) (Signature) (Rank) 11 NOV 1976
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF)

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EX 10 3

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN) 530

NAVEXOS XCU LOK 2130/3 (REV. 11-67)

PAGE 2 RUCMVL 0845 S E C R E T
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPHONED ALUSNA FOLLOWING
SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE: FURTHER INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS
INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 15
MILES FROM COAST.
2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AR
DBL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM
3. NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
4. DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
5. RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
6. WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT
QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
7. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT.
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBVE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
COULD. BLOCH FLOP
WMACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE

PAGE 3 RUCMVL 0845 S E C R E T
QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK
RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF
THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. G2-3.

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on
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OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Research Papers James M. Emes, Jr.

17

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RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUTPBW/USAFE
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RUTARE/CTG SIX ZERO
[redacted]
S E C R E T 0313 JUN
[redacted] TEL AVIV AND JCS, UTPO J-3 NO.

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16 Nov 76 by authority of SECNAV/OJCS & DIA 5216.5/DIA-5A-3 & NWX
(Date) (Signature) 21 Jun 76
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY





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NAVEXOS 0105/2 (REV 12-68)

Encl (2) to CNO ltr Ser 09B10/8U500532 of 6 Dec 76

8

[redacted]

[redacted] RECOVERED [redacted] FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

[redacted] SAID HE RECOVERED TWO ROLLER [redacted] ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND
[redacted] THAT ON THE [redacted] HE [redacted] POSITIVELY
[redacted] SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP [redacted] AND HE IN SEA.
[redacted] TWO IDF HELICOPTERS [redacted] BETWEEN 1500Z TO 1521Z AND WERE
[redacted] HELOS SEARCHED [redacted] WERE [redacted] UNTIL 1800Z.
[redacted] SAW ONE MAN IN [redacted] WATER AND
[redacted] SAW NO OTHER
[redacted] SEARCH [redacted] LIGHT
[redacted] WAS [redacted] AND WELL
[redacted] SAID THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY
[redacted] UNDERSTOOD
[redacted] HAVY [redacted] STAND READY

[redacted] 1916152 Jun

[redacted] SURVIVORS [redacted] BURIED IN
[redacted] BY [redacted]
[redacted] STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID

[redacted] FORCES [redacted] MADE [redacted] RECOVERED
[redacted] RECOVERED [redacted] NO OTHER [redacted]
[redacted] AND LIVED IN CAVE ON [redacted]
[redacted] WOULD [redacted] OTHER [redacted]
[redacted] RECORDED LAST PLACE [redacted]
[redacted] SAW [redacted] YELLOW DOTS
[redacted] SAW [redacted] BLOOD DOES NOT CHECK REPORT IN
[redacted] OTHER WITNESSES. HE LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CON-
[redacted] OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

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(authority)
BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5200.1-R
ON 16 Nov 76 CNO Spain Director Navy
RDS 3A OF 11 NOV 1976

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9

[illegible] 0206Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLRD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 0903 - 67.
SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 4412 02 JUN 67
B. USDAO 0829 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0827 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0834 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0842 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0845 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0852 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0856 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0864 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0886 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.
FOR RADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY. FOLLOWING IS

Doc. 45 Ex YP-LIBERTY

6 Nov 16 OK Spain DIA Sec Rpts

NOFORN

(PAGE 1 OF)
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594

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

10

PAGE 2 RUMVL 0378Z S E C R E T NOFORN
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE [illegible] AT APPROX 061420Z. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL ~~BLOCH~~ ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081230Z POSIT 3120N 3300E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS ~~ON~~ RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR WAR ZON COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 081530Z DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AND
A SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS
ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR SHIPS IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

Page 2 of 6

PAGE 3 RUMVL 0378Z S E C R E T NOFORN
PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. [illegible] AT APPROX 0815Z, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO PAD TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 081510Z (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 081625Z, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB'S RUNNING NORTH. AT 081635Z, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

[illegible] by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DOD 5200.1R of 11 Nov 76
on 16 Nov 76 OP-09N1 JDG Sec Nav.

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0930 1 S E C R E T NOFORN
OF DIARMO CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA MISUNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGN. AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE MESSAGE SENT WASBOLO OR PORTA BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081730Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 08.1725Z.
6. CONTACT ALUSNA ON FLIGHT. DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM CDR ARMY ATTACHMAN OF
A PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 08.30Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING ISR ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH USS NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTHER AMPLIFYING REMARKS
CONTAINED IN USDAO AMMENDATE MSG REF D.
7. CNO ON RECEIPT EMBASSY ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.
8. CNO AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM

SECRET 152 JUNE 67

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0930 1 S E C R E T NOFORN
[illegible] ASSISTANT OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
[illegible] OR HAD PICKED UP ANY [illegible] WERE POSSIBLY
PART OF CREW OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.
9. [illegible] AT 09.30Z IT COL BLOCK CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO INQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCK READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT.
THESE WERE:
A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. FOR NAVY AND EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM
SEA.
ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCK FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD-16 and DIA 5-18, 999/RDS-3A
of 11 NOV 1976

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

S E C R E T NIFORN USDAO 2 JUN 67.
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH
COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE
CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND
GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITTAL READING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E
DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF
PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR
AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERROVEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS
OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE.
.3 (C) AT APPROX 091500Z, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR
SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
BUT PHONE CONNECTIOOTBQDLVERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

Page 4 of 6

PAGE 2 RUQMEL 0500/2 S E C R E T NIFORN
TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG
BACKUP WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE
THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO
REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY
REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN
POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION
WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER TAN USDAO
TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO
FLO IMMEDIATELY.
11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
TO ALUSNA:
A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY
BUT WERE REFUSED.
B.
MTB'S CONTINUED SEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL 0515042 WITH
NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT
ISRAELI PERSONNEL STATE TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR
IN SEA.
D. 4 OF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 081315Z AND
WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 081504Z

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on 16 Nov 76 [illegible] 5/9/80 OP-09B5-30 OF 11 NOV 1974

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0933Z/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
E.
TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER
F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE
G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.
H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE.
I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.
10 (S) AT 1030Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 1033Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0933Z/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 1030Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.
14 (S) AT APPROX 1019Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.
15 (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0930/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
15. (S) AT APPROX 131200Z WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID ATED IN QUOTE MALICIOUS UNTRUE QUOTE STORIES AND
REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

Page 6 of 6

PAGE 6 RUQMVL 0930/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 131255Z, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GEN RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (C) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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Declassification (partial) [illegible] by authority of OPNAVINST 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 948/ROS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

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S S C R E T 0921 JUN 67
YOUR [illegible] JUN NOTAL
1. IDF/G UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINT 3. EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY TO COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFICIAL TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED IN YY MSG 0924 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
BT

ACTION TAKEN:
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OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999
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PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0554 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: ISR ELI [redacted] ACCIDENT

1. [redacted] HAS PASSED IDF [redacted] ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE. PRESS [redacted] 0530Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107-3420) AREA [redacted] TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER [redacted] IDENTIFIED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 15 MILES OFF THE COAST.

2. [redacted] REPORTS FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0525.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. NOVEL FOR SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DIO 00.2.

5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY NTR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO.

Regrade to SECRET

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[redacted] ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONV. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTACT WITH USN NET.

7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMPT CONTACT NOW PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 8 KNOTS NORTHERLY, COURSE 60 IN WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYM [redacted] ALL ABOARD AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND TO RESCUE IF ASKED. HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIATE NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NOT COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

ET

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OPNAV 5510.1E AND
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OF 11 NOV 1974
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

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FINAL SECTION OF II.

(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OVSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. THE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALLL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATOACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD IOS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.

COMMENOS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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B. IN ACCORDANCE WI . IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS, AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS, HTHE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTYS SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STAN DING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

C. THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBERTY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.
3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:
A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.
B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICAOIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIVERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.
D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
BT

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-R, 999/RDS-3A
on 16 NOV 1976 (Date) IDR Spain (Signature) OF 11 NOV 1976 JAG SecCourt (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0625 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLG TO RECEIVE REPORT OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S DELIBERATELY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z.

6 Jun 67 1430Z

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0325 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 31:25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

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PAGE 2 RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67

SECTION I OF II.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

Page 2 of 5 18 1030Z JUN 67

PAGE 3 RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.
SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES FLIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE

Research Papers James M. Ennes Jr.

24

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

orig to adm. Hand

NHNHCICKDA527ZCNGX103
CO RUDLKD
DE RUCNVL 3923 1672333
ZNY CCCCC
O JOSBORIZ JUN 67 17945
FM USDA TEL ACIV ISRH
MH
TO RUCIJUA/CNO
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCNCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0320 JUN 67
REFS: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117:0Z JUN 67
B. (AMEMB TEL AVIV 4176 JUN 67
REF A REQ TO AMEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHINGTON JUN NEWS
STORY STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA, STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B REQ TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THA SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

ACTION TAKEN
DOWNGRADED
NC

2/6 8 1981

B

[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZC [illegible]
OO RUFLKO
DE RUFHDA [illegible]
ZNY TTTTT [illegible]
FM [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
O 080110Z JUN 87 ZFF-3 - - LEGEND -- INFORM ORIG MSN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
MSG BY SCDS AT 0312Z, W3/82 JUN/83
FM JCS
TO RUFPAK/USCINCPAC
INFO RUFNAAA/CNO
RUEDPKA/CINCLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLNP INCOMMANDER.....
RUFGCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFGCR/CTF 64
RUFGCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQUSAEUR
RUFNAS/USAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPMS/DIPMSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNYA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFTRNA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.....
ZT
[redacted]
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7[illegible]0723OZ JUN 87
B. COMSIXTHFLT 0715O3Z JUN 87 (PCTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

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| | | |

Z

"Liberty"

[redacted] JCS752. J-3 SENDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7047/90CT.DZ JUN 67
B. CINCUSNAVEUR DOG-002 JUN 67
C. CINCEUR DOG/JRC DOG.D.7039625 JUN 67
D. COMSIXTHFLT 300912Z JUN 67
1. (S) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE COMM PORTION OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT, REQUEST PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFO:
A. TIME OF RECEIPT:
(1) REFS A, B, C, AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REFS A, B, AND C BY COMSIXTHFLT.

Declassified
UNCLASSIFIED
by OJCS
10 Nov 76

PAGE 2 JCSM-[redacted] S E C R E T
(3) REF D BY CINCUSNAVEUR
B. TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION INCLUDING HOME RELAY STATION:
(1) REF B TO COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY
(2) REF C TO CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REF D TO USS LIBERTY.
2. (U) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REF B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO
BT-A

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

NAVEXOS NCU LC.: 2100/3 (REV 10-63)

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
CCN:
TOR: 0346/10
DSN:
DCN: FC

DTG: 091936Z JUN 67

3 [redacted]

551

Doc. 30 Ex YG Liberty

[redacted]

P 291622Z MAY 67 ZFF1
FM JCS
TO RHEDNK/CINCLANT
RUSTDN/USCINCEUR
RUEDMA/CINCMED
RUDDYA/CINCLANTFLT
RHDLKD/CINCSOUTHEAST
[illegible]

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by OJCS
10 Nov 76

[redacted] CSCAP [illegible] BLEDS.
[illegible] (U)
1. (C) FOR ENGLAND: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND [illegible] MAY REQUEST CINCLANT DUTY OFFICER ASSISTANCE [illegible]
2. (C) FOR INCREASED [illegible] ASSURANCE UPON [illegible]
[illegible] PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT. [illegible]
[illegible] PASS. DRUG ASAP. DTG

[illegible]

[illegible] ICT

TURF 291951Z MAY 67 III 2/23 CIO

29 16 02Z MAY 67

CITE LOGGED

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Doc 104 Ex 4B Linenn

[redacted]

552

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[redacted] JCS CPWO CAS SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY SKED (U)

REF: A. DIRNSA G/104/31 906Z MAY (NOTAL-BUM)

PARA 2/RUEPJS 0210 S E C R E T

INFO: WHEN ADDEES REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING

SKED:

A. 20 JUN DEPART ROTA

B. 2[illegible] JUN ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE

C. [illegible] TRANS VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 40-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO NATA

D. 33-NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 12 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA HAS 18 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

E. 9-10 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISRAEL 6.5NM

2. (U) DEF RESI JCS (JRC) CINCLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT TO BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL NOREPS DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.

3. (U) ENTROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

GP-3

BT

[redacted]

RUEPWKA/NSACSSGCHAN

RUEPJS/JCS

RUEPWKA/DIRNSA

RUEPJS/JCS

RUEPWKA/DIRNSA

RUEPJS/JCS

RUEPWKA/DIRNSA

NNNNXMU

VV [redacted] TUE026

OO RUDLXD

DE RUEPJS [redacted]

ZNY SSSSS

O [redacted]

FM JCS

TO RUEPSKK/USCINCEUUR

INFO RUEHAAA/CNO

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEDNKA/NCCCCINCLANTFLT

[redacted]/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT

RUCIJUA/CTF 64

RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY

RUEPUS/CINCSA

RUFPBK/USAEUR

RUCINS/DIRNAVSECGRU

RUCIJUA/ADIRNACSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUDCKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

BT

[redacted] JCS CPHP JA3 SENDS

SUBJ USS LIBERTY SKED (U)

REF DIRNSATO [redacted]4/31 1966Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)

PAGE 2 RUEPJS [redacted] S E C R E T

1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:

A. ?? JUN DEPART ROTA.

B. ?-8 JUN. ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE

AW PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AF[redacted] COASTAL

ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-30E. CPA [redacted] ROCCO MATA

[redacted] NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPA[redacted] SISIA SARDINIA

SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA

LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 3[redacted]0N AND

BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34[redacted]0E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR

12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5NM.

2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)

CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS,

DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.

3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

A. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

GP-3[redacted]

BT

[redacted]

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LEGEND: INFORMATION THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD

3 ALL ADDEES

SERVICE NUMBER [redacted]

EXH

SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

INCOMING

CON

TOR 15 MAY

SSN

SCN

DTG 011585Z JUN 6[redacted]

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Liberty

FBI COPY

NNNNCZCMDB110ZCNGB329
PP RUDL[redacted]
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
ZXY-YS
CHAD197
ZCZCBNA111ZCBXA093
PP RUFPBNA
DE RUEPJS 130C 1582241
ZNY CCCCC
P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/C ECZDROZFZROTYAUWNCLAN
RUEDNKA/CVVJTBBXPFFNNDYNQIFXD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUNFCR/CTF 67
→ RUNFCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQNASAEUR
RUFNAS/NASAEU. OFF GERMANY
RUEPJS/DIRNSA
RUCIAAA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIAAA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPGNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR
BT
[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: JCS 6724/811545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED. OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM., GP-4
BT

Nc/5

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DOC. 14 Ex 48-LIBERTY

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
CIRCULATION
NSC 3
SECRET
CONF
TOR 0722Z
SSN
SDN
DTG 072230Z Jun 67
[redacted]
(WHEN FILLED IN)

555

[redacted]B I GZCHG8329

[redacted]ZOV RUFPB IA

[redacted]I ZCBKAC23

[redacted]IS 130C 15822

[redacted]Z JUN 67

[redacted]/CINCEUR

[redacted]ECZDRGZFZ I DIYAU CLAN

[redacted]KD/CINCUSNAVEUR

[redacted]/COMSIXTHFLT

[redacted]/CTF67

[redacted]/USS LIBERTY

[redacted]/NAVSAEUR

[redacted]/NAVSAEUR OFF GERMANY

[redacted]/DIRNSA

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRU

[redacted]/ADIRNAVSECGRU

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS

[redacted] L/SERVICES

JCS 6724/271345Z JUN 67

[redacted] PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED OPERATING

[redacted] REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED

[redacted] CONDITIONS DICTATE.

[redacted] CPA 140 120 NM, ISAEL 15 NM. GP-4

READD: RSN 1EC1/SO-4/N3/1 JUN67
R 011233Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO CINCLANTFLT

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EX. 2

(PART C)

COL 4

FOR

DTG

SOH

3072230Z Jun 67

DISCLOSURE SLIP

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED. CONTACT NAVCOMMUNIT FOR SECRET CONTROL OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES.

DATE	SIGNATURE	PARAGRAPH
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		

22-27

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EX 3
557

[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE 3

ZCZC [redacted]
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFNDA [redacted]
ZNY TTTTT ZZYZ
FM [redacted]
O [redacted] JUN 67 ZFF-3 • • LEGEND -- INFOMI ORIG WHEN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
FM JCS ARE BY 5005, T 03124, W3/03 JUN/03
TO RUFNK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUFNAAA/CNO
RUEDWKA/CINCLANT
RUEDWKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLPD INCOMMUNICADO
RUFGCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFNCR/CTF 64
RUFNCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/AMEMBASSY
RUFNAS/USAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPUS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDWKA/DIRNAVSECGRUDET
RUFNDNA/DIRNAVSECGRUDET
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS [redacted]/072030Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (PCTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) RED LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREA DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 95 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

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1

[redacted] JCS7931 J-3 SENDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7047/300[illegible] JUN 67
B. CINCUSNAVEUR [illegible]
C. [illegible]
D. COMSIXTHFLT [illegible]
(C) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE COMM PORTION OF THE JCS WRAP UP LIBERTY INCIDENT, REQUEST PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFO:
A. TIME OF RECEIPT:
(1) REFS A, B, C, AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REFS A, B, AND C BY COMSIXTHFLT.

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PAGE 2 RUENAA0001 S E C R E T
(3) REF C BY CINCUSNAVEUR
B. TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION INCLUDING NAME RELAY STATION:
(1) REF B TO COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY.
(2) REF C TO CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REF D TO USS LIBERTY.
2. (C) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REF B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO

BT

DD-A



(PRIORITY)
COM
TOR 0346/10
SGN
DGR TC

(WHEN FILLED IN)

DD FORM 1056 (REV 10-55)

559
Doc. 30 Ex YP Liberty

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4

[redacted]

P 291622Z MAY 67 ZFF1
FM JCS
TO RUEDNKA/CINCLANT
RUFTDRA/USCINCEUR
RUFGNAA/CINCPAC
RUDHYA/CINCLANTFLT
RHMCSD/CINCSTRIKE
RUEKDA/CINCONAD
RUFPCA/COMSTRIKFLT
RUEWNA/CINCPACFLT
RUDHYA/COMSUBLANT
RUEKDA/COMSTRIKFLT
RUDHYA/COMSUBSTRIKFLT
RUDHYA/COMSUBEASTLANT
RUDHYA/COMSUBWESTLANT
RUDHYA/COMSUBSOUTHLANT
RUDHYA/COMSUBNORTHLANT
RUEKDA/COMSUBSTRIKFLT
RUDHYA/COMSUBGIUK
RUDHYA/COMSUBNAVSOUTH
RUDHYA/COMSUBNAVNORTH
RUDHYA/COMSUBNAVCENT
RUDHYA/COMSUBNAVSOUTH
RUDHYA/COMSUBNAVNORTH
RUEKDA/COMSUBNAVSOUTH
RUEKDA/COMSUBNAVNORTH
RUEKDA/COMSUBNAVCENT

C35CUU TUE 26

C 1521545

) 67 ZFF3 —LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD B
CINCEUUR ALL ADDEES
CNO SERVICE NUMBER
NTFLT
NCLANTFLT
AMEUR
MFLT

BERTY

SECRU
SECGRU
SECGRULANT
ECGRUEUR

CPHO JAY SENDS
Y SKED (U)
04/31/1906Z MAY (NOTAL BOM)
SIC S E C R E T
REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING

ROTA,
ROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS

VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
36-00W 33-00E, CPA MOROCCO NATA
ST 3 NM, CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM, CPA ALGERIA
CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
NDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
AND 34-00E, WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
EAEL 6.5NM
JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC)
INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL POVREPS,
INCIDENT REPORTS,
TECH TASKING IAW REF.

ES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

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

VV [illegible]KXC356VV [illegible]TVD026
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 02 ICC 152154Z
ZNY SSSSS
O [illegible] 15-SZ JUN 67 ZFF3 —LEGEND: INFOADDEES WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD.
FM [illegible]JCS [illegible] —RELEASERS SERVICE NUMBER— 1755/15221326
IO RUFPBKK/UISCINCEUUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/NCCCCINCLANTFLT
RU[illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 64
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPMS/CIRMSA
RUFPBK/NSAEUR
RUCIMSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUSRU
BT
[redacted] ICS CPHO JAS SENDS
SUBJ USS LIBERTY SKED (U)
REF DIRNAVSECGRU/104/31906Z MAY (NOTAL-DOM)
PAGE 2 RUEPJS 02 C S E C R E T
1. (S) UNEVRES REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:
A. 2? JUN DEPART ROTA.
B. 2-8 JUN ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE
AS PERMITS, THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MORCCCO MAIA 3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
C. 9-30 JUN CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5 NM
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECHTASKING IAW REF.
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW
GP-3
BT

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Ex 1

| | | |

NNNNCZCKDB I I [redacted]CNGB329
PP RUDLKD [redacted]
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
CNAD197
ZOZCBNA I I I ZCBKA093
PP RUFPBNA
DE RUEPJS 130C 1582241
ZNY CCCCC
P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/C ECZDROZFZROTY/UWFCLAN
RUEDNKA/CUNTYBXPFFNMDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUMFCR/CTF 67
RUMFCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQNASAEUR
RUFNAS/NASAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
UCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

UEDHKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
UFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR
T
[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
JBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
EF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING
REA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED
S LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
: CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM, GP-4
F

Liberty

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DOC. 14 Ex 48-LIBERTY





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2

RECDS IICZCHG8329

SCC UZQV RUFPBNA

DE RUFPBNA 1ZCBKAG93

R TPBNA

FM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO RUFPBNA/USSLIBERTY

RUFPBNA/USSLIBERTY

RUFPBNA/USSLIBERTY

DISCLOSURE SHEET

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

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22-27

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EX 3

56.5

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

[redacted]
OO RUFLKO
DE RUFKDA [redacted]
Z [redacted]
FM [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
O 080110Z JUN 67 ZFF-3 - - LEGEND - INFOR ORIG WHEN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
→FM JCS ANS BY SOOS AT 03122, W3/08 JUN/67
TO [redacted]
INFO [redacted]
RUEDWKA/CINCLANT
RUEDWKA/CINCLANT FLT
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
RUFMAS/HOUSAFUS
RUFMAS/USAFAN OFF GERMANY
RUEPMS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDWKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPDA/DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
BT
[redacted] 1137 JUN 67
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7137/070230Z JUN 67
B. CCMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (TCTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

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| ORIGINATOR SECTION | | |

[redacted]

[redacted] CSCAAD JJ ENDS.
CONFIDENTIAL (SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
1. (C) FOR ENCLAVE: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND
[illegible] REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON ASCENSION
2. (C) FOR DISCRETION: WHEN ASSUMES OPCON RESPECT
[illegible] PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT, ESTIMATED
[illegible] PASS CHOP ASAP. GP4

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ILLEGIBLE

TOR: 251955Z MAY 67 NR 2/29 CHO

29 16 02Z MAY 67

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Doc 104 Exhibit

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

5

UNC35CV TVP126

2ICC 1521545

UUU 67 ZFF3 —LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD B
DISCINCEUUR —ALL ADDEES
AA/CNO SERVICE NUMBER YMOS 15235
CLANTFLT
CCINCLANTFLT
USNAVEUR
INTHFLT
64
LIBERTY
SA
UR
NAVSECGRU
RHACSECGRU
NAVSECGRULANT
AVSECGRUEUR

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by OTCS
10 Nov 76

JCS CPW JAS SENDS
JERTY (SKED) (U)
3/104/3 I 19962 MAY (NOTAL-BOM)
IS 22 IC S E C R E T
FES REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY I W FOLLOWING

ART ROTA.
ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS

THAT VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
IT 35-00N 35-00E. CPA MOROCCO NAIA
DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
NM CLAIMED DIST .2 NM.
CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
ISREAEL 6.5NM
SI JCS (JRC) CNC CINLANT (JRC)
E INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS,
ND INCIDENT REPORTS.
E TECH TASKING IAW REF.

DURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

DOLSS Ltr 48-LIBERTY

DINNNXMV

VV ZKXC356VU TVB026

OO RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 02JOOJ152154B
ZNY SSSSS
O 011545Z JUN 67 ZFEA LEGEND: DISCRIMINES WITH THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD
FM UCS ALL ADDRESSEES
TO RUFPSKK/DISCINCEUUR SERVICE NOTICE 20735+1522326
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/NECCCINCLANTFLT
RUDFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 64
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPWS/CIRNSA
RUFPSK/NSAEUR
RUCIWSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
BT

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[redacted] ICS CPHP JAS SENDS

SUBJ USS LIBERTY SKED (U)
REF DIRNSA G/104/3 1906Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)

PAGE 2 RUEPJS 02 C S E C R E T
1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:
A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.
B. 2-8 JUN ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE
AV PERMITS THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-30E. CPA MOROCCO MATA 3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
C. 9-30 JUN CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5NM
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL COVREPS DAILY SITIE AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

4. [redacted] (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW
GP [redacted]
BT

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Liberty

NNNNCZCKDB110ZCNGB329
PP RUDLKD
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
CNAD197
ZCZCBNA111ZCBKA093
PP RUFPBNA
DE RUEPJS 130C 1582241
ZNY CCCCC
P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO ECZDROZFZROTYAUWNCLAN
RUEDNKA/CVWTBRXPFFNMDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUMFCR/CTF 67
RUMFCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/NAVSAEUR
RUFNAS/NASAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIKSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIKSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR
BT
[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM, GP-4
BT

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DOC. 14 Ex 48-LIBERT

James M. Innes, Jr. Research Papers

2

DRAFT

[illegible]B I OZCHGB329

[illegible]OV RUFPBHA

[illegible]D 07

[illegible]ZCBKAGQ3

[illegible]UFPBHA

[illegible]S 13DC 15822HI

[illegible]CCCCC

[illegible]JUN 67

[illegible]JCS

[illegible]RUFPBHA/USCINCEUR

[illegible]AA/CINCLANTFLT ROTYAUWNCLAN

[illegible]/RUFPBARFFNMDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

[illegible]C/COMSIXTHFLT

RUFPCR/CTF

RUFPCR/USS LIBERTY

RUFNAD/USNAVEUR

RUFNNS/USNAVEUR OFF GERMANY

RUFNNSA/IRNSA

[illegible]GSA/DIRNAVSECGRU

[illegible]RNSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

[illegible]EDNK/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

[illegible]FFSA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

ST

[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS

[illegible] USS LIBERTY AGTR

REF: JCS 6724/20 0545Z JUN 67

[illegible]ED PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING

[illegible] FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED

[illegible] CONDITIONS DICTATE.

[illegible] CRAFT 0/20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM. GP-4

READD: R [illegible]301/SO-4/ND/11 JUN67
R 1013227Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO CINCLANTFLT

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EX 2

James M. Eames Jr. Research Papers

DISCLOSURE SHEET

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: OINCUSNAVEUR

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DOC 57 EX VP LIBERTY

5th

[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZC [redacted]
OO RUFLKO
DE RUFNDA [redacted]
ZNY TTTTT ZEO
FM [redacted]
R [redacted]
[redacted]
O 080110Z JUN 67 ZEF-3 - LEGEND -- INFORM ORIG THEN MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
→FM JCS AIG BY SOOS AT 03124, M3/03 JUN/BB
TO RUFPAK/USCINCPAC
INFO RUFNAAA/CNO
RUEDWKA/CINCLANT
RUSDWKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLYB INCUSCINCEUR----------
RUEDCI/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFPCR/CTF 64
RUFPCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQNSAEUR
RUFNAS/NSAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPNS/DIRNSA
RUCINSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCINSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUFDNSA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFDNSA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR----------
RT
[redacted] 7 JUN 67,
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7337/072036Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (PCTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP ARES DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 95 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
RT

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ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTM[redacted] NSGE

CINCUSNAVEUR

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

CON	
TOR	0812Z
SSN	
SGN	

080110Z JUN67

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

1

[redacted] JCS7231 J-3 SUNDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7247/300102 JUN 67
B. CINCUSNAVEUR DOG-0002 JUN 67
C. CINCEUR DOG-0/ARO DOG-0/336252 JUN 67
D. COMSIXTHFLT 030912Z JUN 67

(U) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE COMM PORTION OF THE JCS WRAP UP LIBERTY INCIDENT, REQUEST PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFO:

A. TIME OF RECEIPT:
(1) REFS A, B, C, AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REFS A, B, AND C BY COMSIXTHFLT.

PAGE 2 RUEADC 0001 U N C L A S S
(U) REF C IS CINCUSNAVEUR
B. TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION INCLUDING [redacted] RELAY STATION.
(1) REF B TO COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY.
(2) REF C TO CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REF D TO USS LIBERTY.
2. (U) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REF B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO

BT-A
BT

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by OTES
IAW No. 76

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
CCN
TOR 0346/16-
DSN
CSN FC

[redacted]

Doc. 30 Ex 49 Liberty

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[redacted]

4

[redacted]

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10 Nov 76

[redacted] CSCSED J3 ALNDS.

[redacted]



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Doc 104 Exhibit Lindsey

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[redacted]

ICC 1521545

[redacted] --LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD
ISCINCEUUR — ALL ADDEES
A/CNO SERVICE NUMBER [redacted]
LANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT
SNAVEUR
NINFLT
64
LIBERTY
A
R
AVSECGRU
NACSECGRU
AVSECGRUL T
VSECGRUEUR

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by OTCA ID No. 42

JCS CPUS CA3 SENDS
ERTY/SKED (U)
/104/31-1962 MAY (NOTAL-BOM)
SECRET
FS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING
RT ROTA.
NTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
T 35-00W 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO NATA
DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
E AND 34-00E, WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
ISRAEL 6.5NM
JCS (JRC) CNO CINCLANT (JRC)
INCLUDE AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL SOVREPS,
D INCIDENT REPORTS.
TECH TASKING IAW REF.

URES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

DOC 55 Ext 48-L.1.2.(2)

TOR	
SSN	[redacted]
SCN	

DTG 011535Z JUN 62

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNXMV

VV [redacted] KXC356VV [redacted] TVB026

OO RUDLKD

DE RUEPJS 021CC 152 1508

ZNY SSSSS

O [redacted] 154SZ JUN 67 ZFF3 — LEGEND: INFO ONLY — THIS MSG WAS ORIGINALLY RECEIVED

FM JCS — ALL ADDEES

TO RUEPSKK/DISCINCEUUR — SERVICE NUMBER — 1677 5 152326

INFO RUENAAA/CNO

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT

RUEDNKA/NSCCC INCLANTFLT

RUEDNKA/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT

RUCIJUA/CTF 64

RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY

RUEPUS/CIRUSA

RUFPBK/NSALUR

RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU

RUCIJUA/ADIRNACSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

RUDLKD/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

BT

[redacted] ICS CPHP JAS SENDS

SUBJ USS LIBERTY (SKED) (U)

REF DIRNSAG/1064/31 [redacted]06Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)

PAGE 2 RUEPJS 0210S E C R E T

1. (S) WHEN REQUESTED SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:

A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.

B. 2-8 JUN ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE

IAW PERMITS. TRANSIT VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL WATERS ROUTE TO POSIT 32-30N 33-30E. CPA MOROCCO MATA [redacted] CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

C. 9-30 JUN CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-30N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5 NM

2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC) CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.

3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW

GP-3

BT

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SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

CINCUSNAVEUR — 001 002 003 004 NIT NIT NIT NIT NOIC NIT CITE SDO

COU — TOR — SSN — SSN

DTG 011535Z JUN 67

Liberty

FPT
Duplex

VNHCZCKDB110ZCNGB329
RUDLKD
RY-YSCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
ZAD197
ZZCBNA111ZCBKA093
RUFPBNA
RUEPJS #30C 1560841
NY CCCCC
072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/C ECZDROZFZROTYAUWNCLAN
RUDNKA/CVWTSBXPFFNNDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUPSC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFCR/CTF 67
RUFCR/USS LIBERTY
RUMAS/NAVASAEUR
RUMAS/NASAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUPWS/DIRNSA
RUHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

RUDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR

[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: A. JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING
AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED
BY LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
A. CHAGE CPA UA TO 28 NM, ISAEL 15 NM., GP-4

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by OJCS
10 Nov 76

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DOC. 14 EX 48-LIBERTY





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[redacted]B1GZCHGB329

ZOVRUFPBNA

ZCBKA093

[redacted]EPUS 130C 1582241

[redacted]JUN67

[redacted]/USSTINCEUR

[redacted]/C ECEDRCZFZROTYAUWNCLFN

[redacted]/CINCUSNAVEUR

[redacted]/CINCLANTFLT

[redacted]67

[redacted]/USS LIBERTY

[redacted]/CNAVEUR

[redacted]/CNAVEUR OFF GERMANY

[redacted]TRNSA

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRU

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRU

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRULANT

[redacted]/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR

ST

[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS

[redacted] JCS 7226/211545Z JUN 67

[redacted] PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING

[redacted] REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED

[redacted] CONDITIONS DICTATE.

[redacted] CPAPCA IO120 NN. ISAEL 15 NN. GP-4

READD: [redacted]SD 1301/SC-L/N3/1[redacted] JUN67

R 1813[redacted]Z JUN 67

FM CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO CINCLANTFLT

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EX 2

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FOR	1427
[redacted]	
SON	72

N3

070230Z Jun 67

DISCLOSURE SHEET

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

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EX 3
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[redacted] (WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

ZCZC[redacted]
OO RUFLKO
DE [redacted]
ZNY TTTTT
FUFMS/[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
O 080110Z JUN 67 ZFF-3 - - LEGEND -- INFOM ORIG MSG RISC RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES.
FM JCS AMS BY SCOS AT 0312Z, W3/08 JUN/BB
TO FUFMK/USCINCEUR
INFO FUFMAAA/CINC
RUEDMKA/CINCLANT
RUFDMKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLNO INCUSNAVEUR----------
FUFCF/COMSIXTHFLT
FUFCF/CTF 64
RUFMCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFMAS/HQUSAEUR
FUFMAS/USAEUR OFF GERMANY
FUEPMS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU
RUFDMK/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFIDIA/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR----------
BT
[redacted] 7[redacted] 07 SEP.
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7[redacted]/070240Z JUN 67
B. COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
1. (U) CANCEL REF A.
2. (TS) REQ LIBERTY COMPLY NEW OP AREAS DEFINED LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 REF B, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, I.E., NOT CLOSER THAN 100 NM TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT AND 25 NM TO CYPRUS. GP-3
BT

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ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
NSGE N3
CINCUSNAVEUR
OO O1 O2 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 CITE BOO
OO1 OO2 OO3 OO3B O11 O12 O14 O15 O16 O17 A14 ADO
NCU LOHOON

(PAGE 1 OF 1)
CON
TOR 0312Z
SSN
SCN

20110Z JUN67
[redacted]
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5E1

[redacted]

FM JCS
TO RUTPEK/USCINCEUR
INFO [redacted]/COMIDEASTFOR
ADMIN/JCS LIBERTY
[redacted]
RUTPAC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT

[redacted] JCS7931 JUN 67
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REFS: A. JCS 7947/060110Z JUN 67
B. CINCUSNAVEUR 060455Z JUN 67
C. USCINCEUR 060547Z [illegible] 0306252 JUN 67
D. COMSIXTHFLT 230917Z JUN 67

1. (S) IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE COMM PORTION OF THE JCS WRAP UP LIBERTY INCIDENT, REQUEST PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFO:
A. TIME OF RECEIPT
(1) REFS A, B, C AND D BY USS LIBERTY.
(2) REFS A, B AND C BY COMSIXTHFLT.

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UNCLASSIFIED
by OJCS
10 Nov 76

PAGE 2 RUETUZ 0000 S E C R E T
(3) REF C BY CINCUSNAVEUR
B. TIME OF TRANSMISSION FROM LAST RELAY STATION INCLUDING [illegible] RELAY STATION:
(1) REF B TO COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY.
(2) REF C TO CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, AND USS LIBERTY
(3) REF D TO USS LIBERTY.
2. (U) REQUEST RETRANSMIT REF B INFO TO JCS(JRC) AND CNO
BT
#3

Liberty
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CLASSIFICATION SECTION
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION
INFO
[illegible]
#3

(PAGE 1 OF ___)
CCN
TOR 0346/10
GCN
CCN FC

NAVEXOS P 5216/5 (REV 10-53)

Doc. 30 Ex Y8 LIBERTY

4

R 291622Z MAY 67 ZFF1
FM JCS
TO [redacted]
[redacted]
INFO [redacted]

[redacted] CSCA 99 JJ [redacted]
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
1. (C) FOR ENCLAVE: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND
[redacted] MAY REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON ASCENSION
[redacted] FOR DISPOSITION. DUTY ASSUMES OPCON [redacted]
[redacted] PREPARE OPS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT. ESTIMATED
[redacted] DISS. CRUD ASAP. GP4

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by OJCS 10 Nov 76

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5

WW [illegible] TVE 26

FJS 82ICC 1521545
SSSS
252 JUN 67 ZFF3

LEGEND: INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD BY ALL ADDEES
SERVICE NUMBER [illegible]

PSRKZUISCINCEUUR
RUENAAA/CNO
RA/CINCLANTFLT
RA/NCCCCINCLANTFLT
A/CINCUSNAVEUR
A/COMSIXTHFLT
RA/CTF 64
RA/USS LIBERTY
A/CINCUSA
A/NS4EUR
A/DIRNAVSECGRU
RA/DIRNAVSECGRUNAT
A/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
A/DIRNAVSECGRUSERU

Declassified by
UNCLASSIFIED
by OTCS
10 Nov 76

[redacted] JCS CPUO JAS SENDS
SS LIBERTY SKED (U)
RMSA G/104/31 19 67Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)
RUEPJS 0221 S E C R E T
SUBJ: REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING
UN DEPART ROTA.
JUN. ENROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
[illegible] THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO NATA
CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
IAS 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
CPA ISRAEL 6.5NM
REQUEST JCS (JRC) CINC CINCLANT (JRC)
WILL BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MCUREPS,
SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.

PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.

Doc 55 Ct 48-L

CCY
YGN
SSN
DCN

DTG 015/25 JUN 67

584

[redacted]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

VV [redacted]XC356VV [redacted] TVB026
000 RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 021CCC 162 1548
ZNY SSSSS
O 111548Z JUN 67 ZFF3 — LEGEND: INFORM [redacted] THIS MSG HAS BEEN RECVD
FM JCS — ALL ADDEES
IO RUFPSKK/UISCINCEUUR — SERVICE NUMBER — JCS 1522/152326
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUEDNKA/NCCCCINCLANTFLT
RUEKVD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPCR/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCIJUA/CTF 64
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
RUEPWS/CIRNSA
RUFPBK/NSAEURT
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIJUA/ADIRNACSECGRU
RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUDCKD/DIRNAVSECGRUSRU
BT

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by OSES 10 Nov 76

[redacted] IOC CPWP JAS SENDS
SUBJ USS LIBERTY (SKED) (U)
REF DIRNSA 7/104/31906Z MAY (NOTAL-BOM)
PAGE 2 RUEPJS 0001 S E C R E T
1. (S) WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING
SKED
A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.
B. 2-8 JUN ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS
SAFE
IAW PERMITS, THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL
ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-30E. CPA MOROCCO MATA
3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA
SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA
LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.
C. 9-30 JUN CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND
BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-30E WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR
12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5NM
2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)
CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS
DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AKED FOLLOW.
GP-3
BT

EX 1

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNCZCKDB 110ZCNGB329
PP RUDLKD
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUFPBNA
CNAD197
ZCZCBNA111ZCBKA093
PP RUFPBNA
DE RUEPJS 130C 1582241
ZNY CCCCC
P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
INFO RUENAA/C EC2DROZFZROTYAUWNCLAN
RUEDNKA/CVWTBBXPFFNNDYNQIFKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUNFCR/CTF 67
RUMFCR/USS LIBERTY
RUFNAS/HQNASAEUR
RUFNAS/NASAEUR OFF GERMANY
RUEPWS/DIRNSA
RUCIHSA/DIRNAVSECGRU
RUCIHSA/ADIRNAVSECGRU

RUEDNKA/DIRNAVSECGRULANT
RUFPBNA/DIRNAVSECGRUTEUR
BT
[redacted] JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EASTMED OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
2. CHAGE CPA UA TO 20 NM, ISAEL 15 NM., GP-4
BT

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by OJCS 10 Nov 76

DOC. 14 EX 48-LIBERTY





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[redacted]

JCS 7537 J-3 SENDS

JCS 6726/215452 JUN 67

PRESENT SITUATION PERMITTED OPERATING

FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED

CONDITIONS DICTATE.

CPA 10 TO 20 NM. ISAEL 15 NM. GP-4

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EX 2

DISCLOSURE SHEET

DTG/MONTH/YEAR 080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO/INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR

REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED. CONTACT NAVCOMMUNIT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES.

	DATE	SIGNATURE	BRN/RANK
1			
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5			
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8			
9			
10			

22-27

COPY 6 OF 10 COPIES

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EX 3

Mr Mayhew
Room 6247

STATE

NEA/ARN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
EXECUTIVE CENTER

67869

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

010 03 492
IMMEDIATE

OPTTOOOMCA
HA22 JCS1426/09 R2
ZCZCIE029IVZCZCEIVZCZCIEOVZCZCEIA171REAA85
OO RUEKDA
DE JUPMVZ 0845 1601530
ZNY SSSSS
P 0915202 JUN 67
FM USDO TEL AVIS ISRAEL
TO RUEOSW/WHITE HOUSE
RUPJS/OSD
RUPAAA/CNO
RUMC/DEPT STATE
RUQMKF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCST
UNE
RUOLMD/CINCNAVEUR
RUKDA/JCS
INFO JUPJ"DUA
RUHDT=XISIN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPR/CTO SIX ZEZO PT TWO
JUFPBS/17-13
JUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTRE/CTO SIX ZEZO
BT
S E C R E T 0845 JUN 67.
ATOQ 1300ZTHE IOF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TZLEPTOMED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS TUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATUON ON YESTERDAYS
INNIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTZD AND RECOGNIZDD AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTZRNAZIONAL
KUSZOM.
3. THE AREA IS NOTTA COMMVN PASSAGE
OR SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOOOTA
DECLAREDTTAZA CLOSE
TT NUZRALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE TGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL QUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
: CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13JUN67

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of CINCUSAREUR DIAS-18,999/EX-3A
on 16 Nov 76 [illegible] TAGS [illegible] 11 Nov 1976

SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[illegible] MILITARY SECURITY CONTROL CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTZD. 1 [illegible]D AT
0107Z HIGH SPEED KNOOTE WESTWARD TTOTOARD EGYPTIAN COAST.
[illegible] OF NAVY HADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARDMENTOOF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
COME
TI 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERZLY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSOD HIM FR A LABEL FOO TH STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPTA TTREATSLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA JEQUSTED HE CONSULT WOTH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
WOULD BLOCH CALE
BAK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
CUSTZD HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESZMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDZRSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DIRLIED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE; IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

LY'S RROEOUS AZTACK
RESULTZD FROM TO
IGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLOAN SOME PORTUON OF
THE GRZAZ VICTORY BEING SHARED BY UDF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SEEN. GP-3.
BZ
NNNN

ADV TO...NMCC OSD 2 OF 2 67889

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DECLASSIFIED
...uation (cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAVSSMAN OPNAV 5-18,99
16 Nov 76 OJAG Ltr 11 Nov 1972
(Date) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SECRET

...CZCNDA724ZCNGA002
OO RUDLKD
DE RUQNVL 0845 1601530
ZNY SSSSS
O P 091520Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUEPNAN/CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIK
HH
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUIKRE/CTG SIX ZETO
BT
S E C R E T 0845Z JUN 67.
AI 09/1300Z: THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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by authority of: OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIR 5-18, 959
on 16 Nov 1976 O'Regan JAG Sec Mgt
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

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SSN			
SGN			

DTG 092215Z JUN 67

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPHONED TO ALUSNA FOLLOWING SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP UNQUOTE.

1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVY SHIP 15 MILES FROM COAST.

2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA

DBL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL

CUSTOM.

3. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.

4. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.

5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.

7. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM SEA.

COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT. COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH FLOP SMACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QSEIR IS LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.

3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. GP-3.

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) by authority of
on
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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CLASSIFICATION/CONTROL

RUDNAV

DE RUCNVL 0249 160 1115

ZNY SSSSS

O 09:315Z JUN 67

FM USDAO TEL AV ISRAEL

TO RUEPWH/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPCS/OSD

RUEPWAA/CNO

RUEHC/DEPT STATE

RUEKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE

RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR

RUFPRK/CINCEURARMYHEIDELBERG

RUEHDA/JCS

INFO RUEPJS/DIA

RUEHDT/USUN

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

RUTPBW/USAFE

RUTPAC/CINCUSAREUR

RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO

BT

S E C R E T 0249 JUN 67

REF MOSAN RADM MOORE MMCC AND ALLUNA, TEL AVIV AND JCS, UTPO J-3 MC

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16 Nov 76 by authority of SECNAV/JAG & DIA 5-18594/FOIA-3A & DNAVY

(Date) (Signature: JAG Section) 21 Jun 76

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

23

PAGES 1 OF 2

ECH

TOR 1441Z/7

SIG

CSN 12

DTG 090815Z JAN

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR USN 2-69/3 (REV. 10-65)

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[illegible] INCLUDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT. 1. A

[illegible] SPOKESMAN, LT COL ALEX BLOCH, TELEPHONED FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
TO USNA: A. FOLLOWING ATTACK THREE [illegible]
APPROACHED LIBERTY AND ASKED BY LSL: QUOTE DO YOU
NEED HELP UNQUOTE. LIBERTY REPLIED QUOTE NO THANK YOU. WE
DO NOT NEED HELP UNQUOTE. [illegible]
[illegible]
SEA, BUT RECOVERED TWO RUBBER LIFE BOATS, ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND
ONE PAMPHLET ON TRANSISTORS. MIB PERSONNEL NOW STATE POSITIVELY
THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP INTO SEA AND NONE IN SEA.
B. TWO IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 1505Z TO 1521Z AND WERE
WAVED OFF BY SHIP. WERE TOLD HELICOPTERS SHIP DID NO DESIRE
HELP. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH OVER 5 KILOMETER RADIUS UNTIL 1604Z.
C. LT COL BLOCH WAS INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT
EXCEPT ONE WHO IS NOW ON AIR MISSION. ALL STATE THEY SAW NO CREW
MEMBER ENTER SEA AND NONE IN SEA. D. IDF INSTITUTED LIGHT
SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL
CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS. STATED THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY
IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MISSING PERSONNEL BUT UNDERSTOOD
SHIP NEEDED NO HELP. E. IDF NAVY STATES UNDER STANDARD WIND

PAGE 3 RUQNVL 0040 S E C R E T
AND CUR

Pg 2 OF 2 — 1916Z 15 Jun

EXI CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR BODIES WOULD BE CARRIED TO
[illegible] APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH (31 16N 34 15E) BY CURRENT
STATE D. IF CERTAIN THAT LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID

ON POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS INJURED
OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN
VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF
FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE
BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST.
E. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCH REPORTED LAST PILOT INTER-
VIEWED. PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS
WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF SHIP. BLOCH DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN
VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. WAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CONF
FIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

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(cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIN 5-15
RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 OK Ryan JAG Sec Dy

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

11 5 5

CZCKØB545ZCNGB653
PP RUDLKD
DE RUHNVL 0900/1 1661620
ZNY SSSSS
P 1016.02 JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 0900Z, 67.
SECTION . OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 14125Z JUN 67
B. USDAO 0525 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0527 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0534 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0545 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0549 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0552 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0558 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0584 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0886 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.
FOR RADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY. FOLLOWING IS .....

DECLASSIFIED

Doc. 45 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

(authority) (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA S-14,999/RDS-3H
on 16 Nov 76 OR Spain DNSC Mgr OF 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

NOFORN

PAGE 1 OF ____

ADDN			
TOR	15 OR 16		
SSN	15		
SGN			

C/1SS-S)
SI ONLY
SA ONLY

ACTION
DEPARTMENT
SECTION

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDEN. AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (LORFEO) AT APPROX 0814002. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081200Z POSIT 3125N 3033E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR WARZON COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 0815302 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AN...
D SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

Page 2 of 6

PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. (C) AT APPROX 0815402, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO FLO TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 0816102 (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 0816252, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MIS RUNNING NORTH. AT 0816352, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
ON CALLING CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL NO INMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE NUMBER SENT WAS FOUR OR FORTY BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081720Z.
-6. .C/WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN OF
DF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH U.S NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTTER AMLLIFYING REMARKE
CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.
7. .C/ ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.
8. .C/ AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM

PAGE 5 RUQMV 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
GENL CASSIDY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY
SURVIVORS, (DEAD OR ALIVE) OF MEN WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN
AREA IN NEED OF RESCUE. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.
9. .C/ AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO ENQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCH READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT
THESE WERE:
A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM..
SEA.
ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCH FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

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LCOL BLOCH
THE INCIDENT. REQUESTED HE
OWN AND ALUSNA CALLED BACK AND REF E
BLOCH SENT IMMEDIATE MSG OF
USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E
COMMENTING LIBERTY INCIDENT WAS RESULT OF EAGERNESS
NFUSING LIBERTY ATTACK AS RESULT OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
US ATTACK AS RESULT OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
ORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
EXTENT OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
AND MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD
ALUSNA TYPE RADM
VY RADM POOR.
DELIVERY POOR.

S E C R E T NTFORN
ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG
ACT ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM
AND QUESTIONS. COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING
LED QUESTIONS. SLOWNESS OF RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN
RECENT NON- ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION
ON OF HOSTILITIES. AND TEMPO ISRAELI HIGHER TAN ISSUED
FO OF SURVIVORS. REQUESTS AT LEVEL WERE PASSED TO
SIBLE U.S. BETTER RESPONSE SEARCH
E THAT U.S. FOR INFO AND RENEWED
Y GET REQUESTS FOR INFO
QUESTS
ATELY.
0916SCZ. LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
AT
A: ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY
LLOWING ATTACK,
ERE REFUSED.
ATTACK AREA UNTIL 081504Z WITH
ATTACK FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND
S CONTIOPTBLEARCH EXCEPT FOR INTO THE SEA OR
RESULTS TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP
ATIVE EQUIPME T. PERSONNEL STATE 081305Z TO 08131-Z AND
RES 3-3 PERSONNEL UNTIL 081504Z
HELOS CONDUCTED SEAFCH
SEA.
IDF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY
WERE WAVED OFF.

CLASSIFIED BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5210.1E AND DOD 5.1B
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(1)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 16 NOV 76

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E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST [illegible] CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 13 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG. REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

J. (S) AT 1007302Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 1033302 AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

PAGE 5 of 6 15/15 JUNE 67

13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 130930Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14. (S) AT APPROX 101915Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999/RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 USRapin SIAG SecCont
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(Date) (Name and Address of Person Making Change)

PAGE 5 RUOMVL 0903/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INTO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
16. (S) AT APPROX 131200Z WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID AIED IN QUOTE MALIC OU NTRUE UNQUOTE STORIES AND REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

PAGE 6

PAGE 6 RUOMVL 0903/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 131255Z, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GEN BARAK HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (S) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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Declassification (cancellation) (Downgrading)
by authority of ONAVINST 5510.1E AND DIAM 58.1, CH 2 AND ROS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 ... OR Spain JAG Sec Mgr.
(Date) (Signature) (Name)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SECRET

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TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
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S S C R E T 0927 JUN 67
YOUR 171947Z JUN 67(TOTAL
1. IDF FLO UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO
PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINTON EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA
BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY O COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFIC AL
TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED
17 USG 0920 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
BT

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OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999
RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

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Doc. 43 Ex 48 5-18, 9991
LIBERTY Rec.

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RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 64 - Ex-48 - Liberty 602

PAGE 2 RLGTVL 0538 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L DNLO838 DTG 87.

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ACCIDENTAL ATTACK ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE.

1. FLO HAS PASSED IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS AT 0500Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107N-3343E) AREA AT NOON TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT WAS VERIFIED [redacted] THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED, BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 15 MILES OFF THE C. UNQUOTE.

2. [redacted] APOLOGIES FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0525.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DIO 00.2.

5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO.

PAGE 3 RLGTVL 0538 C O N F I D E N T I A L

NEG (AIR) ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONF. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTAC WITH USN NET.

7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMP CONTACT NON PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 8 KNOTS NORMALLY, COURSE 60 NM WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYN [illegible] STARBOARD AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED, HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIAT NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NO COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

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PAGE 2 RUEMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67

SECTION I OF II.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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PAGE 3 RUEMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL-ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.
SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES FLIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

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B. IN ACCORDANCE WI IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS ON ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS, HTHE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTYS SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STANDING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18,
DDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 (Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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FINAL SECTION OF II.
(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. THE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALLL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATOACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD HIDS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.
COMMENOS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT [illegible] POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE COI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.

3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. [illegible] BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:

A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIVERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

Page 5 OF 5 181030 Jun67

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.

D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AIR ATTACKS.

4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.

5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.

6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3

BT

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(Classification) (Changed to)

by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-61,999/R05-3A

on 16 Nov 1976 (Date) [signature] (Signature) OF 11 NOV 1976 JAG Sec Ct (Rank)

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Z 081414Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OKRVH
RUEPNAA/CNO
RUENC/DEPT STAE
RUQMCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPPSA/CINCSTRIKE
[redacted]/CINCNAVEUR
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INFO RUEPJS/DIA
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RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPEU/USAFE
RUFYAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT :- ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTB [redacted]DE
RONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
BT

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(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
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DTG 081414 Jun 67

3 CONFIDENTIAL
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Doc 25 Ex #8 LIBERTY

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

egpt to adm. Kidd

ACTION TAKEN

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RUDLAE/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCNCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 3520 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117?0Z JUN 67
B. (AMEMB TEL AVIV 4176 JUN 67
REF A REQS TO AMEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHINGTON 16 JUN NEWS
WEEK STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA, STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B DOG TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THA SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

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...ation (cancelled) (Changed to
) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND D.A 5-18,
on 16 NOV 76 (M) RDS-[redacted] 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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Doc 57 Ex 48 Liberty

610

Mr Mayhew
Rdg (7047)

STATE

PH # 632-0

NEA/ILPAC

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
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ON SERVICE - TEXT
13 JUN 67

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O 091520Z JUN 67
FM USDO TEL AVISISRAEL
TO RUSBGW/WHITE HOUSE
RUPJS/OSD
RUPNAA/CNO
RUMC/DEPT STATE
RUQMKF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEOPSA/CINCSTRIKE
UKE
RUDLMD/CINCNAVEUR
RUKDA/JCS
INFO JUSMDUA
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RUTRMC/CTO SIX ZERO PT TWO
JUFPDS/17-13
JUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTRE/CTO SIX ZERO
ST
S E C R E T 0945 JUN 67.
ATO91300ZTHE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPTOED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS TUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATUON ON YESTERDAYS
INMIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNAZIONAL
KUSTOM.
3. THE AREA IS NOTTA COMMVN PASSAGE
OR SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOOOTA
DECLAREDTTAZA CLOSE
TT NUERALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE IGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL OUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13JUN67

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on 16 Nov 76 UKRegion IRG Sec Dept [illegible] 11 Nov 1976

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTZD. 7. AS SOON AT
QUOTZ HIGH SPEED KNUOTE WESTWARD TIOTOARD ENEMY COAST.
8. DF NAVY HADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARDMENTOOF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
GOVE
IS 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERZLY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSDO HIM FR A LABEL TOO THE STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPTA TTREAHOLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA JEQUSTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
WOULD BLOCH CALL
BAK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
QUOTZD HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEUR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

AY'S RROEOUS ATTACK
RESULTZD FROM TO
IGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLOAN SOME PORTUON OF
THE GRZAZ VICTORY BEING SHARED BY UOF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SEEN. GP-3.
BZ
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by authority of OPNAVSECLIC DNA 5-18,994/K,
on 16 Nov 76 DK Spain Rec'd Mgr. 9 Nov 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

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OO RUDLKD
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ZNY SSSSS
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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWH/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUEPNAN/CNO
RUEKC/DEPT STATE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
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INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEKDT/USUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZETO
PT
S E C R E T 090 JUN 67.
SUBJ: 09/1300Z THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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Classification (cancelled) (Changed to) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIAS-18, ROD-3A of 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 1976 O'Keefe JAG Sec Wash
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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PAGE 1 OF 2

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPHONED TO ALUSNA FOLLOWING SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE FURTHER INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP UNQUOTE.

1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES FROM COAST.

2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AR[illegible] CONSTITUTED A BLUNDER AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.

3. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.

4. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.

5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.

7. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM SEA.

COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT. COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH FLOP

RWMACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE.

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.

3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. GP-3.

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SECRET

FM USDAO TEL AV ISRAEL

TO RUEPMW/AMEMB MOSCOW

RUEPCS/CSA

RUFPAA/CNO

RUSHC/DEPT STATE

RUMKCF/COMSIXTHFLT

RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE

RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR

RUEPRX/CINCEURAFSUSEUCOM

RUEHDA/JCS

INFO RUEPJS/DIA

RUEKDT/USUN

RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

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RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR

RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO

SECRET 0615 JUN 67

FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL TO RUEPMW/AMEMB MOSCOW RUEPCS/CSA AND RUFPAA/CNO TEL AVIV AND JCS, UTPO JCS IN

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by authority of CNAVSTA HAIFE & DIA S-IF 5991/RDS-3A & DNAVY
16 Nov 76 OR 8 June 76 & 21 Jun 76
(Date) (Signature: JAG Secty) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0040 U S U N I N S

RELEASING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT. 1.

VERIFY ISRAELI ASSISTANCE

NAVY SPOKESMAN, LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, TELEPHONED FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO LUSNA: A. FOLLOWING ATTACK THREE IDF MTB [illegible] APPROACHED LIBERTY AND AT 1330Z ASKED BY BLOCH: QUOTE DO YOU NEED HELP UNQUOTE. LIBERTY REPLIED QUOTE NO THANK YOU. WE DO NOT NEED HELP UNQUOTE. MTBS REMAINED IN AREA UNTIL 1504Z SE/ROWING [illegible] SEA, BUT RECOVERED TWO RUBBER LIFE BOATS, ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND ONE PAMPHLET ON TRANSISTORS. MTB PERSONNEL NOW STATE POSITIVELY THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP INTO SEA AND NONE IN SEA.

B. TWO IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 1303Z TO 1321Z AND WERE WAVED OFF BY SHIP. MTBS TOLD HELICOPTERS SHIP DID NO DESIRE HELP. HELOS CONDUCED SEARCH OVER 5 KILOMETER RADIUS UNTIL 1504Z.

C. LT COL BLOCH HAS INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE WHO IS NOW ON AIR MISSION. ALL STATE THEY SAW NO CREW MEMBER IN SEA AND NONE IN SEA. D. IDF INSTITUTED LIGHT [illegible] SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS. STATED THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MISSING PERSONNEL BUT UNDERSTOOD SHIP NEEDED NO HELP. E. IDF NAVY STATES UNDER STANDARD WIND

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0040 S E C R E T
AND OUR

PG 2 OF 2 — 191815Z Jan

EXT CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS WOULD BE CARRIED TO [illegible] APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH (SIXTH SCRIBED BY C-W-H) C-W-H, E. IF CERTAIN THAT LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID

OF POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS INJURED OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST.

F. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCH REPORTED LAST PILOT INTERVIEWED. PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF SHIP. BLOCH DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. HAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CONFIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

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Authority NND 963051
By [illegible] NARS, Date 16 NOV 96

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 0900Z, 67.
SECTION . OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 14125Z JUN 67
B. USDAO 0529 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0827 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0834 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0845 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0849 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0852 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0856 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0884 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0886 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.
FOR ADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY.. FOLLOWING IS.....

DECLASSIFIED Doc. 45 Ex 48-LIBERTY

(Cancellation (cancelled) ((Changed to —
) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-14,494/RDS-3A
on 16 Nov 76 ONSpain DIA Sec. Mgr OF 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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ACTION

SECTION

NOFORN

PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0300/1 S E R E T NOFORN
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDEN AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E. [redacted] CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (IDF/FLO) AT APPROX 081400Z. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081200Z POSIT 3129N 3033E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR [redacted] COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 081530Z DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AN...
D SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

PAGE 2 of 6

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0300/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. ADC AT APPROX 081540Z, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO F.O TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 081610Z (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 081625Z, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB RUNNING NORTH. AT 081635Z, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

Jr. Research Papers James M. Ennes, Jr.

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
ON CALLING CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE NUMBER SENT WASFOUR OR FORTY BUT WAS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081725Z.
6. (C)WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN OF
DF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH U.S. NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTHER AMLLIFYING REMARKE
CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.
7. (C) ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.
8. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
PAGE SIX OF SIX JUNE 67
QUOTE. PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
GENL CASSIDY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY
SURVIVORS, DEAD OR ALIVE, OF MEN WERE MISSING BUT WERE POSSIBLY
ALIVE IN HULK OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.
9. (S) AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCK CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO INQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCH READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT
~~THESE~~ WERE:
A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM
SEA.
ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCK FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

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S E C R E T NOFORN 0900/2 JUN 67.
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITAL HEADING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE.
10. (C) AT APPROX 09:40ØZ, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS BUT PHONE CONNECTIOOTBQDLVERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

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TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG BACKUP WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER TAN USDAO TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO FLO IMMEDIATELY.
11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS TO ALUSNA:
A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY BUT WERE REFUSED.
B. N
MTB'S CONTIOPFBLEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL SS1504Z WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND OTHER EQUIPME T.
C MTB PERSONNEL STATE TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR IN SEA.
D. IDF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 08131-Z AND WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 081504Z

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E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 13 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

12 (S) AT 100730Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 100330Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

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13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 100930Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14 (S) AT APPROX 101915Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
15. (S) AT APPROX 1312032 WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID AIED IN QUOTE MALIC OU UNTRUE STORIES AND REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

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OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 1312552Z LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GENL RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (C) ON 4 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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Declassification (cancellation) (Downgrading to ...)
by authority of ODNAVINST 5510.1E AND DIRINT 5510/RC-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 ... ORIginating Agency's Det.
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

SECRET

UNNHCCCKDAD132CNSA566
PP RUDLKD
DE RUSNVL 0927 1682302
ZNY SSSSS
P R 172300Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
S S C R E T 0927 JUN 67.
YOUR 171947Z JUN NOTAL.
1. IDF FLO UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINT ON EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY C COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFIC AL TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED 17 USG 0923 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
BT

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 18

SECRET

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RADM
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OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999
RDs 3A OF 11 NOV 1976

16 Nov 76 DR Spain JAG Secmgt

SECRET

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 43 Ex 48 5-18, 9999
LIBERTY

SECRET
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SECRET

DE RUQMVL 0834 1592107
ZNY CCCCC
O 082100Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUFPJS /OSD
RUQMKG/USDAO AMMAN
RUEHDT/USUN
INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUQEJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
RUFPRK/USCINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUQMGV/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUFPRW/CINCUSAFE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
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RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
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FM OPNAV 5510 1E AND DIA
5-18, 499/CDS- 3A OF
10 NOV 76 OR Spain 11 NOV 1976
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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE NAVY

ORIGINATOR SECTION: N2

ACTION DEPARTMENT: N2

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PAGE 1 OF 2

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

Doc. 64 Ex 48 - Liberty

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PAGE 2 RUOMVI 0354 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY 8 JUN 67.

1. IDF HAS PASSED IDF ARTILLERY SPOTTED ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE PRESS AT 0532Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED ISRAELI ARISH (3107-3343E) AREA AT NOON TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT WAS VERIFIED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED SUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 15 MILES OFF THE C UNCLOSE.

2. [illegible] APOLOGIES FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0525.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DIG 0[illegible].2.

5. ASSISTANCE [illegible] ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO.

PAGE 3 RUOMVI 0354 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(ALL AMEN) ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONV. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTAC WITH USN NET.

7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMP CONTACT NOW PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 2 KNOTS NORMALLY, COURSE 60 NM WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYN
ELI ABOARD
AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED, HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIAT NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NO COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

BT

DECLASSIFIED
on ... by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E and DIA 5-18, 489/RDS-3A of 11 Oct 1976
16 Nov 76 DIC Eyes JAG Sec Cnt
(Date) (Name) (Title)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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DOC. 1 - EX WP-LIBERTY

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P 161033Z JUN 67
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TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUEPNAA/CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
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RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUDLND/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
RUDLND/USDAO LONDON
RUFJC/USDAO PARIS
RUEHCR/USDAO MOSNOZ

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OPNAV 5510.1F AND
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CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LUN 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

GE 2 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67

CTION I OF II.
BJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO
ENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR
HE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE
INDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT
ET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT
THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO
HE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY,
ASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN
OWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS
OLLOWS: QUOTE
"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE
ND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY
AS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK
AS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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AGE 3 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH
Y ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND
F HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS
EING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE
ACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO
ND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY
NIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR
HE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE
IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT
IBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH.
HE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING
ND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
HE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT
ACE VALUE.
SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT
ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING
AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY
WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES
FLIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE EVEN IF THE
UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE
WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

DECL: OADR
(Classification (circled) Changed to
by authority of ONAVSSIIG 5 DIA 5-18, 997/ROS-3A dtd 11/18/76
11 Nov 76, OADR Gen-JAG Ltr dtd

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B. IN ACCORDANCE W[illegible] IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS, HTHE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTBYS WHO REPORTED LIBERTYS SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STAN-
DING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTYS SPEED.

C. THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MERCHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

BT

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Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to
by authority of: OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA S
999 ROS 3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 (Date) [signature] (Signature) LT USN (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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FINAL SECTION OF II.

(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. THE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATOACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD IOS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.

COMMENDS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT [illegible]E POINT IN HIS READING TO [illegible]INT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.
3. LTC EFRAT PROBASLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:
A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.
B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICAOIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIVERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

Pg 5 of 5 1810Z Jun67

C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.
D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
BT

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on 16 Nov 1976 OR Spain JAG Sec Cert OF 11 NOV 1976
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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWH/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OKRVH
RUEPNAA/CNO
RUENC/DEPT STATE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUELRD/CINCNAVEUR
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INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEMDT/USUN
RUFPEK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPEW/USAFE
RUFYAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT :- ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTB'S DELIBERATELY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

8 Jun 67 1430Z

nc/oc

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PAGE 2 RUQNVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 3125N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3
BT

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OPNAV 5510.1E ADD DIA-
DTL 9111/RDS-3H OF
11 NOV 1976
16 Nov 76 DK&pmm JAG Sec Cat

ORIGINATOR SECTION

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RUCNCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0320 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117:0Z JUN 67
B. (AMCNS TEL AVIV 4175 JUN 67

REF A DIR TO AMEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHINGTON JUN NEWS BRIEF STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO WHAT FR THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI PENINSULA, STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B MSG TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THA SUCH REQ WAS MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED IMMEDIATELS TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND OPERATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

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ACTION TAKEN

1945

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by authority of OPNAV SE10.1E AND D.A S-18,
on 16 NOV 76 (OJAG/ADS) 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
DEPUTY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 57 Ex 48 LIBERTY

MR MAY NEW
Room 6247 — STATE — PH # 632-05

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C.

67809

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/IIC
SERVICE

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ON SERVICE - TEXT
13 JUN 67

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TO RLEQWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUPJS/OSD
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RUHC/DEPT STATE
RUQNKF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEOPSA/CINCST
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RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTRE/CIN SIX ZERO
ST
S E C R E T 0845 JUN 67.
ATO913002THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPTONED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS TUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATUON ON YESTERDAYS
INNIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNAZIONAL
NUSZON.
3. THE AREA IS NOTTA COMMON PASSAGE
OR SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOOOTA
DECLAREDTTAZA CLOSE
TT NUTRALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE TGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL QUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
; CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13JUN67

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. I ES :ID AT
QUOTZ HIGH SPEED KNOOTE WESTWARD TTOTOARD ENEMY COAST.
BZ/ OF NAVY HADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARDMENTOOF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
COME
TT 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERZLY READ OFF SBVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSOD HIM FR A LABEL FOO TH STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLA TTREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA JEQUSTED HE CONSULT SOTH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
KOULD BLOCH CALE
BAK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
QUOTZD HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEUR BA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUSZ BE WELL DIRLLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEUR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE; IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

AY'S RROEOUS AZTACK
RESULTZD FROM TO
TGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLOAN SOME PORTUON OF
THE GRZAZ VICTORY BEING SHARED BY UOF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SRING. GP-3.
BZ
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on 16 Nov 76 OK Spain Engr Mgr. 9 Nov 1972
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James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

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S E C R E T 09 JUN 67.
AI 09/1300Z THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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) by authority of: ODNAY 5510.1E AND DIA 5-15.99
on 16 Nov 1976 O'Boyle JAG Sec Regs. 5A of
(Date) (Signature) (Rank) 11 NOV 1976
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES)
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ACTION DEPARTMENT
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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPHONED THE ALUSNA FOLLOWING
SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE FURTHER INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS
INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 15
MILES FROM COAST.
2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AR
DBL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM.
3. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
4. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT
QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
7. MOD NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT.
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
COULD. BLOCH FLOP
PACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T
QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK
RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF
THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. GP-3.

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RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
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S E C R E T 0615Z JUN 67
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(Date) (Signature: JAG Sec Cust) (Rank)
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RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCHCP/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 3020 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117302Z JUN 67
     B. ( AMCNO TEL AVIV 4170 JUN 67
REF A REQ TO AMEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHINGTON JUN NEWS
STORY STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA. STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B MSG TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THAT SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
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on 16 NOV 76. [illegible] JAG Sec Ltr

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PAGE 3 RUSNVL 0049 S E C R E T

AND OUR

EW CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS WOULD BE CARRIED TO
[illegible] APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF GAZA (WHICH BASED ON CURR
STATE). 2. IF CERTAIN THAT LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID

ON POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS INJURED OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST. 3. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCK REPORTED LAST PILOT INTERVIEWED. PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF SHIP. BLOCK DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. WAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CONFIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

PAGE 2 OF 2 — 191815Z Jun

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18
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P 151615Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN 090015Z 67.
SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 14129Z JUN 67*
B. USDAO 0529 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0827 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0834 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0845 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0849 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0852 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0856 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0864 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0866 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.
FOR RADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY.. FOLLOWING IS.....

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Doc 45 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

NOFORN

(PAGE 1 OF)
CON
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DTG 151615Z JUN 67

PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0530Z/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (IDF/FLO) AT APPROX 0814002. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081200Z POSIT 3129N 3333E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR BAR ZON COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 0815302 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AND
D SAID IDF HELOS HAD NOT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

PAGE 2nd (C)

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0530Z/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. (C) AT APPROX 0815402, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO [illegible] TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 081610Z (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 081625Z, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB RUNNING NORTH. AT 081635Z, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

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on 16 Nov 76 OP Spain JAG Sec Mgr.

PAGE 4 RUQNVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
ON CATLANG CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE NUMBER SENT WAS FOUR OR FORTY BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081820Z.
6. (C) WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN ON
DF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH U.S. NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTHER AMPLIFYING REMARKS
CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.
7. (C) ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.
8. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
PAGE 5 RUQNVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
QUOTE: PAGE 5 RUQNVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
GENL CASSIDY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY
SURVIVORS. GENL CASSIDY WAS INFORMED THAT WERE POSSIBLY
ALL IN HOLD OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.
9. (S) AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCK CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO ENQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCK READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT
THESE WERE:
A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM
SEA.
ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCK FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

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S E C R E T NOFORN 0900/2 JUN 67.
FIDAL SECTION OF TWO
THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH
COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE
CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND
GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITAL HEADING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E
DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF
PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR
AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS
OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE.
10. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR
SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
BUT PHONE CONNECTION/BQDLVERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

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TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG
BACK WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE
THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO
REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY
REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN
POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION
WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER TAN USDAO
TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO
FLO IMMEDIATELY.
11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
TO ALUSNA:
A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY
BUT WERE REFUSED.
B. N
MTB'S CONTIOPFBLEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL 581504Z WITH
NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND
OTHER EQUIPME T.
C MTB PERSONNEL STATE TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR
IN SEA.
D. IDF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 08131-Z AND
WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 0815047

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E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 13 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

10. (S) AT 130730Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 130330Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

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13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 130930Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14. (S) AT APPROX 131915Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I. REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0933/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
16. (S) AT APPROX 131200Z WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID ATED IN QUOTE MALIC OU NTRUE STORIES AND
REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

PAGE 6 RUQMVL 0933/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 131255Z, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GENL RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (C) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CAN BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. (COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

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SECRET

ACTION TAKEN:

JUN 10 4 29 AM '67

SECRET

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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
~~TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR~~
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
S S C R E T 0927 JUN 67.
YOUR 171947Z JUN NOTAL.
1. IDF FLO UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINT ON EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY O COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFIC AL TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED IN MSG 0922 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
BT

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OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999
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16 Nov 76 OR Spain JAG Sec Mgr

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

PAGE 1 OF

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RUFPRK/USCINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUQMDV/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUFPRW/CINCUSAFE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
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RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

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CINCUSNAVEUR

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

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PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0054 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L DTG:081354Z JUN 67.
SUBJECT: [illegible]
1. IDF HAS PASSED IDF PRESS SPOKESMAN STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS AT 0530Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107-3340E) AREA AT 0900 TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT [illegible] VESSEL FLED. IT WAS LATER CONFIRMED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL. ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 15 MILES OFF THE COAST UNQUOTE.
2. [illegible] APOLOGIES FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0829.
3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.
4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DIG 0.2.
5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.
6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO.

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0054 C O N F I D E N T I A L
[illegible] AVAILABLE ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONV. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTACT WITH USN NETS.
7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMPT CONTACT NON PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 6 KNOTS NORTHERLY COURSE 60 NM WEST OF ASHELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYN STARBOARD AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.
8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED. HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIATE NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.
9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NO COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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E.O. 12958 as amended
BY authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-16, 419/RDS-3A of 11 Oct 1976
16 Nov 76 DIC Express JAG Sec Cust
(Signature) (Date)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
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RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
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RUFPBW/USAFE
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT DAO

PAGE 1 OF 5

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RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67

I OF II.

ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO
RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR
MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE
S OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT
EIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMOR, THE IDF JAG.
AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT
FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO
EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY,
STON, D.C.
THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN
ERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS
S: QUOTE
1. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE
OM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY
T IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK
DE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH
ELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE. FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND
HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS
SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE
OUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO
SISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY
TIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR
ORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE
FICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT
Y WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH.
F NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING
E REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
NQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT
ALUE.
3. SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT
K ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING
KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY
DENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES
TING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE
NTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE
EPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

DIA

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B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS, THE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTYS SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STAN DING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E and DIA 5-18, 990 and DOS 3A or 11 Nov 1476
on 16 Nov 76 [signature] JAGC USN
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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FINAL SECTION OF II.
(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. OHESE OVSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OHEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. OHE IDF CNO DECIDED THAO ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENOIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME OO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBEROY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0928 2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WIOH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IO WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATOACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD IOS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.
COMMENOS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT A POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.

3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:

A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICAOIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIVERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, SOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

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C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.

D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.

4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.

5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.

6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3

BT

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(Canceled) (Changed to
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-6, 999/RLS-3A
on 16 Nov 1976 (Date) (Signature) (Rank) OF 11 NOV 1976 JAG Sec Court
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RUEPNAA/CNO
RUENC/DEPT STAE
RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDFA/CINCSTRIKE
RUEHD/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
RUFPEK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPEW/USAFE
RUFYAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT :- ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTB'S DE
RONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 31.25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
BT

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... OPNAV 5510.1C AND DIF-
5-15, 9119/RDS-311 OF
11 NOV 1976
16 Nov 76 DK Spann JRG Sec Cont

ORIGINATOR SECTION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CO OI O2 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 CIT SD

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NCU LONDON

PAGE 1 OF

CON			
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DTG 081414Z Jun 67

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION TAKEN

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NC

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CO RUDLMD
DE RUDLAVL 3520 1672333
ZNY CCCCC
O 2615002 JUN 67
FM USDA TEL ACIV ISRH
NH
TO RUCIJUA/CNO
RUDLKE/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUCRCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 3520 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117302 JUN 67
B. AMCNO TEL AVIV 4176 JUN 67
REF A MSG TO AMEMB TEL AVIV CITED WASHINGTON JUN NEWS
~~BT~~ STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED ALUSNA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHETHER THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA. STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B MSG TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THAT SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

DECLASSIFIED

(Authority) (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5.18,
on 16 NOV 76 (NM) EDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

DOC 57 EX 48 LIBERTY 654

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NEA/ARP

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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FM USDO TEL AVIS/ISRAEL
TO RUEOHB/WHITE HOUSE
RUPJS/OSD
RUPNAA/CNO
RUHC/DEPT STATE
RUPNKF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCST
UNE
RUSLMD/CINCNAVEUR
RUKDA/JCS
INFO JUPJ"DUA
RUHDT"XISUV
RUFPBKICINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRL/CTO SIX ZERO PT TWO
JUFPBW/17-13
SUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTRE/CTO SIX ZERO
BT
S E C R E T 0845 JUN 67.
ATOD BOOZTHE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TZLEPTOISED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS TUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS
INNIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTZD AND RECOGNIZOD AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTZRNAZIONAL
KUSZOM.
3. THE AREA IS NOTTA COMMVN PASSAGE
OR SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOOOTA
DECLAREDTTAZA CLOSE
TT NUZRALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE IGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL OUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13JUN67

CLASSIFICATION (cancelled) (Changed to SECRET
by authority of CINCUSNAVEUR and DIA S-18,999/R05-70
on 16 Nov 76 LCDR Kevin TAG Sig Appt 8 Nov 1976
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
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CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/IIC
SERVICE

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IMMEDIATE

ON SERVICE - TEXT
13 JUN 67

655

James M. Fennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

9

12

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTZD. 1 MS .:0 AT
QUOTZ HIGH SPEED KNUOTE WESTWARD TTOTOARD ENEMY COAST.
WTW OF NAVY HADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARBLENTOOF
LL-ARISH FROM SEA.
GOVE
T: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERZLY READ OFF SBVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSOD HIM FR A LABEL FOO TH STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPTA TTOEAHOLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA JEQUSTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
WOULD BLOCH CALE
BAK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
QUOTZD HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESZMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO MISPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUSZ BE WELL DIRLLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEUR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE; IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

AY'S HROEOUS AZTACK
RESULTZD FROM TO
IGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLOAN SOME PORTUON OF
THE GRZAZ VICTORY BEING SHARED BY UDF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SRING. GP-3.
BZ
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00 RUDLKD
DE RUQMVL 0845 1601538
ZNY SSSSS
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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUERNAN/CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUQKCT/CONSIXTHFLT
RUEDPCA/CINCSTRIKE
RH
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZETO-
PT
S E C R E T 0845 JUN 67.
AI 09/1300Z-THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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(PAGE 1 OF 2)

DTG 091520Z JUN 67

EX 10

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Encl 5-18,9 ROS-3A

NAVEXOS NCU LON 2100/3 (REV. 10-57)

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPHONED TO ALUSNA FOLLOWING SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE FURTHER INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.

1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 3 MILES FROM COAST.

2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AR
DBL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM.

3. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.

4. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.

5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.

7. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM SEA.

COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT. COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH FLOR
RMACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE.

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0845 S E C R E T

QUOTED READING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.

3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. GP-3.

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FM RUSNVL/USAG TEL AV ISRAEL
TO RUEPNW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCS/OSD
RUEPNA/CNO
RUSHC/DEPT STATE
RUMKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUCDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUFPRK/CINCEURAMSEC JCK
RUEWDA/JCS
INFO RUEPCS/DIA
RUERDA/USUN
RUTPRM/CTG SIX ZERO [illegible] TWO
RUFPBW/USAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUFKRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O R R E C T COPY JUN 07
NEW TEGUCAN, GRDN MOORE WMCO AND ALUSNA, TEL AVIV AND JCS, DTPO J-3 MC

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by authority of SNAVSSIO/IG & DIA S-13599/CAS-3A & USN
on 16 Nov 76 QR & ps 5G SAG Secty 21 Jun 76
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OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0040 S E C R E T NOD

RECURRENCE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT. 1. A

VICE ID EDFENSIVE ASSISTANCE
NAVY SPOKESMAN, LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, TELEPHONED FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.
TO LUSNA: A. FOLLOWING ATTACK WHILE ISRAELI IDF
APPROACHED LIBERTY AND AT 1287Z ASKED BY LCDR DUTE DO YOU
NEED HELP UNDUCTE. LIBERTY REPLIED DUCTE NO THANK YOU. WE
DO NOT NEED HELP UNDUCTE. [illegible] REMAINED IN AREA UNTIL 1504Z SEARCHING
[illegible]
SEA, BUT RECOVERED TWO RUBBER LIFE BOATS, ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND
ONE PAMPHLET ON TRANSISTORS. NIB PERSONNEL NOW STATE POSITIVELY
THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP INTO SEA AND NONE IN SEA.
B. TWO IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 1302Z TO 1321Z AND WERE
WAVED OFF BY SKIP. WHEN TOLD HELICOPTERS SHIP DID NO DESIRE
HELP, HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH OVER 5 KILOMETER RADIUS UNTIL 1504Z.
C. LT COL BLOCH HAS INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT
EXCEPT ONE WHO IS NOW ON AIR MISSION. ALL STATE THEY SAW NO CREW
MEMBER EITHER SEA AND NONE IN SEA. D. IDF INSTRUCTED LIGHT
[illegible] SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL
CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS. STATED THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY
IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MISSING PERSONNEL BUT UNDERSTOOD
SHIP NEEDED NO HELP. E. IDF NAVY STATES UNDER STANDARD WIND

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0040 S E C R E T
AND CUR
SHIP CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS WOULD BE CARRIED TO
[illegible] APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH (SIGN SAISED BY CMEN
STAFF). 2. IF CERTAIN THAN LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID

ON POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS INJURED
OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN
VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF
FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE
BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST.
C. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCH REPORTED LAST PILOT INTER-
VIEWED. PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS
WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF SHIP. BLOCH DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN
VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. HAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CON-
FIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIN 5-19-7
on 16 Nov 16 OK Spain JAGSec Nyn
RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

CZCKDB543ZCNGB653
PP RUDLKD
DE RUUMVL 0900/1 1661620
ZNY SSSSS
P 0916.2Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N NOFORN 0900Z 67.
SECTION . OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 141250Z JUN 67
B. USDAO 0525 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0827 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0834 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0845 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0849 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0852 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0856 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0864 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0880 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0892 JUN 67.
FOR RADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY.. FOLLOWING IS.....

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OF 11 NOV 1976
16 Nov 76 QR Spain JT16 5.c. Mgt
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DTG 15 1615 Z OCT 67

PAGE 2 RUCNVL 0330/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDEN AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (IDF/FLO) AT APPROX 0814000Z. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 081200Z POSIT 3120N 3333E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS ON RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR WAR ZON COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 0815302 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AN-
D SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

PAGE 3 RUCNVL 0330/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. (C) AT APPROX 0815402Z, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO FLO TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 0816102 (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 0816252, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB RUNNING NORTH. AT 0816352, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

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PAGE 4 RUQNVL 0900Z S E C R E T NOFORN
ON CARRYING CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE. ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT THE NUMBER SENT WAS FOUR OR FORTY BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION FROM HAND HELD FLAGS. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081720Z.

6. (C) WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN OF [redacted] OF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM WITH U.S. NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTHER AMPLIFYING REMARKS CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.

7. (C) ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z. SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.

8. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM

PAGE 5 RUQNVL 0900Z 1 S E C R E T NOFORN

QUOTE. PAGE 5 RUQNVL 0900Z 1 S E C R E T NOFORN
GENL CASSIDY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY SURVIVORS OF [redacted] BUT WERE POSSIBLY ALL IN VICINITY OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.

9. (S) AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS EXPECTING REPLY TO ENQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCH READ OFF LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT THESE WERE:

A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM SEA.

ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCH FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF

BT

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S E C R E T NOFORN 0920/2 JUN 67.
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITAL HEADING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE
10. (C) AT APPROX 09:48Z, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS BUT PHONE CONNECTION AND DELIVERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

PAGE 4 of 6

PAGE 2 RUQMVA 0920/2 S E C R E T NTFORN
TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG BACKUP WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER TAN USDAO TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO FLO IMMEDIATELY.
11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS TO ALUSNA:
A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY BUT WERE REFUSED.
B. N
MTB'S CONTIOPFBLEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL 55i504Z WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND OTHER EQUIPME T.
C MTB PERSONNEL STATE TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR IN SEA.
D. IDF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 08131-Z AND WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 081504Z

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by authority of [illegible]

E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

12 (S) AT 100830Z. LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 100330Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

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13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 100930Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14 (S) AT APPROX 101915Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTAC BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBABLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
16. (S) AT APPROX 131200Z WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE ITEM). ALUSNA SAID ATED IN QUOTE MALIC OU NTRUE QUOTE STORIES AND REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIPS. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

Page 6 of 6

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 131255Z, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GENL RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (C) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19 COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CANNOT BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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S S C R E T 0927 JUN 67.
YOUR (719472) JUN NOTAL.
1. IDF FMC UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINT ON EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY O COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFIC AL TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED BY MSG 0923 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0384 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE.

1. IDF HAS PASSED IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS AT 0500Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107-3340E) AREA AT NOON TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT WAS VERIFIED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 15 MILES OFF THE C
UNQUOTE.

2. LOCAL APOLOGIES FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0585.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENTAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DIO 00.2.

5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO,

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0384 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TEL AVIV) ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONF. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTAC WITH USN NET.

7. ALUSN OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEMP CONTACT NOT PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 8 KNOTS NORMALLY, COURSE 60 NM WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYN
STARBOARD
AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED; HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIAT NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NO COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
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Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy

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PAGE 2 RUEMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928Z JUN 67

SECTION 1 OF 11.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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PAGE 3 RUEMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL-ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.
SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES FIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

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B. IN ACCORDANCE WI IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS, IN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RAD. WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 28O TO 30 KNOTS, HTHE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION. IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTY'S SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STAN DING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS ~~THIS~~ HAPPENED, WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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FINAL SECTION OF II.
(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORECASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OVSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. ONE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALLL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATTACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD ITS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.
COMMENOS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0926/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.

3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:

A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICAOIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIVERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDN'T HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

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C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.

D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.

4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.

5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.

6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3

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C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT
AND MTR'S DE
RONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 31:25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3
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CO RUDLKD
DE RUDLVL 0920 1672000
ZNY CCCCC
O 2609ZOZ JUN 67
FM USDA TEL ACIV ISRH
NH
TO RUCIJUA/CNO
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEACGF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEPJSDIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0920 JUN 67
REF: A. STATE DEPT 211695 DTG 117202Z JUN 67
B. (AMEMB TEL AVIV 4175 JUN 67
REF A REQ TO AMEMB TEL ACIV CITED WASHINGTON JUN NEWS
STORY STATING ISRAEL GOVT QUERIED AUSDA ON 5 JUN AS TO
WHAT EF THERE WERE ANY AMERICAN SHIPS OPERATING OFF SINAI
PENINSULA, STATE REQUESTED EMBASSY COMMENT.
REF B REQ TO STATE DEPT CONTAINS DENIAL THA SUCH REQ WAS
MADE AND STATES ANY SUCH REQ WOULD HAVE BEEN FORWARDED
IMMEDIATELY TO CNO AND OTHER HIGH NAVAL COMMANDERS AND
REPEATED TO STATE DEPT. GP-3.
BT

1794

ACTION TAKEN

DECLASSIFIED

authority (cancelled) (changed to)
by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND D.I.A. 5-18,
on 16 NOV 76. [illegible] JAG & Comp
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Doc 57 Ex 48 LIBERTY

[illegible] NEWHOUSE (D) 4-7 STATE PH # 632-07

NEA/ARN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/IIC
SERVICE

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DE JUSMVZ 0845 1601530
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P 0915202 JUN 67
FM USDO TEL AVISISRAEL
TO RUEQMW/WHITE HOUSE
RUPJS/OSD
RUPNAA/CNO
RUMC/DEPT STATE
RUDMKF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCST
UNE
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
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INFO JUPJ"DUA
RUEIDT/XISUN
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRA/CTO SIX ZERO [illegible]
JUFPDG/17-13
JUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTRE/CTO SIX ZERO
ST
S E C R E T 0945 JUN 67.
ATOS 13002THE IDF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN
LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH TELEPTONED TO ALUSNA FOLOWING
SEBEC POINTS AS TUOTE: FURTHE INFORMATUON ON YESTERDAYS
INMIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.
1. SHIP WASSIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13
MILES FROM COAST.
2/ PRESENCE IN AFIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNAZIONAL
KUSZOM.
3. THE AREA IS NOTTA COMMVN PASSAGE
OR SHIPS.
4. ZGYXTTOOOTA
DECLARECTTAZA CLOSE
TT NUZRALS.
5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIT EL QUSEIR.

ACT...ASD/ISA-9 J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACSA-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15
CSA-1 CSAF-1 CMC-6 SSDSG-1 GEN LEMNITZER-1 FILE-1 (72) RLL/JB

1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: NMCC-1 (73) 12 JUN 67

EX COPY NMCC-1 (74) 13 JUN 67

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on 16 NOV 76 [illegible]

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

694

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[illegible] MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. I ASSUMED AT
QUOTE HIGH SPEED KNOTS WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
STOP OF NAVY MADERLIER REPORTSOF BOMBARDMENTOOF
EL-ARISH FROM SEA.
DONE
TO: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN
POINTS ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FR A LABEL FOR TH STATEMENT
ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENTS
COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY TREABLE ON HIS OWN AND
ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO
WOULD BLOCH CALE
BAK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE
QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BA
A HIGHLY
SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT
UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFIC
COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S
ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN
IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS
THAN HALF THE SIZE; IS MANY YEARS OLDERM
LACKS THE
ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERT.
3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YEYE

AY'S RROEOUS ATTACK
RESULTED FROM TO
TGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF
THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMED AIR
FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SEEN. GP-3.
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... 16 Nov 96 OR Span Rec Mgr. 9 Nov 1972
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FM ,,,CZCKDA724ZCKGA021
OO RUDLKD
DE RUQMVL 0845 1601530
ZNY SSSSS
O P 091520Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/OSD
RUEPNAN/CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
RUCKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
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RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
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BT
S E C R E T 0845 JUN 67.
SUBJ 09/1300Z THE DCF ASSISTANT ARMY SPOKESMAN

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(PAGE 1 OF 2)

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DTG 091524Z JUN 67

ACTION PRIORITY E 3

INFO

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PAGE 2 RUGMVL 0845 S E C R E T

LT COL MICHAELY BLOCH TELEPHONED TO ALUSNA FOLLOWING SEVEN POINTS AS QUOTE FURTHER INFORMATION ON YESTERDAYS INCIDENT WITH THE AMERICAN SHIP. UNQUOTE.

1. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES FROM COAST.

2. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AR
DBL AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOM.

3. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.

4. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.

5. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.

6. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.

7. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM SEA.

COMMENT: 1. AT FIRST COL BLOCH MERELY READ OFF SEVEN POINTS. ALUSNA PRESSED HIM FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF INCIDENT. COL BLOCH COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH FLOR
RUMACK IN TWO MINUTES WITH THE ABOVE.

PAGE 3 RUGMVL 0845 S E C R E T

QUOTED HEADING. 2. WHILE EL QUSEIR BEARS A HIGHLY SUPERFICIAL RESEMBLANCE TO LIBERTY, ALUSNA CAN NOT UNDERSTAND HOW TRAINED PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS COULD BE SO INEPT TO CARRY OUT YESTERDAY'S ATTACK. CERTAINLY IDF NAVY MUST BE WELL DRILLED IN IDENTIFICATION OF EGYPTIAN SHIPS. EL QUSEIR IS LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE, IS MANY YEARS OLDER, AND LACKS THE ELABORATE ANTENNA ARRAY AND HULL MARKINGS OF LIBERTY.

3. ALUSNA EVALUATES YESTERDAY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK RESULTED FROM TRIGGER HAPPY EAGERNESS TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF THE GREAT VICTORY BEING SHARED BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AND IN WHICH NAVY WAS NOT SHARING. GP-3. 57

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RUHKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUELKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUFPBK/CINCEURANSOCOM
RUEWDA/JCS
INFO RUEPCG/DIA
RUCRDT/USUN
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PI TWO
RUEEBW/USAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CTG SIX ZETO
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S E C R E T 0649 JUN 07
REF TEGKAN RADM [redacted] AND ALLONA, TEL AVIV AND JCS, DTG JUN [redacted]

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16 Jan 76 by authority of CNO/JAG SECNAVINST 5510.1G & DIA S-1 5200/CAS-3A & NAVY
(Date) (Signature: JAG Section) 21 Jun 76
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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(PAGE 1 OF 2)
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Encl 2 3-18, SECNAVINST 5510.1G-3A 690
Doc 62 Ex 48 LIBERTY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0048 S E C R E T

RELATING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT. 1.

AMB BROSHAN, LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, TELEPHONED FOLLOWING STATEMENTS TO ALUSNA: A. FOLLOWING ATTACK THREE ISRAELI MTB APPROACHED LIBERTY AND AT 1227Z ASKED BY LOUD. QUOTE DO YOU NEED HELP UNQUOTE. LIBERTY REPLIED AGAIN NO AND THANK YOU. WE DO NOT NEED HELP UNQUOTE. MTBS REMAINED IN AREA UNTIL 1504Z SEARCHING SEA, BUT RECOVERED TWO RUBBER LIFE RAFTS, ONE SURVIVAL KIT AND ONE PAMPHLET ON TRANSISTORS. MTB PERSONNEL NOW STATE POSITIVELY THEY SAW NO CREWMEMBERS JUMP INTO SEA AND NONE IN SEA.

B. ~~WHO~~ IDF HELICOPTERS WERE OVER LIBERTY 1302Z TO 1321Z AND WERE WAVED OFF BY SHIP. WHEN TOLD HELICOPTERS SHIP DID NO DESIRE HELP. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH OVER 5 MILOMETER RADIUS UNTIL 1501Z. C. LT COL BLOCH HAS INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE WHO IS NOW ON AIR MISSION. ALL STATE THEY SAW NO CREW MEMBER ENTER SEA AND NONE IN SEA. D. IDF INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS. STATED THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO YESTERDAY IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MISSING PERSONNEL BUT UNDERSTOOD SHIP NEEDED NO HELP. E. IDF NAVY STATES UNDER STANDARD WIND

PAGE 4 RUOMVL 0048 S E C R E T

AND SEA CONDITIONS SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS WOULD BE CARRIED TO GAZA BEACH APPROX OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH (SHIP SAILED E/W COURSE) 2. IF CERTAIN THAT LIBERTY STATED SHE NEEDED NO HELP AND DID NOT REQUEST ASSISTANCE AS ABOVE STATEMENTS OF IDF FORCES AT SCENE THAT NO PERSONS INJURED OR WERE IN WATER CONSIDER SEARCH EFFORT ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW UNACCOUNTED CREWMEMBERS BELIEVE NO EFFORT TOO GREAT. IDF FORCES CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 10 JUNE AND WILL COMPLY ANY OTHER REQUEST. 3. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED COLONEL BLOCH REPORTED LAST PILOT INTERVIEWED. PILOT STATES HE THINKS HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN MAKE OF SHIP. BLOCH DOES NOT CREDIT REPORT IN VIEW OTHER WITNESSES. WAS LIBERTY PROVIDED INFO WHICH COULD CONFIRM OR DENY THIS POSSIBILITY.

Pg 2 of 2 — 1918152 Jun

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN 0900Z, 67.
SECTION . OF 2
SUBJ: (U) USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
REFERENCES:
A. TOUR 1412Ø2Z JUN 67
B. USDAO 0525 JUN 67.
C. USDAO 0527 JUN 67.
D. USDAO 0534 JUN 67.
E. USDAO 0545 JUN 67.
F. USDAO 0549 JUN 67.
G. USDAO 0552 JUN 67.
H. USDAO 0556 JUN 67.
I. USDAO 0564 JUN 67.
J. USDAO 0580 JUN 67.
K. USDAO 0592 JUN 67.
FOR RADM KIDD, PRESIDENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY.. FOLLOWING IS.....

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of 11 NOV 1976
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Doc. 45 Ex 48 - LIBERTY

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PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0980/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING USS LIBERTY INCIDENT AS OBSERVED AND RECORDED BY ALUSNA TEL AVIV CDR E.C. CASTLE, USNRR:
1. (C) ALUSNA CALLED TO ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (LNO/FLO) AT APPROX 0814002. MET THERE BY LT COL MICHAEL BLOCH, ASSISTANT IDF SPOKESMAN WHO SAID ISRAEL AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. SHIP AT 0812002 ~~PUSH~~ 3129N 3033E. SAID MAYBE SHIP WAS U.S. NAVY. SAID HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. HAD NO OTHER INFO. MADE APOLOGIES AND REQUESTED INFO OF OTHER U.S. SHIPS NEAR WARZONE COASTS. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF B.
2. (C) ALUSNA REPORTED INCIDENT TO U.S. AMBASSADOR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORT FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY (FONMIN). AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO SITE OF INCIDENT TO ATTEMPT IDENTIFY SHIP AND REQUESTED HELO FLIGHT FROM DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ISRAEL FONMIN.
3. (C) AT APPROX 0815302 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF U.S. DEPT ISRAEL FONMIN CALLED ALUSNA AN...
D SAID IDF HELOS HAD PUT U.S. SURVIVORS ABOARD ISRAELI NAVY SHIPS AND THAT ALUSNA COULD BE FLOWN TO MEET THEIR ARRIVAL IN PORT. BEFORE DEPUTY DIRECTOR COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT LT COL BLOCH CAME ON SAME PHONE AND SAID THE REPORT OF

Page 2 of 3

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0980/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
PICKING UP SURVIVORS WAS COMPLETELY INACCURATE AND THAT NO SUCH ACTION HAD TAKEN PLACE. BLOCH THEN SAID THE ATTACKED SHIP HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS USS LIBERTY AND THAT FLO WAS ARRANGING HELO FLIGHT FOR ALUSNA TO FLY TO SHIP AND COMMUNICATE WITH ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE WITH C.O. OF LIBERTY. USDAO SENT FLASH MESSAGE, REF C.
4. (C) AT APPROX 0815402Z, FLO CALLED ALUSNA AND SAID TO PROCEED TO F.O TO PICK UP ESCORT FOR HELO FLIGHT. ASTALUSNA ACCOMPANIED ALUSNA.
5. (C) AT 0816102 (TIME RECORDED BY ASTALUSNA), HELO WAS AIRBORNE FROM DOV HOSS AIRFIELD ON NORTHERN EDGE OF TEL AVIV. HELO PROCEEDED ON DIRECT INTERCEPT TO SHIP. AT 0816252, HELO PASSED OVER THREE IDF MTB RUNNING NORTH. AT 0816352, HELO WAS OVER USS LIBERTY BUT HAD NEITHER ELECTRIC MEGAPHONE OR HAND HELD SIGNAL LIGHT. ALUSNA HAD PLANNED TO BE LOWERED ABOARD LIBERTY FOR BRIEF CONFERENCE WITH C.O. ALUSNA IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND NOT ABLE TO CONVEY HIS IDENTITY TO BRIDGE OF LIBERTY. LIBERTY MADE PREPARATIONS TO RECEIVE ALUSNA ABOARD ON FORECASTLE. SPEED OF SHIP (WHICH IT IS ASSUMED COULD NOT BE REDUCED FOR DAMAGE CONTROL REASONS) CAUSED HELO PILOT TO SAY HE COULD NOT MAKE TRANSFER. SHIP THEN WAVED OFF TRANSFER ATTEMPT. ALUSNA WROTE NOTE INQUIRING AS TO CASUALTIES

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
ON CALLING CARD AND DROPPED IT ABOARD LIBERTY IN IMPROMTU PACKAGE.
ALUSNA UNDERSTOOD SHIP TO SIGNAL AFFIRMATIVE CASUALTIES AND THOUGHT
THE NUMBER SENT WASFOOR OR FORTY BUT IS UNCERTAIN OF TRANSMISSION
FROM HAND HELD LIGHT. HELO HAD TO DEPART BECAUSE OF FALL OF
DARKNESS. OFFICER ON BRIDGE GAVE A THUMBS UP SIGN. ENTIRE HELO
TRIP WAS FRUSTRATION AND ESSENTIALLY NON-PRODUCTIVE EXCEPT ALUSNA
WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE LIBERTY UNDERWAY ON OWN POWER AND TO NOTE
LIST AND SOME TOPSIDE DAMAGE. HELO DEPARTED LIBERTY AT 081700Z
AND TOUCHED DOWN TEL AVIV 081725Z.
6. (C) WHILE ALUSNA ON FLIGHT, DATT RECEIVED TELEPHONE REPORT
FROM IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN OF
DF PRESS NOTICE ON INCIDENT WHICH
WAS FOR RELEASE AT 081930Z. INTERIM COL TAYLOR OF DIA HELD PHONE
CONV WITH DATT. DATT UNDERSTOOD FROM PHONECON THAT LIBERTY NOT
SEEKING IDF ASSISTANCE AND THAT SHIP HAD SATISFACTORY RADIO COMM
WITH U.S. NAVY. INFO THIS PARA AND OTHER AMLLIFYING REMARKS
CONTAINED IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG REF D.
7. (C) ON RETURN EMBASSY, ALUSNA INFORMED THAT GENL GETTY OF
NMCC REQUESTED PHONE REPORT WHICH WAS MADE AT APPROX 082100Z.
SUBSTANCE OF PHONE CON SAME AS PARA 5 ABOVE.
8. (C) AT APPROX 091200Z, ARMA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM

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QUOTE. PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0900/1 S E C R E T NOFORN
GENL CASSIDY OF NMCC ASKING USDAO TEL AVIV TO DETERMIN IF
IDF PLANES OR SHIPS HAD SIGHTED ANY BODIES OR PICKED UP ANY
SURVIVORS. NEW DATT DID NOT KNOW WERE MISSING MEN WERE POSSIBLY
ALL IN BOAT OF LIBERTY. GENL REQUESTED PHONE REPLY IF ANSER
AFFIRMATIVE. ALUSNA PASSED ENQUIRY TO FLO.
9. (C) AT 091300Z, LT COL BLOCK CALLED ALUSNA. ALUSNA WAS
EXPECTING REPLY TO ENQUIRY ON MISSING MEN. INSTEAD BLOCK READ OFF
LIST OF SEVEN POINTS OF FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING LIBERTY INCIDENT
THESE WERE:
A. SHIP WAS SIGHTED AND RECOGNIZED AS A NAVAL SHIP 13 MILES
FROM COAST.
B. PRESENCE IN A FIGHTING AREA IS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM.
C. THE AREA IS NOT A COMMON PASSAGE FOR SHIPS.
D. EGYPT HAD DECLARED THE AREA CLOSED TO NEUTRALS.
E. LIBERTY RESEMBLES THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR.
F. SHIP WAS NOT FLYING FLAG WHEN SIGHTED. SHE MOVED AT QUOTE
HIGH SPEED UNQUOTE WESTWARD TOWARD ENEMY COAST.
G. IDF NAVY HAD EARLIER REPORTS OF BOMBARDMENT OF EL-ARISH FROM
SEA.
ALUSNA PRESSED BLOCK FOR A LABEL FOR THE STATEMENT ASKING IF
BT

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OF 11 NOV 1976

S E C R E T NOFORN 0500/2 JUN 67.
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
THIS WERE AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE INCIDENT. LCOL BLOCH
COULD NOT SUPPLY A PREAMBLE ON HIS OWN AND ALUSNA REQUESTED HE
CONSULT WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHO COULD. BLOCH CALLED BACK AND
GAVE ABOVE NON-COMMITAL HEADING. USDAO SENT IMMEDIATE MSG REF E
DESCRIBING ABOVE EXCHANGE AND COMMENTING ON UNLIKELYHOOD OF
PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS CONFUSING LIBERTY AND EL QUSEIR
AND EVALUATING NAVY'S ERRONEOUS ATTACK AS RESULT OF EAGERNESS
OF IDF NAVY TO GLEAN SOME PORTION OF GREAT VICTORY BEING WON
BY IDF ARMY AND AIR FORCE.
10. (C) AT APPROX 09:40ØZ, ALUSNA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM
RADM MOORE AT NMCC REGARDING TYPE AND EXTENT OF SEARCHES FOR
SURVIVORS MADE BY IDF NAVY. RADM MOORE PUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
BUT PHONE CONNECTIOOTBQDLVERY POOR. ALUSNA STATED HE UNDERSTOOD

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PAGE 2 RUOMVL 0500/2 S E C R E T NTFORN
TENOR OF QUESTIONS AND WOULD ACT ON THAT BUT REQUESTED MSG
BACKUP WITH DETAILED QUESTIONS. ON QUERY ALUSNA TOLD RADM MOORE
THAT IN VIEW GENERAL RECENT NON-COOPERATION OF FLO REGARDING USDAO
REQUESTS FOR INFO ON HOSTILITIES, SLOWNESS OF REPLY TO QUERY
REGARDING POSSIBLE SURVIVORS, AND THE JUST RECEIVED QUOTE SEVEN
POINTS UNQUOTE THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR ISRAELI SEARCH ACTION
WOULD PROBABLY GET BETTER RESPONSE AT LEVEL HIGHER TAN USDAO
TO FLO. REQUESTS FOR INFO AND RENEWED SEARCH WERE PASSED TO
FLO IMMEDIATELY.
11. (S) AT 091630Z, LCOL BLOCH TELEPHONE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS
TO ALUSNA:
A. FOLLOWING ATTACK, 3 ISRAELI MTB'S OFFERED HELP TO LIBERTY
BUT WERE REFUSED.
B.
MTB'S CONTIOPFBLEARCH IN ATTACK AREA UNTIL 551504Z WITH
NEGATIVE RESULTS EXCEPT FOR RECOVERY OF RUBBER LIFE BOATS AND
OTHER EQUIPME T.
C. MTB PERSONNEL STATE TEY SAW NO ONE JUMP INTO THE SEA OR
IN SEA.
D. IDF HELICOPTORS WERE OVER LIBERTY 081305Z TO 08131-Z AND
WERE WAVED OFF. HELOS CONDUCTED SEARCH UNTIL 081504Z

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on 16 Nov 76 OPR/RDS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0900/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
E.

TCOL BLOCH HAD INTERVIEWED ALL PILOTS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE. ALL STATED THEY HAD SEEN NO ONE IN OR ENTERING WATER.

F. IDF HAD INSTITUTED LIGHT PLANE SEARCH UPON RECEIPT OF QUESTIONS REGARDING SEARCHES AND WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL DARKNESS 9 JUNE.

G. IDF NAVY ESTIMATED STANDARD WIND AND CURRENT CONDITIONS WOULD CARRY SURVIVORS OR DEBRIS TO POINT ON GAZA STIP COAST OPPOSITE CITY OF RAFAH.

H. IDF AGREED TO CONDUCT SEARCH ATTACK AREA AND WATERS TO GAZA COAST LINE BEGINNING FIRST LIGHT 13 JUNE.

I. AS ABOVE BEING DRAFTED AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF F, LTCOL BLOCH TELEPHONED INFO THAT LAST PILOT HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. THAT PILOT THOUGHT HE SAW SIX TO TEN YELLOW BOATS WITH PEOPLE IN WAKE OF LIBERTY. BLOCH DISCREDITED THIS REPORT.

10 (S) AT 1007Z, LTCOL BLOCH REPORTED AIR SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS BEGAN AT 1033Z AND THAT SURFACE SEARCH WOULD BEGIN IN AFTERNOON. ALUSNA RECOMMENDED TO US AUTHORITIES THAT IF NO RESULTS DEVELOPED BY NIGHTFALL, TERMINATION OF SEARCH BE AUTHORIZED. INFO THIS PARA SENT AS USDAO FLASH MSG, REF G.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0900/2 S E C R E T NOFORN

13. (S/NFD) AT APPROX 1009Z, USDAO SOURCE REPORTED SECONDARY SOURCE GAVE INFO GATHERED BY OVERHEARING IDF AF AIR-TO-GROUND CONTROL FREQUENCIES. INFO SUGGESTED THAT IDF AIRCRAFT MADE TWO OR THREE IDENTIFICATION PASSES OVER A SHIP SOMETIME PRIOR TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHIP HAD U.S. FLAG BUT NO PERSONNEL ON DECK. INFO THIS PARA FORWARDED TO LIMITED-ADDRESSEES INCLUDING CNO AND DIA IN USDAO 0854 JUN 67.

14 (S) AT APPROX 1019Z, IDF SPOKESMAN REPORTED NEGATIVE RESULTS FROM DAY LONG AIR AND SURFACE SEARCH BUT SAID IDF NAVY STILL OPERATING IN AREA AND WOULD CONTINUE ALERT WATCH FOR SURVIVORS. THIS INFO SENT IN USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF H.

15. (S/NFD) ON QUERY FROM DIA, USDAO TEL VIV IMMED MSG, REF I, REPORTED INABILITY TO RECHECK STORY OF SECONDARY SOURCE CITED PARA 13 ABOVE. HOWEVER USDAO WAS ABLE PROVIDE IN REF I INFO ON MTB ATTACK RECEIVED BY EMBASSY OFFICER FROM IDF NAVAL OFFICER WHO SAID HE WAS ABOARD MTB. SAID MTB'S LAUNCHED TORPEDOS AT LIBERTY WHEN THEY SAW HER UNDER ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT. MTB CREW SAW U.S. FLAG AFTER TORPEDO LAUNCH. SAID FLAG HAD BEEN OBSCURED BY SMOKE. IN SAME REF ALUSNA OFFERED PROBABLY BUT NOT CERTAIN SERIES OF EVENTS AS FOLLOWS:

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Authority for declassification (Change) to
) by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18,

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0903/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
A. IDF AIRCRAFT REPORTED AND IDENTIFIED LIBERTY AS U.S.
B. IDF AF HQ MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BROADCAST INFO TO ALL UNITS BUT PROBASLY UNINFORMED AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM STRIKE IN EGYPT HAD ATTACKED LIBERTY.
C. MTB'S SAW AIRCRAFT ATTACKING LIBERTY AND PRESUMED HER TO BE EGYPTIAN SHIP. THEY EAGERLY RACED INTO ACTION WITHOUT WAITING TO IDENTIFY OUR SHIP.
16. (S) AT APPROX 1312002 WHEN ALUSNA VISITED FLO ON OTHER BUSINESS, LTCOL BLOCH OPENED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WAS HEARING MALICIOUS UNTRUE STORIES ABOUT INCIDENT FROM U.S. (PRESUMABLY NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE IIEND. ALUSNA SAID ATED IN QUOTE MALIC OU NTRUE QUOTE STORIES AND
REMINDED BLOCH THAT SOME MONTHS EARLIER WHEN USN AIRCRAFT HAD ACCIDENTALLY PENETRATED THE ISRAELI AIR CONTROL ZONES, THE IDF AF CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE HAD ARROGANTLY ALTHOUGH FACETIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT NEXT TIME HE MIGHT HAVE TO ATTACK THE PLANES OR SHIP. BLOCH SAID THAT THAT OFFICER TALKS QUOTE A LOT OF NONSENSE UNQUOTE AND THAT HE HOPED ALUSNA DIDN'T THINK OTHER IDF OFFICERS WERE LIKE THAT. ALUSNA REPLIED HE JUST WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING BUT

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PAGE 6 RUQMVL 2930/2 S E C R E T NOFORN
OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LIBERTY INCIDENT.
17. (S) AT 1312552, LTCOL BLOCH CALLED ALUSNA TO REPORT IDF COFS GENL RABIN HAD APPOINTED AN OFFICIAL COURT OF INQUIRY IN THE INCIDENT INVOLVING USS LIBERTY. THIS INFO SENT AS USDAO IMMEDIATE MSG, REF J.
18. (C) ON 14 JUNE, ALUSNA WAS ASKED TO MEET IDF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMMODORE ERELL, AT FLO IN EARLY EVENING. COMMODORE ERELL PRESENTED APOLOGIES TO U.S. NAVY ON BEHALF OF IDF NAVY. ERELL STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO COMMENT ON ELEMENTS OF THE MISTAKE UNTIL AFTER COURT OF INQUIRY REACHED ITS FINDINGS. ON QUERY ERELL SAID HE PRESUMED FINDINGS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO USG. THIS INFO AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS SENT IN USDAO PRIORITY MSG, REF K.
19. COMMENT: A. ABOVE DOES NOT INCLUDE EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOI OF WHICH U.S. MILITARY ATTACHES HERE WERE AWARE BUT IN WHICH THEY TOOK NO PART.
B. DESPITE THE LENGTH AND DETAIL OF ABOVE IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT IT DOES NOT ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO REFERENCED MESSAGE REPORTS. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO USDAO TEL AVIV IT CANNOT BE PRESUMED THAT ONLY THE IDF KNOWS WITH CERTAINTY THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE TRAGIC INCIDENT.
C. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.
BT

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Declassification (correction) (Changed to
by authority of ODNAVSSIO.1E AND DIAS-18,
CNO/ADS-3A OF 11 Nov 1976

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ACTION TAKEN:

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TO RUDLXD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
BT
S S C R E T 0927 JUN 67.
YOUR 1719472 JUN NOTAL.
1. IDF FLG UNDERSTANDS REQUEST URGENT. COL BLOCH WILL TRY TO PROVIDE SOURCE OF POINT ON EGYPTIAN DECLARATION OF CLOSED AREA BY SUNDAY BUT SAYS IT MIGHT REQUIRE UNTIL MONDAY O COMPLY.
2. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT OR ALLUSION BY ANY ISRAELI OFFIC AL TO ALLEGED QUERY ON LOCATION U.S. SHIPS. STATE DEPT MSG C TED 1Y MSG 0920 JUNE IS ONLY MENTION RECEIVED THIS OFFICE SO FAR.
GP-3.
BT

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DECLASSIFIED: OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999
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ORIGINATOR SECTION

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0334 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I DNL0334 JUN 67.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ACCIDENTAL ATTACK ON U.S.S. LIBERTY, 8 JUNE.
1. FLO HAS PASSED IDF ARMY SPOKESMAN STATEMENT RELEASED TO PRESS AT 0930Z. QUOTE: AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL APPROACHED THE EL ARISH (3107N-3345E) AREA AT NOON TODAY. FIRE WAS OPENED ON THE VESSEL. AFTER IT WAS VERIFIED THAT THE VESSEL WAS NOT AN ENEMY VESSEL, ASSISTANCE WAS OFFERED BUT THE VESSEL CONTINUED UNDER ITS OWN STEAM. THE VESSEL BELONGS TO THE U.S. NAVY AND THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APOLOGIZED. THE VESSEL WAS 13 MILES OFF THE C UNQUOTE.

2. LOCAL APOLOGY FROM IDF PASSED TO ALUSNA EARLIER. SEE DAO 0325.

3. DAO HAS MADE NO COMMENT TO IDF, WHO ARE APPARENTLY VERY CONCERNED AND WORRIED HOW ACCIDENAL ATTACK WILL BE TREATED BY USG.

4. EGYPTIAN SHELLING ATTACK FROM SEA IN GAZA AREA REPORTED BY IDF YESTERDAY. SEE DAO 90.2.

5. ASSISTANCE AFTER ACCIDENT OFFERED BY IDF NAVY WHIC WE HAVE BEEN TOLD USS LIBERTY WAVED OFF.

6. REF PHONE CONVERSATION (COL TAYLOR DIA AND COL PERNA DAO.

Page 1 of 2 Pages

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0334 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(NEAR AVR.) ISRAELI HELICOPTERS NOT USED OR PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR RESCUE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PHONE CONT. USS LIBERTY DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEK ISRAELI ASSISTANCE, AND HAS SATISFACTORY RADIO CONTAC WITH USN NET.

7. ALUSNA OVERFLIGHT IN IDF HELICOPTER FOR INSPECTION AND ATTEM CONTACT NOW PRODUCTIVE, EXCEPT TO OBSERVE SHIP UNDER WAY AT APPROX 6 KNOTS NORMALLY, COURSE 60 NM WEST OF ASKELON AT 1930Z. LIBERTY LISTING APPROX 10 DEGYW
STARBOARD
AND MAY BE HAVING SOME STEERING DIFFICULTY.

8. IDF WILL RESPOND IN RESCUE IF ASKED. HOWEVER WE SHALL INITIAT NO REQUEST REPEAT NO REQUEST UNLESS ADVISED BY NMCC OR OTHER WASH AGENCY.

9. IDF REQUESTS THAT IF ANY OTHER US SHIPS (OR AIRCRAFT) ARE IN OR CONTEMPLATE ENTRANCE TO COMBATANT AREAS, WE PROVIDE APPROPRIATE N COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3.

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JOC.1 - EX 48-LIBERTY

132

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RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUDLNO/CINCNAVEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
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RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
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RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CIG SIX ZERO
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RUFJC/USDAO PARIS
RUEHCR/USDAO NOSNOZ

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PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67

SECTION 1 OF II.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EFRAT, AIDE TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWINRRG:
A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.
B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM COL SHIMGAR, THE IDF JAG.
C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EFRATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE
"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

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PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.
SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES. A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES FIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

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B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS, AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLINRRG THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 280 TO 30 KNOTS,HTHE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATION IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH. IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTYS SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHINRRG THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE., IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STAN DING ORDER

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SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EFRAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM RON, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN OVEREAGERNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C.O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MECHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EATENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

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by authority of OPNAV 5510.1E AND DIA 5-18, 999 / ADS-3A OF 11 NOV 1976
on 16 Nov 76 DKSpain JAGC Mgr
(Date) (Signature) (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

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FINAL SECTION OF II.
(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DIVCOM THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORE-CASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OVSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR. TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. THE IDF CNO DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

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PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALLL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (COL RON) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATOACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD IOS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.
COMMENOS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

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PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBEROY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.
3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:
A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.
B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIBERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. EL QUSEIR WAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBEROY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS IT ALSO COULDNIT HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

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PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOO SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.
D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC EFRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. M COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
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By NARA Date 12/31/96

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RUEDPPSA/CINCSTRIKE
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RUEKDA/JCS
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RUENDT/USUN
RUFPEK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZETO PT TWO
RUFPBU/USAFE
RUFYAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUEXRE/CTG SIX ZERO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.
ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT - ISRA RAFT
AND MTB'S DE
RONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08/1200Z,

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0825 C O N F I D E N T I A L
POSITION 31:25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. ILF HELICOPTERS
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT
APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR
WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
BT

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PAGE TWO RUTPRC 052 S E C R E T
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USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS
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B/ JCS 080110Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)
C/ COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67
1. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED IMMED TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40N/32-30E UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.
2. NIO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.
[redacted] ACKNOWLEDGE
[redacted]
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Classification (cancelled) (Changed to)
by authority of OPNAV/JAG/NAVSO Ltr 009D32/131
on 28 Jun 76 DRAgain & 21 Jun 1976
(Date) (Signature) JAG Sec Gnd (Rank)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

Research Papers James M. Ennes, Jr.

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