ASSOCIATED PRESS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
AT
CARRIER FLEET
BY RODGERS

ABOARD THE SIXTH FLEET FLAGSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, JUNE 7 (AP)-
VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM I. MARTIN, IN A FLAT DENIAL OF ARAB
CHARGES, SAID LATE TODAY U.S. SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT HAVE OPERATED
"WITHIN NORMAL AND PROPER RULES" OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT DURING THE
MIDDLE EAST WAR.

THE ADMIRAL, CO-COMMANDER OF THE SIXTH FLEET AND ALL ITS AIR ARM

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IN WHAT WAS PROVING DOWN ALL BOAT [illegible]
U. S. FLEET PILOTS IN ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AGAINST ARAB COMM[illegible]
MARTIN, IN A STATEMENT HE MADE AVAILABLE TO QUESTIONERS, SAID:
"IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY AIRCRAFT FLYING INTO
FLEET TO HAVE FLOWN THESE MISSIONS ALLEGED BY ARAB MEDIA EASTERN
EASTERN STORIES."

THE ADMIRAL SAID THE DAILY FLIGHTS CONDUCTED BY THE U.S.
NAVY'S AND U.S. MARINE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE STRESSED
FORCE IS DEFENSIVE, HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL.

"NO NAVAL TRAINING FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED UNTIL 5
JUNE WHEN AIR OPERATIONS WERE RESUMED," THE ADMIRAL SAID. THIS
WAS MONDAY, THREE DAYS OF THE SIX-DAY WAR.

"ON 6 JUNE THE ONLY AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WERE BY HELICOPTER,
BY PROPELLER-DRIVEN C1A COMMAND ON-BOARD DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, AND
BY TWO PROPELLER-DRIVEN AIRCRAFT ON ROUTINE RECONNAISSANCE
PATROLS WITHIN A 50 MILES RADIUS OF THE SIXTH TASK FORCE.

"ON 7 JUNE, HE CONTINUED, "THE CARRIER TASK FORCE CONDUCTED
NO AIR OPERATIONS EXCEPT HELICOPTER AND C1A AIRCRAFT. NO AIRCRAFT
OF THE SIXTH FLEET HAVE BEEN WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES OF THE
EASTERN COAST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, SPECIFICALLY ISRAEL AND THE

ARAB REPUBLIC."

IN TWO MORE, THE ADMIRAL STATED, "NO SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT HAS
ENTERED THE TERRITORIAL AIR SPACE OF ANY MIDDLE EASTERN OR NORTH
AFRICAN NATION DURING THIS CURRENT PERIOD OF TENSION."

AS FAR AS NAVY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE, NO PLANES WITH
[illegible] HAVE LANDED IN AMERICA SINCE MONDAY NIGHT, WHEN WORD OF
THE FIGHTING REACHED HERE.

AT THAT TIME SEVERAL AA JET ATTACK PLANES WENT ALOFT WITH
TWO JET-POWERED JETS FOR TARGET PRACTICE ON AN ISLAND A FEW HUND-
RED FEET LONG IN THE AREA OF CRETE. THE AA SKYHAWKS LEFT THE DECK
AND RETURNED WITHIN 90 MINUTES. LATER PRACTICE BOMBING MISSIONS WERE
CANCELLED.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] DETROIT NEWS
[illegible], SIGNIFY
VIA COMMERCIAL TELEX [illegible]
DT

[illegible]ABOARD THE [illegible]--[illegible]--IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, [illegible] ABOARD THIS SHIP [illegible] EVERY U.S. FLEET OUTPUT I INSIST BE HANDLED [illegible] TO IT.

THE [illegible] IS [illegible] THE FLEET THAT IF ANY NATION IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE OUR [illegible] IS GIVEN [illegible] ASSISTANCE FROM THE SIXTH FLEET TOO NO PART IN A RACIAL [illegible] ASSAULTS AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES, IT WAS TO BE RUSSIA.

SOVIET MISSILE-[illegible] CRUISERS AMERICA AND SARATOGA, THE TWO GIANTS OF [illegible] FLEET, SINCE THEY CAME TOGETHER AS A RESULT OF THE MIDDLE EAST [illegible] A WEEK AGO.

SOME HAVE BELIEVED [illegible] SURVEILLANCE OVER CHARLIE TWO TOO THAT FLEET LEADERS [illegible] WOULD RESULT IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE WAR STEPS DIRECTLY AIMED TO DROP SOVIET VESSELS WERE [illegible], AS IS THE FACT, NEITHER SIDE JUST TAKE OFF IN ASSAULT [illegible] NOR DO THE FLEET GET WITH [illegible] TYPE.

BUT [illegible] SOME RUSSIAN SPIES BECAME TOO MUCH WEDNESDAY. SPIES, SPIES ... IT [illegible] TO BE RUSSIAN SHIPS ALL OVER THE PLACE.

NORMALLY, THE AMERICA AND HER ESCORTING DESTROYERS HAVE BEEN TRAILED BY A SINGLE SOVIET. LATELY, IT HAS BEEN THE RUSSIAN GUIDED-MISSILE DESTROYER [illegible].

FIRST AND ONLY TO BE SEEN

THE 3RD WAS JOINED WEDNESDAY BY ANOTHER SOVIET DESTROYER, THE 303, WHICH DEPARTED THE MEDITERRANEAN TO BE REPLACED BY A SMALL RUSSIAN PATROL CRAFT ESCORT, WHILE SOVIET MISSILES ASTERN THREE FOR DESTROYERS WERE BEING PLOTTED.

IN THE MEANTIME, AN OLD FRIEND, A SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TRAWLER

[illegible] A TANKER SHOWED UP, AND AS NIGHT FELL THE AMERICA WAS ZIG-ZAGGING ITS WAY ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH OF CRETE, WHILE ONE OF ITS ANTI-SUBMARINE, RADAR-EQUIPPED HELICOPTERS FLEW LOW OVER THE SEA LOOKING FOR WHAT OFFICERS SAID "POSSIBLY" WAS A SOVIET SUBMARINE SOME 10 MILES AWAY.

WHAT WITH ALL THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS, THIS PATCH OF THE "BLUE" REMINDED THE DETROIT RIVER ON A HOT SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

THE SIXTH FLEET HAS BEEN USED TO RUSSIAN ATTENTION FOR A LONG TIME, BUT THIS WAS CRAZY.

[illegible], IT CAN COME WITHIN 150 YARDS OF THE U.S. DESTROYER U.S. LAWS [illegible] WHILE WE [illegible] COULD. THE LAWS [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] MARINE, IN THE [illegible] OF-[illegible] CHINA.

[illegible] U.S. [illegible] ESCORT OF THE FLEET FLAGSHIP OF THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET, FORCED THE RUSSIANS TO TAKE A COMPLETE HALF CIRCLE TURN [illegible] [illegible].

THE [illegible] PROMPTED VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM I. MARTIN, THE CITY-[illegible] COMMANDER OF THE SIXTH FLEET, TO PUT ON A [illegible] TO [illegible] SOVIET [illegible] AND [illegible] BY VOICE LIGHT [illegible], HE SAID, "SHOVE OFF, [illegible]."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

"[illegible] PAST FIVE DAYS HAVE [illegible] MAY HAVE YOU ARE [illegible] LAST WAS THAT WAS OVER [illegible] WAITING FOR CENTAURUS.

"[illegible] WILL COMMENCE MANEUVERING AT [illegible] PRESENT POSITION IN THIS FORMATION [illegible] SHIP AS WELL AS THE SHIPS OF THIS FORCE.

"I [illegible] WITHOUT DELAY AND DISCONTINUE YOU [illegible] UNTIL [illegible]."

[illegible] OFFICER [illegible] IT," THE SEA COMMANDER KEPT UP [illegible] VITAL MILES OFF THE STARBOARD [illegible] CODE CLOSE ITS DISTANCE FROM US A [illegible].

[illegible] GIVE [illegible] TURNED OUT IN A STATELY LEFT-[illegible] SIDE OF THE AMERICA AS WE [illegible] PASSED CLOSE TO THE CATAMARAN WHICH [illegible] LAY OFF ITS BOW.

THE ONLY [illegible] WAS A BIT EXCITED ABOUT EGYPT'S CHANCE [illegible] TO WAR [illegible] THAT THE SHIP WAS ONLY [illegible] THE SHIP'S NAVIGATOR, CAPT. HOYT [illegible] "BUT THIS IS DIFFERENT," HE SAID, WITH A BROAD SMILE.

BT

BLANCHARD, ABOARD THE AMERICA.

BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4 - AUG : 2
Copy 1971

REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS

PHASE I

REPORT

OF THE

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

UNDER AUTHORITY OF

H. Res. 201

MAY 10, 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1971

80-000

KF32
.A733
1971

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]

H.Doc. [illegible]

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

F. EDWARD HÉBERT, Louisiana, Chairman

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
G. ELLIOTT HAGAN, Georgia
CHARLES H. WILSON, California
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana
RICHARD C. WHITE, Texas
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
HAROLD RUNNELS, New Mexico
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
BOB WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
CARLETON J. KING, New York
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey
G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, Virginia
C. W. (BILL) YOUNG, Florida
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

F. EDWARD HÉBERT, Louisiana, Chairman

SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey

JOHN T. M. REDDAN, Counsel
JOHN F. LALLY, Assistant Counsel
RICHARD A. RANSOM, Professional Staff Member

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia, Chairman
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
JOHN T. M. REDDAN, Counsel
JOHN F. LALLY, Assistant Counsel

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 24, 1971.

HON. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is a report entitled "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications—Phase I," unanimously approved by the appointed members of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee conducting this review. This report is based on extensive investigations and hearings which were held during the past year and a half concerning the responsiveness of Department of Defense communications in crisis situations and the effectiveness of that Department's management of its communications systems.

You will note that there are deletions from the report. These are security deletions which have been made on the recommendation of the Office of the Directorate of Security Review of the Department of Defense.

I shall appreciate your early approval of the report so that it may be printed.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN,
Chairman, DOD Worldwide Communications Subcommittee.

Approved for printing:
F. Edward Hébert, Chairman
May 10, 1971

other possible situations which would result in damage to defense communications.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. *LIBERTY*

JUNE 7–8, 1967

Hostilities commenced between Israel and the United Arab Republic on June 5, 1967. On that same date at 2015 hours, the Commander, 6th Fleet, ordered all his surface and air units to stand off at least 100 miles from the coasts of the belligerent nations. At the time of that order, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not assigned to 6th Fleet, but was under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief Europe. On June 7th, at 0001 hours, U.S.S. *Liberty* was transferred to the operational control of Commander, 6th Fleet. At the time of her transfer, her operational orders, dated June 1st, directed that the closest permissible approach to the coast of the United Arab Republic would be 12.5 nautical miles, while she could approach no closer than 6.5 nautical miles to the coast of Israel. No action was taken by the Commander, 6th Fleet, on June 7th to cause U.S.S. *Liberty* to conform to his order previously issued to all other 6th Fleet surface and air units.

During the afternoon of June 7th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reposition U.S.S. *Liberty* to move her further from the coasts of the belligerent nations. In implementing that decision, a series of five messages from JCS and U.S. commanders in the European Command were directed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and other addressees. None of those messages had reached *Liberty* by 1200Z hours on June 8th, 13½ hours after the first message was released for transmission. The circumstances surrounding the misrouting, loss and delays of those messages constitute one of the most incredible failures of communications in the history of the Department of Defense.

Those five messages will be discussed seriatim. Each is described according to its date-time-group, a six-numeral designation assigned by the originator of the message reflecting the date and hour, month, and year of its release. At the time of the U.S.S. *Liberty* incident, the date-time-group was not an accurate reflection of the time the message had been released by the sender to the communications center, although, in most instances, the difference in the time was an interval of only a few minutes, e.g. JCS 072230Z was released to the communications center at 072241Z. Each date-time-group includes the letter "Z" designating the Greenwich time zone, thus all times are standardized.

JCS 072230Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

This message contained the first directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relocation of U.S.S. *Liberty*. It was directed to the Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR), for action. Information copies of the message were addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR); Commander U.S. 6th Fleet; Commander Task Force 64; U.S.S. *Liberty*; and others. This message modified the operational orders of U.S.S. *Liberty* by directing that her closest permissible approach to the coasts of the United Arab Republic and Israel should be 20 nautical miles and 15 nautical miles, rather than 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles, respectively.

This message was released from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army Communications Station, at the Pentagon, for transmission at 2211Z hours, June 7th. The action copy of that message to CINCEUR was not transmitted from the Army communications station until 1235Z hours, June 8th, more than 14 hours after its receipt in station. The information copies, addressed to Commander Task Force 67 and U.S.S. *Liberty*, were not transmitted until 1315Z hours June 8th, and then were incorrectly routed to the Naval Communications Station, Philippines. From that station, they were sent to Navy Communications Station, Asmara, where they were placed on Fleet Broadcast at 2135Z hours, June 8th, 23 hours after the date-time-group of the message, and about 9½ hours after the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*.

This message lost some of its significance, since it was canceled by a subsequent message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described in the next section.

JCS 080110Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

Preliminary telephone call

One hour and nine minutes after releasing the above 072230Z message for transmission, the Joint Chiefs became more concerned over relocating U.S.S. *Liberty* and decided that 20 and 15 nautical miles was too close to the coasts of UAR and Israel for safety. At 072350Z hours, June 7th, a JCS representative made a telephone call to the Command Center duty officer at Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). In that call, a verbal directive was issued to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center duty officer to order U.S.S. *Liberty* to operate no closer than 100 nautical miles to the coasts of the belligerents. The duty officer at CINCUSNAVEUR was also told that a message formalizing the verbal directive would follow later. However, the JCS might as well have omitted that telephone call since it proved completely ineffective in accelerating action at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. It is true that, as a result of the telephone call, a message incorporating the oral directive was prepared at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters for dispatch to Commander, 6th Fleet; but despite the urgency indicated by the JCS call, the release of that message for transmission was delayed until the formal notification message from JCS had been received.

Formal message

The promised confirmatory message was not released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 080110Z, more than an hour after the telephone call to CINCUSNAVEUR. That delay is not necessarily significant, since JCS could reasonably have expected an immediate and intelligent response to its telephone directive. This message, JCS 080110Z, canceled the earlier JCS 072230Z message and directed that U.S.S. *Liberty* should remain at least 100 nautical miles from the coasts of any of the belligerent nations.

An immediate precedence[2] was assigned to this message, whereas the 072230Z message had been assigned a priority precedence, thus

---

[1] Department of Defense has informed the subcommittee that the original message was addressed to CTFG4, but that an apparent operator error caused it to be addressed to CTF67 when it was prepared for transmission.

[2] There are four Department of Defense precedence categories: flash, immediate, priority, and routine, in diminishing order. These designations indicate the desired speed of delivery. They serve as a guide to operating personnel in processing, transmission and delivery of the message.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

indicating the increased concern of the Joint Chiefs concerning the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. This message was also released to the Army Communications Station at the Pentagon for transmission. The action copy of this message was again addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Europe, with information copies addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR; Commander, 6th Fleet; Commander, Task Force 64; and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. A delay of 44 minutes occurred in the Army Communications Station, Pentagon, before the message was transmitted to CINCEUR, the action addressee at 080211Z. Real Adm. Francis J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications, testified before the subcommittee that he thought 44 minutes was an inordinate amount of time for processing such a short message.

The delay in processing the action copy of the message is insignificant, however, when compared with the deplorable handling of the information copies addressed to Commander, Task Force 64, and to U.S.S. *Liberty*. First, there was a delay of 2 hours, 23 minutes before those messages were transmitted from the Army Communications Center, Pentagon, at 080350Z. The only explanation for that delay was that messages of equal or higher precedence were awaiting transmission before this message arrived in station. The Department of Defense, however, was unable to furnish the subcommittee with any documentary evidence which would support that explanation.

The information copies of the message, addressed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and Commander, Task Force 64, were finally transmitted at 0350Z, but, once again, those messages for addressees in the Mediterranean area were misrouted to Naval Communications Station, Philippines. A subcommittee witness testified that the misrouting was due to an erroneous routing indicator which had been assigned to the message by a civilian clerk in the Army Communication Center, Pentagon. Upon its arrival at the Naval Communications Station, Philippines, the error was recognized, the routing indicator was corrected to Naval Communications Station, Morocco, and the message was retransmitted within an hour. That correction should have taken those copies of the message to the Mediterranean area and ultimately to the addressees, except that the message was routed to pass through the Army Communications Station, Pentagon. That station, instead of transmitting the messages to the Navy Communications Station, Morocco, to which they were addressed, sent them to National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Md., where they were filed without further action. The only explanation given for this inexcusable conduct was that clerical personnel had misread the routing indicator. Needless to say, those messages had not reached either U.S.S. *Liberty* or Commander, Task Force 64, by 1200Z hours, June 8, 1967.

USCINCEUR 080625Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCUSNAVEUR

JCS message 080110Z was received at CINCEUR headquarters at 0212Z hours, June 8th. That headquarters, in a telephone conversation with CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters at 0325Z hours, directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take the JCS message for action. That oral order was confirmed by a formal message directed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action, with information copies to Commander, 6th Fleet, and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. The formal message, however, was not released until 0625Z hours. No explanation has been offered for the 3-hour delay in preparing that message at CINCEUR headquarters. A further delay of 46 minutes occurred in the message center at CINCEUR before the message was transmitted.

In order to ensure getting this message to its addressees, it was transmitted concurrently over two alternate relay paths. The necessity for the alternate transmission was quickly demonstrated by the loss of the message at [illegible]masens, Germany, Army DCS relay, the first station on one of the transmission paths. As a result of that loss, there was no further transmission of that copy of the message. The explanation offered for the loss of that message was that the

* * * station was being operated under a combination of adverse conditions caused by the consolidation of commands and relocation of units from France. Heavy traffic volumes resulted from the extensive relocation of units and reprogramming of teletype circuits. The number of qualified personnel was inadequate to ensure error-free processing of traffic.

The second transmission route succeeded in getting the message to CINCUSNAVEUR and to Command[illegible] by 0735Z hours on June 7th. The information copy directed to U.S.S. *Liberty*, however, had to pass through additional relay stations before it could be placed on fleet broadcast for dissemination to U.S.S. *Liberty*. That meandering route through relay stations consumed another 9 hours. During that time, there were long in-station delays for processing of the message, and there was a delay of more than 2½ hours in passing the message from an Army DCS Communications Station at Asmara to the Navy Communications Station located within a mile of the Army station. Finally, the message was placed on the fleet broadcast at 1646Z hours, June 8th,[1] at which time U.S.S. *Liberty* was limping back to port with her decks awash, mangled, and so severely damaged that she was subsequently scrapped.

CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z JUNE 1967 TO COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET

The headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) received three separate messages directing the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. Those messages and the times of their receipt were:

(a) A telephone call from the JCS reconnaissance center at 2350Z, June 7th.

(b) An information copy of JCS 080116Z message which was received at this headquarters at 0212Z hours, June 8th.

(c) A telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th.

Despite the urgency which must have been obvious by that time, no action was taken at that headquarters for more than 3½ hours after the initial telephone call. It was not until after receipt of the telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th that CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters stirred into action. At that time, the duty officer directed that a teletype conference be established with Commander, 6th Fleet. That conference circuit was established, and

[1] A garbled version of this message was placed on fleet broadcast at 1052Z, June 8th, and there was some question whether it had been received by U.S.S. *Liberty*. But as Rear Admiral Fitzpatrick testified, "It is a moot point whether the ship received it or not for two reasons. If it did receive it, it was instructions contrary to them, and number two, even if they had received it, it wouldn't have made any sense to them. All it said was to take some other JCS message for action, cancel her previous orders, and they would let them know what that other message was because as we know that other message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which they had the information copy on, didn't get to them."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

According to official file, the duty officer prepared a message which he and duty Captain took to CINCUSNAVEUR Deputy Chief of Staff for release, but Deputy C/S directed them to hold it pending receipt of message IAW CINCUSNAVEUR policy that no ship movements would be directed upon oral orders unless those oral orders were issued in person by a flag officer.

at 0445Z hours, Commander, 6th Fleet, acknowledged receipt of the order to take action upon the JCS message. The teletype order was confirmed by CINCUSNAVEUR formal message 080455Z which was received by Commander, 6th Fleet, at 0518Z hours, June 8th.

For some unexplained reason, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not informed of either of these messages to Commander, 6th Fleet.

COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET 080917Z JUNE 1967 TO U.S.S. LIBERTY

Upon receipt of the messages from CINCUSNAVEUR, the only action remaining for Commander, 6th Fleet, was issuance of an order to U.S.S. *Liberty* to comply with the minimums directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not until 0917Z hours, June 8th, however, more than 4 hours after his receipt of the order, that he released his action message directed to U.S.S. *Liberty*. Although his superiors had manifested their concern about repositioning U.S.S. *Liberty* by telephone calls which gave him advance notice of the order, the Commander, 6th Fleet chose not to use the voice circuit when he passed the order to the ship. Rather, he used the normal communications system for transmission of his message.

After its release to the communications center aboard the 6th Fleet flagship, U.S.S. *Little Rock*, that message was delayed for more than 1 hour and a quarter before it was transmitted at 1035Z hours. The explanation for that delay was that there were one flash and seven immediate messages being prepared for transmission at the time the message was received in the message center aboard U.S.S. *Little Rock*. The message arrived at the Army DCS station at Asmara by 1215Z hours, June 8th. That station, however, instead of delivering it to the nearby Navy station for fleet broadcast, missent it to the Navy Communications Station, Greece. It was returned to Army DCS station at Asmara and finally delivered to the Navy Communications Station at 1510Z hours, June 8th, 6 hours, 8 minutes after its release by Commander, 6th Fleet, and more than 10 hours after he had been ordered to act upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction. The message was transmitted on fleet broadcast at 1525Z hours, June 8th, more than 3 hours too late to alert U.S.S. *Liberty* to the danger of her position.

The circumstances surrounding the transmission of these five messages could be considered a comedy of errors were it not for the tragic results of the failure to move U.S.S. *Liberty*. At 1210Z hours, June 8, 1967, U.S.S. *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli aircraft and, at at 1235Z hours, she was torpedoed by Israeli patrol boats. As a result of those attacks, 34 officers and men were killed, while 75 were wounded, and the ship sustained such severe damages that it was never restored to duty. At the time of those attacks, U.S.S. *Liberty*, through no fault of hers, had not received any of the above-described messages. If the communications system had been responsive, she should have had several hours during which she could have placed some distance between herself and the coast, thereby probably avoiding the attack.

Should there be any doubt that these failures of the communications system were critical, the following excerpts from the findings of fact of the Naval Court of Inquiry, convened to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*, would appear to conclusively resolve them:

Liberty's position at the time of the attack had been previously ordered changed farther to seaward by JCS; however, the messages relating to these changes were not known to the ship before the attack took place * * *

The communications delays and misrouting errors, which caused these several nondeliveries, combined with delays in initiating followup actions on operational instructions received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware of plans and decisions made for her repositioning * * *

* * * *Liberty* received no directive, prior to the attack, that higher authority desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles from the coastline of the UAR * * *

Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of communication conditions regarding U.S.S. *Liberty* during the period 1 and 8 June. The ship is known not to have received at least five messages sent prior to the attack, each of which was not only important but, in that respect, critical to the events which terminated in the aggravated attack on this ship on June the 8th.

Higher authority modified *Liberty*'s original operational guidance between June 1st and the attack on the 8th which, if she had received it, would have resulted in her being further off shore.

Combination and compounding of many delayed communication deliveries related to *Liberty* incident denied the ship the benefit of command decisions actually made prior to the attack which, among other things, would have caused the ship, as a minimum, to be heading further off shore from her 081200Z actual position * * *

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. PUEBLO JANUARY 23, 1968

On January 23, 1968, U.S.S. *Pueblo*, a U.S. Navy auxiliary general environmental research vessel utilized for intelligence collection, was located off the coast of North Korea. That morning the ship established communication with Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, Japan, to send a situation report (SITREP), two technical reports and a service message. At 0300Z, January 23, *Pueblo* was still using her transmitter when a North Korean submarine chaser (SO-1) came into view. There were some flag-hoist signal exchanges between *Pueblo* and the North Korean craft which consumed several minutes. Then at 0350Z the commanding officer of *Pueblo* released the first of two messages designated Pinnacle. Pinnacle is a flagword which identifies the message as having major significance and requires immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government. In addition to its Pinnacle designation, the message was assigned a "flash" precedence, thereby identifying it for most rapid processing, transmission and delivery.

PINNACLE 1—230352Z JANUARY 1968

This message reported the encounter with the North Korean patrol craft, the exchange of flag-hoist signals, and the Korean signal "Heave to or I will fire". It concluded with *Pueblo*'s intention to remain in the area, if considered feasible, or to withdraw slowly to the northeast.

This message was received by the Kamiseya station at 0350Z hours. It was then relayed at 0400Z hours to Commander, Naval Forces, Japan where it was received at 0413Z hours. Despite its Pinnacle designation, which required immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government, this message was delayed at the headquarters of Commander, Naval Forces Japan, for 47 minutes before it was finally released for retransmission at 0500Z hours. Rear Adm. Francis Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE FOLLOWING 9 PAGE SUMMARY AND 19 PAGES OF SELECTED AND PARTIALLY CENSORED TESTIMONY WAS GIVEN TO THE PRESS A FEW DAYS AFTER THE ATTACK AND CALLED A "COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT."

IT IS NOT.

IT IS A SUMMARY, AND A HIGHLY SELECTIVE AND MISLEADING ONE AT THAT.

THE FULL REPORT RUNS TO MORE THAN 700 PAGES AND WAS TOP SECRET UNTIL 1976.

FOLDER 8

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

A Navy Court of Inquiry has determined that USS LIBERTY was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and nationality, and in calm, clear weather when she suffered an unprovoked attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats June 8 in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify LIBERTY correctly. The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack.

LIBERTY fired her .50 cal. machine guns at the aircraft and torpedo boats, but only after she had been attacked and hit.

The Court, convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, conducted classified hearings in London and aboard LIBERTY in Malta June 11-17. Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, USN, was president of the Court, which consisted of himself and Captains Bernard J. Lauff and Bert M. Atkinson, both attached to Admiral McCain's headquarters.

A Court of Inquiry is a formal fact-finding body which takes testimony under oath. It is not a disciplinary court. Convening of such an inquiry is a normal procedure, commonly employed after any serious accident or incident resulting in substantial loss of life or damage to a ship. The fact of its convening does not, of itself, indicate an assumption by the Navy that anyone within the Navy is at fault.

The Court's findings were presented to Admiral McCain and approved by him on June 18, and forwarded to the Navy Department for further review.

It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation. Witnesses suggested that the flag may have been difficult for the attackers to see, both because of the slow speed of the ship and because, after five or six separate air attacks by at least two planes each, smoke and flames may have helped obscure the view from the motor torpedo boats. The Court heard witnesses testify, however, to significant surveillance of the LIBERTY on three separate occasions from the air at various times prior to the attack -- 5 hours and 13 minutes before the attack, 3 hours and 7 minutes before the attack, and 2 hours and 37 minutes before the attack.

Inasmuch as this was not an international investigation, no evidence was presented on whether any of these aircraft had identified LIBERTY or whether they had passed any information on LIBERTY to their own higher headquarters.

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The Court affirmed LIBERTY's right to be where she was. A neutral nation, the Court stated, has a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, the Court pointed out, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her.

The Court found that LIBERTY entered the Mediterranean June 2, after stopping briefly at Rota, Spain, where she took aboard fuel and provisions. Her orders were to steam at best possible sustained speed to an operating area in the Eastern Mediterranean north of the Sinai Peninsula.

Testimony before the Court showed that LIBERTY arrived in her assigned operating area the morning of June 8. Her orders were to steam in an area bounded on the north by latitude 32N, on the east and west by Longitudes 34 East and 33 East, and on the south by a curved line following the contour of the coast 12.5 nautical miles off the coast.

The U.A.R. claims a 12-mile territorial sea, Israel six miles. The United States claims and recognizes claims of three miles. Thus LIBERTY's operating area was defined to ensure that she would remain in international waters as that term is recognized by all parties concerned, and with some margin to spare. The Court found that she was, in fact, well within her assigned operating area at the time of the attack, and that at no time before or after the attack did she approach closer than 13.6 nautical miles to land. She was under the operational control of Commander Sixth Fleet at the time of the attack.

LIBERTY steamed in her operating area the morning of June 8 in a "modified condition of readiness three." This meant that she had her normal steaming watch on deck, plus one man standing by the forward gun mounts. LIBERTY carries four pedestal-mounted .50-cal. Browning machine guns -- two single mounts on her forecastle and identical mounts on either side of the deck-house aft of the bridge. Under "modified condition three," bridge lookouts would man the two after guns until the crew manned general quarters stations.

LIBERTY steamed southeasterly (130° true) until 8:49 a.m., when she reached the eastern boundary of her operating area and turned to a southwesterly course (253° true). At 8:50, a single unidentified jet crossed her wake, an estimated three to five miles astern, then circled the ship and retired in the direction of the mainland. No signals were exchanged between the ship and the plane. LIBERTY was flying her normal size American flag (5 feet by 8 feet) at the masthead. Her name was painted on her stern in English, and her U.S. Navy distinguishing letters and number on her bow. (Egyptian naval ships carry their names in the cursive Arabic script.) Her

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

configuration, as shown in the international standard naval identification book, "Jane's Fighting Ships," and her standard markings, were clearly sufficient for the aircraft to identify her properly as the non-combatant ship LIBERTY. She was then steaming at 10 knots.

Jet and propeller aircraft circled the ship again at 10:56 and 11:26 a.m. At these times, the ship was steaming at only five knots.

At 11:32 the ship changed to a west-northwesterly course (285° true). She was on this course and steaming at five knots when the attack began.

From 1:10 p.m., until 1:48 p.m., before the attack, LIBERTY's crew was exercised at general quarters. This was a routine procedure, part of the ship's mandatory training program, established by the Commander Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, and was not related to her mission in the Eastern Mediterranean. Upon completion of the drill, the ship returned to her "modified condition three." At 2:00 p.m., the ship's Commanding Officer, Commander William L. McGonagle, Norfolk, Va., fixed her position by radar as being 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret at El Arish, which was to the southeast (bearing 142° true).

In the Commanding Officer's words, "About 1400 (2 p.m.) the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level (above the bridge), reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical, to the aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135°, its position angle was about 45 to 50 degrees, its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. (This apparently was a rocket launched by a second aircraft.) I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level (one level above the main deck, two below the bridge), portside amidships, were burning furiously.

"It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer (LCDR Philip M. Armstrong of Norfolk, Va., later killed in action) to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'Connor, (LT James G. O'Connor, USNR, of Norfolk, Va.) was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down, the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level, starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. Armstrong, Mr. O'Connor, and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead ... flank ... (this is an order for maximum speed) ... At this time I ordered a person, who I believe to have been LT Bennett, (LT Maurice H. Bennett of Pittsburgh, Pa.) to report to CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) via the hicom (high command radio circuit) that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required."

For the next five or six minutes, aircraft made criss-cross attacks on the ships, hitting her with rockets and machine gun fire. A later count entered into the Court's record, showed 821 separate hits on the ship's hull and superstructure.

Testimony failed to establish an exact number of aircraft involved in the attack. The Court's findings state: "In five or six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket, and incendiary attacks."

During this period, the ship gradually built up speed from five knots. Her exact speed during the subsequent minutes -- until she lost all power at about 2:36 -- is not known. Her maximum speed is 18 knots, but it is doubtful that she exceeded 11 or 12 while under attack.

The ship's public address system and many of her internal communication circuits were destroyed by the air attack. The helmsman was seriously injured by the bomb hit on the starboard side. He was immediately replaced by Quartermaster Third Class Francis Brown, of Troy, N. Y., who later was killed. A few moments later, while on the starboard bridge wing, Commander McGonagle received a serious leg wound from shrapnel. "I was not knocked off my feet. I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence," he told the court of inquiry. "I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my right trouser leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries."

At about 2:24, look-outs sighted three high speed boats approaching the ship from the northeast (from the ship's starboard quarter, relative

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

bearing 135°), heading for the ship in a triangular formation at a speed of 27 to 30 knots. Since the boats appeared to be making a torpedo run, Commander McGonagle ordered a man from the bridge to man the forward starboard gun mount and take the boats under fire.

It was at this time that Commander McGonagle discovered that LIBERTY's American flag had been shot down. He immediately ordered a signalman to hoist the "holiday ensign" -- the largest flag aboard (approximately 7 by 13 feet) from the yardarm, the normal flag halyard having been destroyed. There was smoke from the burning whale boat and other topside fires in the vicinity of the bridge.

Commander McGonagle passed the word, "Stand by for torpedo attack." He held his course, since turning away from the boats would bring the ship closer to land, and turning toward them would swing the ship broadside toward the attackers, giving them a larger target.

When the boats were approximately a mile away, the center boat was seen to be flashing a signal light. Because of smoke and flames just aft of his starboard bridge wing -- in the direction from which the boats were approaching -- Commander McGonagle could not read the signals, but he was able to see what he believed at the time to be an Israeli flag. As the air attack had knocked out LIBERTY's starboard signal light, he attempted to signal with a hand-held Aldis lamp. This may not have been powerful enough to penetrate the smoke pouring from the fires started by the attackers. Believing that the air attack might have been an error, he immediately shouted to the starboard forward gun to withhold fire. The gunner fired a short burst at the PT boats before he understood the Commanding Officer's order. At the same time, the after gun on the starboard side opened fire.

Because of the whaleboat fire on the starboard side, between the bridge and the gun mount, it was necessary to send an officer aft on the port side to pass the word to the starboard gunner to cease firing. ENS. David G. Lucas, USNR, of Virginia Beach, Va. (who was wounded earlier and, unknown to himself, had a piece of shrapnel lodged in his forehead) ran aft on the 03 (bridge) level portside. "The first thing I noticed," he testified to the Court, "was that the mount 54 (on the port side) was vacant. The flames ... (from the burning gasoline cans) ... had reached mount 54 and chased everyone out of there. I ran back to mount 54, looked over the skylight from the engineering spaces." (This skylight is on the centerline of the ship just aft of the stack. It stands about three feet high and is perhaps ten feet wide, dividing the 03 level at this point into port and starboard areas which meet several yards aft of the gun mounts, aft of the skylight structure. It is possible to look over the skylight, but not to cross it. There is no deck above the 03 level aft of the bridge.)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ENS. Lucas continued: "I had a clear view of mount 53 (the starboard mount, which was firing) from, say, the waist level up, and there was no one on mount 53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were in the gun, or bullets that were in the ready service ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and firing." Apparently by accident, this gun was firing in the direction of the attacking boats.

At this time, the PT's opened fire with their gun mounts, killing the Quartermaster Brown at the helm, and in a matter of seconds one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time was then 2:34. A minute later, a second torpedo struck the ship on the starboard side, immediately forward of the bridge and a few feet below the water line.

The torpedo explosion tore a hole in the side of the ship that extended from a few feet above the water line to below the turn of the bilge. It was shaped like a tear-drop, and was 39 feet across at its widest point. Its immediate effect was to flood all compartments on two decks below the water line, from frame 53 to frame 66. These frames support water-tight bulkheads, and mark the location of what was "number two hold" when LIBERTY was a merchant cargo ship before her conversion for Navy use. LIBERTY used the spaces for store rooms and her research department.

Twenty-five men died in the blast. Those few not killed outright escaped from the compartments. The Court heard testimony from witnesses, including a salvage expert, who stated that beyond a shadow of a doubt those who died there were killed instantly by the blast. None could have survived, trapped in the compartment, to die of suffocation or drowning.

The torpedo did not start a major fire, probably because of the immediate flooding of the affected area. LIBERTY immediately took on a nine-degree list to starboard. Power and steering control were lost temporarily, and the ship came to a dead stop.

The three torpedo boats also stopped, less than a half mile astern of the stricken ship. One signalled in English, "Do you need assistance?" Commander McGonagle, not being able to signal by light, ordered a signalman to hoist the international flag signal for "not under command," meaning that the ship was out of control.

Two or three minutes later, two helicopters bearing a Star of David marking approached and circled the ship several times. At 3:19, power was restored, but steering control could not be regained from the bridge. It was necessary to give rudder orders by telephone to men in the "after steering" compartment, and for some time they operated the ship's heavy rudder by hand. The helicopters departed, returned, and departed again, and a pair of jet aircraft circled the ship, but there were no further attacks.

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

By 4 p.m., Commander McGonagle's wounds were giving him a great deal of pain and he was suffering from loss of blood. The ship's doctor had seen him on the bridge, but had made no effort to get him below to a battle dressing station. "The Commanding Officer at that time was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves," the doctor told the court. "To know that he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the conn and helm and through the night calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men 'we're going to live.' When I went to the bridge and saw this, I should say that I knew that I could only insult this man by suggesting that he be taken below for treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it."

Ensign Lucas told the court, "It would have taken ten men the doctor's size to even begin to get him off the bridge."

"He was in great pain," Ensign Lucas testified, "there were several times when he was still walking around, but it was obvious that he was in great pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At several times he felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he started to get dizzy he would turn to me, or if Mr. Bennett or Mr. Painter were there, he would say this is what course we're on, what speed to make. He would give instructions."

At about 4 p.m. he lay on the deck while others applied a tourniquet to his thigh. At other times, when he felt faint, he lay on the deck of the bridge wing with his leg propped high, and continued to conn the ship, sometimes by watching her wake.

Lieutenant Richard F. Kiepfer, MC, USN, of Brooklyn, New York, the ship's medical officer, performed one major operation and gave emergency treatment to wounded men as best he could. He manned the main battle dressing station, together with one hospital corpsman, while the other corpsman operated a secondary battle dressing station in the forward part of the ship. Both stations were flooded with seriously injured men, and for a time there was little opportunity to do more than give first aid. Bleeding was stopped, men were given morphine for pain and treated for shock. Lung wounds were treated to ease breathing. The most seriously wounded men were transferred to the aircraft carrier AMERICA the following day. By that time the doctor and his two corpsmen had been on their feet, giving emergency treatment for 28 hours. "Any time we needed one volunteer, we'd get ten," he testified. "If anything had to be done...there were hands everywhere. When we asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on the adjoining tables who were saying, 'If you need some, I have this type.' These were people already wounded."

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The Court found that "from the time of the first air attack onward, attackers were well coordinated, accurate and determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams and quarters effectively chewed up the entire topside, including ship control and internal communications -- sound powered -- network. Well directed initial air attacks had wiped out the ability of the four .50 cal. machine guns to be effective."

"The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer, officers and men of LIBERTY was exceptional," the Court reported, "The Commanding Officer is being recommended for an appropriate award and the ship for an appropriate unit citation. These planned actions are fully supported by testimony to the Court."

"It is the opinion of the convening authority that USS LIBERTY was operating in international waters in conformance with the most recent guidance received by her, provided by competent authority," Admiral McCain wrote in his endorsement forwarding the Court record to the Department of the Navy.

Admiral McCain's endorsement continued:

"Heroism was the order of the day... It is the conviction of the convening authority that the possibility is high that the ship would have been lost completely had there not been the highest order of damage control competence on board, combined with the fact that the ship had secured from General Quarters for drill only minutes before the attack took place."

Early on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued orders for LIBERTY to move farther from the coast, even though such a move would partially degrade her mission. The messages were misrouted, delayed, and not received until after the attack. LIBERTY's Commanding Officer also had the authority to move farther to sea on his own initiative, had he any reason to believe that his ship was in danger of attack, or for any other cause. The Court found, however, that since he was in international waters, his standard identification symbols were clearly visible, and foreign aircraft had inspected him three times that day, he had no reason to believe that his ship was in danger of attack. The convening authority specifically concurred that "no indication was received by the ship prior to the attack which would have dictated a need for emergency measures."

LIBERTY continued to carry out her assignment at the location which her Commanding Officer considered optimum for that purpose. The Court reached no judgment on whether earlier arrival of the messages would have reduced the likelihood of the attack.

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

In an appendix to its findings, the Court noted that LIBERTY might have been mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship EL QUSEIR. In commenting on this possibility, the Court stated: "While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive hull marking of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria as a justification for attack, any ship resembling EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy."

The Court also noted reports of rumors that the town of El Arish had been bombarded from the sea, but pointed out that neither LIBERTY, with four .50 caliber machine guns, nor EL QUSEIR, which is armed with two 3-pounders, could logically be suspected of having conducted a shore bombardment.

USS LIBERTY arrived at Malta, under her own power, at 6 a.m. (local time) June 14, escorted by the destroyer USS DAVIS and the fleet tug USS PAPAGO. She was drydocked the same day.

The hole in LIBERTY's side is being patched and other repairs are being made to make it possible for her to return to the United States safely under her own power. She is expected to be in Malta until about July 10. Her home port is Norfolk, Va.

Note: Discrepancies in times in the summary and the Commanding Officer's testimony were caused by battle damage which caused clocks in various parts of the ship to stop at different times or to behave erratically. All times given are ship's local time 6 hours ahead of Washington time.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY

Commander William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy, took the stand as a witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and present duty station.

A. Commander William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that although the witness is experiencing considerable pain from shrapnel wounds in his leg, that he willingly appeared at this hearing.

Q. Captain McGonagle, as you are well aware, this court of inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed attack on the U.S. naval vessel which you command, USS LIBERTY, which occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the court the circumstances of that incident as you recall it?

A. At the time of the incident, LIBERTY was operating under the operational control of Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet. The ship had arrived in its assigned operating area on the morning of 8 June 1967 after having departed from Rota, Spain on 2 June 1967. The ship was steaming in international waters and was so at all times. A "condition of readiness three, modified," was set. The "condition three. mofified" watch consisted of normal steaming watch, with the exception that one man was stationed in the forward two .50 caliber machine guns, 51 and 52. Lookouts on the bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and 54 in the event of surprise air or surface attack. Each machine gun had a box of ammunition attached to the machine gun with a round up to but not in the chamber of each mount.

During the 0800 to 1200 watch on the morning of 8 June, at about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship at about 10,000 feet, three times at a distance of approximately two miles. It was not possible to identify any insignia on the aircraft and their identity remains unknown. It was also possible to see on the 8 to 12 watch in the morning the coastline of the Sinai peninsula. Aircraft activity of an apparent propeller patrol type flying at very low altitude and parallel to and over the coast in the vicinity of El Arish was noted. It is estimated that the

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Testimony

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

altitude of this plane was approximately 500 feet. At no time did this plane approach the ship in any fashion. His distance remained approximately 12 to 15 miles.

It was possible to visually sight the minaret which is quite conspicuous at El Arish. This was used as a navigational aid in determining the ship's position during the morning and afternoon of 8 June. It became visible at about 0930 and the ship's position was verified, and was within our established operating area. Radar ranges were taken on the nearest land on the same bearing as the minaret. The minaret was also identifiable by radar. There were no other conspicuous or outstanding navigational features in the area. At about 1056 in the morning of 8 June an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. This aircraft continued to return in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at 30 minute intervals. It was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown. This aircraft did not approach the ship in any provocative manner. It made no attempt to signal the ship. The ship made no attempt to signal the aircraft.

At 1039B the minaret at El Arish was bearing 189°T, 17 miles. At the time the ship was on a course of 253 at speed five knots. At 1132, the ship changed course to 283 true, speed five knots and was on this course and this speed at the time of the attack. At about 1310, 8 June, the ship went to general quarters for drill purposes to conduct training for a mandatory noncompetitive exercise to exercise the crew in chemical attack procedures. The drill was performed in a satisfactory manner. At the commencement of the drill it was possible to see a large billowing cloud of black smoke rising from approximately 15 to 20 miles to the west of El Arish on the beach. The exact identity of the cause and the location of thin explosion is not positively known, although it was believed to be near the beach in that area. This was noted at about 1300. Before dismissing the crew from general drills, I gave the crew a short talk on the PA system, reminding them of the importance of expeditiously responding to general quarters and the setting of condition Zebra for drills and in the event of an actual attack. So that they would be impressed I pointed out to the crew at that time that the column of black smoke on the beach should be sufficient evidence that the ship was in a potentially dangerous location. I had no evidence or indication that an attack would actually be made on the ship at the time that statement was made to the crew. After conducting general drills, it is my usual practice to go to the wardroom and have a cup

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(MORE)

of coffee and critique the drill with the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, the Engineering Officer, Lieutenant Golden, and the Damage Control Officer, Ensign Scott, if I have not been particularly satisfied w[illegible] the drill. If the drill has been satisfactory, usually I contact the officers on [illegible]ndividual basis at some later time during the day and indicate to them that I was satisfied with the drill and point out some of the errors in which improvement could be made and point out also to them the things that I felt had been done properly. I was satisfied with the performance of the crew for the afternoon drill and did not assemble the above-mentioned officers in the wardroom for a critique.

After general quarters was over from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few minutes. As I recall, the following officers were present on the bridge: LCDR Armstrong, Lt. Ennis, Lt. O'Connor, who is normally officer of the deck during general quarters, Lt. Toth, the Operations and Navigator also Intelligence Officer. Lt(jg) Painter came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume the watch as the officer of the deck. At that time, and the time was approximately 1400, I personally sighted the minaret at El Arish to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5 miles. I do not know that this radar range can be verified from the records available at this time. I had also earlier in the day established a danger bearing on the minaret at El Arish to be 119 degrees true from the ship. The danger bearing was established to insure that the ship remained clear of shoal areas to the south of the south[illegible] westernmost edge of our operating area.

At this point in the preparation of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's notebook, 12-1600 watch, Thursday, 8 June 1967. I referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected attack. The log shows that at 1355, Lt(jg) Painter relieved Lt. O'Connor as officer of the deck. The log also shows that at 1355, Ens. O'Malley, as junior officer of the deck under instruction, assumed the conn. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I shall relate in my own words and to the best of my knowledge and belief all events of which I have personal knowledge which occurred during that time frame.

About 1400 the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical, to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135, its position angle about 45 to 50 degrees, its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(MORE)

Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning furiously. It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'Connor was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down, the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity ~~of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately aft of the~~ bridge. Mr. Armstrong, Mr. O'Connor and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead flank.

Up to this time, the ship had one boiler on the line steaming at speed five knots. The other boiler was not on the line but pressure was being maintained in order to be able to respond to speeds in excess of that which is capable with one boiler, approximately 11 knots, should it be necessary. Earlier in the day, the Engineering Officer had requested permission to let number two boiler cool so that he could replace a steamline gasket. This permission had been granted and the boiler had started to cool from about 1200 on 8 June. I do not know whether the engine room acknowledged by the engine order telegraph the flank bell or not, but smoke immediately commenced coming out of the stack and I assumed that they did. It seemed to me that shortly thereafter the ship increased speed.

At this time I ordered a person, who I believe to have been Lt. Bennett, to report to CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required. I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag or not. One helmsman was seriously injured in the starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by Quartermaster Third Brown. I do not recall who had the helm at the time of the initial attack.

The response of the crew to general quarters was very expeditious. I do not recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever arrived on station or not, but the public address system, the 21 MC, (an electrically-powered inter-com system) and most sound powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial first or second of the total number of six to eight strafing attacks that occurred.

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

It seemed to me that the attacks were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with each attack coming at approximately forty-five second to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a fire-fighting party to put out the fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning furiously. It is estimated that the total air attack was completed in approximately five to six minutes. About midway during the attack, Ensign Lucas was noted on the bridge and at that time he became my assistant and assisted me in every way possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the repair parties to main control and other vital stations.

Sometime after the starboard bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers right leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries.

Shortly after this I opened the bridge safe and took out a camera which was maintained on the bridge to take pictures of foreign ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to the port wing of the bridge and there was able to take several pictures of the planes as they had passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort to obtain documentary evidence to establish the identity of the aircraft, I retained this camera in my possession throughout the remainder of the attack. Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which approached the ship after the attack was over. This film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for development and further disposition.

On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this.

In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course 283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during the air attack. It is believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats was about 1420. The boats appeared to be in

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mount 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing range.

About this time I noticed that our Ensign had been shot away during the air attack and ordered David, signalman, to hoist a second Ensign from the yardarm. During the air attack, our normal Ensign was flying. Before the torpedo attack, a holiday size Ensign was hoisted.

I alerted the crew as best I could to stand by for torpedo attack from starboard. I did not have an accurate ship's position at this time, but I knew that to the left of the ship's course at that time lie shoal waters and by turning to the left I would be approaching land, closer than had been given me in directives which I held in that instant in time. I realized that if I attempted to turn to starboard, I would expose a larger target to the torpedo boats. I elected to maintain a heading of 283 at maximum speed.

When the boats reached an approximate range of 2,000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signalling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israeli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center torpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time, I yelled to machine gun 51 to tell him to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error. I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries. The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boats before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do. Instantly, on machine gun 51 opening fire machine gun 53 began firing at the center boat. From the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level, I observed that the fire from machine gun 53 was extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat. It was not possible to get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge. I sent Mr. Lucas around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell Quintero, whom I believed to be the gunner on machine gun 53, to hold fire until we were able to clarify the situation. He reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53.

At this time, they opened fire with their gun mounts and in a matter of seconds, one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time that this torpedo crossed the stern is believed to be about 1426.* About 1427* without advance warning, the ship sustained a torpedo hit starboard

*Times subsequently adjusted to 1434 and 1435, respectively

(MORE)

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

side forward, immediately below the waterline. The ship immediately took a 9 degree list to starboard. Oil and debris were noted coming from the starboard side following the explosion. There was no major resultant fire from this explosion. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water. Steering control was lost. All power was lost. Immediately, I determined that the ship was in no danger of sinking and did not order any preparations to be made to abandon ship. It was my intention to ground the ship on shoal areas to the left of the ship's track to prevent its sinking, if necessary.

Immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo, the torpedo boat stopped dead in the water and milled around astern of the ship at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signalled by flashing light in English, "Do you require assistance?" We had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted CODE LIMA INDIA.** The signal intended to convey the fact that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty and that they should keep clear.

Reports received from damage control central indicated the location of the torpedo hit and that flooding boundaries had been established and that the flooding was under control. During the strafing by the torpedo boats and immediately prior to being hit by the torpedo, quartermaster third Brown, who was acting as helmsman at the time, was felled at his station.

The mess decks were designated casualty collection station and casualties were taken to the collection station by repair party personnel and other members of the crew able to assist. Following the torpedo hit, those personnel from that area who were able to do so, left their stations.

One of the torpedo boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. Pictures were taken of the torpedo boats prior to and subsequent to the attack.

About 1515, two helicopters approached the ship and circled around and around the ship at a distance of about 100 yards. The insignia the Star of David was clearly visible. Hull number on one of the helicopters was 04 or D4. The other had a hull number of 08 or D8. It was not known whether these helicopters intended to strafe the ship or not. However, they did not approach the ship in a hostile manner but kept pointed parallel to the ship as they continued around and never made a direct approach as such. They were not taken under fire by LIBERTY, nor did they fire at us. The torpedo boats left the general area of the ship at about 1515. About 1537, after they had departed the ship and gone to a range of about five miles, they again headed toward the ship at high speed. Their intentions were unknown. At about this same time two unidentified jet aircraft were also noted approaching the ship from our starboard side, in

** "I am not under command" (not able to control movements of ship).

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

similar fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets disappeared from the scene. To further assist in identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted.

Both boilers had been put back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this time is not known. About 1555, communications were restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing additional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the ship, was also provided.

At the time this message was being dictated to Lieutenant Bennett on the port wing of the bridge, I was lying on the deck with a tourniquet being applied to my right leg at the thigh. A few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from loss of blood, and called for assistance of CTI Carpenter to apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the conn immediately upon the air attack and retained the conn until rendezvous was effected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9 June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level.

No bodies were noted in the area of ship following the explosion. Several life rafts, however, were released and placed into the water by various crew members whom I was unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene, and no fault can be found with their estimate not having the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats might be needed at a later time, no additional lifeboats were placed in the water.

At about 1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area without further signal or action. At this time, the ship was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being conducted from after steering. The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was made to steer and make good a course of 000 magnetic. It was not known what effect the nearby explosions might have had on the pilot house magnetic compass. The gyro compass was out. It was not known what the

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

azimuth of the setting sun was, but this was used as a rough guide and it appeared that the magnetic compass had not been unduly affected. The ship's fathometer in combat was working following the attacks.

At about 1655, the fathometer sounding reported approximately 26 fathoms under the keel. Since I was not positive of the ship's position, I ordered Mr. Lucas to round up as many personnel as he could, and proceed to the forecastle and standby and anchor.. My intentions was to anchor until it became night so that I could visually sight the North Star to see whether the magnetic compass had been unduly affected or not. Once I was able to sight the North Star, then I would know in which direction the ship was actually proceeding. Mr. Lucas and personnel did go to the forecastle, and at one point I did order the port anchor to let go. But before the port anchor could be let go, I reversed my decision and backed all engines two-thirds to see if I could back clear of the apparent shoal area. I commenced backing the ship at about 1704 and continued backing until 1722, at which time the fathometer reading was approximately 48 fathoms under the keel. With the ship going ahead two-third and right full rudder we quickly came to a magnetic heading of about 350 magnetic and continued on to a heading of 025 magnetic about 1729. The ship was at this time making a speed of about 8 knots. At 1730, the ship lost lube oil to the main engines, and all engines were stopped. At 1731, the ship was on a heading of 022 magnetic with 50 fathoms of water under the keel. Lube oil pressure was regained to the main engines within a very short period of time, and the ship continued right to a magnetic heading of 040 at 1737, at which time 72 fathoms was indicated under the keel. At 1743, the ship's heading was 068 magnetic and 82 fathoms of water under the keel. At this time I considered the ship to have stood clear of the immediate danger of grounding and at 1748 increased speed to ten knots on a magnetic heading of 050.

The ship remained at general quarters, and reports from danage control central were to the effect that all watertight boundary bulkheads were holding satisfactory. Dr. Kiepfer, and the two corpsmen, were doing outstanding work in assisting injured crew members. They advised me from time to time of the number of casualties, the extent of injuries, and efforts being made.

At 1750, a message was received from COMSIXTHFLT to the effect that escorts were on the way and that the ship was to proceed on a course of 340 magnetic at maximum speed until 100 miles from present position, then turn 270 magnetic. The ship attempted to carry out this directive. At 1757, COMSIXTHFLT advised that escorts were proceeding to rendezvous with us at maximum speed of destroyers.

At 1841, an Israeli helicopter approached the ship and hovered at bridge level approximately 30 feet from the ship. They made various attempts to

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

indicate by visual means that they wished to land a man on board. At one point, I considered granting the request, but considering the obstructions in the area of the forecastle, signalled a wave-off to them. Lettering on the tail of the helicopter was SA32K. On the fuselage were the numerals 06 or D6. At 1857, the helicopter dropped a message on the forecastle. The message was written on the back of a calling card, identified as Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attache for Air Embassy, USA. The message on the back read as follows: "Have you casualties?" We attempted to advise them by flashing light with an Aldis lamp that, "affirmative," we did have casualties. It was evident that they were unable to understand what we were saying. After some ten to fifteen minutes of unsuccessful efforts to communicate between the helicopter and the ship, the helicopter departed from the area, at a time unknown, but as dusk was approaching the ship.

Three musters were taken during the night to identify the dead, the seriously injured, and to determine those who were missing. As of 0900, 11 June, two of the persons previously reported missing, have been recovered, one by removing him directly from the space on board ship. The other was recovered by the PAPAGO, a Fleet tug steaming approximately six miles astern of the ship on the morning of 11 June. It is not known at this time whether any of the other individuals reported missing have drifted free of the space through the torpedo hole and vanished from the area. It will not be possible to determine until the ship has been drydocked and the compartment dewatered and remains recovered. Preparation of casualty messages were completed as expeditiously as possible upon the completion of the musters and necessary message notifications sent.

The ship rendezvoused with the two destroyers on the morning of 9 June. Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve reported on board to inspect damage and confer with the Commanding Officer. Personnel from the USS DAVIS immediately boarded the ship to render assistance with damage control and treatment of injured personnel.

I have no complaint to lodge against any officer or man on board USS LIBERTY for any acts of commission or omission during the attack and post attack phase. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for their courage, their devotion to duty, and their efforts to save the ship. As the result of my personal knowledge of the manner in which the following personnel performed their duties during the attack and post attack phase, I intend to commend Ensign Lucas, Signalman Davis; Quartermaster Third Brown; Lieutenant George Golden, Engineering Officer; and Ensign Scott, Damage Control Assistant. I have requested the officers and the petty officers of the ship to advise me of any other individuals, who, to their personal knowledge, performed in such a manner as to warrant special recognition. I also intend to address a letter of appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Bill Pettyjohn, Chief Staff Officer, COMDESRON Twelve, for the outstanding manner in which

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

he has assumed the responsibilities of assisting the Commanding Officer in sailing the ship from point of rendezvous to destination of Malta. A message of condolence from the ship has been sent to BUPERS with the request that it be delivered to the next of kin at the funeral or memorial services conducted for the deceased and those missing in action. A personal letter from the Commanding Officer to the next of kin will be prepared and sent at the earliest possible time. Dr. Diepfer, and the two pharmacist mates will also be awarded letters of commendation from the Commanding Officer.

The court recessed at 1620 hours, 14 June 1967.

The court opened at 1645 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. Commander William McGonagle, U. S. Navy, resumed his position on the stand as a witness.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q: Captain, will you please continue with your description of the incident?

A: On further recollection of the event involving machine gun 53 firing; the effectiveness of the firing leads me to believe that a person, whom I believe to be QUINTERO, Boatswain Mate Seaman, to have been on station at machine gun 53 and took the torpedo boats under fire. It is possible that he evacuated his station as a result of the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat prior to Ensign Lucas' arriving to determine who was on the mount. For clarification purposes, the 50 caliber machine guns that are on board USS LIBERTY are Browning machine guns, M2, heavy barrel, with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. These machine guns are mounted on a pedestal and are aircooled weapons. Two men can effectively serve the gun. One as gunner, who uses an open sight; the other individual, the leader, who keeps ammunition up to the chamber. These machine guns are manually controlled. There is no director means of controlling the fire. The limiting stops for arc of fire of these weapons consist of piping, bent in a shape to prevent the gun barrel from being pointed at a direction which would harm the ship or any portion of its structure, and the outer edge of the gun tubs themselves which offer very limited splinter protection. The machine guns themselves do not have any splinter shields attached. These machine guns are not considered mounts in the normal Navy terminology of a mount. They should be considered more as pedestal mounted machine guns.

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The time gap in the Quartermasters notebook resulted from the fact that there were insufficient number of people in the bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events as they occurred and execute the orders of the Commanding Officer simultaneously. With communications to various stations limited, various personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were used as messengers. At one time during this time frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were Quartermaster Brown, who was on the helm, Ensign Lucas, and myself. Ensign Lucas was busy relaying my instructions to the various battle stations. The smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present on the bridge throughout the entire incident and maintained his faculties at all times during the incident.

At this time, I have related all of the events that are considered pertinent and should be brought to the attention of the board of inquiry. One additional fact, which should be noted by the board, is the fact that the chart used for plotting the ship's position and for laying out the operating area is identified as Portfolio A3259, Chart DC3924 Nov, Second Edition, September 30, 1963 (revised 5/4/64). This chart shows the approach to the operating area that the USS LIBERTY made, a diagnonal transit from northwest to southeast. It lists point A, B, and C as the proposed southernmost limit of the operating area and the intended track of LIBERTY.

Q. Captain, you mentioned in your testimony that a helicopter hovered over LIBERTY and that an object was dropped which you recovered. I show you this card, and ask you if you recognize it?

A. Yes sir, I do recognize this card. It is a calling card.

Counsel for the Court: I'd like to offer this into evidence as exhibit number 89, and to serve as identification. If there is no objection, I would like you to read it now.

A. I read from the card I now hold in my hand. It is a calling card from "Commander Ernest Carl Castle, United States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, Tel Aviv." This is on the face of the card. On the back of the card is written, "Have you casualties?" It's noted that this card is smeared with oil smudges on both sides.

Q. Thank you very much. You also mentioned in your testimony that you took a camera out of your bridge safe and were able to start to take some pictures. I show you developed pictures and ask you if you recognize them?

A. Yes, I recognize most of these pictures as having been taken by myself during the attack. Some had been taken by another individual unknown, but I do recognize the scenes depicted therein.

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Q. Therefore, will you mark the back of the pictures for record purposes so that identification will be known? and I offer them in evidence as Exhibit 9.

A. Yes sir, I will mark them so that they, the scene or object depicted will be clearly indicated.

President: I'd like to, at this point ask the Captain -- did you not have wounded still lying about the deck at the time this helicopter was hovering over the ship?

A. Admiral, if you mean the helicopter which the attache was in, I'm not sure that the wounded were still lying around the deck, as such. By that time, most of our wounded had been taken to the casualty collection stations But there were people that were wounded. Whether they were evident to the Naval Attache from his position in the helicopter I do not know. There were injured on deck, however.

Counsel for the Court: In amplification of the Admiral's question, was there not a considerable amount of blood on the decks that would be obvious from a reasonable distance?

A. That is correct. There were numerous blood streams the full length from the 01 level on the forecastle to the main deck, at machine gun mount 51, where one body was still lying. I do recall that now. As I recall now, there was also another body in the vicinity of mount 51. The seriously injured were cared for before those obviously beyond help; were taken care of and removed from the place where they were hit.

Counsel for the Court: You have in your custody, USS LIBERTY charts that were used on the day of 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Will you please read the information relative to this court?

A. This is a chart of the Mediterranean Sea from Antalya Korfezi to Alexandria including Cyprus. It is further identified by Chart No. BC3924 November, second edition, September 30, 1963, revised 5--4-64. This chart shows points A, B, and C. These three points limit the southern operating area in which LIBERTY intended to operate.

Captain Lauff: Do I understand those to be the southernmost limit of your operating area?

A. These points represent a point greater, a distance from the beach, greater than that specified. The lines between point A, B, and C were the intended track of LIBERTY during the forenoon and afternoon watch of 8 June 1967. The lattitude and longitude of these points are as follows: Point A --

(MORE)

Papers of James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Project

31-27.2N 34-00E. This point is thirteen nautical miles from the nearest land. The coordinates of point B are: 31-22.3N 33-42E. This point -- is 14.6 nautical miles from nearest land. The coordinates of point C are: 31--31N 33-00E. This point is 18 nautical miles from nearest land. Closest point of approach to nearest land on a line between points A and B is 13 nautical miles. The closest point of approach to nearest land between points B and C is 14.1 nautical miles. Verbal instructions to the officers of the deck were that the ship was not to be to the south of a line connecting these points at anytime. Exhibit number 12 is a chart. The course between point A and B is 253 true. The course between point B and C is 283 true.

Counsel of the Court: Do any of the members of the Court desire to question the witness?

No response.

Witness: Exhibit number 13 is a Mediterranean Sea chart of Egypt and coastline from Damietta to El Arish. This is further identified as chart No. 3975, seventh edition, March 1931, revised 2/3/64. This chart has on it the previously described points A, B, and C. It also has on it the danger bearing established on the conspicuous minaret at El Arish of 119 degrees true from the ship. The shoal areas of five fathoms or less are circled in red to easily call attention to their location.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you in your custody, a CIC log and the radar bearing book for USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 13 and the CIC log as exhibit number 14. I now offer these exhibits into evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Do any members of this Court desire to question the witness concerning the charts, exhibits 11 and 12, or the radar bearing book and the CIC log, exhibits 13 and 14.

No response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Commander William L. McGonagle, was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Captain, did you bring with you today the gyro compass record for USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. Is this it?

A. Yes sir, it is.

I request the recorder to mark this as exhibit number 26 and offer it into evidence as exhibit number 26.

Q. Will you please read pertinent extracts from that.

A. The ship's gyro was last inspected by the USS VULCAN qualified gyro inspection and repair personnel on 30 March 1967.

Q. Is that 30 March 1967 a timely inspection?

A. Yes sir, it is. The ship's gyro is required to be inspected whenever possible by tender or yard personnel specifically trained in this responsibility once each quarter. I would like to indicate that the log shows that the error at the time of this inspection was .1° westerly.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions. Does any member of the Court desire to question the witness?

President: Captain, in our previous discussions, you told me a story which I have since come to identify as remarkable humility and selfeffacement on your part which I presume has caused you not to mention in testimony the way you navigated this ship out of dangerous waters after the attack. Will you please tell the Court how, while lying on your back, with no compass except the magnetic compass, and based upon your recollection of your magnetic compass error in relation to the gyro compass book, you used the sun and subsequently the North Star to clear the area.

A. Admiral, after a time on the bridge, when I had received minor injuries, I lost considerable blood and attempts to stem the flow of blood by self-help were unsuccessful, I noticed myself beginning to lose consciousness. I immediately lay down on the deck flat on my back on the port wing and raised the bleeding leg as high as possible; resting it on my port bridge chair, and there a first class communications technician by the name of Carpenter and other persons who I don't recall at this time, applied a tournaquet to my right leg which effectively

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Chronology

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

stopped the flow of blood. I, at no time, lost consciousness and had my full faculties at all times. I realized by that time I had lost considerable amounts of blood because it was sloshing in my shoes and my right leg was completely soaked with blood. They cut the right pant leg off to get it out of the area of the wounds. I looked at my wounds at that time and they still did not appear to me to be serious and since the flow of blood had been stopped I gave no further consideration to -- I didn't consider I had any more problem in that area. I asked them to bring me coffee, fluids, a couple of salt tablets, and so forth. I conned the ship by looking aft and by being able to see the wake of the ship I was able to tell after steering which way to apply the rudder and how long to leave it on to attempt to average out the best course that I felt the ship should travel on to stand clear of possible shoal areas. I remained on my back for approximately an hour and a half. I then felt that I had regained sufficient strength that I was able to get up from the deck and con the ship from the wing of the ship and from the pilot house. I couldn't get my leg in a comfortable position so I moved from one place to the other. I couldn't stay in any one place for too long a period of time. It seemed to me that my remaining on the bridge, this would be able to lessen the shock that the rest of the crew had received.

President: During your testimony yesterday, in relation to the loss of your quartermaster, the loss of your navigational capabilities, and related circumstances making it difficult to reconstruct navigationally and chronologically exactly what occurred, you were asked to develop in conjunction with your ships officers and through the assistance of any other assets available, such as your engineer's bell book, the CIC log, recollections of ships personnel the best available story, chronological in words and pictorial on charts and whyfors what happened. Have you done this?

A. Yes sir, we have.

President: Would you be kind enough to submit into evidence at this time, those documents?

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have the chronological listing of events relative to USS LIBERTY on 8 June.

A. Yes sir, I do.

Q. Would you provide it, please?

A. Here it is.

REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:

1. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-ØØE (POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE TO 31-31N 33-ØØE, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED, SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES, IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED TO HEAD

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 1ØØ FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 1ØØ FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL STEAMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS WERE FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME AND THE SHIP DID NOT EVEN EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING THE DEPLOYMENT.

2. ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED
Ø754 STEAMING ON 13ØT, SPD 1Ø KNOTS
Ø849 PASSED THROUGH POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T
Ø85Ø SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3 - 5 MILES -- CIRCULED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR MAINLANT.
ØØ45 DECREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS
1Ø56 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH
1126 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP
1132 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T
131Ø EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL
1348 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL.
1351 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,ØØØ YARDS BEARING ØØ2T -- REPORTED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT
1353 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.
1358 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE 5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7ØØØ FT.
A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP
14Ø3 LOUD EXPLOSION -- PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS
14Ø5 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM -- LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85, Ø1 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.
14Ø5 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.
14Ø5 - 141Ø SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STRAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE Ø1 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER. THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.
141Ø BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS.
1424 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD -- BEAM DISTANCE 4 - 5 MILES
1426 NOTICED NORMAL STREAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK
HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDARM.
1428 MTB SIGNALING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STBD QUARTER. LIGHT OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.
143Ø ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD FIRE.
1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT SIDE OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING
1431 WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.
MTB COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP
1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.
1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.
TWENTY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB STRAFING FIRE.

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
1436 LOST STEAM PRESSURE -- SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS -- MANY GAUGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED OUT.
1440 MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER 206-17.
1503 ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALLED "DO YOU NEED HELP" IN ENGLISH C.O. SIGNALLED "NEGATIVE"
1505 MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE
1507 HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVID MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP, PORT SIDE, HOVERED AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.
1508 SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.
MARKINGS OF HELICOPTERS ARE 04 and 08 OR D4 and D8. HELICOPTER WAS REPEATED PASSED AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT OBSERVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.
1519 TOWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT [illegible] DID NOT ANSWER -- CONTINUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.
1536 MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT.
DURING NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER THE HORIZON.
1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STER SIDE AND RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.
1620 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSES AT SPEEDS VARYING FROM 0 to 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN THE WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE FIGHTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING CASUALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER STEERING.
1845 ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP -- CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD AND ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL -- THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER SOMEONE TO THE DECK -- C.O. CONSIDERED RECEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE BUT RULED THIS OUT AS TOO HAZARDOUS REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AND AT 1852 COPTER DROPPED A MESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE, THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING CARD OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU CASUALTIES"

SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT TEN MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD, THE MUTILATED BODIES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED FROM THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE SUNSET (ABOUT 1905) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO RDVU WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT.

3. FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK, CIC LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/GUN /BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you to your readiness file and your gunnery procedures?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you information as to the number of bullet marks on USS LIBERTY as a result of the attack on 8 June 1967?

(MORE)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

A. Yes sir, I have had a topside inspection of the ship made and have recorded the number of projectile hits in various areas of the ship.

President: What was the total number of hits you took, Captain?

A. We took a total of 821 plus one torpedo hit.

Counsel for the Court: That does not include shrapnel marks?

A. No sir, that does not include shrapnel marks which are innumerable.

Counsel for the Court: Does the Court desire to question this witness further?

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on your open fire doctrine, what is your open fire doctrine?

A. The open fire doctrine is that, except in a melee, all fire will be controlled by the Commanding Officer through his normal gunnery control organization. At surprise air and surface attacks, the gunnery personnel on the mounts are authorized to open fire if they are unable to communicate with gun control or the bridge.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

- E N D -

Logs

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

	1003		
		1.2	
		1.3	
		1.4	
		2.0	
		2.1	
	1059	1.5	
		1.9	
	1112	1.6	1.3.6
		1.8	14.0
		0.4.5	13.4
		(2nd)	
	1145	1.73 / 1.8.9	
		1.8	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8 JUNE 1961

ARR.	TIME	LAT.	LONG.	EST	REMARKS
	0000	31°54'N	32°24'E	ARK	
	0100	31°54'N	32°35'E	ARK	
	0200	31°58.5'N	32°47.5'E	ARK	
	0300	31°55'N	33°00'E	ARK	
	0400	31°54'N	33°10'E	ARK	
	0500	31°47'N	33°20'E	ARK	
	0600	31°41'N	33°30'E	ARK	
	0700	31°38.5'N	33°39.5'E	ARK	
	0800	31°34'N	33°50.5'E	ARK	
	0900	31°27'N	33°51'E	ARK	
	1000	31°21'N	33°51.5'E	ARK	
	1100	31°24'N	33°41'E	ARK	
	1200	31°23.5'N	33°41.5'E	ARK	
	1300	31°23'N	33°35.5'E	ARK	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

9 June 1961

[illegible]

COD LT O'CONNOR — CICWC NELSON

[illegible] ASSUMED THE CONN & STEAMING WATCH

[illegible] SPEED TO BE MAINTAINED THE ANTISUB, ANTISURFACE AND ANTIAIR WARFARE OPERATIONS. THE SEA STATE REMAINED MOD [illegible]

RADIO CHANGED TO NIGHT DISTRESS [illegible]

THE U.C.S.Y.

0300 C/C TO 123°T

0335 LOST BY CARSON RD-3

[illegible]

[illegible] - 0335

COD ENS SCOTT — CICWC CARSON RM3

0335 Assumed The WATCH STEAMING AS Before

0353 C/C TO 198°(T) — Blow Tubes

0415 C/C TO [illegible]

0600 C/C TO 123°(T)

0600 [illegible]

SPEED 20

CSC - 1600

CICWC COMMUNICATION RM-2

[illegible] ASSUMED THE WATCH STEAMING AS BEFORE.

1130 C/C TO 123°(T)

1530 C/C TO 253°(T)

[illegible]

1132 C/C 70° 283°(T)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1515 GENERAL QUARTERS ALL

1517 SECURE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE (SECURED)

1524 CHEMICAL ATTACK (CANCELLED)

1545 SECOND PHASE GENERAL QUARTERS

1550 [illegible]

[illegible] Fire on Board

1414 Darkened Ship

1424 3 Continuous Sounds Blower

1430 Bridge Orders Now Here

1431 Steering By Pelorus Not Binnacle

1433 Demagnetized Bell Equipment

1435 Secured [illegible]

1445 Steering Records Transferred

Rudder Reports Transferred

1446 Torpedo Boats Now Has Left Main Area

1517 Helmsmen's Emergency

1519 Power Plotting Has Rudder Does Not Answer

1520 Alternating Has Control

1524 Condition Zebra Reset

1534 Torpedo Boats Now Re-Approaching

1538 Appears To Be Destroyer Bearing (Identified)

1545 Torpedo Beat

1554 Holding Code Light Ended

1542 Torpedo Boats Recommend Code Lights (Changed Course)

To Be Smoking

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1607 BOAT APPROACHING STARBOARD SIDE AT
WEAPONS RANGE (ABM (12 MILES)

1611 HOSTILE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE
1615 2 UNIDENT OBJS APPROACHING SHIP
STARBOARD SIDE
1621 SHIP ALT ENDING NO STEERAGE
1622 LOST STARBOARD RUDDER
1623 ALL ENGINES AHEAD 1/3

1628 SHIFT RUDDER AMID SHIP
1631 2000-17 HIGH SPEED PROPELLER
50 CAL FORWARD
300 50 AFT AIRCRAFT
CIRCLED BOAT
1651 MAINTAIN 4 KNTS
1652 BOATS FLYING STANDARD COURSE
1652 "TORPEDO BOATS BEING TO BE ISSUED"
CAPTAINS STATEMENT
1653 GUN DIRECTOR
1653 SHIP ATTACKED BY TWO TORPEDO BOATS
1654 S/M TO P/S TO INTERCEPT
HOSTILE TORPEDO APPROACHING
1655 FIRE GUNS BOATS SHIP TURNED AWAY
1655 TO ACCOMPLISH.
1655 WORD PASSED TO COMMENCE FIRE
PHOTO SCORE TAKEN OF THE ATTACKING
BOATS
1702 FIRE TWO ADDITIONAL TORPEDOES

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, J

Sunrise 0[illegible] (C)
Sunset 1[illegible] (C)

CAPTAIN'S NIGHT ORDERS
NIGHT OF 24 [illegible] 72
(DAY) (MONTH/YR)

Moonrise _____
Moonset _____

Tactical Information

Nature or type of operation: [illegible]

Composition:

OTC _____ IN _____ SCRN CDR _____ IN _____

Formation Course 180 Speed 15 Axis _____ Guide is _____

Bearing _____ Yds. _____ Friendly forces likely to be encountered:

Own Ship Information

Readiness Condition #3 (Modified) Material Condition Zebra Guards [illegible]

Boilers 1 S/S Generators _____

Maximum speed requirements expected #17 Kts. Cruising speed 12 Kts.

Lights and Navigational Aids expected to be sighted

NAME	CHARACTERISTICS	GEO.RANGE	BEARING	TIME TO SIGHT
[illegible]				

Unexecuted Orders, Navigational Data and Directives AT [illegible] (E) C/C 090
AT 0[illegible] (E) C/C 123. DO NOT [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

You are expected and required to comply with U. S. Navy Regulations and standing orders for OOD's and CIC Officers underway contained herein. Call me on all contacts with a CPA less than 3 miles. PUT ALL OTHER REQUIRED REPORTS TO ME AND CALL ME AT ANY TIME IF IN DOUBT.

Keep the watch alert and have armament and recognition signals ready. Keep a dark bridge. No matches, lighters, or open lights; no smoking by the enlisted watch standers on the bridge. Exercise watches frequently with drill problems.

This book will normally be kept on the bridge, where it will be read, initialed, and understood by officer and enlisted watchstanders prior to going on watch.

CALL ME: At 0700.
15 minutes before C/C or C/S.
If depth of water under keel is less than 35 fathoms. SEE ABOVE

	COD	JOOD	CIC	OOW
20-24	[illegible]			[illegible]
00-04	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
04-08	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]

Respectfully,

[illegible]
Commanding Officer

[illegible]
Navigator

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO. NEW YORK 09501

ACTR5/03
5750
Ser

11 MAR 1968

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09B9)

Subj: Command History: submission of (Report Symbol: OPNAV Report 5750-1)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12 of 8 Nov 1966

Encl: (1) Command History of LIBERTY from 1 Jan 1967 through 31 Dec 1967

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).

D. L. BURSON

Copy to:
COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

I N D E X

Page

1 Part I Brief Chronology

4 Part II Basic Narrative

9 Part III Documentary Annexes

9 Excerpts from 8 June 1967 Quartermaster's Notebook

11 Officers Aboard 8 June 1967

12 Enlisted Personnel Aboard 8 June 1967

23 Personnel Recommended for Awards for Outstanding Performance on 8 June 1967

24 Major Equipment Casualties on 8 June 1967

25 Sample Letter of Commendation

26 Congratulatory Messages

28 Personnel on Board 31 December 1967

31 Biography of CDR W. L. MCGONAGLE

32 Biography of LCDR D. L. BURSON

after page 33 Photographs of CDR W. L. MCGONAGLE and LCDR D. L. BURSON

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PART I

BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

5 Jan 1967 - Equator crossing ceremonies at longitude 09-04.5E.

23 Jan 1967 - Arrived Luanda, Angola for fuel and recreation.

27 Jan 1967 - Departed Luanda, Angola. Underway for operations and Monrovia. Liberia.

15 Feb 1967 - Arrived Monrovia, Liberia for recreation.

17 Feb 1967 - Departed Monrovia, Liberia. Underway for Norfolk, Virginia.

28 Feb 1967 - Arrived U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. Commenced two-month in-port period.

20 Mar 1967 - Underway for sea trials in Virginia Capes area.

22 Mar 1967 - Return to U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia.

24 Mar 1967 - Commenced four-week tender availability at U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. Moored outboard USS VULCAN (AR-5).

21 Apr 1967 - Completed tender availability. Moored berth 42, U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia.

2 May 1967 - Underway for four-month deployment to West African area.

22 May 1967 - Arrived Abidjan, Ivory Coast for four days.

24 May 1967 - Departed Abidjan, Ivory Coast for Rota, Spain in accordance with operations immediate orders.

1 Jun 1967 - Arrived Rota, Spain to take on fuel and provisions.

2 Jun 1967 - Departed Rota, Spain. Underway for operations area in Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Chopped from Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet to Commander, SIXTH Fleet.

8 Jun 1967 - Attacked by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats. Nine (9) persons killed, twenty-five (25) missing and approximately seventy-five (75) injuried.

James M. Ennes, Jr Research Papers

9 Jun 1967 - Rendezvoused with USS DAVIS (DD-937) and USS MASSEY (DD-778). Killed and more seriously injured personnel air evacuated to USS AMERICA (CVA-66). Admiral MARTIN, Commander SIXTH Fleet aboard. Underway for Malta for repairs with USS PAPAGO (ATF-160) and DAVIS as escorts.

11 Jun 1967 - Dead in the water. Divers from PAPAGO inspected hull damage from torpedo hit.

14 Jun 1967 - Arrived Valletta, Malta. Board of Inquiry convened. Drydocked.

18 Jun 1967 - Board of Inquiry completed.

14 Jul 1967 - Repairs completed. Drydock flooded.

15 Jul 1967 - Dock trials.

16 Jul 1967 - Departed Valletta, Malta with PAPAGO as escort. Underway for Norfolk, Virginia.

19 Jul 1967 - Chopped from Commander SIXTH Fleet to Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

29 Jul 1967 - Arrived U. S. Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia. Berthed Pier 17.

3 Aug 1967 - LIBERTY winner of Battle Efficiency Competition Award.

14 Aug 1967 - Board of Inspection and Survey convened.

17 Aug 1967 - Board of Inspection and Survey adjourned. Recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that LIBERTY be repaired and returned to duty.

29 Sep 1967 - Personnel inspection and presentation of Purple Heart Medals to ninety-eight (98) personnel for injuries received during 8 June 1967 attack.

2 Oct 1967 - Change of Command Ceremony. Commander W. L. MCGONAGLE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

relieved by Lieutenant Commander D. L. BURSON.

30 Dec 1967 - Third anniversary of commissioning.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PART II

BASIC NARRATIVE

1. Command Organization and Relations:

a. Commanding Officers: CDR W. L. MCGONAGLE, USN, 494467/1100
25 Apr 1966 - 2 Oct 1967
LCDR D. L. BURSON, USN, 611971/1100
2 Oct 1967 - Present

b. Homeport and Home Yard: Norfolk, Virginia

c. Mission: To conduct technical research operations in support of U. S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communication systems such as satellite communications.

d. Compliment:

Normal: 16 Officers, 276 Enlisted
As of 1 Mar 1968: 7 Officers, 95 Enlisted

e. Inactivation: Chief of Naval Operations message of 071929Z Feb 1968 to Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet directed them to inactivate LIBERTY earliest. Ship chopped to Officer in Charge, Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, Norfolk, Virginia on 2 Mar 1968.

2. Operations.

a. LIBERTY started the new year operating off the Western Coast of Africa. On 5 January approximately 100 persons were initiated into the Royal Order of Shellbacks upon crossing the equator at Longitude 09-04.5E. LIBERTY visited Luanda, Angola from 23 to 27 January for fuel, rest and recreation. Operations were continued while enroute to Monrovia, Liberia.

James M. Ennes, Jr Research Papers

After a two-day visit, LIBERTY departed Monrovia on February 17, and, after conducting competitive exercises, got underway for Norfolk, Virginia. LIBERTY arrived at the U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia on 28 February. This marked the beginning of a two-month in-port period. Sea trials were held in the Virginia Capes area from 20 through 22 March to test the moon relay gear. A four-week tender availability with the USS VULCAN (AR-5) at U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia, commenced on 24 March and was completed on 21 April. LIBERTY remained at the Naval Station taking on fuel, provisions and personnel until 2 May when she got underway for a scheduled four-month deployment to conduct technical research operations on the Western coast of Africa. The first port visit was Abidjan, Ivory Coast on 22 May. The scheduled four-day visit was cut short by an operational immediate message instructing the ship to proceed at the fastest possible speed to the Naval Station, Rota, Spain, to take on fuel and stores and then to proceed to an operating area in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. LIBERTY arrived in Rota on 1 June and departed the following morning. She chopped from Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet to Commander SIXTH Fleet on 2 June. She reached her operating area early in the morning on 8 June and was subjected to an unprovoked attack by what was later to be identified as Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats. One torpedo struck the ship starboard side amidships, frames 52-78 just below the waterline, completely flooding one watertight compartment to the first platform. Many men were recorded missing in this space. Upon reaching Malta, it was determined that twenty-five (25) men had been killed by the torpedo explosion. Nine (9) other men were killed topside[1] by

[1]Data on the thirty-four (34) deceased personnel is included in Part III.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

gunfire from the attacking aircraft. The ship sustained over eight-hundred hits during the attack. Excerpts from the Quartermaster's Notebook covering the happenings of the attack are included in part III. At sunrise on 9 June the USS DAVIS (DD-937) and the USS MASSEY (DD-778) rendezvoused with LIBERTY and sent medical and other key personnel aboard to assist. Later that morning the USS AMERICA (CVA-66) and Commander SIXTH Fleet Flagship USS LITTLE ROCK (CLG-4) arrived. Commander SIXTH Fleet, Admiral MARTIN came aboard. The more seriously injured and deceased personnel were air evacuated to AMERICA. LIBERTY, in the company of DAVIS and the USS PAPAGO (ATF-160), got underway for an undetermined port for repairs that afternoon. Several days later, it was decided to drydock her at Valletta, Malta, for permanent repairs to the torpedoed area and temporary repairs elsewhere. On June 11 all engines were stopped so that damage control teams could find the cause of excessive vibrating of the watertight bulkhead at frame 52. At the same time divers from PAPAGO examined the torpedo hole and roughly estimated its size to be 35 feet wide by 25 feet deep. The bulkhead at frame 52 was shored satisfactorily and no further difficulties were encountered. LIBERTY arrived in Valletta, Malta on the morning of June 14 and moored while waiting for final preparations of the drydock. A Board of Inquiry, headed by Rear Admiral I. C. KIDD, representing Commander SIXTH Fleet convened immediately. The informal part of the inquiry had been conducted from 9 through 13 June while enroute to Malta. LIBERTY was drydocked on the afternoon of the 14th. The unpleasant task of removing bodies and gear from the damaged space took two days before drydock personnel could start their work on June 16. Two shifts of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Maltese workers made the temporary and permanent repairs, with assistance from the ship's force. Repairs were completed and the drydock was flooded on July 14. After successful dock trials on the 15th, LIBERTY, with PAPAGO providing communications and navigation aid, got underway for Norfolk, Virginia, on the 16th. She arrived at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, on 29 July, having chopped back to Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet from Commander SIXTH Fleet on the 19th. Routine maintenance was performed by the ship's force, which was gradually being reduced, while waiting for a decision as to the final disposition of the ship. LIBERTY was notified by Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet on 3 August that she had won the Battle Efficiency Competition Award for her class. A Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) convened on 14 August and upon completion on 17 August recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that LIBERTY be repaired and returned to duty. On 29 September Captain BEERS, Chief of Staff, Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet presented Purple Heart Medals to ninety-eight (98) personnel who had received injuries during the 8 June 1967 attack. Seventy-one (71) other Purple Hearts which had been forwarded to other commands were awarded to personnel who had been transferred. LCDR D. L. BURSON, who had served as Executive Officer since 27 June, relieved CDR W. L. MCGONAGLE as Commanding Officer on 2 October. CDR MCGONAGLE went to the USS KILAUEA (AE-26) as Prospective Commanding Officer. During the second quarter of fiscal year 1968 LIBERTY was selected as one of the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet ships to be placed in a reduced manning status. Reduction in the manning level was projected to gradually decrease

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

enlisted personnel to fifty (50) and officers to five (5). This manning level is to be maintained until a decision is reached as to the final disposition of LIBERTY. Enlisted personnel had been reduced to one hundred eighteen (118) and officers to seven (7) when LIBERTY quietly celebrated her third anniversary of commissioning on 30 December.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PART III

DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES

Excerpts from 8 June 1967 Quartermaster's Notebook

1403 - Loud explosion - Port side amidships.

1405 - Sounded General Quarters. Large fire in vicinity of frame 85, 01 level where fuel for motor driven fire pumps is located.

1405 - All engines ahead flank.

1405-1410 - Ship under repeated air attack with two or more unidentified aircraft making coordinated strafing, rocket and incendiary runs over the ship. Three major fires topside covering large areas of ship with flames and heavy smoke. A total of eight officers and men were killed or died as a result of injuries received during the air attack: One officer killed and one mortally wounded on bridge, two men killed at machine gun 51, one man killed at machine gun 52, one died of wounds received on the main deck starboard side and two died of wounds received on the 01 level portside. Approximately seventy-five wounded, including Commanding Officer, throughout topside areas from shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets.

1419 - Began making turns for 18 knots.

1424 - Three (3) motor torpedo boats sighted visually abaft starboard beam. Distance 3-4 miles.

1426 - It was noted that normal steaming ensign, which had been flying from the gaff, had been shot away during the air attack. Holiday size ensign hoisted on port yardarm.

1428 - Motor torpedo boats signalling by flashing light from starboard quarter. Light obscured by dense smoke from burning motor whaleboat.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

1430 - One round fired by machine gun 51. Commanding Officer ordered hold fire.

1431 - Machine gun 53 opened fire on center of the three motor torpedo boats. Commanding Officer ordered Ensign LUCAS to proceed to machine gun 53 to cease firing. Motor torpedo boat believed to be flying star of David flag. Flag quite small.

1431 - Word passed to standby for torpedo attack to starboard side of the ship.

1434 - Torpedo passed 75 yards astern of the ship.

1435 - Torpedo hit starboard side amidships. Twenty-six men died as a result of the torpedo hit and motor torpedo boat strafing fire. Torpedo hit in vicinity of the research coordination center where approximately twenty men were at their General Quarters station. This and adjacent spaces were flooded instantly and most personnel in these spaces died of either blast or drowing. The number of injured was 200. Their names are recorded in the medical records of the command and are not repeated herein.

1435 - Lost electrical power throughout the ship.

1436 - Lost steam pressure - secured engines and boilers.

1440 - Hull number of one motor torpedo boat observed to be 206-17. Motor torpedo boats standing away from ship.

1503 - One motor torpedo boat returned to ship and signalled "Do you need help?". Commanding Officer directed that "negative" be sent in reply.

1507 - Helicopters bearing Star of David approached ship and hovored. Distance 500 yards. Hull numbers D4 or 04 and D8 or 08.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1515 HELOS D8, D4 circle, parallel to ship, not hostile

1515 MTB's depart - sit five miles away

1519 power restored to bridge except for rudder.

1520 Engines back

1523 Engines out

1537 MTB's approach fast from starboard / 2 jets approach stbd same time
crew warned to stand by for resumed attack

1555 Communications back

1600 Message sent amplifying attack report, identifying MTB's as Israeli

1637 MTB's depart / ship making 8K, 340M

1730 Lost Lube Oil pressure

1730 Regained pressure / engines back

1841 Is. helo D6 arrives/dropped card/ left after 10/15 minutes.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PERSONNEL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1519 - Power restored to bridge except for rudder. Steering manually from after steering. Attempting to clear area to Northward at speeds varing from 0 to 8 knots. Personnel casualties treated on continuous basis in wardroom and mess decks. Flooding boundaries established. Fires extinguished.

Officers aboard 8 June 1967

* LCDR Philip M. (Clarence) ARMSTRONG, Jr., USN, 509825/1100 (Deceased) (NAVY CROSS)
* LT Maurice H. (Hugh) BENNETT, USN, 626125/1610 (SILVER STAR)
* LT James M. (Moses) ENNES, Jr., USNR, 653840/1615
* LT George H. (Austin) GOLDEN, USN, 574328/6302 (SILVER STAR) (PLANE COMMANDER)
* LT Richard F. (Francis) KIEFER, MC, USNR, 710107/2105 (SILVER STAR)
* LCDR David E. (Quin) LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610
* ENS David G. (George) LUCAS, USNR, 710515/1105 (SILVER STAR)
* CDR William L. (Loren) MCGONAGLE, USN, 494467/1100 (MEDAL OF HONOR)
* LT James G. (George) O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615
  ENS Malcolm P. (Patrick) O'MALLEY, USNR, 703423/1105
* LTJG Lloyd C. (Ltjg) PAINTER, USNR, 692274/1105
* LT James C. (Cecil) PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462 (Deceased) (DIED IN RESEARCH)
  ENS John D. (Dedrick) SCOTT, USNR, 700158/1105 (SILVER STAR)
* ENS Richard P. (Patten) TAYLOR, Jr., USNR, 689116/3105
* LT Stephen S. (Spencer) TOTH, USN, 669613/1100 (Deceased) (DIED ON BRIDGE) (SILVER STAR)
* LTJG Malcolm M. (Emmum) WATSON, USNR, 699039/1105

* Purple Heart Medal Awarded

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Enlisted Personnel aboard 8 June 1967

	Rate	Name	Service Number	
*	CT1	ADDINGTON, Reginald Norwood	349 53 80	
	CTSN	AMOORA, Gary L.	999 55 21	
	SFP3	AMETTI, Americo F.	913 46 93	
	FN	AISHE, Benjamin C.	915 59 17	
*	CT3	ALLENBAUGH, William B. (Deceased)	684 49 96	died in Research
~~*~~	~~CT2~~	~~AMEEN, Timothy Paul~~	~~774 03 93~~	
	CT3	ANDERSON, James M., Jr.	B60 82 52	
*	CT3	ANDERSON, Joe Denny	771 76 7[illegible]	
*	EMFA	ANDERSON, Richard Edwin	B51 81 36	
	GMSN	ARFSTEN, Theodore L.	B10 66 32	
	CT2	ARMSTRONG, Alvis L.	772 11 79	
*	EMFN	ASHWORTH, Joseph Wayne	699 53 18	
	CTSN	BACSKAY, Thomas G.	138 04 05	
	SD3	BAGAN, Rogelio M.	544 12 27	PLANK OWNER
*	CT1	BAKER, Richard K.	486 80 12	
	CS3	BARTON, Gary L.	795 88 68	PLANK OWNER
	FN	BEATTIE, John W.	779 51 69	
*	CTSN	BECKEL, Edward H.	B40 15 47	
*	CTSN	BENEDICT, Nathan Dow D., Jr.	129 55 74	
	CTC	BENKERT, Joseph Arthur A. (NAVY [illegible])	530 81 79	
*	CTSN	BENNETT, Lee R.	998 13 79	
*	CT1	BINGHAM, Lowell Thomas	521 38 68	
*	FN	BISHER, Gerald Robert	B10 42 43	

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* CIV GS-7	BLALOCK, Donald Lassie	458 74 5503	
* SN	BLANCHARD, Gary Ray R. (Deceased)	777 77 22	hit by rockets died in surgery
* CT2	BLOXHAM, Glenn L.	774 27 59	
* CIV GS-7	BLUE, Allen Merle M. (Deceased)	531 42 3327	
* CS3	BOCCELLA, Salvatore (n)	796 37 69	(probably wounded)
* MM3	BOOTH, John Edward	998 19 47	
* FN	BOSTIC, Calvin (n) II	795 71 61	
* FN	BOTCHER, Don Reuben	779 52 59	
* CT2	BOWEN, Larry L.	796 83 28	
CT2	BRADLEY, Thomas E.	794 67 41	
* CT3	BRONG, James Victor	513 41 23	
* MMC	BROOKS, Richard John (Silver Star)	434 62 63	
* QM3	BROWN, Francis (n) (Deceased) (Navy Cross)	778 76 70	died at helm PLANK OWNER
* BT3	BROWN, Frank Johnson J. (Silver Star)	796 69 65	PLANK OWNER
* YN3	BROWNFIELD, Virgil Louis L. (Silver Star)	794 23 49	
* BT3	BRUMMETT, Gary Wayne	696 29 26	
* CT3	BUCK, Ronald [illegible]	918 25 71	
RMSN	BUNDY, David W.	139 01 82	
CT1	BYRD, Charles E.	543 85 61	
* MMFA	BYRD, Danny R.	290 54 86	
CT2	CALLIGAN, John J.	687 01 30	
* CT2	CAMPBELL, Ronnie Jordan (Deceased)	586 13 23	died in Research
* CT1	CARLSON, Richard Carl	444 13 12	
* CS3	CARNAHAN, David Neal	810 42 33	
* CT1	CARPENTER, Jeffery Robert R. (Silver Star)	535 14 05	
CT2	CARPENTER, Joseph P.	794 84 55	

? Name "Boccella" appears on a separate casualty list.

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* SN	CASPER, William E.	796 40 74	
* CT2	CHADSEY, Calvin L.	686 66 82	
* CT2	CLEVELAND, Fred Marsial	353 80 14	
RD2	COCNAVITCH, Charles J.	589 81 75	
* SN	COLSTON, "J" "C", Jr. (Bronze Star)	771 04 56	
* SN	CONCEPCION, Rodney Carl	674 38 09	
* CT2	CONVERSE, Jerry LeRoy L. (Deceased)	794 79 44	died in Research
* SN	COOK, Eddie Lamar	997 59 71	
* ENFA	CORNISH, George Robert	998 07 12	
SHL3	COTTEN, James E.	795 57 95	PLANK OWNER
DK3	CRAIG, Juan A.	598 02 65	
* CTSN	DALLY, Rodney Lee (Bronze Star)	520 04 91	
* CTSN	DANIELS, Dale E.	860 44 52	
* SM2	DAVID, Russell O'Neal O., Jr. (Bronze Star)	683 33 65	
* CT2	DAVIDSON, James Ray	699 64 72	
SFM3	DEMOFI, Duilio (n) (Bronze Star)	913 46 75	
TN	DIANA, Rodolfo A.	920 25 93	
ICFN	DI GERONIMO, James P.	914 82 01	
	(appears on the casualty list as CT2 Marvin Francis Dodd 599 79 51)		
* CT2	DODD, Edward J.	918 95 37	
* SHL3	DUBZEWSKI, Henry Edward E., Jr. (Bronze Star)	546 83 16	
* M3	DYE, Robert Munro	599 67 51	PLANK OWNER
* CTSN	EAKINS, Kenneth P. (Burton)	794 04 69	
SN	EASTON, Alan W.	779 28 89	
* CTSN	ECKER, Kenneth P.	851 36 48	
* CT1	ECKHART, Lewis D.	932 69 34	
* CT2	ELKLEBERRY, Dennis M.	914 81 10	

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

* CT2	EISENBERG, Robert B. (Deceased)		776 09 35	
SD1	ELDER, Eddie G.		987 14 [illegible]	
MM3	FISHER, John W.		788 34 78	
* SN	FOLLIN, Donald Fletcher F., Jr.		917 66 74	
RM3	FREESE, Everett L.		689 67 45	
CT2	GALLO, Ernest A.		779 23 86	
* CT3	GAUTHIER, Kenneth R.		771 37 99	
~~* RD3~~	~~GILSON, Ronald Dean~~		~~794 71 33~~	PLANK OWNER
CT3	COINS, Larry D.		777 78 57	
* CT3	GOSS, Jerry Lee(Deceased)	died in Research	773 61 55	BURIED IN MASS GRAVE IN ARLINGTON
* CTSN	GRANSKI, Ronald Frank		880 56 19	
* CT1	GRAVES, Curtis A. Lee (Deceased)		518 58 24	died in Research
SD3	GREEN, Troy L. Lawrence (BRONZE STAR)		451 50 06	
* YN3	GURCHIK, Stephen C. Charles (BRONZE STAR)		697 82 42	PLANK OWNER
ET3	HALBARDIER, James T.		771 64 06	
RM2	HALMAN, James V.		692 26 14	
SN	HANDY, Edward D		917 37 50	
MM3	HAUCK, Charles K.		999 33 02	
* CT3	HAWKINS, David William		118 73 49	
* CTSN	HAYES, Lawrence Paul (Deceased)		B70 53 70	died in Research — MASS GRAVE
* GMG3	HAZEN, David Carl		696 84 98	PLANK OWNER
* SN	HEANEY, Warren Dennis		918 44 65	
* CT2	HENDRICKS, Charles Richard		685 56 42	
* SHL2	HEROLD, Donald (n) (BRONZE STAR)		609 22 48	
* CT1	HERSEY, Warren E. Durand (Deceased)		903 67 11	died in Research
* CT3	HIGGINS, Alan (n) (Deceased)		788 62 97	air attack

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CT3	HILDEBRAND, Wayne L., Jr.	913 42 28	
* SN	HOAR, Carl Lewis L. (Deceased)	774 46 48	air attack
MM3	HOBSON, Jerry G.	770 94 82	
SN	HOLDEN, Glen J.	793 69 17	
* CT3	HORNE, John S., Jr.	692 96 29	
* FN	HRANKOWSKI, John Michael	B10 43 15	
CTSN	HURST, Donald A. (BRONZE STAR)	B81 88 16	
* SN	~~JACKSON, Thomas Franklin~~	~~689 15 99~~	
* CT2	JOHNS, Frederick K.	794 91 14	
FN	JOHNSON, Duane D.	B50 62 4[illegible]	
* CT3	JOHNSON, Melvin P.	99[illegible] 32 29	
CTSA	JOHNSON, Perry W.	391 89 97	
CT3	JOHNS, Charles F.	138 16 69	
* CTSN	KAVANAUGH, James P.	908 51 32	
* CTSN	KEENE, Richard Walter, JR. W. (Deceased)	778 82 75	died in Research
* FA	KELLY, Glenn Douglas	B50 76 86	
* BT3	KELLY, James Fredrick	773 86 89	
SN	KERNER, Frederick W.	796 40 70	
BT3	KIDD, Robert C.	789 36 89	
SH1	KIMBLE, Kenneth R.	996 47 35	
* CTSN	KIRK, Eugene Henry	918 81 30	
* SA	KISIEL, David John	998 70 04	
CT3	KRAM, William M.	713 71 21	
* FN	KRASNASKY, Stephen John	354 82 98	
* CT3	KREIN, Loren W.	538 49 74	
* SN	KRINER, Alan Francis	779 57 61	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* CT1	KUKAL, Ronald G.	539 00 34	
* SN	LA MAR, John D.	779 56 36	
* CTC	LAMKIN, Carlyle F. Francis (SILVER STAR)	518 69 45	
* CT2	LANDIS, Calvin L.	777 52 31	
SA	LARKINS, Dale D. Duane (SILVER STAR)	919 48 93	
* FA	LATORRE, Steven J.	914 73 89	
* SN	LEHMAN, Joel Wayne	771 54 02	
* CTSN	~~LEHMAN~~, Terry W.	914 59 44	
* EM2	LE MAY, William Michael	773 35 21	
* SN	LEMOND, Thomas William	917 [illegible] 31	
* CTSN	LENAU, James L. (Deceased)	[illegible] 55 58	died in TTY repair shop
* CT1	LENTINI, Joseph Charles	594 81 55	
SK3	LEWIS, Claude L., Jr.	543 39 65	
* CT2	LIEFELD, Anthony J.	776 10 30	
* CTC	LINN, Raymond Eugene E. (Deceased)	571 13 74	died in comm
CTSN	LIPPLY, Ronald L.	789 51 85	
* SSGT	LOCKWOOD, Lance F. (SILVER STAR)	185 98 56	
TN	LOMASANG, Benjamin L.	589 73 87	
* CT2	LONG, Philip L.	692 84 63	
CTSN	LONG, Robert W.	B50 92 [illegible]	
* FN	LOSASSO, Gerald Francis	796 1[illegible]	
PNSN	LUCAS, Randy W.	778 90 60	
CT3	LUNDIN, Donald J.	774 75 69	
* CT1	LUPTON, James M. (Deceased)	511 31 28	died in Research — MASS CASUALTY
* FN	MARAIO, James Anthony	916 29 05	
* TN	MARFIL, Sofronio Parate	776 90 09	PLANK OWNER

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* CTJ	MARGGRAF, Duane R. Rowe (Deceased)	773 96 50	died in Research
* CTSN	MARLBOROUGH, David W. (Deceased)	B10 04 80	died in Research
NM1	MARTIN, Charles M. Monroe	497 49 88	
* CT2	MASSENGALE, John L.	695 14 21	
* CTC	MATTHEWS, James A.	345 18 52	
* SN	MATHEWS, Jimmie L.	998 21 92	
* CTSN	MC ANDREWS, Patrick H.	B11 44 21	
* SN	~~MC CALLISTER, Robert Lee~~	~~919 61 90~~	
CT3	MC CLISTER, Edward H.	697 91 03	
* CT3	MC FARLAND, Terry Lee	795 25 54	
* CT2	MC FEGGAN, David Lee	774 71 98	
* CTSN	MC INTURFF, Frank (n) III	861 44 71	
CT3	MC MAKIN, Garvin L. Lee Douglas	595 81 92	
* SMSN	MEADORS, Joseph Leslie	B71 04 56	
* CT2	MENDLE, Anthony P. Robert (Deceased)	777 62 87	died in Research
FN	MERCADO, Remegio N.	776 90 13	PLANK OWNER
SK1	MERRITT, James H.	282 22 24	
* CT2	MEYER, Stephen Edward	771 42 03	
* FN	MILLER, David Bruce	354 88 36	
SHB3	MOULDS, Thomas R. Robert	697 77 29	
FN	MUMFORD, Richard G.	354 81 34	
* CT3	MYERS, David V.	B40 65 88	
CT3	NEEDHAM, James L. Leonard	915 09 65	
* SF1	NEESE, Richard D. Dale	430 77 74	
* BT3	NEWELL, John Paul	776 08 93	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

25

SK1	NEWTON, Richard L.	455 53 06	
* CTSN	NYGREN, Carl C. (Deceased)	788 37 16	died in Research — MASS GRAVE
EIN2	O'CLASSEN, Francis J.	594 41 13	PLANK OWNER
EIR3	OLIPHANT, Glenn R.	918 82 61	
* BT2	OWENS, Eugene (n)	549 85 64	
* CT2	PAGE, David W.	904 28 51	
* CTSN	PAGELER, Donald W.	B60 58 17	
* SN	~~PAHIDES, Stamatie (n)~~ (BRONZE STAR)	795 34 78	PLANK OWNER
* CTSN	PARKER, Herbert J.	138 54 18	
* CS3	PATTEN, Dennis Allyn	904 30 77	
* SN	PAYAN, Salvador (n)	796 66 15	
* CT2	PAYNE, Garland Wray	772 94 77	
* CTSN	PEETOOM, Herbert C.	797 04 78	
* SK3	PERKINS, Edward George	776 42 83	PLANK OWNER
* SN	PIERSON, Gerald V. (Henson)	794 07 20	
CT3	PLASTERER, David T.	915 85 59	
* CT1	PLEASANTS, Carl L.	535 78 10	
* QM3	POLLARD, Floyd H.	353 95 47	
* CT2	POPIELSKI, John G.	778 80 00	
YN2	POWLEDGE, Martin D. (BRONZE STAR)	775 78 26	
CT2	PRIGMORE, Eugene (n)	538 02 77	
* SN	PURCELL, Harvey Lee	917 37 39	
SN	QUINTERO, Anthony A.	779 59 90	
* SN	QUINTERO, Thomas Alvarez	137 51 83	
FN	RAMEY, David (n)	796 43 22	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* BT3	RAMELSBURG, Albert Edwin	119 90 38	
* IC1	RANDALL, John R.	517 81 45	
* SGT	RAPER, Jack L. (Deceased)	199 40 72	died in Research — Miss Grave
EM3	REGER, Richard J.	697 11 63	
* CPL	REHMEYER, Edward E. (Deceased)	212 09 19	died in Research
* SA	REILLY, Robert Brian	B12 40 15	
* SA	REILLY, Thomas Joseph	913 50 66	
CT3	RHODES, Paddy "E"	793 84 81	
SN	RICHARD, Stephen J.	B10 21 75	
* CT2	RITENBURG, Douglas C.	237 87 21	received purple heart in 1974
* SN	ROSSI, Victor John, Jr.	B40 67 53	
* CT1	ROWLEY, Charles LeRoy	456 48 03	
SN	RUSSELL, William R.	917 37 09	
TN	SARNO, Reynald S.	589 74 71	
* CTSN	SCARBOROUGH, Robert A.	788 80 10	
* EN3	SCHALEY, Kenneth Michael	694 00 58	
* FN	SCHNEIDER, Robert J. (Ronald Wilber)	B60 64 72	
* CT2	SCHNELL, Robert James	642 55 84	
* HM3	SCHULMAN, Samuel J. (Leonard)	353 96 33	
* CT3	SHAFER, Maurice B. Bryan	693 94 86	
* CTSN	SHAW, David Alan	904 39 56	
* FN	SIMPSON, Michael Ray	917 52 03	
* CT3	SIX, Harold Eugene	777 58 53	
* ICFN	SKOLAK, David (n) (Deceased)	B50 17 83	died in forward gun mount
* SN	SLAVENS, Larry James	916 92 00	
* DC3	SMITH, James C. Clayton	777 19 71	

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

WIA/WDED

CDR William Loren [illegible] COLEGLE, USN, 494467/1100
- LCDR Philip [illegible]c Cutcheon [illegible]STRONG, Jr., USN, 569025/1100 (Deceased)
LCDR David Edwin LEWIS, USN, 534572/1610
- LT Maurice Hoque BENNETT, USN, 620125/1610
- LT James Marquis [illegible] IES, USNR, 353040/1515
LT George Houston GOLDEN, USN, 574329/6202
- LT Stephen Spencer TOTH, USN, 669613/1100 (Deceased)
- LT James George O'[illegible]NOR, USNR, 671765/1615
- LT James Cecil PIERCE, USN, 649805/6[illegible]62 (Deceased)
LT Richard Francis [illegible]HITEL, [illegible]C, USNR, 710107/2105
- MTJG Lloyd Clyde [illegible]D[illegible]ER, USNR, 692274/1105
- MTJG Malcolm McEachin [illegible]RTSON, USNR, 699039/1103
- ENS David George LUCAS, USNR, 710515/1105
- ENS Richard Patten TAYLOR, Jr., USNR, 699116/3105
CT1 Reginald Norwood [illegible]DDINGTON, USN, 340 53 80
CT3 William B. ALLENBAUGH, USN, 684 49 96 (Deceased)
- CT3 Joe Denny ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77
- EMFA Richard Edwin ANDERSON, USN, B51 81 36
- EMFA Joseph Wayne ASHWORTH, USNR, 699 53 18
CT1 Richard K BAKER, USN, 486 80 12
CTCN Nathan Dow BENEDICT, Jr., USN, 139 55 74
- CTCN Lee R. BENNETT, USN, 998 13 79
- CT1 Lowell Thomas BINGHAM, USN, 521 38 68
FN Gerald Robert BISHER, USN, B10 42 43
- GS-7 Donald Lessie BLALOCK, Civilian
- SN Gary Ray BLANCHARD, USN, 771 77 22 (Deceased)
CT2 Glen L. BLOMAN, USN, 774 27 59
GS-7 Alan [illegible]. BLUE, Civilian, 531 12 3327 (Deceased)
- CS[illegible] Salvatore (NMN) BOCELLA, USN, 796 37 69
- FN John Edward BOOTH, USN, 998 19 47
- FN Don Reuben BOTCHER, USNR, 779 52 [illegible]9
- CT2 Larry L. BOWEN, USN, 796 85 28
- [illegible]3 James Victor BRONG, USN, 923 41 23
MMC Richard John BROOKS, USN, [illegible]64 [illegible]2 63
- QM3 Francis (NMN) BROWN, USN, 778 76 70 (Deceased)
BT3 Frank Johnson BROWN, USN, 796 69 65
- YN3 Virgil Louie BROWNLEE, USNR, 794 23 49
BT3 Gary Wayne BRUMFITT, USNR, 696 29 20
- CT3 Ronald D. BUCK, USN, 918 25 71
- FN Danny R. BYRD, USN, 290 54 86
- CT2 Ronnie J. C[illegible]ELL, USN, 586 13 23 (Deceased)
- CT1 Richard Carl CARLSON, USN, 44[illegible] 13 12
- CS3 David Neal CARNAHAN, USN, B10 42 33
- CT1 Jeffrey Robert CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05
SN William E. CASPER, USN 796 40 74
- CT2 Calvin L. CHADSEY, USN, 686 66 82
CT2 Frederick Marsial CLEVELAND, USN, 353 80 14
- SN "J" "C" COLSTON, USN, 771 04 56
- SN [illegible]ey Carl CONCEPCION, USN, 674 38 09

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CT2 Jerry LeRoy CONVERSE, USN, 794 79 44 (Deceased)
SN Eddie Lamar COOK, USN, 997 59 71
FN George Robert CORNISH, USN, 998 07 12
CTSN Rodney L. DALEY, USN, 820 04 91
CTSN Dale E. DANIELS, USN, 860 44 52
SH2 Russel O'Neal DAVID, USN, 683 63 65
CT2 James Ray DAVIDSON, USN, 699 64 72
CT2 Marvin Francis DODD, USN, 599 79 51
SH3 Henry Edward DURZEWSKI, Jr. 546 83 16
CTSN Kenneth Burton ENKINS, USN, 794 04 69
CTSN Kenneth E. ECKER, USN, 751 36 48
CT1 Lewis D. ECKHART, USN, 922 69 31
CT2 Dennis M. EIKLENBERG, USN, 914 81 10
CT2 Robert B. FISHERS, USN 776 09 35 (Deceased)
SN Donald Fletcher FOLLIN, Jr., USN, 917 66 74
CT3 Kenneth R. FOUNTAIN, USN, 771 37 90
RD3 Ronald Dean GILSON, USN, 794 71 33
CT3 Jerry Lee GOSS, USNR, 773 61 55 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE C
CTSN Ronald Frank GRANITSKI, USN, 880 56 19
CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 21 (Deceased)
YN3 Steven Charles GURCHIK, Jr., USN, 697 82 42
CT3 David William HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49
CTSN Lawrence F. HAYDEN, USN, 870 53 70 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE
GM3 David Carl HAZEN, USN, 695 84 98
SN Warren Dennis HENRY, USN, 910 44 65
CT2 Charles Richard HENDRICKS, USN, 685 56 42
SH2 Donald (NMI) HEROLD, USN, 609 22 48
CT1 Warren E. HERSEY, USN, 903 57 11 (Deceased)
CT3 Alan (NMN) HIGGINS, USN, 788 62 97 (Deceased)
SN Carl Lewis HOAD, USN, 774 46 48 (Deceased)
CT3 John S. HORNE, Jr., USNR, 692 96 21
FN John Michael IWANOWSKI, USN, 815 49 15
SN Thomas Franklin JACKSON, USN, 680 15 90
CT2 Frederick (NMN) JOHNS, USN, 794 91 14
CT3 Melvin F. JOHNSON, USN, 958 52 29
CTSN James P. KAVANAGH, USN, 918 51 32
CT2 Richard Walter KEENE, USN, 778 82 75 (Deceased)
FA Glen Douglas KELLY, USN, 850 76 86
MT3 James Fredrick KELLY, USN, 773 86 39
CTSN Eugene Henry KLEE, USN, 918 81 30
SN David John KLEIL, USNR, 998 70 04
FN Stephen John KRASNOSKY, USNR, 354 02 98
CT3 Loren W. KUHN, USN, 538 49 74
SN Alan Francis KUHNEN, USNR, 779 57 61
CT1 Ronald G. KUKAL, USN, 539 00 34
SN John D. LAVER, USNR, 779 56 36
CTC Carlyle Francis LAWKIN, USN, 518 69 45
CT2 Calvin L. LANDIS, USN, 777 52 31
EMFA Steven J. LATOUR, USN, 914 23 89
SKSN Joel Wayne LEIPH, USN, 771 54 02

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

- CTSN Terry W. LEPTON, USN, 914 59 44
- EM2 William Michael LEARY, USN, 773 35 21
- SN Thomas William LEDOUD, Jr. USNR, 917 49 31
- CTSN James L. LENNE, USN 997 56 58 (Deceased)
- CT1 Joseph Charles LEWICKI, USN. 594 80 55
- CT2 Anthony J. LIEFELD, USN, 776 10 30
- CTC Raymond Eugene LIND, USN, 571 13 74 (Deceased)
- CT2 Philip L. LONG, USN 692 84 63
- SSGT Bryce F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 1059856
- FN Gerald Francis LOGSDON, USNR, 796 18 83
- CT1 James T. LUPTON, USN, 511 31 29 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE
- EMFN James Anthony MARINO, USNR, 916 29 05
- TN Sofronio Parate MANGIL, USN, 776 90 09
- CT3 Duane Rose MARQUART, USN, 773 96 50 (Deceased)
- CTSN David H. MARSHBOURN, USN, 810 04 80 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE
- CT2 John L. MCGINNIS, USN, 695 14 21
- SN Jimmy L. MATHEWS, USN, 998 21 92
- CTC James A. MATTHEWS, USN, 345 18 52
- CTSN Patrick H. MCCARTHY, USN, 811 44 21
- SN Robert Lee MCCALLISTER, USN, 919 61 90
- CT2 David Lee MCFERRIN, USN, 774 71 98
- CTSN Frank (NMN) MCINTURFF, III, USN, 961 44 71
- SMSN Joseph Leslie MEADORS, USN, 871 04 56 C
- CT2 Anthony Potter MIDDLE, USN 777 62 87 (Deceased)
- CT2 Stephen Edward MEYER, USN, 771 42 03
- FN David Bruce MILLER, USNR, 354 88 36
- SF1 Richard Dale MEEKS, USN, 430 77 24
- BT3 John Paul NEWELL, USN, 776 08 93
- CT3 Carl C. NYGREN, USN, 708 37 16 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE
- BT2 Eugene (NMN) OWENS, USN, 949 85 66
- CTSN Donald W. PAGELER, USN, 860 58 17
- SN Stamatlie (NMN) PANIDES, USN, 793 34 78
- CTSN Herbert J. PARKER, USNR, 139 54 18
- CS3 Dennis Allyn PATTEN, USN, 904 30 77
- SN Salvador (NMN) PAYAN, USNR, 796 66 15
- CT2 Garland Gray PAYNE, USN, 772 94 77
- CTSN Herbert C. PEEPLES, USN, 797 01 78
- SK3 Edward George PELUSO, USN, 776 42 83
- SN Gerald Henson PERSON, USNR, 794 07 20
- CT1 Carl L. PLEASANTS, USN, 535 78 10
- QM3 Floyd H. POLAND, USN, 353 55 47
- CT2 John C. POPIELSKI, USN, 778 80 00
- SMSN Harvey Lee PURCELL, USNR, 917 37 39
- SN Thomas Alvarez QUINTERO, USNR, 779 59 90
- BT3 Albert Edwin RAMELSBURG, USN, 119 90 30
- IC1 John R. RANDALL, USN, 517 31 45
- SGT Jack Lewis RAPER, USMC, 1994072 (Deceased) – MASS GRAVE
- CPL Edward E. REMEYER, III, USMC, 212 09 19 (Deceased)
- SN Thomas Joseph REILLY, Jr., USN, 913 50 66
- SA Robert Brian REILLY, USN, 812 40 15

ENCLOSURE (1)

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes,

- CT1 Charles LeRoy HOWLEY, USN, 458 48 03
- CTRN Robert A. SCHNOROUGH, USN, 788 80 10
- RP3 Kenneth Michael SCHNLEY, USNR, 694 00 .8
- FN Ronald Miller SCHNEIDER, USN, 860 64 72
- CT2 Robert J. SCHNELL, USNR, 542 55 84
- RP3 Samuel L. SCHNE..., USN, 353 96 33
- CT3 Maurice Bryan SHNE..., USN, 695 94 86
- CTSN David Alan SHN..., USN, 904 39 56
- FN Michael Ray SIMPSON, USNR, 917 52 08
- CT3 Harold Eugene SIX, USN, 777 58 53
- ICFN David (NMN) SMOLNK, USN, 850 17 83 (Deceased)
- FN Larry James SNAVELY, USN, 916 92 00
- DC3 James Clayton SMITH, USNR, 777 19 71
- CT1 John Caleb SMITH, Jr., USN, 237 77 94 (Deceased)
- CTSN Jerry Don SMITH, USN, 915 81 02
- CTC Melvin Douglas SMITH, USN, 493 95 95 (Deceased)
- SH3 Thomas Bernarde SMITH, USN, 918 04 37
- CT2 Dennis C. SNIDER, USN, 776 20 26
- SN Larry Lewis SOPER, USN, 698 80 13
- PC2 John Clarence SPICHER, USN, 473 41 77 (Deceased)
- ET3 Joseph Daniel STOUDT, USN, 870 41 42
- CT2 John R. SUTTER, USN, 795 24 58
- CT3 Ralph Edgar SWETT, USN, 775 06 25
- CT3 Charles J. THOME, USN, 786 48 42
- GM33 Alexander Neil THOMPSON, Jr., USN, 770 47 21 (Deceased)
- CTC Harold Justice THOMPSON, USN 471 37 .7
- MR3 Larry Bruce THORN, USN, 688 22 63
- CT3 Thomas Ray THORNTON, USN, 997 97 91 (Deceased)
- CT3 Phillippe Charles TIEDTKE, USN. 914 32 84 (Deceased)
- ET3 Barry R. TITTEN TN, USN, 770 11 63
- SFP3 Phillip Francis TOURNEY, USN, 773 26 68
- FN Jeffrey Lynn TRIPLETT, USN, 354 81 85
- CT3 Barry M. USER, USN, 917 09 36
- SK2 Donaciano (NMN) VALDEZ, Jr., USN, 370 92 58
- FN Thomas Lee VAN CLEAVE, USN, 898 39 72
- SN Carl Joseph VICKERS, USNR, 775 67 19
- CTC Frederick James WALTON, USN, 236 31 86 (Deceased)
- RP3 Jerry W. WARD, USN, 775 76 67
- FN Richard Larry WEAVER, USNR, 999 88 63
- CS2 Gordon J. WEDIG, USN, 428 92 34
- SN George Woodrow WELSON, Jr., USN, 529 34 49
- CTSN Daniel B. WOOD, USN, 796 87 55
- CTSN Robert R. WOOR, USN, 840 63 62
- RP3 Robert Wayne WYE, USN, 595 67 51
- ETSN Thomas Emmett VANDERSCHURR, USN, 850 34 20
- CT2 Timothy Paul MEEH, USN, 774 03 93
- CT3 David W. MYERS, USN, 840 65 88
- CT2 Gregory L. WELCH, USN, 694 46 31
- CTSN Robert M. WOLTZ, USN, 840 69 13
- CTSN Edward P. WOOTEN, USN, 840 15 47
- SN Victor John WORST, Jr., USN, 840 67 53
- CT2 David W. WYNE, USN, 904 28 51
- CT3 Terry Lee WETHERLAND, USN, 795 25 54
- CTSN Robert D. VANDEVENTER, USN, 916 69 27
- ETFN Calvin (NMN) BOSTIC, II, USN, 795 71 61

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CORRECTIONS

ADD: TROCCOLA and
RITENBURG

TOTAL 205
- 34 DEAD
171 WOUNDED

NOTE: DODD, EDW. J.
SHOULD PROBABLY BE
DODD, MARVIN F. AS
ON CASUALTY LIST

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* CTSN	SMITH, Jerry D.on	915 81 02	
* CTI	SMITH, John C., Jr. (Deceased)	237 77 94	
* CTC	SMITH, Melvin D. (Deceased)	493 95 96	
* SHL3	SMITH, Thomas Barnarde	918 04 37	
MMC	SMITH, Wayne L.	459 43 24	
* CT2	SNADER, Dennis C.	776 28 26	
* SN	SOPER, Larry Lewis	698 89 13	
* PC2	SPICHER, John C. (Deceased)	473 41 77	PEARL DIVER
* BT3	STOUDT, Joseph Daniel	B70 41 42	
RM2	STURMAN, Richard S.	775 34 94	
* CT2	SUTTER, John R.	795 24 58	
* CT3	SWEET, Ralph Brent	775 06 25	
* CT3	THOME, Charles J.	489 48 42	
* GMG3	THOMPSON, Alexander Neil (Deceased)	770 47 21	died in MT 51
* CTC	THOMPSON, Harold J. (Deceased)	471 37 37	
* MR3	THORN, Larry Bruce	688 22 63	
* CT3	THORNTON, Thomas Ray(Deceased)	997 97 91	died in Research body recovered from wake by PAPAGO
* CT3	TIEDTKE, Phillippe C. (Deceased)	914 32 84	died in Research
* ETR3	TIMMERMAN, Barry R.	770 11 63	
CTSN	TOBIN, Michael J.	B10 88 97	
* SFP3	TOURNEY, Phillip F.	773 22 58	
SN	TRACY, Stephen B.	794 55 25	
CT3	TRADER, Ronald E.	521 38 68	
* FN	TRIPLETT, Jeffery Lynn	354 81 85	
* CT3	UBER, Sammy M.	917 08 36	
* SK2	VALDEZ, Donaciano (n), Jr.	370 92 58	

ENCLOSURE (1)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

* HM1	VAN CLEAVE, Thomas L Lee (name corrected)	298 39 72	
CT3	VANDERPOOL, George R.	774 57 71	
* ETRSN	VANDERSCHUUR, Thomas Emmett	B50 34 20	
* CTSN	VANDEVENTER, Robert B.	916 69 27	
* SN	VICKERS, Carl Joseph	775 67 19	
CTSN	WAINWRIGHT, Richard W.	996 89 02	
* CT1	WALTON, Frederick J. James (Deceased)	236 31 86	died in Research body recovered through hatch
* CTSN	WALTZ, Robert M.	B40 69 13	
* EM3	WARD, Jerry W.	775 76 78	PLANK OWNER
RM2	WARD, Joseph P.	696 68 05	
C..	WARWAS, Daniel J.	695 48 05	
TN	WATAN, Pedro P.	777 05 34	
CT3	WAY, Clyde W.	917 95 38	
* SN	WEAVER, Richard Larry	999 88 63	
* CS2	WEDIG, Gordon J.	428 92 84	
* CT2	WELCH, Gregory L.	694 46 31	
SN	WHEELER, Tommy W.	793 74 39	
CTCS	WHITE, Stanley W.	431 63 20	
* SN	WILSON, George Woodrow, Jr.	529 34 49	
CIV GS-7	WILSON, Robert L.	228 56 6000	
* CTSN	WOOD, Daniel B.	796 87 55	
* CTSN	YAGER, Robert R.	B40 63 62	

* Purple Heart Medal Awarded.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Awards

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Personnel Recommended for Awards for Outstanding

Performance on 8 June 1967

MYC Richard John BROOKS, USN, 454 62 63 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

YN3 Virgil Louie BROWNFIELD, USNR, 794 23 49 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

BM3 "J" "C" COLSTON, USN, 771 04 56 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SFM3 Duilio (n) DEMORI, USN, 713 46 75 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SHL2 Henry Edward DURZEWSKI, Jr., USN, 546 83 16 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SD3 Troy Lawrence GREEN, USN, 451 50 06 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

ENS David George LUCAS, USNR, 710315/1105 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

MM1 Charles Monroe MARTIN, USN, 497 49 88 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

YN2 Martin Denny POWLEDGE, USN, 775 78 26 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

DC3 James Clayton SMITH, USN, 777 19 71 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

HM1 Thomas Lee VAN CLEAVE, USN, 298 39 72 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

LT George Houston GOLDEN, USN, 574328/6302 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

LT Maurice Hogue BENNETT, Jr., USN, 628125/1610 - NAVY CROSS MEDAL

LT Richard Francis KIEFER, MC, USNR, 710107/2105 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

LTJG John Deaderick SCOTT, USNR, 700158/1105 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

CTC Joseph Arthur BENKERT, Jr., USN, 530 81 79 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

BT3 Frank Johnson BROWN, USN, 796 69 65 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

CT1 Jeffery Robert CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

CTSN Rodney Lee DALEY, USN, B20 04 91 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SM2 Russell O'Neal DAVID, USN, 683 33 65 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

YN3 Steven Charles GURCHIK, Jr., USN, 697 82 42 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SH2 Donald (n) HEROLD, USN, 609 22 48 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

CTSN Ronald A. HURST, USN, B81 88 16 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CTC Carlyle Francis LARKIN, USN, 513 69 45 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SN Dale Duane LARKINS, USN, 919 48 93 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

SSGT Bryce F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 185 98 56 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

CTSN Frank (n) MC INTURFF, III, USN, B61 44 71 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

CT3 Garvin Lee Douglas MC MAKIN, USN, 595 81 92 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SHB2 Thomas Robert MOULIN, USN, 697 77 29 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

CT3 James Leonard NEEDHAM, USN, 915 09 65 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

SFC Richard Dale NEESE, USN, 430 77 24 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SN Stamatie (n) PAHIDES, USN, 793 34 78 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

CT3 Paddy "E" RHODES, USN, 793 34 81 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

CT2 Robert James SCHNELL, USN, 542 55 84 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

HN Samuel Leonard SCHULMAN, USN, 353 96 33 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

CT3 Maurice Bryan SHAFER, USN, 695 54 86 - NAVY COMMENDATION MEDAL

CTC Harold Jesse THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

SFP3 Phillip Francis TOURNEY, USN, 773 22 68 - BRONZE STAR MEDAL

Deceased Personnel Recommended for Awards for Outstanding Performance on 8 June 1967

LCDR Philip McCutcheon ARMSTRONG, JR., USN, 569825/1100 - NAVY CROSS MEDAL

LT Stephen Spencer TOTH, USN 669613/1100 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

QM3 Francis (n) BROWN, USN, 778 76 70 - NAVY CROSS MEDAL

GMG3 Alexander Neil THOMPSON, USN, 770 42 41 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

ICFN David (n) SADLAK, USN, 850 17 83 - SILVER STAR MEDAL

Major Equipment Casualties on 8 June 1967

Radar

Gyroscope

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

All electronics gear in Research Department compartments between Frames 42 and 78, first platform and hold.

Motor Whale Boat 26'

Personnel Boat 33'

Utility Boat 33'

Miscellaneous communications transmitting and receiving gear

All inflatable life rafts (twenty-four)

.50 Cal. machine guns (two)

Sample Letter of Commendation

From: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To:

Subj: Letter of Commendation

1. Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet recently announced that USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) had been adjudged "OUTSTANDING" ship of its competitive group for Fiscal Year 1967.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) takes great pleasure and professional pride in commending you for your performance of duty as____ _____. Your performance and leadership contributed significantly to achieving this mark of excellence and is worthy of special recognition. WELL DONE.

/s/ W. L. MCGONAGLE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Congratulatory Messages

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe

To: Commander W. L. MCGONAGLE, USN

The tragedy is beyond recall. What solace there may be, however small, lies in the magnificent performance of the officers and men of LIBERTY in action of historic stature in the face of an unprovoked attack. Under most difficult and trying circumstances not only did the ship defend itself valiantly, but through superb seamanship on the part of all hands, the ship was brought safely into port.

You, your officers and men answered the call to duty with unquestioned valor. The performance of all hands stands out as an example in history of that type of courage which marks American Manhood as the finest in the world.

I am proud to be associated with you.

/s/ Admiral John S. MC CAIN, USN

From: Commander SIXTH Fleet

To: USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

As you prepare to depart for CONUS, I commend to every man who sails in SIXTH Fleet the fact that USS LIBERTY has become a legend in her own time. Her personal monitoring of transmissions during the attack and observations made aboard subsequently induce the highest in praise for a great ship, a gallant Commanding Officer, and a superb crew. We have shared your grief for those who lost their lives, we remind ourselves that

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

you were classic examples of unswerving devotion to duty. For CDR MOGONAGLE and men of LIBERTY: WELL DONE. SIXTH Fleet is proud to have claimed you.

/s/ Vice Admiral MARTIN, USN

From: Commander Service Squadron EIGHT

To: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

1. In battle efficiency competition for fiscal year 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was adjudged the outstanding ship in her competitive group.

2. The spirit, interest and the great effort exerted by each ship in the group made the competition this year particularly keen and most difficult. Your achievement reflects an outstanding shipboard training program, a high degree of leadership and exceptional professionalism.

3. Commander Service Squadron EIGHT commends the Commanding Officer, the officers and men of USS LIBERTY for the high standards achieved in your pursuit that led to winning the coveted Battle Efficiency Award. WELL DONE.

/s/ Captain BUNTING, USN

From: Commander, Naval Oceanographic Office

To: Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Via: Commander Service Squadron EIGHT

During the period of 2 May 1967 to 2 June 1967, the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) carried a team of NAVOCEANO scientists in a unique application of the Navy Navigation Satellite System to problems of precise positioning in equatorial

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

areas. The mission was cancelled when the ship's itinerary was modified and our people departed at Rota, Spain. Installation of the complex electronics package and its associated mast group was accomplished by the crew in such a manner as to favorably reflect the best traditions of the service.

I wish to express my personal appreciation to Commander [illegible] and his officers and men for the unstinting efforts expended on behalf of our project. Please extend my sympathy to the families of those who were casualties of the unfortunate Mediterranean incident.

/s/ [illegible]

Personnel on Board 31 December 1967

Officers

LCDR Donald L. BURSON, USN	[illegible]SON, Richard E. EMFN
LT Wallace I. WHITE, USNR	[illegible]SON, Rogelio M. SD3
LT John J. BILLINGTON, USN	BARTON, Gary L. CS2
LTJG David [illegible] LEE, USNR	[illegible]LON, George W. ET1
ENS David G. LUCAS, USNR	BIS[illegible]ER, Gerald R. FN
ENS Edward A. ADAMS, SC, USNR	BLANTON, Danny R. FN
ENS Malcolm P. O'MALLEY, USNR	BOCCELLA, Salvatore (n) CS3

Enlisted

		BOOM, John E.	MM3
AISHE, Benjamin G.	FN	BOTCHER, Don R	BT3
ALEXANDER, Ricky L	EM2	BRADY, Gary J.	SA
ANDERSON, Jerry O.	FN	BRADY, Howard H.	CT1

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

BRODEUR, Maurice A.	YN	[illegible], Thomas M.	FN
BROOKS, Richard J.	MMCS	[illegible], Troy L.	SD3
BROWNFIELD, Virgil L.	YN3	[illegible], James T.	DK3
BUNTON, Robert L.	FN	[illegible], Edward D.	SN
CADMAN, John E.	FN	[illegible], Richard L.	SK3
CAIL, Scott R.	CTSA	[illegible], Charles K.	MM2
CANON, John F.	STS2	[illegible], David C.	GM33
CASPER, William E.	SN	[illegible], Warren D.	CS3
COCNAVITCH, Charles J.	RD2	[illegible], David J.	CT3
COLSTON, "J" "C"	LN3	[illegible], James E.	CTSN
CRAIG, Juan A.	DK2	[illegible], Terry C.	MM2
CRISS, Thomas A.	SN	[illegible], Glen J.	RD3
DAVIS, John E.	SA	[illegible], John M.	SN
DEMORI, Duilio (n)	SFM3	[illegible], Ronald L.	RMSN
DIANA, Rodolfo A.	FN	JOHNSON, Duane D.	MM3
DI GERONIMO, James P.	ICFN	JONES, Lowell S.	SN
DOYLE, Eugene C.	HN	KERNER, Frederick W.	SN
DURZEWSKI, Henry E.	SHL2	KIDD, Robert C.	BT3
ELDER, Eddie G.	SD1	KINSLE, Kenneth R.	SH1
ELLIS, James T.	CT3	KISIEL, David T.	SA
[illegible], Johnnie W.	ENFA	KRASNANSKY, Stephen (n)	FN
FISHER, John W.	MM3	KRINER, Alan F.	RD3
FOLLIN, Donald F.	SN	LAKO, Charles M.	SN
GILSON, Ronald D.	RD3	LEHMAN, Joel W.	SK3
GREEN, Eddie T.	RM3	LEVAND, Thomas W.	SN

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

L...IE, Richard E.	ET1	...LEY, David (n)	...
LOWASKO, Benjamin L.	TN	...ELL, John K.	EC1
LOSASSO, Gerald F.	FN	...SSEN, Elmer F.	EN2
LUCAS, Randy W.	FN3	...ER, Richard J.	ET2
LUN...N, Charles E., III	CDR	...LY, Robert B.	SN
MARAIO, James A.	EMFN	RICHARD, Stephen J.	SN
MARTIN, Charles M.	MM1	ROBB, Alan J.	SN
MATHEWS, Jimmie L.	SN	ROSSI, Victor J.	SN
MC CALLISTER, Robert (n)	SN	...SELL, William R.	SN
MEADORS, Joseph L.	SM3	SC...D, Kenneth M.	EMFN
MEHAFFIE, Walter D.	SN	SC...ARGER, Robert J.	SN
MERCADO, Remegio N.	TN	SCH...DER, Ronald W.	FN
MILLER, David B.	FN	SIMPSON, Michael (n)	AN
MOORHEAD, William B.	SN	SMITH, James C.	DC3
MUMFORD, Richard C.	AN	SOLDAO, Anthony J.	QM2
NEESE, Richard D.	SFC	STOLL..., Joseph D.	BT3
NELSON, Bert J.	MM3	THOM..., Raymond (n)	SA
NETTLES, Johnnie P.	RM3	THORN, Larry D.	YR2
NEWTON, Richard L.	SK1	TRACY, Stephen B.	SN
OLIPHANT, Glen R.	ETR2	TRIPLETT, Jeffery L.	SN
~~OWENS, Eugene (n)~~	~~BT2~~	~~VALDEZ, Donaciano (n)~~	~~SK2~~
PASCALE, Arthur M.	ETNSN	VAN CLEAVE, Thomas L.	...1
PATTERSON, James P.	MM2	VICKERS, Carl J.	SK3
POOLEDGE, Martin D.	YN2	WATAN, P...o P.	TN
PURCELL, Harvey L.	SK3	WEARY, Albert E.	PC3

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

McDIG, Gordon J.	CS1
MILLER, Tommy W.	SN
WILLIS, James L.	FN
WRIGHT, David C.	SN

Biography of Commander William L. McCONAGLE, United States Navy

Commander William L. McCONAGLE was born in Wichita, Kansas on November 19, 1925. He enlisted in the Navy in January 1944, and upon completion of the NROTC program at the University of Southern California in June 1947, was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy.

After a three year tour of duty aboard the USS FRANK KNOX (DDR-742) where he served as First Lieutenant, Gunnery Officer, ASW Officer, Engineering Officer and Communications Officer, Commander McCONAGLE was ordered to the USS KITE (AM-22). Aboard the KITE he served as Gunnery Officer, Engineering Officer, and Executive Officer. During his tour the KITE was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Korean Service Medal with six battle stars and the United Nations Ribbon for service during the Korean Conflict.

In January, 1952, Commander McCONAGLE was assigned to the U. S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany where he was Officer-in-Charge of 18 German built and manned minesweepers engaged in clearance and check sweeping for mines planted during WWII in the Baltic and North Seas.

Upon promotion to Lieutenant in 1953, Commander McCONAGLE was ordered to the U. S. Naval Communications Station, Philadelphia, where he served as Personnel Officer and Administrative Assistant. Upon completion of this tour in January 1955, Commander McCONAGLE reported to the USS ROCHESTER

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(CA-124) as First Lieutenant. He served in this billet for two years before receiving orders to assume duties as the CO of the USS HARKO (WPC-97).

From January, 1959 to June, 1961 Commander McCONAGLE was an Instructor in Naval Weapons, Operations and Tactics and Naval Leadership for the NROTC Unit at the University of Miami.

From July, 1961 to July, 1963 Commander McCONAGLE served as Commanding Officer of the USS RECLAIMER (MSO-463). Commander McCONAGLE served on the staff of COMSERVPAC as Current Operations Officer immediately prior to assuming command of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on April 25, 1966. Commander McCONAGLE, upon being relieved on October 2, 1967, reported to the USS KILAUEA (AE-26) as prospective Commanding Officer.

Commander McCONAGLE is married to the former Miss Jean Stoneham of Glendale, California.

Biography of Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, United States Navy

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON was born in Houston, Texas on May 12, 1934. After graduating from the University of Texas he attended Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island in August 1956 and was commissioned Ensign in December 1956.

Lieutenant Commander BURSON's first tour of duty was aboard the USS BLUE (DD-744) as Fire Control Officer. During this tour he was awarded the China Service Medal for participation in the Formosa Patrol. After attending nine weeks of Gunnery Officers School, San Diego, he returned to BLUE as the Gunnery Officer, was appointed Lieutenant Junior Grade, and received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in operations in support of Quemoy.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

In December 1959 Lieutenant Commander BURSON reported to the Military Sea Transport Service Office, [illegible], Texas as Reserve Officer and Naval Control of Shipping Officer. He was promoted to Lieutenant in February of 1961.

His next assignment was a two year tour as Executive Officer aboard the USS DIRECT (MSC-130) which operated in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Commander BURSON reported aboard the USS AUCILLA (AO-56) as Operations Officer in November of 1963. He was awarded the Bronze Star in lieu of a second award for the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in the Dominican Republic Contingency. During this time the AUCILLA operated in the Western and Northern Atlantic and Caribbean as part of the Second Fleet.

In August 1965 he reported to the CINCLANTFLT Staff as Frequency Control Officer in the Communications Division. He was appointed Lieutenant Commander in December of 1965 and served at CINCLANTFLT until reporting aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on June 21, 1967 as Executive Officer. He became Commanding Officer on October 2, 1967.

Lieutenant Commander BURSON is married to the former Miss Dorothy Virginia Curtis of New York City.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COMPOSITE CHRONOLOGY

*0754 Steaming on 130T, Spd 10K
*0849 Passed through point Alfa, changed course to 253T
*0850 Single unident jet crossed astern, distance 3 to 5 miles
*0905 Decreased speed to 5 knots
#1030 Two jets orbit three times, 2 miles, elevation 10,000 ft
*1056 Another A/C circled ship - high
#1056 Boxcar circles, no markings, returns at approx 30 minute intervals
*1126 Another A/C circled ship
*1132 Passed through point Bravo, C/C to 283T
*1310 Exercised at GQ drill
1310 GQ drill
1317 Chemical attack probable (simulated)
1324 Chemical attack (simulated)
1348 Secure from General Quarters
*1348 Secure from General Quarters
*1351 Three small surface contacts held on radar 32,000 yards bearing 082T
*1353 Radar reports possible aircraft passing over surface contacts.
#1355 LTJG Painter takes deck; ENS O'Malley takes conn as JOOD
CO: "No QM notebook entries are made from 1356 to 1446."
*1358 Single aircraft sighted approaching ship from 135R, 5-6 miles, 7,000 ft alt. Aircraft passed down track of ship.
1358 Attacked by two jets. Machine gun fire. Repeated bombings.
#1400 Air attack. "O'Connor went with XO; Bennett ordered to send msg; 21MC lost on 1st or 2nd of about 6 to 8 strafing runs."
*1403 Loud explosion - port side amidships.
*1405 Sounded GQ. Large fire vicinity frame 85, 01 lvl, fuel storage drums
*1405 All engines ahead flank (rung up by CO on engine order telegraph)
1406 Fire on bridge.
*1405-1410 Ship under repeated air attack with two or more unidentified aircraft making coordinated strafing, rocket and incendiary runs over the ship. Three major fires topside covering large area of ship with flames and heavy smoke. A total of eight officers and men were killed or died as a result of injuries received during the air attack: One officer killed and one mortally wounded on bridge, two men killed at machine gun 51, one man killed at machine gun 52, one died of wounds received on the main deck starboard side and two died of wounds received on the 01 level portside. Approximately 75 wounded, including Commanding Officer, throughout topside areas from shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets.
1410 continued attacks
*1410 Began making turns for 18 knots
*1420 CO sends man to machine gun 51 to take boats under fire
1424 Three gunboats sighted.
*1424 Three MTB sighted abaft starboard beam, distance 3-4 miles
*1426 Noted that ensign shot away. Holiday ensign hoisted on yardarm
*1428 MTBs signalling by flashing light from stbd quarter. Light obscured by dense smoke from burning motor whaleboat
1430 Bridge orders hold fire
*1430 Bridge orders hold fire
*1431 Machine gun 53 fires on center of three torpedo boats. CO sends ENS LUCAS to machine gun 53 to order cease fire. Boats flying small Star of David.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

9

1431 Stand by for torpedo attack
*1431 Word passed to stand by for torpedo attack on starboard side of ship
1433 "demolition bill in effect"
#1434 (corrected from 1426) torpedo passes astern P6
*1434 Torpedo passes 75 yards astern
#1435 (corrected from 1427) torpedo hit P6
1435 Torpedo hit starboard side
*1435 Torpedo hit starboard side amidships. Twenty-six men died as a result of the torpedo hit and motor torpedo boat strafing fire. Torpedo hit in vicinity of the research coordination center where approximately twenty men were at their GQ station. This and adjacent spaces were flooded instantly and most personnel in these spaces died of either blast or drowning. The number of injured was 200.
*1435 Lost electrical power throughout the ship
*1436 Lost steam pressure - secured engines and boilers
*1440 Hull number of one MTB observed to be 206-17. MTB's standing away fm ship
*1503 One MTB returns to ship, signals "do you need help?" CO ans "negative."
*1505 MTBs retire toward shore (TIME IS WRONG
*1507 Helos bearing Star of David approach ship and hover, distance 500 yds. Hull numbers D4 or 04 and D8 or 08.
*1508 Helos make repeated passes around and over ship
1515 Two Israeli helos making repeated passes overhead
#1515 Helos D4/04 and D8/08 circle, parallel to ship, not hostile P7
#1515 MTBs depart, sit five miles away P7 (MACHINE GUNNED LIFE RAFTS AT 1515)
1516 MTBs have now left the area (TAKING A LIFE RAFT WITH THEM)
1517 Helos friendly
1519 Power available now (rudder does not answer)
*1519 Power restored to bridge except for rudder
1520 After steering has control of steering
#1520 Engines back P8
#1523 Engines out again P7
1524 Condition ZEBRA reset
*1530 MTBs approaching ship starboard side 7-8 miles. During next hour and a quarter they returned to the ship, retired over horizon by 1713
1536 MTBs now reapproaching (BRIDGE SEES SHARK STAR of DAVID FOR FIRST TIME)
*1537 MTBs approach fast from starboard. Two jets approach at same time from starboard. Crew warned to stand by for resumed attack. P7
1538 Appears to be destroyer behind MTB
1539 Hoisting CODE LIMA INDIA (changed course)
1542 MTBs reversed. One seems to be smoking.
#1555 Communications back P9
#1600 Message send amplifying attack report. Identifying MTBs as Israeli P9
1607 Boat approaching starboard side at high speed, approx 12 miles
#1610 Ship's international call sign hoisted P9
1610 Hoisted international signal flag

MTB "DO YOU NEED HELP" QUERY CAME LONG AFTER TAKING RAFT and SOME TIME AFTER WE SENT MESSAGE IDENTIFYING MTB".

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1615 } Two unidentified jets approaching ship, starboard side
*1615 } Two unidentified jets approach fm stbd, recconoiter at a distance
*1620 Attempting to clear area steering northerly course at speeds varying from 0 to [illegible]. Personnel casualties were treated in the wardroom on a continuous basis. Damage control and fire fighting controlled flooding and damage. All [illegible] casualties were restored but steering was by hand from [illegible] steering.
1621 Stop all engines. Lost steering.
1623 Left Starboard side.
1623 All engines backed one-third
1628 Rudder Amidships
1630 Ship is underway, course 340Mag, Speed 8 knots
1630 704-17 helo and patrol boat circles, 50 Cal forward, 3in50 Anti Aircraft
1631 maintain [illegible] "PROBABLY HERE HSAS ... DO YOU NEED HELP?"
1632 Boats flying Israeli ensign
● 1632 CO says, "I feel boats seem to be Israeli"
1632 } Gun boats [illegible] treating;
#1637 } MTBs depart, ship making 8 knots, course 340 Magnetic. P9
1642 change speed to all ahead one-third, after steering having trouble keeping on c
1648 Three gun boats have turned away
1653 Change course to 000 magnetic
1655 Word passed to COMBATINF that photos were taken of the attacking aircraft
#1655 Fathometer shows 26 fathoms. Set anchor detail. P9
1702 Power to [illegible] windlass.
#1704 Ship backing. P9
#1722 Stop backing. Fathometer now shows 48 fathoms. P9
#1730 Lost lube oil pressure. Engines stop. P9
#1731 Regained pressure. Engines back on. P9
#1743 Heading [illegible] magnetic, 47 fathoms, consider no danger of grounding P9
#1748 Increased speed to 10 knots, Course 030 magnetic. P9
#1750 COMBATINF message advises escorts on the way, orders steam 340M for 100 miles P9
#1841 Israeli helo hovers on bridge, 30 feet away, wants to land a man P10
*1845 Israeli helo approached ship -- circled close aboard and attempted to signal -- [illegible] appeared to desire to lower someone to deck -- CO considered receiving [illegible] on forecastle but ruled this out as too hazardous -- repeated attempts to communicate were unsuccessful
*1852 Helo dropped message packet on forecastle. Message, written on a calling card of [illegible] Naval Attache, Tel Aviv, asked, "have you casualties?"
Ship tried to [illegible] over next ten minutes, no apparent success.
Three wounded boarders or dead crewmen still on forecastle. Helo departed shortly before 1905 local.
#1857 Israeli helo, 706 arrives, drops card, leaves after 10 or 15 minutes. P10

● CONFLICT: CO SAYS SENT MSG 1600 IDENTIFYING MTB AS ISRAELI.
CIC WO HAS HIM FIRST IDENTIFY BOATS AT 1632.

ABOVE IS COMPOSITE OF CIC [illegible] LOOK (unmarked),
CO's statement to Board of Inquiry (marked with #)
Board of Inquiry's official reconstruction from QM notebook,
CIC [illegible] Log Book & recollection of CO, Chf Engr, gun and Bridge personnel. "all concur" (marked with *)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

11

ADDENDUM TO LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY RELEASE
DATED JUNE 28, 1967

The following names are used in the unclassified transcript of testimony of Commander McGonagle, USN, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY. Amplifying information follows:

NAME	HOMETOWN
Lt. George Houston Golden, Jr.	Virginia Beach, Va.
Ens. John Deaderick Scott	Charlotte, N.C.
Lt. James Marquis Ennes, Jr.	Norfolk, Va.
Lt. Stephen Spencer Toth	Virginia Beach, Va.
LTJG Lloyd Clyde Painter	Dos Palos, Calif.
Ens. Malcolm Pat O'Malley	Minneapolis, Minn.
Signalman Second Class Russell O'Neal	Columbia, S.C.
Boatswain's Mate Seaman Anthony A. Quintero	Kansas City, Mo.

Communications Technician 1st Class Jeffrey Robert Carpenter - Norfolk, Va.

The following pen-and-ink changes are provided for clarification:

1. Summary of proceedings - page 3, line 21, should read, "... d-held ...lis lamp."

2. Unclassified transcript - page 11, line 7, should read "Dr. Kiepfer."

END

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

12

Capt. Ward, Navy OIC, has stamped

Pentagon
Office
Public Affairs
Available at
OX 75312

U.S. GOVT PRESS RELEASE Noon, 13 Feb 69

On April 28, 1969, the U.S. Government received $3,566,497 from the Government of Israel in settlement of certain claims arising out of the attack on the USS LIBERTY on June 8, 1967. The amount received represents payment in full of the following U.S. claims:

A. 164 claims totaling $3,[illegible] on behalf of the members of the crew of the USS LIBERTY who were injured in the attack.

B. The claim for $92,437 for expenses incurred by the U.S. Government providing medical treatment to the injured men.

C. A claim of $21,742 for expenses incurred by the U.S. Government in reimbursing members of the crew of the USS LIBERTY for personal property damaged or destroyed in the attack.

Distribution to the injured men of funds received in settlement of their claims is now in process and will be completed in a few weeks.

On May 31, 1968, the Government of Israel paid in full claims totaling $3,323,500 on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed in the attack.

The only unsettled claim arising out of the attack on the USS LIBERTY is the claim for damage to the ship which remains under discussion.

END

Not used in file clean finally.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

13

FACT SHEET ON USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The Navy technical research ship USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was commissioned at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, Dec. 30, 1964.

LIBERTY was converted from a Victory Hull, the SS SIMMONS VICTORY, by Willamette Iron and Steel Company, Portland, Oregon. The ship has been equipped to conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy electronics research projects which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications.

LIBERTY is the fourth ship of the fleet to bear the name and is named for cities in 16 states.

SS SIMMONS VICTORY was a turbine-propelled cargo ship built in 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland. First operated by States Marine Lines, SIMMONS VICTORY was placed in the reserve fleet in 1958 and brought out for conversion in 1963.

On June 8, 1967 the LIBERTY was attacked by Israeli forces approximately 15 miles north of the Sinai Peninsula in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea taking the lives of 34 of her officers and men.

FACTS

Length:	455'
Beam:	62'
Weight:	11,000 tons
Draft:	21'
Accommodations for	21 officers and 322 enlisted

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

14

9 February 1968

PRESS RELEASE by CINCLANTFLT this a.m.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) TO BE INACTIVATED

Norfolk, Virginia (February 9) - The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, announced today that the technical research ship USS LIBERTY will be inactivated.

The decision to inactivate the LIBERTY is based on the results of a special study made by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard on the extent of repairs needed because of damage suffered by the ship in an attack by Israeli forces last June.

The inactivation facility to which the LIBERTY will be sent and the exact time of the inactivation will be determined at a later date. However, inactivation will begin immediately by the crew presently assigned while the industrial phase of inactivation will not begin before July 1968.

LIBERTY is now in reduced manning or caretaker status at the Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base. LIBERTY is commanded by LCDR Donald L. Burson, USN, of Norfolk, Virginia.

-30-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

15

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) 15 FEB 1967

NAME OF OFFICER	ADDRESS	TELE. NO.
CDR William L. McGONAGLE, USN Wife: Jean Dau: Cindy (11/2/51) Dau: Sandra (10/28/55) Son: William L. Jr. (11/10/57)	204 Oak Grove Norfolk, Va.	623-5090
LCDR Philip M. ARMSTRONG, Jr., USN Wife: Marie (Meetie) Son: Philip M. III (11/9/56) Dau: Katharine (11/30/57) Son: Timothy (11/24/53) Dau: Elizabeth (8/14/62) Son: Christopher (11/13/63)	131 Cayuga Road Virginia Beach, Va.	497-1331
LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN Wife: Dolores Ann Son: Michael (1/17/56) Son: Christopher (6/11/66)	1[illegible]19 Bushey Drive Silver Springs, Md.	933-5692
LT George H. GOLDEN, USN Wife: Bessie Dau: Patricia (11/20/46) Dau: Katherine (2/[illegible]/50) Dau: Linda (11/5/51)	400 Ticonderoga Road Virginia Beach, Va.	499-0253
LT John E. GIDUZ[illegible], USN Wife: Betty Dau: Kathryn (9/[illegible]/52) Son: John Jr. (9/[illegible]/53) Son: Donald (1/15/[illegible]8)	4625 Crown Point Lane Virginia Beach, Va.	497-1766
LT James C. PIERCE, USN Wife: Pauline Dau: Susan M. (12/4/52) Son: James H. (8/8/58) Son: Edward W. (9/[illegible]3/65)	1633 Wildwood Drive Virginia Beach, Va.	428-6568
LT Maurice H. BENNETT, USN Wife: Joy Kirk Dau: Heidi E. (6/2[illegible]/57) Dau: Heather O. (1/3/61) Dau: Holly E. (12/13/61) Dau: Hillary J. (1[illegible]/21/64) Son: Maurice H. III (4/18/66)	533 Harton Circle Virginia Beach, Va.	486-2804
LT James G. O'CONNOR, USNR Wife: Sandra (Sandy) Son: Kevin (6/11/66)	5361 Coachway Drive Norfolk, Va.	855-4231
LT Stephen S. TOTH, USN	301 53rd Street Virginia Beach, Va.	428-8397

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

16

NAME OF OFFICER	ADDRESS	TELE. NO.
*LTJG Lloyd C. PAINTER, USNR	Rt #2, Box 288 Dos Palos, California	EX2-3550
*ENS Malcolm M. WATSON, USNR	Box 115, Parkton, N.C.	None
*ENS John D. SCOTT, USNR	2511 Cornell Avenue Charlotte, N.C.	366-4729
ENS David G. LUCAS, USNR Wife: Paula	4629 Jeanne St. Apt. 204 Virginia Beach, Va.	497-45
*ENS Richard P. TAYLOR Jr., USNR	Rt #3, Box 7 Excelsior, 15 Minn.	474-6415

* LIVING ON BOARD

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

17



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

18

MISC NOTES AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL

RE ISRAEL, THE LAVON CASE, SHIPBOARD ROUTINE, LTJG, HONORS FOR DEAD, RADAR RANGE FORMULA, LOCATION OF NSG FILES ON THE LIBERTY, SOME CONGRESSIONAL REMARKS, ETC.

FOLDER 9

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

19

NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1961 (section IV, page 2, column 4)

The Lavon Affair - David Ben-Gurion, an avid student of the Bible, frequently alludes to Joshua, the prophet, judge and general who led the Hebrews back to Israel, rarely lost a battle or an argument, and lived 110 years. At 74, the Premier of modern Israel can look back to a half century of successful battles against Turks, British and Arabs, arid soil, poverty and huge immigrant problems.

Last week, Mr. Ben-Gurion was engaged in another struggle--this one with fellow-leaders of his dominant Mapai (Israel Labor) party. At stake was his own Premiership, the cohesion of the party, and the stability of the democratic coalition government. The issue was the "Lavon affair," which last week erupted into a Cabinet crisis after smoldering for six years.

On Feb. 17, 1955, Mr. Ben-Gurion--who had stepped down as Premier and Defense Minister thirteen months earlier--returned from "retirement" to become Defense Minister again, replacing Pinhas Lavon, a party colleague and the only other man ever to hold the post. (In November, 1955, Mr. Ben-Gurion also resumed the Premiership.) It became known that Mr. Lavon had been ousted because of the failure of a secret security operation--now considered by informed sources to have been the arrest (Oct. 6, 1954), trial and conviction (Jan 27, 1955) by Egypt of eleven Jews, two of whom were executed--on charges of arson, sabotage and espionage for Israel.

Charges of Conspiracy - Mr. Lavon at the time denounced the "adventure," but in a Cabinet inquiry was accused by a group of subordinates of having ordered it. His accusers included several of the "Young Turks" whom Mr. Ben-Gurion has since been grooming for political leadership. Mr. Lavon said there had been a political conspiracy against him.

Last August, a witness in another cases testified that he had helped fabricate evidence against Mr. Lavon. The former defense chief was then exonerated by two special investigations--the first headed by a Supreme Court judge, the second conducted by seven of the fifteen Cabinet members. The inquiries established that a letter implicating Mr. Lavon had been forged and that false testimony had been presented "with the approval of an [unidentified] officer who is on active service."

Last Sunday, the full cabinet accepted the committee's report, but the eight Mapai members quarreled bitterly and split. Four of them, including Foreign Minister Golda Meir, who threatened to resign, voted to absolve Mr. Lavon. Mr. Ben-Gurion stalked out of the meeting before the vote was taken, while three of the "Young Turks" abstained. On Wednesday, the Premier's office announced he would take a four or five week leave, starting this month, to decide whether to resign or accept the Cabinet decision.

Party middle-roaders as well as non-political figures are now attempting to arrange a compromise.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

20

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The Second Arab Awakening

Jon Kimche

Holt, Rinehart and Winston
New York Chicago San Francisco

21

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

secrecy, and it was many years before the outside world came to hear of it. Even inside the country, there was a strong opposition; some of Israel's best-known scientists, including the Executive Director of the Weizmann Institute, Meyer W. Weisgal, addressed strong warnings to Ben-Gurion to desist from the project. Ben-Gurion ignored the warnings, and the Dimona project got under way. With it came the expansion of the Defence Ministry under Peres as the dynamo for the modernization of the armed forces and for the development of Israel's domestic industries.

Ben-Gurion knew what he wanted; but his problem was to carry with him the stiff-necked people whom he led. Thus, he sought to encourage a change in the Israeli attitude to the new Germany. A new relationship had developed in the wake of the Reparations Agreement which was concluded in September 1952, according to which Germany paid around $70 million annually to the Israeli Government and further large sums – totalling close on $100 million in some years – to individual Jews by way of restitution. Since most of these payments were made in goods, Israel became one of Germany's most important customers. Ben-Gurion was greatly impressed (as was Peres) by the German ability to provide Israel with essential needs.

With the coming of General de Gaulle in France, Ben-Gurion (who thought de Gaulle was the greatest statesman in Europe) and his colleagues wanted some reassurance over the future of the far-reaching projects in which Israel and France were jointly engaged – mostly in the field of defence. In Ben-Gurion's opinion, the French connexion could be safeguarded only if Israel had parallel relations also with the Germans. But this entailed the formal recognition of the Federal German Republic by Israel. Ben-Gurion saw no particular difficulty in this; but he was far ahead of his own people, in this as in other issues. The Germans, for their part, also encountered internal difficulties, and as a result the formalization of relations with Germany did not take place until after Ben-Gurion's retirement.

Just as he had sought in his endeavour to make public opinion accept the new status of Germany and had failed, so he failed to impress the Jewish world with the need for a rethinking of the

Zionist position. He clashed with the Zionist leaders, and with members of his own government and party in his insistence that the older-type Zionists had played their part and that the future was in Israel. Such support as he had came from the Israeli youth, but even this support was badly shaken by the intrusion of an event which was to have a traumatic impact on Israeli politics and on Ben-Gurion himself: the Lavon Affair.

The Lavon Affair

The story opens right back in 1951, before the overthrow of King Farouk. There was no ease in Zion, and much uncertainty about the threats of war from across the border. In the prevailing near-war atmosphere, Israel's Intelligence Service decided to improve its eyes in Egypt. A specially trained agent, Avraham Dar, an Israeli Army officer, was sent there, with orders to recruit a network of reliable Egyptian Jewish 'friends' to whom Israel might turn for help if need arose.

In the course of the next few years, Dar assembled a group of young Egyptians who wanted to help Israel. Some of them engaged in espionage, but most were little more than members of an illegal Zionist organization, helping Jews to leave Egypt and make their way to Israel. They were anything but professional spies; they sought no monetary reward. They were no menace to Egypt and not much help to Israel.

By 1954, Egypt was under the unquestioned rule of a revolutionary junta led by Colonel Nasser. And Nasser was in the final stages of negotiating his agreement with Britain for the total withdrawal of all British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, which would leave the bulk of the vast store of remaining supplies in Egyptian hands. In Israel, as we have seen, this development caused much concern. The Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, had spoken early in 1954 about Israel being an interested party in the British withdrawal. He had received reassuring words from the British Government but no firm commitment.

At this time, Ben-Gurion had withdrawn from the government and was living at the *kibbutz* of Sde Boker. The Minister of

22

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Defence was Pinhas Lavon; General Dayan was the Chief of Staff. 'As Minister of Defence under the unwritten Israeli constitution', writes the American observer E. A. Bayne,

> Lavon was charged with the protection of the nation. Defence can be conducted in several ways at once, obviously: by keeping powder dry; by preventive action either limited or extensive (and Israel has undertaken both) and even by coercing allies. An idea along the last line seems to have occurred to the Israeli military intelligence, whose chief was Colonel Benjamin Givli. . . .
>
> A black theory emerged; why not cause the destruction of certain American and British assets in Egypt, endangering British and American lives? The public outcry in Britain and the US would be sufficient, hopefully, to cause a change of policy so long as the plot could be made to seem to have been Egyptian-inspired. It would prove the irresponsibility of Egypt . . . and the West would be forced to retain its own protection of the vital canal.[44]

These ideas had not emerged suddenly. They had been considered on various levels, explored and tested by consultation at home and abroad – but only within a closed inner circle at the Ministry of Defence. Neither Dayan, the Chief of Staff, nor Shimon Peres, the Director-General of the Ministry, had been brought into the discussion either on the political or on the Intelligence level.[45] And at no stage was Premier Sharett, or his Cabinet, informed or consulted about the proposed operation which was shaping the fate of thirteen young Jews in Cairo and Alexandria.

During the early part of 1954, Dar was joined in Egypt by a second Israeli agent, a man known as Paul Frank. The signal to proceed with the planned action was given by Colonel Givli, and Dar and Frank made the necessary preparations during May and June. On 14 July, Dar's Egyptian operatives planted their home-made incendiary bombs. It was another ludicrous affair. One bomb set fire to a pillar-box, another exploded fairly harmlessly on a bookshelf in the library of the US Information Service, and a third blew up in the coat-pocket of a boy of 19 called Natanson.

There was nothing frivolous about the consequences. The bombs had barely exploded when the Egyptian secret police moved in. Dar and Frank managed to get away in time; the eleven

others were arrested. Among them were Marzouk, a doctor at the Jewish hospital; Azzar, a teacher; Marcelle Nino, the only woman in the group; and Max Bennet, a German Jew who was said to have been previously employed by the Jewish Agency.

The event passed apparently unnoticed at first. The Egyptians said nothing about the arrests, and the two fires started by the saboteurs were so insignificant that it was not difficult for the Egyptian secret police to avoid all publicity. The Israelis were preoccupied with two major border incidents, in Jerusalem and on the Gaza frontier, which had taken place four days earlier and in which there had been a considerable number of Israeli and Egyptian casualties.

On 16 July, two days after the Cairo arrests, a meeting took place at the Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv at which the Minister, Lavon, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, Givli, met together with other senior officers to consider the border situation with Egypt. Afterwards, Lavon and Givli remained behind for a private conference.

This was the crucial meeting at which Givli sought and received Lavon's formal approval for the operation in Egypt; but what Lavon did not know was that the plan had already been carried out and had failed. Givli waited another three days, and on 19 July he informed the Chief of Staff, Dayan, who was in Washington, that Defence Minister Lavon had given him authority to proceed with the Cairo operation – about which Dayan had not been previously informed.

A week later, on 26 July, Givli addressed a memorandum to Lavon, advising him that the operation had been carried out and had failed. The Minister informed neither Premier Sharett nor the Cabinet. But when Dayan returned from his visit to the United States, he began to ask awkward questions about the authority given for the operation; he received no satisfactory answer. Givli claimed that he had a blanket authorization from Lavon for such operations. Lavon asserted that the sabotage attempt had been carried out without his knowledge or approval. A conflict developed within the Defence Ministry, and came presently to the notice of Sharett.

23

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

That was not all that the Prime Minister heard. On 5 October the Egyptian Government made public some details of the arrest of 'an Israeli spy ring', and on 10 October the Parquet, or security police, in Cairo gave more details and the names of the arrested. This made no particular impact on the Israeli press or public, or on the Cabinet. But the more Sharett heard of the operation, the more disturbed he became. He wanted to know who had authorized it, and he was not satisfied with the answers he received from Lavon, Givli and others. He asked Justice Olshan, of the Supreme Court, and General Dori, the former Chief of Staff, to investigate the antecedents of the operation.

While this 'Committee of Two' considered the testimony of Lavon and Givli, of Dayan and Peres, and of others, the Egyptians concluded their negotiations with the British and signed the evacuation agreement of 19 October; seven days later there was a real act of Arab terrorism, an attempt to assassinate Nasser by the Muslim Brotherhood.

On 12 November the Egyptians published a long and detailed indictment against the thirteen accused Jews, of whom eleven were in custody, and a week later the Parquet gave full details of the alleged confessions. In Israel, all this was noted neither by the press nor by the government; but in Cairo the Public Prosecutor began to link the 'Zionist plot' with the assassination attempt of the Brotherhood.

The plan to cause disturbance in Egypt now played right into Nasser's hands. The trial of the Brotherhood leaders, which took place at the end of November, was swift and shattering. Six of them were sentenced to death, and the rest to long terms of imprisonment. On 7 December, the executions were carried out. The Brotherhood trial augured ill for the Jews, whose trial had opened on 4 December.

The Jewish prisoners had been under arrest for five months without access to their lawyers, but the trial itself was fairly conducted. The course of the trial was barely mentioned in the Israeli press, except for editorial denunciations of it as a show trial. In the middle of its proceedings, the Committee of Two completed its investigation into the source of the order given for the

operation. It reported to the Prime Minister that it had 'not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt' that Lavon had not authorized Givli to proceed. The burden of responsibility thus clearly lay on Lavon as Minister.

In Cairo, the trial was all but over when Max Bennet took his own life in his prison cell. On 27 January 1955, the judges returned their verdict. The sentences were much more severe than either the prisoners or the Israelis had anticipated. Marzouk and Azzar were sentenced to death, and two others received hard labour for life; Marcelle Nino and one other were given fifteen years hard labour; two were given seven years; and two were acquitted. There followed an ill-advised Israeli public and private campaign to exert pressure on Nasser to save the two sentenced to die. But to no avail: on 31 January, Marzouk and Azzar were executed.

Meanwhile, Lavon had come to Premier Sharett with proposals for what was euphemistically described as 'a reorganization of the Defence Ministry'. In fact, Lavon demanded the dismissal of Shimon Peres from his post as Director-General and the transfer (not dismissal) of Givli. Sharett refused. On 2 February, Lavon sent his resignation to Sharett, but it was not immediately accepted. Sharett was greatly concerned by the effect on the army of the dispute between Lavon and the senior officers and officials. Something more than Lavon's resignation was necessary to heal this wound.

It was becoming apparent that there was only one man in Israel who could restore the shaken morale of the army. Ben-Gurion's place of retirement, Sde Boker, saw a steady procession of supporters urging him to return to office. He initially refused; he had no intention of going back to public life until the general elections, which were due that summer. He suggested that Shaul Avigur, the former head of the Mossad, the organization which had conducted illegal immigration under the British Mandate, would be a suitable choice as Defence Minister. Avigur, it transpired, was not interested.

Sharett, for his part, initially did no more than ask Ben-Gurion's advice. However, on 17 February, the day on which he finally took the decision to accept Lavon's resignation, Sharett took part in

24

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

a meeting of Mapai Party leaders at which the respected Speaker of the Knesset, Josef Sprinzak, persuaded his colleagues that Ben-Gurion must be asked to return, as Prime Minister or at least as Defence Minister. Mrs Myerson (later Meir) went to See Boker bearing this message. Ben-Gurion refused the premiership but accepted the Defence Ministry.

On 21 February, Sharett announced to the Knesset that Lavon had resigned because of differences over the reorganization of the Defence Ministry, and that Ben-Gurion had taken over. Ben-Gurion transferred Givli from Intelligence to a field command, and at once exerted firm civilian authority over every facet of the Israeli defence forces.

Lavon retired from active politics, but not for long. Within a year he was back as Secretary-General of the Histadrut (the Trades Union Federation), one of the most powerful positions in the Israeli Establishment. No one seemed to bother any more about the authority for the order that had been given for the 'security mishap'. In a miserable prison in Cairo, Marcelle Nino continued to serve her long years of hard labour. (She was quietly released in an exchange for Egyptian prisoners after the 1967 war.)

We must now turn our attention to another of the principals of this drama: Paul Frank. He had managed to escape the Egyptian police net. He had returned to Israel by way of Germany, and had been decorated by the army for his services. He continued to do useful work for the Israelis until, one day, the Israeli Intelligence Service discovered that he was working also with the Egyptians. In 1959 he was induced to return to Israel; he was tried, and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.

Israeli Intelligence now took another look at the Cairo affair, and after much interrogation came up with a new explanation for the debacle of 1954. It sought to explain the speed and comprehensiveness of the arrests.

In Cairo during the early part of 1954, Frank had befriended some of the German technical specialists who were already then working for the Egyptians; through them he got to know senior Egyptian security officials. The Israelis suspected – but they were never able to prove it – that through these contacts he had

revealed the purpose of his mission and betrayed his colleagues.

At his trial in Israel in 1959, Frank accused two senior defence officials of having induced him to give false evidence in 1954 in order to substantiate Givli's claim that Lavon had given a blanket authorization for operations of the kind which he, Frank, had carried out in Cairo. At about the same time, Lavon was privately informed by a former senior Intelligence official that certain documents in the files of the Intelligence Service had been tampered with so as to place the responsibility for the operation on Lavon.

By April 1960, Lavon felt that he had accumulated sufficient new evidence to justify reopening the question of responsibility for the 1954 operation in Egypt. He sent a dossier with the new material to Premier Ben-Gurion, who had also been given the additional information which had emerged from Frank's trial. As a result, on 28 August 1960, Ben-Gurion instructed the Chief of Staff to appoint a judicial committee headed by Supreme Court Justice Cohen, a former Attorney-General, to investigate the new evidence submitted by Lavon and that which had been unearthed by the trial of Frank.

Soon afterwards, Lavon returned to Israel after a prolonged period of convalescence in Switzerland. A meeting with Ben-Gurion took place on 26 September 1960. At this encounter Ben-Gurion told Lavon that he had no reason to blame him for anything done by him during his term of office as Minister of Defence; but neither was he in a position to exonerate him if others had censured him. 'I am not an investigator, nor a judge,' Ben-Gurion said. Lavon, for his part, objected to the appointment of Justice Cohen, not a Party man, to investigate the new evidence submitted by Lavon, and the meeting ended on an inconclusive note. Lavon wanted rehabilitation, not another investigation.

As a result of an apparent misunderstanding between the Prime Minister's Military Secretary, Colonel Argov, and Lavon's principal assistant, Ephraim Evron, the Cohen Report was shown to Lavon soon after its submission to the Prime Minister. It found no conclusive evidence either way. Lavon protested against its verdict and against not being called to give evidence before this

enquiry, and he proceeded to place the whole issue before the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs Committee which met in mid-October 1960.

For the first time since this committee had started work in 1948, the secrecy which had been strictly preserved in all its proceedings was broken. The press was able to get full accounts of the discussion, and especially of the charges which Lavon had made against officials and officers of the Defence Ministry.

Most of the press supported Lavon's charge that he had been wrongly accused, and forced from the government by a conspiracy of members of the Defence Ministry. Ben-Gurion maintained that the only way to establish the facts, with due regard to the security of the State, was by a formal judicial enquiry in which all the laws of evidence on oath would be applicable. But he was overruled by his Cabinet. A majority of ministers – headed by Levi Eshkol, the Finance Minister – preferred a Cabinet committee.

This committee, the 'Committee of Seven', was duly set up and reported its findings to the Cabinet on 25 December 1960. In a carefully worded document, it formally exonerated Lavon. Without explicitly absolving him of ultimate ministerial responsibility, it found that he had 'not given the direct order' which led to the Cairo operation. It found also 'reasonable grounds' for believing that a high-ranking officer had submitted forged evidence to incriminate him. The Cabinet endorsed the report. Ben-Gurion refused to have any part in the voting, because he felt that the Committee had not given due judicial weight to the evidence. Three other ministers also abstained: Dayan, Eban and Giora Josephtal.

The following day Eshkol met with Ben-Gurion and persuaded him to agree to suspend the controversy for the duration of the Zionist Congress, which was due to meet in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion took his vacation; Congress met and dispersed. But Ben-Gurion had been overruled on a question of principle; it was not in his nature to let the matter rest. By the end of January, he was back in Jerusalem. On the last day of the month, like a bolt from the blue, Israel heard that he had resigned office. 'All my life,' he wrote in his letter of resignation to President Ben-Zvi, 'I have

accepted the decisions of the majority, in the Party, in the Histadrut and in the Government. But in security affairs, as I see them, there is only one thing for me – my conscience.'

It was not the end of the 'affair'. Defeated in the Cabinet, Ben-Gurion turned to the Party, and there found more support for his stand. After a series of meetings and the resignation of three Mapai members from Lavon's Histadrut Executive, the Party Central Committee was forced into action – not by Ben-Gurion's resignation, which he had been persuaded to withdraw, but by a further intervention by the Finance Minister, Levi Eshkol. It was Eshkol's speech on 4 February 1961 that swung the conference against Lavon. By a vote of 159 to 96, Lavon was dismissed from the Secretary Generalship of the Histadrut. Among those who voted against the resolution were Sharett (despite the fact that he had denounced Lavon in strong terms for disrupting Party unity) and Aron Becker, who was to be Lavon's successor at the Histadrut.

The affair continued to trouble Ben-Gurion. After his withdrawal from public office in June 1963, he tried once more to discover what had really happened in 1954 and subsequently. He engaged Haggai Eshed, an able journalist on the staff of *Davar*, to undertake a complete survey of all available material, classified and otherwise. He also asked two lawyers, one a former judge-advocate of the army, to consider the purely legal aspects of the case.

In October 1964, Ben-Gurion brought the result of their investigation to the Minister of Justice, Dov Joseph, who proposed to submit the dossier of some five hundred pages to the Attorney-General for an opinion. This opinion was presented by Joseph to the Cabinet on 6 December, and released to the public two days later. It cast strong doubts on the validity of the conclusions of the Committee of Seven which had exonerated Lavon in 1960. It was the signal for Ben-Gurion to renew his demand for a full enquiry into the whole episode. When Prime Minister Eshkol made it clear that neither he nor the Cabinet was prepared to reopen the Lavon Affair, Ben-Gurion turned once more to the Party.

Ten years of disputation and nine committees of enquiry, of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

one sort or another, appear to have obscured the central issue underlying the misguided operation in Cairo in 1954. The identity of the man who gave the order to start the operation is unimportant; but how was it possible for such a dangerous political action to be planned and organized without the knowledge of the Prime Minister and the government?

Ben-Gurion was never so isolated from his people as he was over the Lavon Affair; they could not understand his preoccupation with it. Yet to Ben-Gurion it was the touchstone of the integrity of the government. He thought that Eshkol had compromised this integrity by allowing a political committee, made up of members of the Cabinet, to usurp the functions of a judicial committee. He saw in this a source of present and future corruption of power. But he remained a lone voice. Few shared his fears and even fewer understood his long-range concern.

The years of transition

One of his former ministers who owed a great deal to Ben-Gurion said that the members of the Cabinet 'felt a great feeling of liberation' when Ben-Gurion finally withdrew from politics in 1963.[46] They could now embark on foreign and domestic policies which had been impossible while Ben-Gurion was there. Peace with the Arabs might become a practical possibility under Eshkol.

It did not. In the end, the country and the Eshkol Government settled for a 'policy of transition'. Eshkol would bridge the gap between Ben-Gurion and the new generation that was emerging. But before long, as conditions moved to a state of seeming quiet under Eshkol, the Israelis – especially in government – were discovering that 'transition' was not a policy. They were also beginning to see that a favourable balance of payments was no substitute for an absent faith.

The Israeli Government's national development policy was based on two basic assumptions: that immigration would continue at the rate of 40,000 to 60,000 a year, and that there would be no substantial rise in the rate of emigration. But in 1966 these

two trends were reversed. By the end of the year, immigration had done little more than compensate for the greatly increased rate of emigration. Some argued that this change was a consequence of the deteriorating economic situation of the winter of 1966. In fact, the reverse was true; the economic difficulties had arisen principally from the sudden falling off in the rate of immigration.

No one in his senses could ever have believed that a country such as Israel could compete with the standard of income and life offered by the United States, Canada, France or Great Britain to their scientific and managerial elite; and it was no surprise that recruiting teams from prominent firms in those countries were offering tempting terms to Israeli graduates. But the immigrants had not come to Israel for economic considerations; and, in most cases, they were not leaving the country for those reasons. The real crisis centred on the true reasons that had made them come: the faith which now appeared unable to provide the answers that not only the younger generation, but also many of the old settlers, were seeking.

In 1966, Dr Yaacov Herzog, then Eshkol's Director-General at the Prime Minister's Office, gave a private briefing in which he set out his own views of the state of the nation. He thought that what the Israelis wanted to have was a convincing answer to the questioning of their presence in Israel, in the midst of a hostile Arab world.

A large section of the population, he said, especially members of the younger generation, were deeply disturbed because they lacked a sense of national purpose. This malaise affected even practising orthodox Jews – only about a third of the population – whose faith in traditional Zionism might have been expected to sustain them. Ben-Gurion, Herzog continued, held the German holocaust largely responsible for this situation. Apart from its grim harm to European Jewry, it had inflicted a long-range blow on the Jewish State. For the six million killed, Ben-Gurion believed, were the Jews who would have built the State, would have gone to [illegible], would have been the immigrants even of that day. But this had not happened, and therefore the country,

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

3. See p. 74 above.
4. Memorandum by Sir Gilbert Clayton to the Chief Administrator, General A. W. Money, 18.v.1918; printed as an appendix in Lloyd, *Egypt Since Cromer*.
5. See Dan Gillon, 'Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?', *The New Middle East*, No. 4, January 1969.
6. *Ibid.*
7. For the text of the Declaration, see p. 64 above.
8. See PRO Cab. 106 1923.
9. *A Palestine Notebook, 1918–1923*, pp. 35–36.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 26. According to the audited and published accounts of the Zionist Office in Palestine for 1918, the total amount received and spent for relief, schools, special aid and the Jewish National Fund was 704,935 Swiss francs – at the then prevailing rate of exchange, not quite £30,000. See the Reports of the Executive to the Twelfth Zionist Congress, Part 2, p. 55.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.
13. This whole episode (pp. 179–82) is based on Aref al-Aref's private papers and diaries.
14. See p. 147 above.
15. See Royal Institute for International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–1939*, Information Paper No. 20a, July 1939. The figures are those given by the War Minister in the House of Commons on 1 January 1939. See also the *Report of the Palestine Royal Commission*, July 1937.
16. Personal communication.
17. HMSO, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. V, Doc. 569, p. 799.
18. *Ibid.*, Doc. 579, p. 784.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 785.
20. Minutes of Twentieth Zionist Congress, 4.viii.1937, reprinted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 9.viii.1937.
21. David Ben-Gurion in the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 23.viii.1963.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. Cmd. 6019.
25. David Ben-Gurion in the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 30.viii.1963; translation slightly amended.
26. Verbatim record, Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem.
27. According to the minutes of the meeting, those present were Dr Wise (presiding), David Ben-Gurion, Nahum Goldmann, Hayim Greenberg, Judge Levinthal, Louis Lipsky, Richard Gottheil, Meyer Weisgal and Dr Weizmann.
28. This and the following quotations are taken from the verbatim record

of the meeting, Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem. The Ahad Ha'amistic school followed the line taken by Asher Ginsberg, an Odessa-born Zionist, who, writing as Ahad Ha'am, urged that Palestine should become a spiritual rather than a political centre for the Jews.
29. Ben-Gurion, in conversation.
30. Allon, in conversation with David Kimche, 10.viii.1956.
31. *Ibid.*
32. In conversation, 3.v.1955.
33. Allon, in conversation, 10.viii.1946.
34. For a detailed account of this, see Jon Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars*, pp. 257–9, 265–7.
35. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents 1951*, p. 462.
36. See Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, II, 308.
37. According to Ben-Gurion's own account. See Jon and David Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill* (revised edn., 1970), Epilogue; and *The New Middle East*, June 1969, p. 15.
38. For a detailed report, see *Jewish Observer*, 27.iii.1953 and 3.iv.1953.
39. The full text of the speech was made available by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
40. Information provided by the staff of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in Jerusalem, and the Israeli and Jordanian representatives at the United Nations.
41. British United Press dispatch from Cairo, 1.i.1956.
42. English text as issued by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
43. Information given by the Egyptian doctors who had stayed on at the Gaza General Hospital, 20.vi.1967.
44. E. A. Bayne, *The Lavon Affair*, a report prepared for the American Universities Field Staff, May 1961.
45. By his own account, Reuven Shiloah, the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, knew of these contingency discussions, but not of the planned action.
46. In conversation.
47. In conversation, at the Ministry of Labour, Jerusalem.

6 Palestine: Nation or Dispersion?

1. PRO FO 371/3398, Clayton to Mark Sykes, 4.ii.1918; quoted by Dan Gillon in 'Were the British Wrong about the Palestinians?', *The New Middle East*, No. 4, January 1969.
2. The Syrians claimed Palestine as the 'southern' part of their country.
3. PRO FC 371/5124.
4. PRO FO 371/6374.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Terence Prittie

ISRAEL

MIRACLE IN THE DESERT

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, *Publishers*
New York • Washington • London

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

of both his party and the nation as a whole. David Ben-Gurion, whom he succeeded, was a very different type of character. A man of magnetic personality and grand vision, beamed out in striking phrases and compelling conviction, Ben-Gurion was not like any other politician—he was statesman, prophet, historian, and religious pontiff rolled into one. To say that he dominated Israeli politics from 1948 to 1963 is as inadequate as any other phrase one might use about him. His imprint was clear on every facet of the life of the country, virtually nothing happened in Israel that did not owe most to his inspiration.

Ben-Gurion himself approved the choice of Eshkol as his successor, but there is no reason to think that he either liked or trusted him. Ben-Gurion, moreover, had retired once before and had allowed himself to be persuaded to return to the political stage. Very possibly, he visualized this happening again, and it may have been with a pang that he realized too late that the tenacious and astute Eshkol was, after all, most unlikely to surrender office to him. It had been easy enough to lift Eshkol into the saddle; it was going to be very hard to unseat him should the need to do so arise.

In 1965, Ben-Gurion broke with Mapai, the party he had been largely responsible for founding. With the help of a band of devoted lieutenants, he organized a new socialist party, Rafi (Israel Workers List). Rafi's future is unpredictable; it may become a socialist "ginger-group" or it may search for a new synthesis between capital and labor, between welfarism and private initiative.

Apart from these issues, there were a number of reasons for Ben-Gurion's organizing Rafi, but the chief one was a feud that had been going on between two sections of Mapai for more than a decade—since the obscure Lavon Affair of 1954.

In July, 1954, the Egyptian secret police pounced on a group of Israeli agents who had just exploded several incendiary bombs, more or less harmlessly, in Cairo. These Israeli agents seemed to have fallen prey to the excess of inventiveness and zeal that sometimes affects Jews. Although this has never been proved with certainty, it appears that they wanted to wreck American and British property in Cairo in order to provoke an anti-Egyptian outcry in the Western world and perhaps cause a Western reoccupation of the Suez Canal Zone. This little group of misguided men was rounded up on July 14, and two of them were later to be executed. But their contact man in Tel Aviv asked the approval for their enterprise from the Minister of Defense, Pinhas Lavon, only on July 16. It is still not definitely known whether

Lavon approved or rejected a project that had already, unknown to him, been nipped in the bud two days previously.

Israel's Prime Minister at the time was Moshe Sharett. Ben-Gurion had resigned, for the first time, in November, 1953, and had retired to the kibbutz of Sde Boker in the Negev desert, founded a year earlier by a group of idealistic young men who had just completed their military service in the Negev. Ben-Gurion wanted to reinject a mood of pioneering idealism into his people and hoped to do this by personal example. The colonization of the Negev was, in any case, his dearest wish.) Sharett was deeply puzzled by the events in Egypt and in the Ministry of Defense. Lavon gave him his own account, which was that on July 18 he refused to authorize a campaign of bomb outrages. General Moshe Dayan, then Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, gave him a different version; so did Shimon Peres, the Director General of the Defense Ministry. Both Dayan and Peres were later to join Ben-Gurion in forming the new party of Rafi. There were investigations, which brought Lavon's resignation in February, 1955. Sharett invited Ben-Gurion to take his place as Prime Minister, but Ben-Gurion consented only to return to the cabinet as a replacement for Lavon in the Ministry of Defense.

The matter might have ended there, but in April, 1960, Lavon, who had been collecting evidence on his own in order to reopen the file on the 1954 operation in Egypt, sent a dossier of new material to Ben-Gurion, who had in the meantime become Prime Minister once again. Ben-Gurion ordered a fresh investigation, and his cabinet appointed a select committee to sift the evidence and reach findings. This procedure was against Ben-Gurion's own judgment; he would have preferred a regular judicial inquiry. This cabinet committee exonerated Lavon on December 25, 1960. But Mapai, as a party, reached an opposite decision and expelled Lavon from his post as Secretary General of the Histadrut in February, 1961.

Honors, as between Ben-Gurion and the former Minister of Defense, Lavon, were now easy. There was a second chance of burying the affair. But it is a Jewish characteristic to be quite desperately obstinate when in search of justice or justification. When Ben-Gurion retired for the second time as Prime Minister, in June, 1963, he employed expert legal opinion in a further investigation of the Lavon Affair. Their summary of the case went to the Ministry of Justice, which decided in December that the findings of the cabinet committee that had exonerated Lavon were subject to grave doubt. Ben-Gurion repeated his demand for a

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

regular judicial inquiry, once again it was refused. This time Mapai's party conference also refused to reopen the affair. In a fury, the Grand Old Man of Israeli politics left Mapai and formed Rafi. Dayan and Peres, feeling themselves personally implicated, joined him.

The Lavon Affair involved the rule of law, as well as points of principle and tact. Ben-Gurion was probably right in wanting a regular judicial inquiry, for it was an unfortunate precedent to entrust the Lavon Affair to a cabinet committee whose members would inevitably prefer to see an erring party colleague eased quietly into the background. On principle, too, Ben-Gurion was right to oppose Lavon's efforts to continue in politics and government. As minister responsible for the Cairo fiasco of 1954, Lavon had to resign, and his efforts to rehabilitate himself were selfish and damaging to both his party and his country. As far as tact went, however, Ben-Gurion was at fault; he had no need to reopen the episode in 1963 or to pursue his grievance to the point of splitting his party and the socialist cause that had played so large a part in Israel's first seventeen years of life. The Lavon Affair brought credit to nobody.

Instead, the splitting of Mapai turned the 1965 elections into a bitter struggle in which Ben-Gurion indulged in the absurd gesture of refusing to shake hands with his opponents, and they, in turn, enlisted the support of every possible pressure group to defeat and humble the new party. The acrimony of internecine socialist strife invaded villages and families, causing heated and purposeless arguments between neighbors and brothers. The unspoken thought in the minds of many Israelis was expressed by one old man, who was quoted as saying, "I hope Ben-Gurion may be strong enough to take the beating he deserves." The cartoonist Dosh saw in Ben-Gurion a nihilist who was ready to destroy his own reputation in order to get even with his opponents, and depicted a dwarfish Ben-Gurion, armed with a hammer, attacking a huge statue of himself, with the caption: "De-Bengurionization."

Rafi had nothing to add to the preachings or practice of Israeli socialism. Ideas, of course, continued to stream from Ben-Gurion, with his supreme imaginativeness and apocalyptic vision, but they did not constitute a program. He and his "Three Musketeers"—the dashing Dayan, with his black eye-patch and army swagger, the swarthy and lucid Peres, and the go-getting Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek—called for a rejuvenation of Israeli politics. There was to be a "new style," an elegance, an incisiveness, a fresh infusion of ideas and ideals. Rafi's leaders declaimed against the staleness of the "Establishment,"

against its emphasis on organization, on the packing of party lists, and the "arrangement" of political life from the top. There was some substance in these charges. A party that had been in power as long as Mapai had was liable to regard government as essentially its private concern and primarily a matter of administrative technique and finesse. Rafi's leaders believed there should be more progress and change, greater social unity and social justice. There was to be a new type of Israeli politician, not the dusty, conventional man-of-the-people, but a vital, vigorous individualist.

All this sounded very stirring. And there can be no question that Israeli politics *had* become more mundane, more materialistic. This was in step with the mood of the people. The thrilling enthusiasms of the pioneering phase have diminished (but by no means vanished), efficiency has become more important than equality; Israelis have come to expect more and to grumble more; they have, in fact, become more like people in Western or Western-type countries. A new nostalgia for the old, "worth-while" days has grown up. People have begun to reflect, sadly, that faith, tradition, and idealism brought the Jewish people through eighteen centuries of exile and misery, but that the Israeli inheritors are embracing a creed of utility, patronage, and power.

Ben-Gurion and his followers, however, produced only one real plank for their political platform: this was electoral reform. In Ben-Gurion's view, the existing system of proportional representation—however fair in a mathematical sense—had obvious flaws. There is a lack of political contact between the citizen and the Knesset member—the latter feeling responsible much more to his party than to his constituents. There is much jockeying within the parties for places high up on the electoral list. Personality, and the identification of the politician with the interests of the voter, are of less importance than party discipline and party organization.

Moreover, exact proportional representation leads to a multiplicity of parties. Every nuance of opinion can lead to schism, for even the smallest party is permitted to return its member to the Knesset. In 1959, there were twenty-four parties in the field. In 1961, the government wisely passed a law under which every party had to deposit $2,700 for an election, which it would forfeit if it failed to obtain 1 per cent of the votes cast. As a result, the number of parties fell to fourteen; some wastage of political effort was saved. But at the 1965 elections, the number was up again to seventeen.

Wastage goes on. Since 1949, the various socialist parties have, al-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

NY TIMES INDEX 1961

...Economy—Cont
...$4 billion
...Africa, country and ... to attain world level ... N 1,4, strikes ... published 5 16.

...Apr 8; Tel Aviv trade drive opens, ... Roosevelt feted, S 19,29:3; Min ... support Bond Sign dinner, NYC, Ap 9; ... 2-24 annual Hanukkah Festival, ... Leiden, NYC, Mar 6, D 11; Olga ... Haskell sculpture exhibit Jan 1, F 19,32:4
Espionage. See also Trade Agreement Ap 10 par. ... e 2 and Foreign Relations F 8 par.
... alleged Israeli espionage, see sub ... eign Relations Je 30, Jl 1,2 and Pol Je 1 ... 9; Middle East—Pol Ap 29 to 4 2, Jl 10 ... Ag 2 to 9 31, S 1 to 9 46, O 1,3,5 to 9 51, ... 8-6, 1954—Pol N 10 to 24 N 16 par
Foreign Relations and Service. See Africa ... Ap 8,11 to 24 Je 3 par, My 7 par, My 21 ... Colonies, Relations F 27, Dahomey S 29, ... Relations Intg Powers 9 48, ... 21 Middle East, South Africa, rental ... pars Jl 12, N 23,24,27,28, Upper Volta

... accredited as Arab to Cyprus, Je 23,1:1 ... gets 3-yr sentence for giving security ... to foreign nation, F 8,2:3; appeals to Sup ... 4
... Eisenhower Administration cites 'excellent' ... relations with Premier Ben Gurion as sign of ... Israel's 'neutrality' toward west, news conf, My 11, ... Ben Gurion's influence in world affairs ... Internal crisis feared, My 21,3:1
... Je 2,5, USSR ... arrests Zionists on espionage charges, Je 2,5:3; Sharett to appeal, ... 2 Govt denies charge, Je 4, Sharett in ... hagen calls charge 'prearranged frame-up' ... 2,5
... urges improved relations with USSR ... Middle East, on behalf of Liberal ... Ag 8,15:1; Indian reply to Belgrade conf ... urges nations denies India plans to recognize ... 5 5,6:4
BEN GURION VISITS ABROAD. See subheads ... pond sales pact My 30, and Pol, Jews abroad ... Je 1,6, Burma, Ben Gurion visit pure, Foreign ... on My 26,27, Immigration—Israel Je 1, Jewish ... ad Je 2, Jews—Gen Je 1,6, Middle East—Pol ... 43,26,27,30,31 to 9 20; Je 1,3 to 9 20;
... refugees par Je 2
BEN GURION VISITS ABROAD: Ben Gurion to ... speaks, then runs to US to attend meetings of ... Israel origins, will see Pres Kennedy in ... visit to US not official; other details; White ... ouse event on NYC meeting, My 21,23:3, trip set; ... reception, My 23,1:4, White House confirms Ken... dy will see Ben Gurion in NYC, My 23,18:4; Ben ... arrives, NYC, en way to Canada; illus, ... Ag 6,1:3; stopped briefly, London, My 24,11:1, Ben Gurion arrives, Ottawa; hailed by Prime Min ... Diefenbaker; speculation on talks; Arab sympathiz... ers demonstrate, My 25,13:1; he confs with Diefen... baker, visits news conf; stresses visit aim to es... tablish personal contact with heads of govt, My 26, ... to confer in talks with Diefenbaker; issues communi... que with him; visits Quebec and Montreal; holds ... news conf, Montreal, My 27,7:1; in Montreal; roots ... for Expos in game with Yankees, My 28,13:1; com... ments on trip, My 28,IV,2:4; ed extremes have to ... , My 28,IV,8:2; Ben Gurion arrives, NYC, confers with US, visit to Canada; visits UN Secretariat, ... sees aides; illus, My 29,1:3; in Phila; visits ... Independence Hall; hon by city; confers with ... Rusk, Goldberg and Sen Javits, NYC, noted; illus, ... My 30,1:4; in NYC; confs with Kennedy on 'world ... problems', no details pub but Kennedy calls talks 'most useful'; speculation Ben Gurion gives Kennedy gift; later confs ... with Pres Lyndon Johnson, Sec Goldberg, other de... ... 1:4
BEN GURION VISITS ABROAD: Ben Gurion in ... confs with Jewish leaders; illus; hon at lunch... eon, given by Amb to US Comay, Je 1,1:3; ... Ben Gurion flies to US, confs with ... leaders; earlier activities ... confs with Amb Stevenson, ex-Pres ... illus, Je 2,1:7; he arrives, London; ... confers with Macmillan and Sec Home; visits ... Churchill, Je 3,3:2; roots, Je 4,18:4; in ... 1:1; confs with Pres de Gaulle, Je 7, ... Malraux, Je 8,39:6; returns to Israel; ... Je 9,16:7
... See misc sec Je 30, Jl 1,2, Ag 6, Heal ... Israel Jl 12 (re USSR claim to property that ... to its Consulate regime)
... See Ben Gurion visits cr road pass My 21,23, ... Je 1,2, Subheads Armament O 26; Iran ... 18, Holidays Ag 21; Monuments Je 26; Pol, Jews ... abroad pars My 9,8,10; and Religion Jl 14
General
... that position (US) gives Israel reproduction of ... Washington 1790 is against bigotry to Hi synag... ... Je 8,10:7; US Amb Hare hails Israeli peace ... of nat purpose, Je 13,4:1; House Lords Bank, de ... Lee, by I Kirshon, and The Idea of the Jewish ... State, by J Halpern, revd, Je 27,VII,6:1; Prof K ... Schmidt finds origin of Israel pub in 8 Dec in ... Press, My 18,14:6
... Christians sees Jewish state as new ghetto; ... warns Christians to anti-Semitism on grounds both ... seek segregation of Jews, e, Amer Council for ... Judaism, My 7,37:1 (see also Jews—Gen My 7,8,12, ... 14), Premier Ben Gurion sees Israel as model ser... because it is being built by Jews, My 11,15:3
... Lt Col Lorch book The Edge of the Sword: ... Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949, revd, ... Jl 16,VII,3:1
... Mayor Wagner calls Israel gala major center of ... stability and active force for peace in Mideast, e, ... ZOA, S 1,5:6; Sec Goldberg lauds humanitarian ... ideals, e, NYC, N 27,7:3
Holidays and Special Occasions. See Middle ... East—Mid Autumn My 21, Tet Ap 2 par, Ap 17 par ... (for dispute over Independence Day not parade)
... Premier Ben Gurion opens Independence Jubilee ... date, radio e, Ap 30,16:7; Eichmann trial to extend ... for date, Ap 21,1:4; Pres Remembrance Day proclamation, ... annivs, Ap 21,10:3, annivs marked, parade, illus, ... Ap 21,12:1, ed, Ap 21,32:4; annivs marked, Jerusalem ... Hall; Israel Independence Day proclaimed, Ap 21 ... 12:7; NYC parade sets, Ap 23,27:1, annivs marked by ... ZOA unit, NYC, Mayor Wagner attends gala concert, ... Ap 25,72:1; Parliament Assembly of Ancient hold ... annivs, Ap 28,6:7
... 14th anniv of UN decision to create State of ... Israel noted, ZOA dinner, NYC, N 24,40:3
Law and Legislation. Hatzofeh Hadati (US) de... plores 'disunity of legal systems,' urges ... code based on Talmud, e, NYC, My 29,22:5
Memorials and Monuments. Drive under way in ... US to raise $2 million for 'Statue of Liberty' monu... ment as goodwill gift from Amer people sponsored by Sen Javits and others, Je 28,31:1

Politics and Government

... Built in Ben Gurion Govt over ... Lavon dismissal '55 (see Cabinet, Jan 26 ... repts creating Lavon of blame for disaster in security ... action '54 noted, Je 1,IV,2:4; Min Dayan shows ... old mil records which reptdly contradict part of ... Lavon testimony to Parliament com; Premier Ben ... Gurion absent from Cabinet meeting, Je 3,1:3; ... Sharett charges Govt persecuted Lavon, Je 4,1:1; ... Parliament rejects minority demand for Lavon ... dispute, Je 5,2:6; Ben Gurion on security Je 5,5:5; ... ex-Army officer, who was charged in clothing theft ... case with submitting forged documents that ... blamed Lavon, ousts 3 from service, orders follows ... Atty Gen Hausner decision not to prosecute him; ... officer's name withheld, Je 11,9:1; Ben Gurion ... charges Lavon conducts 'dirty' campaign to clear ... self, vows to stay in pol; central com, still rejects ... Cabinet complaint against Lavon, Je 13,1:4; Min Rosen re... veals he urged Ben Gurion to end rift with Lavon ... but appeal was ignored, Je 14,4:3
... Mapai party attempts truce with Ben Gurion, asks ... Cabinet members not to resign over Lavon affair; ... Pres Ben Zvi seeks truce for Ben Gurion meeting with ... Cabinet; Min Rosen asks mass Cabinet resignation, ... Je 16,1:2; Ben Gurion accepts Cabinet decision ... ending Lavon, retracts charge of bias, in to Rosen, ... Je 17,1:3; minority parties dissatisfied with Ben ... Gurion retreat; Rosen wins Progressive party backing, Je 18,7:4; Ben Gurion on vacation, Sea of ... Galilee, Je 19,7:5; Lavon refuses to resign from ... Histadrut post; scores proposed Mapai com probe as 'one-sided' Je 21,2:6; aides seen splitting ... Mapai party, aiding Opposition, Je 22,IV,8:1; Cabi... net confirms decision absolving Lavon; defeats ... Mapam party motion to dissolve Govt Je 23,4:8; ... Ben Gurion Govt defeats no-confidence vote, 77-26; ... seen weakened; coalition parties warn against ... ousting Lavon from Histadrut, Je 31,8:5
... Amb Suhar convicted of perjury in '57 libel suit; ... fined, Je 16,2:4
... Ben Gurion resigns over Cabinet ouster of Pi... Lavon; Govt automatically falls but runs keep cre... taker role; reaction, London, Washington, F 1,1:4; ... Lavon aides and Ben Gurion career revd, F 1,10:3; ... Ben Gurion silent on forming new Govt, awaits out... come of move in Mapai party to oust Lavon as His... tadrut sec gen, F 2,3:7; party secretariat approves ... no-confidence opposing Lavon in post; Lavon refuses ... to resign, F 4,9:4; party central com, 159-96, votes ... to remove him as Histadrut sec gen; police clash ... with crowd of 1,000 protesting vote; arrest 9; ex-Premier Sharett speaks against ouster; Lavon links ... vote to Ben Gurion resignation and Min Eshkol ... stand, F 5,1:1; Ben Gurion resignation background; ... map of Knesset structure by parties, F 5,IV,2:3; ... Histadrut exec com sets vote on Lavon; Pres Ben ... Zvi delays action on new Govt; observers doubt ... vote on Lavon strengthens Ben Gurion, F 6,3:3; ... Mapai formally asks Ben Zvi to let Ben Gurion form ... new Govt; Mapam party recommends designating ... Mapai man over other than Ben Gurion; contends his ... attack on Cabinet in Lavon case would not make for ... harmony, F 7,3:1; Lavon resigns Histadrut post; ... resignations, including 58 Mapai members, ac... ISRAEL—Politics—Cont ... resigns, F 8,4:4; Histadrut acting sec gen Ha... expected to continue Lavon fight for reinstate... rights in Mapai; State Dept says it is pleased and ... will support Lavon if reinstated, F 9,2:6; Ben Gurion ... insists he will not form Govt unless Lavon ... reinstated, F 10,4:3
... Eliezer Peri, pro-Lavon leader, to form new party, ... F 10,8:1; Ben Gurion weighs resignation, F 10,8:3; ... asks type limit on alternatives, Mapai party divided, ... party seeks Natl Religious Front support, F 11,2:5; ... Front executive rejects appeal, F 24,6:1; Mapai re... affirms non-Lavon leadership; Ben Gurion reiterates ... Knesset if efforts to form Govt unsuccessful, F ... Eshkol, 7 other parties refuse coalition talks, F ... at nominated Histadrut sec gen, F ... 25,6:3; Progressive and Ben Zvi Liberal parties plan ... merger to create new party; protest on integration ... and immigrants, F 26,9:1; Mapai rejects Ben Gurion ap... peal to make Min Eshkol Premier to avoid new elec... tions; Ben Gurion elected Histadrut sec gen, F ...
... Ben Gurion unable to form Govt; Mapai leaders ... hold talks on plan to form Govt with Liberal party; ... Ben Gurion to meet with Mapai Cabinet members, ... Mar 1; Mapai Cabinet rejects Ben Gurion plan for ... coalition with Liberal party; Ben Gurion to meet ... Cabinet ministers, Mar 5; Mapai Cabinet members ... split on new elections as only alternative to forming coalition ... with Ben Gurion, Mar 6; Mapai Cabinet votes by ... narrow margin to back Ben Gurion in coalition talks; ... party 58-50 to 2; Knesset backs new elec... tions, Mar 14,1:1
... Jerusalem High Ct upholds Supreme Court ... verdict, Mar 13,1:1
... Pres Ben Zvi urges Ben Gurion to form new Govt, ... F 16,8:1; Ben Gurion weighs formation of new Govt ... with type limit on alternatives, Mapai party divided, ... party seeks Natl Religious Front support, F 22,2:5; ... Front executive rejects appeal, F 24,6:1; Mapai re... affirms non-Lavon leadership; Ben Gurion reiterates ... Knesset if efforts to form Govt unsuccessful, F ... Eshkol, 7 other parties refuse coalition talks, F ... at nominated Histadrut sec gen, F ... 25,6:3; Progressive and Ben Zvi Liberal parties plan ... merger to create new party; protest on integration ... and immigrants, F 26,9:1; Mapai rejects Ben Gurion ap... peal to make Min Eshkol Premier to avoid new elec... tions; Ben Gurion elected Histadrut sec gen, F ...
... Ben Gurion unable to form Govt; Mapai leaders ... hold talks on plan to form Govt with Liberal party; ... Ben Gurion to meet with Mapai Cabinet members, ... Mar 1; Mapai Cabinet rejects Ben Gurion plan for ... coalition with Liberal party; Ben Gurion to meet ... Cabinet ministers, Mar 5; Mapai Cabinet members ... split on new elections as only alternative to forming coalition ... with Ben Gurion, Mar 6; Mapai Cabinet votes by ... narrow margin to back Ben Gurion in coalition talks; ... party 58-50 to 2; Knesset backs new elec... tions, Mar 14,1:1
... Jerusalem High Ct upholds Supreme Court ... verdict, Mar 13,1:1
... Pres Ben Zvi urges Liberal party, ... Mar 8,5:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Apr 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... May 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jun 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jul 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Aug 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Sep 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Oct 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Nov 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Dec 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 29,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 30,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Jan 31,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 14,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 15,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 16,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 17,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 18,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 19,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 20,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 21,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 22,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 23,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 24,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 25,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 26,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 27,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Feb 28,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 1,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 2,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 3,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 4,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 5,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 6,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 7,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 8,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 9,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 10,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 11,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 12,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ... Mar 13,1:1; Ben Gurion bars Liberal party, ...

NY TIMES INDEX 1969

ISRAEL-Economy

Employes, Civil

Espionage. See Middle East Ma 10 in ¶ 9; N 25,17 in ¶ 7; D 1 in ¶ 8 for alleged Israeli espionage; see Middle East Je 24 in ¶ 5, My 29-31 in ¶ 21; Ap 1,2,4 in ¶ 4, My 1,13 in ¶ 1; My 26 in ¶ 16; Je 3 in ¶ 42; D 1 in ¶ 7

Foreign Investments. See subhead Econ, misc; sec O 8; land sales, pre

Foreign Relations and Service. See Africa, Mr 1 p 20, Amer Nations O 11,15 in O 16, Belgium F 14, Canada (Belgium) 2, Cyprus Ag 11,15, Lebanon Je 6, U.S., Internatl Relations Je 6 in ¶ 2, Libya O 6, Middle East, Venezuela O 16, pro-Colombia O 26, Zanzibar Je 23

Relations with Vatican viewed in light of Pope's trip to Holy Land; seem to have improved in past decade, especially under Pope John XXIII; seen hanging on relations between Jews and Christians in Israel, Je 5,28:1

Pres Johnson, in Premier Eshkol delivered personally by Dir Sharon, Je 8,26:6; Eshkol says he is willing to meet with Johnson any time, reply to it, Je 14,23:1

Ireland grants full recognition, Je 28,10:1; Irish parliamentary delegation, recd by Pres Shazar; confs with Min Meir, Mr 24,2:6

Australian Prime Min Menzies cancels planned visit because of illness, Je 13,2:7

Chancellor Erhard holds W Ger values good relations, news conf, Bonn, Je 20,2:6

Eshkol and Turkish Premier Inonu confer, Paris, on restoring full diplomatic ties, Jl 3,18:5

Premier Eshkol repts signs of thaw in USSR attitude toward Israel, int in Tel Aviv Maariv, S 7,1:7; says he expects to confer with W Ger Chancellor Erhard by next summer, S 7,2:5; W Ger repts no definite plans, S 8,35:5

Mizrachi Women's Organ hon Mayor Wagner for promoting US-Israeli understanding, O 5,3:3

W Ger Chancellor Erhard and Eshkol agree to confer before next summer, possibly in Paris, O 15, 5:3

Caracas embassy residence fired upon by terrorists; employe hurt; Foreign Min blames anti-Jewish propaganda by Arab missions there, O 16,9:4

Sen Goldwater says US must preserve applicable laws, article in Jewish pub Heritage, O 20,28:8

Ex-Chancellor Adenauer says he will make private trip to Israel in interest of Israeli-W Ger ties, O 22,2:5

ISRAEL-Politics-

Knesset members of Knesset Labor party caucus back Premier Eshkol's decision to call Cabinet meeting to discuss Eshkol resignation; Cabinet debate described as stormy; party meeting, party central committee to meet, Jl 15,1:4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Employee, Civil

Espionage and Subversion

Foreign Investments. See

Foreign Relations and Service. See

W Ger decides to seek formal diplomatic ties.

Israel

Cab not approves 'immediate establishment' of diplomatic ties with W Ger.

Knesset 66 29 with 10 abstentions, approves Cabinet decision to establish diplomatic relations with W Ger.

Israel and W Ger announce establishment of full diplomatic rels; Erhard and Eshkol each to name envoys in more.

Holidays and Special Occasions

Politics and Government

THE SHATTERED SILENCE

The Eli Cohen Affair

by

Zwy Aldouby and Jerrold Ballinger



COWARD, McCANN & GEOGHEGAN, INC.
New York

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4

Sabotage in Alexandria

Modiin commander Benyamin Gibli was far from the least of those concerned over recent reports relayed by the Cairo network about the steps the junta had taken to strengthen the armed forces and support fedayeen raids into Israel. In the light of the somber evaluations his analysts supplied, Gibli was unable to share the views of Premier Moshe Sharet and his moderate-dominated Cabinet that the government of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had assumed the chairmanship of the Revolutionary Council from Naguib at the beginning of 1954, favored a peaceful solution of the conflict with Israel.

The bellicose statements of the new Egyptian leadership and the intensification of skirmishes along Israel's southern border, though disquieting, did not disturb Gibli as much as what seemed to be a potentially devastating policy shift in London. A sale of aircraft to the Egyptian Air Force coupled with an agreement over the Sudan had set the stage for a Suez withdrawal. The probability of an immediate accord over the evacuation of the canal zone, without a guarantee of Israeli rights, thus heightened his fears that the waterway would be irrevocably closed to Israeli shipping, and the bases in the Nile Delta, which the British had stocked with huge caches of arms, would fall into Egyptian hands.

The portents from Washington appeared even darker. There was ample evidence of a pro-Egyptian drift in the Middle

Eastern policy of the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been seeking the friendship of Arab leaders for the past two years by proposing the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Israel and the internationalization of Jerusalem. His aides in the State Department, who held high hopes that Egypt would become the cornerstone of a Western-oriented regional alliance, had promised Nasser not only moral backing but the same military and economic aid the United States had given Saudi Arabia and member-states of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. And as a token of good faith, Washington allowed Cairo to purchase strategic materials in the United States.

The potentially dangerous foreign policy moves made by England and the United States had a devastating impact on Israeli intelligence circles. Few members of the General Staff found any solace in the placating statement issued by Whitehall and Foggy Bottom which attempted to reassure Israel that the two governments intended to maintain an impartial friendship with both Arabs and Jews. Churchill's dramatic assertion "I am a Zionist" and London's pledge to block any aggression against Israel did little to dispel their fears that England would give in to virtually every demand made by Nasser over the canal issue, making a peaceful settlement with Egypt after a withdrawal from the Suez an impossibility. They were just as skeptical about American assurances that the reciprocal coziness between Washington and the junta, with broad hints of an arms agreement and a place for Egypt in a pro-Western regional alliance, would not harm Israel.

Colonel Gibli, unlike some of his civilian colleagues in the intelligence community, scorned diplomatic overtures and considered secret political operations as the only way to alter the pro-Arab trend in Western policies. Gibli's superiors, Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Moshe Dayan, though mutually antagonistic, supported his position. They both seemed determined to follow the same bellicose policy toward the Arabs that Ben-Gurion had advocated before he resigned to tend sheep and meditate at Sde Boker in the

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

remote Negev desert. But Lavon was at loggerheads with Sharet and most Cabinet members; he was also snubbed by many of his subordinates. And to add to his isolation, he was being denied access to sources of information other than Modiin. (The newly created Mosad, which came under the jurisdiction of the prime minister, was at the time in the process of taking over the duties of foreign intelligence gathering.) Lavon thus hesitated to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward covert operations in Egypt. In May, after discussing the situation with Gibli, Lavon rejected his propositions to employ networks of young Zionists in sabotage; he promised, though, to discuss the matter again at a later date.[1]

Gibli saw no point in waiting. As an aspirant to the post of chief of staff, he realized that a successful secret operation which would tip the balance in favor of Israel could also further his own ends. If the sabotage acts attained their goal, he would have no difficulty in receiving Lavon's approval and the blessings of even the most skeptical moderates in Sharet's Cabinet. And he could then personally claim the credit. In case of failure, the only ones to be blamed would be his subordinates. Thus strengthened by his own ambition and sure of Dayan's backing (he was also said to have won the blessing of Ben-Gurion), Gibli decided to ignore Lavon's equivocation and act on his own.[2]

Once he had made his decision, the colonel entrusted the mission of activating the network to the Special Operations Department code-named Unit 131. Its chief was Lieutenant Colonel Mordechai "Motke" Ben Zur, a former field intelligence officer of the Harel Brigade and lieutenant colonel in the reserves. Ben Zur, who had often proved himself in the field, was most eager to undertake covert operations abroad.[3] The Cairo sabotage plan was, therefore, received with gratitude and enthusiasm.

In the first week of June, after a routine conference of department heads, Gibli asked Ben Zur to remain behind. Reviewing the progress of intelligence gathering in Egypt, the

colonel praised the proficiency of the Cairo and Alexandria rings; the intelligence reports they had provided far exceeded initial expectations. On the negative side, clashes of personality within the network had caused needless friction—a problem that Bennet as a lone operative was unable to resolve. Marzouk's strongly independent stance also ruffled the Center. Nonetheless, Gibli felt that by now the two cells had acquired enough experience to broaden the scope of their activities and were ready for the new phase of their overall mission: the sabotage of American and British installations in Egypt. The terrorist acts, Gibli explained, aimed at bringing about a rupture in relations between Cairo and the Western powers, would be made to appear the work of Communists or ultranationalists. He then instructed Ben Zur to ready the unit for action in July. When Gibli had concluded, Ben Zur understood that authorization for the operation had apparently been given by either Lavon or Dayan.[4]

In order not to endanger Bennet's primary mission of military intelligence gathering by assigning him to reconcile private feuds, Ben Zur selected Lieutenant Colonel Avri, his former superior in the Harel Brigade and now an experienced Modiin operative, to oversee the operation. The twenty-nine-year-old agent had successfully carried out several missions in Egypt as Waffen SS officer Paul Frank, a cover he had established in West Germany. While in Cairo, he had cultivated close friendships with the commander of the Navy, the military intelligence chief, Interior Minister Zakharieh Muhieddin, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the chief German military adviser.[5] Ben Zur was therefore convinced that under Avri's supervision, the risks involved in the network's new and far more dangerous undertakings would be greatly minimized.

After a series of conferences at Modiin Headquarters, Avri was ordered to fly to France, where Ben Zur would await him for a briefing. The chief of special operations arrived in Paris at the beginning of June. At a café in St. Germain des Pres, Ben Zur presented Avri with the final plan conceived by headquarters. Along with the leaders of the two rings, Avri would have

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

full responsibility for every aspect of the operation. Further instructions, Ben Zur explained, would be broadcast in code on Kol Israel's daily *How to Cook* program. At the second meeting in Paris, Ben Zur gave Avri the order to initiate the bombings.[6]

Upon his return to Egypt on June 30, Avri found the network in turmoil. Marzouk was no longer participating in its activities, and the Cairo ring was practically dissolved; Azar was incapacitated by personal problems, and Eli, traveling for his firm, could not operate the transmitter he was assigned. As Victorine was of greater aid to Bennet, Avri would not involve her in the sabotage operation. He decided to deal only with the Alexandria ring and contacted Nathanson, who had proved the network's most militant operative. Avri summoned him and Levi to a secret meeting in Cairo where he outlined their assignments. But when Avri disclosed that their men would have to carry out acts of sabotage intended to isolate Egypt from the West, they both made no effort to conceal their displeasure. At a later meeting Dassa contended that the bombings of public buildings would inevitably cause death or injury to many innocent civilians; he felt no hatred for ordinary citizens who were not responsible for government policy and saw no reason why they should suffer. Azar was no less opposed. He told Avri flatly that he could not in good conscience comply. Faced with their intransigence, Avri first attempted persuasion but failing to find convincing arguments, finally resorted to threats and warned that such insubordination might force him to "take extreme measures."

When the sabotage order was passed down to the others, it was received with equal foreboding. Eli reacted with resentment and anger for the first time since joining the Zionist underground. The Modiin command unquestionably had to consider the security of Israel before its operatives' feelings; yet to Eli, the intelligence officers in Tel Aviv seemed incapable of understanding that not every Arab was an enemy and that to risk harming civilians was anathema to Jews who had spent their lives in Egypt. He was not irrevocably committed to destroying everything Egyptian; certainly he did not consider himself a

saboteur capable of carrying out any mission regardless of the consequences. For his friends, Levi, Nathanson and Dassa, however, the order carried the full weight of authority. Having trained in Israel, they considered themselves under the same obligation as Israeli soldiers. Their eventual decision to fulfill the assignment, whatever the cost to their consciences, was sufficient reason for Azar to take part in the bombings. The damage inflicted to morale, nonetheless, would never be repaired.

At a joint conference the following morning, Avri discussed with Levi the targets where incendiary devices and time bombs were to be planted. The operation, they agreed, would be divided into two phases: the ring would first sabotage public buildings, then place diversionary bombs in U.S. and British installations. Levi, Nathanson, Dassa and Azar would plant the bombs, while Eli would maintain contact with Tel Aviv. The men would run only the minimum risk, as their actions would inevitably be blamed on extremist forces.

Later in the afternoon, Eli and his group were summoned to the apartment headquarters on Ramleh Square, where Levi showed two training films on the preparation and use of explosives which Modiin had sent from Tel Aviv and Dassa demonstrated how to conceal phosphorus incendiary devices in eyeglass cases and how to wire time bombs into boxes of Vim detergent. It took Eli and his friends only hours to refresh their memories.

Two days after his arrival, Avri was able to radio headquarters. Tel Aviv acknowledged and gave the green light. Modiin Headquarters ordered to start the bombings in exactly forty-eight hours and culminate them on the second anniversary of the coup, a likely date for anti-Nasser agitation.

On Thursday, July 1, Avri took an unprecedented step by meeting personally with all four Alexandrians, Levi, Nathanson, Dassa and Azar, and issuing final instructions. He was well aware, he told them, that they had misgivings about sabotage, but the orders received from Tel Aviv were categorical: American and British property had to be damaged in order to create

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

tension with the two countries. Such action might enable dissident Members of Parliament in Britain to prevent an agreement for the evacuation of the Suez bases and could sway American public opinion against the arming of Egypt. But above all, Avri stressed, the havoc they created would be blamed on the Communists, Green Shirts or Moslem Brethren, discrediting the military regime as unpopular, unstable and unworthy of Western aid. He then proceeded to outline the steps of the mission: The group would place the bombs in main post offices, railroad stations, movie theaters, British and American consulates and libraries of the United States Information Service.[7]

The first phase of the operation was carried out within a twelve-day period. On Friday, July 2, fire bombs dropped into three parcel post mailboxes destroyed the mailing room at the General Post Office on Place Ismail in Alexandria, injuring several clerks.[8] Tuesday morning, the fourteenth, Dassa and Azar arrived at the USIS library in Cairo's Liberation Square shortly before closing time. "Under the pretext of doing research," Azar would recall, "we placed the explosives between the shelves." Later in the evening a blast shook the library. But a number of homemade devices they placed in the baggage department of the main railway station caused only minor damage. That same evening, an explosion caused by a bomb Levi and Nathanson had planted at the USIS office on Ramleh Boulevard in Alexandria rocked its library. Hysteria mounted in both cities, as sirens wailed through the streets with increasing frequency. No public place was considered immune. The chief of the political police had no evidence that any of the extremist groups were involved, but as the press clamored for action, hundreds of known agitators from both left and the right were rounded up and imprisoned.

The Alexandria group again went into action in the third week of July. On the afternoon of the twenty-third, Cairo patrons of the Rivoli and Radio cinemas discovered two devices placed by Dassa and Azar which a bomb squad dismantled minutes before they were to explode. At the same time, a blaze set by Levi was extinguished in the Alexandria Lido theater.

By Friday evening, police reinforced by army units were deployed throughout Egypt in full force. The Alexandria Criminal Investigation Department assigned its plainclothesmen to watch every public building in the city. Captain Hassan Zaki al-Manawi from the Atarine Police Station took up his post near the Rio Cinema early that evening. He was standing in front of the box office eyeing the crowd when he suddenly heard cries for help and saw a young man, his jacket ablaze, run from the theater. The inspector wrestled him to the pavement, attempting to smother the flames. In the struggle, an eyeglass case fell from the man's pocket, scattering a black powder onto the sidewalk. After helping him to his feet, al-Manawi instinctively examined the spilled substance: he immediately recognized the basic ingredients used in homemade incendiary devices. The young man, who identified himself as Philippe Nathanson, insisted that he was not badly hurt, but al-Manawi refused to let him go. An escort of black-bereted city policemen rushed him to the nearby Government Hospital, where a Bickford fuze and incriminating papers were found in his possession. Later questioned at the Manshieh Police Station, Nathanson denied any connection with the bombings. A quick search of his apartment, however, led to the discovery of compromising letters "about a man called 'Paul,' who seemed to be an important person," plus photos of Dassa and Levi. A more thorough search uncovered a darkroom with negatives of bridges and military installations and a secret cache with two boxes of explosives, a number of homemade bombs and seven microfilms containing chemical formulae for the preparation of *plastique*.

Samir Darwish, head of the Alexandria CID, who had taken over the preliminary investigation, at once realized that he possessed the first clue in the "July mystery bombings" and confronted the prisoner with the evidence. Nathanson radically changed his story, now stubbornly insisting he was a Communist under instructions to carry out random acts of terror against the regime. He withstood the torture, but in the morning, when Darwish told him that his mother was being held on suspicion of collaboration, Nathanson broke down and made a

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

complete confession, naming his accomplices by their code names and identifying "Pierre" (Levi), who had participated with him in the bombings.[9]

Levi had been just as unsuccessful in his last mission as had "Henri" (Nathanson). He had attempted to bomb the Metro Cinema in Alexandria but, unable to obtain a ticket because of a "Woman-Only" matinee, had decided to postpone the operation. Later that evening, when he heard rumors of Nathanson's arrest, he quickly disposed of the bomb in a nearby canal and decided to wait until morning before seeking instructions from Avri. Levi unsuccessfully attempted to reach Azar by phone and went to a debriefing appointment he had with Avri instead. After reassuring the confused and frightened young man, the Israeli operative suggested they meet again the following day in Alexandria. He hoped by then to be able to assess the situation and plan the next move. Levi was on his way home when the police detained him. He would soon succumb to his interrogators and reveal the identity of "Roger," his co-conspirator Dassa.

Dassa, who had planted a bomb in the Cairo Cinema the night of Nathanson's arrest, had stayed overnight in the capital and had taken an early morning train home unaware of the arrests. A team of detectives picked up the stunned Dassa at the Alexandria railway terminal and whisked him to the Mashieh Station, where he was subjected to intensive grilling by Darwish. Dassa denied all knowledge of the bombings but, when confronted with Nathanson and Levi, who had already acknowledged involvement, confirmed his and "Jacques'" (Azar's) participation.[10]

Meanwhile, Azar had called Dassa's home to get a report on his actions in the capital and learned of the arrests from his parents. When he read in the morning papers about the Rio Cinema incident, he rushed to see Avri at a prearranged meeting place. Azar arrived on Rue des Banques badly shaken. Disregarding security procedures, he made no effort to avoid an open conversation. He told Avri of the arrests and insisted that it was imperative something be done before the police swooped down on those who were still free. Avri refused to choose an immediate course of action and coldly ordered him to return home and find out more details. Azar reluctantly obeyed.

At a second meeting the following day, Azar was in a state of panic. He told Avri what he knew and was ordered to aid in an attempt to destroy any evidence left at the apartment-headquarters. They both rushed to Ramleh Square, entered the apartment through a window, and hurriedly removed documents, transmitters and explosives. Avri gave Azar the bulky material and told him to destroy it; he only took with him a tiny, expensive radio. Their timing could not have been more propitious. As they were leaving, the police arrived in force.

At the third meeting a week after the arrests, Avri attempted to convince Azar to leave the country with him. Azar refused, arguing that he could not abandon his mother. Avri decided to give him one more chance to change his mind and set up a fourth and last meeting. Forty-eight hours later, taking the necessary precautions, he arrived at the prearranged place ahead of time and was getting ready to approach the street corner when he saw a police detail arrive. Moments afterward, Azar was led from a prison van and stationed at the meeting place to await his contact. Avri calmly left the premises.[11]

In the meantime, while Azar was being led to the station, Eli stopped at a café on his way home from the office. He sat sipping coffee when a police detective he knew well came by the table to tell him about the arrest of "a local Zionist who had been involved in the recent bombings." Eli managed to feign shock that a Jew had been implicated and after a short exchange left the café hurriedly. He went straight to the apartment he had rented for the group in the hope of destroying anything which might be used as evidence but found the building already surrounded by police.[12] Strangely enough, no one of the arrested would ever mention the ring's wireless operator, "Alex" (Eli's code name).

CID interrogators, reinforced by General Security agents, questioned Azar day and night. As they had found in his possession the material Avri had ordered him to destroy, he had finally acknowledged his part in the bombings and mentioned

M. Emes, Jr. Research Papers
James M.

having recently met "Robert" (Avri), whom he knew under the alias Paul Frank, and confessed that he was to contact him again within a few days. It was from Azar that the police also wrenched the names of Zaafran and Meyuhas. Their arrest would lead to the capture of the last members of the no longer operational Cairo ring—Naim, Cohen, and Marzouk. When Zaafran was asked whether he knew the "Paul" mentioned in the letters found in Nathanson's apartment, he simply said: "Sure, that is the cover name used by Dr. Marzouk."

Though well aware of the roundups in Cairo and Alexandria, Marzouk had gone to work at the hospital where he was seized by a force of CID detectives and counterespionage agents of the Mukhabarat (General Security Service). During his initial interrogation, Marzouk revealed some details of the Zionist apparatus. The apartment-headquarters in Alexandria, he admitted, "was not meant to be used only for radio transmissions but also as a meeting place for Israeli intelligence officers who periodically came to Egypt for inspection . . . " One of them, Marzouk claimed, was in Cairo at that moment, but he could not lead the police to him since he had always made contact through "Claude" (Ninio), the liaison between the network's two rings and the center in Israel.[13] The name of Victorine-Marcelle had been previously mentioned by the other suspects, and a warrant for her arrest was immediately issued.

The usually well-informed Victorine-Marcelle learned of the arrests only by chance. She tried to contact Bennet by means of a message she left at the prearranged "drop," but when he did not appear at the meeting by late Monday afternoon, she considered it too dangerous to remain in the city any longer. Taking a leave of absence from work under the pretext of attending her sick mother, she quietly left Alexandria. But her anxiety did not go unnoticed. Shortly after she had left the office, the Cairo police received an anonymous phone call from one of her colleagues who had grown resentful of Victorine's fame and social contacts and had become suspicious of her behavior. By the time detectives burst into her apartment she was already gone. The police, nonetheless, found much more

than they had expected: The body of a young man later identified as a fellow operative was hanging from a beam of the bathroom ceiling.[14]

Detectives subsequently traced Victorine to a resort near Alexandria and broke into her room just as she tried to leap from a window. Confronted with the disclosures of her fellow conspirators, she finally admitted her role in the network but denied knowing the exact whereabouts of Max Bennet; she actually knew only the license number of his car. But, Victorine had once carelessly approached Bennet while he was in the company of intelligence officials, one of whom recalled the encounter. The information from these two sources, though minimal, was sufficient to trace Bennet. The police checked with all the doormen in the Zamalek district until they found Bennet's blue Chevrolet. After a search revealed a radio transmitter in the oil tank, they set up an ambush in Bennet's garage and caught him red-handed while he attempted to contact Tel Aviv.[15]

As the police inexorably closed in, Avri, having lost radio contact with the center, sent an open telegram to a contact in Germany—"Pierre [Levi's code name] gone bankrupt. Staying on to save investment"—and signed his son's name. The cable was forwarded to Tel Aviv by regular mail. Forty-eight hours later, Modiin Headquarters ordered Bennet to leave Cairo. He nevertheless only felt secure enough to send out his family, while he stayed on.

Unaware of the network's confessions, Avri attempted to confuse the police by continuing the bombings himself. He blew up a refinery near Cairo and threw hand grenades from a passing car into the entrance of a military base in the canal zone. But after Azar's arrest, he concluded that it was too late to arrange for the escape of men who were still free, particularly since Modiin had failed to supply the forged documents promised for such an emergency. He calculated that his own arrest would cause far more damage to Israeli intelligence than his abandonment of the network. It was vital, therefore, that he leave Egypt. Fearing that the police would seal off the borders, he

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

decided against using a planned escape route through Libya. He sold his car and took a Lufthansa flight to Munich.[16]

Aside from Avri, Saadi, along with a number of unidentified members of the network, managed to elude the police. Two weeks after Nathanson's arrest, eleven of the operatives were in custody.

Eli had been implicated in the case by the documents found in Azar's apartment and was seized shortly after the first arrests along with 150 Cairenes and Alexandrian Jews, all of whom had Zionist records and were known to be on friendly terms with members of the network. Brought before a team of interrogators headed by the military attorney, Amin Abdul Ala, Eli was subjected to an interminable staccato of questions. As doggedly as his inquisitors tried to pry a confession, Eli disclaimed having any knowledge of the ring and its operations. Ala was still unwilling to chance his release and had him transferred to the Siwa desert prison near the Libyan border where enemies of the regime of all persuasions were herded together in abject misery and denied contact with the outside world. After four months of periodic questioning, the military attorney failed to find even the slightest link between Eli and the accused and grudgingly ordered his release along with twenty other suspects. [17]

After the preliminary investigation had been closed by the Cairo and Alexandria CID and the General Security Services, the eleven saboteurs were transferred to the Army Detention Center in Cairo and handed over to the Military Investigation Branch. Isolated and denied access to counsel, they were questioned for forty-three days and nights. They all acknowledged Zionist affiliation but were still unwilling to cooperate in spite of the incriminating evidence the police had found in their possession. (CID counterespionage agents, who had searched the network's seven apartments in Cairo and Alexandria had discovered a wealth of "professional paraphernalia"—documents, maps, photographs, microfilms, copies of correspondence with Modiin fronts in Europe, miniature tape recorders, explosives and even an automatic leaflet distributor. Particularly puzzling was the number of radio transmitters. Although only three had been operated by Bennet, the Cairo and the Alexandria rings, the security services claimed to have found six more concealed in jam jars, auto oil tanks and even a Bible.) The prisoners' contempt for collaboration was further demonstrated when Victorine made a second attempt at suicide. On August 12, while waiting for the interrogator to arrive, she heard a knock on the door. As the guard got up to answer, she leaped, and, in a swift move, jumped through the window. Her act proved futile; she had fallen only one floor and suffered a broken leg and minor injuries. "The Zionist agents would rather have died than harm Israeli intelligence by divulging its secrets," later remarked one of the military attorneys while testifying about the prisoners' spirit.

To achieve a breakthrough, the Military Investigation Branch decided that more extreme measures were in order. Torture and intimidation were ultimately used on Bennet, Ninio, Marzouk [18] and Azar to pressure them into signing a prepared confession. This excruciating method proved successful. All eleven succumbed to their inquisitors.

Radio Damascus was the first to announce the arrests of the "Zionist gang which threatened the internal security of Egypt and was undermining Anglo-Egyptian talks." But the official statement about the case was made only on October 6, over Radio Cairo by Interior Minister Zakharieh Muhieddin. The police investigation, he announced, had been completed with the confessions of the accused, and he was now able to reveal "Israel's plot to spread sedition and unrest in Egypt." The objective of the bombings, Muhieddin disclosed, had been "to worsen relations between Egypt on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other." It had also been convincingly established, he added, that Jews living in Egypt had been forced to work for the ring in spite of their desire to remain loyal to the government. The press hastened to publicize the minister's assertion. "All the Jews of Egypt should follow closely the upcoming spy trial and repeat the story to their children

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

a hundred times," urged the daily *al-Mussawar*. "They would thus see that Israel only wants to make them betray the country that had treated them so generously." [19]

As the opening of the trial approached, there were other portents besides Muhieddin's clear assumption of guilt which clouded the fate of the defendants. Israeli-Egyptian relations had been further strained over an incident sparked by the Anglo-Egyptian Canal Zone agreement signed by a jubilant Nasser in Cairo on July 27, 1954. Sharet, who feared Egypt would close the door to any future diplomatic efforts to keep the Suez open for Israeli shipping, decided to test Nasser's intentions. On September 28 the 500-ton *Bat Galim* flying the white and blue Star of David steamed into the canal with a crew of ten and a cargo of meat and plywood from Massawa. The Port Said authorities arrested the sailors and sequestered the ship and its cargo.

In addition to its problems with Israel, the junta was beset by domestic strife. Nasser had reacted to attacks on the regime by lashing back at his enemies with arbitrary arrests and purge trials of dissidents conveniently labeled "Communists led and run by Zionists." Yet the more Nasser sought to stifle the opposition, the more vocal it became. The Moslem Brotherhood, combining skillful propaganda with carefully staged riots, launched an all-out war against the premier. The new supreme guide, Hassan al-Hodeibi, plotted a coup, signaled by Nasser's assassination, in which every Cabinet minister and 160 revolutionary officers were marked for death. By the final week of October the violence had reached a climax. As Nasser mounted the podium in Alexandria's Muhammad Ali Square to address a wildly enthusiastic crowd of more than 200,000, a young member of the Brotherhood's ultramilitant Secret Wing raced forward, firing eight shots at close range. Inexplicably, the bullets missed their target. The organization was again dissolved, and arrests reached the 1,000 mark. "We must finish once and for all with those who use arms and violence," declared Nasser's minister of state. "We have decided not to allow these reptiles to crawl among us again." Significantly, the same apocalyptic

rhetoric was used by the Cairo press in referring to the accused Zionists. The trial, proclaimed *al-Gumhuriya*, would show the world that "Egypt wants only to cleanse her territory of spies and traitors in the same way she wanted to cleanse it of reactionaries, agents of imperialism and corruptors."

The court-martial opened in Cairo on Saturday, December 11, 1954, against an unprecedented backdrop of violence and repression. Eli arrived at the Court of Appeals, a massive three-story structure of ocher stone located in the heart of the Old City, shortly before the gavel was pounded at 9:30 A.M. He was well aware that his presence might arouse the suspicions of the authorities and the curiosity of his friends on trial, who no doubt felt uncertain and abandoned. Yet he believed it was vital to prove to those with whom he had shared so much in the last two years that they had not been deserted.

Towered over by two dozen red-fezzed blue-uniformed policemen, the eleven defendants were led into a dingy, deteriorating chamber, where a high dock covered with steel mesh and encircled by a spiked balustrade had been erected. Each took his place in the dock between two guards. Victorine alone was assigned a space in the second row behind the bench of the defense. The five members of the Supreme Military Tribunal, presided over by Brigadier Muhammad Fuad al-Digwi, sat behind a long table under a huge inscription: "He Who Has to Judge Shall Judge Rightly." In a box to their right, four military prosecutors shuffled briefs, while behind the partition in the front row a battery of eight Egyptian defense attorneys and their French, British and German colleagues, who had been denied the right to plead, conferred in tense whispers. The Quai d'Orsay had assigned two *maîtres* to represent Marzouk, who held Tunisian citizenship; Bonn had sent a lawyer to defend Bennet, a West German subject; and his wife had retained the services of a British barrister. The press box was filled to capacity. Among the seventy spectators crowding the courtroom were three diplomatic observers and a representative of the World Jewish Congress; at least 10 percent of those present,

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

a witness later recalled, were political police officers. Only close relatives of the accused had been allowed to attend, after having been warned not to talk to the defendants or even to look at them.

The proceedings, held in accordance with Ottoman military law, were opened by a court officer who read the names of the thirteen accused—Dar and Avri were being tried in absentia—and paused only briefly before listing in a disembodied voice the members of the Supreme Military Tribunal, only one of which had passed his bar examinations. As soon as he had finished, Marzouk's attorney, Maître Ahmad Rushdi, a former minister of justice and chairman of the Egyptian Bar Association who had been retained by the French government, defiantly requested an adjournment. The police, he explained, had refused him permission to consult his client before the trial, and the prosecution had failed to present him with Marzouk's dossier. He was still unaware of the charges brought against his client. The senior prosecutor blandly told the court that the indictment had not been distributed to any of the defense counsels simply because there were not enough copies available. General Digwi was apparently not concerned by the staggering handicaps under which the counsel for the defense labored. He did not find the omission at all worrisome and told the *maître* that he would have to obtain his knowledge of the case in court.

During the exchange, the eleven defendants sat impassively in the dock. Nor did any of them show any sign of emotion when the general prosecutor began reading the indictment. "The accused," he stated with pathos, "were engaged in collecting and disseminating information calculated to assist an enemy country and create a state of disturbance and public unrest, endangering the safety of Egypt." They were charged either collectively or separately on counts of criminal conspiracy, espionage for Israel, the manufacture and possession of explosives and incendiary devices and the carrying out of acts of sabotage. After a short recess, the prosecutor demanded the death penalty for all thirteen. When he had ended, each of the defendants softly pleaded "not guilty."

Before the first session was closed, Eli listened with growing

depression as Nathanson, the government's star witness, attempted to absolve himself of all responsibility for the bombings. Nathanson boasted to have foiled the "Zionist plot to destroy cinemas and public buildings" by setting himself ablaze in front of the Rio Cinema. His participation in the earlier bombings, he insisted, had come only after Avri threatened to inform the authorities of his voyage to Israel.

For most of the next two weeks, Eli commuted to Cairo almost daily. He sat in the courtroom as the prosecution produced seventeen witnesses, the majority of them police officers, in its effort to prove the guilt of those involved in "monstrous crimes against Egypt." After only forty-eight hours of such statements, Dassa, Levi, Azar and Nathanson changed their strategy and confessed the accusation, claiming that they had been misled. They ignored the real aims of those who directed them and had never wanted to act against Egypt.

When the court resumed its deliberations in the second week of the court-martial, the assistant prosecutor requested permission to make an announcement. A hush fell over the room as he informed the court that Max Bennet, scheduled to testify that Tuesday morning, had committed suicide in his cell the previous night. Bennet, an inquiry instituted by the court later revealed, had been under close surveillance before his death for having attempted to bribe a guard to smuggle potassium cyanide into his cell. He had nevertheless managed to convince another to exchange a razor blade for a half chicken he had received in a package from the British consulate. By the time he was found lying on the floor Bennet had already lost too much blood. He weakly asked for water and died. He left a note asking that a tree be planted in his memory and urging his wife to marry again.[20] "Bennet died by his own hand," editorialized a Cairo daily, "when he learned that Egypt is the grave of Zionists and Zionism."

Bennet's death deepened Eli's gloom. The captain's refusal to place himself at the mercy of the tribunal seemed to underscore the apparent willingness of the others to collaborate in the hope of obtaining lenient sentences.

After another recess, the tribunal moved to Alexandria for an

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

on-the-spot examination of the "bomb factory" and sabotage sites. It also witnessed Nathanson and Levi demonstrate how they had slipped explosives into an airmail letter box. The cooperativeness of the accused was in keeping with the strategy of the defense attorneys who planned to show that their clients were only pawns in a plot over which they had no control. "They were children who did not know what they were doing," the counsel for several of the defendants asserted. "They played with fire and it burned them. . . . These boys should be lashed and sent home. They fell easy prey to adventures and even blackmail." Some of the accused attempted to reinforce his explanation, claiming that they had ignored the real aims of those who directed them. "I am no Zionist," bluntly stated Nathanson. "Israel doesn't interest me." Azar admitted that the bombings were intended "to harm relations between Egypt and the United States, particularly at the time of negotiations for economic aid to Egypt." He told the court: "I tried to break away, but I couldn't." When General Digwi asked if he believed that Egyptian Jews were proud of his actions, Azar replied sadly, "I think they must all be very sorry . . . I never meant to betray Egypt. I threw an incendiary device into the sea rather than harm innocent people in my country."

Eli was at first disappointed by Marzouk's testimony, which he regarded, no doubt somewhat self-righteously, as an abject attempt to avoid any responsibility for his actions. The doctor had been quick to assert that "John Darling deceived us. I refused to cooperate as soon as I found out he had other motives in mind." But Marzouk's contention clearly indicated the cynical attitude he had decided to adopt. The network, he insisted, had been formed to help end the tension between Egypt and the Jews; indeed, he never realized that he was spying for Israel "until the words were used by the prosecutor." He similarly disclaimed having acted as the head of the Cairo ring and, revising a previous confession, denied all charges of military espionage. The other defendants also struck an ingenuous pose. "I have confessed to everything I have done," Levi said on the stand. "But I want the court to know that I took the whole affair as fun. I am an Egyptian before I am a Jew, and at no time did I think I was causing harm to Egypt, my country. I will never live or die as an enemy of Egypt." Dassa simply stated: "I never knew the real purpose of the group. I was only seventeen."

It remained for Victorine to display what Eli considered an honorable defiance before the tribunal. Her attorney, Maître Barsum Salama, accused the police of having "tortured, beaten and forced her to talk under pressure"—a charge never investigated or denied by the court—and asserted that she "had merely accepted financial help from John Darling to help her mother who was dying of cancer." Yet Victorine made no effort to gain the court's sympathy. Asked a number of times about her relationship with Darling, she repeatedly replied: "I have nothing to say." President Digwi interjected: "What do you mean you have nothing to say?"

Victorine: It means I don't want to reply to this question.
Digwi: Meaning, you know the answer but you don't want to reply?
Victorine: Yes.
Digwi: Why don't you want to reply to this question?
Victorine: I just don't want to.[21]

On January 6, 1955, after the final summations by the prosecution and the defense, the tribunal recessed to consider the verdicts. Three weeks later, on the morning of the twenty-seventh, the court reconvened for five minutes to pass sentence. The courtroom was packed full, with police, foreign correspondents, diplomats and TV crews. The relatives of the accused were absent; only the father of Dassa sat alone on a bench in the center. A mood of optimism could almost be felt among the press gathered expectantly in a corner. The period between the trial and the announcement of the verdict had been regarded as unprecedented and seemed to offer some hope for the defendants. It was exactly noon when the judge advocate, Colonel Ibrahim Sami, took the president's chair and, turning to face the accused, studied them for a moment before speaking. He

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

refrained from reading the sixty-page verdict and merely called out the sentences. Marzouk was the first to be named. He rose, then stiffened and leaned heavily against the dock upon hearing that he had been condemned to death by hanging. Sami Azar, his eyes glazing, listened stonily to the same sentence before collapsing. The colonel slowly read the other sentences: Victor Moïse Levi and Philippe Herman Nathanson, life imprisonment; Victorine Ninio and Robert Nissim Dassa fifteen years; and Meir Josef Zaafran and Meir Samuel Meyuhas, seven years—all at hard labor. Eli Jacob Naim and Caesar Josef Cohen were acquitted. Marzouk coolly congratulated the two. "After sentence was passed," remembered one of the accused, "he approached me, gripped my hand and uttered *'mabruk'* [good luck]." None of the other prisoners reacted when the colonel announced that the sentences had already been approved by President Nasser as military governor of Cairo, although this sudden change in procedure curtailed the defense's efforts, virtually eliminating any chance of appeal.[22] Five months of numbing solitary confinement had resigned them to their fate.

The death sentences were received with cries of outrage. Foreign observers who had attended the trial characterized the court's decision as a "vindictive judgment" and charged that the verdict had been motivated by "external and internal political reasons." They had mainly been given to show the Arab League, then meeting in Cairo, that the regime could be tough not only with Moslem Brotherhood leaders, who had been executed earlier, but also with the Jews.

Last-minute appeals by Britain, France and the Vatican went unheeded. The United States, which considered the verdicts "an internal Egyptian matter," remained officially indifferent to the situation. Pleas for clemency by the families of the condemned were also ineffective. Marzouk's mother and one of Azar's sisters kept a vigil each day in front of Nasser's home in the hope of seeing the rais (chief) and asking for mercy. But even the chief rabbi of Egypt, who had always had access to Nasser, twice requested an audience and found that his influence was unavailing.

The government carried out its retribution on Monday, January 31, against the two men who had, ironically, sought at first to prevent the bombings but had been caught in a web of conflicting loyalties and emotions. News that they would die in the morning was spread through the *harets*, and at dawn, Eli joined a crowd of 200 gathered in front of the Bab-al-Halek Prison. At 8 A.M. Marzouk, handcuffed and manacled, was led to the gallows, between two warders. He wore a black shirt, bright-red trousers and a purple cap—the garish uniform of the condemned. Upon reaching the scaffold, the indictment and verdict were read to him by a high-ranking Egyptian officer. "His face was frozen," the Karaite Rabbi Baruch Salah later said, "as if the words were not directed to him." After the *hacham* had prayed in Hebrew, Marzouk asked as a last wish to be buried near his father. The hangman moved forward with hood and rope. Ten minutes later Marzouk was officially pronounced dead. A half hour passed before another detail of guards brought Azar from his cell. He prayed and received comfort from Rabbi Haim Matri. "Azar refused a last request," Rabbi Matri remembered, "but he was much more emotional than Marzouk, and tears came to his eyes when he said the *Vidui*." He repeatedly uttered, "God, forgive me," before the trap was sprung.[23] Outside the prison gates, Eli saw the black flag hoisted.

The execution and imprisonment of the eleven Zionist operatives only spurred the efforts of the Political Police to snuff out any remnants of what they called a Jewish fifth column, and the country's remaining 45,000 Jews were particularly vulnerable to charges of subversion. Throughout 1955, all Jews lived under the constant threat of standing trial for espionage and Communist-Zionist activities. But while Zionists were still the prime target of the Political Police, it soon became apparent that every Jew would be made to feel Nasser's wrath. The government was no longer bothering to make much of a distinction between loyal citizens and those actively supporting Israel.

Whenever Eli opened the semi-official *al-Ahram* he came across editorials illustrated with vilifying cartoons which only the publications of the Third Reich could match in venom and

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

irresponsibility. Accounts of "outrage against Arabs in Occupied Palestine" appeared next to articles accusing Jewish businessmen, physicians and community officials of espionage, sabotage and speculation. In trams and buses, at street corners and railway stations, Eli was accosted by youths who distributed anti-Jewish tracts of the Islamic Congress. Even the evening radio programs were dominated by commentators who gave vent to anti-Jewish sentiments and guest lecturers who cited the peril Judaism posed to Islam. Sooner or later, however, promised the official fortnightly *al-Gumhuriya*, "world Jewry would be exterminated as the Nazis did earlier." The government's publishing houses printed similar tirades, and Alexandrian bookstores were stocked with ragged displays of anti-Jewish propaganda and cheap novels. Indoctrinating schoolchildren to hate was officially made part of the curriculum. Ministerial memorandums instructed all teachers, including Jews, to enlighten their pupils about "the bitter enemy of Islam and the Arabs—Israel." "Instill in the heart of the youths a hatred of Israel," the directive urged, "as we are doing with the armed forces."

The new policy embittered Eli. "I saw him lose his temper for the first time," Baruch Mizrachi recalled, "when he heard that his relatives' children would have to face such lies and slander."[24] The Ministry of Education also ordered Jewish schools to admit Moslems so they would be able further to "exert pressure upon the other pupils." Until then there had been no ban on Hebrew, and the community schools in Alexandria taught the 650 remaining children a full curriculum of Judaic learning. But 120 Jewish homes were suddenly searched for Hebrew literature, and a group of youths were whisked to jail for violating a pledge not to learn the language. Zionist activists ordered their followers to destroy any compromising material.

Eli himself visited the homes of relatives and friends urging them to dispose of prayer books in order to avoid arbitrary accusations of Zionism. Every jeweler in Alexandria was notified that the manufacture of Star of David charms or medallions bearing Hebrew characters was strictly prohibited. Girls were

stopped in the street and ordered to remove their necklaces; those who refused were arrested. Alarmed by the danger such practices represented to Jewish culture, the chief rabbi appealed to Nasser. To deny the use of Hebrew signs, he claimed, struck at the very roots of the religion. His pleas were to no avail.

The new persecution also affected the country's other minorities. Many of Eli's Coptic and Catholic friends had expressed uneasiness at the Muhammadanization drive. Some openly complained of discrimination, particularly from the Islamic clergy, and the systematic exclusion from public office. Conscious of the danger of violence, they prepared to emigrate. The Copts and Catholics, who knew of Eli's good connections with the police and emigration officials asked him for aid. He helped many leave, often using the facilities of the illegal Zionist apparatus. But while Armenians, French and British, Maltese Cypriots and Lebanese sailed en masse, many Jews still preferred to stay and face the uncertainties of the future.

Eli led a campaign of persuasion, arguing in favor of the necessity to flee the inevitable pogroms. As a result, the young willingly registered for aliyah (immigration), but Eli encountered stiff resistance among the older people, who were reluctant to give up their comfortable surroundings for the difficulties of readjustment abroad.[25] Yet the cruel vagaries of history would shortly end whatever freedom of choice still remained.

After the 1956 conflict, angered by its second defeat, Cairo lost no time in waging another campaign of retribution against the Jews. This time, however, a new and particularly sinister element was introduced; the program of repression would be supervised by former Nazi officials. During the Sinai campaign a number of Egyptian vehicles had been spotted bearing swastikas, and Arabic translations of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* were found in the knapsacks of dead and captured soldiers. With the fall of the Reich, former Nazis who had first fled to Spain and South America in fear of war crimes trials discovered that the Middle East offered greater advantages. By 1948 large numbers had

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

24. Z.A. interview, Los Angeles, February 25, 1971; Steve Eytan, pp. 92-95. Azar testimony at trial in *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review.*

CHAPTER IV

1. Hazin and Horowitz, p. 55.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-32; Avneri; pp. 101-22; Steve Eytan; pp. 98-99. See also Bayne, *Israel's Affair* and Ben-Gurion, *Thin as They Are.*

3. Steve Eytan, p. 91.

4. Gibli's refusal to assume responsibility for the operations in Egypt and his efforts to blame the minister of defense for giving the orders to initiate them triggered the Lavon Affair, Israel's *cause célèbre.* When, six years later, Lavon demanded to be cleared of any responsibility for the "security mishap," the investigation led to a feud between him and Ben-Gurion which would rock the country until late in 1964. Lavon eventually retired from public life; Gibli was exiled to the post of military attaché in London and finally left the army in January, 1961.

5. "The Third Man," by A. [illegible] (memorandum prepared at the authors' request), pp. 1-4. See also Steve Eytan, pp. 93-94. Bayne, p. 11; Hazin and Horowitz, pp. 5-86, 239; Zionist Espionage, p. 11, *Al Therir*, December 21, 1954, and *Haolam Haze.*

6. Hazin and Horowitz, pp. 55. Steve Eytan, p. 94.

7. Interview, Los Angeles, February 25, 1971; *Al Tahrir*, December 21, 1954.

8. *Al-Ahram* and *al-Gumhuriya*, July 5 to 25, 1954. *Al-Tahrir*, December 21, 1954. Zionist Espionage, pp. 9-11, and *The Cairo Trial*, p. 9. See also "The Alexis Affair," *Haolam Haze*, Nos. 1385 and 1386, March 23 and April 1, 1964, and No. 1608, June 26, 1968—a disguised but accurate account of the case.

9. Interview, Los Angeles, February 25, 1971, and Zionist Espionage, p. 11.

10. *Ibid.* Also "The Cairo Trial" by Felix Harari, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, December 13, 1964.

11. Bar Zohar, "Damascus Calling Tel Aviv," *Haaretz* (weekly supplement), September 8, 1967, p. 7; and *Maariv-Yahim Veleilot*, May 28, 1965, p. 5. Eli's testimony in the first televised session of the court martial (hereafter cited as Transcript No. 1, February 28, 1965, p. 9; also *Al-Hayat*, March 2, 1965.

12. Zionist Espionage, p. 13.

13. *Ibid.* Also *Jewish Observer.*

14. *Ibid.* On Ninio's suicide attempt see, "A Hanging Instead of a Meeting," *Haolam Haze*, No. 1425, December 30, 1964. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, December 13, 1964, and *Jewish Observer*, December 17, 1954. Victorine later claimed that Eliahu Armand Carmona, a clerk at the commercial firm in Heliopolis, had committed suicide because his daughter lived in Israel and he feared the authorities would suspect him of collaboration with the Zionists.

15. Interview, Los Angeles, February 25, 1971. Zionist Record, p. 37; and *Jewish Observer*, December 24, 1954.

16. "The Third Man," by A. B. (memorandum), pp. 4-11. Avri was tried in 1959 *in camera* by a military court in Jerusalem and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment on a security breach involving another mission in Germany. Azar was later commissioned a lieutenant in Zahal, Marzouk received the rank of second lieutenant, and Levi, Nathenson and Dassa became sergeants. They all were finally released in 1968 as part of an exchange of prisoners.

17. *Bamahane*, July 18, 1965; *Haaretz*, September 8, 1967. *Maariv-Yamin Veleilot*, May 28, 1965. Also *France Observateur*, Paris, June 16, 1955; and *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, October 15 and December 10, 1954.

18. Preliminary investigations in *Al-Ahram*, October 7 through 12, 1955, and Zionist Espionage, p. 23. Ninio's second suicide attempt in *Haolam Haze*, December 30, 1964, and "Record of Sessions, Special Military Tribunal, Case Against Thirteen Zionist Spies," Cairo Parquet (hereafter cited as Stenographic Record), p. 379.

19. *Al-Ahram*, October and December 12, 1954; Radio Cairo, December 13, 1954. Zionist Record, pp. 25-26 and NBC interview with Interior Minister Zakharieh Muhieddin (transcript), New York, December 13, 1954. Also "Observations of the Public Prosecutor" (indictment), Cairo Parquet, November, 1954; excerpts in *Jewish Observer*, November 12 and December 3 and 31, 1954.

20. *Jewish Observer*, No. 52, December 24, 1954, p. 3-4; New York *Times*, December 22, 1954; and Zionist Espionage, p. 18 & 37; Cohen-Sidon, p. 67; and *Jewish Observer*, February 4, 1955.

21. Stenographic Record; "The Roger Baldwin Reports" (confidential), January 8, 10 and 12, 1955; "The Cairo Espionage Trial-Confidential Report," by MP Maurice Orbach, December 19, 1954; Correspondence of Maurice Orbach about the Cairo trial (letters), December 21, 1954, through February 10, 1955; Orbach eyewitness account, *Jewish Chronicle*, February 4, 1955, "Le Compte Rendu du Proces," *La Terre Retrouvé*, Vol. 24, No. 7, January 1, 1955; interview of Jacques Calmy with Maitre Dreyfus-Schmitt, *La Terre Retrouvé*, February 15, 1954. See also New York *Times*, December 12 through 20, 1954; *Manchester Guardian*, December 23, 1954; and *Jewish Observer*, November 19, 1954, through January 14, 1955.

22. While Cairo was prepering the trial, Israeli authorities brought to court 14 teenagers from the Gaza secondary school, captured in February near Ashkelon; they all were sentenced to five years imprisonment for espionage in behalf of Egypt.

23. Cohen-Sidon, pp. 63-67; New York *Times*, February 1, 1955; *Al-Ahram*, February 6, 1955; *Manchester Guardian*, February 8, 1955; *Time*, New York, February 14, 1955, *Jewish Observer*, February 4, 1955, and *Maariv*, November 30, 1955.

24. Z.A. interview with Baruch Marrachi, Paris, March 1, 1970.

25. *Ibid.* See also Kartikow, pp. 6-9, Edward Wakin, *A Lonely Minority*, "The Copts of Egypt," *MEA*, Washington, Vol. 12, No. 7, August-September, 1965, pp. 198-208.

26. Eli's testimony in Transcript No. 1, February 28, 1965, p. 23; also *Al-Hayat*, March 2, 1965, and *Bamahane*, July 1965.

27. Letter of Eli to Alexander Cohen, Tel Aviv, May 28, 1959.

CHAPTER V

1. Eli's testimony in Transcript No. 1, February 28, 1965, pp. 24-25.

2. *Laisha*, April 28, 1970. Also *Maariv*, May 19, 1965.

3. *Ibid.* and *Haaretz*, May 19, 1965.

4. *Bamahane*, June 18, 1965.

5. In "Eli Cohen, The Life and Death of a Hero," by Arieh Avnery and Yichezkel Adiram, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, May 19, 1965.

6. Eli's testimony in Transcript No. 1, February 28, 1965, p. 25.

7. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, May 19, 1965.

8. *Ibid.*, and Z.A. interview with S.T., Tel Aviv, February 11, 1970; and Y.R., Ramat Gan, February 13, 1970.

9. *Laisha*, April 28, 1970.

10. On Nadia Cohen see Adam Sidon's interview in *Laisha*, May 25, 1965.

11. Z.A. interview with Nadia Cohen, Tel Aviv, February 26, 1970. Also *Haolam Haze*, No. 1446, May 26, 1965.

12. Eli's testimony in Transcript No. 1, February 28, 1965, pp. 28-29.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

15. Interview of François Vohin with Nadia Cohen. *France Soir*, March 12, 1965.

CHAPTER VI

1. Z.A. interview. Tel Aviv, February 8, 1970.

James M. Eanes, Jr. Research Papers



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1971

Mrs. Gandhi Urges Calm in Hawkish Parliament

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

...improved [illegible] policy ... the choices that any ... world ... normalization between the ... Government and the ... rebels, whom the Pak... army has been ... Of the Western ... United States is ... Pakistan ... Only a few hours after ... made her appeal, top ... Government officials ... briefing on the border ... reported what, only ... been the most serious ... of the current confronta... ... clash on the western ... border of East Pakistan last ... artillery in which, according to the Indians, four battalions of Pakistani troops crossed into India and were driven back after a day-long battle.

The Indian spokesman said that 135 Pakistanis had been killed and that the Indians had suffered "few casualties."

[redacted]

He said that [illegible] Pakistani battalions, about 2,000 men, attacked an Indian border post at Shikarpur, about 100 miles north of Calcutta, where the Bengali rebels have a large base camp.

Though she expressed hope that the Western powers would "prevail" on Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi was not especially optimistic about the results. "I must make it clear" she said, "that we cannot depend on the international community ... or on the countries which ... pressed, to solve our problems for us. We appreciate their sympathy and moral and political support, but the brunt of the problem has to be borne by and met by the people of India. India who have our fullest sympathy and support." Bangla Desh, which means Bengal for ..., is the name the independence movement has given [illegible]

... Parliament speech ... Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram accused Pakistan of "provocative acts" and said the situation was "very serious indeed." He added: "We do not propose to relax our vigilance ... withdraw our troops from ... borders until a satisfactory ... is found to the situation in Bangla Desh which shall enable and enable the refugees to return to their homeland."

ISRAEL ENDS A CURB IN LAVON SPY AFFAIR

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Nov. 15—The Israeli press has finally won a lifting of the ban on the personal stories of intelligence agents who participated in a mysterious sabotage mission inside Egypt in 1954.

What has been called only "the security mishap" led to Israel's first major political crisis, revolving around the controversial former Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, now living in obscurity in Tel Aviv.

Full details of the Lavon affair and the intelligence blunder that brought it about remain a secret. But late last week Premier Golda Meir confided at a Labor party meeting that she planned to attend a "very special wedding" next week, the happy ending to the story of a girl who at the age of 16 was convicted of espionage for Israel and spent 10 years in an Egyptian jail.

The girl, Victorine Marcelle Nino, was completely unknown to the Israeli public, but once Mrs. Meir signaled her willingness to give the bride away—a belated gratitude of the state for services she had performed—censorship authorities decided to lift some of the wraps on the old spy network.

Miss Nino was one of a dozen persons convicted in Cairo in 1954 of having staged terrorist raids against British and American installations in Egypt, apparently intended to stir up bad feelings between the West and Egypt. The mission quickly was shown to be a far-fetched idea, and Israeli intelligence services suffered as a result.

Oslo Plans Ties With Hanoi

OSLO, Norway, Nov. 15 (UPI)—The Norwegian Storting (Parliament) approved a Government proposal today to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said Norway would contact the North Vietnamese authorities for formal recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations.

Our
... collar
moonbeam

THE NEW YORK TIMES 10 February 1965 (page two, column three)

ISRAEL SEEKS TO BAR BOOK ABOUT LAVON

JERUSALEM, Israeli Sector, Feb. 9--The Government is seeking to block the publication of a book on the Lavon affair written by an Israeli journalist at the request of former Premier David Ben-Gurion.

The journalist, Hagai Eshed, had earlier prepared a report on the affair for Mr. Ben-Gurion. The book is said to be substantially the same as the report.

The report was submitted last October to the Ministry of Justice by Mr. Ben-Gurion to support his contention that the affair should be reopened.

Pinhas Lavon was Minister of Defense in 1954 when a security mission outside Israel ended in disaster. In 1960, a special ministerial committee cleared him of responsibility.

The political struggle over the affair led to a Government crisis last December in which Levi Eshkol resigned as Premier. He subsequently was returned to office.

The incident that led to the Lavon affair involved espionage and sabotage in Cairo. The failure of the mission, which was aimed at arousing anti-Egyptian sentiment in Britain and the United States, reportedly resulted in the execution of two participants by the Egyptians.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NEW YORK TIMES 23 February 1964 (page 16, column 1)

THE LAVON AFFAIR REVIVED IN ISRAEL

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, Feb. 22--The 10-year-old Lavon Affair, which has ended the careers of several high political and military figures, and once brought down a Cabinet headed by David Ben-Gurion, has returned to annoy the Government of Premiuer Levi Eshkol.

Three opposition parties have offered motions of no confidence in the Government since new light on the affair was offered in the Knesset (Parliament) last Tuesday by Gen. Moshe Dayan, Minister of Agriculture. Exactly what General Dayan said has been concealed by censorship.

All that Israelis have ever been told about the Lavon Affair is that Pinhas Lavon, former Minister of Defense, and a senior military officer had argued over a disastrous security venture in 1954.

(It is believed to have been an espionage operation in Egypt.)

A Tel Aviv newspaper, Maariv, has reported that General Dayan was questioned in the Knesset after he told Cabinet colleagues that the disastrous operation began four weeks before Mr. Lavon's approval was asked, and that the request for his sanction was meant to shift the blame.

Critics ask why General Dayan has never told this to any of several investigating bodies.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SACHAR, ABRAM LEON
COURSE OF OUR TIMES. KNOPF, 1972.
K S T W WO 909.82 S121C
HISTORY OF THE JEWS. 4TH ED. REV. KNOPF, 1953.
A D F S 933 S121
HISTORY OF THE JEWS. 5TH ED., REV. AND ENL. KNOPF, 1964.
A CH DA F K LP S W WO 933 S121H

SACHAR, HOWARD MORLEY
ALIYAH, THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL. WORLD, 1961.
B P RV S 929.25693 S121A
COURSE OF MODERN JEWISH HISTORY. WORLD, 1958.
K P S W 296 S121C
ALSO REFERENCE
W
EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-1924. KNOPF, 1969.
A B CH D RV S W 956 S121E
EUROPE LEAVES THE MIDDLE EAST, 1936-1954. WITH AN INTROD. BY WILLIAM L. LANGER. KNOPF, 1972.
A CH D P RV W 956.03 S121E
FROM THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL. DELL, 1970. REPRINT OF THE 1964 ED. WITH A NEW INTROD. WRITTEN IN 1970.
S W 956.94 S121F2
FROM THE ENDS OF THE EARTH, THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL. WORLD, 1964.
B K S W WO 956.94 S121F

SACHER, JACK
MUSIC A TO Z, BASED ON THE WORK OF RUDOLF STEPHAN. BROSSET, 1963.
B D C S T 781.23 S121M

SACHS, CURT
HISTORY OF MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS. NORTON, 1940.
A D G K LP RV S T W WO 781.91 S121H
ALSO REFERENCE
A B CH D G K RV S T W WO
OUR MUSICAL HERITAGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MUSIC. 2D ED. PRENTICE, 1955.
A RV S W WO 780.9 S121O
RHYTHM AND TEMPO, A STUDY IN MUSIC HISTORY. NORTON, 1953.
RV 781.62 S121
RISE OF MUSIC IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, EAST AND WEST. NORTON, 1943.
A CH D P LP RV T W WO 780.9 S121R
ALSO REFERENCE
A CH P T W
WORLD HISTORY OF THE DANCE. NORTON, 1937.
A B D F G K LP P RV S W WO 793.3 S121

SACHS, ELIZABETH JOHANNA
NURSING CARE OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, BY W. E. PILLSBURY AND E. J. SACHS. 7TH ED. LIPPINCOTT, 1952.
RV 610.736 P582

SACHS, HANNELORE
RENAISSANCE WOMAN. TR. FROM THE GERMAN BY MARIANNE HERZFELD. REV. BY D. TALBOT RICE. MCGRAW, 1971. (THE IMAGE OF WOMAN SERIES)
A D S 704.9434 S121R

SACHS, HANNS
MASKS OF LOVE AND LIFE, THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. SCI-ART, 1948.
RV 150.195 S121M

SACHS, MAURICE
HUNT, TR. FROM THE FRENCH BY RICHARD HOWARD. STEIN, 1965.
RV S W 8 S121S

SACHS, MENDEL
SOLID STATE THEORY. MCGRAW, 1963.
S 530 S121S

SACHS, NELLY
O THE CHIMNEYS, SELECTED POEMS, INCLUDING THE VERSE PLAY, ELI. FARRAR, 1967. TEXT IN GERMAN AND ENGLISH.
A B CH D K LP RV S T W WO 831 S121O
SEEKER, AND OTHER POEMS. TR. FROM THE GERMAN BY RUTH MEAD AND OTHERS. FARRAR, 1970. TEXT IN GERMAN AND ENGLISH.
D RV 831 S121S

SACHS, PAUL JOSEPH
MEMORIAL EXHIBITION, WORKS OF ART FROM THE COLLECTION OF PAUL J. SACHS, 1878-1965, GIVEN AND BEQUEATHED TO THE FOGG ART MUSEUM, HARVARD UNIVERSITY. -- HARVARD UNIVERSITY. WILLIAM HAYES FOGG ART MUSEUM. COMP. BY J. HONGAN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF M. L. BENNETT.
RV. GRAPHIC, 1969.
R 769.164 H339M
MODERN PRINTS AND DRAWINGS. KNOPF, 1954. GUIDE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN DRAUGHTSMANSHIP.
D P RV S WO 769 S121M

SACHSEL, GEORGE E
PROCEEDINGS. -- SOLID WASTE RESOURCES CONFERENCE ON DESIGN OF CONSUMER CONTAINERS FOR RE-USE OR DISPOSAL, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1971. COMP. BY G. E. SACHSEL. GPO, 1972. (U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SERIES, SW-8P)
ON COVER: DESIGN OF CONSUMER CONTAINERS FOR RE-USE OR DISPOSAL. CO-SPONSORED BY BATTELLE MEMORIAL INST., COLUMBUS LABORATORIES, AND THE U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
B CH 621.757 S66D

SACK, ALBERT
FINE POINTS OF FURNITURE, EARLY AMERICAN. CROWN, 1950.
B CH LP 749.211 S121F

SACK, JOHN
LIEUTENANT CALLEY, HIS OWN STORY, BY W. L. CALLEY. ED. BY J. SACK. VIKING, 1971.
A BK CH D K LP RV S T W WO B C157C
M. NEW AM. LIB., 1967.
A B BK CH D G K LP P RV S T W WO 959.7 S121M
MAN-EATING MACHINE. FARRAR, 1973.
W 959.7 S121MA
REPORT FROM PRACTICALLY NOWHERE. HARPER, 1959.
K S 910.41 S121R

SACK, THOMAS E
COMPLETE GUIDE TO BUILDING AND PLANT MAINTENANCE. 2D ED. PRENTICE, 1971.
A W 658.2 S121C2
COMPLETE GUIDE TO BUILDING AND PLANT MAINTENANCE. PRENTICE, 1963.
W 658.2 S121C

SACKETT, WALTER W
BRINGING UP BABIES: A FAMILY DOCTOR'S PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CHILD CARE. HARPER, 1962.
B D S 649.1 S121B

SACKHEIM, GEORGE I
CHEMISTRY FOR THE HEALTH SCIENCES, BY G. I. SACKHEIM AND R. M. SCHULTZ. MACMILLAN, 1969.
W 540 S121C

SACKLER, HOWARD
FEW ENCLITICS, WITH AN INTROD. BY MARTIN GOTTFRIED. DIAL, 1970.
CONTENTS - SARAH.- NINE O'CLOCK MAIL.- MR. WELK AND JERSEY JIM.- SKIPPY.
A B CH LP RV S T W 812 S121F
GREAT WHITE HOPE, A PLAY. DIAL, 1968.
A B BK CH D DR G K LP S W WO 812 S121G

SACKMAN, HAROLD
COMPUTERS, SYSTEM SCIENCE, AND EVOLVING SOCIETY - THE CHALLENGE OF MAN-MACHINE DIGITAL SYSTEMS. WILEY, 1967.
M 651.8 S121C
ONLINE PLANNING: TOWARD CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING, ED. BY H. SACKMAN AND R. L. CITRENBAUM. PRENTICE, 1972.
M 658.403 S1210

SACKS, CLAIRE
HAMLET - ENTER CRITIC, ED. BY C. SACKS AND E. WHEN. APPLETON, 1960.
B S T W 822.33 H3S
B S T W

SACKS, OLIVER W
MIGRAINE - THE EVOLUTION OF A COMMON DISORDER, WITH A FOREWORD BY WILLIAN GOODDY. U. OF CALIF., 1970.
A B CH D K LP RV S T W WO 616.857 S121M

SACKS, SEYMOUR
FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN A METROPOLITAN AREA, THE CLEVELAND EXPERIENCE, BY S. SACKS AND W. F. HELLMUTH. FREE PR., 1961.
RV 352.1 S121F
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, FISCAL PATTERNS AND GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS, BY A. K. CAMPBELL AND S. SACKS. FREE PR., 1967.
RV 352.1 C187M

SACKSON, SID
GAMUT OF GAMES. RANDOM, 1969.
A B BK CH D G K LP RV S T W WO 793.74 S121G

SACKVILLE-WEST, VICTORIA MARY, HON.
DAUGHTER OF FRANCE, THE LIFE OF ANNE MARIE LOUISE D'ORLEANS, DUCHESSE DE MONTPENSIER, 1627-1693, LA GRAUDE MADEMOISELLE. DOUBLEDAY, 1959.
D K LP RV S T B M795A
EDWARDIANS. DOUBLEDAY, 1930.
RV FICTION
ENGLISH COUNTRY HOUSES. COLLINS, 1941.
RV 728.8 S121E
JOY OF GARDENING, A SELECTION FOR AMERICANS. HARPER, 1958.
A B D K S SH 635.9 S121J
LAND. HEINEMANN, 1933.
RV 821 S121L

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NEW YORK TIMES INDEX, 1964, page 478

Israel, Politics and Government

"Forthcoming book by H W [sic] Sachar indicates Lavon affair stems from Defense Min intelligence sec '54 effort to keep Brit troops in Egypt by simulating anti-Brit and anti-US incidents through sabotage; rept disclosure that intelligence chief implicated Lavon without his approval of plan, Mr 29,4:1"

---

23 March 1981

The best reference to the Lavon affair is DECLINE OF HONOR, James Creech & Avri El-Ad, Regnery Publishing Company 1976. El-Ad was the Israeli agent who headed the Lavon team and now lives in California; Creech wrote the book for El-Ad, did some additional original research, and now lives in North Carolina.

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

David Ben-Gurion

ISRAEL

A PERSONAL HISTORY

FUNK & WAGNALLS, INC., NEW YORK
SABRA BOOKS, NEW YORK, TEL AVIV
DISTRIBUTED BY THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Yonah Kesse (Mapai): "This won't help you. In Prague they're already saying you're a spy."

David Libshitz (who together with Hannah Landau had also resigned from Mapai) "Behind this proposal [to express no-confidence in the Government] by eighteen representatives of the Communists, Mapam, and the Left Faction there is no responsibility whatsoever - whether from the point of view of labor, Israel or the Jewish people. In the present situation, in view of the sharp changes in Soviet policy, we must assemble and mobilize our fullest responsibility in order to develop a policy based on the bitter and tragic reality of the present situation of the State of Israel and the people of Israel."

Sharett (Foreign Minister) responded the following day, February 17: "Before ending this debate I have nothing to add by way of explaining the Government position and appraisal, for this has been done by the Prime Minister at the opening of the discussion. However, I wish to reply to a few points that were made in the course of it.

"Knesset member Sneh has tried to dredge up the forgotten past. He claims that the Soviet Union rescued thousands of Jews from extermination. I do not know at what date we should start keeping accounts. For instance, what would have happened if at the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 the ax had not fallen on the Zionist movement, if a way had been found to reconcile that regime with continued emigration to Israel; if the masses of Russian Jewry had been permitted to go to Israel as they wanted to; if a broad channel had been opened before the Halutz movement in Russia? What would have been the result? The 1920s would have passed quite differently and we would have been arrayed differently to confront the Holocaust of World War Two - perhaps we would already have achieved independence in the '30s and then it is doubtful whether European Jewry would have been exterminated. When a World War broke out and the Holocaust was menacing European Jewry, what role in its outcome was played by the pact concluded then [between Hitler and Stalin] and what possibility did it open for the unobstructed domination of Europe by Hitler and his Storm Troopers and the doom of the Jewish people throughout the world?"

Bentov for Mapai, Wilner for the Communists, and Sneh for the Left Faction each submitted a motion of no-confidence. Each of the resolutions received eight votes in favor and eighty-five against. A motion by the Coalition Faction that "the Knesset identifies with the Prime Minister's statement" was adopted, seventy-nine to sixteen. Begin had announced that Herut would abstain.

On July 20, 1953, four months after Stalin's death, diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union were resumed at the latter's initiative. A. N. Abramov was named Soviet Minister to Israel and Dr. Shmuel Elya Yashiv resumed his post as Israeli Minister in Moscow.

The "Lavon Affair" ★ Investigation by the Olshani-Dori Committee Fails To Reach Firm Conclusion ★ Background of Ben-Gurion's Return to Defense Post

The final year of the Second Knesset saw an event that agitated the country and left an unpleasant aftertaste. In the language of the censorship it was the "Security Mishap"

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

of the "Unfortunate Affair"; in the language of the newspapers, the "Lavon Affair."* Whatever the label, it referred to an order given, or at any rate carried out, in July 1954 by the person whom the censors called the "Senior Officer," as a result of which several persons lost their lives.

The unnamed Senior Officer claimed that he received the order from the Minister of Defense, at that time Pinhas Lavon, and several days after the mishap informed me in writing that those involved had been arrested and would be put on trial. Lavon did not react at all to this information. The Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, was not then in the country. On his return he demanded a report from the Senior Officer. After receiving it on November 1, 1954, Dayan announced at a Staff meeting that the operation in question had been carried out on orders from the Minister of Defense, and that an officer was obliged to obey the Minister without hesitation.

The Minister of Defense did not participate in Staff meetings but his secretary, Ephraim Evron, who was present, undoubtedly reported to him what Dayan had said. In the middle of December, Lavon called in Dayan and the Senior Officer, and told them that the Government or the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee or both would most likely summon them to a hearing into the security affair. He therefore proposed that they testify that the order had been given to *plan* the operation, not to execute it. When the two men did not reply, Lavon understood that they did not agree to say what he suggested.

The "security mishap" occurred in the second half of July 1954. A few days earlier, on Tuesday, July 13, 1954, Shmuel Dayan [father of Moshe], Kadish Luz, and Mordekhai Namir had come to see me at Sde Boker, with the idea of drawing me back into the Government. The visit had been initiated by Shmuel Dayan, who consulted several other Mapai members. Luz had not taken part in the consultations but the members wanted him included as a representative of the kibbutzim, with Dayan representing the moshavim and Namir as spokesman for the cities. At Sde Boker, Namir did most of the talking. "The public has no feeling of security," he said in substance. "There is no authority. Though the apprehensions at the time of your resignation have proved false, they now are growing worse. We have come to ask you to return."

I replied that I did not intend to return just then because, though a private citizen, I was busy with two very important matters. One was the mobilization of young members of the well-established moshavim to settle with their families in the new immigrant moshavim. (An enlightening book on this project, *Movement Without a Name*, was later written by Braha Habas, published by Davar in 1964.) The other was the creation of a "regional settlement" in the desolate south of the country, in an area later known as the Lahish Region.

Toward the end of the month, on July 28, while I was undergoing treatment at Tel Hashomer Hospital, I had a visit from Golda Meir, Zalman Arrane, and Levi Eshkol, who spoke about difficult relations with the Ministry of Defense. I suggested that they speak forthrightly about Pinhas Lavon. Back home at Sde Boker, on August 14, Moshe

*Lavon Affair: An Israel intelligence operation abroad, the details of which have never been officially disclosed, proved unsuccessful. Whether a Senior Officer (his identify never officially revealed) undertook the operation, as he claimed, on the order of Defense Minister Lavon or on his own authority as Lavon claimed, was the crux of the "affair."—Editors.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Dayan, the Chief of Staff, came to see me. He told me about the astonishing order issued by Lavon while he, Dayan, was abroad. The operation ordered failed, he said, and it should have been known that it would fail.

Namir paid me a second visit on the morning of November 20, 1954. In recent weeks, he claimed, the sense of national security had weakened further, the situation of the country and the Mapai party had deteriorated. There was a lack of authority and discipline in the Government, the Histadrut, and Mapai.

On January 27, 1955, Shaul Avigur, visiting me, said he had been informed by Prime Minister Sharett that he had appointed a private commission (the Olshan-Dori Committee) to investigate who had given the order. Either the Minister or the Senior Officer had exceeded his authority and had acted on his own. The committee had not found judicial proof, but its clear impression was that the order had come from Lavon. Avigur said the Army had no confidence in Lavon and it was known that he did not like the Army. He therefore urged that I return to the Ministry of Defense.

In the first days of February 1955 I received from Lavon a copy of a letter he had sent to Prime Minister Sharett, tendering his resignation. He complained that the Olshan-Dori findings were submitted to Avigur over Lavon's opposition; that he had been "kept at arm's length" during hearings; that members of the Government avoided him as if he "were afflicted with a loathsome disease." He felt himself "excluded from the group and from collective responsibility" and therefore was resigning.

The copy of the letter indicated that copies were also sent to Golda Meir, Arrane, and Eshkol.

Two weeks after the receipt of this copy, on February 17, 1955, I was visited by Golda Meir and Namir. They had come on behalf of the Prime Minister, to ask me to return to the Ministry of Defense. Their report on the gravity of the crisis in the Ministry and the lack of confidence inside the Army shocked and upset me. I knew that in our situation the Army was the most precious body in the State. Though I had intended to remain in Sde Boker for at least another year, I felt that this time I had to yield to the Prime Minister's wishes. Security and the Army came before all.

The next morning, February 18, I was surprised when Paula, my wife, said that she had heard of my appointment as Minister of Defense on the 18-o'clock news broadcast the previous evening. On Monday, February 21, I went to Jerusalem and was present in the Knesset when the Prime Minister announced Lavon's resignation and Ben-Gurion's co-option as Minister of Defense. No debate was held, but a number of members—Ya'ari on behalf of Mapam, Ben-Aharon for the Kibbutz Hameuhad members who had left Mapam, Shmuel Mikunis for the Communists, and Chaim Landau for Herut—announced their opposition to my co-option. By a vote of seventy-four to twenty-three with one abstention (myself) the co-option was approved and I immediately signed the declaration of allegiance.

On returning to the Ministry of Defense, Ben-Gurion read the conclusions of the Olshan-Dori Committee which said in part: "We regret that we are unable to answer the question posed by the Prime Minister: we can only say that we have not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he (the Senior Officer) did not receive instructions from the Minister of Defense; at the same time we are not certain if the Minister of Defense actually did give the orders attributed to him."

Ben-Gurion knew both Olshan and Dori, and esteemed them highly. Both men had

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

been members of the Hagana for many years. Olshan was a Justice of the Supreme Court and Dori the first Chief of Staff of the IDF. Since they had not been able to establish the truth, Ben-Gurion decided not to deal with the affair at all. He did not even read through the entire report of the committee. It was necessary, he felt, to give Lavon the benefit of the doubt and to continue to treat him as a colleague, for he possessed qualities and talents that Ben-Gurion considered important. As for the Senior Officer, the Defense Minister felt it necessary to be strict, since he served in a unit calling for a high degree of trustworthiness because it guarded State secrets; in view of the doubt, he decided to transfer the man to a different post. Ben-Gurion spoke about this with Moshe Dayan, who concurred, as did the Prime Minister. The new Defense Minister refrained from asking Lavon, Sharett, or any other member of the Government what he thought about "the Affair," and none of them told him anything they might have known about it.

Only later in the year did Ben-Gurion find letters in the Ministry of Defense, addressed by Sharett to Lavon, that seemed somewhat surprising.

In a letter dated August 14, 1953 (when Sharett was still serving as Acting Prime Minister and Lavon as Acting Minister of Defense, Ben-Gurion being on a leave of absence):

> Between the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Ben-Gurion) and myself there was a practice of providing advance notice of every serious act of retaliation against any of the neighboring countries, or any forceful step against the Arab population of the State. This procedure was not followed with regard to the curfew and the search in Tira or the operations carried out on the night of the 12th of this month. Therefore I must request you henceforth to give me sufficient advance notice of any serious operation of the types I mentioned, which you have ordered or which have your approval.

In the second letter on August 19, Sharett wrote to Lavon:

> Your refusal to participate in collegial consultations is very surprising and creates a very serious problem. If the intention is to bring about my resignation as Acting Prime Minister, there could be nothing simpler. Is that what you desire?

A letter dated May 25, 1954, when Sharett was already full rather than Acting Prime Minister, and Lavon full Minister of Defense, Sharett wrote:

> Security measures are not being reported to me as they should be. Things occur that are not being brought to my attention. I hear announcements on the radio and later read about them in the papers without knowing the true background. The proper arrangement would be for me to know the facts, if at all possible, before the official version is released. I should know the facts, and it is up to you to take the initiative.

Even while living and working at Sde Boker, Ben-Gurion had heard of the strained relations between the Government and the Minister of Defense, as well as within the Ministry of Defense itself. Since the Prime Minister did not find it necessary to tell him about these things after his return to the Ministry of Defense, Ben-Gurion did not press him. Nor did he ask the other members of the Government after the elections to the Third Knesset when he again became Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, in a coalition he had formed of Mapai, Mapam, Ahdut Haavodah, Hapoel Hamizrahi, and the Progressives—the Government confirmed by a vote of seventy-three to thirty-three on November 3, 1955. Meanwhile the Senior Officer, in his new assignment, carried out his duties to

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Ben-Gurion's satisfaction, and with Lavon Ben-Gurion continued to maintain the same friendly relations as before he had retired to Sde Boker.

Through all his years of service, from the formation of the Israel Defense Forces until his resignation from the Government at the end of 1953, there had been, to the best of Ben-Gurion's knowledge, no case when officers exceeded their authority and carried out military operations on their own. There had been other offenses and during the War of Independence a few episodes of insubordination, but he was certain that the Army was completely immune to the dangerous maladies infecting the Arab armies both then and now: usurpation of power and failure to submit to the civilian authorities. After what happened in 1954, however, he saw the need of sending the following instructions to the Chief of Staff:

> I consider the nation's complete confidence in the Army a most valuable asset. The undermining of this trust constitutes a danger to security and a serious stumbling block to the Army. I assume that you and all of your associates will help me to augment this trust. The nation and its representatives must of necessity be completely certain that the Army is the executive arm of the State and *not the director of its policy*. Israel policy is determined by the Government and the Knesset and by them alone.
>
> Soldiers and officers, like all other citizens, are free to belong to any lawful organization in the State, nor is the military or civilian authority entitled to restrict their freedom of thought and of civilian action, apart from restrictions legally imposed on the political activity of soldiers. Nevertheless, soldiers and officers receive from the State training, equipment, and information earmarked for State security. These are not private property of the soldiers and commanders, who may use them only according to the instructions and with the knowledge of the authorized bodies. Here of necessity discipline must be very strict and unqualified. A soldier or officer who misappropriates any of these three things is betraying his nation and committing a grave offense. The higher his rank, the greater the responsibility and the graver the restriction.
>
> An officer may not divulge the information he receives by virtue of his military duties even to his closest and most trusted friend. This applies all the more to staff officers. Anyone who cannot meet this requirement would do better to resign from his post of his own free will. The transmission of information to unauthorized persons is a crime of no lesser magnitude than the handing over of arms and explosives to civilians for their private use or for the commission of crimes.
>
> As a citizen a soldier is subject to the laws applicable to every citizen. As a soldier he is at the command of the State and its authorized bodies and them alone, and is subject to severe discipline. The Army and the entire nation must be made aware of this. Despite differences of opinion on every other matter, it is vital that on the question of security there be a maximum unity among the entire nation. Even if we have controversies in matters of defense, the entire nation must have full confidence in the IDF, because the IDF, its men, and commanders exist only for the security and welfare of Israel.

As Minister of Defense from the creation of the Army until the end of 1953, and again from February 1955 until June 1963, Ben-Gurion knew that the Army had been conducted along these lines; he assumes that this has continued.

There have been cases of desertion and a very few instances of inaccurate reporting. At the very beginning there were some cases of insubordination, as well as of weapons stolen and sold. In all these cases the guilty were punished (apart from a very few times during the War of Independence, when it was practically impossible to detect and punish such

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

...ings). When two generals committed an error by announcing complete mobilization over the radio—an error, not a crime—both were dismissed after an investigation by the entire Government had shown that it was indeed an error. The Security Mishap of 1954, as far as Ben-Gurion knows, has had no parallel in the Army from the day of its birth to the present. Consequently, he had no interest in dealing with this "affair," which concluded with the private investigation by Olsha.. and Dori. Though the members of that committee had no formal authority, they were wise and just men on whose actions and findings he could rely without reservation.

Appeal to Youth To Cultivate Zionist Ideals ★ Controversy Over Regional Settlement

The year of the so-called Security Mishap, 1954, was also a year of soul-searching by the younger generation. Youth was yearning for an inner consolidation and did not always find it. The steep decline in Aliya that began in 1952 and reached its lowest point in 1953—10,388 immigrants; 12,500 emigrants—inevitably brought the best elements of the nation to a profound reckoning with themselves. The bitter fact could not be ignored that the sources of immigration having dried up for the time being, our forces had to be strengthened from within, especially among the young.

Israel at that time had about a hundred thousand young people in the fourteen to eighteen age group, only 20 to 25 percent of whom were attending academic or vocational high schools. The various youth movements concerned themselves chiefly with those in schools, so that some seventy-five or eighty thousand boys and girls of this age category were being neglected. These were youths who had already passed the elementary-school age or young people from slums and backward districts, condemned to grow up without education, training or involvement.

Israel's first Minister of Defense, who had meanwhile resigned from the Government, did not agree with the bleak appraisal of our youth being made at this time. In his work with the Army during the State's first six years he had come to know young people from all walks of life—children of old, established settlers, native-born youths, new immigrants, urban and rural youngsters, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, for the Army takes in even illiterates, persons completely without education or training, teaches them how to read and write, and gives them their first knowledge of the Jewish nation and the Jewish people. It accustoms them to order and cleanliness, discipline, courage, and esprit de corps. It was obvious to Ben-Gurion that there are no real differences among various communities and tribes.

The attempts made during the first years to appoint officers to the highest and most responsible posts at an extremely young age had proved no error. Generals and Chiefs of Staff under the age of forty or even thirty-five had not failed us, nor would any army in the world have been ashamed of them. But the most important thing the Army showed was that there was no natural difference among communities or persons from different countries of origin with respect to valor and devotion to the State. The Army indeed had proved that we were one people. Its officers had been born in Afghanistan, Persia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Yemen, Morocco, Egypt, India, Germany, Poland, England, and America.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

VIII

ANOTHER "AFFAIR" AND A "SCANDAL FACTORY"

Echoes of the 1954 "Security Mishap": Ben-Gurion Opposes Cabinet Role in Judicial Case

Section 1. Cohen Committee and Committee of Seven

Trial in Jerusalem Recalls "Lavon Affair" ★ Board of Inquiry Appointed ★ Press Rebuked for Distorting Issues

In the final months of 1960, while the public was awaiting the trial of Adolf Eichmann, an internal sensation rocked the country. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, many people connected an espionage trial in Jerusalem with the so-called "Lavon Affair" of 1954–1955, with which the writer has dealt earlier in this book.*

At the end of 1953, it will be recalled, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion retired from the Government "for a year or two or more," as he informed the President. On the urging of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his colleagues, he returned much sooner—first, on February 21, 1955, as Defense Minister because of a morale problem in the Ministry, and then, after the elections to the Third Knesset in July 1955, also as Prime Minister.

Meanwhile the "affair" that had caused his earlier return quieted down completely. A private inquiry set up by Sharett, the Olshan-Dori Committee, had reached an impasse, and Secretary of Defense Pinhas Lavon had resigned. Upon succeeding him, Ben-Gurion transferred the Senior Officer involved in the case to a different post. At the end of 1954

* In accordance with restrictions imposed by military censorship, the author has withheld the names of the Senior Officer and other officers involved in the so-called Lavon Affair, as well as the name of the accused in the espionage trial in Jerusalem. — EDITORS

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

and in 1955 Ben-Gurion was on cordial terms, both personally and publicly, with both men.

The Senior Officer carried out his new assignment in the Central District very ably. Ben-Gurion continued to treat him as a friend. He also remained on friendly terms with Lavon, giving him the benefit of the doubt. Ben-Gurion appreciated his administrative abilities and looked upon his resignation from the Defense Ministry as a final liquidation of the "affair." He even gave Lavon a civilian security assignment when the need arose.

In the Third Knesset no question connected with the unfortunate "security mishap" was ever raised. Even in the elections to the Fourth Knesset, when Mapai emerged with its greatest victory of any time before or since, no repercussions of the 1954 case were heard. In fact, until 1960 no echo of the dispute, either written or oral, had reached the Prime Minister, nor did he have any interest in it. None of the Cabinet members who had served with Lavon in the Sharett Government had told Ben-Gurion what had taken place at the time, and he had not asked for such information.

That was the situation until May 5, 1960, when Lavon informed the Prime Minister that he had heard from a certain lieutenant-colonel that Army documents related to the 1954 events had been falsified. A few hours later he sent Ben-Gurion a record in writing of what that officer had alleged. The Prime Minister immediately assigned his military secretary, Col. Chaim Ben-David, to investigate. Five days later Ben-David brought in a report, including accounts of conversations with the lieutenant-colonel, a number of other officers, and a civilian employee of the Defense Ministry.

Now we must go back a bit: to July 29, 1959, when a trial began in a Jerusalem District Court of a man who had figured in the 1954 affair and whom the press had dubbed the "Third Man," the other two being Lavon and the Senior Officer. The trial was not related to the mishap of 1954. The charge was violation of State security and the man was sentenced to twelve years in prison. More than a year later, on August 28, 1960, the Chief of Staff, Gen. Chaim Laskov, sent the Prime Minister excerpts from the verdict in Jerusalem. These embodied information that necessitated the appointment of a military board of inquiry to examine the reliability of two officers, one in the regular Army and one in the Reserves.

The Prime Minister instructed Laskov that the board was to include an outstanding jurist and that it make a thorough investigation into the allegations of falsification and concealment of documents. The Chief of Staff asked Chaim Cohen, a member of the Supreme Court and a former Attorney General, to serve as chairman. The proceedings of the Cohen Committee, as it was generally called, inadvertently gave rise to the Affair of 1960, which should properly have been termed the Ministerial Committee Affair; the content of the inquiry was entirely different from the affair of 1954. However, the new developments finally obliged the Prime Minister to examine what had happened in 1954, something that he had seen no need or purpose in doing until then.

At the time the Cohen Committee was set up, Lavon was on vacation in Europe. But he sent his secretary, Ephraim Evron, to demand that the Prime Minister have the board of inquiry dissolved. Ben-Gurion replied that it was none of Lavon's business. Suspicions having been raised against Army officers, he was obligated as Minister of Defense to obtain the facts. Lavon returned to Israel on September 24, 1960. Two days later, under the headline "Committee to Investigate Lavon's Resignation from Cabinet," *Davar* published the following piece of fiction:

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

> A few weeks ago a high level board of inquiry was set up to investigate the affair leading to Pinhas Lavon's resignation as Defense Minister in February 1955. It was decided to appoint the committee after new evidence came to the attention of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Similar items, without any basis in fact, appeared in all the other newspapers. They also reported that Lavon would visit Ben-Gurion that day. Lavon did call on the Prime Minister. In his diary for September 26 Ben-Gurion wrote:

> I was surprised to hear Lavon's objections to a board of inquiry with regard to the Senior Officer. First he objected to Chaim Cohen. I told him that I held Cohen's ability, erudition, and fairness in great esteem. He said that as a member of the Government at the time when Cohen was Attorney General, he had tried to have him dismissed. (Later, when I related this at a meeting of the Cabinet, Pinhas Rosen said that there had been no such proposal). Lavon feared that the president of the Supreme Court, Justice Olshan, who had been a member of the Olshan-Dori Committee in 1954–1955, would be able to influence Cohen, a fellow member of the court.
>
> When I rejected this argument Lavon demanded that I announce publicly that he had not given the order [in 1954] and had been punished unfairly. I assured him that I had never accused him, but that, on the other hand, I could not clear him, since by so doing I would be incriminating someone else. I was not a judge, nor had I ever investigated the matter. He said he would go to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. I advised him not to, as it too was not authorized to adjudicate in a dispute between two individuals. I also told him that when the Cohen Committee concluded its hearings, I would submit its findings to the Cabinet. The next day *Davar* printed the following misinformation:
>
> "It has meanwhile developed that some of the testimony presented at the time [to the Olshan-Dori Committee in the end of 1954] did not support Lavon's version and was unreliable. On the basis of these developments the Prime Minister decided to appoint a new committee with authority to rehabilitate Lavon completely if, as is likely, it turns out that he was wronged. It is assumed that the committee will concentrate on the affair as it relates to Lavon's resignation, rather than the other aspect of the problem."
>
> In this fabrication there was not one word of truth. Similar and worse things appeared in the other newspapers, especially *Lamerhav*. *Davar* accompanied its article on the purpose of the Cohen Committee with an editorial to the effect that "various public figures with detailed knowledge of the matter have long been convinced that the time has come for an official rehabilitation of Pinhas Lavon in connection with the Affair which led to his resignation." In their editorial opinion no further boards of inquiry were necessary because recently the matter had been sufficiently clarified. (It did not say where, by whom, or when.) On the other hand, the editorial went on, the announcement has to come from the Prime Minister.

On September 28, 1960, *Davar* reported that on the previous day Lavon had said, "The Board of inquiry to investigate my resignation as Minister of Defense in February 1955 does not concern me and I do not intend to appear before it." He added, however, that "if invited to the meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee," he would attend. *Davar* also reported that the General Zionist and Herut blocs had demanded that the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee be convened as soon as possible. Because of these distortions of the object of the Cohen Committee, the Prime Minister's

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

Office sent the newspapers an official statement defining that committee's jurisdiction and authority:

> On instructions of the Minister of Defense the Chief of Staff has appointed a three-man board of inquiry to investigate the conduct of an officer in the regular Army and a reserve officer in the light of a verdict by a civilian court which makes a new reliability check necessary. The Minister of Defense will submit the board's findings to the Government and the Minister of Justice will take every measure that is called for.

In view of the mistaken and misleading press reports about the assignment of the Cohen Committee and Lavon's conference with him, the Prime Minister on October 2, 1960, issued the following statement, published in the papers the next day:

> After my meeting with Mr. Lavon on Monday, September 26, 1960, a number of [illegible], unfounded, and tendentious comments appeared in several newspapers. For my part, I gave no information to the press about the meeting and I assume that nothing was said by Mr. Lavon either, but someone decided to stir up trouble and gave several newspapers false and misleading reports about what took place at the meeting.
>
> I had nothing to do with what is called the "Lavon Affair." I had no reason to blame Lavon for anything done by him during his term of office as Minister of Defense, and as I told him when I met him on September 26, 1960, I see no need or obligation to exonerate him (a) because I did not censure him; and (b) if anyone did censure him or tried to do so, it is not within my authority to exonerate him. I am not an investigator or a judge. I do not pass judgment on anyone, least of all on Mr. Lavon.
>
> As Minister of Defense I considered it my duty, in view of the material that was submitted to me by Mr. Lavon some five months ago, and the reports that reached me during the trial of a certain person in recent months, and particularly after the verdict, to instruct the Chief of Staff to appoint an inquiry board to investigate the integrity of an officer on active service and another officer in the reserves. I did not suggest to Mr. Lavon that he should appear before this board and it did not occur to me to do so.
>
> However, I told Mr. Lavon about the motives that prompted me to appoint such a board, and I turned over to him, at his request, the material in my possession, and of which he was not aware, that led me to initiate this investigation. It seems to me that he has the right to see this material.
>
> The newspapers that are dealing with this affair in good faith, out of concern for the truth and for Lavon's good name, are deserving of praise. But I am not certain that all the newspapers are dealing with the affair from such pure motives. Other persons should not be blamed, directly or indirectly—we are concerned here with two officers of the Defense Forces, but this applies to everyone—as long as they have not been proved guilty. I assume that Mr. Lavon is not in the least interested in defense or aid of this dubious kind.
>
> Through misinformation or bad faith, several newspapers are confusing two spearate matters: (1) an unfortunate incident on which an inquiry committee, appointed by Prime Minister Sharett at the end of 1954 at the request of the then Minister of Defense, Pinhas Lavon, reached no conclusion; (2) the resignation from the Government of Mr. Lavon, who was then the Minister of Defense. The then Prime Minister announced this resignation in the Knesset on February 21, 1955, in the following words: "At a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday, Mr. Lavon submitted his reasons for resignation, namely, that he did not find it possible to continue in his post after his proposals for changes in the structure of the defense organization were not accepted by the government."
>
> I have not the least doubt that the then Prime Minister made a truthful announcement

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

to the Knesset. I had political differences of opinion with Mr. Sharett in the Government, but I never had and I do not have today the slightest doubt as to his personal integrity and honesty, and I am certain that he did not make any statement in the Knesset that was not the whole truth. All the members of the Cabinet at the time and the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee know that Lavon himself made the same statement about the cause of his resignation, both in the Cabinet and in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, but at greater length. [Ben-Gurion at this point listed those present at that Cabinet meeting and at the Knesset committee meeting.]

Everyone who writes that Mr. Lavon was "dismissed" from his post is either writing an untruth on purpose --and there are such journalists--or he is writing about events without knowledge of them.

Even today I do not know what changes in the structure of the defense organization were proposed by the then Minister of Defense [Lavon] and why they were not accepted by the Prime Minister [Sharett,] at neither before I left the Ministry of Defense at the end of December 1953 nor after I returned in February 1955 did I see any need for changes in the Defense organization, and during my meetings with Lavon I did not hear from him what his proposals were. (In a letter to me of October 3, Lavon rightly pointed out that I was mistaken --that he had submitted the proposed changes to me after my return to the Ministry.) I cannot say that the structure of the Defense organization is ideal--there is no such thing--but it is, in my humble opinion, effective and suitable for our needs. I will not say that no shortcomings are possible in this structure--after all, human beings and not angels serve in the Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense. But I do not think that the existing structure necessarily gives rise to shortcomings.

Five months ago Mr. Lavon gave me certain material. Last week, when he returned from his vacation, a discussion took place between us, at his request. Since Lavon did not tell me that I had the right to publish the contents of our discussion, I will not describe it, but I have read series of misrepresentations of this meeting in the press. Just as Mr. Lavon did not tell me that I had the right to make this discussion public, so I did not tell him that he had the right to make it public; I assume that, like myself, he said nothing about our conversation to the press.

But I must refute certain false or inaccurate press reports. A statement has already been made with my approval by the Prime Minister's Office on the functions of the board of inquiry appointed by the Chief of Staff in accordance with my instructions. This committee does not deal with what the newspapers call the "Lavon Affair" but only with the integrity of two officers, whose investigation was made necessary by certain legal material--as Minister of Defense I must know if Army officers are trustworthy or not.

Since Mr. Lavon thought, perhaps rightly, that this material affects him, I gave him the material that I had on this question. The officers being investigated must be given every opportunity to prove their innocence; this is the elementary right of every man, even a criminal. With respect to fairness, justice, and law, all men are equal. As Minister of Defense I will not allow an officer to serve in the Defense Forces whose hands are not clean; but I will also not allow an officer to be pilloried without proof and without trial.

In *Maariv* on September 25, 1960, the following headline appeared in large type: "Ben-Gurion Orders a Reinvestigation of the Evidence That Caused Lavon's Resignation from the Government in 1955." This statement is wholly without foundation.

The report published in *Lamerhav* on September 28, 1960, by an anonymous writer, that the Prime Minister told Lavon that "this committee is not capable of reaching the *full* conclusions regarding *all* those involved in the affair, and he [Lavon] therefore objected to its composition," is not "accurate." I am not certain that Mr. Lavon told these things to the *Lamerhav* reporter, because the remarks attributed to him here contain two "inex-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

actitudes": the Cohen Committee was chosen for a limited purpose, as was announced officially, and this, of course, was told to Mr. Lavon in my discussion with him on Monday; it was not for the reason mentioned in the newspaper that there was an objection to the composition of the committee, if there was such an objection.

Yediot Aharonot on September 28, 1960, reported that "Lavon categorically submitted to Ben-Gurion his old demand for the clearing of his name with an unequivocal declaration." I do not know how the newspaper knows what the committee is about. It was not "imposed" on Mr. Lavon; it was "imposed" (if the language of the editor must be used) upon two officers. The committee's conclusions will be submitted to the Cabinet, and if the Minister of Justice and his counsel see fit to embark upon legal action, they will do so. Mr. Lavon was not asked his views on the committee and did not have to be asked, for the two officers whose reliability the Minister of Defense saw fit to check in the light of certain data are not subordinate to him.

On September 29 *Haaretz* itself denied a news item that had appeared in its own paper on the previous day, according to which the Prime Minister's office had issued a denial concerning new findings brought to the Prime Minister's attention by Mr. Lavon.

Lamerhav and *Yediot Aharonot* of September 29 carried the information that the, had heard from Lavon that the "documents" he had presented to the Prime Minister do not shed light but cast a shadow. Apparently the reference was to a document handed to me by Lavon a few months ago. For the sake of accuracy it should be mentioned that in the course of the conversation between us on September 26, I told Mr. Lavon about certain documents I had received recently—not from him—that cast doubts on the reliability of two officers. Lavon asked to see these documents. I immediately called upon my military secretary, Col. Chaim Ben-David, and asked him to transmit them to Lavon, since it appeared to me that they might possibly have some bearing on the affair in which Lavon is interested.

Lamerhav of September 30 wrote that its correspondent "learns from reliable sources that Lavon never requested that his name be cleared by Ben-Gurion's making a unilateral announcement of such a rehabilitation. What Lavon asked Ben-Gurion was the opportunity to have the matter clarified in the appropriate parliamentary public body, *i.e.*, the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee."

The "reliable sources" presented the correspondent with a piece of information that is false from beginning to end. As I have already stated, I do not regard myself as entitled to inform the public of Mr. Lavon's words to me, just as I presume that Mr. Lavon does not consider it his right to publish my words to him, without each of us having received prior permission to do so from the other. But the statement that Lavon asked me for the opportunity to clarify the matter before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee is silly. Lavon needs no such permission from me, and he may approach that committee any day, whenever he sees fit, without my knowledge or my permission.

Finally, I wish to state that I am completely in accord with Almogi, who said that this entire matter has no connection with Mapai, the Israel Labor Party. To the extent that I am dealing with this matter, it is only in my capacity as Minister of Defense.

On the day this statement was issued the Prime Minister was invited to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. The Minister of Justice, Pinhas Rosen, was also present. The committee's regular chairman, Meir Argov, being out of the country, Herzl Berger took his place. The absence of the regular chairman caused considerable confusion. Argov was well versed in the Knesset rules and regulations, which he upheld strictly and resolutely; he would not permit members to overstep their authority. Berger, while perfectly honest, was not well acquainted with the committee's powers and limitations.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Ben-Gurion gave the Knesset committee a summary of his statement to the press. When certain members began to ask about the affair of 1954 and whether he believed that the Defense Minister at the time had given the famous order or the Senior Officer had acted on his own, he told them: "I do not think it is the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee's business to investigate people's guilt or innocence. It is not a judicial committee. In my opinion this is a matter to be decided by the judiciary."

Mr. Bader of Herut remarked that "there is nothing more terrible than for a person to feel he has been wronged." The Prime Minister replied: "If only one person were involved it would be much simpler, but in this matter there are two people; one cannot say simply, 'You are innocent, and you are a criminal.' This is the whole trouble."

Later in the discussion Bader said, "Sir, if you were to appoint a committee of three judges right now I would be more at ease." The Prime Minister replied, "I am not the one to appoint judges." Bader then remarked, "It would be better if the matter were cleared up here and now, but that is only my opinion." The Prime Minister commented: "I am no less interested than Mr. Bader in having the innocent man cleared but this is a matter for a court of law."

After other members asserted that what was involved was a security matter, the Prime Minister said:

> I see that you want to argue a matter that belongs to the judiciary. I will not participate in a committee that discusses matters rightly belonging to the judiciary. While I may not be a jurist, I am able to distinguish between judicial matters and matters of security. Here we have a judicial matter. There are two people; one says one thing, one says another. And though one is closer to me than the other, the obligation to seek the truth is binding on all of us. No security problem is involved in knowing who told the truth and who didn't. Mr. Berger announced that like every institution in Israel, the powers of this committee are clearly limited. In my opinion it would be in the public interest to extend the framework of its authority to the greatest degree possible. Still, there is a limit to how far it can be stretched without breaking. I would ask all members to take this into account in making proposals. The committee did not draw up the Knesset rules, but rules do exist.

Since a number of members, especially one from Herut, had further questions, the chairman postponed the discussion to an early subsequent day.

Lavon Tells His Side of the Story to the Knesset Committee ★ Peres and Sharett Refute Some of His Testimony

On October 3, 1960 Pinhas Lavon wrote to the Prime Minister as follows:

> I read your statement to the press yesterday and I will certainly reply to it. With your permission I will touch at present on one of the points you make. After stating that I wasn't "dismissed" from the post of Minister of Defense and that I resigned because the changes I recommended in the defense system were not accepted by the Government, you add, "Even today I do not know what those changes were—in my meetings with Pinhas Lavon I did not hear from him what they were." Allow me to refresh your memory.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Immediately after rejoining the Government as Minister of Defense, you invited me to inform you of my proposals and conclusions. In that conversation I told you, as I did Prime Minister Sharett before my resignation, that two men ought to be expelled from the defense organization. Likewise I told you of my various proposals regarding the structure of the defense organization. All this took place in your office in Tel Aviv on February 22, 1955. At your request, immediately after the conversation, I put my proposals in writing and sent them to you in my letter of February 24, 1955.

Lavon was right in refreshing the Prime Minister's memory. It is true that at the time of Ben-Gurion's return to the Ministry of Defense, Lavon stated his proposed changes. In the other matters at issue, however, he was mistaken. Three documents remain from the time of his withdrawal in February 1955:

1. His letter of resignation to the Prime Minister dated February 2, 1955, which states:

> You have submitted the additional findings of the Olshan-Dori [Committee] to Shaul Avigur. You did this despite my opposition. During the two hearings that went on for weeks I was kept at arm's length. Neither you nor another member tried to speak to me (except Eshkol, with whom I did not wish to speak for reasons which some worthy people may perhaps not understand), as if I were afflicted with a loathsome disease. I was anathema. I could not know what you thought, claimed, or accused. I was an object of pity or for settling accounts. Your conduct and that of the members excluded me from the group and from collective responsibility. But you are not the only ones who are free; I am also free, and this is to inform you that I am no longer prepared to be the friend of people who have liquidated their friendship with me. I hereby tender my resignation as Minister of Defense and from the Government.

There is no hint here that he was resigning because the Prime Minister did not agree to remove two people from the Defense Ministry. There is also the testimony of the Prime Minister at the time, that Lavon's resignation was influenced by the fact that bad relations obtained between Lavon and himself. At a meeting of the [Mapai] Party Central Committee, Sharett later would say: "I do not think that it is a secret to many that when I was Prime Minister and Pinhas Lavon Minister of Defense, a serious complication developed in our relationship, a complication that was very disappointing, very regrettable, and very grave. I will not go into details at this point. I am only stating the fact. This personal conflict was not without effect on Lavon's resignation as Minister of Defense."

2. The stenographic record of the Cabinet meeting of February 20, 1955, the last one in which Lavon participated. He spoke of the many mishaps that had occurred in 1954, concluding with these words: "In the light of these developments and the additional mishaps since then, I informed the Prime Minister that such failures could not be averted and complete control assured over the defense forces without the creation of a legal basis for their operations. We are the only state that lacks a definitive law in this respect. Presumably the Prime Minister had good reasons not to accept my proposals. Now that they have been rejected there is no possibility of my continuing to bear responsibility for national security and I have informed the Prime Minister of my resignation."

After Lavon left the Cabinet session, the Prime Minister said that the resignation has given rise to a serious internal situation. "How are we to understand the word 'internal'?" Sapir asked. Sharett explained: "Between myself and the Minister of Defense. Unfortunately not all these discussions remained where they belonged; they have become

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

the property of many people, both in the Army and among the general public. Now, this has created a grave situation in the Army, a situation of disappointment, bitterness, mistrust, internal insecurity. The supreme need, in my opinion, is to fill the vacated post, and in such a way that this resignation not weaken the Army's internal stability but make it even greater than before." [The reference was to the effort to co-opt Ben-Gurion to return to that post.] The Cabinet discussion went on for a long time, but no one mentioned that a condition for Lavon's remaining Minister was the dismissal of two people from the security system.

3. Finally there is the record of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee meeting the next day, February 21, 1955. Lavon spoke at length of the chain of events that led him to conclude that "failures such as these cannot be prevented, nor control over the security forces ensured, without changes of a rather radical nature both in the structure of the security system as a whole and the division of authority among its various branches." He added: "I did not object when the Prime Minister, for reasons which were doubtless well founded, saw no possibility of accepting my proposals. Following their rejection I did not feel it possible to continue to bear responsibility for State security and I informed the Prime Minister of my resignation from the Government."

These are the three documents. Lavon's statements to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and to the press in October 1960—five years and eight months later—cannot be reconciled with the records of 1955. After his first appearance before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 4, 1960, *Haaretz*, the only independent newspaper in Israel at that time, came out with a prominent headline: "Lavon Reveals Intrigues and Forgeries That Compromised Him as Defense Minister. Foreign Affairs Committee Continues Hearings." As Minister of Defense and Prime Minister for six years before and six years after Lavon, this writer knew of no deliberations of that committee ever having leaked to the press. Only statements released for publication by its chairman ever reached the public. No Government body had ever observed such strict secrecy as the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, nor was any Government body ever as reckless as that committee during its hearings on the Lavon matter from October 4, 1960, until January 18, 1961.

Lavon's initial appearance before the Knesset committee was on October 4. Before the debate the chairman, Mr. Berger, said: "Yesterday an item appeared in *Haaretz* and was repeated in *Yediot Aharonot* that completely distorts what took place in this room. *Haaretz* writes: 'Among other things the Prime Minister said at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 2, 1960, that two versions had been presented to the investigating committee at the time—the Olshan-Dori Committee [1955]—and the committee had rejected Lavon's version in favor of the other one.' *Yediot Aharonot* put it even more clearly. Apparently they had time to formulate it better: 'It is also known that the only thing Ben-Gurion told the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee which was not included in the statement to the press was the revelation that two versions were presented to a two-man committee of Justice Olshan and Gen. Dori which in 1955 investigated the affair that led to Lavon's resignation, and the committee accepted the second one.' I hope," the chairman concluded, "that the members will have no objections if I inform the press today that the Prime Minister never said this or anything like it."

Lavon thanked the Knesset committee for allowing him to address it. "As far as

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

I am concerned," he said, "it is basically untenable that this is a matter for the courts. To the best of my understanding it is not a matter for negotiations at the judicial level, but belongs to a different sphere altogether. I must ask your forgiveness if I am not brief. I will be compelled to speak of several points connected with the findings of the Olshan-Dori Committee, and it was decided not to let me see its material except for my own testimony, of which I had had a stenographic record made anyway. Apart from that I saw none of the testimony."

"Even while you were Minister of Defense?" Ben-Eliezer asked.

"Yes," Lavon answered. "Even when I asked for the testimony of a particular witness they refused, claiming that that person, who was one of my subordinates, did not want me to see it."

He presented at length his version of the affair which to this day, perhaps rightly, has not been released by censorship except for a few things that can be noted here.

"One bright day in January [1955]," he said, "there appeared before the committee a letter supposedly sent on July 19, 1954, by the Senior Officer to the Chief of Staff, who was in the United States at the time."

In Lavon's opinion the reason this letter was produced was because it said that the Minister of Defense had given the order to the Senior Officer; but the letter in question, he claimed, had been forged. He stated that Knesset member Galili had told another member, an officer, to inform Lavon that forgeries had been made. Lavon asked to see the officer, but he could not be persuaded to meet Lavon.

He then related that on February 4, 1960, he was visited by an officer who had heard of the alleged forgeries; that in May 1960 he informed the Prime Minister what he had been told, and that the Prime Minister immediately assigned his military secretary to investigate the matter. (After this three-quarters of a page of the stenographic record is blank: evidently either the committee chairman or Lavon had not permitted a record to be kept.) He was surprised, Lavon said, that after the material was submitted to Ben-Gurion, on July 15, 1960, he did not do the elementary thing called for, since this material was substantial, even if, from a purely legal point of view, not sufficient. (It is not clear to the writer whether he was objecting to the formation of the Cohen Committee or to the fact that it was appointed only after the trial of the "third man" was completed.)

Lavon cited what the Prime Minister had said two days earlier to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee: "Perhaps this investigation will lead us to the matter of the 1954 affair, or perhaps there is no connection. I do not know." And Lavon added, "I wish to say that I only hope that this was a slip of the tongue by the Prime Minister, for otherwise it is extremely serious, both for me personally and for the matter at hand—a whole lot more serious than a great many other things in this affair." (The writer can state that far from being a slip of the tongue, it was his considered opinion throughout, when he was Prime Minister and when he was not, that only an authorized court of law was qualified to investigate rumors and accusations that cast suspicion on certain people.)

Lavon followed these statements with an indictment of the Cohen Committee: "What is the object of this committee?" he exclaimed. Trials and justice do not always go hand in hand, he said. Then he complained against the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense both in his own time and under Ben-Gurion: "The Director of the Ministry of Defense, who had no connection with the affair itself and knew nothing about it except

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

from hearsay, considered it necessary to appear before the Olshan-Dori investigating committee and give evidence which, despite my request, I have not been permitted to see to this day."

"To whom did you make the request? To the committee?" Meridor asked.

Lavon replied: "To the Prime Minister at the time, Moshe Sharett. He told me that the witness was unwilling to have me see the testimony. Hence I cannot say that no collusion was involved here." In answer to a question by Bader, Lavon declared, "I am not saying nor have I ever said—I have no evidence—that either the former Chief of Staff (Moshe Dayan) or the former Director of the Ministry of Defense (Shimon Peres) were accessories to acts of forgery and perjury. However, it is very likely—there is a good deal of logic in it. The wagon was rolling, debts were accounts to settle. It was possible to climb aboard, if not the front way then around the back, and strengthen the hand of forgers and perjurers."

Shimon Peres appeared before the Knesset committee on October 23, 1960. "As I have already stated," he said, "my testimony was made up of questions from members of the [Olshan-Dori] committee and my answers. I was not asked nor did I answer questions on anyone's character. Mr. Lavon has complained publicly that I refused Prime Minister Sharett's request to show Lavon my testimony. Since then I have learned, after Mr. Sharett's statements to the committee, that this complaint is groundless. Mr. Sharett never even mentioned the matter to me. I would like to ask Mr. Lavon: Would it really have been so difficult for him to ring up Mr. Sharett and to learn in one minute that he was making false complaints?"

Returning to Lavon's testimony on October 4, 1960: "It is true," he said, "that the statement I issued was to the general effect that I demanded changes in the security system. My proposals were rejected and I resigned. Let me tell you what these changes were: one of them, the deciding factor in whether I would remain in the Government, was a change in personnel. I informed the Prime Minister at the time that I could not remain as Minister of Defense with a Director who gave evidence against me behind my back and a Senior Officer who accused me falsely—this was the minimum condition. The Prime Minister felt he could not do this."

We have already seen what Lavon wrote the Prime Minister in connection with his resignation on February 2, 1955. We have seen the reasons he gave to the Cabinet on February 20, 1955, and to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on February 21, 1955. These documents make no mention of a demand for the dismissal of the Director of the Ministry and the Senior Officer.

Sharett testified before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 17, 1960: "The Minister of Defense (Lavon) asked me to approve a series of measures that he considered essential. They included changes in organization as well as changes in personnel. The changes in personnel were to be two. One was the transfer of the Senior Officer from his post. Lavon did not demand his removal from the Army or the forfeit of his officer's rank but merely his transfer from the General Staff to a different post." Sharett added that such a transfer is within the authority of the Chief of Staff, not that of the Minister of Defense.

The writer can confirm this. If an officer of any rank acted without authority and then claimed that he had an order from the Minister of Defense—as Lavon contended in 1955 and now again in 1960—the Minister's duty was to have him court-martialed

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

at once, behind closed doors. The substance of the dispute would not be made public: Israeli military courts could be trusted to keep security secrets just as a civilian court was trusted in 1959 to conduct the trial of the "third man" in secret. As for the dismissal of Director-General Peres, Sharett confirmed that Lavon had demanded it and explained why he had not complied. Such an action, he said, would have been construed as laying the blame for the affair on him and "this blame could not be hung on the Director-General."

Shimon Peres testified the following week. "I had no part personally in any discussion about Lavon's dismissal or acceptance of his resignation," he said. "The Prime Minister did not request my opinion in the matter. I did not attend any party meeting or other forum where it was considered, nor did I know anything about the proceedings except from hearsay. The first time I learned explicitly that Mr. Lavon had demanded my resignation was his statement before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee." "Now?" asked the chairman. "Yes now, in 1960," Peres affirmed.

Another strange thing in Lavon's speech to the Knesset committee on October 4, 1960, in connection with his reasons for resigning, must be recorded. "I also wish to mention the following facts," he said. "On February 2, 1955, I sent my letter of resignation to the Prime Minister, a rather long letter. Since it was a letter between the two of us, I will not read it here, nor is it of any importance in this matter. But it gave my reasons for resigning. On February 17, 1955, the statement was broadcast over Kol Israel. I did not wish to wait for the outcome of the various investigations that were under way in different parts of the country, near and far, so I asked my friend on my left here, Mr. Evron, to give the announcement to Kol Israel. He showed it to the Prime Minister at the time and then it was broadcast. It said: 'Today, February 17, 1955, the Minister of Defense issued the following statement: On February 2, 1955, I notified the Prime Minister in writing of my resignation from the Government. In the light of negotiations since then, I informed the Prime Minister today that my resignation is final. I have decided to give the reasons therefore to the Cabinet and to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.'"

Copies of Lavon's letter of resignation to Sharett were sent to four people, three of them—Aranne, Eshkol, and Golda Meir—were members of the Government at the time; the fourth was an ordinary citizen living in Sde Boker, Ben-Gurion. Clearly that letter contained the real reasons for his resignation. It said nothing of changes in the defense system or a demand for the dismissal of Director-General Peres and the Senior Officer. The reason he cited for resigning was his personal relations with Aranne, Eshkol, and Sharett. Though its language was bitter, the letter complained only that the Prime Minister and his colleagues lacked confidence in him. One may doubt whether he gave the real reasons for his resignation to the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in February 1955 or to the same committee five years later, but one could hardly doubt the sincerity of the emotions expressed in the letter of February 2, 1955.

At the October 4, 1960, session of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee the two Herut representatives, Meridor and Bader, proposed that the Cohen Committee hearings be postponed. Bader went so far as to say, "I doubt whether the public, the nation, the people, and history take seriously the recommendations of a committee before which Mr. Lavon has not appeared in this matter." The Knesset committee came to no decision, arranging to reconvene in another week.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Lavon Statement to the Press ★ Three Conflicting Reasons for his 1955 Resignation ★ The "Scandal Factory"

On the day of his first appearance before the Knesset committee Lavon made a press statement, published the next day, October 5, in all the papers. It read:

> On October 2, 1960, David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, issued a statement which compels me to take issue on several main points:
>
> 1. The Prime Minister states that there was no connection between my resignation from the Government and the hearing previously conducted by the Committee of Two [Olshan-Dori]. The Prime Minister bases himself on the announcement in the Knesset by the then Prime Minister, Sharett, and on my announcement in the Cabinet and in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to the effect that I had resigned because proposals for changes in the structure of the defense system were rejected by Mr. Sharett. Upon reading the Prime Minister's announcement in this connection, I sent him the following letter on October 3, 1960. [The letter is quoted in full above, pages 610–11.] To this I must add that the only ultimative condition for my remaining in the Government was the dismissal of two men with whom no self-respecting person could continue working together after what had happened in a certain affair.
>
> 2. I was surprised to read the Prime Minister's arbitrary declaration that "if anyone [a]nything needs clearing, only a court of law has the right and power to do so." I do not think anyone has the right to confuse these two matters: that of the two officers which is being or will be investigated by a certain board of inquiry about charges of forgery and perjury, and that of the resignation of a former Minister of Defense. Naturally, when the investigation on the first matter is completed, the Minister of Defense or the Chief of Staff can decide to put those guilty of criminal acts on trial. This, however, is not the case with regard to the question of why a Minister of Defense resigned, and what the circumstances were which compelled him to do so. These questions are not of a judicial, or even a security nature. They are questions of national and public interest, and there is no logical or moral reason for trying to invoke judicial intervention. Even the Committee of Two, appointed at my request, was not a judicial body and did not have judicial authority. Obviously the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, with a considerable amount of justice, does not consider himself suited to be the arbiter in this matter; but there are institutions and not merely personalities in this country. There is the Government, which under law is a collective body; and there is the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. There is no reason why in this affair, which is of a national and public nature, both institutions or either of them should not consider themselves compelled to investigate and to draw conclusions.
>
> 3. On the instructions of the Minister of Defense the Chief of Staff set up a board of inquiry while I was abroad. I will not go into the question whether he had the right to do so without informing me. Formally, he undoubtedly did, but from the point of view of human relations and friendship there can be other opinions. I myself cannot see the need for such a board in view of the fact that the material in the hands of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (and I am familiar with all of it) was sufficient to be forwarded to the Attorney General, who in pursuing his investigation could have obtained the assistance of an officer or two whom the Chief of Staff would most certainly have placed at his disposal. It is not clear to me why this procedure was not followed instead of matters being complicated by setting up a committee that does not have any final arbitrating power.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4. At this point I wish to add a remark which is not included in the Prime Minister's statement, consisting as it does of "explanations" he is trying to disseminate to the effect that there is no connection, nor is any likely to develop, between the material that has recently come to light and a certain "affair." As long as it is in the nature of a security secret, I cannot divulge the nature and contents of this material, but I can state publicly and with full responsibility that all of it is connected with the affair in question and with that alone.

5. I agree unreservedly with the Prime Minister's assertion that no aspersions should be cast on the personal integrity of several of the people who have had to do with this affair. But it can happen that people of integrity make mistakes, and serious ones. The fact that such mistakes come to light has nothing to do with their personal integrity.

6. Finally, I stress once again that under no circumstances should the Israel Defense Forces be involved in this affair or in any ramifications that may develop from it. The IDF is dear to all of us. If, at and about the time of my resignation I remained silent for so long, an overwhelming consideration was concern for the welfare of the IDF. Yet nearly six years have passed since then. The IDF has changed. Great transformations have come about in its corps of commanders. For most of the IDF the affair is already a matter of history; if it is necessary to reopen it now, care must be taken not to drag in the Army. It does not concern the IDF nor will its good name be harmed by it.

Lavon appeared before the Knesset committee three more times, on October 11, 17, and 20. Never before, not even in the days of the *Altalena*, had the country been so agitated. Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee were always considered confidential, and had never before been leaked. But now everything that transpired was spread in the press, usually in mangled form. All barriers were dropped. Testifying on October 17, Sharett defined this "innovation" as follows: "A storm has risen in Israel, a storm now raging in the press and the length and breadth of Israel's public life. What is now under way is not a process of inquiry but a scandal factory."

The Lavon statement to the press made a number of valid points such as that the Army should be kept out of the affair. But it also contained some doubtful points and inaccuracies. Why was he so surprised by the Prime Minister's assertion that "if anything or anyone needs clearing only a court of law has the right and power to do so"? Did he not know that the crux of the 1954 affair lay in the fact there were two versions: that of Defense Minister Lavon, who denied giving the order for the unhappy operation, and that of the Senior Officers, who claimed that he had received it?

He was correct in saying that no one "has the right to confuse these two affairs"—the officers being investigated by the Cohen Committee and his resignation. But if there was any attempt to confuse the two issues, Lavon himself was to blame. In September 1960 he tried in vain to persuade Ben-Gurion to nullify the board assigned to examine the reliability of two officers. True, the question of why any Minister resigns is not a matter for the judiciary; nor can the resignation, after its acceptance, be the subject of an inquiry. But we cannot help wondering why on different occasions Lavon gave different reasons for giving up his post. And the October 4, 1960 attesting in his press statement compounded the confusion by saying that "the only ultimative condition for my remaining in the Government was the dismissal of two men with whom no self-respecting person could continue working together after what happened in a certain affair."

Press items from the "scandal factory" claimed that had Sharett known in 1955 what he learned in October 1960, he would never have "forced" Lavon to resign. Yet in a letter to Ben-Gurion on March 6, 1961 (two months after Ben-Gurion had resigned

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

over the miscarriage of justice by the Ministerial Committee of Seven in December 1960), Sharett would write: "I have taken care to refute the assumption in various circles and newspapers that had what was known in 1960 been known in 1954, Lavon would not have been compelled to resign. The truth is that the causes of the resignation were altogether different. Serious things had happened for which Lavon was to blame and these obliged him to resign. This was the gist of my statement to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 17, 1960, my article in *Davar* on October 21, my statement to the Press on October 25, and my speech to the Mapai Party's Central Committee on February 4, 1961."

From Sharett's testimony we may conclude that the 1954 affair was not the sole or perhaps even the main cause of the resignation. His emphasis on grave personal complications clearly implies that Lavon's resignation was not brought about only by the affair of 1954. On December 16, 1960, in Lavon's presence, Levi Eshkol said exactly the same thing to the Mapai Secretariat: "I want to be perfectly frank. He (Lavon) has already heard me say this. I said that unless a miracle occurred I did not see how the system of relationships Lavon had created would long survive." Turning to Lavon, he added: "There was something called the 'Affair,' and it began the day you took office." Lavon had joined the Government formed by Sharett on January 25, 1954, and the "security mishap" took place in July 1954. If Eshkol's statement was correct—and since Lavon did not deny it at the time we may assume it was—then some affair had been in existence from the moment Lavon entered the Government, at any rate before the unfortunate mishap in July. In the *Davar* article to which he alluded, Sharett wrote (October 21, 1960):

> The resignation of a Minister in a coalition government cannot always serve as the subject for a serious and purposeful inquiry by the Government itself, and certainly not by a Government formed later. Just as members of such a Government do not elect or appoint each other, so they cannot prevent one of their colleagues from resigning. In a coalition government the Ministers represent their respective parties and a resignation is something worked out on the formal level between the Minister and his party, and on the personal and political level between the Minister and the Prime Minister. At any rate, it is not a matter for "investigation" in any government framework.
>
> Actually, what is now taking place in our public life is not an inquiry but a scandal factory. In my appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, I refused to contribute to this destructive process. Mischievous winds are raging in our public life. Newspapers lacking all restraint are ceaselessly stirring up trouble between individuals and trying to poison the public atmosphere. It would seem that people well acquainted with the meaning of responsibility have been struck blind and are disregarding it more and more. Others, out of spite it would seem, are rebelling and leading the public astray. Every day the press explodes with a new "revelation" to blow up the controversy and inflame a lust for virulent rejoinder and blind revenge. The majority of the public is flabbergasted by the divulgences and confused by the turmoil, which kicks up such a lot of dust while keeping the main thing hidden.
>
> I discern three different aspects of the affair and my conclusions are likewise threefold. First, the criminal aspect that is basically a subject for judicial inquiry. Secondly, the defense aspect of both the operation itself and the information that has come to light in its wake; this can be heard by the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, which will do well to limit itself to this matter only and wind up its hearings as soon as possible. Thirdly, the resignation, which should be left to the judgment and appraisal of public opinion and in the final account to history.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

It is hard to dispute these conclusions, but for some reason Sharett did not stick by the first of them when it was required. He did not make clear in his article that if the criminal aspect—the question, that is, of who gave the order—had been submitted to a judicial body, the scandal factory would have ground to a halt, since the judiciary enjoys the nation's confidence, and has earned it. Such an investigation was prevented by Lavon's powerful opposition from 1954 onward, as we learned from Sharett himself. At the meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on January 15, 1961, he would say: "In Lavon's place I would have declared myself in favor of a judicial board of inquiry, and the reason it was not held was not because I refused but because Lavon opposed it."

But why was Sharett as Prime Minister dependent on Lavon and his opinion? Had a judicial investigation taken place at once, in 1954, the "Lavon Affair" would never have developed and we would not have been subjected six years later to a scandal factory and a Government crisis.

One member of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in the period of the scandal factory, Yacov Hazan (Mapam), noted the confusion of issues. At the meeting of October 17, 1960, he said: "We are dealing with two different matters. One of them is personal, between Lavon and the Senior Officer, only one of whom can be in the right . . . . One of the two has to be cleared: either one of them committed forgery or the other lied. I think that a properly run country cannot afford to live off the blood of its citizens."

This sensible view was ignored by the other committee members, just as they had ignored the Prime Minister's plea for a judicial inquiry when the committee deliberations first began. Ben-Gurion was heeded neither by the Mapai members nor those of other parties, perhaps for the reason given by Eshkol: "Lavon's appearances before this committee have made him a magnet for all of Mapai's opponents. He has become a magnet, and all those who seek to hurt Mapai have clustered around him."

New Accusations by Lavon ★ The Cohen Committee Submits Findings ★ "Senior Officer" Requests Judicial Action ★ Cabinet Sets Up a Ministerial Committee of Seven

To this day large parts of Lavon's statements to the Knesset committee in October 1960 have not been released for publication by the censor, although the "mishap" has been described in full detail in many foreign papers. Lavon, however, did not restrict himself to that security blunder. He complained also of irregularities in the Ministry of Defense and in the work of its Director-General, Shimon Peres. He had bitter things to say about a mishap of a similar nature which had occurred earlier and in a different country.

The writer will not presume to judge between Lavon and Peres. But as Minister of Defense for fifteen years, both before and after Lavon, he considers it his duty to establish beyond doubt that Lavon's claim that a similar security mishap had occurred in 1952 in a different country was completely unfounded. What took place in that country was an intentional frameup of local Jewish youths by a hostile Arab government. One of them "confessed" his guilt after terrible tortures. In the subsequent trial he insisted that

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

the confession had been obtained under duress, and that neither he nor his friends had had any part in the crime attributed to them. He was hanged notwithstanding. The second young Jew, also sentenced to hang, later had his sentence commuted to ten years of imprisonment. He is now living in Israel and is familiar with every detail of the episode.

None of the Jews accused implicated any of their friends or claimed they had received orders from Israel. The fact is that no Jews had any part in the crimes in question, nor was there any resemblance between what happened in that country in 1952 and what is known as the "Lavon Affair," in which the Senior Officer claimed that the Minister of Defense had given him an order and the Minister claimed that the officer had acted on his own. The truth could be discovered only by judicial proceedings, but Lavon opposed this. He even tried to call off the board of inquiry known as the Cohen Committee.

Although Lavon told the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee that the Army "must on no account be brought into this affair," in subsequent appearances before the committee he hurled serious accusations against Army officers and officials of the Ministry of Defense, if not against the Army as a whole.

"I call it corruption," he said at the October 17 session, "when officers and officials of the Ministry of Defense consider it their function to engage in talebearing, to spread rumors, and to influence the newspapers in this affair. I do not know how many they are. I am told that there are scores of people. I am told this by the newspapermen themselves to whom they speak. What business is it of lieutenant-colonels or majors or officials of the Ministry of Defense to devote days and nights to this matter? Is that what they get paid for?" And he added, "I have material even more damaging than this, but I have refrained from making it public. We have a Minister of Defense (Ben-Gurion) who is not an interested party. He ought to tell these boys to lay off—it's none of their business."

He had not yet revealed all the corruption that he supposedly knew about military officers and officials of the Defense Ministry. He went on to say that "officers at present responsible for the Army have no connection with the matter." Yet when Knesset member Chaim Landau (Herut) asked, "What people in the Defense Ministry are engaging in journalism?" Lavon replied, "I am not prepared to mention names." Nor did he refrain from intimating that the present Minister of Defense also bore responsibility for those unnamed lieutenant-colonels and majors, because he did not "tell those boys to lay off." Lavon did not make plain to the committee that he had never brought his accusations against the lieutenant-colonels and majors, or even the officials of the Defense Ministry, to the attention of the minister, and refused to mention names when requested to do so.

Naturally, Lavon's charges against people in the Ministry of Defense, including Army officers, appeared in the newspapers and were the occasion for a question in the Knesset. S. Zalman Abramov of the General Zionists addressed it to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense: "On October 14, 1960, *Davar* published an interview with Pinhas Lavon in which he says: 'If there is talebearing and the dissemination of false rumors in order to cultivate journalists and influence in certain circles, the question is, is this their function? Is it for this that they receive salaries from the national coffers?' Since no denial of this serious accusation has appeared in that paper or any other, I would ask the honorable Minister: (1) Is the abovementioned accusation true? (2) If so, how does he plan to eliminate these faults and ensure that they will not recur? (3) If the accusation is untrue and the abovementioned statements are a slander of the defense system, what action does the Minister intend to take against its author?"

Research Papers
James M. Emmes, Jr.

Ben-Gurion replied in the Knesset on November 23, 1960:

1. The above-mentioned person has elsewhere said things of an even more serious nature about "scores" of lieutenant-colonels, majors, and officials of the Foreign Ministry who spend their days and nights in talebearing and disseminating false rumors in connection with this affair. Yet when asked to state who they were, he replied, "I am not prepared to mention names." Hence, I do not see any substance of responsibility whatsoever in his accusations.

2. The employees of the Defense Ministry are among the most loyal and devoted of our civil servants, for they know that what they are serving is the nation's most vital need. If any accusation is brought against a specific person or persons among them, I will treat the matter with the utmost severity, just as I do in the case of the Army.

3. I have asked the Attorney General if the authors of statements such as these can be prosecuted for libel. He replied that unless a specific person can be identified to whom the statements apply they do not come under the definition of libel provided by law. The Attorney General feels that a new libel law should be enacted which would put an end to the present state of affairs whereby a citizen's honor and good name can be disparaged at will."

The hearings by the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee brought no clarification or conclusions regarding the 1954 affair or any other. The majority of Lavon's claims and charges were refuted by Sharett and Shimon Peres. On January 31, 1961, the Minister of Justice denied Lavon's implication that the Senior Officer had done something else without authorization. "I will give only one example," Lavon had said in October. "There was an operation that Knesset member Hazan surely remembers—one in which five boys were sent to Syria in connection with some instrument that was supposed to be planted in some tree. As a result one boy, Feige Klein's son, lost his life. This was something neither I not the Chief of Staff knew about and it was done by that same person."

"That is to say," Bar-Yehuda asked, "the same Senior Officer?"

"Yes," Lavon replied, "it was folly from beginning to end."

Raphael interrupted to ask, "Was it within the Senior Officer's authority?"

"No, he needed approval by the Chief of Staff," Lavon answered. "I believe that the Chief of Staff at that time (Dayan) knew about it. I myself learned about it only after it was all over."

The event to which Lavon referred occurred a short while before the writer returned to the Ministry of Defense on February 21, 1955. On reassuming the post he inquired into the matter and read what the preceding Minister of Defense (Lavon) had told the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. What he told them at the start of 1955 about the event in question was the exact opposite of what he now told the same committee in 1960.

In November 1960 the Minister of Justice, Pinhas Rosen, persuaded the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to suspend its hearings because the Cabinet—overriding the Prime Minister's objections—had decided to set up a seven-man ministerial committee to deal with the subject.

When Chief of Staff Laskov on September 12, 1960, in accordance with the Prime Minister's instructions, formed the Cohen Committee, its scope was quite clear. In the letter to Justice Cohen and the two lieutenant-colonels who constituted the committee, he stated:

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

You are appointed to a board of inquiry the purpose of which is to investigate:

a. Whether any measures were taken by the "Senior Officer," his assistant, or any other officer in the bureau in question to induce witnesses in general and the "third man" in particular to perjure themselves to the Olshan-Dori Committee that investigated the "security mishap" or to the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff and whether false evidence was actually given.

b. Whether any alterations were made in the documents of [name deleted by censor] or other documents connected with the investigation carried out by the abovementioned committee, and if so, by whom and at whose orders.

c. Justice Chaim Cohen will be the chairman of this board of inquiry. It will seek to establish facts and arrive at conclusions. It will begin its work by examining: (1) the material of the Olshan-Dori Committee of Inquiry; (2) the verdict of the Jerusalem District Court in the case of the "third man" written by Colonel Amiad. The board will submit its findings by October 15, 1960.

The Cohen Committee findings, presented on the specified day, read in part:

Since 1953 various accusations and suspicions have been raised to the effect that documents and records in connection with the "security mishap" had been forged. Apparently no one has yet succeeded in obtaining proof. Though we do not know if the claims of forgery that we have heard are all the claims ever made to this effect in this affair, we find that they have not been proved, nor have the suspicions, except for one matter which still bears investigation, been substantiated.

In July 1954 the Senior Officer sent the Chief of Staff, who at the time was in the United States, a typewritten two-page letter. The second page contained a paragraph beginning with the words, "according to Lavon's instructions . . [deleted by censor] have been activated." The suspicion was raised that this letter was written not on July 19, 1954, but at a later date; or alternately that the second page was subsequently altered by the addition of a paragraph that was not in the original.

Colonel Herzog, who accompanied the Chief of Staff on that trip to the United States, has confirmed that the Chief of Staff received the Senior Officer's letter between July 23 and 26, 1954, while visiting a military base in Florida.

The officer in charge of the Police Laboratory for Criminal Identification, Avraham Hagag, has given his opinion in writing that the two pages of the document submitted are of the same age; that the dates appearing on the first page are as written originally and have not been altered; that when they were written the same second page now attached to the first page was attached to the first page; and that the document was not tampered with in any way to make it appear either more or less recent than it really was. A copy of his opinion is attached herewith: "In view of this evidence, we hereby establish that the Senior Officer's letter was sent to the Chief of Staff on July 19, 1954, that it consisted of the same two pages that make up the document now in our possession, and that it was not altered in any way."

The board then went on to state that no support was found for the testimony of the "third man" in the Jerusalem District Court that his original diary for the year 1954 had been replaced and reports altered with a view to substantiating the testimony of the Senior Officer and his assistant before the Olshan-Dori Committee. As for the claim that the Senior Officer or his assistant had tampered with documents relating to the affair, it found that "Neither we nor those who made allegations or voiced suspicions know which documents were allegedly forged, nor have we in our possession any data enabling us to assume that if any documents were in fact forged, even during the period

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

in question, they related to the Affair and served, or could have been or were designed to serve, as evidence before the Olshan-Dori Committee. If notwithstanding all this we felt it necessary to investigate the question of those forgeries thoroughly, this was mainly in order to put an end to the discussion and the speculations that these allegations and suspicions have aroused."

The board found that documents had vanished from the office of the Senior Officer and that the frightening ease with which the "third man" (sentenced to twelve years for espionage) had been able to steal secret documents "point to serious and disquieting flaws in that unit's filing system." However, they "have not found sufficient evidence indicating the guilt of any particular person." In the board's opinion the Senior Officer had not told all that he knew and remembered. Also the board had not had time to examine four witnesses whose examination, it felt, was in order.

On October 18, 1960, the Minister of Defense submitted all the material of the Cohen Committee to Attorney General Hausner.

While the country was still rocking from the "scandal factory" and the distortions in the press, and before the release of the Cohen Committee's findings, the Senior Officer asked the Chief of Staff for a judicial committee of inquiry to determine whether he had acted on his own in 1954 or had received an order from the Minister of Defense. The Chief of Staff passed his letter on to the Minister of Defense who gave it to Minister of Justice Rosen at the Cabinet meeting of October 23, 1960. Levi Eshkol thereupon asked: "Will the Minister of Justice be the one to decide the issue?" Ben-Gurion replied: "He can appoint an inquiry committee, but not if the Cabinet should rule otherwise. That is why I am bringing the matter to the Cabinet. I have consulted the Attorney General, and this is what he advised me to do, because it is a matter of common decency; a person has the right to defend his honor. For Ben-Aharon and myself Lavon may be a very important person, but before the law everyone is equal. The Senior Officer is requesting a judicial committee with the power to subpoena witnesses and determine whether or not he gave the order."

Mr. Rosen then said: "The Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice have the authority to appoint inquiry committees. Neither has ever been known to appoint a committee on an important issue without consulting the Cabinet. I will not do so on my own initiative." When several Ministers voiced their opposition to a judicial inquiry, the Prime Minister said:

"There will be no end to this business until a committee rules according to law. There will be no end of it if the Senior Officer's proposal is rejected. This is a country of law. I understand that there are members here who would like the Government to be the judge. To that I am completely opposed. The Government cannot be a judge in a case like this. Only a committee of jurists who have no preconceived notions in the matter or an inclination to one side or the other, and who know how to conduct a judicial inquiry, can do this. I see how a 'judicial' inquiry is developing in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee—it is a scandal the like of which Israel has never yet known. I am opposed to the Government acting as an investigator in this matter."

"Perhaps," Minister of Finance Eshkol suggested, "the Government won't investigate but will merely come to the reasonable conclusion that we have reached the end of the line."

At that meeting the Cabinet did not reach a decision because it was busy debating

James M Ennes, Jr Research Papers

whether to publish the findings of the Cohen Committee. By a vote of six to five (in which the Prime Minister did not participate) it was decided to publish the findings as edited by the Minister of Justice, and without mentioning names. The question of a judicial inquiry was postponed to October 30, 1960, the following week.

Meanwhile the Prime Minister learned that Eshkol was trying to persuade members to appoint a *ministerial* committee, rather than a judicial committee of inquiry. At the start of the October 30 meeting the Prime Minister therefore declared:

"I will participate neither in the debate nor in the voting. I merely wish to clarify my position. In my opinion there is only one question with regard to the past: Was the order given or not, and if it was, by whom? I hold that this is a question that can be resolved only by due judicial process, by objective persons with the power to subpoena witnesses and to put the person who lied on trial. There is law in this country. We must distinguish between two things. As to how to proceed tomorrow or the day after in some security question or other, there can be no differences of opinion. That is something which can be decided by a political body. But in cases in which one has to determine what has already happened, to establish facts, the entire free world provides for judicial procedures. Now that I have said what I had to say, I will merely conduct the meeting."

"The Senior Officer has submitted a request to the Chief of Staff," the Minister of Justice then said. "The Chief of Staff forwarded it to the Prime Minister and last week the Prime Minister gave it to me. The Senior Officer requests a board of inquiry, under the Committees of Inquiry Law, empowered to 'determine if I was given an order by the Minister of Defense at the time. I have said, and I repeat, that when I gave the order to carry out the operation, it was on the basis of an order from the Minister of Defense at the time.' If there is no new material, I see no reason to accede to the request. I think this is a matter that should be decided by a ministerial committee, such as I am about to propose.

"In my opinion the ministerial committee should resolve the question whether a committee of inquiry is required, after seeing all the material. The Government should decide how to proceed in this matter and how to arrive at a conclusion. This will hardly be possible unless a limited ministerial committee sees all the material, after which it will be in a position to recommend that the Government appoint a committee of inquiry with power to subpoena witnesses, and so on. It can also recommend against the appointment of such a committee. But personally I am not at all sure if we will be able to bring this business to an end without a committee of inquiry. I have said this several times. I assume that what the ministerial committee will decide on will be the procedure. It may well be, however, that on the basis of the material it will decide that the last word can be said on the subject. I doubt that this will be the case, but it is possible."

Ben-Aharon and Eshkol firmly supported Rosen's proposal for a ministerial committee. After a lengthy debate, both relevant and irrelevant, Rosen said: "I gather that the members agree that a ministerial committee should be appointed to study the material and recommend to the Government how to proceed. The committee as such—so I understand—will not make conclusions without submitting a report to the Cabinet." The proposal was adopted by a vote of twelve to nothing. The Prime Minister abstained from the voting. Opinion differed on the number of members on the committee. By a vote of seven to four the Cabinet decided on five members: Pinhas Rosen, chairman; Eshkol, Ben-Aharon, Shapira, and Shitreet. An additional session was set for the next day for final agreement on the composition of the committee. The following day, October 31,

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

the Cabinet convened without the Prime Minister, who was busy in the Knesset. The ministerial committee, it was decided, would have seven members. Israel Barzilai and Benjamin Mintz were added to those already elected.

3

Meetings of Ministerial Committee ★ Rosen Drafts Its Findings ★ Police Investigation into Alleged Forgery Reports "No Case"

The first meeting of the ministerial Committee of Seven on November 3, 1960, was opened by its chairman, the Minister of Jusice, Pinhas Rosen. He defined its competence as follows: "To review the material and to tell the Government what in our opinion should be done in the future." There is no stenographic record of the first thirteen meetings--only brief summaries of the material examined.

At the third meeting (November 10) Minister Mintz asked to see documents relating to the Senior Officer in a certain trial. At first Rosen said that the material was not relevant to the matter at hand, but then he agreed to produce it. When the Prime Minister learned that this material was read to the committee, he wrote to the Minister of Justice: "I have learned that one of the members of the Committee of Seven asked to see the material of [deleted by censor] and you consented. Since I am not the Senior Officer's defense attorney it makes no difference to me whether you delve into his past, but as far as I know this is not your assigned function; nor have you asked for any material on the actions of the other party to the dispute, the Minister of Defense in 1955. Does this not constitute discrimination?"

The Prime Minister received the following answer on January 11, 1961: "We have drawn no conclusions from the Senior Officer's conduct in the matter of [deleted], as I have warned the members several times not to be influenced by this case, which occurred twelve years ago and which did not preclude his attaining the rank of a Senior Officer in the Israel Defense Forces."

The Prime Minister found the reply astonishing. The Minister of Justice recognized that this material did not pertain to the committee, then went ahead and presented it. He felt that by admonishing his colleagues not to be influenced he had rectified the error. But why did the members of the committee wish to see this material? For diversion? Later one of its members indicated that it was solely on the basis of this material that he had decided against the Senior Officer.

On November 20 the Minister of Justice wrote the Prime Minister:

> The committee's conclusions will relate to questions of procedure only. Our assignment is to review the material connected with the affair and to advise the Government how to proceed in dealing with the affair itself, and whether additional steps should be adopted to this end. Our proposals could be any of the following: (1) to empower the seven-man committee to draw findings from the material it has seen; (2) to accredit the seven-man committee as an inquiry committee; (3) to accredit the seven-man committee as an investigating committee; (4) to appoint another investigating committee in which the [Knesset] Opposition will not participate; or (5) to appoint an investigating committee in which the Opposition will participate.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

> Eshkol persuaded Ahdut Haavodah, Mapam, and the religious parties to agree to recess the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and to appoint a ministerial committee because that was the only way to replace the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee hearings with something more practical and effective.

For some reason the Minister of Justice did not realize that the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee's hearings would have stopped in any case, had the Government granted the Senior Officer's just request for a judicial board of inquiry.

On November 28, 1960, the Minister of Justice announced that he had instructed the Cabinet Secretariat to ask Lavon whether he had any material relating to the affair. The material was received that afternoon, but the minutes do not disclose its nature. At the thirteenth meeting, the following day, the Secretary read a photocopy of the police experts finding, as conveyed to the Cohen Committee, that no forgery had been found in any copy of the Senior Officer's letter of July 19, 1955.

Beginning with the fourteenth meeting on December 5 there is a complete stenographic record of the proceedings. On that day Rosen apprised the members that Attorney General Hausner had flown to Paris to question the "secretary," the Senior Officer's successor, and others in connection with the matter of alleged forgery. Though by law such an interrogation was the function of the police, Rosen had insisted that it be done by the Attorney General. Barzilai asked, "Did the Cohen Committee recommend this?" Rosen replied, "First of all it was I who requested it and it is also recommended by the Cohen Committee." On the same day he said, "Though I am not inclined to a committee of inquiry—I am opposed to it—I think we ought to hear Sharett, Lavon, the Senior Officer, and the reserve officer in this matter." He also asserted that "The Senior Officer has a legitimate interest in a committee of inquiry," but failed to explain why he opposed it.

At the same December 5 meeting Rosen said, "The wording of the decision (to set up the Committee of Seven) is imprecise. In the Cabinet we spoke explicitly of procedural findings; findings, yes, but specifically the kind I'm talking of: that is to say, not fact findings." Eshkol asked, "Then what are we now?" Rosen answered, "A study committee."

Returning from Paris, the Attorney General appeared before the Committee of Seven on December 13. He had spoken with the "Senior Officer's successor" and then with the Senior Officer's secretary. The successor said that in 1955 he had heard from the secretary that she had made a change in some letter. In a confrontation with Hausner she denied saying this. Hausner then questioned her in private. She was a great admirer of the Senior Officer. On the last day of the interrogation she admitted that she had made a change in the letter. When Hausner produced the letter of July, 1954, she said, "Yes, that is the one." The secretary was now back in Israel, Hausner announced, and was being questioned by the police. Eshkol asked whether any purpose will be served by continuing the police investigation. "The secretary's testimony is of the first importance for any further inquiry," Hausner answered.

Chairman Rosen: "We have before us a request by the Senior Officer and his attorney to be heard in order to prove that Lavon gave the order. We will have to decide about this. I propose that we hear a certain officer who seems to have been present when the Senior Officer came out from a conference with Lavon and told him that he had just received the order. After that I want to hear Dayan, who has asked to be heard. We should also hear the Senior Officer and Lavon and perhaps Sharett as well."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The prospect of an appearance by Dayan worried Ben-Aharon. "I'm afraid of what happens if we start opening the door," he said.

Rosen: "I would like to hear the Senior Officer. I would like to hear Lavon and I would also like to hear Sharett."

Shapira: "Dayan ought to be heard."

Eshkol: "You want it in all the papers?"

Shitreet: "I said at one of the previous meetings that I am in favor and my opinion is unchanged. If the chairman wants to hear three or four witnesses, and they are key witnesses, they ought to be heard."

Eshkol: "I remain opposed. We are not an investigating committee."

Rosen: "Let's take a trial vote."

The vote was taken: three members were in favor of hearing witnesses, two were opposed and one abstained.

With that the meeting ended. In opening the next session (December 15), Chairman Rosen reported that he had spoken to General Dayan: "He must find a way for the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to know that Lavon lied in at least one respect. We have before us also a request by Advocate Salomon (the Senior Officer's lawyer) to address the committee. He has heard about the alteration in the copy of the letter which previously read 'in accordance with previous talks,' or something like that. But he feels this does not prove that Lavon did not give the order."

Unexpectedly, Rosen then informed the committee that he had already prepared a draft of its findings. The draft included the statement: "The committee has not heard witnesses. The majority of the members were of the opinion that it was not within its competence to hear witnesses." At the first meeting, it will be recalled, the Minister of Justice declared the function of the committee was "To review the material and to tell the Cabinet what in our opinion should be done in the future." In the draft of findings, however, the formulation was different: "The Cabinet set up a committee to examine all the material relating to the affair and to submit its conclusions to the Government."

The Committee of Seven knew very well that the interrogation of "the secretary" (who had returned to Israel at the request of the Attorney General) and of three other civilians and three Army officers had been turned over to the Israel police. In his directive to the Chief Inspector of the Police, on December 12, Hausner wrote, among other things:

> I request that you assign a suitably experienced officer to wind up the investigation concerning the possible forgery of a document mentioned in the deposition of the secretary. The man against whom the accusation is made, an officer in the reserves, has already been questioned and denies the said accusation. Attached is a copy of the report on this subject.

On December 26 the Deputy Commander of the Investigating Military Police submitted a Final Investigation Report to the head of the Manpower Division: "Subject: suspicion of forgery in the letter by the Senior Officer to the Chief of Staff on July 19, 1954."

The principal witness, it appeared from the report, was the secretary alleged to have altered a letter by the Senior Officer in order to stress that Lavon had given him the order for the operation in question. In her interrogation by Hausner, in Paris, she declared that she introduced the words "according to Lavon's order" in what she was "99 percent

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

certain" was the letter of July 19, 1954. But in the first police questioning in Israel she stated that "after thinking over" her Paris testimony, given under great tension, "she had begun to doubt whether it was in the letter of July 19, 1954, that the alteration had been made." The police report added: "In a face-to-face confrontation with the reserve officer the secretary adhered to her story that among the documents the latter had given her to type there had been *some document* [emphasis in the original] in which she was to have made the change." But she remained doubtful whether it was the July 19 letter.

The report also stated: "After two days of tests, Albert Hagag, a criminal identification expert with the Israel Police, concluded that all the existing copies of the Senior Officer's letter of July 19, 1954, to the Chief of Staff, had been typed simultaneously on one typewriter. He identified the typewriter. *No traces of forgery were found in the copies of the letter.* [Emphasis in original.]" Citing the ambiguity in the secretary's testimony and the conclusion of the identification expert, the report concluded: "No Case."

Section 2. Ministerial Committee Proceedings: Ben-Gurion Resigns

Senior Officer Not Invited To Testify ★ Peres Answers Lavon's Accusation ★ Ministerial Committee Makes "Material" Findings

Most of Lavon's testimony before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee was not released by censorship and rightly to the extent that it related to the "mishap" and its consequences. A large part of it, however, did not relate to the affair itself but to charges of "irregularities" in the Defense Ministry during his term as Minister, for which he blamed largely the Director-General of the Defense Ministry, Shimon Peres. The Knesset committee rejected the just demand by Hazan that the Senior Officer be invited to present his side of the affair, but it did invite Peres. In the course of four appearances he commented on Lavon's imputations—not as reported in the newspapers but as set forth in the shorthand record. He also refuted slanders in press reports against high-ranking Army officers.

On January 5, 1955, Peres had received a phone call from the Olshan-Dori Committee asking him to appear before it that afternoon. On his arrival he was informed that the committee's inquiry was secret and that his testimony would be kept secret. In the nearly six years since then he had not seen the records of his testimony. Only now, in late 1960, did he learn that because of this testimony Lavon had at that time demanded that the Prime Minister dismiss him—a demand based in part on the false assumption that he had refused to show it to Lavon. Peres also vigorously denied that he had testified about Lavon's character, as Lavon claimed: he had merely answered questions, none of which related to Lavon's character.

Lavon had told the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of a plot, forgeries, wastage, and other troubles in the Ministry, and the newspapers had linked this with his demand for the removal of Peres. The press, indeed, gave the impression that Israeli

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

democracy was menaced by defense personnel and officers—the lieutenant-colonels and majors about whom Lavon had complained, while refusing to identify them by name. Peres declared that in his thirteen years in the defense system he had come to know most of the high-ranking officers, but had never heard from them any objections to the democratic civilian control over the military. On the contrary, the magnificent Officer Corps completely accepted and supported our democratic form of government.

He had not taken part in any Cabinet discussions, if there were any, about the dismissal or resignation of Lavon, Peres testified, nor had he been asked for his opinion in the matter by Prime Minister Sharett. Lavon himself had never told him that he wanted him dismissed, which in any case was within his authority as Minister of Defense. Peres made clear that he had no connection whatsoever with the "security mishap" before, during, or after the event.

Lavon complained before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee that the Defense Ministry had had some dealings in connection with a floating dock, which he claimed was not a defense matter, citing it as an example of the "irregularities."

"One bright day," he said, "I heard that there was a draft agreement [on the dock]: 50 percent Ministry of Defense, 50 percent Solel Boneh [a civilian company]. I asked whether the three or four or five boats we had in the Navy justified 50 percent coming out of Defense funds. Whether such a dock should be bought or not is not a question for the Ministry of Defense. There are Economic Ministers, let them do the deciding. Why does the Defense Ministry have to be a partner in it?"

It is true that the Ministry was involved in a dock purchase, but it had no such implications of "irregularity." In October 1953 the Minister of Defense at the time (Ben-Gurion) submitted to the Cabinet an eighteen-point plan for defense policy over the next three years. Point 10 spoke of maximal utilization of the civilian economy for military supply, transport, construction, production, and other military services. Point 16 dealt with "expansion of civilian aviation and shipping," including procurement of "a floating dock at Haifa."

Asked about this part of Lavon's accusations, Peres recalled that Lavon himself, as Defense Minister, "took the initiative" on acquisition of a floating dock, and two months before his resignation proposed that it be operated jointly by the Defense and Transport Ministries and also serve the Merchant Marine and the Navy. "The first time I heard that Lavon was opposed to it," he said, "was after his appearance before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on October 11, 1960."

At a subsequent hearing Lavon extended the dimensions of his charges. "At the last meeting," he said, "I gave the dock as an example. I can add several others as well. For instance, there was the matter of the maintenance plant. When I looked into it I was unable to understand why the 'gigantic' State of Israel needed three maintenance plants, one for the Air Force, one for El Al, and one set up by the Ministry of Defense. Why three maintenance plants? Why not only one? Such a plant, of course, could not be under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. I am mentioning this as another example of the differences of opinion."

On this point, on October 23, Peres related:

> The idea for the maintenance plant originated in 1951. On a visit to the United States, Mr. Ben-Gurion saw such a plant in California run by former Mahal people [foreign volun-

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

teers during Israel's War of Independence], and invited them to Israel. It was then that he put me in charge of construction. On August 17, 1952, the Government resolved (Resolution No.560) to create an aircraft maintenance plant. I handled the matter not only for the Minister of Defense but also for the Minister of Transport at the time. I also have documents consenting to the creation of the plant from El Al, from the Ministry of Transport, and from the Economic Ministers.

Disputes developed as to the nature of the plant, the relationships with El Al and the Air Force, and other things. There was also opposition to the appointment of Mr. Schwimmer, who is presently the plant's director. Mr. Lavon claims there are three maintenance plants. I am afraid he is mistaken. There are as many plants as there are airfields. Every Air Force squadron requires a maintenance plant for low-level repairs. . . .

Take the current year, for example: the Bedek plant will put in man-hours of work worth IL18 million, including $2 million worth of work from foreign customers who pay for it in dollars, as well as work for the Air Force, for El Al, and for Arkia. We have dealings with the United States, England, France, and other countries. The management of the Bedek plant, which employs twenty-five hundred workers, includes representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Transport, and Commerce and Industry as well as the Air Force and the IDF. And there are no problems of either duplication or friction. It is one of the finest outfits in the country.

Lavon had made a blanket charge of "wasteful redundancy—almost everything in the Army had its counterpart in the Defense Ministry: spokesmen, manpower departments, administration, budget, and so on and so forth." Except for the "so on and so forth," Peres dealt with each of these elements. Where there was seeming duplication, he argued, there were always different functions that made it necessary and justified.

The strangest thing about these proceedings was that the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in 1960 was discussing irregularities that supposedly took place in 1954—discussing them with the person who was Minister of Defense in that year. Was there no Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in 1954? Were there not members of the committee in 1960 who had also served on it in 1954? No one asked the most simple question: Why had the Minister of Defense in 1954 not brought these complaints of redundancy before the committee five or six years ago?

On October 26, 1960, the Knesset Speaker tried to show that it was not within the committee's authority to deal with what happened in 1954, since it was not an investigating committee. Section 22 of the Basic Law of the Knesset and Section 13 of the Knesset Rules of Procedure made it clear that the committee had no authority whatsoever to hear anything that did or did not occur in 1954 from the Minister of Defense in that year. But only after the Cabinet on October 31 decided to set up the ministerial Committee of Seven did the Minister of Justice manage to persuade the committee to interrupt its hearings on what happened in 1954–1955 until the Government committee completed its investigation.

What the Minister of Justice who initiated the Committee of Seven failed to understand was that such an investigation was not within the authority of a ministerial committee either. The objective—to determine who gave or didn't give the order in 1954—was not within the Cabinet's authority but belonged to a judicial body. Every democratic state maintains a separation of powers; there is legislative and executive power on the one hand, judicial power on the other; the executive is not empowered to adjudicate disputes between individuals. In fact the Minister of Justice had himself informed his

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

committee colleagues on December 5, 1960, that their findings were to be p dural rather than material, and that they were merely a study committee. He had stated th same thing in a letter to this writer dated October 20, 1960.

In the committee's last days, however, he suddenly changed his mind and presented a draft of findings, concluding with the words: "The investigation of the affair should be considered closed." His proposed findings asserted that the Attorney General's investigation in Paris had shown that the words "according to Lavon's order" were not in the Senior Officer's original letter; this was plainly untrue. Upon returning from Paris Mr. Hausner had merely said that the testimony of : secretary gave grounds for further investigation, which was being carried out by the police in Israel.

Strangely, Rosen saw no need to await the o come of this investigation. Perhaps it was because, when he had first heard of the "secu ty mishap" in early 1955, he said he was certain that Lavon had not given the order. This certainty was based, it ceemed, only on the belief that a smart man like Lavon wouldn't do a foolish thing like that. He did not consider that the Senior Officer was also a smart man and that for him to do such a thing would have been even more foolish. The Minister of Defense was at least authorized to give such an order, whereas the Senior Officer was not. What motive could he have had for such an operation without the Minister's agreement? If it succeeded, the Defense Minister would get all the credit, and if it failed, he could be court-martialed and expelled from the Army. Actually, had he really acted without authorization, it was Lavon's duty to put him on trial at once for undertaking an unauthorized operation that led to the loss of lives.

Yet Rosen repeated several times at one meeting, "I am almost certain t Lavon did not give the order." And he said this both before and after he had heard the ttorney General testify that the matter should be further investigated in Israel by the police. Then, incredibly, the committee did not await the final outcome of the police investigation (though the secretary's revised testimony to the police was already before it), and on December 21 produced findings that were clearly "material" rather than prodecural. In substance they cleared Lavon, which amounted to condemning the Senior Officer without even affording him an opportunity to tell his story.

After some discussion these findings were approved, with a few changes, and submitted to the Government.

Cabinet Confirms the Findings of Its Committee of Seven ★ Prime Minister Condemns the Entire Proceedings and Tenders His Resignation

The Prime Minister received the ministerial committee findings two days before they were brought to the Cabinet session on December 25. As he examined the committee's minutes and the findings, he was struck by some puzzling facts: According to Pinhas Rosen, the committee was to "examine all the material relating to the affair and submit its findings to the Government." Yet when he opened the first meeting on November 3, he defined its authority as "to review the material and tell the Government what we feel should be done in the future." When and on what grounds had the committee's authority

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

suddenly changed? In a letter to the Prime Minister dated November 20, as already noted, Rosen had written: "The committee's findings shall be procedural only." Its findings a month later, however, said that the episode should now be considered closed.

"The committee did not hear witnesses," according to Section 3 of the report. "The majority of the committee was of the opinion that to hear witnesses was outside its competence." But the Minister of Justice had sent the Attorney General to Paris to question witnesses, and his information was brought before the committee. The chairman himself went to Mr. Olshan and Justice Cohen to clarify facts in connection with the affair and submitted their statements to the committee. Eshkol told the committee, of which he was a member, that he had heard from Moshe Dayan that Lavon had not given an order; they refused, however, to hear Dayan, who had asked to appear. It quickly became clear that Eshkol's story was mistaken—Dayan had never said that Lavon did not give the order, and Eshkol himself then asked that his statement be stricken from the record.

The Committee of Seven alleged in its conclusions that "witnesses" questioned by the Olshan-Dori Committee had lied. It noted that it had read the recent minutes of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee; although these showed that some of Lavon's statements had been refuted by Sharett, Peres and Rosen himself, it failed to mention this in the findings. According to Section 8, "the Attorney General's investigation has shown that the words 'according to Lavon's order' were not in the original letter." This despite the fact that the Attorney General had instituted further inquiry on the issue by the police in Israel. Despite the fact, too, that the Cohen Committee had accepted the judgment of the police experts that there had been no tampering with the letter.

The testimony gathered by the police enabled them to conclude that "there is no evidence of any forgery." The police investigation disclosed that the secretary involved had not even handled the letter of July 19, 1954. As it later developed, she had made a change in a different letter, dated November 1, 1954, that the Senior Officer had sent, at his request, to the Chief of Staff. This was the letter she had typed; this was the change, a quite innocent revision, that remained in her memory. No alteration whatsoever had been made in the letter that became the basis for reviving the "Lavon Affair": the letter of July 19, 1954, containing the words "according to Lavon's order."

The Attorney General on December 13, 1960, informed the ministerial committee of the testimony of the Senior Officer's successor. It was this man's claim that the secretary had told him of a change which had started the whole rumpus. Questioned by Hausner, he said, "In straining my memory, I find the secretary may simply have mentioned an Army document rather than the letter to the Chief of Staff and perhaps in view of what I learned later I connected the two by association." At any rate, unlike Rosen, Hausner was not convinced that the crucial letter, that of July 19, had been falsified and therefore brought the secretary to Israel for further interrogation.

Section 12 of the committee's findings asserted: "In this report we have concentrated on one question, namely, whether the Senior Officer received the order to act from Lavon." Why then, in Section 8, did they introduce something that refers not to the Senior Officer but to the reserve officer? This could mislead readers unable to distinguish between them. The reference, moreover, was based on the findings of the Cohen Committee that "the instructions given by the reserve officer at an earlier date were not merely liaison orders," though no one had claimed that the Senior Officer had given operative orders "at an

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

earlier date." If the committee "concentrated mainly on one question," namely, who gave the order, why did it drag in the reserve officer's order "at an earlier date"?

The Minister of Justice presented the committee's conclusions to the Cabinet, which put to a vote, the findings were accepted by eight minister ; four abstained (Eban, Burg, Dayan, Yoseftal) and the Prime Minister did not participate in the voting. Immediately after this vote the Prime Minister requested a leave of absence for five or six weeks for reasons of health. Having received the Government's consent to the leave, he said among other things:

> I took no part in the discussion nor in the selection of the ministerial committee. I was opposed to the whole idea. Until two and a half months ago I had read only the findings of Olshan and Dori. I said to myself that if two such people could not ascertain the truth, it would be better to let the matter fall into oblivion. This was before Lavon came to me with objections to the judicial board of inquiry, not against himself but against Army officers under suspicion. He objected to Supreme Court justice Chaim Cohen. I told him that Cohen was a man to be trusted. Lavon said: "When I was in the Government I proposed his dismissal." I replied: "Had I been in the Government at the time I would have voted against you." All this did not affect my attitude to Lavon, until I read the minutes of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and was stunned—accusations and slanders with no basis in fact, slanders against lieutenant-colonels and majors whom he refused to name. . . .
>
> You have probed and dug around to prove that the Senior Officer is capable of not telling the truth. But have you found that Lavon speaks only the truth? I asked myself: what happened? I was responsible for the Army on behalf of the State six years before Lavon and six years after Lavon. In all those years nothing occurred like what happened in 1954. When I learned that a certain captain and three soldiers had not told me the truth in connection with an incident on the Sinai border, I ordered them put on trial. Soldiers should be better than private individuals. In this lies their strength. I asked myself: what happened that year? How did a sudden transformation come about in the Army? I know now that the Minister of Defense in that year issued orders that two Chiefs of Staff, Mordekhai Makleff and later Moshe Dayan, felt should not be executed because they might bring disgrace upon the State, and prevailed upon him to revoke them. One of these Chiefs of Staff—he is now a member of the Cabinet—asked to testify to the committee about this but was refused permission. The committee also refused to hear the Senior Officer who had been slandered by Lavon, though one of its members, Yacov Hazan, demanded three times to hear him. Lavon admits that he had spoken to the Senior Officer about certain operations that led up to the "security mishap"—why did he not speak to the Chief of Staff about it?
>
> In 1954 I was an ordinary citizen living in the Negev and did not know what was taking place. In recent weeks, however, I tried to clarify what happened at the time and came across a letter written by the Prime Minister at the time, dated May 25, 1954, to Minister of Defense Lavon: "Security matters are not being reported to me as they should be. Things occur that are not being brought to my attention. I hear announcements on the radio and later read about them in the papers without knowing the true background. The proper arrangement would be for me to know the facts, if at all possible, before the official version is released. At any rate I should know the facts; however, it is up to you to take the initiative."
>
> What is the basis of the ministerial committee's main finding, Section 10? It is that "Lavon claims that nothing of the kind happened." There is no other proof that the Senior Officer did not receive an order. From his appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, have you the impression that everything Lavon says is the truth?

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

I ask the Minister of Justice: He knows that there is a certain procedure and only through that is it possible to arrive at the truth. Witnesses are interrogated, each side cross-examines the other, and their lawyers probe and investigate. Why were you so afraid of a judicial board of inquiry? . . .

You have made your decision. There are findings, and there is a Government resolution that confirms them. The Cabinet has a rule of collective responsibility. I do not, nor will I, share this responsibility, not for appointing the committee, for its findings, or for the Government resolution. I am not a member of your Government.

With these words the Prime Minister left the meeting, since he had been granted the leave of absence. After Ben-Gurion left, Dayan said he wished to bring two things to the Government's attention: "One: What Lavon told the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee is not the truth. And I will request permission to appear before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and set things straight. The second is: When I was Chief of Staff, Lavon issued an order, at least one and perhaps more which I found unacceptable, and instead of carrying it out I prevailed upon him to revoke it and he agreed."

The Zionist Congress on December 28, 1960, and a grave dispute with the American government delayed the Prime Minister's resignation. Only on January 31, 1961, was he able to tender it to the President of the State. The letter of resignation said, among other things:

It is not easy for me to abandon endeavors which I consider important and in which I have been engaged for many years, and plans which I have begun to implement. My understanding of my obligations toward the State forbids me to bear the responsibility for the decision adopted by the Government on December 25, 1960, as this decision is incompatible with the fundamental principles of justice and the basic laws of the State. The law of collective responsibility obligates every member of the Government to bear the responsibility for its decisions and acts, even if he is himself opposed to them. True, on several occasions the members of the Government adopted decisions with which I did not agree, and I accepted the ruling of the majority and bore the responsibility. At this session, however, the Government adopted a decision that I cannot reconcile with my conscience, and I have no alternative but to resign.

I did not take part in the voting on this decision, as I did not take part in the voting on the adoption of the conclusions on December 25, 1960. It was clear to me that if it was necessary to investigate the matter known as "The Affair," which has been disturbing the public for several months for reasons I will not discuss here, it should be investigated by legal procedure before a court or a judicial inquiry committee. In such a judicial investigation both parties should be given an equal opportunity to summon witnesses or submit documents if they find it necessary, each party cross-examining the other, and the duly constituted court should issue its verdict. It is an accepted principle that it is better to acquit ten guilty persons than to condemn a single innocent man. To acquit a suspected person, it is not necessary to prove by convincing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he is innocent. But in order to condemn a suspected person, it is essential to prove by convincing evidence beyond the shadow of a doubt that he is guilty.

I opposed the establishment of the Committee of Seven. It was my opinion that if it was necessary and possible to investigate what truly happened in 1954—which of the two was guilty and which innocent—this should be done only by an authorized judicial instance, according to due process of law, and not by a political body, contrary to the laws of the State. When the "Seven" submitted their conclusions to the Government on December 25, 1960, I told the Government, "The conclusions were wrong, because they acquit one

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

of the two and convict the other without a judicial investigation and without hearing the parties." The conviction of a citizen without due process of law is a grave violation of the basic rights of the citizens. It is also a dangerous precedent for the future.

The campaign of denigration that has been organized against me during the past few months—by whomever it was organized—at meetings, in the press, in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and in the Knesset cannot affect me in any way. I hold democracy in Israel no less dear than any other citizen, and democracy means, among other things, the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. My resignation from the Government at this time is due to the command of my conscience and my profound concern for law and justice in the State.

These Issues Debated by Central Committees of Mapai and Histadrut ★ Mapai Removes Lavon from Histadrut

The Eichmann trial diverted the public attention somewhat from the storm aroused by Lavon's appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and the differences of opinion in the Government regarding the powers assumed by the ministerial committee in adjudicating a dispute between two persons. The Prime Minister was only the most conspicuous of those who contended that the committee violated the Basic Law of the State, without even observing the accepted legal procedures of fairness to both sides. Intentionally or not, the press continued to confuse the public by applying the word "affair" to two completely separate matters.

The *first* was what happened in 1954 as a result of an irresponsible order that led to the loss of lives, the origin of which was not clarified either at the time or afterward. After Ben-Gurion's return to the Government in 1955 the matter was dropped, as already recounted. Five years later, in 1959, one of the persons involved in the episode was tried and convicted of treason—on charges in no way connected with the 1954 affair. As a by-product of this trial questions arose about the reliability of two officers, one of them the Senior Officer of the so-called "Lavon Affair." The Senior Officer requested the Chief of Staff for an investigation to determine at long last who had given the disputed order in 1954.

It was this request that produced the *second* affair, climaxed by the resignation of Ben-Gurion. The Government refused to grant the Senior Officer's demand for adjudication by a court of law, setting up instead a ministerial committee that presumed to pass judgment without the due process provided in such cases. Ben-Gurion termed this "a serious blow to the basic laws of a democratic state and the basic rights of its citizens."

Obviously, had it not been for the "security mishap" of 1954 the Minister of Defense in that year (Lavon) would not have appeared before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in 1960, touching off a public controversy without precedent in the history of the State; nor would a Cabinet committee have taken upon itself to judge between two people who accused each other. Nevertheless, the 1954 affair and the conduct of the ministerial Committee of Seven were two entirely different matters, both in content and in the people involved. The first affair was a dispute of fact between two citizens. The second involved the right of the Cabinet to assume purely judicial functions.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

A special meeting of the Central Committee of Mapai convened at Ben-Gurion's request on January 12, 1961, over two weeks before he tendered his resignation. There he again analyzed Lavon's statements and his complaints about the work of the Ministry of Defense and the Army. He said in part:

> In the past three months Lavon has mobilized all the enemies of his party in the Opposition as well as in the two parties in the Coalition (Mapam and Ahdut Haavodah), as well as some daily and weekly newspapers, for an effective and virulent war against Mapai and certain Mapai members, those who, for some reason, did not find favor in the eyes of the Minister of Defense of 1954. And with the aid of his subordinates who received their wages from the Histadrut, of which I too am a member, a campaign of slander and backbiting has been organized the like of which we have never before known in Israel.
>
> In these months he has succeeded in transforming the cause of security and the honor of the Israel Defense Forces and its leading personalities into levers for unbridled party conflict in Israel. The name of the Israel Defense Forces has been defiled. Security has ceased to be the sincere concern of all parties as it was until four months ago. For this purpose Lavon insisted categorically that the dispute should not, heaven forbid, be submitted to judicial inquiry by upright men without party prejudice. A judicial inquiry might have revealed the truth; so he insisted that the matter be discussed only in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, in which all the other parties would be on his side and the members of our party would be silenced. And his calculations were not mistaken.
>
> Dr. X in the Knesset and Mr. Y in the press are trying to terrify us with the idea that we are in danger of a dictatorship by a "superior elite." This is a vile and foolish slander. Any army in the world would be proud of the Israel Defense Forces' leadership. There are no angels in our Army, sometimes some officer or soldier misbehaves and he is immediately brought to trial. Nowhere in the world is more care taken than in the Israel Defense Forces to prevent the slightest stain on the honor of the military commanders. Every boy and girl who is sent to the Army is in devoted and honorable hands. The slanders against the Army come from sullied sources. Its thousands of officers and civilian staff have done and are doing their duty loyally and devotedly, and I am full of affection and admiration for them.

Although these statements by Ben-Gurion appeared in full in the press, the "scandal factory" continued to operate, with "intellectuals" issuing manifestos about the imminent danger of dictatorship. Some even professed to see the Prime Minister's decision to resign because of the Committee of Seven's conduct as an attempt to apply pressure on Mapai to expel Lavon from the Histadrut Secretariat. On January 25, 1961, Moshe Sharett wrote to the Prime Minister as follows:

> If you wish to enchance your standing in the eyes of the Israeli public and the nation as a whole, to prevent the party's disintegration, and put a stop to the internal moral degeneration of the State, you must get up and declare that you will wind up your vacation and return to your post as Prime Minister in the very near future without any preconditions; that you do not require that any member be dismissed from his post and you will content yourself with what has already been said, draw a line under it and let it go at that.

The Prime Minister replied two days later:

> I have not the slightest doubt that what you say you say with sincerity. There is no ulterior motive and you have the good of the State and the movement at heart. Unfortunately I am unable to agree with your suggestion. I may finish my vacation in ten days, but on

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

returning I will tender my resignation to the Government as I said I would when they confirmed the findings of the Committee of Seven. I will resign because there is some thing called the rule of collective responsibility and this I cannot share after the Government, even without bad intentions, in my view has done something that is unacceptable in declaring itself a court of law, thus violating one of the foundations of the democratic State where complete separation between the executive and judicial authorities is required, and in confirming findings which constitute half-truths and a blatant injustice.

This country cannot live by whitewashing lies, misrepresenting facts, and perverting justice. I shall bear no part of this responsibility for subversion of the moral foundations of our existence. I am not, nor have I any means of, applying pressure, nor, if I had, would I put them to use. I have never utilized means such as these, no matter what the intellectuals say. On the other hand I will not lend myself, even passively, to the grave moral error committed by the majority of the Cabinet members.

If asked, I will be prepared to form a new Government with full freedom to fight for the disclosure of the truth, for I believe in the power of truth. I believe that the truth is stronger than anything, and would cleanse the atmosphere, enhance the party's honor, and strengthen the State. I have not for one moment made my remaining in the Government dependent on Lavon's standing but rather on what has been done by the members of the Government for which I cannot share the responsibility.

While the Prime Minister did nothing with regard to Lavon's position in the Histadrut, three of Lavon's close assistants in the Secretariat of the Histadrut Executive Committee announced on January 22 that they could not continue working with him and resigned. Zeev Cohen, a member of Kibbutz Tel Yosef, wrote in his letter of resignation:

> As a result of the developments and complications in the Lavon Affair, I consider it my public and personal duty to tender my resignation to the Histadrut Central Committee. When I first heard Lavon's version of the Affair at the start of October 1960 I sincerely wished for his exoneration. But the deep abyss into which the State, the Histadrut, and the party have been pushed as a result of his declarations and testimony has undermined the basis for my jointly bearing any further responsibility for the leadership of the Histadrut in the party's name.

Yitzhak Haskin, like Pinhas Lavon a veteran member of Hapoel Hatzair, wrote to the Party Secretariat: "I am unable to continue serving as a member of the Executive of the [Histadrut] Central Committee under the leadership of Pinhas Lavon. I am informing you of my resignation, the reasons for which I will state orally." Yehudit Simhoni, a member of Kibbutz Geva and the mother of Gen. Assaf Simhoni who fell in the Sinai Campaign, wrote that for her "the basis of Mr. Lavon's moral authority has been undermined, and to work under his leadership has become unbearable."

At the Mapai Secretariat meeting on February 2, 1961, to consider the three resignations, Eshkol presented a resolution to the effect that Lavon could no longer represent the party in the Histadrut. The resolution was supported by Bar-Yam, D. Hacohen, Moyal, Kargman, Surkis, and Netzer, but strongly opposed by Arrane, Hering, and Sapir. Lavon attacked the three who resigned with exceptional ferocity, venting his spleen especially on Mrs. Simhoni, to the point where the chairman, Almogi warned him to desist. Put to a vote on February 4, the Eshkol resolution was approved by a large majority, and it was referred for final decision to the party's Central Committee meeting scheduled for the next day. There it was decided that two members would speak for the resolution

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

and two against. The speakers were Eshkol and Yoseftal for; Dr. Rotenstreich and Sharett against.

Eshkol pointed out that Mapai had made Lavon the Secretary of the Histadrut after the events of 1954–1955. Many sided with him in his struggle to vindicate himself for the period when he was Defense Minister. But now he had seriously prejudiced values and institutions as well as individuals, and done it in the public domain, where the party has many bitter enemies.

When Ben-Gurion insisted that the unsettled contradiction between Lavon and the Senior Officer could be dealt with only by the judiciary, Eshkol said he was not opposed to that view in principle. All the same, he "fought to have it recognized that the matter could be brought to a conclusion in a ministerial committee." Thus "we set up the Committee of Seven." But, he continued, "In his appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Lavon seriously and needlessly prejudiced several matters and interests."

"In his performance in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee," Eshkol added, "he managed to make himself a magnet for all the opponents of Mapai. All who sought to hurt Mapai clustered around him. Perhaps the intention was only, if possible, to get back at Ben-Gurion, who had held his central position in the life of the State for thirteen years. But the ultimate effect was, with the help of the statements and the material Lavon provided, to undermine the entire regime. A situation has now developed in which he is unable to serve as Secretary of the Histadrut."

Dr. Rotenstreich, in opposing the resolution, suddenly switched to the subject of Ben-Gurion:

> Ben-Gurion has many disputes: A dispute with Jewish history, a dispute with treasures of Jewish creativity throughout the generations, and a dispute with Zionism. The position taken by Ben-Gurion in these disputes is based on steadfast views, which made him the leader of his generation and the architect of our people's resurrection. Ben-Gurion has taken as his term of reference his standing in this generation and considers the rebirth of our nation not only as a meeting ground of previous generations but as a mirror of them as well. However, the present dispute is different: It does not pertain to Ben-Gurion's position in history or to his concept of our nation's position in history.

He appealed to the Central Committee not to be led astray by the impulse of hatred and to remove the issue from the agenda until tempers cooled down. With regard to Eshkol's statement that Lavon had been a magnet for Mapai's opponents, he argued that "There is no magnet which hasn't first been magnetized." Mapai, he said, should be guided by principles and by comradeship. "How will we be able to demand that young people show responsibility and adhere to principles?" he asked. "One can gain a moral victory yet lose in the public arena, and one can win in the public arena and lose on the moral level. A public victory that lacks a true moral foundation is not enough."

Giora Yoseftal then spoke:

> We are not sitting here as a tribunal. We are not deciding who gave the order or did not. What we are being asked to do is to make a political decision, whether or not Lavon can represent the party as Secretary of the Histadrut. I have come to the conclusion that part of the aims of his campaign is not valid, and for that reason he can no longer serve as the party's representative in such a central post in our public life.

James M. Ennes, Jr Research Papers

Lavon has been fighting two campaigns, not one. The first is the campaign for his rehabilitation, in which he has had the party's sympathy. But he fought a second campaign as well, one far beyond what concerned him personally. . . . Lavon has created a condition of psychosis in this country, such as no one before him has ever succeeded in bringing about. The psychosis alleges that the Army is an independent entity in which subordination to the civilian authorities is not assured. This is the suspicion that has led to the present hysteria, the fear that democracy is endangered. We can state categorically that if there is any country where the subordination of the military to the elected civilian authorities is assured beyond doubt it is ours. We proved it in the withdrawal from Sinai where it was a well-known fact that the Army did not want to withdraw. We have proved it on other occasions as well. Lavon, on the other hand, has painted a picture of people in the Army who seek to operate without control of the Knesset and the Government. Lavon has damaged confidence in the survival of the basic and elementary foundations on which democracy is based. A public representative who fights for his rehabilitation by casting suspicion on the basic values of our social and political life can no longer represent us.

The last speaker, Sharett, said in part:

I do not think that it is a secret to many that when I was Prime Minister a problem developed between myself and Lavon, one which was very disappointing, very regrettable, and very grave. I will not go into details at this time. This personal complication was not without effect on Lavon's resignation as Minister of Defense. However, I did not maintain that the resignation was the end of the road in his public life. I was not one of those who had unqualified praise for Lavon's work in the leadership of the Histadrut. I did feel, however, that his positive points outweighed the negative.

But Lavon's appearance before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee shocked me. He said things that to my mind were absolutely bad. I want to say that Giora Yoseftal was right in one respect about Lavon's appearance before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and I agree that it was the most important one of all: that of confidence in the Army and the security forces.

Suddenly a demand comes to settle accounts with Lavon as a man working in the service of our movement. We all know what happened: One man, a member in our midst, we might call him our eldest brother, concluded that Lavon could not continue as Secretary of the Histadrut and that if he were not dismissed, he would react accordingly. Let no one deny it: this is the point of departure of the new stage in the imbroglio and the reason we are sitting in this meeting. I am firmly opposed to the Prime Minister's taking it upon himself in any way to determine who will or will not head a body that is by no means an organ of the State. In my opinion, in such cases he has no right to say "either-or." Naturally, he is entitled to demand an inquiry into whether or not a given person is worthy of holding that post but *without threats and/or ultimatums* [emphasis in the original]. In this matter the Prime Minister is not entitled to impose his opinion in any manner whatever. As for myself, I am not so certain whether Ben-Gurion is really prepared to formulate and defend his position in those terms—that is, *either-or*. I have reason to believe that he is not prepared to go all out in this; but that is not the point. The important point is that members are convinced that this basically is his position. Our guiding lights, in other words, are not honor and justice but fear and a desire to settle accounts. Such a policy will bring the party neither honor nor strength. I am expressing my opinion—is it really a question of conscience for a personality like Ben-Gurion? And if so, is he entitled to compel the conscience of others?

I do not know if adopting Eshkol's proposal will ensure Ben-Gurion's return to the Premiership, and he is no doubt entitled to propose certain conditions. In view of these

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

unknowns I am forced to assume that serious complications are yet in store for the party. If Eshkol's motion is rejected I shall propose that the Central Committee appeal to Ben-Gurion to return to the Premiership, draw a line, and let things go at that."

The writer, who did not attend that meeting, had no part in Eshkol's resolution, though, as he told the Central Committee on January 12, 1961, his attitude toward Lavon after his testimony to the Knesset committee was completely negative. When Sharett said that Ben-Gurion was entitled to require that the person who filled a certain post be qualified but "without threats or ultimatums," he apparently forgot what Ben-Gurion had said to him in a letter on January 27, only a week before: "Not for one moment do I make my remaining in the Government dependent upon Lavon's status but rather on actions of members of the Government for which I cannot share responsibility." Had Sharett conveyed this to his colleagues in the Central Committee, it might have saved the movement a good deal of embarrassment and obviated the demonstrations and manifestos by "intellectuals.."

Eshkol's proposal, in effect removing Lavon as Secretary of the Histadrut, was adopted by a vote of 159 to 96, with 5 abstaining.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

P 695

people he has been able to overcome all obstacles—provocation and hostility all around us and indifference abroad—and he has succeeded in preventing weakness at home.

On the foundations of the pioneering achievements of the first builders of the new Jewry in this country, and the yearning of the generation, he has forged with boldness and determination the instruments for our national resurgence: the State and its army, the Israel Defense Forces, which crushed the enemies who rose to destroy us, and established the boundaries of Israel. He has struggled for the realization of the vision of the generations, the vision of the return to Zion—he has struggled and prevailed. It is his identification of our people's noblest aspirations for revival, which have inspired us throughout two thousand years of exile and suffering, that will establish David Ben-Gurion's place in history as one of our people's greatest visionaries and men of action in all generations. He is assured of this title in his own right, irrespective of any official position or title.

Members of the Knesset, this Government, which I have the honor to present to you and the heavy responsibility of heading, will persevere in the path that has been followed by the previous Governments, in line with changes in circumstances. The Government's policies as a whole are given in detail in a statement of basic principles and will certainly find expression in debates in the future.

On June 26, 1963, after a three-day debate, the Knesset expressed confidence in the new Government by a vote of sixty-four to forty-three, and the members of the Cabinet signed declarations of allegiance.

Section 4. Again the "Lavon Affair"

Ben-Gurion in 1964 Seeks Judicial Inquiry into Ministerial Findings of 1960–1961 on the "Security Mishap" of 1954

THE "security mishap" of 1954, popularly known as the "Lavon Affair," flared up again more than a decade later, after this writer had retired to private life. To refresh the reader's memory, we must revert briefly to earlier events.

On November 2, 1961, after the elections to the Fifth Knesset, Ben-Gurion presented his new Cabinet, in which he remained as Prime Minister. On that occasion, in a clear reference to the "affair," he declared that neither the Knesset nor the Government exercised judicial functions; that the Knesset's authority did not extend to revising past events, and that the Government had no right to adjudicate a dispute between individuals. No member of either the Coalition or the Opposition disputed this view, and the Knesset voted confidence in the new Government.

What he considered a miscarriage of justice by the ministerial Committee of Seven in 1960–1961, however, would give the Prime Minister no peace, since he considered the moral integrity of the supreme organs of the State indispensable to its existence. In order to bring about a judicial inquiry to rectify the wrong, he felt it necessary that as thorough an examination as possible be made of all the data available on the deliberations of the ministerial committee. Accordingly he ordered all State bodies possessing material directly or indirectly connected with the affair to place them at the disposal of Hagai

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

Eshed, a trusted journalist. The study by Eshed continued for more than a year. For security reasons it could not be published—military censorship had deleted more than half of it—but his report was turned over to the Prime Minister.

The sole basis, and a doubtful one at best, for the findings of the Committee of Seven, in effect exonerating Lavon, was the testimony a secretary gave to Gideon Hausner, Attorney General at the time, when he questioned her in Paris, at the committee's request. She recalled, though vaguely, that in 1954 she had changed a sentence in one of the letters that figured in the case. But a police investigation in 1961 (when the woman was back in Israel) and the material now compiled by Eshed made it clear beyond doubt that if she made a change it was not in the crucial letter by the Senior Officer dated July 19, 1954, but in one dated November 1, 1954.

The Senior Officer, of course, was one of the principals in the case. He had written to the Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, not one letter but two. The first was so prolix and vague that Dayan requested another, clearer and more concise. The second letter contained the expression "the Minister of Defense directed me," and it was not a forgery, as claimed by some, but a condensed version of what he had written in the original letter. It was on the basis of this revised letter that the Chief of Staff informed the General Staff that the "security mishap" had been implemented on the order of Minister of Defense Lavon.

The police investigation established, with reference to this all-important letter, that (1) its date had not been altered; (2) no changes had been made and the words "according to Lavon's orders" were in the original letter; (3) it had not been typed by the secretary who many years later gave the testimony but by another typist.

Two private attorneys, A. Hoter-Yishai and M. Tunik, volunteered to examine all the documents in Ben-Gurion's possession from the legal standpoint. When their judgment supported the likelihood that the Committee of Seven had perverted justice, the former Prime Minister proposed to his successor, Levi Eshkol, who had been an active member of that ministerial committee, that he ask the Supreme Court to examine its findings.

If the court determined that the committee had acted properly, he explained, its conduct would be cleared and vindicated, while if it were found that the committee had acted improperly, it would amount to an honest error that the Prime Minister himself wanted to set straight. On the other hand, should he, Ben-Gurion, bring the issue to the court and it determined that the committee had perverted justice, it would seriously hurt the prestige of the Prime Minister. "Let me think it over," Eshkol replied. Ben-Gurion agreed and a week later returned to receive his decision. The Prime Minister rejected the suggestion. "In that case," Ben-Gurion said, "I will ask the Minister of Justice for a judicial hearing."

On October 22, 1964, Ben-Gurion therefore submitted the issue to the Minister of Justice, Dr. Dov Joseph, and the Attorney General, Ben-Zev. He turned over to them the compilation of data made by Hagai Eshed, the legal analysis of the two private attorneys, and documents from his own contacts with the Committee of Seven, when he was Prime Minister. He urged "the creation of a committee of inquiry consisting of Justices of the Supreme Court (1) to investigate the Government's refusal in 1960 to set up a judicial inquiry, as requested by the accused Senior Officer, and its appointment instead of a ministerial committee; and (2) to determine whether the procedures and findings of this committee were in accord with truth, justice, and the laws of the land."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Two weeks later, on November 6, 1964, the opinion of the Attorney General as submitted to the Minister of Justice was published in the press. The Attorney General dealt with each of the three sets of documents delivered to him: the personal memorandum by David Ben-Gurion, the survey by Mr. Eshed, and the legal opinion by the lawyers Hoter-Ishai and Tunik

First he discussed the Eshed survey, which was in the nature of historical research on the events of the years 1954–1960. "To Mr. Eshed's credit," he declared "let it be said that he does not present his conclusions as the final word but states that a number of investigations have to be made before the case can be considered closed. Eshed's aim is to show that there is plenty of evidence, including some found after the Committee of Seven finished its work, that would undermine its conclusions absolving Lavon of giving the order to the officer on July 16, 1954. It is therefore on this aspect alone that Eshed's work should be reviewed—his contribution to the clarification of the matter assessed. It is my opinion that Eshed succeeded in achieving this aim."

With respect to the opinion submitted by the lawyers, the Attorney General had this to say:

> The opinion of Hoter-Yishai and Tunik is mainly a critique of the committee's procedures. It is impossible to disregard the fact that the criticism is sharp. The committee is accused of no less than exceeding its authority, bias, and preventing important witnesses and testimony, which would have completely changed the picture, from being heard.
>
> The major principle in our system of justice is that flawed legal procedure does not have the effect of nullifying proceedings and findings unless injustice is caused thereby. If injustice is caused—if, moreover, any proceedings, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are impaired, according to the principles of natural justice—the proceedings are considered null and void.
>
> From the conclusions submitted by the ministerial Committee [of Seven] for the Cabinet's approval we learn that the committee did not hear witnesses and that the majority of its members were of the opinion that it was not authorized to do so. The committee thus admits that it declined to operate properly in inquiring into a dispute that is essentially a question of facts. Had the committee limited itself to procedural conclusions, this flaw in its work would perhaps not have been crucial. But since it drew conclusions on factual questions—such as the finding in Paragraph 8 to its conclusions that "There is good reason to believe that this testimony (that which the 'secretary' gave in Paris) is accurate, and that the Senior Officer submitted a forged letter to the Olshan-Dori Committee [1954] as proof that he received the order from Lavon," or the decisive finding further on that "We establish therefore that Lavon did not give the order upon which the Senior Officer based himself, and that the security mishap was implemented without his knowledge"—the committee's decision not to hear witnesses is grave. It must be added that the committee also declined to hear the Senior Officer and refused to permit his lawyer to appear and present his claims. In this way the committee infringed on the right of a man to appear and defend himself against accusations directed against him, and artificially limited the field of its inquiry.

The Attorney General then quoted a considerable amount of judicial material to prove that an accused is entitled to be present and to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, and he stated:

> The Committee of Seven appears to have ignored the above principles and conducted its work without observing the principles of natural justice and the rules for conducting

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

proceedings of this kind. To this it should be added that even in gathering its material the committee showed impatience both in that it refused to hear witnesses and in that it accepted the evidence of the secretary as something proved and beyond dispute, although it was aware that the matter was still the subject of a police inquiry.

Of course, in this matter the committee showed a certain amount of restraint by noting that "police inquiry is now in progress in this connection, but it is sufficient for the purposes of this inquiry to say that there is a reasonable assumption that this statement is correct." The question remained, however, whether this inquiry was something special, different from the need to investigate the truth of the case itself. No court of law would pass judgment before an investigation is completed. In view of this and without going into all the other arguments of Messrs. Hoter-Yishai and Tunik, I feel that the *factual findings of the Committee of Seven would not have stood the test of an Israel court.* (Emphasis is mine—D.B-G.)

The Attorney General then referred to the personal memorandum in which Ben-Gurion outlined his connection with the "Lavon Affair" and its aftermath through the years, particularly, in his own words: "My reactions to the actions of the members of the Government who dealt with it through the Committee of Seven that ended with my resignation on January 31, 1961." Ben-Gurion, Ben-Zev stated, had concluded with a request to appoint an "inquiry committee made up of Supreme Court justices," as already quoted above. In parentheses Ben-Zev noted that "The Attorney General has no authority to appoint an inquiry committee, hence such a request is superfluous."

The Attorney General's opinion went on to note that the Committee of Seven had undertaken to determine the facts in a controversial matter without having any judicial or quasi-judicial standing recognized by law. Its mistake was that it took upon itself to rule upon extremely complicated questions of fact, thus playing a quasi-judicial role. Its factual conclusions were in the nature of personal opinions and had no judicial value: "No investigator making a scientific study of this matter would feel himself bound by the findings of the committee, and could, moreover, easily discover its defects."

He listed various arguments for and against a new investigation and concluded: "There are cases in which the truth refuses to come to light, when it appears only after many hard trials, or accidentally, or at an unexpected time. But whatever the Cabinet decides, whether to reopen the affair or not, it must take into consideration that it still possibly will not have had the final word."

The Minister of Justice on his part declared that "A committee of inquiry should be appointed under the Inquiry Committee Ordinance to carry out a complete, thorough, and comprehensive investigation of the entire matter of the 'security mishap' to determine who was responsible for it, whether or not the Minister of Defense or anyone else gave the order for it, and whether or not the Senior Officer acted on his own without the Minister's knowledge."

Three days after publication of the opinions of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice, on November 9, 1964, Prime Minister Eshkol informed the Knesset that Moshe Dayan had resigned as Minister of Agriculture and the Cabinet had decided to co-opt Chaim Gavati to take his place. Yehuda Sha'ari (Liberal Party) claimed that Dayan had not resigned for reasons of health or because of a crisis in his Ministry but because of differences of opinion between himself and the Prime Minister. The present Cabinet, he charged, was demoralized and paralyzed by internal contradictions [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

that this Government should resign because it has brought us an economic disaster de luxe." The proposal to co-opt G'vati was approved by a vote of forty to twenty-nine with nine abstaining.

Mapai Central Committee Debates the Conduct of the Ministerial Committee
★ *Ben-Gurion Disputes Eshkol on Its Origin*

The grave criticism leveled by the Attorney General against the procedures and conclusions of the Committee of Seven made a powerful impression on public opinion, as well as on the ruling Mapai Party. Many demanded that the party's governing bodies convene to consider the problem, but the Prime Minister and the top leadership sought to prevent this. At the meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on December 12, 1964, Prime Minister Eshkol, having considered the matter and consulted other Cabinet members, announced his conclusion that they could not accept the proposal of the Minister of Justice and still maintain a Government. Dayan asked that the subject be discussed before the next Cabinet meeting by the party Central Committee, which accordingly was convened next day.

Eshkol opened that party discussion. "They want us," he said, "to set up an inquiry committee, after the Committee of Seven, to investigate things that happened ten years ago. I told the members and I will say this publicly: we are opening a Pandora's Box of disasters. It won't end with this matter alone. In the next fifteen years we may find ourselves investigating the glorious fifteen years that have just passed." He ended with these words: "I want to say to you, my friends, and I have purposely left this to the end, that there won't be a Government if we allow ourselves to vote for an inquiry committee."

Ben-Gurion came to the meeting late but read the stenographic record of what Eshkol had said. He thereupon reiterated what he had told the Secretariat gathering, namely, that the Prime Minister had failed in a matter of inordinate gravity, in which the nation's honor was at stake, and that he ought to resign. Even a jurist with no party affiliations like the Attorney General, he pointed out, found that the Committee of Seven had "conducted its work without observing the principles of natural justice and the rules for conducting proceedings of this kind," and asked whether "the needs of this inquiry were special needs different from the need to investigate the facts of the case itself."

He had resigned as Prime Minister in 1961, Ben-Gurion recalled, because his colleagues had committed an injustice. Now that the Attorney General had denounced the conduct of the Committee of Seven, one of whose most active members was the present Prime Minister, Eshkol should have resigned as soon as he read the Attorney General's report, lest anyone suspect him of personal or party machinations. When the findings of the Committee of Seven were submitted to the Government on December 25, 1960, Ben-Gurion said, he had announced that he could no longer be a member of that Government. On being urged by his colleagues to reconsider, he had replied that "The state does not depend on one man and it will get by without me." Neither did the State depend on Levi Eshkol, [illegible] and in light of the Attorney General's [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NOTES

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]	[illegible]
ELF	below 3 Hz
SLF	3 - 300 Hz
VLF	3 - 30 kHz
LF	30 300 kHz
MF	300 3000 kHz
HF	3 - 30 MHz
VHF	30 300 MHz
UHF	300 - 3000 MHz
SHF	3 - 30 GHz
EHF	30 300 GHz

Register of Retired Commissioned and Warrant Officers, Regular and Reserve, of the United States Navy NAVPERS 15,939

[illegible] SHIPS

[illegible]

[illegible]

AIRSIG

14 FEB 76

FORMULA FOR RADIO HORIZON:

D (in miles) = $\sqrt{2h}$ (in feet)

h = height of antenna

ABOVE FORMULA ACCOUNTS FOR REFRACTION. FOR MEAN SIGNAL TO HORIZON (SAME AS LINE OF SIGHT TO HORIZON) USE

$$D = \sqrt{1.5h}$$

5750/1 NAVSECGRP

LIBERTY INCIDENT

FILE # OF REPORT HELD IN CRANE

THIS IS NAVAL SECURITY GROUP'S MAIN FILE ON THE LIBERTY -- WHEN I REQUESTED ACCESS UNDER THE FOIA, THE SAID THEY COULD NOT IDENTIFY THIS FILE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	intelligence report 7 pp. Secret	6-22-67	A
#2 cable	RUQMVL 0928/1 3 pp. Confidential	6-18-67	A
#3 cable	RUQMVL 0928/2 3 pp. Confidential	6-18-67	A
#4 cable	Paris 20317 1 p. Secret	6-17-67	A
#5 cable	NMCC 81708 8 pp. Secret	6-15-67	A
#6 cable	RUQMVL 0892 1 p. Confidential	6-15-67	A
#12 memo	Peter Jessup for Rostow, Bundy, Smith 1 p. TS	6-8-67	A
#12a list	mission list 1 p. TS	n.d.	A
#12b memo and map	from Capt. Vineyard 2 pp. TS	6-1-67	A
#12c memo	meeting minutes 1 p. Secret	4-10-67	A

FILE LOCATION: National Security File, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, Liberty

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7122 (7-72)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PROGRAM

Invocation. . . . .Chaplain David E. Simmons, CHC, USN (Ret.)
Remarks. . . . . . .Rear Admiral G. P. March, USN
Unveiling. . . . . . .Rear Admiral G. P. March, USN
Benediction. . . .Chaplain David E. Simmons, CHC, USN (Ret.)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Director of Naval History provided several items for the Memorial. Skilled craftsmen, artists, and officers and enlisted personnel of the Naval Security Group Command Headquarters and the Naval Security Station assisted in designing and completing the display.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE SHIP

The technical research ship USS Liberty (AGTR 5) is the fourth ship of the fleet to bear that name. She served during both World War II and the Korean conflict. In February 1968 the Navy acquired the hull and on 30 December 1964 USS Liberty was commissioned at Bremerton, Washington.

Equipped with specialized gear for electronics research the ship completed five operational deployments to the South Atlantic and Mediterranean with Norfolk as homeport. While steaming on station in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea on 8 June 1967, the ship was taken under attack by Israeli air and naval forces in international waters off the coast of the United Arab Republic.

Apparently the victim of erroneous identification, Liberty suffered 34 dead and 170 wounded during the attack. Despite painful wounds the Commanding Officer, Commander William L. McGonagle, USN, remained on the bridge and directed damage control operations while bringing the ship safely to Malta.

Liberty went into dry dock at Norfolk, Virginia and on 4 March 1968 deactivation began. The ship was subsequently decommissioned and placed in the reserve fleet.

DEDICATION

USS LIBERTY MEMORIAL

0900
8 JUNE 1977
REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH N. WENGER
NAVAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM
WASHINGTON, D.C.

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5)

TO THOSE
WHO MADE THE
SUPREME
SACRIFICE



IN MEMORIAM

Dedicated to those who gave their lives on 8 June 1967 on board USS Liberty (AGTR 5) while carrying out U. S. naval cryptologic operations in the Mediterranean Sea.

CT3 William R. Allenbaugh, USN
LCDR P. M. Armstrong III, USN
SN Gary R. Blanchard, USN
SN Francis Brown, USN
CT2 Ronnie J. Campbell, USN
CT3 Jerry L. Converse, USN
CT2 Robert B. Eisenberg, USN
CT3 Jerry L. Goss, USN
CT1 Curtis A. Graves, USN
CTSN Lawrence P. Hayden, USN
CT1 Warren E. Hersey, USN
CTSN Alan Higgins, USN
SN Carl L. Hoar, USN
CT2 Richard W. Keene, Jr., USN
CTSN James L. Lenau, USN
CTC Raymond E. Linn, USN
CT1 James M. Lupton, USN
CT3 Duane R. Marggraf, USN
CTSN David W. Marlborough, USN
CT2 Anthony P. Mendle, USN
CTSN Carl C. Nygren, USN
LT James C. Pierce, USN
ICFN David Skolak, USN
CT1 John C. Smith, Jr., USN
CTC Melvin D. Smith, USN
PC2 John C. Spicher, USN
GMG3 Alexander N. Thompson, Jr., USN
CT3 Thomas R. Thornton, USN
LT Stephen S. Toth, USN
CT1 Frederick J. Walton, USN
CT3 Philippe C. Tiedtke, USN
Mr. Allen M. Blue (Civilian)
SGT Jack L. Raper, USMC
CPL Edward E. Rehmeyer III, USMC

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COLOR KEY TO RESEARCH PAPERS

● PERSONAL OR PRIVATE PAPERS

PAPERS PROPERTY OF DAVID LUCAS - TO BE RETURNED.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EXTRACTS FROM LUCAS JO JOURNAL

1966
10 OCT - 0700 Reported on board - assigned duty as MPA
23 NOV - 0730 Arrive Dakar, Senegal
25 NOV - 0900 Depart
 2 DEC - 0800 Brief stop for mail at Monrovia, Liberia
22 DEC - 0830 Arrive Abidjan, Ivory Coast
27 DEC - 0600 Depart
28 DEC - Brief return to Abidjan to pick up late-arriving mail

1967
5 JAN - 0730 crossed equator - Lucas is first through line -
Lucas is Deck Dept Head now
12 JAN - 1530 Anchored seven miles from mouth of Congo River
23 JAN - 0830 Arrive Luanda, Angola
27 JAN - 1400 Depart
6 FEB - Toth asks Lucas to sign for binoculars used by watchstanders on the bridge. Lucas refuses.
15 FEB - 0830 Arrive Monrovia, Liberia
17 FEB - 0845 LT HUDSON, USCG, aboard until 1530 to observe drills
1600 Depart
28 FEB - Arrive Norfolk, moor port side to to USS GEORGETOWN
17 MAR - 1100 COMSERVRON EIGHT on board for lunch and tour
24 APR - Received word that 1NOV66 ship photos are on file at the Naval Photographic Center, Washington, D.C.
2 MAY - 1000 Unable to depart Berth 42, Norfolk, on time due TRSSCOMM leak
1530 Underway
3 MAY - 1800 Received telegram - Baby Girl Born - gave out 50 cigars
6 MAY - Chief Carlsen in sickbay since 3rd, probably will be sent to CONUS from Abidjan
12 MAY - 0500 Lucas sighted first land at Cape Verde, Dakar, during his watch
22 MAY - 0445 Sea and Anchor Detail set for arrival Abidjan
0930 Liberty Call
24 MAY - 0430 Reveille - Special Message Orders
0700 Underway for Rota, Spain
1 JUN - 0925 Set Sea and Anchor Detail for entering port
1000 Tied up port side to to Pier One, Rota, Spain
1400 Base Liberty granted to expire on board 2400
2 JUN - 1315 Set Sea and Anchor Detail for getting underway
1345 Set the underway watch
---- Message advises COMSIXTHFLT will visit LIBERTY on 7 June
3 JUN - Meeting in Deck Office with CO, XO, CTC Smith, BM3 Ward, GMG3 Hazen, SN Quintero, Kerner, Blanchard about high lining.
4 JUN - Message advises COMSIXTHFLT will come 6 June via highline.
5 JUN - 1030 Rigged highline gear - held dry run
0930 Officers meeting to discuss COMSIXTHFLT visit
1300 GQ for drills - CO told crew of Israeli war and informed them at that time that C6F visit cancelled.
---- Set Modified Condition Three watch; two men in fwd guns at all times; ammo in guns, not in chambers.
7 JUN - Revised Abandon Ship Bill to add personnel who arrived at Rota and drop those who were transferred

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8 JUN -		ATTACKED - "learned at sunset Israel had attacked and sent apology."
9 JUN -	0700	DAVIS (DD937) alongside, Massey present. Dead and seriously wounded sent to AMERICA by helo. Deck department lost three men killed and fourteen wounded to America.
10 JUN -		BM2 LIBBY & Five SN on board from DAVIS. Xray by Dr. Kiefer shows shrapnel in head.
11 JUN -		PAPAGO checks torpedo hole; estimates 39' wide, 23' high Nets rigged over hole. Lines to nets break when underway.
14 JUN -	0700	Entered Harbor at Valetta, Malta Testified for Board of Inquiry for one hour, forty-five minutes.
	1300	Moved to Drydock #2
28 JUN -		Picked up ship's Postcards
30 JUN -		Officers meeting to discuss citations
8 JUL		Sending 57 PAO letters to Maltese (mostly to school children), and seven to UK and USA.
9 JUL -	0400	Fire in Forward GSK locker; much smoke, little flame, water damage to paper supplies.
12 JUL		Accompanied CO and Ambassador to orphanage to give away handclasp materials. Took pictures.
14 JUL -	1300	Started filling drydock
	1645	Moved to pier
16 JUL -	0700	UNDERWAY FOR USA with PAPAGO
18 JUL		Near Collision with PAPAGO
27 JUL		Gave three LIBERTY postcards to each man in pay line
29 JUL -	1700	Moored PIER 17, NAVPHIBASE LITTLE CREEK Press interview
14 AUG -	1300	Seventeen man INSURV board arrives
17 AUG		INSURV board recommends keep LIBERTY as Navy ship.
30 AUG		Completed form for Israeli medical claim
10 SEP -	1400	CDO Duty - Storm Condition III set - recalled crew
15 SEP -	2200	CDO Again - Storm Condition II set - recalled crew again
18 SEP -		Scott makes LTJG / Lucas now Bull Ensign
19 SEP -		Captain shows Combat Camera Group slides of 8 June.
23 SEP -		Lucas completes one year of commissioned service.
29 SEP -	0945	Personnel Inspection followed by Purple Heart awards and presentation of ltrs of commendation for Battle "E" Award.
2 OCT -	1000	Change of Command
29 OCT -	1830	CDO - relieved early due to swelling of head wound.
8 NOV -	0915	Admitted to Portsmouth Naval Hospital
9 NOV -	1220	One piece shrapnel removed from head (temple)
29 NOV -	1000	Small piece of shrapnel removed from back of head.
14 DEC -		Learned LIBERTY chosen for "caretaker" status.
1968		
22 JAN -		Learned LIBERTY to be deactivated.
9 FEB -		Deactivation set for 1 August 1968.
20 FEB -		Worked on Command History.
2 MAR -	1600	Arrive Southgate, NNSY
	2359	Chopped to NAVINACTSHIPFAC
18 MAR -		Received card from detailer - duty NSGA HOMESTEAD about 1 AUG.
23 MAR -		Made LTJG
28 MAR -		Last entry

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

INDEX OF PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS -- Liberty references

Finis: Court of Inquiry Reviews Assault	NEWSWEEK	70:24	July 3, 1967
Inquest for Liberty	TIME	90:15	July 7, 1967
July 8, at 1400	NATIONAL REVIEW	19:952-8	September 5, 1967
Signals Misrouted, Misread	U S NEWS	63:7	July 10, 1967
Mystery of	U S NEWS	62:33	June 26, 1967
Unexplained Casualty	LIFE	62:28-9	June 23, 1967

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NOTES GLEANED FROM POD's

5 JUN 67 - COMSIXTHFLT IS DUE TO VISIT ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7th

13JUL 67 - ETD MALTA 0700 SUNDAY 16 JULY
ETA NORFOLK 1000 SATURDAY 29 JULY

1 JUL 67 - all hands should read report of Court of Inquiry.
"ANY STATEMENTS OR COMMENTS TO OTHERS IS CONFINED TO THE EXACT WORDING IN THIS REPORT."

3 JUL 67 - Looking for anyone who saw SKOLAK's actions on 8 June

22JUL 67 - Interviews and statements to news media concerning the attack on LIBERTY 08 June are not to be given by individuals. If you are approached by someone wanting an interview or statement inform them that they must contact the Public Affairs Officer at CINCLANTFLT who will make all arrangements. Also, inform the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer of the request made to you. The only information that ships company is allowed to discuss is that already made available to the press. Therefore, there is nothing new that we would be able to tell them in an interview.

28 JUL 67 - paraphrase of above statement about press.

29 AUG 67 - warning to avoid REILLY group re claims against Israel.

4 FEB 67 - There will be a cookout tomorrow at 1630, weather permitting/
Anyone desiring to contribute old clothes, shoes or hats to the leper colony in Monrovia, turn in items to the chief master-at-arms.
Results of weekly fishing contest: CT1 Benkert won in the Barracuda class with a 2 lb 4 oz barracuda

31 JAN 67 - During the last fishing period six fishing reels were turned in broken, one of which is irrepairable. The use of Special Services athletic equipment is a privilege and if such abuse continues, it will be withdrawn.

8 FEB 67 - practice today for battle problem to be held after leaving Monrovia.

14FEB 67 - compliments to engr ofcr for 98.6 grade on Friday's economy trial.

18FEB67 - well done for yesterday (friday's) drills in which eight drills received grades of 100% and one (underwater hull damage) received 99%.

30 DEC 66 - names of 46 plank owners & breakdown of some ship's statistics

5 MAY 67 - ship's history

14 MAY 67 - Sunday - Bingo will not be played today due to a missing ball. A new ball will be made by next Sunday.
All hands are reminded that today is Mothers Day. How long has it been since you wrote home?

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CHRONOLOGY OF 1967 WAR - New York Times Index

1 June - United Nations Security Council meets

2 June - Dayan named Defense Minister

3 June - Most tourists have left UAR / Japan tells its tourists to leave
United States Sixth Fleet stands by near Crete

4 June - Security Council meets

5 June - WAR STARTS / Sixth Fleet still near Creto

---

6 June - UAR charges US and British planes played direct role in Jordan,
provided cover over Israel while Israeli planes hit UAR,
U. S. denies any involvement / ISRAEL CAPTURES EL ARISH

7 June Security Council Unanimously adopts resolution for immediate cease fire.
UAR breaks diplomatic ties with United States and denounces
Great Britain charging support for Israel; claims US planes left
Wheelus AFB for Israel, British planes bombed UAR positions in Sinai;
Syria, Algeria, Iraq & Sudan break ties with US;
Syria, Iraq & Sudan break ties with Great Britain;
Algeria seizes American owned oil companies;
United States evacuates 3,000 dependents from Beirut.

8 June - Israel says it took over 1,000 prisoners in battle for El Arish

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

29 April 1977

CONFIRMATION OF: 1. The Authentication list was destroyed prematurely.
2. There was still another message, top secret, telling us to move away from the shore and this, too, was lost.

Stumbled across a G20 memo (G21REF/kwk Ser 00453-67) dated 23 AUG 1967, signed by H.E. Phillips, Acting G20, addressed to G30, subject: Lessons Learned - USS LIBERTY. Classified SECRET. Memo has four paragraphs. The secret portions discuss communication plans. Other sections are

Para 1. States that "shortly after loss of crypto I and II by torpedo attack" there was "apparent emergency destruction of authentication/code systems."

This tends to confirm report I received long ago that radiomen destroyed authentication list and could not authenticate when asking for help. This also confirms Dave Lewis's report that KW-7 keying material was destroyed during the air attack. My information, though, is that the material was destroyed before the torpedo, not after.

Para 3. This paragraph discusses the failure of LIBERTY to receive a top secret GENSER message due to lack of TS broadcast capability & discusses having TRSs copy a CINCSTRIKE broadcast to be sure of a way of getting TS messages.

This confirms the report given to me by Jay Jensen while still aboard USS AMERICA on June 9, 1967, that Jay had received a message for us during the night, top secret, but had been unable to relay to us & had sent it on for further relay.

A Reference cited in the G20 memo was: NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN 051206Z Jul 67 CONFIDENTIAL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NOTES ON ISRAELI HISTORY: 19 NOV 77

Lavon: WMAL morning radio news, describing arrival of Egyptian Premier SADAT in Israel mentioned that one bystander was (Something?) Assad who served 14 years in Egyptian prisons for espionage. Must have been one of the Lavon terrorists.

Irgun: NBC John Chancellor evening news mentioned that Israeli Prime Minister Begin & Sadat would be meeting in the King David Hotel. Woman announcer commented that Begin was head of the Irgun when the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel in 1945.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
LBJ - 1967 USGPO
PRESS CONFERENCE OF 13 JUNE 1967

was issued on Monday when the fighting started, there was a sentence about new programs of development for the entire area. Could you give us some of your thinking as to what new programs might be involved?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't think I ought to go beyond the statement that I made on May 23d at this time.

THE U.S.S. "LIBERTY"

[4.] Q. Mr. President, do you have any more facts that you can release on the attack on the U.S.S. *Liberty*?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I think you know about as much about it as we do.

VIETNAM

[5.] Q. Mr. President, there seems to have been a lull or a fall-off in the fighting in Vietnam in the last few weeks. If that is true, and perhaps you could confirm it for us, do you think there is a change in the situation vis-a-vis both Vietnam and the Soviet Union that might lead us closer to a settlement of that conflict?

THE PRESIDENT. I would not make such a prediction. I think the fighting goes up and down depending on a good many factors.[4]

THE DEBT LIMIT

[6.] Q. Sir, on the domestic side, what does the administration plan to do about the problems you are having with the debt limit bill in the House?

THE PRESIDENT. The Treasury and Mr. Mills[5] are exchanging viewpoints, I think, at the moment. I think the committee will take action sometime shortly and make its recommendations to the House. I would not want to anticipate what they would do in their votes, but I think it will be acceptable to the administration.

THE SELECTION OF A NEW SOLICITOR GENERAL

[7.] Q. Mr. President, have you decided upon a successor to Mr. Marshall[6] at the Justice Department?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I have not. We have been considering some other appointments there. They will be announced later in the week. I doubt that the Solicitor General will be announced for some time, at least until Mr. Marshall's nomination is acted upon.

RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE CITIES

[8.] Q. Mr. President, we have had a new outbreak of racial violence in the cities this summer and it looks as if it may get worse. I wonder if you would comment on the causes of it and what might be done about it?

THE PRESIDENT. We are trying to do everything we can in cooperation with the cities, the counties, the States, and the private employers to minimize the tensions that exist. We have asked the Congress for help in this direction. They have promptly and generously acted in the $75 million special

---

printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 3, p. 831).

[4] Following a verbal report to the President, Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General of the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam, met with reporters at 1:30 p.m. on June 12 in the Fish Room at the White House for a news briefing on the military situation in Vietnam. The full text is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 3, p. 864).

[5] Representative Wilbur D. Mills of Arkansas, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

[6] For the President's remarks at the press conference announcing the nomination of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, see Item 264.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY
University of Texas
Sid Richardson Hall
2313 Red River Road
Austin, Texas 78712

phone: 512 397-5137

charge: 52¢ plus 32¢ each add'l minute to direct dial before 1700.

1530 21 December 1977

Called Martin Elzy in archive section of LBJ Library who said "President's Activity Log" is about 10 pages per day and is available at twenty cents per copy. He says there is usually much backup material (much of it still classified) which can also be copied at the same rate, unless classified.

He promises to write to me this week to send log & tell me what is available.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PROGRAM

National Anthem	N C T C Band
Invocation	Chaplain E. P. HAMMOND
Introduction of Distinguished Guests and Speakers	Captain G. B. TAMBURELLO
Remarks	Guest Speakers
Benediction	Chaplain E. F. ELLIS
Ribbon Cutting	Honorable Robert L. F. Sikes Rear Admiral D. H. GUINN Captain G. B. TAMBURELLO Mrs. Melvin D. Smith
Reception	Subsistence Building



SMITH HALL

In Memory of

CTC MELVIN D. SMITH, USN

Who was killed 8 June 1967

during an attack on the

USS LIBERTY AGTR 5

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

These quarters are named in memory of Chief Petty Officer SMITH, who was born 27 Februar 1938 in Burlington, North Carolina. He entered the Navy in April 1956. His tours of duty included 4 years, from 1962 to 1966, as an instructor at the Naval Communications Training Center.

This is the first Barracks Construction project at this station since World War II, when most of the existing quarters were constructed, and is the beginning of a series of new Bachelor Quarters programmed for construction at the Naval Communications Training Center. The structure is four stories high, completely air conditioned and will provide 64,000 square feet of space in 138 rooms for 500 men of various paygrades. It also provides for lounges and television spaces.

The architect was Look and Morrison of Pensacola and the prime contractor was K. Chavis, also of Pensacola. The contract price was $825,000. Groundbreaking was 27 May 1966.

Contracts for the construction of this barracks were awarded by and construction was under the supervision of Southeast Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Captain J. G. DILLON, CEC, USN, Commanding Officer and Officer in Charge of Construction.

The Resident Officer in Charge of Construction was Captain S. C. GILL, CEC, USN.

BACHELOR ENLISTED QUARTERS

DEDICATION



NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING CENTER

Pensacola, Florida

21 October 1967

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S. Military Communications Archaic

By Jack Anderson

Despite the lessons from three wars and the outlay of some $40 billion, our military communications system is sometimes no more efficient than a hand-crank telephone.

Not only is it untrustworthy for carrying vital messages between Washington and the field in time of war, it is unreliable and highly vulnerable to sabotage in time of peace.

This is our conclusion after studying stacks of documents by military communications and internal memos given us by military communications experts at a four-hour meeting recently only a few miles from the Pentagon.

So distressed were these officials by the state of our worldwide military cable, radio, microwave and satellite complex that they risked dismissal in order to reveal to us facts like these:

• Russian trawlers have located our undersea cables by electronic devices and have cut them at least three times in the last 15 years. "They were just practicing for the real thing, and, besides, they wanted us to know they could do it," one of our informants said.

• The Soviet Union has pinpointed virtually every major American communications center where military lines intersect, sometimes simply by obtaining telephone company maps. "Saboteurs know every blankety-blank manhole carrying our long lines," an expert told us.

• The basic "Autovon" voice system is centralized in cities and its lines generally run along roads and railways — all prime targets in case of war. Overseas, the "Autovon" lines and microwave facilities are underprotected. Natives freely vandalize the land lines for copper, which they resell.

• The "Autodin" system for carrying data is so complex it is often useless. Dust or heat enter through cracks in walls and knock it out. Maintenance is costly. A tiny voltage surge can immobilize it for hours.

• The "Autosevocom" network used by hundreds of bigwigs to talk to each other over scramblers requires a page and a half of instructions and is prohibitively slow and costly. We have seen military plans for a simpler system, which was rejected by Pentagon brass unwilling to admit they wasted millions on the existing system.

• The National Security Agency, which handles top secret communications, became disgusted with the military security network. To improve it, six or seven special security switching systems were ordered from ITT at a cost of more than $30 million. ITT built them, but the Defense Communications Agency design was so faulty that the project was junked. The Pentagon never accounted fully to Congress for the misspent funds.

Deadly Communications

The results of these and other Pentagon foul-ups in the $6 billion a year communications budget are anything but theoretical. Among hundreds of everyday delays, lost messages, garbles and misdirected cables, here are a few of the most disastrous:

• In 1968, two warning messages were sent from the USS Pueblo saying it was under threat by North Korea. Although they were sent for "immediate delivery," it took 1½ and 2½ hours respectively for them to reach Washington authorities. This was one reason U.S. forces failed to rush to the aid of the ship.

• In 1969, the U.S. Command in Korea sent three urgent messages warning that an American EC-121 spy plane was being tailed by North Korean jets. The messages took from a half hour to three hours to reach Washington. By that time the plane was shot down.

The military communications men who confided in us say that in the late '50s, farsighted systems engineers within the administration wanted to set up eight switching centers outside the major cities. These would be less vulnerable to bombing, could handle peacetime civilian loads, and would be available for both civilian and military emergencies.

Interagency infighting and high costs caused a drastic modification of the program. Now, there is much the same sort of squabbling over the promising satellite systems.

© 1973, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

James Research Papers

Fast, Powerful Missile Boat Unveiled by Israel's Navy

TEL AVIV, Feb. 4 (AP)—Israel has developed a high-speed, long-range missile boat with heavy firepower in a step toward strengthening this country's naval power while reducing its dependence on foreign arms supplies.

Completion of the first 400-ton steel and aluminum "Reshef," or flame gunboat, was announced at a news conference today by the commander of the Israeli navy, Rear Adm. Benyamin Telem, and Israel Libertovsky, director of the Israel Shipyards, which designed and constructed the vessel.

Telem, who called the gunboat the "best of its kind," said the Reshef carries two 76 mm. deck guns, several heavy-caliber machine guns, four depth charges and seven Israeli-produced Gabriel anti-shipping missiles.

Telem said the 154-foot Reshef is 42 feet longer than the French Cherbourg class and that the Israeli craft weighed 185 tons more than the Cherbourg type.

He gave the range and endurance of the Reshef at three times that of the French craft. He would not give figures, but noted that five Cherbourg gunboats spirited by the Israelis from Cherbourg to Haifa in 1969 took five days to complete the 2,900-nautical-mile journey. The new vessel has a speed of 32 knots, he added.

The admiral said the Israeli boat had a greater capability to operate and fight in high seas than other gunships, but would not say if the Reshef was better than any boat in Arab navies.

"All I can say is that our crew is definitely better," he commented.

Telem said the Israeli navy prefers small, fast ships to larger craft, and added that the Gabriel missile was more effective than long-range guns, with a range of about 20 miles.

The boat, designed by Israeli and foreign experts, was almost totally manufactured in Israel, except for the engines—four 2,670-horsepower diesels. They were made in West Germany.

The cost \$10 million to build and would be available for export sales. He said the sale price depends on the size of the order and the buyer, but emphasized the prices would be 30 to 40 per cent less than comparable American or French craft.

Sadat Takes Step To Tighten Rule

By William Dullforce
Special to The Washington Post

CAIRO, Feb. 4—The expulsion of 64 intellectuals from Egypt's only legal political party was seen by Egyptian and diplomatic observers today as a step by President Anwar Sadat back toward authoritarian rule, despite his insistence last week that "there will be no going back on the practice of democracy."

A disciplinary committee of the Arab Socialist Union expelled the journalists, authors, lawyers, movie producers, poets and an actress yesterday for "spreading rumors and lies against the government and the alliance of the people's working forces."

Some diplomats suggest that Sadat could be tightening the reins in preparation for Middle East peace talks and an eventual settlement with Israel. Informed Egyptians and other diplomats, however, consider this to be unlikely in view of the current uncertainty here on Egypt's immediate political course.

The view most commonly held by Egyptians and foreign observers is that Sadat has been genuinely shaken by investigators' reports of the plotting behind last months student demonstrations. Before the assembly last week, Sadat painted a scenario of activities by "left-wing adventurers and right-wing reactionaries" to undermine his government.

Both diplomatic and Egyptian observers feel that Sadat has exaggerated the danger to his regime. Western diplomats are particularly surprised that Sadat is [illegible]

The list of expelled ASU members included both left-wingers and right-wingers, but the majority were leftists.

Some were accused of involvement in "acts aimed at creating confusion and distorting Egypt's reputation abroad by supplying the foreign press, broadcasting services and news agencies with false information, or signing misleading statements for publication abroad with the aim of depicting the country as shaken by instability and chaos."

Other professional members were accused of having "deliberately and persistently tried to exploit their associations to issue statements which do not represent the views of the people's working forces in an attempt to support the campaigns designed to spread chaos, wreck democratic principles and distort the work of the legitimate constitutional institutions."

Among the journalists expelled were Louis Awad, a well-known writer and contributor to Al Ahram; Makram Mohamed, a senior reporter for Al Ahram; Mohamed Ouda, a political columnist for Al Gomhouria; and Mustafa Nabil, a senior correspondent of the political weekly Al Musawar.

Meanwhile, on the first day of resumption of classes, at universities following a month-long suspension, authorities announced yesterday that campus political meetings can in future be convened only by the official student union or ASU committee with the approval of [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research
Presidential Papers

Israel's Creditors: Uncle Sam Is No. 2

By Yuval Elizur
Special to The Washington Post

JERUSALEM, Jan. 27—The massive loans extended to Israel by the U.S. government in recent years for the purpose of arms purchases brought Israel's outstanding debt to the U.S. to $2500 million at the end of 1972, making Uncle Sam Israel's second largest creditor. This was disclosed here in an interview for the Washington Post by Abraham Agmon, the director-general of the Israel Ministry of Finance.

At the end of 1972 Israel's largest creditor, or group of creditors, was the holders of the State of Israel Bonds, most of them in the U.S. Israel owed them over $1.3 billion, or a third of the country's record breaking foreign debt of $3.9 billion.

The debt to the U.S., to which should be added to the million owed by Israeli firms to the Export-Import Bank in Washington, has accumulated steadily since 1971, when Israel started obtaining loans for the purchase of arms. Although Congress has already appropriated $2 billion for the budget years ending June 30th, 1971, and June 30th, 1972, for these items. Almost the entire sum has already been utilized by Israel.

In addition, Israel received $50 million as a supporting assistance grant during the year ending June 30, 1972.

Other American financial assistance to Israel includes loans for the purchase of agricultural surplus items under P.L. 480, which in recent years reached about $60 million a year, and a $50 million loan, extended for the first time in 1972, for housing projects in Israel.

For each of the budget years ending June 1973 and June 1974, the administration has already asked Congress for an additional $300 million a year for the purchase of arms by Israel.

Other large creditors of Israel are the World Bank, to which Israel owed about $100 million at the end of 1972, and the German Federal Republic, whose loan balance to Israel totalled $610 million at that time.

Israel's foreign debt is a heavier per capita burden than carried by any other nation. It will grow again in 1973 and is expected to reach $4.3 billion by the end of the year.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Joseph Alsop

The Politics Of the Energy Problem

Last week, the new Israeli ambassador quietly flew to Tel Aviv to consult with his government. His motive was simple. The extremely shrewd Simcha Dinitz is deeply worried by the grisly politics of the American energy problem, and so are the Israeli leaders.

In the present feckless climate, it will first be well to show why the energy problem has become so much more worrying, and so suddenly, before getting on with the politics inherent in it. In brief, all the optimists about energy have been basing all their hopes on large annual increases in U.S. imports of oil from the Mideast. Above all, Saudi Arabia, with the greatest pool to tap, was relied on to increase its output at the rate of 25 per cent per annum.

A thrill of horror therefore went through the U.S. government and the oil industry, when King Faisal of Saudia Arabia announced that his country's output would not be increased by a single barrel of crude. He would only [illegible]



By Auth in the Philadelphia Inquirer

But general recognition of this country's need to produce every [illegible] energy we [illegible] get from [illegible] own resources, is [illegible] than the beginning of the energy [illegible] ugly politics. Consider King Faisal's demand. Then consider the response we have already seen, in the form of a letter to his stockholders from Otto Miller, chairman of the board of the Standard Oil Company [illegible]

vast majority of California Standard's reserves of crude are to be found in Saudi Arabia.

The natural result of Miller's letter was a storm of protest from the American Jewish community. The storm frightened the big oil companies, and silence has now fallen. But anyone with a particle of political common sense can easily see that this silence is [illegible]

Every kind of smarmy word will be used to conceal the dreadful fact. Yet the temptation to blame gas rationing on Israel will be too much for some U.S. politicians. Needless to add, yielding to this temptation will be, not merely sordid, but also against the national interest. The Arabs cannot be successfully bought off by a craven America, sacrificing every principle for the sake of ease and comfort.

The right way out and the only [illegible] out is to be tough with

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

flee had forced Israel to give the Arabs all they have so long demanded.

The optimists about energy—uniformly wrong to date, please remember, are now muttering that King Faisal does not mean a word he says. The people who have been right about the energy problem are convinced, in contrast, that King Faisal means every word of it. This glum conviction is shared by Israeli intelligence. There is no incentive for the Saudi Arabians to go much above the present level of about 8.5 million barrels of crude per day. The vast resulting dollar-revenue is all and more than all they can spend.

The Shah of Iran further cannot cover more than a small share of the deficit that must result from King Faisal's hold-down order. Consequently, the outlook is for a rather severe, indefinitely prolonged energy shortage, with devil-take-the-hindmost competition among the user nations, including Japan and most of the Western Europeans. The fuel rationing the President is already talking about for next winter can easily merge into gasoline rationing next summer. And so it will go.

In this situation, finally, President Nixon's program for solving the energy problem was never much more than a collection of band-aids to be pasted over a cancer. Yet the Congress will not even touch several of the most vital aspects of the Nixon band-aid program, such as the de-regulation of natural gas prices, to stimulate larger output.

The great vogue long enjoyed by the environmentalists is the root-cause of this congressional immobility. This will enable President Nixon to say, later on, that his band-aid program might have done the trick if it had not been for Congress. Any way the end of the environmentalist vogue can of course be easily predicted, the moment fuel oil and gasoline begin to be rationed.

[illegible] the Arab Right could [illegible] nation's will, ultimately, in order to maintain the needed flow of Arab oil. It was a wonderfully plain argument, not unconnected with the fact that the [illegible] of the Arab world was the [illegible] of the entire world war, there is serious danger of anti-Semitism becoming a factor in American politics.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Pentagon's Transfer of Rule Called Possible Law Violation

By Morton Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) told the Defense Department yesterday that the "intimidation" and transfer of Navy contractor Gordon W. Rule may violate a law making it a crime to obstruct a congressional inquiry or intimidate a witness.

"I judge this action against Mr. Rule to be a distinct obstruction of the work of the Joint Economic Committee," Proxmire said in separate letters to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner.

Rule rejected a demand to quit made last week by Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr., who engaged in what Proxmire and Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) called "harassment," "retaliation" and "brow-beating."

With that, Kidd, chief of the Naval Material Command, reassigned Rule from his $36,000-a-year mission to review and challenge procurement contracts to "upgrading the curriculum" at the Navy Logistics Management School.

A GS-14 or GS-15 in the civil service "could upgrade that goddam curriculum," Rule told a reporter yesterday. "It doesn't take a super-grade GS-17 to do it." Rule plans to try to see Warner next week.

In other developments:

• Aspin, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, asked the Civil Service Commission to investigate whether the treatment given Rule violates "the purpose of the civil service laws . . . to protect men . . . who disagree with the administration party line" and who "tell the truth as they see it."

• Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, charged that Rule lied last year when he accused Hebert and three other leading members of the Louisiana congressional delegation of having exerted improper influence on the Navy to settle claims made by Avondale Shipyards of Avondale, La.

• Rule replied by renewing a previously undisclosed offer to "testify under oath in an open public hearing" and he released previously undisclosed evidence to support his charge.

The current Rule case began when he wrote his superiors that Kidd had given Rule a "satisfactory" fitness report.

Last Tuesday, subcommittee chairman Proxmire asked Rule if he had "any views" on President Nixon's appointment of Roy L. Ash to head the Office of Management and Budget.

Ash was president of Litton Industries, which is building amphibious ships that are costing at least $104 million each more than expected and are now destined to be delivered 22¼ to 32½ months late. To avert a cash-flow crisis at Litton, Ash told Navy officials he would "go on to the White House" in an effort to change the payment method for the ships, according to minutes of a June 6 meeting.

Rule told Proxmire the Ash appointment was "a mistake." President Eisenhower, having warned against the "military-industrial complex," must be "twitching in his grave," Rule said.

Next day, Kidd went to Rule's apartment to try for an hour to get him to sign retirement papers "for the good of the Navy." Sources close to the admiral said he meant that he had lost confidence in Rule's usefulness. Yesterday, Rule said he is asking Kidd to state in writing why, and when, he lost that confidence.

Proxmire told Laird that Kidd's effort to "intimidate" Rule "was deliberate and a direct consequence of his testimony" and therefore a possible violation of the law.

The Avondale Shipyard dispute pitted Rule against four influential Louisiana Democratic legislators: Sen. Russell B. Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee; the late Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the Senate Appropriations; Majority Whip Hale Boggs, now missing after a plane crash in Alaska, and Armed Services chairman Hebert.

Avondale, an Ogden Corp. subsidiary with the biggest single payroll in Louisiana, had a contract to build 10 destroyer escorts. It filed claims with the Navy for an extra $151 million. In an internal Navy report, Rule said he was blocking payment because Avondale had failed to substantiate some of the claims. Subsequent certain cost prices and

ordered a review by Rear Adm. L.K. Wendlin, who verified the Rule report, terming certain Avondale claims "unsupportable."

Yesterday, Rule supported the charge of pressures with an official Navy chronology showing that Avondale president Henry (Zack) Carter rejected a Navy offer of $71.6 million on Oct. 23, 1970, "stating that he intended to . . . ask for congressional assistance." Avondale later offered to settle for $75.5 million but the Navy stood fast.

The chronology also shows that on Nov. 3, 1970, Assistant Navy Secretary Frank P. Sanders and aides met in Boggs' office with Boggs, Hebert, aides to Ellender and Long, and Carter, and that on Dec. 1, 1970, the Navy agreed to settle for $1.9 million more than previously.

In 1971, Rule, testifying before the Proxmire subcommittee, linked the meeting in Boggs' office with the $1.9 million increase.

Sen. Long denied any improper influence had been exerted, and was backed by Proxmire. Long also termed it "obvious" that the Navy owed Avondale large sums, and offered to testify under oath.

Hebert, at the same time, said Rule "will have every opportunity to prove his allegations under oath—and he knows it." Yesterday, Hebert said he called off a hearing at the Pentagon's request. But Rule disclosed a telegram to Hebert showing that two weeks earlier he had requested a chance to testify publicly, under oath, but was turned down and left "no alternative" but to go before Proxmire.

Last March, Rule in another appearance before Proxmire, alleged "raw pressure" had been applied in behalf of Avondale by the legislators.

Italians Seize Arms

Reuter

ROME, Dec. 23—Police have seized 2 cannon, 13,306 rifles and pistols, three grenade launchers, 94 machine guns more than 3,000 bombs and 136 mines in a national purge on illegal arms during the first 10 months of this year.

the hecht co
downtown
open today,
sunday
noon 'til 5

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

TWO DISTINGUISHED NAVAL LEADERS, WITH A TOTAL OF OVER 80 YEARS SERVICE, retired from active duty this week. On October 31st, Admiral Charles K. Duncan was relieved of his three major Atlantic Commands by former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, in Norfolk, Virginia. During ceremonies held onboard USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, Admiral Cousins relieved Admiral Duncan as Commander in Chief, Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. Later that day, Admiral Cousins took over as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic at the Allied Command Headquarters. Present at both ceremonies were Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, SECNAV John Warner and CNO Admiral Zumwalt. Admiral Duncan had the distinction of having held more commands in the Atlantic Area, in his almost 40-year career, than any other officer in history. Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. retired November 1st, closing out 41 years of Naval service. During his career, half of which was spent in the Submarine Force, Admiral McCain held a variety of command billets, and received the Silver Star for heroism in combat while serving as Skipper of the Submarine Gunnel during World War II. A forceful spokesman on the importance of Seapower, the gravel-voiced Admiral, and his ever-present cigar, were an integral part of the Navy scene for four decades. From July 1968 until September 1972, Admiral McCain served as Commander in Chief of all forces in the Pacific. At his change of command ceremony, Admiral McCain was personally awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by the President of the United States.

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

U.S. Officials Mutter Against Israel

By Jack Anderson

The muttering against Israel is growing louder in the backrooms of the State and Defense departments.

State Department strategists have warned grimly that a resumption of the Middle East war almost certainly would lead to another Arab oil embargo.

This would be a disastrous blow, in their opinion, to the U.S. economy—an economic Pearl Harbor that would plunge the United States into a severe recession.

The secret State Department estimate is that Israel would win the military conflict but would suffer a financial debacle. This would force Israel to seek massive U.S. aid, the strategists believe. They question whether the United States can afford to finance any more wars for Israel.

This State Department view is echoed in the Pentagon, where generals have grumbled to us that their own military stocks have been dangerously depleted to rearm the Israeli army.

The generals are also eager to court Saudi Arabia, which is dickering to make a multibillion-dollar arms purchase. This would help stimulate U.S. military production.

The Pentagon has even made a secret offer to help develop a modern, mobile Saudi defense force, which could be moved swiftly by helicopter to protect the desert kingdom's oil installations. Under this plan, the United States would sell Saudi Arabia 400 helicopters during the next decade.

At the same time, there has been talk inside the Pentagon of military intervention against the Arabs in case of a new oil embargo. This would be contrary to the present U.S. policy, which rules out military meddling in the Middle East. President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev reached an understanding at Vladivostok that they would seek a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

But as we reported in an earlier column, a new oil crisis could cause the United States to change its policy. The United States will take military action, if necessary, to protect its "vital interests," and some strategists have suggested privately that another oil embargo would affect the nation's "vital interests."

Secret military studies show it would be impractical, if not impossible, to take over the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. Not only would the wells and pipelines be highly vulnerable to sabotage, but tankers could be bottled up in the gulf.

Nevertheless, there has been secret speculation that the United States, if its oil supply should be jeopardized, might support an Israeli paratroop attack on Kuwait's oil fields. But more likely, according to the unofficial talk, U.S. Marines would attempt to take over Libya's more vulnerable fields.

Both the United States and Soviet Union are working behind the scenes, meanwhile, to find a diplomatic solution to the Middle East dispute. There has been talk even of imposing a solution on both sides.

The world's major powers are lining up almost solidly in favor of an Israeli withdrawal, with some modifications, to its 1967 frontiers.

In secret exchanges, Egypt has given the United States a deadline to secure the next Israeli pullback in the Sinai. At the minimum, the Egyptians want Israel to hand over the Sinai oil fields and two strategic mountain passes which were captured during the 1967 war.

This must be arranged before Brezhnev's visit to Cairo in mid-January, the Egyptians have warned, or they will have to abandon their reliance on U.S. diplomacy and seek more support from Brezhnev.

Israel is willing to withdraw to new lines in the Sinai, but not to give up all the captured territory for several years. It will take this time, the Israelis contend, to determine whether Egypt is really willing to live at peace with them.

During this period, the Israelis suggest that U.N. forces or joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols replace the evacuated area. Once peace is firmly established on the Israeli-Egyptian front, Israel will relinquish all the captured territory.

The Egyptians, however, have already rejected a slow, piecemeal Israeli withdrawal. The other Arab states are even less inclined to accept partial, step-by-step settlements.

What worries State Department strategists is that the adamant Arab attitude might entice the Israelis to take desperate action and seek a swift military solution.

The uncertain winter weather, it is believed, would restrain Israel from attacking for the next few months. Clear skies would be needed for the Israeli Air Force to be effective. But spring could bring a new Israeli offensive, it is feared.

To discourage war, American advisers are cautioning Israel that the United States won't be able to use European bases again to provide an arms lift. They also are suggesting that the American taxpayers, caught in their own economic pinch, may be unwilling to pay the bill for rearming Israel.

The last war cost Israel an estimated $6 billion and brought a painful devaluation of the Israeli pound. Without heavy U.S. aid, the tough little nation may not be able to afford another financial drubbing.

©1978, United Feature Syndicate

SALE
OUR VERY BEST
STORM WINDOW
Aluminum Triple Track Self Storing
10 FOR
$2 2 0 25

Sun Research Papers
James M. Ennes

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Answering the Charge of 'Anti-Israel Bias'

Post 1 Issue 76

A letter-writing campaign now under way to editors of newspapers that publish our column, accusing us of distorted reporting on the Arab-Israeli struggle, is based on a wholly false report that we acknowledge having an "anti-Israel bias." In fact no such bias exists.

Because this campaign is national in scope, the grave indictment of our objectivity in analyzing the most emotionally charged foreign policy issue faced by this country requires a direct response. So, for the first time in the 13 years of writing our column, we are departing from usual format to answer the charge.

The accusation stems from a criticism of our column contained in the Dec. 18 issue of Near East Report, a weekly publication of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, the most effective propaganda arm of the American Jewish community. The nonprofit publication is distributed to all members of Congress and 30,000 other influential Americans.

The Dec. 18 issue of Near East Report is based on an interview with us published in the journalism review, MORE, containing the misquotation that we acknowledged "the column's anti-Israel viewpoint." In Near East Report, this comes out as our acknowledging "anti-Israel bias."

Although Near East Report never called to check the authenticity of the quote, the facts are different. Asked by MORE's interviewer about criticism of our Middle East reporting, we related the following incident involving Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin to illustrate the intensity of the criticism.

> ***"Our reporting of the Middle East has always sought to disentangle real American interests from claims and counter-claims of both Israel and the Arabs."***

Rabin regularly saw us during his tenure as ambassador to Washington and was criticized for it by American Jews who dislike what we have written. He told us, shortly before he returned to Israel in 1973, that when one Jewish friend attacked us as "anti-semitic," he contradicted the friend and said no, they are not anti-semitic, they are "anti-Israel."

That was Rabin's judgment, but it is not, and never has been, "acknowledged" by us. On the contrary, we strongly deny any anti-Israel bias and so told the author of the MORE article. Yet, MORE attributed the quotation not to Rabin but to us.

The Dec. 18 issue of Near East Report made one other charge against us, equally without foundation, which is regularly mentioned in the letter-writing campaign. We reported last Sept. 16 that Israel's military demands included $1 billion in "urgent" immediate supplies; $1.2 billion a year for the next five years in military credits; and $2.5 billion in outright military purchases from the U.S. in each of the next five years. We quoted one high Pentagon official as calling "totally ridiculous" such an arms expenditure by a country with an annual gross national product of less than $10 billion.

Near East Report charged us with publishing "an astonishing allegation" in citing Israel's annual $4 billion arms demands. Yet, there was no visible protest to the New York Times when, two weeks later, The Times reported that "the total Israeli defense effort during (the next three years) would be about $4 billion a year." The truth is that the $4 billion figure is accurate.

But if our column's frequent criticism of Israeli policy (such as the $4 billion arms request) is not based on anti-Israeli bias, what is its source? It has been our consistent thesis that U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli struggle must be determined by American interests, not those of Israel or of the Arab states surrounding it.

Accordingly, our reporting on the Middle East has always sought to disentangle real American interests from claims and counter-claims of both Israel and the Arabs—making us neither pro-Israel not anti-Israel, neither pro-Arab or anti-Arab.

We have always agreed with Henry Kissinger's thesis, stated at San Clemente in the summer of 1971, that the U.S. never agreed to underwrite Israel's conquests. Until those conquests by Israel's sensationally successful military operations in 1967 are returned to the Arabs, we believe the large American military investments in Israel deserve scrutiny. That includes the closest study of their political impact on the Arab world and Western Europe.

If Israel ever does return, more or less, to a negotiated version of the pre-1967 borders, we would support all efforts at air-tight American guarantees of the military security of Israel. Such an underwriting of the Jewish national state is scarcely indicative of anti-Israel bias. But in truth, there has been very little movement back to the old borders in the seven years since 1967. The fact that we have criticized this makes us neither "anti-Israel" nor "pro-Arab" — the facile charge so often levelled against those who displease Israel's political friends in this country.

© 1975, Field Enterprises, Inc.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Jack Anderson

The Peace Price: $15 Billion

WASH POST 01 SEP 75

The closer Congress scrutinizes Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Middle East peace pact, the louder the grumbling grows, particularly over the price tag and those 200 American "technicians."

As it turns out, from secret State Department briefings of senior lawmakers, the American taxpayers will be asked to provide well over $15 billion in aid to Egypt and Israel during the next five years.

And the 200 U.S. peacekeepers, according to intelligence sources, will likely include "retired" CIA agents, an invitation to controversy no matter how good a job they do in the Sinai buffer zone.

Before the agreement can be put into effect, of course, the lawmakers must approve the stationing of technicians between the two hostile camps. And a half dozen committees or more will get a crack at one phase or another of the five-year $15 billion aid package.

But this has not made Congress any more comfortable with the interim agreement. Some of the legislators we queried in the past few days were worried that there is still more "fine print" or "oral understandings" to come.

For example, last week we revealed that President Ford and his wizardly Secretary of State have virtually promised the Israelis spanking new F-16 fighters and Pershing missiles. The missiles can reach targets 460 miles away and can easily be equipped with nuclear warheads.

Other portions of the secret accords have been privately disclosed to a few chairmen and ranking members of committees in both the House and Senate, but yo. ter members have been kept in the dark both by the administration and their own chairmen.

Some lawmakers have even stopped us in the halls of Congress and fumed, "How come you find out about these things before we do?"

In this wavering economy, every million in foreign aid counts, and Kissinger and his public relations men have been citing the figure of $2.3 billion in economic and military aid for Israel and $500 million as the outer limit for Egypt.

But at an executive session of the House International Relations Committee, members were told that these figures are bound to rise in coming years.



General Dynamics photo

"Last week we revealed that President Ford and his wizardly Secretary of State have virtually promised the Israelis spanking new F-16 fighters (above) and Pershing missiles."

By putting together these projections, congressmen quickly came up with a five-year figure of well over $15 billion.

The price of one portion of the Israeli aid package is bound to soar. About $400 million of the money promised to Israel is in compensation for the oil they will lose next year by surrendering the Abu Rudeis oil fields back to Egypt.

Such payments will continue for all five years. Since the price of crude is going nowhere but up, the American contribution for Israel's lost oil is certain to follow suit.

In addition, Ford and Kissinger have given the Israelis an ironclad, written guarantee that they will be supplied with oil until at least September 1980.

According to the secret accords, Israel is expected to "make its own independent arrangements for oil . . ." However, if they are unsuccessful for any reason, the documents state, "the United States government will promptly make oil available . . ."

In the event of an oil embargo, the secret agreements imply, Israel would be supplied with oil from American stockpiles. Kissinger further vowed, if necessary, "to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport."

Another aspect of the Sinai pact that has created some furrowed brows on Capitol Hill is the proposal to provide American technicians.

Those "technicians," top-level intelligence sources confided to my associate Joe Spear, will have very close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, say our sources, many of them will probably be regular CIA employees who will be "retired" shortly before they report for their desert duty.

The idea of placing American technicains in "early warning" stations was first suggested by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at a meeting with President Ford in Salzburg, Austria.

Concerned that Congress would see the technicians as an echo of Vietnam in the early 1960s, Ford and Kissinger originally balked at the proposal. Sadat was eventually persuaded to settle for United Nations personnel.

Israel, however, adamantly insisted on an American presence. No Americans, no peace agreement, they declared. Kissinger, faced with the awful prospect of once again limping back to Washington in defeat, went along.

Some key congressmen, however, are convinced that Kissinger is secretly delighted with the proposal to put Americans in the Sinai. It forces Congress to put the stamp of approval on his peace pact and thus absolves him of full responsibility if it flops.

In fact, say some of the experts we have consulted, the American technicians are not needed. Ostensibly, they will be there to give impartial warning of menacing maneuvers by either side.

Both the Egyptians and the Israelis, however, will be provided with sophisticated American electronic equipment to establish warning stations of their own.

From their perch atop a 2,500-foot prominence known as Umm Hashiba, the Israeli radars will be able to "see" aircraft taking off in Cairo. The Egyptians will have a comparable facility, enabling them to monitor Israeli's huge Sinai air force base at Bir Gifgafa.

The American presence, therefore, will be largely symbolic. In more ways than one, it may prove to be one of the most costly symbols the American public has ever purchased.

© 1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Pueblo Award Called 'High Point'

Life After Release Not Easy for Former Crew Member

Reprinted from the Norfolk Ledger-Star

By BILL McALLISTER

CHESAPEAKE — Navy Signalman First Class Wendell G. Leach sipped at a rum and cola and spoke of his days as a crewman of the spy ship Pueblo with a mixture of pride and bitterness.

On September 7, he readily accepted a medal brought one of the few honors since his release from a North Korean prison almost five years ago.

Leach, 31, was notified during May 2 "that the Navy was considering the Pueblo crewmen to be decorated for bravery during the ship's capture on Jan. 23, 1968.

He will be presented the Bronze Star, one of only three crew members to be so honored. Silver Stars are to be presented to the others, posthumously.

The honor Leach said, came as a surprise. He was not sure what was the appropriate reaction, he said as he and his third wife, Doris, celebrated the honor in their small Navy apartment near the Northwest Radio Station.

LEACH HAS BEEN stationed at the remote post since returning from Korea. The station is located on a spit of land about two miles from the North Carolina line for the past two years. He is a member of the facility's fire department.

Serving aboard the Pueblo, whose capture set off a debate among Naval officials, has given Leach's Navy career what he called "a double barrel treatment."

The award was welcome, but his service left others unimpressed, he admitted. There was, for example, the executive officer of the destroyer Ault on which he served first, whom he considered lost.

The Ault was his first duty station after his release in late 1968. When he walked aboard, Leach said the officer told him that he knew of his duty with the Pueblo and said "because of that you'll have to prove to me you're not a fink."

The officer soon busted Leach to petty officer second after he was absent without leave from the ship. Leach said he had "come over the hill" because of marital problems with his second wife, whom he married after returning from Korea.

BUT FIRST WIFE had divorced him while he was being held by the North Koreans. The divorce proceedings were initiated before the ship and left Japan on its ill-fated mission.

Word of the divorce was one of three messages that Leach received during the 11 months in captivity. The other two contained the deaths of a stepmother and grandmother.

At the time of the ship's capture, Leach was on the bridge attempting to send the attacking North Korean gunboats the agreed-upon signal that would have prevented the seizure, which he has been awarded previously the Purple Heart.

"It's not like an actual battle where one is outstanding," he recalled. "But I did do my job under fire with seconds and I think that's what it's about."

THE SHIP'S commander, Cmdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, recommended Leach for the award and despite the controversy over Bucher's role in the capture, Leach said he has no doubts about Bucher.

"I'd serve under him again," he said. "I can't think of anyone I'd rather serve. He did his job as he knew he could and worked for his country and his crew."

Memories of the beatings and days in captivity still haunt Leach, and he conceded that he remains a more nervous person for the experience.

A telegram from the City of San Diego, sent to him on the crew's return to the United States here in the home town of his teammates are listed. A bookshelf crowded with books

OFFICERS

[illegible]

U.S.

[illegible]

reasons for joining, the Armed Forces Relief and Benefit Association. It'll be chock-full today and tomorrow about them.

AFRBA. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE.

Please send me [illegible] about AFRBA and [illegible] an officer on active duty [illegible] obligation, of course.

Name

Address

City

State

Armed Forces Relief and Benefit Association 50
1156 15th [illegible]

AAFES Stores Will Begin Fingerprinting Check Cashers

By BOB TOWLE

WASHINGTON — Shoppers at the AAFES exchanges in the U.S. will, beginning October 1, at least three ports be required to have their thumbprints recorded on the back of their checks when they cash them.

The fingerprinting will be done at the point of sale, and the thumbprint has been developed on the checks, establishing positive and permanent identification.

Then, if the exchange is using the computerized check cashing system, the customer's identification and the check amount are punched on an electronic keyboard that flashes this information to a central computer bank. The computer has a detailed listing of all exchange customers who have passed a

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

April 5, 1968

Lieutenant and Mrs. James M. Ennes, Jr.
5343 Coachway Drive
Norfolk, Virginia 23502

Dear Lieutenant and Mrs. Ennes,

You are cordially invited to attend a memorial plaque presentation ceremony aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) at 2:00 PM, Saturday, 13 April 1968. The plaque, which bears the names of the thirty-four deceased men who gave their lives on 8 June 1967, was proposed by the brother of the late CTI John C. Smith, Jr. It will be presented to LIBERTY by Petty Officer Smith's wife, Sandra. Mr. and Mrs. John C. Smith, Sr. will also be in attendance.

If you wish, you may bring relatives and friends to this ceremony.

LIBERTY is located at Pier Bravo, South Gate Annex to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia.

If you desire to obtain any additional information, please feel free to call me at 397-6531, extension 1141 or 1140.

Sincerely,

D. L. BURSON
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy
Commanding Officer
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Smith Hall Dedicated

The new 500-man enlisted barracks was officially opened Oct. 21 at NCTC as Rep. Robert L.F. Sikes (D-Fla.) and Mrs. M.D. Smith cut the ribbon to open Smith Hall.

The new facility is named in honor of Mrs. Smith's husband, Chief Communications Technician Melvin D. Smith, who was killed during the attack on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) on June 8, 1967. He had served as an instructor at the base from 1962 to 1966.

Assisting at the ribbon-cutting ceremonies were Capt. G. B. Tamburello, Capt. Samuel a. Sparks, representing the Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, CNO Smith's brother, Mr. Mike Smith of Merritt Island, Fla., and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. C.M. Smith of Damaure, N.C.

The four story structure features two- and four-man rooms equipped with bureaus, desks and built-in wardrobe closets, central air-conditioning and heating, a visitors reception area, eight television lounges, a food concession room and laundry facilities.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

When I was a lad, and Old Shep was a pup
Over hills and the valleys we roamed
Just a boy and his dog, we were oh full of fun
and we grew up together that way.

I remember one time, at the old swimming hole
When I would have drowned beyond doubt
But Old Shep was right there, to the rescue he came
He jumped in and helped pull me out.

As the years sped along, and Old Shep growing old
his eyesight was fast growing dim
'Til one day the doctor looked at me and said
"I'm sorry I can't help him, Jim."

I aimed my gun at Shep's faithful head.
He reached out and licked my hand.
I just couldn't do it, I wanted to run
I wish they would shoot me instead.

Now Old Shep is gone where all good doggies go
And if there's a dog heaven
There's one thing I know
Old Shep has a wonderful home.

-THIS POEM WAS RECITED BY McGONAGLE.

TITLE?

AUTHOR?

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK 09502

From: Wardroom Mess Treasurer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
To: ENS David G. LUCAS, USNR

Subj: Mess Dues; income tax deductions for

Ref: (a) NAVSO P-[illegible] (9th Edition) Publication [illegible] for Service Personnel for 1966 Income [illegible]

1. The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) operated away from [illegible] or longer for the following inclusive periods [illegible]:

(a) 08 January through 23 March [illegible] days
(b) 31 May through 29 August [illegible] days
(c) 01 November through 31 December [illegible] days

2. During calendar year 1966 mess bills were [illegible]

Jan - $30.00	Jun - $30.00	[illegible]
Feb - $30.00	[illegible] - $25.00	[illegible]
Mar - $30.00	Aug - $25.00	
Apr - $30.00	Sep - $15.00	
May - $25.00	Oct - $20.00	

3. Afloat Mess Bills may be deducted from gross income in accordance with reference (a).

M. H. BENNETT
LT USN
Wardroom Mess Treasurer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

D10

ALL PAGES



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Sincerely,

Scott Christman

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

7 December 1966

To the families and friends of personnel
attached to the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5),

As you already probably know the LIBERTY commenced her fourth cruise on 1 November and will remain at sea until the end of February, making several ports of call on the West coast of Africa. Although to the majority of the crew these ports are well known, to some they will be new and possibly exotic. The customs and dress of the citizens of these countries, although strange by our standards, are classic and colorful which will make for some pretty interesting letters back home. For camera "bugs" there will be more than ample opportunity to capture some of our experiences for you back home.

To supplement the "Guide for Dependants" recently published by Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet: to help you better understand the role performed by your husband: son or friend aboard the LIBERTY and to cover some items of interest they may omit to mention, the following information may prove helpful:

HISTORY OF THE LIBERTY

The USS LIBERTY began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation in Portland, Oregon. Following service in the Atlantic and the Pacific (which includes service during the Korean War at Suyong Bay, Pusan), the ship was mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958.

In February 1963 the ship was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research Ship. The conversion culminated in the ship's commissioning on December 30, 1964 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington under the name USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5). Three deployments have been successfully completed and the fourth to be of four months duration began 1 November 1966.

MISSION

The mission of the USS LIBERTY is to conduct Technical Research Operations in support of U. S. Navy electronics research projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communication systems, such as satellite communications.

To successfully fulfill the mission assigned requires the dedicated professional performance and teamwork of every officer and man aboard. The number of plank owners (original crew members attached to the ship on date of commissioning) has been reduced to a very few, but the example and standards of excellence and achievement they established continue to serve as a source of inspiration to those of us who have recently reported aboard. The hours are often long, weather conditions less than ideal, time in homeport with families and friends altogether too short, and mail from home at infrequent intervals, but the personal satisfaction gained in the knowledge that a necessary and vital task, in the highest interests of the Nation's welfare and security has been well done makes the hardship and loneliness less severe.

James M. Ennes, Jr Research Papers

ADVANCEMENT IN RATE CEREMONIES

As a result of scores achieved during recently concluded Fleet Wide Competitive Examinations, 64% of those aboard the LIBERTY who took the examination received authorization for advancement within a four month period, provided eligibility is maintained. This was cause for great celebration not only for the individuals concerned but for the command as a whole. The percentage was among the highest achieved by any ship in the U. S. Navy. Rear Admiral H. A. RENKEN, Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet personally presented Certificates of Appointment to those with an effective date of 16 October 1966 and congratulated all on their achievements. The Commanding Officer also extended his "well done" to each individual. Advancement to rates indicated has been or will be implemented on dates indicated:

EFFECTIVE 16 NOVEMBER 1966

NAME	RATE
BREISCH, Terrance	Communication Technician Chief
BROOKS, Donald	Communication Technician Chief
BYRD, C. E.	Communication Technician First Class
CARPENTER, Joseph	Communication Technician Third Class
KING, Charles E.	Machinist Mate First Class
LENTINI, J. C.	Communication Technician First Class
LUMPKINS, Dennis	Boiler Technician Second Class
MATTHEWS, J. S.	Communication Technician Chief
MC CLISTER, Edward	Communication Technician Third Class
MINOR, P. E.	Boatswains Mate Third Class
RHODES, P. E.	Communication Technician Third Class
RINGE, R. A.	Communication Technician Third Class
SHOFFNER, G. E.	Communication Technician First Class
UBER, S. M.	Communication Technician Third Class
WAY, C. W.	Communication Technician Third Class
WRIGHT, C. D.	Communication Technician First Class
YANKOW, G. J.	Disbursing Clerk Third Class

EFFECTIVE 16 DECEMBER 1966

BERNIER, Gerard L.	Machinery Repairman Second Class
CHADSEY, C. L.	Communication Technician Second Class
DOUGHERTY, Dennis	Communication Technician Second Class
KINSER, John	Damage Controlman Third Class
MC CLENDON, H. W.	Communication Technician Second Class
SCHALEY, K. H.	Engineman Third Class
SMITH, [illegible]	Radioman Chief

REENLISTMENTS

The Commanding Officer administered the oath of enlistment to Petty Officer Donald John LUNDIN, Communication Technician Third Class, USN on 29 November 1966. Petty Officer LUNDIN initially entered the Naval service on 31 January 1964 and has been aboard the LIBERTY since 30 October 1966.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Donald is from Melrose Park, Illinois where he graduated from West Leyden High School.

Petty Officer LUNDIN was awarded $5076.00 as a re-enlistment bonus, and was congradulated on his wise decision by the Commanding Officer, LCDR P. M. ARMSTRONG, USN, Executive Officer and LCDR D. E. LEWIS, USN, Technicial Research Officer.

AWARDS

The number of Good Conduct awards which have been earned recently has been particularily gratifying. The Department of the Navy's Good Conduct Award is in recognition of faithful, zealous and obedient Naval service over a four year span. Proud recipients so far this cruise have been:

Petty Officer Thomas R. MASSART, Electricians Mate Second Class
First Award for service completed 19 June 1965.

Petty Officer Leon R. PARENT, Yeoman Second Class
Third Award for service completed 30 June 1966.

Petty Officer Jeffery R. CARPENTER, Communication Technician First Class
Second Award for service completed 14 July 1966.

United States Armed Forces Institute certificates for achieving satisfactory scores on the tests of General Educational Development. High School Level have been awarded to the following men by the Commanding Officer:

Joseph W. ASHWORTH, EM3N
Francis BROWN, SN
Duilio DEMORI, FN
John FISHER, FN
James KAVANAUGH, CTSN

These certificates certify that the individual has achieved scores on the high school level tests of General Developement which are acceptable to the military and which are at or above the minimum national scores recommended by the American Council on Education as a basis for the issuance of a high school diploma.

These men are now in a better position to improve themselves and seek assignments of greater responsibility. Many Naval courses which require a high school diploma before an individual can be enrolled are now available to them to enhance their Naval Careers.

PORT VISITS

The purposes of our visits are to send and receive U. S. Mail, rest and recreation for members of the crew, to provide them with an opportunity to get to know the citizens of the country we are visiting, and perhaps of even greater importance is to give the citizens of that country a chance to get to know Americans. Each one of us are truly "Ambassadores in Uniform" and represent all of the people of the United States of America. Our manner of dress and deportment create lasting impressions. The outstanding appearance of the sideboys, honor guard, crew and the ship have generated

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

very favorable comments from civil and military dignitaries of the countries visited. The friendliness and conduct of the crew ashore has also been a source of great pride.

THANKSGIVING

Thanksgiving Day was spent in Dakar, Senegal and the commissary personnel:

Petty Officer RICE, Ship's Cook, Second Class
Petty Officer WOLFORD, Ship's Cook, Second Class
Petty Officer BARTON, Ship's Cook, Third Class
Petty Officer SHELLHAMMER, Ship's Cook, Third Class
Seaman BOCCELLA
Seaman CARNAHAN

and mess cooks, under the direct supervision of Petty Officer BAKER, Ship's Cook, First Class prepared a sumptuous feast which was fully appreciated by the entire crew and various Peace Corps members who visited the ship that day. Everyone is looking forward to their Christmas Day menu since we'll be unable to spend that day at home with loved ones and friends.

MAIL & TELEGRAPHIC SERVICE

Every effort is made to provide the ship with the best mail service possible. Circumstances beyond the control of those responsible for arranging delivery to the ship may mean that it may occasionally take longer to receive an answer to some of your questions. Please use zip code 09501 on mail to USS LIBERTY to speed delivery. If the matter is urgent telegrams may be sent to the ship. The correct telegraphic address is:

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
U. S. NAVCOMMSTA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Personnel are also permitted to send telegrams from the ship provided it meets the following criteria:

The class "E" message privilege is primarily for the purpose of morale in affording Naval personnel at sea a means of rapid communications for important personal matters without incurring prohibitive expenses. This privilege shall be used sparingly. Under ordinary circumstances the following rules of subject matter apply:

A. Acceptable:

1. Matters of life and death, and serious illness.
2. Matters of personnal arrangements or important personal business, not of a recurring nature.

B. Not Acceptable:

1. Trivial, indecent or frivolous messages.
2. Messages of unnecessary length.
3. Frequent or recurring messages pertaining to the conduct of a commercial venture.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4. DUNS or business solicitations by commercial enterprize
5. Ordinarily congratulatory messages.

C. Holiday or anniversary greetings are generally not acceptable but may be handled on an individual subject by subject basis.

WARDROOM NEWS

LTJG Philip A. CAMPBELL, USNR and LTJG Larry G. BRANNAN, USNR (a plank owner) are due for release from active duty in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. LTJG CAMPBELL will be relieved as Navigator by LTJG Steve TOTH, who reported aboard during the port visit to Dakar. ENS Dick TAYLOR, who also reported aboard in Dakar, will relieve LTJG BRANNAN as Supply/Disbursing Officer.

Other recent additions to the officers' country include:

LCDR D. E. LEWIS, Technical Research Officer
LT M. H. BENNETT, Assistant Technical Research Officer
LT R. W. PRATT, Ship's Doctor
ENS J. D. SCOTT, Damage Control Assistant
ENS D. G. LUCAS, Main Propulsion Assistant

The newest addition to the Chief Petty Officer's mess is James A. MATTHEWS, Communication Technician Chief. As is customary in the Navy, Chief MATTHEWS first had to endure the "chief initiation" before he was allowed to put on "the hat" of a chief petty officer.

In closing may I invite you to write directly to me on any matter you feel should be brought to my attention or on which I may be able to be of assistance.

Best wishes to each of you for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

W. L. McGonagle

W. L. MCGONAGLE
Commander, U. S. Navy
Commanding Officer
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FROM: _____

_____

_____

STAMP

TO: _____

_____

_____

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO
LA-13:ctf
S-1269:8-28
August 21, 1967

Dear Mr. Esch:

This is to acknowledge your recent inquiry concerning the incident involving the USS LIBERTY.

This matter is receiving prompt attention and you may expect a reply shortly.

Sincerely,

for
L. B. GUISINGER
Lieutenant Commander, USN
Congressional Liaison Div.

Honorable Marvin L. Esch
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COMPOSITE CHRONOLOGY

*0754 Steaming on 130T, Spd 10K
*0849 Passed through point Alfa, changed course to 253T
*0850 Single unident jet crossed astern, distance 3 to 5 miles
*0905 Decreased speed to 5 knots
#1030 Two jets orbit three times, 2 miles, elevation 10,000 ft
*1056 Another A/C circled ship - high
#1056 Boxcar circles, no markings, returns at approx 30 minute intervals
*1126 Another A/C circled ship
*1132 Passed through point Bravo, C/C to 283T
*1310 Exercised at GQ drill
1310 GQ drill
1317 Chemical attack probable (simulated)
1324 Chemical attack (simulated)
1348 Secure from General Quarters
*1348 Secure from General Quarters
*1351 Three small surface contacts held on radar 32,000 yards bearing 082T
*1353 Radar reports possible aircraft passing over surface contacts.
#1355 LTJG Painter takes deck; ENS O'Malley takes conn as JOOD
CO: "No QM notebook entries are made from 1356 to 1446."
*1358 Single aircraft sighted approaching ship from 135R, 5-6 miles, 7,000 ft alt. Aircraft passed down track of ship.
1358 Attacked by two jets. Machine gun fire. Repeated bombings.
#1400 Air attack. "O'Connor went with XO; Bennett ordered to send msg; 21MC lost on 1st or 2nd of total 6 to 8 strafing runs."
*1403 Loud explosion - port side amidships.
*1405 Sounded GQ. Large fire vicinity frame 85, 01 lvl, fuel storage drums
*1405 All engines ahead flank (rung up by CO on engine order telegraph)
1406 Fire on bridge.
*1405-1410 Ship under repeated air attack with two or more unidentified aircraft making coordinated strafing, rocket and incendiary runs over the ship. Three major fires topside covering large area of ship with flames and heavy smoke. A total of eight officers and men were killed or died as a result of injuries received during the air attack: One officer killed and one mortally wounded on bridge, two men killed at machine gun 51, one man killed at machine gun 52, one died of wounds received on the main deck starboard side and two died of wounds received on the 01 level portside. Approximately 75 wounded, including Commanding Officer, throughout topside areas from shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets.
1410 continued attacks
*1410 Began making turns for 18 knots
#1420 CO sends man to machine gun 51 to take boats under fire
1424 Three gunboats sighted.
*1424 Three MTB sighted abaft starboard beam, distance 3-4 miles
*1426 Noted that ensign shot away. Holiday ensign hoisted on yardarm
*1428 MTBs signalling by flashing light from stbd quarter. Light obscured by dense smoke from burning motor whaleboat
1430 Bridge orders hold fire
*1430 Bridge orders hold fire
*1431 Machine gun 53 fires on center of three torpedo boats. CO sends ENS LUCAS to machine gun 53 to order cease fire. Boats flying small Star of David.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1431 Stand by for torpedo attack
*1431 Word passed to stand by for torpedo attack on starboard side of ship
1433 "demolition bill in effect"
#1434 (corrected from 1426) torpedo passes astern
*1434 torpedo passes 75 yards astern
#1435 (corrected from 1427) torpedo hit
1435 torpedo hit starboard side

*1435 Torpedo hit starboard side amidships. Twenty-six men died as a result of the torpedo hit and motor torpedo boat strafing fire. Torpedo hit in vicinity of the research coordination center where approximately twenty men were at their GQ station. This and adjacent spaces were flooded instantly and most personnel in these spaces died of either blast or drowning. The number of injured was 200.

*1435 Lost electrical power throughout the ship
*1436 Lost steam pressure - secured engines and boilers
*1440 Hull number of one MTB observed to be 206-17. MTB's standing away fm ship
*1503 One MTB returns to ship, signals "do you need help?" CO ans "negative."
*1505 MTBs retire toward shore
*1507 Helos bearing Star of David approach ship and hover, distance 500 yds. Hull numbers D4 or 04 and D8 or 08.
*1508 Helos make repeated passes around and over ship
1515 Two Israeli helos making repeated passes overhead
#1515 Helos D4/04 and D8/08 circle, parallel to ship, not hostile
#1515 MTBs depart, sit five miles away
1516 MTBs have now left the area
1517 Helos friendly
1519 Power available now (rudder does not answer)
*1519 Power restored to bridge except for rudder
1520 After steering has control of steering
#1520 Engines back
#1523 Engines out again
1524 Condition ZEBRA reset
*1536 MTBs approaching ship starboard side 7-8 miles. During next hour and a quarter they returned to the ship, retired over horizon by 1713
1536 MTBs now reapproaching
#1537 MTBs approach fast from starboard. Two jets approach at same time from starboard. Crew warned to stand by for resumed attack.
1538 Appears to be destroyer behind MTB
1539 Hoisting CODE LIMA INDIA (changed course)
1542 MTBs reversed. One seems to be smoking.
#1555 Communications back
#1600 Message send amplifying attack report, identifying MTBs as Israeli
1607 Boat approaching starboard side at high speed, approx 12 miles
#1611 Ship's international call sign hoisted
1611 Hoisted international signal flag

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1615 Two unidentified jets approaching ship, starboard side
*1615 Two unidentified jets approach fm stbd, reconnoiter at a distance
*1620 Attempting to clear area steering northerly course at speeds varying from 0 to 8 knots. Personnel casualties were treated in the wardroom on a continuing basis. Damage control and fire fighting controlled flooding and damage. Engineering casualties were restored but steering was by hand from after steering.
1621 Stop all engines. No steering.
1623 Left Standard Rudder
1623 All engines ahead one-third
1628 Rudder Amidships
1630 Ship is underway, course 340Mag, Speed 8 knots
1630 204-17 high speed patrol boat circles, 50 Cal forward, 3in50 Anti Aircraft
1631 maintain 8 knots
1632 Boats flying Israeli ensign
1632 CO says, "Torpedo boats seem to be Israeli"
1632 Gun boats retreating
#1637 MTBs depart, ship making 8 knots, course 340 Magnetic.
1642 change speed to all ahead one-third, after steering having trouble keeping on co
1648 Three gun boats have turned away
1653 Change course to 000 magnetic
1655 Word passed to COM6THFLT that photos were taken of the attacking aircraft
#1655 Fathometer shows 26 fathoms. Set anchor detail.
1702 Power to anchor windlass
#1704 Ship backing
#1722 Stop backing. Fathometer now shows 48 fathoms.
#1730 Lost lube oil pressure. Engines stop.
#1731 Regained pressure. Engines back on.
#1743 Heading 068 magnetic, 82 fathoms, consider no danger of grounding
#1748 Increased speed to 10 knots, Course 050 magnetic.
#1750 COM6thFLT message advises escorts on the way, orders steam 340M for 100 miles
#1841 Israeli helo hovers at bridge, 30 feet away, wants to land a man
*1845 Israeli helo approached ship -- circled close aboard and attempted to signal -- they appeared to desire to lower someone to deck -- CO considered receiving him on forecastle but ruled this out as too hazardous -- repeated attempts to communicate were unsuccessful
*1852 Helo dropped message packet on forecastle. Message, written on a calling card of U S Naval Attache, Tel Aviv, asked, "have you casualties?" Ship tried to communicate over next ten minutes, no apparent success. Three mutilated bodies of dead crewmen still on forecastle. Helo departed shortly before 1905 sunset.
#1857 Israeli helo D6/06 arrives, drops card, leaves after 10 or 15 minutes.

ABOVE IS COMPOSITE OF CICWO NOTEBOOK (unmarked),
CO's statement to Board of Inquiry (marked with #)
Board of Inquiry's official reconstruction from QM notebook,
CIC log, Bell Book & recollection of CO, Chf Engr, gun and
Bridge personnel. "all concur" (marked with *)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1620 clearing area, fires out, flooding controlled

Lloyd gets scotch for XO

1637 (?) MTBs came close long after torpedo, used signal lights but no one could read the light, finally came close with megaphone

1648 MTBs leaving

1655 26 fathoms of water -- set anchor detail due to shallow water

I am moved to mess decks (when? I think I was in mess decks during backing?

CDR Castle hovers as I go under helo

1704 backing out of shallow water = may anchor

1722 48 fathoms of water - stop backing

1730 briefly lost engines

1840 CDR Castle drops card, wants to come aboard, man asks permission to shoot helo pilot but CO xxx says I "no," they'd finish us off

time? I arrive mess decks, IV's hang from lamps.
Jim is alive and on mattress, he waves
XO is pale and up on one elbow, looks OK, waves
Payan is near me with three helpers
man at my feet keeps rolling into my legs

1900 Sailor offers me brandy, I accept grapefruit juice
men bring cases of whiskey and bear to mess deck

1915 Maury visits, I weep, I thought him dead. He tells me about CO message reporting 5-6 minutes of attack. We still don't know who attacked us. Maury thinks a/c were MMMM migs.

1930 XO refuses medical help, tells doc to look after the men, asks for coffee, coughs blood, gives ring and watch to green, dies

---

O'Malley visits, says Bppers and KIA/WIA message with "what action?"

Long night. White or Benkert mostly stay with me, plug my holes, feed me juices

Blanchard, with kidney injury, asks "will I die?"
Doc says, "if I don't operate you will die; if I operate you'll still probably die
doc operates; blanchard dies.

Lloyd notified "you're it for tag" by David. Finds CO unconscious. Takes comm.

Morning: DD's arrive withDr._____and corpsmen.
"We thought it was worse" Then doc takes to mess hall for coffee

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Reports persist of periscope sightings around ship.

CO won't leave bridge. Doc and George considdr relieving him as he was not entirely rational, but decide against it.

Water surges through empty spaces, pushing ship from side to side.

orders received to proceed to point 100 miles off shore

CO determines course by sun, then by North star

CO on back on bridge with leg up, judging course by wake

COmmodore Lehy (Lahy?) comes aboard from flagship Davis with Chief Engr, DCA, 15 deck and 15 snipes. (Goulding p114 says COMDESRON 12 came aboard)

0900-1000 helos start taking wounded to America

Jeff walks to forward deck house for helo, put in stretcher. Stan White ties him in. Someone lifts stretcher so he can see America nearby.

1200 America crew gives three cheers, big lift to Lib crew...
McInturff says "I know we'll make it now. I can swim over that far"

America builds special rig for leg. Docs insist leg is not broken. strap cuts circulation. "do not disturb" MAA[illegible]OW

Lib volunteers go into space with bad bulkhead on five minuteshifts

Ship continues to sink by bow
George considers dumping anchor and chain
Finally George stops ship and PARACO divers measure hole by tying lines across and measuring lines.
Loose flap of metal schops water into ship.
John finally rigs shoring on the weakened bulkhead.

Betsy Golden is hanging clothes when neighbor tells her to go in and listen to the radio.

Paula hears news in Torriganville, Md, on Paul Harvey Show...then mother's stockbroker cousin calls when he sees report on ticker.

"congress" blasts George for KIA/MIA reports.

CO agrees to stay in room and let george run ship by ship CO's orders.

George takes bottle of scothh to CO in cabin. CO accepts, then gives George hell. George explains that it was found "in the possessions of a dead man" and would have gone over the side, but was given to doctor to supplment medical stores. This makes it OK.

George is blasted for muster errors. Carpenter reported missing becnuse it was not known that he had gone to America. Mrs. Carpenter gets erroneous MIA report followed by report of wounds & Jeffs message from America.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

survivors raid clothing of dead and wounded. All of George Golden's uniforms are ruined by a single bullet.

HM3 gets high on dope from life rafts. He is disciplined. (medal rescinded? ck)

I take COD flight from America to Athens, thence Naples, ambulance through downtown naples, see only balconies. ~~Bombingmentoms~~ get big greeting at empty hospital.

Israeli Ambassador asks to talk to me.

I am bathed and bouboned by felicity norrell

ADM Kidd arrives 0400 fourth morning fm a destroyer and wanders about in khaki without stars. Tells crew to think of him as an old chief. he talks to men on forsle.

ADM Kidd convenes board. tells men, we don't want to hear about that, when they try to talk about napalm, chance to attackers to identify lib, fact flag was visible, etc.

Jim arrives Naples, bleeds, checked by Italian urologist. Helo comes to door and takes Jim to airport, thence to Germany.

I am put in Spica, main lined demorol, catheter installed. "If lost return to Gloria"

We are told, OK to interview. TV Cameraman asks to interview me and I refuse. Benkert agrees and spends two days in "practice" interviews.

Lucas gives intv board napalm sample in medicine bottle.

Captain Henry is in charge of repairs at Malta

A Servron eight Captain stays to control news. US Ambadsador at Malta also controls news, visit ship or calls daily, sends lieutenant to complain about people talking (and fighting) too much.

I go to Frankfurt, installed in depressing room of broken femurs. No one can leave rooms. Dave Lewis gets playboy, Army threatens to take his pajamas.

Mrs. Magoo keeps things together in Norfolk

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, 3

Crew fights with tanker crew that resents liberty "glory." George finally orders men to wear only civvies ashore.

George makes "old glory" statement to reporter (Colin _____) in bar and is quoted around the world. Messages come out telling everyone to stop talking. Ambassador visits.

Sheehan files wild story from America but misses real significance.

Lib arrives Norfolk 27? July

Jpy and girls arrive in Red, White and Blue

Joy calls Paula to suggest hang Banner from railroad trestle

Joy calls Mrs. Magoo to tell her Paula wants to hang banner from rr trestle.

Mrs. Mago calls Paula and Paula goes into orbit.

Press and helos meet the ship. Press and dignitaries go aboard first, but only CO and one or two carefully selected people are allowed to see press.

Carlson, McInturff, Lehman get psych tests in San Juan.

State Dept seeks Israeli Permission to give Medal of Honor to CO'

I am invited to MofH ceremony. Honor is played down.
O'Connor and Lewis are called by a Captain and told not to attend.
Medal is given in Washington Navy Yard by SECNAV, although Johnson was present in White House and had been giving all MofH's.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



ONE HERO TO ANOTHER—CAPT William L. McGonagle, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroism while commanding USS Liberty (ATGR 5), during the attack of 8 Jun 1967, presents the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" to Yeoman 3rd Class Virgil L. Brownfield, USNR, for his bravery as the captain's bridge talker during the attack. The ceremony took place at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Welcome Aboard

The State of Alaska now has a Naval Reserve Training Facility and a Naval Reserve Surface Division of its own.

The two additions to the Naval Reserve program were simultaneously established at Anchorage in a ceremony attended by city, state and federal dignitaries. Rear Admiral Donald M. White, Commandant of the 17th Naval District, officially activated the new organizations, and Commander Lloyd W. Olson, USNR, then read the orders designating him as both Officer in Charge of the U.S. Naval Reserve Training Facility, Anchorage, and Commanding Officer of Naval Reserve Surface Division 17–1.

The ceremony was held in the Anchorage National Guard Armory, where the Naval Reservists will share the classrooms and drill hall. The Training Facility started operation with a staff of two petty officers on full time active duty. Original members of the Surface Division included 12 officers and 20 enlisted Reservists.

Before the new units were established Naval Reserve activity in Alaska was restricted to a Composite Company program, which was discontinued.

Grosse Ile Group Finds Cool AcDuTra

Seventeen Naval Reservists from Grosse Ile, Mich., beat the heat this summer with a trip to the edge of the Arctic Circle. They were assigned to AcDuTra at the Keflavik, Iceland, NATO Base.

Besides enjoying the 55-degree

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Chief Thompson was cited for gallantry [illegible] Bronze Star Medal (A [illegible]) by the [illegible] Division Commander, [illegible] Chief Thompson, a [illegible] Squadron Corpsman, was [illegible] Assigned. He immediately assumed the duty of Officer in Charge of the Squad Tent, promptly organizing and supervising the evacuation of the wounded, and directing fire fighting teams with utter disregard for his own safety. He was later wounded in the attack. Recognizing [illegible] when an urgent call came in from the ship to assist the signalman, Chief Thompson



Captain Babcock congratulates Chief Thompson following presentation of Bronze Star Medal with combat "V".

Fallon Chief Honored



NEW $825,000 BARRACKS for enlisted men at Pensacola Communications Training Center was dedicated in honor of Chief Communications Technician Melvin D. Smith, killed in the Israeli torpedo boat attack on the technical research ship Liberty last June 8. Mrs. Smith, the chief's widow, and her two sons, Mark and Melvin Jr., do the honors. Looking on are Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.), left, and Capt. G. B. Tamburello, Center commanding officer. In rear are Mike Smith, brother, and Mr. and Mrs. C. M. Smith, parents.

NOV 22 1967
NAVY TIMES

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.



Capt. W. L. McGonagle

Distinguished Naval Officer Comes To OU

NORMAN — The naval officer who commanded the USS Liberty when she was attacked in June 1967 by Israeli jet fighters and torpedo boats will become professor of naval science and commanding officer of the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps (NROTC) at the University of Oklahoma Sept. 1.

Capt. William L. McGonagle of Walnut Creek, Calif., was presented the Medal of Honor "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty" as commanding officer of the Liberty when she was attacked on June 8, 1967, off the Sinai coast in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel issued an apology for attacking by mistake the U.S. communications vessel.

The highly decorated 43-year-old officer comes to OU from the USS Kilauea, where he has been commanding officer since October 1967. He succeeds Capt. Marcus Lowe, who retired June 30 as professor of naval science and commanding officer of the NROTC unit at the university.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FLAGHOIST

VOL. 1 NO. 11 U. S. NAVAL SECURITY STATION NOVEMBER 1968

AWARDS HIGHLIGHT NSS INSPECTION



RADM R. E. COOK CONGRATULATES LT JAMES G. O'CONNOR UPON PRESENTATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION FOR SERVICE ABOARD THE U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

LT James G. O'CONNOR, Jr. has been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for service aboard the U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5) while under attack during the Arab-Israeli crisis. In presenting the award during ceremonies held at NAVSECSTA October 25, Rear Admiral R. E. COOK, Commander, Naval Security Group Command, extended his personal congratulations: "Your performance under the most adverse conditions reflects great credit upon yourself, the United States Navy and the Naval Security Group."

LT O'CONNOR is married and is the father of two children. A native of Saratoga, New York, he attended Sienna College in Albany. He is currently attending American University under the Department of the Navy's Special Technology and Management Program. When reached for comment on the award, LT O'CONNOR stressed the valor of the men with whom he served, stating that it is most important to "honor the group who actually brought the ship back. They did a terrific job."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FLAGHOIST

Published monthly at the U. S. Naval Security Station, 3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20390 in accordance with NAVEXOS P-35. Printed on government equipment, no commercial facilities utilized, financed from appropriated funds. All opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of the Navy Department or those of this command. This publication receives the services of the Armed Forces Press File, and is a member of the Armed Forces Press Service. Photographs, unless otherwise credited, are official U. S. Navy Photographs.

COMMANDING OFFICER ..... CAPT J. W. FOUST
EXECUTIVE OFFICER ..... CDR S. T. FAULKNER
OFFICER ADVISOR ..... LTJG W. T. WEST
ASSISTANT ADVISOR ..... ENS R. W. JORDAN
EDITOR ..... YNC W. N. DUNN

CONTENTS

FEATURE STORY	ENS R. W. JORDAN	Front Page
CONTENTS		Inside Front Page
THOUGHTS (THANKSGIVING MESSAGE)	RADM J.W. KELLY, CHC, USN	Page 2
ERNIE EDUCATION SEZ	CT1 C. MACDONALD	Page 3
CROSSWORD PUZZLE		Page 4
HOW WISHES COME TRUE	AFPS EDITORIAL	Page 4
PERSONNEL PANORAMA	CT3 R. FRANSEN	Page 5
WELCOME ABOARD/DEPARTURES	CT3 R. FRANSEN	Page 6
THE REGISTERED PUB	MRS. M. PAGE	Page 7
"N63 Cuts Costs"	ENS R. W. JORDAN	Page 8
THE SURVEYOR	MRS. C. BUTLER	Page 9
SUPPLY LINES	LTJG W. COOK	Page 10
STATE BONUSES INFORMATION	AFPS	Page 11
WAVE OFFICERS REPORT ABOARD	ENS R. W. JORDAN	Page 11
THE 'KOUNTIN' CORNER	MRS. E. MORRIS	Page 12
SPECIAL SERVICES	YNC W. N. DUNN	Page 13
THE CREDIT-ABILITY GAP	AFPS EDITORIAL	Page 14
DISA & DATA	NAVNEWS	Page 15
THE GRAB BAG	NAVNEWS	Page 16
THE CROW'S NEST	NAVNEWS	Page 17
CHUCKLES	AFPS	Page 18
"OVER THERE"	AFPS	Page 19
SPORTS	YNC W. N. DUNN	Page 20



Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

CHAPLAIN'S OFFICE
FRAZIER HALL
NAVAL STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

N84:DMH:jw
1700
8 May 1969

My dear Friends:

I am pleased to inform you that the USS LIBERTY Memorial Carillon will be dedicated in the David Adams Memorial Chapel at 1000 hours on Sunday, 8 June 1969.

The Carillon was made possible through the kindness of Rear Admiral Ben Sarver, USN, Commander, Service Force Atlantic, whose Recreation Fund contributed $3,000.00; and Captain E. F. Higgins, Jr., USN, Commanding Officer, Naval Station, Norfolk, whose Recreation Fund contributed $1,500.00. These gifts added to those received by earlier solicitation made it possible to contract for the "Coronation" Carillon by Schulmerich.

You will be pleased to learn that Captain W. L. McGonagle, USN, Commanding Officer of the USS LIBERTY when attacked; and now Commanding Officer in the USS KILAUEA (AE-26), will be present at the dedication. Mr. John Klien, noted carillonist, will give a Carillon Recital following the dedication. The Dedication Service will begin at 1000 in the David Adams Memorial Chapel and at the 1030 Mass in Our Lady of Victory Chapel of the Naval Station in Norfolk.

Many of those to whom we have written expressed a hope that they might be present for this Dedication Service. We most cordially invite you to share in this meaningful experience with us and will look forward to meeting those personally who have so kindly written and graciously donated to the Carillon Fund. A special section of the Chapel will be marked off to seat those who served in the LIBERTY and/or their dependents. We ask that you make known your presence to an usher to be seated among our honored guests.

With warmest personal best wishes and hoping to meet you on Sunday, 8 June 1969, the second anniversary of a fateful hour for the USS LIBERTY, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

David M. Humphreys

DAVID M. HUMPHREYS
CAPTAIN, CHAPLAIN CORPS
U. S. NAVY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

30 JUNE 1923 8 JUNE 1967

NAMED IN HONOR OF

CTC RAYMOND E. LINN, USN

WHO GAVE HIS LIFE FOR HIS COUNTRY
WHILE SERVING ON BOARD THE
USS LIBERTY (AGTR — 5)
WHICH WAS ATTACKED IN THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA ON 8 JUNE 1967

December

South Zanesville Navy Man To Be Honored Posthumously

A South Zanesville Navy career man killed when his ship was attacked by Israeli forces in the Middle East June 8 will be honored posthumously Wednesday night.

Chief Communications Technician Raymond Eugene Linn, Jr. of 16 East Main Street has been awarded the Purple Heart and Navy Expeditionary Service Medal with bronze star by the Navy Department.

The medals will be presented to his widow, Mrs. Jo Ann Linn, at a ceremony at the Zanesville Training Center on Moxahala Avenue at 7:30 p.m.

Chief Linn was serving aboard the USS Liberty when the communications ship was mistakenly hit by Israeli jets and torpedo boats during the 6 Day war in the Middle East. Linn and more than 30 of his shipmates were killed.

Chief Linn was a graduate of Adamsville and enlisted in the Navy while still a senior at Zanesville High School.

His daughter was born in Naval City with the help of Navy Corpsman Paul [illegible] the same corpsman who also helped adopt another baby, 17, of 2203 Maple Avenue.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



U. S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
HAKATA, JAPAN

LINN BBQ DEDICATION CEREMONY

15 April 1969

Named in Honor of

CTC RAYMOND E. LINN, USN
(1928-1967)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

about 1500 words

Mr. Charles L. Jackson
[illegible]

One Man's Fight For Survival
by
LCDR David E. Lewis, USN
as told to
Charles L. Jackson

"I was in a complete state of shock and totally helpless when I was pulled from the rapidly flooded compartment. It was only through the grace of God and a hunch on the part of Lt. Maury Bennett that prompted him to break water-tight integrity and open the hatch where I was found." These were some of the first words spoken to me by LCDR David E. Lewis, USN, survivor of the Israeli attack on the USS LIBERTY, on June 8, 1967 as I began my interview.

"A badly injured back," he continued, "two ruptured eardrums, severe burns about the face and body and multiple shrapnel wounds were the direct result of the torpedo explosion."

It had been three years since the Israeli attack on the

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY when I interviewed LCDR Dave Lewis, but, he had a vivid recollection of the events leading up to the attack, until that torpedo exploded.

Dave Lewis had been assigned to duty on the USS LIBERTY, a technical research ship of the U.S. Navy, on August 1, 1966. He had gone aboard with a feeling of great pride. The officer was impressed with the clean, neat appearance of the vessel. She looked very ship-shape and seaworthy. As the Head of the Research Department, he was assigned a private stateroom on the 02 level, on the port side of the Captain's cabin.

The ship had sailed peacefully into the calm blue waters of the Mediterranean that fateful day, and cruised some 15 miles off the coast of Israel. No one on board had the slightest hint they would be limping back to Valetta, Malta, a few days later looking like a sieve.

"Earlier, on the morning of the attack," the commander recalled, "I had seen the Israeli reconnaissance planes as I was on my way below decks to the communications spaces. There was no indication at that time that an attack was imminent."

"Suddenly, the morning calm was shattered with the roar of attacking jets closing in. Machine gun bullets began ricocheting off the superstructure of the ship. The rockets fired from the jets easily penetrated the thin, steel-plated hull and exploded inside the ship."

General quarters had sounded immediately and cries of "Man your battle stations" were heard on the ship's loudspeakers.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The clanging of the alarm bell seemed louder than ever as the men hurried to their stations. Dave Lewis had just entered the passageway outside the Communications Center, on the way to his battle station, when the torpedo struck. The torpedo hit a main frame which absorbed most of the blast, otherwise, a much larger hole would have been made in the side of the ship. The penetrating force of the blast quickly killed the men in the compartment.

By the time the torpedo rammed home, the ship was already a shambles of flying glass and broken furniture. The noise of the battle was everywhere. The intercoms were alive with voices shouting commands and calling for reports from battle stations, but Cdr. Lewis was totally oblivious to all of this. His eardrums had been blown apart. Flash burns had temporarily blinded him and he was not to see again for nearly a week.

"I remember," he continued, "the crashing sound of the rockets penetrating the ship's hull during the strafing runs of the jets, and the terrible explosions inside the ship, but, at the time, I was concerned with keeping my men busy at their stations in order to distract them from what was happening topside."

"However, I have total amnesia of the torpedo attack. All my wounds were the result of the torpedo detonating just 15 feet from my station."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Chapter [illegible]

The area where the torpedo struck was well below the waterline, just outside the compartment where Cdr. Lewis and his men worked. The compartment had been sealed against flooding and other reasons, called water tight integrity, immediately after general quarters had sounded.

"By the time Lt. Bennett opened the hatch, the area was nearly completely flooded, and I'm sure I wouldn't have lasted three or four minutes more. Bennett told me later that he found me floating just at the head of the ladder when the hatch was opened, and he reached in and took hold of me. I'm eternally grateful to Maury for saving my life."

The twenty nine men working in the compartment never knew what hit them, they were killed instantly. Only the fact that Cdr. Lewis had stepped into the passageway just before the torpedo struck resulted in his survival.

Mr. Lewis was taken to the ship's dispensary and placed on a bunk near other wounded men. He received the minimum amount of attention from the corpsman; compresses for his bleeding and dressings for his burns. The small room quickly filled with the wounded and the dying. The noise outside the dispensary was thunderous, but inside there was quiet calm. Some men were sobbing, others groaning softly, but the corpsmen quickly did their duty as best they could in the crowded spaces.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The following [illegible] Lewis was quoted [illegible] the [illegible] which had responded to [illegible] help.

"I spent a week on board the AMERICA undergoing treatment for my injuries. Then I was flown to Souda Bay where a medical evacuation plane flew me to the naval hospital in Naples, Italy.

"After a week in the hospital there," he went on, "I had recovered sufficiently to be transferred to the Army hospital in Frankfurt, Germany where I spent two days in preparation for a flight which eventually brought me to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md."

When asked how long he was attached to the Naval Hospital in Bethesda he replied, "As an in-patient, three months, during which time I underwent numerous operations to have more pieces of shrapnel and other metal removed from my body. I also underwent treatment for two shattered eardrums and two herniated discs in my back."

"At the end of those three months, I became an out-patient and continued under treatment until I was released to active duty in December 1969, thirty months after we had been attacked. Prior to my release I was subjected to the stringent Air Force hearing test which I managed to pass in its entirety, indicating my hearing ability had been satisfactorily restored. The herniated discs hadnot been completely repaired as I still suffered occasional twinges of pain in my back."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

When asked if his attitude toward the Israelis had changed over the past three years, the commander replied, "Not really, I have never felt any bitterness toward them. As a professional military man I'm inclined to reflect on their professionalism.

"Do you suppose," I asked, "that you might have acted as the Israelis did at the time, if you had been in their position?"

"No, I don't think so," he replied, "a mistake is a mistake, but I hope I wouldn't have made such a mistake. It's a shame that the Israelis failed to recognize us. Twenty nine of the 34 men killed were in my compartment, and two of them would be alive today if I hadn't asked them to make one more deployment with me. I shall always remember Chief Lynn (CTC RAYMOND EUGENE LYNN) and Lt. Jim Pierce. They would have been retired had they not made that last trip."

Mr. Lewis kept in touch with some of the injured veterans and recalled that all who survived the attack were alive today. Of the total of about 300 men in the crew, 202 were awarded the Purple Heart, (204 + RIBBONS) 34 of them posthumously.

As for the USS LIBERTY, after the attack, the fire and rescue parties, aided by the damage control parties did an excellent job in keeping the ship afloat by maintaining water tight integrity and effecting minor repairs. The badly listing vessel sailed under its own power to Valetta, Malta, where it underwent emergency repairs before getting underway again for the long trip home. The LIBERTY has since been retired from active ser-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

vice and to[illegible] rests at anchor [illegible] Norfolk, Va.

On July 1, 1970 LCDR Lewis was transferred from his duty station in Washington, D.C. and proceeded to the Pacific Area where he assumed the duties of the Deputy Research Officer at the Naval Communications Station, Wahiawa, Hawaii. Upon completion of his tour he was promoted to Commander, U.S. Navy and transferred to the National Security Agency, Ft. George, G. Meade, Maryland. As he nears the end of this tour of duty, he is looking forward to retiring from the Navy and returning to Colebrook, New Hampshire, his boyhood home.

-30-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ASSORTED XEROX COPIES

James M. Emes, Jr. Research Papers

LDO AND WO BILLET REVIEW

On 24 June 1975, CHNAVPERS (Pers-401) convened a meeting to initiate a Navy-wide limited duty officer (LDO) and warrant officer (WO) billet review. One purpose of this review was to revaluate each billet in light of the separate functional role definitions for LDO's and WO's approved by SECNAV on 5 December 1974 but not yet officially published. Under these role definitions, the LDO is a technically oriented officer who performs duties that are limited to specific occupational fields, that normally required authority and responsibility greater than that usually expected of a warrant officer that require strong managerial skills, and that are outside a normal development pattern for unrestricted line/restricted line officers. Professional development of the LDO should be focused on increasing the management skills of the LDO within his occupational field. The warrant officer is a technical officer specialist who performs duties which are limited in scope (in relation to those of other officer categories), technically oriented (through experience/functional training), repetitive in nature, and not significantly affected by advancement in rank and therefore amenable to successive tours. Professional development of the WO should be focused on increasing the technical competence of the WO within his specialty.

In addition to considering the functional role definition, each billet was also to be reviewed in relation to the overall command structure to determine the existence or nonexistence of excessive layering of technical /managerial talent in individual commands or units. Examples of excessive layering would be where an E-8 or E-9 is assigned directly subordinate to a CWO2, where an E-9 is assigned directly subordinate to a CWO3, or where a WO is assigned directly subordinate to an LDO below the rank of O-3.

Also to be considered in conducting the review was the requirement to create LDO Ensign billets and eliminate WO1 billets in accordance with the revised LDO/WO program, and the desire to achieve maximum commonality of rank/designator between billets of similar scope and responsibility at different commands. When all other factors had been considered, it was then necessary to attempt to fit the revised cryptologic LDO and WO billet structures as closely as possible to an ideal model established by CHNAVPERS.

As a result of the billet review, this Headquarters recommended to CHNAVPERS on 28 July 1975, 124 LDO (644X) and 146 (744X) billets for FY76 vice the 109 and 161 billets, respectively, currently authorized. The primary reason for the LDO billet increase was to accommodate the creation of the LDO Ensign billets with minimal impact upon the overall grade structure; an increase which had to be offset by a corresponding decrease in WO billets to remain within overall billet totals.

The following is a comparison of approved FY76 LDO and WO billet requirements and recommended requirements as determined by the billet review:

LDO BILLET REQUIREMENTS

Grade	FY76	Recommended
CDR	1	1
LCDR	24	20
LT	60	57
LTJG	24	22
ENS	0	24
Total	109	124

WO BILLET REQUIREMENTS

Grade	FY76	Recommended
CWO4	32	23
CWO3	57	50
CWO2	49	73
WO1	23	0
Total	161	146

If approved by the LDO and WO Billet Review Panel, the specific billet revisions will be automatically incorporated into command manning documents. In those cases where billets were downgraded, every effort was made to ensure the billet was reduced no more than one grade. Each command which had a billet changed in any way, except a WO1 billet upgraded to CWO2, has been informed of the billet action that was recommended to CHNAVPERS.

FALLEN ANGEL

An 85-foot dish antenna, known to many as the "Angel," fell on 30 July from its proud position overlooking Naval Communication Station Honolulu and the Dole pineapple fields near Wahiawa.

The removal of the 21-year old structure was contracted to Eddie's Construction Company of Honolulu. Preparatory work began 29 July with the removal of a two-ton counterweight and huge bolts in the base of the antenna. The "Angel" was supported by a 135-ton capacity crane during the entire process. To facilitate the lifting of the antenna from the supports to the ground, an acetylene torch was used to cut around the base.

As the dish antenna started its descent, it started swinging toward the crane and a cable parted, causing the antenna to topple over onto a derelict car and a chain-link fence.

Constructed in 1954, the "Angel" was used as a receiver in experimental communication projects for the Navy. In 1959 it was converted to a transmitter/receiver for the Moon-relay program which was then called Technical Research Ship to Shore Communica-

James W. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



Fallen Angel" ... The Moon-relay antenna falls to ... ard at NAVCOMMSTA Honolulu July 30.

...s (TRSSCOM). The Wahiawa site was in-...ved in transmitting the first operational ...ge to Cheltenham, MD via the moon in ...hat same year.

...re were three other land sites strate-...ally located in Okinawa, Great Britain, ...Cheltenham. Also there were six instr...tation ships linked to the shore fac...ties. The transmitter beamed a very high frequency signal toward the moon where it bounced to the receiver, traveling almost a half-million miles. In addition, the signal could be retransmitted until it reached its final destination. The Moon relay system was considered to be very secure because anyone desiring to monitor a message was required to know the variables involved in the declination and inclination of the moon and the location of the transmitter and receiver.

However, the system had several drawbacks. Massive equipment had to be constructed ashore consisting of an 85-foot dish antenna mounted on a sturdily constructed cement building. Within the building a computer was installed to control the angle and position of the dish. On board ship, the computer did the same job, with the additional factors regarding the ship's heading, rolling, and pitching. Another drawback was the lack of common moon time between the transmitter and receiver - both had to see the moon at the same time. According to Lieutenant Robert Bellflower, Material Officer in the Security Group Department of the communication station, the Moon-relay system provided an alternative method of communications and later reinforced methods used in satellite communications.

WHO NEEDS A DRINK?

What is an alcoholic? How does he act and what does he do? What type of person becomes an alcoholic?

These questions and others like them have been tossed around for years by the medical profession and the idea for establishing a set series of criteria for judging an alcoholic remains a stormy issue. However, a start toward finding a solution to this impassee was made when a Criteria Committee was formed by the National Council on Alcoholism, a federally funded advisory group under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Its job to establish guidelines for the proper diagnosis and evaluation of alcoholism. The committee expects this criteria to be used to identify individuals at "multiple levels of dependency." (They have defined alcoholism as a "pathological dependency on ethanol.")

The criteria are divided into two elements (1) Physiological and Clinical, and (2) Behavioral, Psychological and Attitudinal. Behavioral manifestations are the easiest to determine and the most objective to recognize, (see chart). Criteria have been further divided into "early, middle and late symptoms" and each symptom is graded according to its degree of implication for the presence of alcoholism. (Those weighted as "5" are the least significant.) A more detailed report can be obtained from the National Council on Alcoholism Publications Department, 2 Park Ave, New York, New York 10016.

Dr. Morris E. Chafitz, the Director of the National Institute on Alcohol and Alcoholism feels that there is a great need for finding new approaches to treatment and rehabilitation, establishing new modes of prevention; for training more personnel in the field of alcoholism and for erasing public misconception about the nature of the ailment. The highest priority, however, must go to the treatment.

Because it is a relapsing disease, few authorities claim a complete cure. Recovering alcoholics in A.A. feel that "once an alcoholic, always an alcoholic," regardless of how long they've been sober.

Claude Steiner, Ph.D., in "Games Alcoholics Play," published by Grove Press, Inc. of New York, disagrees. He states that a "number of individuals once unquestioned alcoholics, returned to social drinking without returning to alcoholism." He does however, admit that this statement could be misconstrued. "A drinking alcoholic may feel that it means that he can lick his problem without quitting. A sober alcoholic may be tempted to "have just one" to see if he does have his problem licked." Dr Steiner emphasized that it is important to distinguish between social drinking and the "institutionalized alcoholism that passes as social drinking in our culture."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Information P

[illegible] from [illegible] to Acting on federal [illegible] and placed in permanent mu[illegible]

[illegible] U S om[illegible] Vietnam President [illegible] diplomat Liss[illegible] [illegible] plea bla

[illegible] Consular Treaty, [illegible] by conservative groups; [illegible] Soviet Freedom [illegible]

[illegible] testified before a [illegible] trial on [illegible] to murder Pri[illegible]

[illegible] Johnson U S is disclosed, sent [illegible] Moscow early in February [illegible] direct talks between U S [illegible] on cold war; offer [illegible]

[illegible] General U [illegible] in Vietnam [illegible] by preliminary [illegible] Diplomatic sources it [illegible]

[illegible] qualified endorsement [illegible] of government efforts [illegible] but there [illegible] opposition [illegible] methods.

[illegible] Council orders the Central [illegible] to start shutting [illegible] to private educational, [illegible], and cultural groups.

[illegible] Zuniga [illegible] crashes into [illegible] at New Orleans International Airport and explodes, killing [illegible] including nine Wisconsin [illegible] on a student charter trip.

[illegible] Treaty Organization [illegible] and Ireland, closes its [illegible] to France.

MARCH 1967

[illegible] Luther King calls on Negroes [illegible] to "people of goodwill" to [illegible] from war by becoming con[illegible] objectors to military service.

[illegible] Birds beat their heavyweight [illegible] to 10 victories record for a slug[illegible] and military.

[illegible] becomes millionaire [illegible] stock deals while working for [illegible] majority, is sentenced [illegible] for one to three years for [illegible] evasion, theft, fraud, and [illegible].

Appeals review board finds "many defi[illegible]", calls for safety moves.

Nat[illegible] entire metropolitan police force [illegible] to quell rock and bottle hurling disturbance by Negroes centering at Fisk University.

10 AFL-CIO American Federation of Musicians and Radio Artists Co. strike against major networks.

11 Adam Clayton Powell wins eighth special Congressional election in Harlem facing House with another decision on seating him.

11 Cabin of North American Aviation Inc. concludes there were weaknesses in protection of electrical wiring inside Apollo 1 spacecraft which caught fire and caused deaths of three astronauts.

15 Thousands in New York City and San Francisco demonstrate against war in Vietnam.

15 Richard Speck found guilty of killing eight nurses in Chicago in July, 1966, gets death sentence.

19 Unmanned American spacecraft, carrying television camera and robot claw for digging, lands softly and safely at eastern edge of Ocean of Storms.

21 Greece's army [illegible] control of country in name of King Constantine and sets up military rule, Constantine Kollias sworn in as Premier.

21 Svetlana Stalina, only daughter of late Russian dictator, arrives in U. S. [illegible] that haven and new life of [illegible].

22 United Auto Workers give [illegible] executive board power to withdraw from parent AFL-CIO, which UAW President Walter Reuther [illegible] has developed "acute case of hardening of the arteries."

23 New-type Soviet space ship - perhaps heaviest yet launched - orbits earth in what may be first step in building space platforms for launches to moon.

24 Vladimir Komarov, Soviet cosmonaut, perishes when parachute straps of his spacecraft foul in landing attempt.

28 Boxing champion Cassius Clay refuses army induction and faces possible five-year prison term and loss of title.

29 Dr. Carl Coppolino, acquitted four months ago of murder, is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by Florida jury in poisoning of his wife.

29 President Johnson gives go-ahead for starting construction of two prototype 1,800-mph supersonic transports.

MAY 1967

1 Secretary of State Rusk lists 28 bids on Vietnam peace spurned by Hanoi; says Reds' repeated "noes" show where responsibility lies for continued war.

2 U. S. announces plans to withdraw up to 35,000 troops and almost 100 planes from West Germany next year; [illegible] also says it will cut garrison.

2 Prime Minister Harold Wilson's [illegible]

[illegible] in member[illegible] [illegible] Market [illegible] Chinese voices publicize [illegible] York City with only [illegible] paper.

[illegible] Migs runs into U S destroyer [illegible] in second collision in two days.

[illegible] parade in New York City to [illegible] Our support of American fighting [illegible] in Vietnam.

[illegible] Premier Chou En-lai tells West[illegible] newsman that Red China will send [illegible] Red Army troops into Vietnam if Hanoi is threatened with invasion.

5 U. S. Supreme Court extends to juveniles same constitutional guarantees already provided for adults accused of crimes.

17 One policeman is killed and two other policemen and student are wounded during five-hour riot at Texas Southern University, predominantly Negro school in Houston. Nearly 500 students are arrested.

18 Cairo demands that U. N. force in Middle East be withdrawn as tension between Arab nations and Israel continues to grow. U Thant agrees to demands.

19 Soviet Parliament, after waiting four months, ratifies treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space.

21 United Presbyterian Church in U. S. A. adopts new confession of faith containing social emphasis, first major creed revision in three centuries.

23 Eruption in Red Sea, and air operations to block Gulf of Aqaba are reported as United States backs Israel, and Soviet Union supports Arabs.

24 Million-dollar experimental train flashes over Pennsylvania railroad tracks at record 156 mph in its first public test.

28 Sir Francis Chichester sails into England's Plymouth harbor, ending his lone, round-the-world sailing trip in 53-foot ketch *Gipsy Moth IV*. The 226 days at sea covered 28,500 miles.

30 Nigerian central government mobilizes its army after military leader of African country's Eastern region declares independent new nation, Biafra.

JUNE 1967

1 Israeli and Arab forces battle. Cease-fire efforts stalled in U. N.; Soviet Union breaks Egypt; U. S. seeks to hold neutral [illegible] action.

[illegible] electrical failure hits parts of [illegible] Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware.

[illegible] forces carve 30-mile front along [illegible] Mediterranean coast, posing [illegible] Suez Canal. Egypt, blaming [illegible] intervention" by American [illegible] planes for its setbacks, [illegible] breaks diplomatic rela[illegible]

6 U N [illegible] adopts [illegible] cease-fire [illegible] ties in Middle [illegible]

8 Israel claims [illegible] approaches to [illegible] Syria [illegible] dent Johnson [illegible] hot-line in Middle [illegible]

8 Israel warplanes [illegible] Navy ship [illegible] ported dead and [illegible]

8 Cabinet Affairs [illegible] of defeated Egyptian [illegible] tered a cease-fire [illegible] decides to stay.

10 Israelis and Syrians [illegible] near Sea of Galilee [illegible] report Israeli troops [illegible] trated Syria [illegible]

10 Soviet Union severs diplomatic [illegible] with Israel and [illegible] unless Israeli forces [illegible] visions of the cease-fire [illegible] U N Security Council.

11 Israel and Syria [illegible] with Israeli troops still [illegible] inside Syrian territory [illegible] put at 670 dead and [illegible]

12 Israel declares it intends [illegible] of ground it won from Egypt [illegible] and Syria in the [illegible]

12 U. S. Supreme Court [illegible] bans on interracial [illegible] down New York law [illegible] tronic eavesdropping [illegible]

12 Soviet Union launches [illegible] space station on four[illegible] Venus.

13 Solicitor General Thurgood [illegible] chosen by President John[illegible] Negro to serve on [illegible]

14 U. N. Security Council [illegible] resolution condemning Israel [illegible] ing for pullback of Israeli troops [illegible] Arab territory.

14 National Guardsmen and [illegible] equipped policemen clamp [illegible] on Negro neighborhood in Cincinnati after two nights of rioting.

14 U. S. fires Mariner 5 toward [illegible] shrouded Venus to try to find if [illegible] can support life.

15 National Guard moves out of Tampa, Fla., as racial riots end.

17 Red China announces explosion of its first hydrogen bomb. It is [illegible] nuclear device.

19 Soviet Premier Kosygin demands that U. N. General Assembly condemn Israel as aggressor, require it to yield conquered Arab territory, and make restitution for war damages. U. S. oppose[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FACTS & DATES 6TH EDITION

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT, WAR; DISASTERS; VITAL STATISTICS.

BOOKS; PAINTING; DRAMA; ARCHITECTURE; SCULPTURE.

SCIENCE; EDUCATION

est weekly casualty toll of the Vietnamese war.

June 5 A band of Mexican-Americans seized the county courthouse at **Tierra Amarilla, N.M.,** wounded 2 policemen, took 2 hostages, and freed 11 prisoners held for unlawful assembly. The rebels were members of the Political Confederation of Free City States, which sought to reclaim some 2500 sq. mi. of northern New Mexico that they said the Spanish crown had granted to their forebears. Most of the rebels were later captured.

June 5 **A 10-hr. power failure** in New Jersey, eastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, and eastern Maryland affected about 40 million people.

June 8 Israeli torpedo boats and planes attacked the **U.S. communications ship *Liberty*** in international waters 15 mi. north of the Sinai Peninsula, killing 34 seamen and wounding 75. Israel apologized for what it said was an accidental attack.

June 12 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that state laws against **interracial marriages** are unconstitutional.

June 23 The Senate voted 92 to 5 to **censure Sen. Thomas J. Dodd** (D-Conn.) for personal use of political funds.

June 23–25 Pres. Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met for a total of 10 hours of "useful" **talks at Glassboro, N.J.** Kosygin had headed his nation's delegation to the UN during its attempt to have Israel branded the aggressor during the 6-day war with the Arab league.

June 30 In Geneva, the U.S. and 45 nations signed the **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade** (GATT), the result of 4 years of Kennedy Round talks.

July 6 The Joint Economic Committee predicted the **Vietnamese war** would cost $4 to $6 billion more in 1967 than the $20.3 billion requested by Pres. Johnson.

sional debut in Berlin in 1904. He was famed as the creator of a distinctively warm and vibrant tone. He became a U.S. citizen in 1923.

Apr. 15 Thomas Hoving, former park commissioner for New York City, became **director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art** at age 36. Hoving had also been curator of the museum's medieval collection at the Cloisters.

Apr. 26 At an auction at Sotheby's in London, New York art dealer David Mann bought a **Picasso Blue Period painting,** *Mother and Child,* for $532,000, the most ever paid for a work of a living artist.

May 1 **Pulitzer Prizes** awarded this year for 1966 works: fiction, Bernard Malamud (*The Fixer*); nonfiction, David Brion Davis (*The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture*); poetry, Anne Sexton (*Live or Die*); history, William H. Goetzmann (*Exploration and Empire*); biography, Justin Kaplan (*Mr. Clemens and Mark Twain*); drama, Edward Albee (*A Delicate Balance*); music, Leon Kirchner (*Quartet No. 3*).

May 8 Playwright **Elmer Rice,** 74, died in Southampton, England. His *Street Scene* (1929) was given in 1947 in an operatic version by Kurt Weill, with lyrics by Langston Hughes.

May 15 Realist painter **Edward Hopper,** 84, died at Nyack, N.Y.

May 9 The Washington Opera Company presented the world premiere of **Bomarzo,** 2nd opera of the Argentinian composer Alberto Ginastera. The work was banned in Buenos Aires, the composer's home town, because the mayor found it "obsessed with sex and violence."

Telegraph Co. ... decrease its ... overseas teleph... per year.

July ... the city's gl... setting fires ... and window ... were 26 d... juries before ... an end on J... national guard...

July 17 Sur... land in the cen... moon., lost ... onds before it ...

July 23 The **nation's history** ing in 43 dead ... 5 days and ni... tional guard w... first began; the ... troopers were ... erty damage w... million.

July 24 A ... **City's Spanish** ... resulting in 2 ... a riot resulted ... property damag...

July 25 Bl... the Negro bus... **Md.,** after a ... chairman of ... ordinating Co... next day by ... Va., and on ... Cambridge for ... disturbing the ...

July 26 A... **United Rubber** ... union signed ... nation's large... the companies ... increases on J...

July 31 A...

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

17893

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] However, I am [illegible]

[illegible] to the [illegible] been [illegible] to the action that will keep it away.

For example, if the Russian vehicle proves to be much heavier than the [illegible] at the present time, [illegible] would well be [illegible] have had to put a lot of dollars in [illegible] and excellent launch on the ground ware for a larger vehicle to put those satellites into orbit.

In addition, the only planetary probe that this country has of any nature and of any substance is the Vanguard, which was cut in the [illegible] program. This is the only area in which we are behind the Russians in terms of effort, but in this regard we are substantially behind. The Soviets have [illegible] and have launched at least four times as many satellites, for whatever value—and I think it is important that we be aware of the fact that the Russians think that the [illegible] for whatever value, they have launched at least four times as many satellites in this particular program area as has the United States. So I say again that those who voted for the motion to recommit ought to know full well the responsibility they must assume.

[illegible] that it is [illegible] the execution of the Federal civil and naval [illegible] involved. This [illegible] of [illegible] of [illegible] have acted on the [illegible] have heard [illegible] of military [illegible] at the immediate [illegible] occurred during the previous Arab-Israeli war.

It is to be noted that an Israeli court of inquiry has held an investigation, but its findings in this matter have not been released. The Israeli Government has announced that a judicial inquiry is underway which may lead to court-martial proceedings against those responsible.

The fact that the U.S.S. *Liberty* was a Victory hull vessel, hundreds of which were produced and used by the U.S. Navy during World War II and since, rules out the possibility of mistaken identity. Every ship recognition book in the world has, for years, identified the characteristic Victory hull and superstructure of the U.S.S. *Liberty* as U.S. Navy property.

What those responsible for this outrage sought to gain can, at this point, be only a matter of speculation. It is possible that in hot headed excitement they believed the attack might involve both the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the conflict. It is possible that they believed a bald attack of this nature

---

[illegible] however, I am [illegible] to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Speaker, [illegible] not true, I would ask the gentleman on the well—and I congratulate him for his statement and concur completely with him—that it creates a $136 million [illegible] fund, but it does cut very materially [illegible] items which can put us in a [illegible] so that we cannot perform properly this space program?

Mr. WAGGONNER. In my opinion, it does. That is all I can express.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

...D R FORD. Mr. Speaker, ...
... I yield to the ...
... leader.
...D R FORD. Mr. Speaker, ...
... from Louisiana has ...
... problem I presented on ...
... Ways to Committee ...
... and ... to the ...
... with ... by ...
... Committee on Science and ...
... It was a bad situation, but ... as a whole was not re...

... part of the bill was subtract... of the Whole and to ... the Committee on Science ... All we could do, after ... amendment was approved, was ... the item. We were not ... the feature of the bill ... to Smithsonian the whole meas...

... such fund in the authoriz... bill here, there is an extra $1.6 ... in detail to it. But I am not ... the Committee on Appropriations ... amendment and make the ... sections so the appropriations ... conform to the line items and not to ... amendment.

... McCORMACK. The gentleman ... be right about that. The Appro... Committee may do this. The fund ... be. But this House did not ... on the overall authorization.

ACTION TAKEN BY JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY TO COMPLEMENT OF BILL

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask ... consent to ... and to revise and extend ... remarks.

... SPEAKER. Is there objection to ... of the gentleman from ...

There was no objection.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask ... unanimous consent that ... and that I may revise and extend ... remarks and include extraneous matter.

... SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from ...

There was no objection.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

... SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from ...

There was no objection.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ... the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ...] ... that the Committee on Science and ... has been considering ... and ... that we will be ready to ... in the House ... so that ... will not be straitjacketed ...

Mr. [illegible]. Exactly. The gentleman has expressed a sense to the House ... but it is not in the language in bills. Our

ATTACK ON THE USS "LIBERTY"

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask ... consent to address the House ... for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

... SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from ...

Mr. [illegible]. Mr. Speaker, I did not ... speech of the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER] ... government ought to express and ... [illegible]

... [illegible]—and indeed ... it ... [illegible] ... by the ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4 - AUG : 0
1971

REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS

PHASE I

REPORT

BY THE

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

U.S. Cong. Hous. OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

UNDER AUTHORITY OF

H. Res. 201

MAY 10, 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-469 WASHINGTON : 1971

KF32
.A733
1971

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

F. EDWARD HÉBERT, Louisiana, Chairman

[illegible]FIAS PRICE, Illinois
[illegible] C. FISHER, Texas
[illegible]CHARLES L. BENNETT, Florida
[illegible] A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
[illegible]ES H. PIKE, New York
[illegible]RD H. ICHORD, Missouri
[illegible]LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
[illegible]ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
[illegible]ELOTT HAGAN, Georgia
[illegible]AMES H. WILSON, California
[illegible]ARLES E. BENNETT, California
[illegible]D V. HICKS, Washington
[illegible] Y. PATTEN, New Jersey
[illegible]ARD C. WHITE, Texas
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia
[illegible]N STRATTON, New York
[illegible]MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
[illegible] J. HALEY, Massachusetts
[illegible]OLO RUNNELS, New Mexico
[illegible]S, Wisconsin

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
[illegible] B. WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
CARLETON J. KING, New York
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey
G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, Virginia
C. W. (BILL) YOUNG, Florida
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

F. EDWARD HÉBERT, Louisiana, Chairman

SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey

JOHN T. M. REDDAN, *Counsel*
JOHN F. LALLY, *Assistant Counsel*
RICHARD A. RANSOM, *Professional Staff Member*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia, Chairman
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
JOHN T. M. REDDAN, *Counsel*
JOHN F. LALLY, *Assistant Counsel*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 21, 1971.

HON. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is a report entitled "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications," which was unanimously approved by the appointed members of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee conducting this review. This report is based on extensive investigations and hearings which were held during the past year and a half concerning the responsiveness of Department of Defense communications in crisis situations and the effectiveness of that Department's management of its communications systems.

You will note that there are deletions from the report. These are security deletions which have been made on the recommendation of the Office of the Directorate of Security Review of the Department of Defense.

I shall appreciate your early approval of the report so that it may be printed.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN,
Chairman, DOD Worldwide Communications Subcommittee.

Approved for printing:
F. Edward Hébert, Chairman
May 10, 1971

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

other possible situations which would result in damage to defense communications.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. *LIBERTY*

JUNE 7–8, 1967

Hostilities commenced between Israel and the United Arab Republic on June 5, 1967. On that same date at 2015 hours, the Commander, 6th Fleet, ordered all his surface and air units to stand off at least 100 miles from the coasts of the belligerent nations. At the time of that order, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not assigned to 6th Fleet, but was under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief Europe. On June 7th, at 0911 hours, U.S.S. *Liberty* was transferred to the operational control of Commander, 6th Fleet. At the time of her transfer, her operational orders, dated June 1st, directed that the closest permissible approach to the coast of the United Arab Republic would be 12.5 nautical miles, while she could approach no closer than 6.5 nautical miles to the coast of Israel. No action was taken by the Commander, 6th Fleet, on June 7th to cause U.S.S. *Liberty* to conform to his order previously issued to all other 6th Fleet surface and air units.

During the afternoon of June 7th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reposition U.S.S. *Liberty* to move her further from the coasts of the belligerent nations. In implementing that decision, a series of five messages from JCS and U.S. commanders in the European Command were directed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and other addressees. None of those messages had reached *Liberty* by 1200Z hours on June 8th, 13½ hours after the first message was released for transmission. The circumstances surrounding the misrouting, loss and delays of those messages constitute one of the most incredible failures of communications in the history of the Department of Defense.

These five messages will be discussed seriatim. Each is described according to its date-time-group, a six-numeral designation assigned by the originator of the message reflecting the date and hour, month, and year of its release. At the time of the U.S.S. *Liberty* incident, the date-time-group was not an accurate reflection of the time the message had been released by the sender to the communications center, although, in most instances, the difference in the time was an interval of only a few minutes, e.g. JCS 072230Z was released to the communications center at 072241Z. Each date-time-group includes the letter "Z" designating the Greenwich time zone, thus all times are standardized.

JCS 072230Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

This message contained the first directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relocation of U.S.S. *Liberty*. It was directed to the Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR), for action. Information copies of the message were addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR); Commander U.S. 6th Fleet; Commander Task Force 64; U.S.S. *Liberty*; and others. This message modified the operational orders of U.S.S. *Liberty* by directing that her closest permissible approach to the coasts of the United Arab Republic and Israel should be 20 nautical miles and 15 nautical miles, rather than 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles, respectively.

This message was released from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army Communications Station, at the Pentagon, for transmission at 2241Z hours, June 7th. The action copy of that message to CINCEUR was not transmitted from the Army communications station until 1955Z hours, June 8th, more than 14 hours after its receipt in station. The information copies, addressed to Commander Task Force 64 and U.S.S. *Liberty*, were not transmitted until 1315Z hours, June 8th, and then were incorrectly routed to the Naval Communications Station, Philippines. From that station, they were sent to Navy Communications Station, Asmara, where they were placed on Fleet Broadcast at 2?? hours, June 8th, 23 hours after the date-time-group of the message and about 9½ hours after the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*.

This message lost some of its significance, since it was overtaken by subsequent message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described in the next section.

JCS 080110Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

Preliminary telephone call

One hour and nine minutes after releasing the above message for transmission, the Joint Chiefs became more concerned over the ordering U.S.S. *Liberty* and decided that 20 and 15 nautical miles were too close to the coasts of UAR and Israel for safety. At 0725Z hours, June 7th, a JCS representative made a telephone call to the Command Center duty officer at Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). In that call, a verbal directive was issued to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center duty officer to direct U.S.S. *Liberty* to operate no closer than 100 nautical miles to the coasts of belligerents. The duty officer at CINCUSNAVEUR was advised that a message formalizing the verbal directive would follow later. However, the JCS might as well have omitted that telephone call since it proved completely ineffective in accelerating action at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. It is true that as a result of the telephone call, a message incorporating the oral directive was prepared at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters for dispatch to Commander, 6th Fleet, but despite the urgency indicated by the JCS call, the release of that message for transmission was delayed until the formal notification message from JCS had been received.

Formal message

The promised confirmatory message was not released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 080110Z, more than an hour after the telephone call to CINCUSNAVEUR. That delay is not necessarily significant, since JCS could reasonably have expected an immediate and independent response to its telephone directive. This message, JCS 080110Z, cancelled the earlier JCS 072230Z message and directed that U.S.S. *Liberty* should remain at least 100 nautical miles from the coasts of any of the belligerent nations.

An immediate precedence[2] was assigned to this message, whereas the 072230Z message had been assigned a priority precedence, thus

---

[1] Department of Defense has informed the subcommittee that the original message was addressed to CTF64, but that an apparent operator error caused it to be addressed to CTF67 when it was prepared for transmission.

[2] There are four Department of Defense precedence categories: flash, immediate, priority, and routine, in diminishing order. These designations indicate to the communicators how rapidly they are to handle and transmit messages. They serve as a guide to operating personnel in processing, transmitting and handling messages of the

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

reflecting the increased concern of the Joint Chiefs concerning the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. This message was also released to the Army Communications Station at the Pentagon for transmission. The action copy of this message was again addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Europe, with information copies addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR; Commander, 6th Fleet; Commander, Task Force 64; and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. A delay of 44 minutes occurred in the Army Communications Station, Pentagon, before the message was transmitted to CINCEUR, the action addressee at 080211Z. Real Adm. Francis J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications, testified before the subcommittee that he thought 44 minutes was an inordinate amount of time for processing such a short message.

The delay in processing the action copy of the message is insignificant, however, when compared with the deplorable handling of the information copies addressed to Commander, Task Force 64, and to U.S.S. *Liberty*. First, there was a delay of 2 hours, 23 minutes before these messages were transmitted from the Army Communications Center, Pentagon, at 080350Z. The only explanation for that delay was that messages of equal or higher precedence were awaiting transmission before this message arrived in station. The Department of Defense, however, was unable to furnish the subcommittee with any documentary evidence which would support that explanation.

The information copies of the message, addressed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and Commander, Task Force 64, were finally transmitted at 0350Z, but, once again, those messages for addressees in the Mediterranean area were mis-routed to Naval Communications Station, Philippines. A subcommittee witness testified that the misrouting was due to an incorrect routing indicator which had been assigned to the message by a civilian clerk in the Army Communications Center, Pentagon. Upon its arrival at the Naval Communications Station, Philippines, the error was recognized, the routing indicator was corrected to Naval Communications Station, Morocco, and the message was retransmitted within an hour. That correction should have taken those copies of the message to the Mediterranean area and ultimately to the addressees, except that the message was routed to pass through the Army Communications Station, Pentagon. That station, instead of retransmitting the messages to the Navy Communications Station, Morocco, to which they were addressed, sent them to National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Md., where they were filed without further action. The only explanation given for this inexcusable conduct was that clerical personnel had misread the routing indicator. Needless to say, those messages had not reached either U.S.S. *Liberty* or Commander, Task Force 64, by 1200Z hours, June 8, 1967.

USCINCEUR 080625Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCUSNAVEUR

JCS message 080110Z was received at CINCEUR headquarters at 0242Z hours, June 8th. The headquarters, in a telephone conversation with CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters at 0325Z hours, directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take the JCS message for action. That oral order was confirmed by a formal message directed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action, with information copies to Commander, 6th Fleet, and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. The formal message, however, was not released until 0625Z hours. No explanation was offered for the 3-hour delay in preparing that message at CINCEUR headquarters. A further delay of 40 minutes occurred in the communications center at CINCEUR before the message was transmitted.

In order to ensure getting this message to its addressees, it was transmitted concurrently over two alternate relay paths. The necessity for the alternate transmission was quickly demonstrated by the fate of the message at the Firmusen-, Germany, [illegible] first station on one of the transmission paths. [illegible] there was no further transmission of that copy of the [illegible] explanation offered for the loss of that message was that the

• • • station was being operated under a combination of adverse conditions [illegible] by the consolidation of commands and relocation of units from [illegible] traffic volume resulted from the extensive reliance [illegible] of teletype circuits. The number of qualified operators [illegible] error-free processing of traffic.

The second transmission route proceeded [illegible] CINCUSNAVEUR and to Commander, 6th Fleet [illegible] on June 7th. The information copy directed to U.S.S. *Liberty* had to pass through additional relay stations before it could be put on fleet broadcast for dissemination to U.S.S. *Liberty*. This route through the stations consumed [illegible] that time, there were long in-station delays [illegible] message, and there was a delay of [illegible] the message from an Army DCS Communications Station [illegible] to the Navy Communications Station located within [illegible] Army station. Finally, the message was placed on the fleet broadcast at 1546Z hours, June 8th,[1] at which time U.S.S. *Liberty* was [illegible] back to port with her dead and wounded aboard [illegible] that she was subsequently scrapped.

CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z JUNE 1967 TO COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET

The headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) received three separate messages directing the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. Those messages and the times of their receipt were:

(a) A telephone call from the JCS recommending [illegible] June 7th.

(b) An information copy of JCS 080110Z message which was received at this headquarters at 0312Z hours, June 8th.

(c) A telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th.

Despite the urgency which must have been [illegible] no action was taken at that headquarters for [illegible] after the initial telephone call. It was not until the telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours [illegible] CUSNAVEUR headquarters started into action. At that time the duty officer directed that a teletype conference be established with Commander, 6th Fleet. That conference circuit was established [illegible]

[1] A careful examination of the communications log [illegible] question whether it was transmitted by U.S.S. *Liberty* [illegible] a message which, as released by U.S.S. *Liberty*, [illegible] Letters and numbers which had been assigned [illegible] which they had the information copy [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

at 0445Z hours, Commander, 6th Fleet, acknowledged receipt of the order to take action upon the JCS message. The teletype order was confirmed by CINCUSNAVEUR formal message 080435Z which was received by Commander, 6th Fleet, at 0518Z hours, June 8th.

For some unexplained reason, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not informed of either of these messages to Commander, 6th Fleet.

COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET 080917Z JUNE 1967 TO U.S.S. LIBERTY

Upon receipt of the messages from CINCUSNAVEUR, the only action remaining for Commander, 6th Fleet, was issuance of an order to U.S.S. *Liberty* to comply with the minimums directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not until 0917Z hours, June 8th, however, more than 4 hours after his receipt of the order, that he released his action message directed to U.S.S. *Liberty*. Although his superiors had manifested their concern about repositioning U.S.S. *Liberty* by telephone calls which gave him advance notice of the order, the Commander, apparently chose not to use the voice circuit when he passed the order to the ship. Rather, he used the normal communications system for transmission of his message.

After its release to the communications center aboard the 6th Fleet flagship, U.S.S. *Little Rock*, that message was delayed for more than an hour and a quarter before it was transmitted at 1035Z hours. The explanation for that delay was that there were one flash and seven immediate messages being prepared for transmission at the time the message was received in the message center aboard U.S.S. *Little Rock*. The message arrived at the Army DCS station at Asmara by 1200Z hours, June 8th. That station, however, instead of delivering it to the nearby Navy station for fleet broadcast, missent it to the Navy Communications Station, Greece. It was returned to Army DCS station Asmara and finally delivered to the Navy Communications Station at 1525Z hours, June 8th, 6 hours, 8 minutes after its release by Commander, 6th Fleet, and more than 10 hours after he had been directed to act upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction. The message was transmitted on fleet broadcast at 1525Z hours, June 8th, more than 3 hours too late to alert U.S.S. *Liberty* to the danger of her position.

The circumstances surrounding the transmission of those five messages could be considered a comedy of errors were it not for the tragic results of the failure to move U.S.S. *Liberty*. At 2120Z hours, June 8, 1967, U.S.S. *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli aircraft and, at 1225Z hours, she was torpedoed by Israeli patrol boats. As a result of the attacks, 34 officers and men were killed, with 75 were wounded, and the ship sustained such severe damages that it was never restored to service. At the time of those attacks, U.S.S. *Liberty*, through no fault of her own, had not received any of the above-described messages. If the communications system had been responsive, she should have had several hours during which she could have placed some distance between herself and the coast, thereby probably avoiding the attack.

Should there be any doubt that those failures of the communications system were critical, the following excerpts from the findings of fact of the Naval Court of Inquiry, convened to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*, would appear to conclusively resolve them:

Liberty's position at the time of the attack had been previously ordered [illegible] farther to seaward by JCS; however, the messages relating to these changes were not known to the ship before the attack took place • • •

The communications delays and misrouting errors, which caused [illegible] nondeliveries, combined with delays in initiating follow-up actions on [illegible] instructions received, all contributed to the ship itself being unaware of [illegible] decisions made for her repositioning • • •

• • • *Liberty* received no directive, prior to the attack, [illegible] desired that the ship operate at least 100 miles from the coast of the U.A.R. • • •

Pertinent to the findings of fact is the matter of communications regarding U.S.S. *Liberty* during the period 4 and 8 June. [illegible] have received at least five messages sent prior to the attack which were not only important but, in that respect, critical to the evaluation of the aggravated attack on the ship on June the 8th.

Higher authority modified *Liberty*'s operating instructions on June 1st and the attack on the 8th was such, if she had received it would [illegible] her being further off shore.

Combination and compounding of many delayed communications related to *Liberty* incident denied the ship the benefit of reasonably made prior to the attack which, among other things, would ship, as a minimum, to be heading farther off shore [illegible] position • • •

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. PUEBLO, JANUARY 23, 1968

On January 23, 1968, U.S.S. *Pueblo*, a U.S. Navy auxiliary environmental research vessel utilized for intelligence [illegible] located off the coast of North Korea. That morning the established communication with Naval Security Group [illegible] Japan, to send a situation report (SITREP), two to [illegible] and a service message. At 0300Z, January 23, *Pueblo* was [illegible] her transmitter when a North Korean submarine chaser (SC) [illegible] into view. There were some flag-hoist signal exchanges between *Pueblo* and the North Korean craft which consumed several hours. Then at 0350Z the commanding officer of *Pueblo* released the two messages designated Pinnacle. Pinnacle is a [illegible] identifies the message as having major significance and requires immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government. In addition to its Pinnacle designation, the message was assigned a "flash" precedence, thereby identifying it for most rapid processing, transmission and delivery.

PINNACLE I—230352Z JANUARY [illegible]

This message reported the encounter with the North Korean patrol craft, the exchange of flag-hoist signals, and the Korean signal "Heave to or I will fire". It concluded with *Pueblo*'s intention to remain in the area, if considered feasible, or to withdraw [illegible] the northeast.

This message was received by the Kamiseya station at [illegible] hours. It was then relayed at 0403Z hours to Commander, Naval Forces, Japan where it was received at 0413Z hours. Despite its Pinnacle designation, which required immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government, this message was delayed at the headquarters of Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, for 47 minutes before it was finally released for retransmission at 0500Z hours. Rear Adm. Francis Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

10

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

BACKGROUND

INFORMATION ON

SOME OF THE

KEY PLAYERS

MOSTLY AT THE

NATIONAL LEVEL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FOLDER 10

MAJOR BREEDLOVE

A MAJOR "BREELOVE" SENT LIBERTY
RECALL ORDER TO CINCUSNAVEUR.

NO BREELOVE ON ACDO 1967
BUT:

CAPT JOE J. BREEDLOVE
O-0085925 (ARMY)

MAJOR MOZELLE BREEDLOVE
N-0002513 (ARMY)

MAJ SMEDLEY BREEDLOVE
O-0071764 (ARMY)

MAJ ? JAMES M. BREEDLOVE
17671 DOB 8-9-22 USAF

I WROTE TO ALL FOUR VIA MIL RECORDS
CENTERS ABOUT 1981/2. NO REPLIES

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SPELLING IS CORRECT

DARBY, LOWEL EDWIN (from 1967 Register of Active Duty Naval Officers)
Captain 1100
File #086799
Lineal #000658-10
Date of Service: 1942
Date of Rank: 1 July 1960
Date of Birth: 29 December 1916
PEBD: 21 September 1940

Qualified to command destroyers
Has Postgraduate training, but no advanced degree
PG major was communications

RUSS, JOSEPH R. (from 1967 Register of Active Duty Army Officers)
Svc #0-0019860
Basic Branch: "IN" - not defined. Need army book of abbreviations (!)
Major General with date of rank 1 October 1959
PEBD: 6 DEC 35
Permanent Grade also Major General with permanent rank from 30 May 1963
Source: OCS
Basic Date: 12JUN35 (not same as PEBD?)
Civilian education: college grad
Military eductation: National War College
Date of Birth: 21 May 1912

"ABBOT CAN ACTUALLY DUPLICATE THE STRAIN A COMMANDER IS UNDER IN MAKING A DECISION DURING COMBAT"

ADMIRAL A. A. BURKE
ARLEIGH A. BURKE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Paul Findley



Paul Findley, throughout his career as a Republican member of Congress, was frequently on the cutting edge of controversial issues. He called for the "normalization" of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China long before the idea was generally acceptable to the American public or to any American Administration. During the early days of the civil rights debate, he moved way out in front of his own party leadership in advocating legislation. He was also one of a small but hardy band of believers in the federal union of the U.S. and the North Atlantic democracies—and introduced a bill in Congress towards that end. But none of the positions he took on such issues ever came close to doing him in. What finally ended his 21 years on Capitol Hill was his willingness over the years to speak his mind on Middle East issues—but in ways which did not please the pro-Israel lobby in this country.

Mr. Findley acknowledges that opposition from the lobby was far from being the sole cause of his failure to win his bid for re-election last fall. The major factor was the "re-districting" by the state of Illinois of his constituency, which took away from him the area where he had been born and went to school, and replaced it with a heavily Democratic industrialized district with a high rate of unemployment—at a time when Republicans were being blamed for the recession.

Tipping the Scales

"Despite everything, it was a close race," he says. "And the lobbying effort was enough to tip the scales against me. I think that without it, I could have won."

The root of the lobby's campaign against Mr. Findley—who had long advocated U.S. negotiations with the PLO and the use of aid as leverage against Israel—was the raising of huge sums of money for his opponent. "I have a print-out of all the political action committees which have been formed throughout the U.S., mainly by Jewish Americans, for the purpose of supporting pro-Israel candidates—and there was not a single one of these committees which did not provide funds for my challenger. This gave him the resources to run an extremely effective campaign—resources which were far greater than what I had available."

Somewhat paradoxically, Middle East issues as such were rarely referred to in the campaign by either of the contenders. And Mr. Findley is now sorry about it. "At the strong urging of my campaign advisors—professionals in their field—I mentioned the Middle East as little as possible during my campaign, and the PLO not at all, except when the subject was raised by a direct question. As I look back on it, I think that was a mistake. I should have talked very plainly and openly, showing the relationship between the interests of my district and peace in the Middle East. It could have helped a lot—who knows?"

From now on, as Mr. Findley settles into his new career in Washington as a consultant, author and lecturer, he will have no such inhibitions imposed on him by well-meaning political friends, and you can bet that he will be heard from loud and clear. His first major project, now underway, is to write a book on what he calls "the effects of the Arab-Israeli dispute on free institutions" in the U.S.

Exposing Intimidation

"I've been appalled at the reluctance of citizens to speak up on the Arab-Israeli issue, if they have opinions that don't conform with a pro-Israel perspective," Mr. Findley says. "They feel intimidated, knowing that somehow they will pay a price for their views. I intend to illustrate through the experiences of specific individuals just how this intimidation has been carried out and how it has encroached upon our freedoms."

Besides writing the book, Mr. Findley is now acting as consultant to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, for which he gives about two lectures a month in various U.S. cities. He also does some other consulting work not related to the Middle East, which is only one of his many intense interests.

Among the others is agriculture, which has resulted in "a client or two," as he puts it, in the agri-business field. Problems of world hunger have always been high on his list—he received a citation from a national association in 1975 for his work in the "advancement of agriculture and the prevention of famine"—and in this connection will be visiting China this summer, at the invitation of the Chinese government, to attend a soybean symposium. In 1978, he had organized and led an agricultural trade mission to that country.

Mr. Findley got his first exposure to Middle East affairs just over a dozen years ago, when the House's subcommittee for Europe, on which he was serving, was handed responsibility for Middle East questions as well. Later he made numerous trips to the region, including an unusual one to South Yemen in 1974, during which he secured the release of a constituent who had been jailed there on spy charges.

Mr. Findley was born in Jacksonville, Illinois, 62 years ago, and graduated from Illinois College, where he was a Phi Beta Kappa. He served in the U.S. Navy during World War II, and has written two books: one on Abraham Lincoln and the other on agricultural commodity programs.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

WALT ROSTOW

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
INFORMED JOHNSON OF ATTACK AT 9:49AM
(GENE ROSTOW'S YOUNGER BROTHER)

ROSTOW, WALT W(HITMAN) Oct 7, 1916- Economist; educator; government official

Address: h. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass.; h. 56 Fairmont St., Belmont, Mass.

An authority on the stages of growth of modern nations, the economic historian Walt W. Rostow is regarded as one of the more brilliant and influential of the intellectuals who have taken leaves of absence from their academic posts to serve as key advisers for the Kennedy administration. As deputy special assistant to President John F. Kennedy for national security affairs, Rostow was in and out of the President's office every day. His views on the strategic role of the United States in the world arena, views reflected in campaign speeches on military policy that helped to elect Kennedy, earned him the reputation of being one of the most influential Presidential advisers. In November 1961 he was appointed counselor of the State Department and chairman of its policy planning council.

Dr. Rostow was recruited by the President from the so-called "Cambridge group" of young brain trusters. Since 1950 he has been a member of the staff of the Center of International Relations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and since 1955 he has been in charge of its basic study of American society in world affairs. As reflected in his research and his many books and articles, his interests range over the Soviet Union, Communist China,



WALT W. ROSTOW

and the relationship between Great Britain and the United States. David Wise, the White House correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*, credits Dr. Rostow with having originated the slogan "the New Frontier" for John F. Kennedy's Presidential campaign.

Walt Whitman Rostow was born in New York City on October 7, 1916, the son of Victor Aaron and Lillian (Helman) Rostow. He is the younger brother of Eugene V. Rostow, the dean of the Yale Law School. Walt W. Rostow received the B.A. degree from Yale University in 1936. As a Rhodes scholar, he studied at Balliol College of Oxford University from 1936 to 1938. He earned the Ph.D. degree from Yale in 1940. Oxford University granted him an M.A. degree in 1946, and Cambridge University granted him another M.A. degree in 1949.

Beginning his career as an instructor in economics at Columbia University, Dr. Rostow taught during the academic year of 1940-41. He then entered wartime service with the Department of State and with the Office of Strategic Services, achieving the rank of major. For his work with the British Air Ministry on problems dealing with the German Air Force he was awarded the Legion of Merit and made an honorary member of the Order of the British Empire.

On October 13, 1942 Dr. Rostow, then an OSS agent, was aboard the British tanker *Empire Mersey* when it was sunk by a German submarine. He managed to save his life, but lost his luggage. Five years later he induced Representative Ellsworth Bishop Foote of Connecticut to introduce a bill for his private relief. It was adopted on May 19, 1947 and reimbursed him to the amount of $585.50 for his torpedoed possessions.

The first published work by Dr. Rostow was the pamphlet *The American Diplomatic Revolution* (Yale, 1947), based on his inaugural lecture before the University of Oxford as Harmsworth Professor of American History on November 12, 1946. His *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century*, 1790-1939 (Oxford, 1948). He collaborated with A. D. Gayer and A. J. Schwartz, in 1948, on *The Process of Economic Growth* (Norton, 1952). With A. Levin and others he wrote *The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850* (Oxford, 1953). He collaborated with A. Levin and others on *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (Norton, 1953), with others on *The Prospects for Communist China* (Wiley, 1954); with R. W. Hatch on *An American Policy in Asia* (Wiley, 1955); and with Dr. Max F. Millikan on *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957). Dr. Millikan directs the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, of which Dr. Rostow has been a staff member. The latter book makes a vigorous plea for an expanded and long-range program of United States foreign economic aid.

His firsthand knowledge of foreign aid Dr. Rostow acquired as assistant chief of the German-Austrian economics division of the Department of State (1945-46) and as assisant to the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe (1947-49). During the academic year of 1946-47 Dr. Rostow was Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford University and during the academic year of 1949-50 he taught as Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions at Cambridge University. In 1950 he returned to the United States as professor of economic history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In 1957 Dr. Rostow joined the "Cambridge group" of Kennedy brain-trusters when Fred Holborn, a member of Senator Kennedy's staff and a former Harvard instructor, asked him to contribute ideas to a major policy address on aid to India that Senator Kennedy was planning to deliver. In 1959 he prepared an important government document for the Joint Congressional Economic Committee on the rate of growth of the Soviet economy. It won wide acclaim, and the New York *Times* on November 13, 1959 commented editorially that Americans should ponder Dr. Rostow's key implication that the success or failure of the United States will be determined by "whether our political leadership mobilizes the evidently ample resources that lie to hand—resources of will, of skill, or talent, of commitment to the American heritage, as well as goods and services—to do the job."

Also in 1959 Dr. Rostow contributed two articles to the London *Economist* that were published in August. He had originally presented ideas contained therein in the form of lectures that he had delivered at Cambridge University late in 1958. The articles won Dr. Rostow attention as one of the original and creative economic theorists of the day. The *Economist* termed his economic interpretation of history, an alternative to Marxism, a "non-Communist manifesto," and called it "the most stimulating

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

contribution to political and economic discussions made by an academic economist since the war."

As published in modified form in the December 1959 issue of *Fortune* magazine, the theory tried "to generalize the pattern of modern economic history in the form of a series of stages of economic growth." These are (1) the traditional society; (2) the preconditions for take-off; (3) the take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; and (5) the age of high mass consumption. Dr. Rostow expanded these ideas in his book *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1960), of which Harry Schwartz observed in the *New York Times Book Review*: "This could become one of the most influential economic books of the twentieth century." On page 134 of the book the phrase "new peaceful frontiers" appeared; later, in modified form, it became a key idea of the Kennedy Presidential campaign.

With another book, *The United States in the World Arena* (Harper, 1960), Dr. Rostow produced what William T. Stone in the Washington *Post and Times Herald* described as a "remarkable study of American conduct in world affairs." Since 1955 Dr. Rostow has directed a basic study of the United States in world affairs at the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In November 1960 Dr. Rostow attended a series of closed meetings of American and Soviet intellectuals at Dartmouth College. Lawyers, educators, economists, and writers from the United States and Soviet Union took part in the meetings, which were held at Dartmouth College under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation. Later that month Dr. Rostow traveled to Moscow as an observer at the Sixth Pugwash Conference of Scientists and Scholars, held to discuss nuclear disarmament.

While in Moscow, Dr. Rostow and Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, special assistant to the President for science and technology, met privately with Vasily V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, at the Soviet Foreign Office. The two men urged the release of two RB-47 flyers, Captains Freeman B. Olmstead and John R. McKone, with no strings attached, as "an essential first step toward better United States–Soviet relations." (President Kennedy announced their release on January 25, 1961.) They also recommended that Soviet pressure on West Berlin be relaxed to alleviate the tensions of the cold war.

Dr. Rostow also conferred in Moscow with one Mr. Pavlichenko, an official of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who asked him when President Kennedy intended to visit the Soviet Union. Reportedly, Dr. Rostow gave the following conditions that the Soviet Union had to fulfill before President Kennedy would agree to a summit meeting or a trip to Russia: return of the RB-47 pilots; successful completion of nuclear-test-ban negotiations; a meeting in New York City between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy to sign the test-ban treaty; progress on disarmament; free elections for all of Germany; and guarantees of Western access to Communist-surrounded West Berlin.

Walt W. Rostow married Elspeth Vaughan Davies on June 26, 1947. She is an assistant professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They have two children, Peter Vaughan and Ann Larned. Rostow. Dr. Rostow is a member of the Royal Economic Society in England and of the Elizabethan Club in New Haven, Connecticut. In 1957 he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Murrey Marder of the Washington *Post and Times Herald* has characterized Dr. Rostow as "a personable man of medium height with a sharp sense of humor and a mind which formulates ideas in series of problems and answers." According to Marquis Childs, he can "toss off ideas at an average rate of a dozen an hour." Louis J. Halle, former State Department planning chief, has called him "an activist who believes that the challenge to our society calls for innovation and sacrifice at the service of a dynamic purpose." Dr. Rostow takes a less formal view of himself. "I don't pose as a philosopher; I'm a working stiff," he told a reporter for the Washington *Post and Times Herald* (August 7, 1960).

The relationship that Dr. Rostow maintains with President John F. Kennedy is easygoing. "Jack and I hit it off from the start," he told Marguerite Higgins of the New York *Herald Tribune* (July 25, 1960). Playing a key role in formulating United States policy to confront the Soviet challenge, he contends that meeting the challenge "demands that we remain loyal to the sense of democratic mission which is at the root of our nationhood and demonstrate once again that democracy is not the absurdity dictators and autocrats have always believed it to be."

References

Directory of American Scholars (1957)
Who's Who in America, 1960-61

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EUGENE ROSTOW

UNDERSECTY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

(WALT ROSTOW'S OLDER BROTHER)

Eugene Victor Rostow, lawyer, economist. Born Brooklyn Aug 25, 1913.
King's College, Cambridge, England 1933-34, MA Camb. U. 1959; Dr. of Laws, 1962. Admitted to N State Bar 1938. Practiced in NYC 1937-38.
Member Faculty Law School, Yale, 1938-66. Prof Law 1944-66.
Dean 1944-63. Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs 1955-66.
Master of Trumbull Coll 1966. Under Secretary of State for political affairs, 1966.
Home: 208 S. Ronan St., New Haven, Ct. 06511
(Peru, Vermont?)
Who's Who Vol 39, 1976-77

ROSTOW, EUGENE V(ICTOR) Aug. 25, 1913- Lawyer; economist

Address: b. Yale School of Law, New Haven, Conn.; h. 208 Sair. Ronan St., New Haven Conn.; Peru, Vt.

The Yale School of Law, one [illegible] oldest and most respected of law schools in America, in recent years has pioneered in teaching law as it relates to the study of philosophy and the operations of society. Instrumental in this development has been Eugene V. Rostow, who succeeded Harry Shulman as dean on July 1, 1955. A member of the law faculty at Yale since 1938, Rostow has also taught in the graduate economics department of Yale University. He is a specialist in the economic aspects of public law and the public regulation of private business and has written two books in these areas: *A National Policy for the Oil Industry* (Yale University Press, 1948) and *Planning for Freedom* (Yale University Press, 1959).

During World War II Rostow was assistant general counsel of the Office of Lend-Lease



Yale News Bureau-Allentuck

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Administration, and from 1949 to 1950 he served as assistant executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. In the spring of 1961 he was elected chairman of the development assistance committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a newly formed economic alliance of Western countries.

Eugene Victor Rostow was born in Brooklyn, New York City, on August 25, 1913 to Victor A. and Lillian (Helman) Rostow. He grew up in New Haven, Connecticut and attended New Haven High School before entering Yale University. In 1933 he graduated with a Phi Beta Kappa key and a B.A. degree. He studied economics on a Henry Fellowship at King's College, Cambridge, England in 1933-34.

While studying at the Yale School of Law from 1934 to 1937, Rostow was editor in chief of the *Yale Law Journal* and received scholarship prizes in his second and third years. He graduated *magna cum laude* with an LL.B. degree in 1937 and passed the New York state bar examinations shortly thereafter. In 1937-38 Rostow practised law with the firm of Cravath, deGersdorff, Swaine, & Wood in New York City.

Rostow joined the faculty of law at Yale as an assistant professor in 1938 and three years later became an associate professor of law. In 1944 he took a leave of absence from Yale and assumed the duties of professor of law that he still holds. Courses that Rostow has given include "Corporate Financing and Re-organization," a survey of antitrust laws; and "Public Control of Business," an examination of the legal-economic techniques by which the federal government can influence the economy. He usually lectures from a sitting position at his desk and speaks rapidly in an easy, well-modulated voice.

Rostow's book *Planning for Freedom: The Public Law of American Capitalism*, which draws on materials from the "Public Control of Business" course, is based principally on the William W. Cook lectures on American Institutions that Rostow gave at the University of Michigan in March 1958. Parts of the book were also developed by Rostow in lectures at the University of Paris in November and December 1959.

The subject matter of *Planning for Freedom* is the legal control of the economy. "Its concern," Rostow explained, "is public policy toward economic affairs, that is, the dispositions of the law for directing, stimulating, releasing, encouraging, repressing, or regulating the economic predilections of Americans." Three areas in which laws may act are in fiscal and monetary policy; organization of markets for products and services; and the labor field.

"Government programs to regulate the relationship between the flow of funds and the flow of goods in a market economy do not require any change in the prevailing pattern of power distribution," Rostow wrote. They need not "become engines of collectivism. On the contrary, if well conducted they should fortify, and not weaken, the health, vigor, and autonomy of the free institutions of business and labor. Thus they should minimize the risk of Socialism, Fascism, or other forms of collectivist domination by the state."

A previous book by Rostow, *A National Policy for the Oil Industry*, examines the forces that determine prices and output in the petroleum industry and considers desirable national policies for regulation of industry in general. Hugh L. Elsbree, writing in *American Political Science Review*, called the book "a sophisticated analysis of existing systems of legal and industrial controls" (June 1948).

In 1941 Rostow was visiting assistant professor of law at the University of Chicago. Its law school published a book edited by him entitled *The Recession of 1937-38; Materials for the Study of the Control of Industrial Fluctuations* (1941). Together with J. Douglass Poteat, Rostow edited *The Bankruptcy Act of 1898* (Chicago Foundation Press, 1940) and the third edition of Wesley A. Sturges' *Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Debtors' Estates* (West, 1940). Rostow is sole editor of the fourth edition (1949) of the Sturges materials.

During World War II Rostow took a leave of absence from Yale to serve as assistant general counsel of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. He worked abroad and in the United States on the legal problems of inter-allied supply from 1942 to 1944. He was later acting director of economic operations in the North African theater of operations. He also served as executive vice-chairman of the North African Economic Board and as executive assistant to Dean Acheson, at that time Assistant Secretary of State. In 1949-50 he worked as assistant executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Harry Shulman, the ninth dean of the Yale School of Law, died on March 20, 1955, less than a year after he had became dean. On June 14 president A Whitney Griswold announced that Rostow would take over from the acting dean, Jack B Tate, on July 1, 1955 A visiting professor at Yale, Benjamin Kaplan of Harvard University, has said that Rostow, as dean, has performed his "complicated roles with skill and good humor; he has, besides, an extraordinary sympathy with the highly diverse characters who make up his faculty and student body." Law instruction at Yale began around 1801, but the law school is officially credited with starting its operations in 1824. The school closed during the Civil War, reopened in 1869, and, in 1870, was the first in America to offer graduate instruction in law.

In December 1955 Yale University announced that the Ford Foundation had given the law school a grant of $1,600,000 to help finance a major revision of its curriculum The new program, which began in 1956 and which Rostow called "unique in the law school world," emphasized the teaching of law as it is related to other areas of study like history, philosophy, economics, politics, and sociology. A four-year course for training law teachers and legal specialists, under which students simultaneously earn an LL.B. and an M.A. degree in another field, was offered. The regular three-year law course was amended to provide more seminars and opportunities for independent research Yale has also received a government grant of $323,000 to support expansion of its program stressing the relationship between law and psychiatry.

"Our purpose," Rostow said, in describing the new programs, "is to train lawyers, law teachers, and public servants who will be capable of constructive leadership in American life. We want Yale lawyers of course to be masters of their professional skills. Beyond that, we seek to turn out lawyers whose command of law is rooted in a mature knowledge of the historic, social, and economic sources and purposes of law. We remain convinced that that kind of humane and broadly based law school training is indispensable in preparing lawyers for the highest and most responsible kind of professional careers, not merely as advocates, but as participants, in every phase of their work in the endless struggle to achieve justice through law."

Rostow has often spoken out publicly in support of "just causes" His article in the *Yale Law Journal* of June 1945 was instrumental in spurring action on behalf of nisei who had lost citizenship rights and property when the United States Army removed them from their homes to detention camps after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. After the war the Justice Department restored citizenship status and property to many nisei. The restitution program was completed in 1959 and Rostow attended, as a guest of honor, the ceremonies marking the end of the program.

During the academic year 1959-60 Rostow taught at King's College, Cambridge, England as the Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions. He also held a Guggenheim Fellowship during this year for the study of American antitrust laws. He served on the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti Trust Laws from 1953 to 1955 and has been a trustee of the Walter Meyer Institute of Legal Research since 1958

Eugene V. Rostow, a "large, almost bulging man whose hair is touched with gray," married Edna Berman Greenberg on August 8, 1933. They live with their children, Victoria, Jessica, and Charles Nicholas, in New Haven, where Rostow is active in community projects. He is a member of the Federal Council of Connecticut (since 1955) and was vice chairman of the New Haven Charter Revision Commission from 1950 to 1955. He also served as chairman of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Education (New Haven); as a member of the Governor's Prison Study Commission of Connecticut and of the New Haven Emergency Committee for Displaced Persons; and as a director of the Family Service of New Haven. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and belongs to the American Law Institute. His religious affiliation is Jewish, and he is a Democrat. His clubs are the Elizabethan (Yale), the Lawn, the Century Association, and the Graduates (New Haven).

Reference

Who's Who in America, 1960-61

ROSTOW, Eugene Victor, lawyer, economist; b [illegible] Aug 25, 1913; s Victor A and Lillian (Dash) R; A B, Yale, 1933, LL B, 1937, A M, 1941 student King's Coll, Cambridge, Eng, 1933-37, M A Cambridge University (England), 1951, Bar of Conn, 1962; m Edna Berman Greenberg, children: Victor A D, Jessica, Charles Nicholas. Admitted to N Y State bar, 1938, and practiced in N Y C, 1937-38; mem faculty, Law Sch, Yale, [illegible] and law, 1941-65, dean, 1955-65, Sterling prof law and public affairs, 1965-66, master of [illegible] Coll, 1966, under secretary of state for political affairs, 1966—; visiting professor [illegible], 1941. Pitt prof. Am. history and institutions, univ fellow King's College, Cambridge, 1959-60; Guggenheim fellow, 1959-60. Decorated Chevalier of the Legion d' Honneur (France) 1960. Administrative assistant Department of State, 1942-44, assistant [illegible] Law Counsel for Europe, UN, 1949-[illegible] UN — Judicial Council of Coex 1955-60; Walgreen W Cook lecturer, Mich. University, 1956; Jessup lecturer Columbia U, Colo, 1961, Leary lectr, U [illegible] 1963, Bramble lectr Bramble University, Tex, Beveridge lectr Northwestern Univ, 1963; author: [illegible] com study Antitrust Laws, 1954-55; Mem Advisory council of the Peace Corps, 1961; [illegible] to undersecretary of state, 1961-66, Trustee Walter Meyer Inst Legal Research, 1958-; Fellow Am Acad Arts and Sciences, mem Am Law Inst (council), Phi Beta Kappa, Alpha Delta Phi, Democrat, Jewish religion. Clubs: Elizabethan (New Haven), Lawn, Century Association, Author books on articles relative to field. Home: 100 High St, New Haven (Summer) Peru, Vt. Office: 2351 St, NW, Washington

Who's who 64-65

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

McGEORGE BUNDY

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
— PITONED) JOHNSON AT 10:30 AM 8 JUNE & THEN WENT WITH HIM TO SIT. RM.

BUTONI, GIOVANNI *Continued*

ildings. In 1960 he bought twenty nine acres of land in Pitamos, New Jersey that together with previously acquired land, gave him a forty acre tract on which to undulate on horseback riding

References

N Y Times III p5 N 4 '61

Who's Who in Commerce and Industry (1961)

Who's Who in Italy (1958)

BUNDY, McGEORGE Mar. 30, 1919- United States government official; author; educator

Address: h. The White House, Washington, D.C.; b. c/o Harper, Publishers, Inc., 49 East 33rd St., New York 16, N.Y.

When President John F. Kennedy named McGeorge Bundy his special assistant for national security affairs he brought to Washington a man whose administrative and intellectual abilities qualified him to become the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences of Harvard University at thirty-four years of age. A Republican, Bundy occupies a post held during the Eisenhower administration by Gordon Gray, a North Carolina Democrat. Trained as a mathematician but long a student of foreign affairs, the former educator now finds himself helping to make history, instead of writing it, as military and political planner for the National Security Council, a policy-making group presided over by the President.

Of distinguished New England ancestry on both sides of his family, McGeorge Bundy was born on March 30, 1919 in Boston, Massachusetts to Harvey Hollister Bundy, a lawyer, and Katherine Lawrence (Putnam) Bundy. His father, a Yale graduate, as a young man served as secretary to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.



McGEORGE BUNDY

McGeorge Bundy has two brothers, Harvey H. Bundy, Jr., and William P. Bundy, now deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security, and two sisters, Harriet L. Bohn (Mrs. G. D'Andelot) and Katharine L. now Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss, Jr., who is related by marriage to Jacqueline Kennedy.

At the age of eight McGeorge Bundy enrolled at the Dexter School in Brookline, Massachusetts, where one of his classmates was John F. Kennedy. In 1931 the year that McGeorge Bundy entered Groton School, Harvey H. Bundy became Assistant Secretary of State in the Hoover administration under Henry L. Stimson a post that he held until 1933. During World War II Harvey H. Bundy served under Henry L. Stimson again, this time as special assistant to the Secretary of War.

While a student at Groton, Bundy played the title role in Shakespeare's *Henry V*. He also excelled in tennis. After graduating from Groton in 1936 with a brilliant performance on the college board examinations Bundy entered Yale College, where he majored in mathematics and engaged in politics and journalism as extra-curricular activities. He belonged to the Liberal Party in the Yale Political Union and wrote for the Yale *Daily News*. One of his contributions to the *Daily News* was a controversial column that advocated the abolition of football at Yale. This bold stand did not prevent him from being tapped for the secret society of Skull and Bones, however. Elected to membership in Phi Beta Kappa, Bundy graduated from Yale with a B.A. degree in 1940. After graduation he made a trip to South America with a friend, and in 1941 he became a Ford fellow at Harvard University. That year he ran for the Boston City Council as a Republican, but lost.

In 1942, after signing waivers for his extreme nearsightedness, Bundy was admitted into the United States Army as a private. Trained as an intelligence officer, he participated in the planning of Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, and in the planning of Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. In London he attended Harold Laski's cerebral Tuesday evenings; during the weekends he relaxed at Lady Astor's. Discharged in 1946 with the rank of captain, Bundy returned to Boston. For the next year and a half he lived in a cottage on the Stimson estate, serving as the daily companion and research assistant of Henry L. Stimson, who was readying his manuscript of *On Active Service in Peace and War* for publication by Harper & Brothers in 1948. Bundy was co-author of the book, an autobiography based on Stimson's diaries, speeches, correspondence, and other papers. Half of the book dealt with World War II.

In April 1948 Bundy came to Washington as a consultant to the program's division of the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall Plan. He worked under Richard Bissell, under whom he had studied at Yale. In September 1948 he served as research analyst of foreign policy on a committee recruited by the Presidential candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. Other members of the spe-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

cial committee included John Foster Dulles and Christian A. Herter.

Bundy then went to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City as a political analyst in a study of the Marshall Plan conducted by a panel of which Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, served as chairman. Returning to Harvard, Bundy became a lecturer in government in 1949. Two years later he was promoted to the rank of associate professor of government and in 1954 he became professor of government.

In his *God and Man at Yale* (Regnery, 1951) William Buckley, Jr., a young Yale alumnus, had charged his Alma Mater with teaching "collectivism" and "atheism." Bundy defended Yale against these charges in two heated articles entitled "Attack on Yale" that appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* in November and December of 1951. The next year he engaged in another defense when he edited *Patterns of Responsibility* (Houghton, 1952), a favorable presentation of the record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson in terms of his public papers: speeches, press conferences, and testimony before legislative committees. Supplying the connecting links between papers, Bundy candidly informed readers that his brother William had married Acheson's daughter and explained that he had assembled the material independently of Acheson. He also made it clear that he did not agree with Acheson on United States policy towards China in the years from 1945 to 1950.

In May 1952 Bundy was initiated into the security aspects of defense planning when he became secretary of the so-called Oppenheimer panel, of which Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer was chairman. Other members of the committee, assigned the task of making a fresh appraisal of the problems of disarmament and atomic energy control, were Dr. Vannevar Bush, John Sloan Dickey, the president of Dartmouth College, and Allen W. Dulles.

When Bundy was appointed dean of the faculty of arts and sciences and of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University in the summer of 1953, he was thirty-four years of age. He headed a staff of more than 1,000, including 288 full professors, responsible for the instruction of 5,000 undergraduates and some 1,800 graduate students. He conducted a popular undergraduate course on "The United States in World Politics." With Archibald MacLeish and John Mason Brown he helped to secure the construction of the Loeb Drama Center for Harvard and Radcliffe, and he brought Lillian Hellman to Harvard to teach a course in playwriting for a semester in 1961. In 1960 he served as a member of the advisory committee for the Survey of Federal Programs in Higher Education.

While at Harvard, Bundy castigated the loyalty and security programs of the federal and state governments. In 1953 he said that "the national security is not served when the security program becomes an instrument of insecurity and mistrust." In 1955 he contended that the security program has a tendency to "discourage that confident and eager sense of partisanship which has so often distinguished the relationship between American scholars and their government."

After John F. Kennedy became an overseer of Harvard University, he saw Bundy, as dean of Harvard College, several times a year, and at commencement exercises in June 1960 the two men sat together and chatted. Approving of what he heard, Bundy helped to organize a scientific and professional committee in support of Kennedy, although he had supported Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. After Kennedy was elected, he considered Bundy for several posts in the State Department and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security and as head of the United States disarmament team.

Named special assistant for national security affairs by President Kennedy on December 31, 1960, McGeorge Bundy became a daily overseer of foreign and defense policy and the factotum of the National Security Council and its subsidiaries. One of the most secret of agencies, the Council was established in 1947 to co-ordinate domestic, foreign, and military policies of all government agencies charged with the nation's security, and to advise the President. The members of the National Security Council are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. As co-ordinator of military and political planning, Bundy presides over the planning staff of the Security Council—a small permanent group augmented from time to time by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Defense Department, and other departments. Members of the staff draft plans in the fields of foreign relations and defense and submit them to the National Security Council.

With a small coterie of insiders, including such special assistants and advisers as Theodore C. Sorensen, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Jerome B. Wiesner, Bundy belongs to the unofficial cabinet of President John F. Kennedy. By means of their intimate relationship with the President, they serve as his eyes, ears, and sometimes his voice in his dealings with the government. The group has become known as the Kitchen Cabinet, a term that dates back to the administration of Andrew Jackson. Its members were subjected to varying degrees of criticism following the failure of the Cuban invasion in April 1961.

In a major policy speech on December 6, 1961 Bundy predicted the growth of a new Europe based on the countries comprising the European Common Market. Bundy cited this future great power, equal with both the United States and the Soviet Union, as one of the forces shaping the course of American foreign policy. He believes that the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

Harvard University, Brown University, Oberlin College, and Hofstra College have conferred honorary degrees on McGeorge Bundy. Among the organizations to which he belongs are the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Academy of Political Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He is an Episcopalian.

McGeorge Bundy married Mary Buckminster Lothrop, who used to be associate director of admissions at Radcliffe College, on June 10, 1950. They have four boys: Stephen, Andrew, William, and James. Bundy is a sandy haired, bespectacled man with green eyes and receding hair, who stands five feet ten inches in height and weighs around 160 pounds. "Precocious" and "brilliant" are adjectives that biographers have overworked in describing him. Businesslike and self-assured, he works at a breakneck pace, then relaxes with a game of tennis. Bundy used to travel to his destinations in Cambridge on a bicycle. He is fluent in French and Spanish, reads German, and commands an elementary knowledge of Russian. Some day he would like to write a book about the conflict between Wilsonian idealism and the exigencies of power politics. The late Learned Hand, who was not given to hyperbole, once called McGeorge Bundy "the brightest man in America."

References

Democratic Digest p41 Ja-F '61 por
N Y Post p42 Ja 5 '61 por
N Y Times p30 Ja 1 '61
N Y Times Mag p27+ Mr 5 '61 por
Sat Eve Post 234:19+ Je 10 '61 por
Tanzer, L. ed. The Kennedy Circle (1961)

BUNDY, McGeorge, [illegible] b. Boston, Mar. [illegible] 1919, s. Harvey H. Bundy and Katharine Lawrence (Putnam) B., A.B. Yale 1940; hon. LL.D. Bowdoin College, Yale 1961, Brown 1962, Oberlin College, Hofstra College, 1962; Rhodes Scholar, William James Political analyst Council Foreign Relations 1948-49, [illegible] Harvard, 1949-51, asso. prof. 1951-53, dean faculty arts and sciences, 1953-61, prof. 1954-61, spl. asst. to the President for nat. security affairs, 1961-66, prof. [illegible]

For Found.: Dir. Mem. Am. Polit. Sci. Assn., Pol. Hist. Assn. Author: (in Value Series [with Stimson]) 1948; Editor: Pattern of Responsibility, 1952. Home: 1040 Fifth Av., N.Y.C. 10028. Office: 477 McKeen St., N.Y.C. 10022

WHO'S WHO 68-69

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LLEWELLYN THOMPSON
AMBASSADOR TO USSR

THOMPSON, LLEWELLYN E., JR. Aug. 24, 1904 United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Address: h. c/o The United States Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R.; h. Spasso House, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

The exceedingly difficult and challenging diplomatic position of United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. is held by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr. He was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the spring of 1957 to succeed Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen. A career diplomat since 1929, Thompson had served as Ambassador to Austria from 1952 until his present assignment in Moscow. He received the U.S. Department of State's distinguished service award in April 1956 in recognition of his "tem-

Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr. Research P



LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.

ness, patience, negotiating skill, and good judgment" which were in large part responsible for the successful conclusion of the Trieste agreement and the Austrian State Treaty in 1955.

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr. was born in Las Animas, Colorado on August 24, 1904. After his graduation from high school, he worked as an accountant and studied in Boulder at the University of Colorado, from which he received the A.B. degree in 1928. The following year on January 29 he entered the U.S. Foreign Service and was appointed a vice-consul in Colombo, Ceylon. He served in the same position in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning in 1933, and in 1937 was made a consul there.

At Geneva he began his work with the International Labor Organization (ILO), as chief adviser to its conferences. He served in that capacity in 1936, 1937 and 1938 for the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth meetings. As an adviser to the governing body of the ILO, he attended its meetings in Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1937, Geneva and London in 1938, and Geneva in 1939. He was an adviser and secretary to the American delegation at the Second Regional Conference of American States Members of the ILO at Havana, Cuba in 1939, and has been an advisory member of the American Commission of the International Institute of Agriculture since 1939.

From January to November 1940 he attended the Army War College in the United States and on November 20, 1940 he received an appointment as second secretary and consul at the American Embassy in Moscow. He was awarded the U.S. Department of State's Medal of Freedom for handling, "at the risk of capture," the Moscow office of the American Embassy when the diplomatic corps evacuated the capital and moved to Kuibyshev as the German armies approached in 1941 during World War II.

Moving to London in 1944, Thompson became second secretary and consul to the American Embassy in Great Britain. Subsequently, on July 24, 1945, he was made first secretary there. At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945, he was the political and liaison officer to the U.S. delegation. In that year he was also political adviser at the Berlin conference and at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London. In 1946 he was political adviser to the U.S. delegation at the first session of the UN General Assembly in London.

On June 12, 1946 he was made chief of the State Department's Division of Eastern European Affairs in Washington and in the following year he became deputy director for European affairs. In 1949 he received the appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. In these posts he was much concerned with Soviet affairs. At Rome from 1950 to 1952 Thompson served as counselor of embassy with the rank of minister and as second in command of the U.S. Embassy.

President Harry S. Truman selected Thompson in July 1952 to act as U.S. High Commissioner and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Austria. For his work while holding this post in helping to bring about the agreement on Trieste and the treaty restoring Austria's independence, the U.S. distinguished service award was conferred on Thompson on April 24, 1956.

After nine years of discord, Italy and Yugoslavia finally in 1954 decided to divide the city and port of Trieste between them. The agreement, sponsored and obtained by the American and British governments, was reached after eight months of negotiation in London, where Thompson and Geoffrey W. Harrison, Assistant Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, worked to help the Italian and Yugoslav representatives to find a satisfactory settlement.

After World War II Austria was under the joint occupation of the four Allied governments, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. After nine years of fruitless negotiation over an independence treaty for Austria, government leaders of that country were finally able, in a visit to Moscow in April 1955, to secure concessions from the Soviet Union making a treaty possible. (See Schärf, Adolf, *C.B.*, October 1957).

The final negotiations, conducted in Vienna by Thompson, the three other Allied ambassadors there, and Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl, hit a snag when the Russians refused to change Article 35 of the draft treaty to include the economic concessions made at Moscow. The Soviet Union wished to have these only in a bilateral Soviet-Austrian agreement, but finally agreed to an American compromise proposal to have the new economic clauses referred to at the end of Article 35 and also attached to the treaty in annex form.

The State Treaty, granting Austria her independence in return for her military neutrality, was signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955 by the foreign ministers of the four Allied governments and Austria. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles paid tribute to the work of Thompson during the lengthy negotiations. During the eleven days of conferences, Thompson revealed, he had lost seventeen pounds.

At his post in Austria Thompson was also concerned with refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. Opening a new home jointly established by the governments of the United States and Austria for refugees, Thompson stated that it is "clear that the victims of tyranny are the abiding concern of all who respect human liberty anywhere" (United States *Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1953). After Hungary's revolution in the fall of 1956, Thompson with his embassy staff helped the U.S. consulate to process the papers necessary so that those refugees immigrating to the United States could go more speedily.

On April 27, 1957 President Eisenhower announced his selection of Thompson to succeed Charles E. Bohlen as U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. Bohlen was sent to Manila as Ambassador to the Philippines. In an article on July 20, 1955, the New York *Times* had remarked that Thompson was regarded "as one of the handful of career men still in the State Department with a grasp of Soviet affairs. The Senate confirmed Thompson's appointment on June 3, 1957 and he took over his new duties in July. He had learned Russian during his earlier tour of duty in the Soviet Union. In 1955 Thompson served with Bohlen as President Eisenhower's interpreter at the Geneva conference, but commented in 1957 that his Russian was "a bit rusty now and I've got to pick it up."

In August 1957 Ambassador Thompson endeavored to persuade American students who had attended the Communist-sponsored World Youth Festival in Moscow not to accept the invitation of the Chinese Communist government to visit Red China. He warned that their passports might not be renewed when they expire and might be stamped "valid only for return to the United States", that they could be fined as much as $5,000 each for misuse of a passport; and that they could face charges under the trading-with-the-enemy act (New York *Herald Tribune*, August 11, 1957). Subsequently, on September 18, the State Department stated that it would restrict the passports of the forty-two students who defied its ban on travel to Communist China "for direct return to the U.S."

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., married Mrs. Jane Monroe Goelet on October 2, 1948. By a previous marriage she has a daughter. They have two children, Jenny and Sherry. Mrs. Thompson was active in welfare and refugee work while in Vienna. For recreation the "quiet," "slim" Ambassador, sometimes called "Tommy Thompson," enjoys skiing and hunting.

References

Christian Sci Mon p2 My 4 '57
N Y Herald Tribune II p2 Ap 28 '57
N Y Times p5 Jl 20 '55; p26 Ap 28 '57; p1+ Mr 10 '57
Time 69:23 My 6 '57
U S News 42:22 My 10 '57
International Who's Who, 1956
Who's Who in America, 1956-57
World Biography (1954)

ADMIRALS, SENIOR OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONALITIES SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT

James M. Emmes, Jr. Research Papers

AIR FORCE GENERAL JOHN E. MORRISON, JR.

Dave Lewis letter of 30 March 1978 says Genl Morrison was AIR FORCE.
That makes sense.

1968 Air Force Register lists:

John E. Morrison, Jr. Svc # R 8459
Permanent Grade Brigadier General - DOR 27DEC65
TEMPORARY Grade Brigadier General - DOR 25MAY65
Date of Birth: 20APR18
Pay Date: 18FEB41

Source: OCS Graduate
Education Level: Master's Degree + 30 hours
~~Professional and Military Schools: Air War College + Air Command & Staff Colleges~~

Dave says he thinks Morrison is still with DIA or CIA as a retired General.

Northern Virginia phone book lists JOHN (H.) MORRISON, JR., BRIG GEN RETIRED living in McLean. He is listed in the Army Register, so there are two generals with similar names.

1977 NSA phone book shows John E. Morrison, Jr., as head of D organization.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Admiral Walsh

Dave Lewis letter says Walsh is "RADM JACK WALSH" who was Chief of N Group at NSA when Dave left.

A recheck of Navy Register shows

John Amand Walsh 1100
DOR Captain: 1 JUL 66
DOB 3JAN24
Spec Qual: Qualified for Command of Submarines
SSBN Navigator
Post Graduate Study
Defense Intelligence

Latest register in Rockville Library is 1970 & he is not yet RADM at that time, but this must be our man. There is no "Jack" and no other Captain John Walsh in the Navy in 1966/67.

He is of interest because Dave said some time ago that Adm Walsh was the Commander of the submarine division in which Dave's brother was a member. Dave's brother's submarine operated "near us" on June 8th, but brother was not aboard at the time, having missed the trip. Hence, Adm Walsh (then Captain) is a good candidate for CO of the sub division whose submarine took the photos of the attack. Dave's brother is a Captain who was stationed in DC in 1977 or so, but Dave told me he has almost no contact with his brother & had not been able to find out more about the films, except that his brother missed his sub's trip that month.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DAVIS, DAVIS, WHO WAS GENERAL DAVIS?

Raven's boss, according to reports, was "General Davis," but I can't find a General Davis.

Rechecked 1967 and 1968 Army Registers and cannot find any BG DAVIS.

1967 Army Register lists a LG DAVIS, DOR 1966, but he's too senior to have worked for Morrison who was just a BG.

~~Maybe Davis was a retired General.~~

Until I learn more I will avoid naming him and will refer on page 12b only to "Deputy Section Head."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

MORRISON

REGISTER OF U.S. ARMY OFFICERS - 1967

Register lists officers as of 1 January 1967. Morrison & Davis are not listed as Generals. A Lieutenant General John J. Davis is listed (DOR 19OCT66; PEBD 11JUN31; BOB 19MAR09) but he does not seem to be our man as he is senior to Morrison.

TOO SENIOR

Only one John Morrison is listed (Dave Lewis said it was John), but as a Colonel. He appears in the Virginia telephone directory as a BGEN. Listing as follows:

Promotion list 8736
JOHN H. MORRISON, JR. Service # O-0065121
Branch: SC [for Signal Corps?]
Colonel
Date of Rank: 8 August 1963
PEBD: 1 December 1940
Source: Appointment from competitive tour.
Civilian Education: College Graduate
Military Education: Associate Course, Command and General Staff College
DOB: 23 January 1921

NOT OUR MAN?

Best bet for General Davis (a guess) is Colonel Dan R. Davis, Date of Rank July, 1964; branch, SC. He is junior enough to have been subordinate to Morrison & senior enough to have become BGEN in 1967.

I have requested copy of 1968 register to check further.

1972 REGISTER

Morrison, John H., Jr. SSN 354 03 9333 Branch SC
Brigadier General
*Date of Rank: 1 August 1970
*Permanent Grade: Lt. Col. - date of rank 12 AUGUST 1969
Basic Date (Active Duty Base Date?) 16 December 1948
DOB: 23 January 1921

*****IMPORTANT: The "General" Morrison was not a general when LIBERTY was attacked. (?)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DAVIS

A possible pick for Davis.

BRIGADIER GENERAL OSCAR E. DAVIS
SSN 126145053
"IN" Branch
Date of Rank: 29 NOV 67
PEBD: 28 May 1941
Permanent Colonel - Date of Rank 7 DEC 56
Basic Date: 7 DEC 41
DOB: 18 JUL 18

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LCDR G. H. GOLDEN, 1425 White Blaze Crescent, Virginia Beach, Va., 23462
phone: 420-5351. (listing 1976 Norfolk area phone book)

CAPTAIN J. C. TOTH, 301 53rd Street, Virginia Beach, Virginia,
phone: 428-8397 (listing 1976 Norfolk area phone book)

A "Mr. Boardman" is noted on corner of NSA's copy of the Pearson story from PENTHOUSE. NSA Phone book lists

1. Norman Boardman, NSAFM D4, 3083 Grey, 6964 black
2. Richard W. Boardman, NSAFM S3, 2346 Grey, 6820 black.

I can't tell which Boardman is the one who keeps file on LIBERTY, but NSA staff minutes of 22FEB77 reflect statement by "Mr. Boardman, Policy Staff" who discusses a Freedom of Information Act suit. A more recent meeting shows Boardman (I think) discussing review of a book. No doubt this is my Boardman. Need to know whether Policy Staff is "S" or "D".

[redacted]

9 MAR 76 NSA STAFF MEETING ANNOUNCED
THAT WALTER DEELEY WAS PROMOTED TO GS-18

9 MAR 76 NSA STAFF MEETING
JOHN R. HARNET (ADPL)
DISCUSSED EFFORTS TO CONTROL A BOOK


Ewart L. Kerley, 50,
Chief Naval Staff of
[illegible]
[illegible] - Medicare Lawsuit claims
[illegible] part

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

C. FARRIS BRYANT

DIRECTOR - OFC OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
JOHNSON PHONED BRYANT AT 10:12AM

BRYANT, C(ECIL) FARRIS July 26, 1914 Governor of Florida; lawyer

Address: h. State Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla; h. Executive Mansion, Tallahassee, Fla

Florida, the fastest-growing state in the nation, elected C. Farris Bryant to a four-year term as its thirty-fourth Governor in November 1960. It was the Florida-born lawyer's second attempt to capture the governorship; he lost in the 1956 Democratic primary to Governor LeRoy Collins, the incumbent. Bryant has promised to balance the state budget without increasing taxes. He has also pledged himself to reapportioning representation in the state Legislature, promotion of tourism and light industries, revision of the state constitution, reallocation of road funds to areas that need highways, and blocking extension of legalized gambling.

For many years Bryant has ardently championed state rights and vigorously opposed integration. "The less said about segregation, the better," he said in May 1960. "To talk about it merely incites people and it doesn't solve the problem" (*Miami News*, May 25, 1960). Bryant began the practice of law in Ocala, Florida in 1938 and four years later won election to the Florida House of Representatives, where, as Speaker in the 1953-54 session, he was known as the "most all-round member" and "most effective House debater."

Cecil Farris Bryant was born in Ocala, Florida on July 26, 1914 to Lela (Farris) and Charles Cecil Bryant, one of Florida's first certified public accountants. Bryant was educated in Marion County public schools. Enrolling at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia in 1931, he studied there for two years, then transferred to the University of Florida at Gainesville, where he received the B.S. degree in business administration in 1935. He decided to become a lawyer and attended Harvard Law School, earning his LL.B. degree three years later.

While still a teen-ager Bryant was inspired to become a debater and orator by the example of his uncle Jon Farris, the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives. By visiting the House with his uncle, he became interested in politics. Deciding to gain firsthand experience in government after graduating from Harvard, Bryant accepted a job as auditor in the state comptroller's office in Tallahassee. In 1940 he returned to his home town, Ocala, where he practised law, ran a utility company, and entered politics. After 1946 he practised with the Ocala law firm of Green, Bryant & Simmons.

First elected to the Florida House of Representatives from Marion County in 1942, he was voted "the first-termer with the most promise" by his colleagues. In 1943 he resigned from the Legislature to become an ensign in the United States Navy. He was in charge of training antisubmarine units on Guam, served as a gunnery officer in several Pacific combat areas, and left the service in 1946 with the rank of lieutenant.

Back in civilian life, he was again elected to represent Marion County in the House of Representatives, where he served for five consecutive sessions, until 1956. In 1953 he was chosen Speaker of the House, and he was also assigned to the committees on finance and taxation, constitutional amendment, drainage and water conservation, and rules and calendar. Bryant, who represented a rural area, supported matters that benefited the more populous southern section of Florida such as the establishment of the Everglades National Park and home rule for Dade County. He also favored state aid to university and medical school students. Florida newspapermen voted him the outstanding member of the House in 1949, 1953, and 1955.

Although Bryant backed much of Governor Collins' legislative program, he quarreled with the Governor during the special session in 1956. Collins had asked the legislature to enact five specific bills to deal with segregation. When it appeared that the lawmakers would go beyond his recommendations, Collins took advantage, according to the Miami *News* (January 24, 1960), of a little-used provision of the state constitution to adjourn the session suddenly while the House was bogged down in a fiery debate on an interposition resolution presented by Bryant.

Bryant's first try for the governorship, in 1956, ended in defeat. His financial support evaporated when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Governor Collins was eligible as a candidate. In Florida the Governor cannot succeed himself, and Collins had been elected to serve for two years of the unexpired term of Governor Dan McCarty, who died in 1953. In the May 1956 primary Bryant lost to Collins.

In the 1960 gubernatorial campaign Bryant toured the state promising better value for the tax dollar and assertion of state rights. He exploited to the full his advantages as an excellent public speaker and magnetic radio and television personality. "Finally, it's my strong point," Bryant said. "I can take money now being wasted in one department and use it where needed."

In an article, "There's a Need for Me," that he wrote for the Miami *Herald* (April 25, 1960) Bryant outlined a fifteen-point platform ranging from additional schools to stricter highway safety. "I would like to be governor for the same reason I volunteered in World War II," he wrote. "My state and my nation are in danger. I see Florida as a whole, no north or south, no big or little, no rural or urban."

During the campaign Bryant also urged that Florida's "lush and booming" section be united with the "gold coast" in order to end sectionalism and permit reapportionment that would provide metropolitan areas with more equitable representation in the Legislature. On the issue of integration both Bryant and Doyle E. Carlton, Jr., his most serious opponent among several adversaries in the primary, promised to keep the public schools open. Bryant, however, went beyond the moderate racial views of his rival when he said that he would postpone integration by lawful means for another four years.

In the May 3 primary election Bryant and Carlton were almost tied and a runoff primary was called for May 24. In the runoff Bryant



Wide World

C. FARRIS BRYANT

not only triumphed over a strong rival but also overcame the opposition of some of the state's influential newspapers and Governor Collins' endorsement of Carlton. Although winning a gubernatorial primary is tantamount to election in Florida, Bryant's defeat of Republican George C. Peterson was nevertheless the closest race for the governorship in the state since 1928.

Perhaps the strength of the Republican gubernatorial vote can be attributed to the fact that Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, Republican Presidential candidate, carried the state in 1960. Bryant himself refused to endorse Senator John F. Kennedy, the Democratic standard-bearer, and denounced the Democratic national platform.

C. Farris Bryant was inaugurated as the Governor of Florida on January 4, 1961. Florida has the richest citrus region in the world and one of the leading resort areas in the United States. Its deepwater ports enable it to rank ninth in foreign trade in the nation, and its industrial expansion is keeping pace with its rapidly increasing population. "All indications are," Bryant told Charles M. Sievert (New York *World-Telegram and Sun*, October 5, 1960), "that the state's population will be 50 per cent greater in 1970 than it is now and we're going to need a lot of new jobs and a lot of new industry." Bryant has emphasized that it is not only the aged and retired who are migrating to Florida; many younger families are settling there. Some of the younger people newly arrived in the state are refugees from Cuba.

Shortly after he took office, Bryant said: "As Governor, it will be my duty to provide the leadership to maintain segregation without violence, anarchy, or closing of schools. But I would not close schools to avoid integration. . . . I am convinced that if we conduct ourselves with dignity and determination and maintain a

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

BRYANT, C. FARRIS *Continued*

peaceful environment in which this problem can be resolved, that over the years the people themselves will work out a solution . . . but in the meantime we must not be turned aside . . . from our goal of making facilities for Negroes equal as well as separate so that within their sphere they too may enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (Miami *News*, January 24, 1960). Despite Bryant's statements, a public school in Miami began integrating in 1959 and several schools in other parts of Florida have followed this precedent.

In April 1961 Bryant sent a $71,928,184 spending program to the Legislature. He proposed doubling the $5 license fee for small cars, enacting a 3 per cent levy on public utilities, and placing on the tax rolls property now tax exempt but being used for profit. He also recommended outlawing "conflict of interest" at all levels in the state road department and making it a crime to give as well as receive kickbacks. He signed a law to reduce taxes on stock and bond holdings to "make Florida an even more desirable place for retirement." Another measure enacted in 1961 provides for a new library system.

Active in many organizations, Bryant is an American Legionnaire, Veteran of Foreign Wars, Shriner, Elk, and Rotarian (local president, 1948) and belongs to the American and Florida bar associations. His fraternities are Phi Delta Phi, Alpha Kappa Psi, Alpha Tau Omega, and Kappa Delta Phi. Long a member of the Chamber of Commerce (Marion County president, 1950) and Florida Junior Chamber of Commerce, he received the National Distinguished Service Award of the Chamber of Commerce in 1948 and the Gold Key Distinguished Service Award of the Florida Junior Chamber of Commerce in 1948 and 1950. The University of Florida cited him for outstanding service to the state and university in 1953.

A Methodist, Bryant once taught Sunday school and a men's Bible class. He has been a trustee of the Methodist conference in Florida since 1954, and has preached from the pulpit as a lay leader. Commenting on the reading of the Bible in public schools, Bryant declared: "This is a God-fearing Christian-orientated nation and Bible reading is proper in schools. I'm mindful of the rights of the minority, but the majority has some rights, too" (Miami *News*, December 31, 1960).

On September 18, 1940 C. Farris Bryant married Julia Burnett, a former Tallahassee schoolteacher, whom he has called his greatest political asset. Bryant met his wife on a tennis court and they were married at a time when his law practice netted him $75 a month. The couple has three daughters: Julia Lovett, Cecelia Ann, and Allison Adair. "The time other people spend on golf courses or hunting or fishing, or out with the boys," the Governor has said, "that's the time I spend on politics. Every minute that's left over I spend with my family." The entire family enjoys playing the piano, horseback riding, cookouts, and water skiing.

Bryant weighs about 165 pounds and has thinning light brown hair. He is a teetotaler. He reads law, history, philosophy, biography, and adventure stories. An eloquent speaker, Bryant often quotes from the writings of Sir Winston Churchill and William Shakespeare in an accent that echoes the Harvard Yard more than the Florida back country. "Like Hamlet," he has said, "one must to thine own self be true. A man should never do less than what he knows is right."

References

Who's Who in the South and Southwest (1950)





James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NICHOLAS B. KATZENBACH
UNDER SECY of STATE

KATZENBACH, NICHOLAS deB(ELLEVILLE) Jan. 17, 1922- United States government official

Address: b. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20025; h. 3111 Highland Pl., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008

Under Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach the United States Department of Justice is no longer the staid "government law firm" that it was in earlier administrations. The brisk change of pace and operating tactics instituted by his predecessor, Robert F. Kennedy, continue to characterize the department as a vital arm of the federal government, following a positive course of action in such areas as civil rights, antitrust litigation, and the war on crime. A lawyer and former law professor, Katzenbach has been in the mainstream of Justice Department activities since his appointment as an assistant attorney general in 1961. As deputy attorney general he played a major role in bringing about the admission of Negro students to the universities of Mississippi and Alabama, and he is a co-author of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of the 1965 voting rights bill. After Robert Kennedy resigned in September 1964, Katzenbach succeeded him as acting Attorney General. He was appointed Attorney General by President Lyndon B. Johnson on January 28, 1965.



NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH

Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach was born on January 17, 1922 in Philadelphia, the younger of the two sons of Edward Lawrence and Marie Louise (Hilson) Katzenbach. One of his ancestors, Nicholas de Jacques Immanuel De Belleville, was the personal physician of Napoleon Bonaparte's brother, Joseph. He came to the United States around 1830 and settled near Trenton, New Jersey. His other forebears included Germans who settled in America about the time of the American Revolution. One of his great-grandfathers, a South Carolinian, fought in the Confederate army during the Civil War. His father, who died when Nicholas Katzenbach was twelve years old, was a successful corporation lawyer and served as Attorney General of New Jersey from 1924 to 1928. His mother was a member of the New Jersey state board of education for forty-four years and served as its president from 1956 until her retirement in 1965. His brother, Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., has served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for education and manpower resources.

Katzenbach grew up in Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, and attended Phillips Exeter Academy in New Hampshire, where his big frame served him well as goalie on the hockey team. After graduating in 1939 he enrolled at Princeton University and majored in international relations and public affairs. Soon after the Pearl Harbor attack he left Princeton to join the United States Army Air Force. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant and became a navigator. In October 1943, while on a B-25 bombing mission over the Mediterranean, he was shot down and taken prisoner by the Italians. He escaped twice, was recaptured both times, and after his second attempt was turned over to the Germans, who committed him to a prisoner-of-war camp. During his captivity he read over 200 books in the prison library furnished by the YMCA and the International Red Cross, to stay abreast of his studies. At the end of the war, after receiving the Air Medal with three clusters, he was discharged with the rank of first lieutenant.

Returning to Princeton, Katzenbach talked university authorities into waiving regulations and permitting him to complete the remaining two years of his undergraduate work by examination. Within six weeks he passed his junior and senior examinations and wrote a thesis dealing with the wage control system of the National War Labor Board. After graduating *cum laude* with a B.A. degree in 1945 he entered Yale Law School, where he became editor in chief of the *Yale Law Journal* and made friends with Byron R. White, now an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. He received his LL.B. degree *cum laude* in 1947, and then, having won a Rhodes Scholarship, went to England, where he attended Balliol College, Oxford University, until 1949. Admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1950, he became a member of the law firm of Katzenbach, Gildea & Rudner in Trenton.

From 1950 to 1952 Katzenbach worked in the Pentagon as attorney-adviser in the office of the general counsel to the Secretary of the Air Force. He continued in this post on a part-time basis from 1952 to 1956, at the same time serving as associate professor of law at Yale University. From 1956 to 1960 he was a full professor at the University of Chicago, where he taught commercial law, trial practice, and international law. Awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship in 1960, Katzenbach went to Geneva, Switzerland to work on a project in international law. While he was there, Byron R. White, then deputy attorney general, asked Katzenbach to take a Justice Department post. He decided to accept and had to abandon the Ford Foundation project.

Katzenbach entered the Justice Department in 1961 as assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. Don Oberdorfer, writing for the New York *Times Magazine* (March 7, 1965), has noted: "Theoretically one of the lowest ranking of the nine assistantships, the post . . . is pretty much what one makes of it. Katzenbach made much of it." In this position he played a major part in drafting a bill to establish the Communications Satellite Corporation and served on the drafting committee for the Kennedy administration's foreign-trade program. He also helped to draft new wire tapping and conflict-of-interest legislation.

In April 1962, when Byron R. White was named to the Supreme Court, Katzenbach was appointed to succeed him as deputy attorney

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

general, the second highest position in the Justice Department. As Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's right hand man and as one of the top action men of the Kennedy administration, Katzenbach had to be ready to cope with the crises that beset the government. In the fall of 1962, when the attempt of James Meredith, a Negro, to obtain admission to the University of Mississippi led to unrest and violence, Katzenbach was on the scene as a "field general," directing United States marshals in an effort to enforce the Constitution and to restore order. During the riots, which lasted some fifteen hours, Katzenbach maintained direct telephone communication with the White House and the Justice Department. After Meredith was duly registered at the university, Katzenbach met with law students and campus leaders, explaining to them that the Supreme Court had ruled that segregation is unconstitutional, and that its decisions could not be defied indefinitely.

One evening in October 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, Katzenbach received an urgent call from the White House instructing him to draw up a legal brief supporting President John F. Kennedy's decision to blockade Cuba. Although one of his secretaries fell asleep in the midst of dictation, Katzenbach calmly completed the assignment on time. In December 1962 Katzenbach was a member of a four-man group appointed by Robert F. Kennedy to help attorney James B. Donovan to negotiate for the release of Cuban prisoners captured by the Castro regime in April 1961 after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. One of the tasks of the group was to convince drug firms donating medical supplies to be exchanged for the prisoners that although the transaction was technically a private one it was sanctioned by the government. Hans Knight quoted Katzenbach in the Philadelphia *Sunday Bulletin Magazine* (November 1, 1964) as saying: "If there's one thing I'm proud of, it's the part I played in helping get the Cuban prisoners freed. . . . We picked an ideal time, of course—Christmas, the season of good will. The firms cooperated and so did Castro."

Katzenbach was again faced with a civil rights crisis in June 1963, when he directed the enforcement of a Presidential order to desegregate the University of Alabama and had a thirty-minute showdown on the university steps with Governor George C. Wallace, who tried to block the enrollment of Negro students James Hood and Vivian Malone. Maintaining his dignified composure, Katzenbach personally escorted the students into the campus, and the integration of the University of Alabama was accomplished without violence. After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963, Katzenbach worked closely with the Warren Commission, which had been appointed to inquire into its circumstances. When the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Katzenbach to a four-man panel to advise him on the execution of the Commission's recommendations.

When Robert F. Kennedy resigned as Attorney General in September 1964 to run for the United States Senate, Katzenbach became acting Attorney General at Kennedy's own request. Although there were several possible candidates for the post of Attorney General, President Johnson decided on January 28, 1965 to give the appointment to Katzenbach. The President said a few days later, "I came to the conclusion, after careful deliberation, that he was the man I wanted to be the President's lawyer and the first lawyer of the land . . . and I had come to the conclusion on my own." The appointment was confirmed by the Senate with only two dissenting votes from Southern Senators, and on February 13, 1965 Katzenbach was sworn in as the sixty-fifth Attorney General of the United States.

In October 1964 Katzenbach, as acting Attorney General, had come into conflict with a federal district court, when he ordered United States attorney Robert E. Hauberg to refuse to prosecute two Negroes who had been accused by a federal grand jury in Jackson, Mississippi of perjury in a voting rights case. He maintained at the time that there were insufficient grounds for prosecution. As a result, federal district judge Harold Cox instituted contempt proceedings against Hauberg for his refusal to sign the indictments and ordered Katzenbach to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and jailed. The controversy was resolved in January 1965 by a federal court of appeals, which invalidated the contempt proceedings on the ground that decisions involving the signing of indictments should be left to executive discretion.

As a prime mover of the Civil Rights Act that became law in 1964, Katzenbach worked closely with Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois and other Congressional leaders during the negotiations of more than a year that preceded its passage. According to Don Oberdorfer, writing in the New York *Times Magazine* article, "Katzenbach played a key role as the chief broker in the lengthy legislative negotiations over the Civil Rights Bill. He was able to win, and keep, bipartisan support."

In the drafting of the 1965 voting rights legislation Katzenbach played a similarly important role. He did, however, oppose the inclusion of an anti-poll tax amendment in the bill, since he felt that such an amendment could be ruled unconstitutional and might undermine the entire legislation. After passage of the legislation he sent federal registrars into selected counties in Southern states to implement it. During the Selma-to-Montgomery civil rights march in the spring of 1965, Katzenbach kept alert to the situation, but resisted demands from civil rights groups that federal marshals be sent to Alabama to protect the marchers.

Katzenbach was largely responsible for resolving the legal controversy involving ownership of General Aniline and Film Corporation, seized by the United States government in 1942. The United States ownership was contested by Interhandel, a Swiss holding company to which the Germans had transferred their controlling stock interest just before World War II. The controversy ended on March 9, 1965 with the opening of bids for the government's holdings in General Aniline in the Attorney General's office. In his war against crime Katzenbach has asked Congress for additional statutory powers to deal with such organizations as the Cosa Nostra syndicate, and he has strongly advocated curbs on mail-order traffic in firearms. He has also taken

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

steps to improve relations between the office of the Attorney General and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover.

To ensure equal justice for all, Katzenbach has urged that more extensive legal aid be made available to the poor. To prevent news media from prejudicing the public against a defendant, he has called for limitations on the flow of pretrial information in federal cases to the press. In April 1965 the Justice Department published a report dealing with the problem of balancing the rights of a free press with the right of a defendant to a fair trial. In an effort to advance the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes, Katzenbach proposed to Congress in March 1965 a plan for allowing selected federal prisoners to hold outside jobs before their prison terms are completed. He is not excessively worried about domestic Communist activities; J. Robert Moskin in an article in *Look* (June 1, 1965) quotes him as saying: "There is no danger the United States is going to be overthrown by the Communist party."

Katzenbach is co-author with Morton A. Kaplan of *The Political Foundations of International Law* (Wiley, 1961). With Leon Lipson he undertook a *Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the Law of Outer Space*, published under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation in 1960. He is a member of the state bars of New Jersey and Connecticut, and he belongs to the American Judicature Society, the American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. Rutgers University and the University of Bridgeport have conferred honorary degrees on him. On February 20, 1965 Katzenbach became the youngest man ever to receive Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson award, presented annually to the Princeton alumnus who best exemplifies "Princeton in the nation's service."

On June 8, 1946 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach married Lydia King Phelps Stokes, whom he had met at the wedding of John Douglas, the son of Senator Paul Douglas. The Katzenbachs have four children: Christopher Wolcott, John Strong Minor, Maria Louise, and Anne deBerniere. They live in the Cleveland Park section of Washington in a rambling twelve-room house built about the turn of the century and covering almost an acre of ground. Mrs. Katzenbach has attended law school to gain a better understanding of her husband's work. She is one of the founders of the Negro Student Fund Committee to promote integration in private schools. Although Katzenbach is an Episcopalian he is sometimes taken to be Jewish, and he has on occasion received anti-Semitic crank letters.

A huskily built man, Nick Katzenbach is six feet two inches tall, weighs 215 pounds, and has a fringe of light-brown hair. He is an indifferent dresser, and it is sometimes up to Mrs. Katzenbach to make certain that his tie, shirt, and socks harmonize. His favorite recreations are skiing, skating, relaxing in his backyard swimming pool, and sailing along the Potomac on his yawl, the *Henja*. He is a chain-smoker. Don Smith in a *Newsday* profile (January 29, 1965) quotes a Justice Department official as saying about Katzenbach: "He's just a quiet, friendly guy who gets things done quickly. He's easy to work for because he just exudes inspiration."

References

Look 29:27+ Je 1 '65 pors
N Y Post Mag p2 F 20 '63 por; p2 N 15 '64 por
N Y Times p14 Ja 20 '65 por
N Y Times Mag p28+ Mr 7 '65 pors
Who's Who in America, 1964-65

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROBERT GORALSKI

(WAS WITH ENGEN ON BRIDGE OF AMERICA
WHEN FIRST WORD RECEIVED OF ATTACK)

GORALSKI

GORALSKI, ROBERT, radio-TV news corr b Chgo Jan 5 1925, s Stanley and Caroline (Bielas) G; B S, U Ill 1949, studies Sch Advanced Internat Studies, Johns Hopkins, 1960-61, Litt D, William Jewell Coll, 1969 m Margaret Anne Walton Aug 22 1948, children Douglas, Dorothy, Katherine Newsman, Announcer WDWS, Champaign, Ill, 1948-51, combat corr U S [illegible] Korea, 1951-53, prodn supr Radio Free Asia, Tokyo, Japan, 1953-54, asst rep Asia Found, Karachi and Dacca, Pakistan, 1954-56, [illegible] dept, desk supr Voice of Am, Washington, 1956-61, White House and State Dept and Pentagon corr NBC News, 1961-[illegible], Nat Security fellow Hoover Inst, 1972-73, Served with USNR, 1943-46, PIO Mass media fellow Ford Found, Fund Adult Edn, 1960-61, Mem Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, Nat Press (Washington), Home 1199 Wendy Lane, McLean VA 22101 356-[illegible] (JAN '77)

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 74-75

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

DEAN RUSK

Dean Rusk, Sec of State. Born Cherokee County, Ga., Feb 9, 1909.
Davidson College, NC, 1931 BS; St. John's Oxford 1933 MA;
Mills College, LLD 1948; Davidson Coll 1950; U Cal, Princeton
& much more.

Asst Chief of Div of International Security Affairs, Dept of
State, 1946: Spl Asst Sec of War 46-47; Dir Office of United
Nations Affairs, US Dept of State 47-49; Asst Sec of State Feb 49;
Dep Under Sec of State 49-50; & much more
Received Cecil Peace Prize 1933, Legion of Merit, Oak Leaf Cluster.

Home: 1 Lafayette Square,
620 Hill Street, Athens, Ga. 30601

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

WALWORTH BARBOUR

AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL

Walworth Barbour, born Cambridge, Mass, June 4, 1908; Phillips Exeter Academy 1926; Harvard 1930; Foreign Service Officer since 1931; Vice Consul Naples, It. 1932; Athens, Greece 1933-36. Vice Consul & 3rd Secty Baghdad, Iraq, 1936-39; Sofia, Bulgaria 1939-41; 2nd Secty & Vice Consul Dec 1941; 2nd Secty & Vice Consul Cairo, Egypt, 1942-44; Athens, Greece, Nov-Dec 1944; Consul Dec 1944; Assigned dept of State since 1945. Assigned Minister-counselor, Moscow, USSR, 1945; Dir. Office Eastern European Affairs 1951-54; dep.asst.sec of State for European Affairs, 1954-55; US Minister, London, 1955-61; Ambassador to Israel, 1961--.
Clubs: University (Washington); Chevy Chase, Md. Office. Dept of State, Washington
Who's Who 1968-69. Vol 35.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROBT. E. KINTNER

(SPL. ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT.)

(JOHNSON PHONED KINTNER AT 10:18AM 8 JUN 67)

KINTNER, Robert Edmonds, government official; b Stroudsburg, Pa., Sept. 12, 1909; B.A., Swarthmore Coll., 1931; m. Jean Rodney, Mar. 9, 1940; children: Susan, Michael, Jeffry. Reporter, New York Herald Tribune, N.Y. City, 1933-36; Washington bureau, N.Y. Herald Tribune, 1933-37; partner in Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, Washington columnists, 1937-41; pres. Am. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 1950, executive v.p. National Broadcasting Co., 1951-54, pres., 1954-56. Assn., 1966; special assistant to the President, U.S., 1966-67. Served as lt. col., U.S. Army; executive, War Dept. Bureau of Public Relations, Washington. Recipient Keynote award Nat. Assn. Radio and TV Broadcasters. Author (with Joseph Alsop) Washington While Passes, Men Around the President. Home: 117 Fifth Av., N.Y.C. 10022. Office: Executive Office of the President, Washington.

WHO'S WHO 65-69

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

GEORGE CHRISTIAN

(JOHNSON'S PRESS SECRETARY)

I wrote
21 DEC 77



Who's Who 1976-77

George Eastland Christian, govt official, born Austin, Texas, Jan. 1, 1927. Student, U of Texas. Sports editor of Temple (Tex) Daily Telegram, 1949; Corres International News Service, 49-56; Asst to Sen Price Daniel, Wash., 57-63, to Gov. John Connally, Austin 63-6[illegible] Press Secty & Spl Asst to President Johnson, Wash., 1966--. Served with USMCR 44-46. Member: Sigma Delta Club. Democrat. Episcopalian. Home: 6800 Rockledge Cove, Austin, Texas [illegible]31. Office: Am Nat Bank Bldg, Austin, Tx 98701. Who's Who 1976-77. Vol 39.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

H. BAREFOOT SANDERS

VANTAGE POINT CALLS SANDERS [redacted] CHIEF OF [redacted]

LEGISLATIVE LIAISON STAFF.

JOHNSON CALLED SANDERS ON PRIVATE LINE AT 10:55AM 8 JUN 67.



SANDER Harold Barefoot, Jr., [illegible]
Dallas, Feb 5, 1925. s Harold [illegible]
May Elizabeth (Forrester) S. B.A. [illegible]
1949, LL.B., 1950; m. Jan [illegible]
1952; children—Janet Lea, Martha [illegible]
Frances, Harold Barefoot III. Admitted [illegible]
bar, 1950; asso. firm Storey, Sanders [illegible]
Armstrong, Dallas, 1950-52; partner [illegible]
& Sanders, 1953-61; U.S. atty. [illegible]
1961-65; asst. dep. atty. gen. [illegible]
1965-66, asst. atty. gen. [illegible]
lative counsel to the President of the [illegible]
1967-; Mer. Tex. Ho. of Reps. [illegible]
County, 1952-53; Democratic candidate [illegible]
gress, 1958. Served to lt. (j.g.) USNR, World
War II. Mem. Am. Fed. (bd. dirs. [illegible]
1963-; Distinguished Service award [illegible]
Dallas bar assns., State Bar Tex., Dallas [illegible]
World Affairs (bd. dirs. [illegible]), Tex. Law [illegible]
Assn. (pres. Dallas 1957-58), Blue Key, Phi
Delta Phi (Tal [illegible] Theta Sigma Alpha [illegible]
Club, Chaparral (Dallas), Home: 6425 Gaston Ave.,
Dallas (Church, [illegible] Office: The White House,
Washington.

Who's Who 68-69

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

92d CONGRESS

MISSISSIPPI

(Population, April 1, 1970, 2,322,549)

SENATORS

JAMES OLIVER EASTLAND, Democrat, of Doddsville, Miss.; born in Doddsville, Miss., November 28, 1904; Methodist; attended the University of Mississippi, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Alabama; moved to Forest, Miss., in 1905 and was reared in Scott County, Miss.; studied law, was admitted to the bar in 1927, and commenced practice in Forest, Miss.; also engaged in farming; member of the State house of representatives from Scott County, Miss., 1928–32; married Elizabeth Coleman in 1932; three daughters, Nell, Ann, and Sue, and one son, Woods Eugene; moved to Sunflower County, Miss., in 1934; appointed to the United States Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Hon. Pat Harrison, and served from June 30, 1941, to September 28, 1941, when a duly elected successor qualified; elected to the United States Senate on November 3, 1942, for the term beginning January 3, 1943; unopposed for the term beginning January 3, 1949; reelected for term beginning January 1955; reelected for term beginning January 3, 1961; reelected for term beginning January 10, 1967.

JOHN CORNELIUS STENNIS, Democrat, of De Kalb, Miss., was born in Kemper County, Miss., August 3, 1901, the son of Hampton Howell and Cornelia (Adams) Stennis; B.S. degree, Mississippi State University, 1923; LL.B. degree, University of Virginia Law School 1928; LL.D., Millsaps College, 1957; LL.D., University of Wyoming, 1968; LL.D., Mississippi College, 1969; member of Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Alpha Delta (legal), and Alpha Chi Rho fraternities; Presbyterian, Mason, Lion, Mississippi and American Bar Associations; elected Mississippi House of Representatives 1928–32; elected district prosecuting attorney, Sixteenth Judicial District, 1931 and 1935; appointed circuit judge, 1937, and elected 1938, 1942, 1946; elected United States Senator November 4, 1947; reelected 1952, 1958, 1964, and 1970; chairman, Armed Services Committee; member, Appropriations Committee and Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee; chairman, Select Committee on Standards and Conduct; married Coy Hines, 1929; two children, John Hampton and Mrs. Margaret S. Syme; a granddaughter, Jane Grey Syme, and two grandsons, John Stennis Syme and Hampton Hines Stennis.

REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST DISTRICT.—Counties: Attala, Bolivar, Calhoun, Carroll, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Clay, Leflore, Lowndes, Monroe, Montgomery, Oktibbeha, Sunflower, Washington, and Webster (15 counties). Population (1960), 467,351; estimated to July 1969, 470,800.

X

THOMAS GERSTLE ABERNETHY, Democrat, of Okolona, Miss.; born in Eupora, Webster County, Miss., May 16, 1903, the son of Thomas Franklin and Minnie Jinkins Abernethy; educated in the public schools of Eupora, Miss., the University of Alabama, Cumberland University (LL.B. 1924), and the University of Mississippi; admitted to bar in July 1924 and entered practice of law at Eupora, Miss., 1925; served as mayor of town of Eupora, 1927–29; moved to Okolona, Miss., in July 1929, where he has continued his practice; elected district attorney of the Third Judicial District of Mississippi, 1935, and reelected without opposition, 1939; Methodist, Mason, Shriner, Lambda Chi Alpha and Alpha Kappa Psi fraternities; married July 5, 1936, to Miss Alice Margaret Lamb, of State College, Miss.; two daughters, Margaret Gail, married to Arthur Warren Doty, and Alice Kay, married to James Leland Martin, and one son, Thomas Gerstle, Jr., married to Marjorie Anne Moore; elected November 3, 1942, to the 78th Congress; reelected to the 79th, 80th, 81st, 82d, 83d, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, and 92d Congresses.

MADE REMARKS ON LIBERTY IN CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

James M. Eastland Papers
James M. Eastland, Jr. Research Papers

92nd CONGRESS
1971 CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY

THIRTY-SECOND DISTRICT.—Portions of Los Angeles and Orange Counties; Los Angeles County area includes portions of the cities of Long Beach, Lakewood, and Bellflower, Orange County area includes city of Seal Beach, communities of Rossmoor, Leisure World, Sunset Beach, Surfside, and a portion of the city of Huntington Beach. Population (1960), 363,842, estimated to July 1969, 536,000.

CRAIG HOSMER, Republican, of Long Beach, Calif.; born in Brea, Calif., May 6, 1915, son of Chester C. and Mary Jane Hosmer; educated in public schools of California, University of California, A.B., 1937, University of Michigan Law School, University of Southern California Law School, J.D. 1940; attorney; active naval service from 1940 to 1946 in all war theaters; attorney for Atomic Energy Commission and special assistant United States district attorney at Los Alamos, N. Mex., during 1948; member, American Nuclear Society, Phi Kappa Psi fraternity, Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity; rear admiral, USNR; elected to the 83d Congress; reelected to the 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, and 92d Congresses; member of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.

THIRTY-THIRD DISTRICT.—San Bernardino County, except: Montclair; western portion of Ontario, southern portion of Fontana, Bloomington; Colton; eastern portion of Rialto; western portion of San Bernardino. Population (1960), 415,908; estimated to July 1969, 643,710.

JERRY L. PET… born in Phoenix, Ariz., July 18, 19… Pacific Union Col… California and U… McCumber; three … avocado); served … Air Transport Cu… Association (AFL-… Ill., 1946-50; profe… 1960-67; vice pre… elected to 90th Con… member of Ways a…

B4 Sunday, Sept. 15, 1974 THE W…



Washington Post

Craig Hosmer: "In the minority for 20 years."

…ornia; …, 1938, …ersity of Southern …e former Shirley …; rancher (citrus- …airline pilot, and …, Air Line Pilots …r airline, Chicago, …oard of councilors, …iversity, 1960-64; …d 92d Congresses;

THIRTY-FOURTH DIS… ANGELES Assembly … mated to July 1969, 61…

…d 60. COUNTY OF LOS …an (1960), 405,70…; esti…

RICHARD T. … Kemmerer, Wyo., … 1923; attended Con… sity of California at… World War II serv… Muriel Jenks April… member of Lions, … Chi Alpha and Ph… attorney at law; a… firm of Launer, C… November 6, 1962; …, Calif.; born in …, with family in …ge, A.A.; Univer- …ol, LL.B.; during the former Doris …, and Kimberly; …, Elks, Lambda …sembly 1957-62; member of law …e 88th Congress, …ngresses.

THIRTY-FIFTH DISTR… COUNTY OF SAN … (1…00, 433,357; estima…

…nbly districts 70 and …and 60. Population

JOHN G. SCHM… Wis., August 12, 19… Marquette Univers… California State Col… fighter and helicopte… instructor in philos… elected to the Calif… Local Government … Senate Finance Com… Committee; member, … Committee on Educa… …n in Milwaukee, …leh; graduate of …ity, B.S., 1952, …arine Corps jet …SMC Reserves; …a Ana College; …airman, Senate … Committee and Veterans Affairs …l Control, Joint …… Goals and Evaluation, and the Educational Innova-

MADE LIB. REMARKS

James M. Ethes, Jr. Research Papers

92d CONGRESS

Parish; Methodist; 33d degree Scottish Rite Mason; member El Karubah Shrine, Shreveport; Elk; member American Legion and 40 & 8; member, Lions Club; Kappa Sigma Social fraternity; married December 14, 1942, to former Miss Mary Ruth Carter; two children, David and Carol Jean; elected to the 87th Congress December 19, 1961; reelected to the 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, and 92d Congresses.

FIFTH DISTRICT.—PARISHES: Caldwell, Catahoula, Concordia, East Carroll, East Feliciana, Franklin, Jackson, Lincoln, Madison, Morehouse, Ouachita, Richland, St. Helena, Tensas, Union, West Carroll, and West Feliciana (17 parishes). Population (1960), 386,708, estimated to July 1969, 423,300.

OTTO ERNEST PASSMAN, Democrat, of Monroe, La.; born on a farm in Washington Parish, near Franklinton, La., June 27, 1900; of Irish-French-Holland Dutch extraction; married; owner of Passman Investment Co., Monroe, La.; served as officer in U.S. Navy during World War II; member, First Baptist Church, Monroe, La.; past State Commander, American Veterans of World War II, Inc.; member, American Legion; 33d degree Scottish Rite Mason; member, Red Cross of Constantine of York Rite of Freemasonry; past Grand Master, Grand Lodge of the State of Louisiana, Free and Accepted Masons; elected on November 5, 1946, to the 80th Congress; reelected to the 81st, 82d, 83d, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, and 92d Congresses.

SIXTH DISTRICT.—PARISHES: Ascension, East Baton Rouge, Livingston, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Washington (6 parishes). Population (1960), 327,051; estimated to July 1969, 473,000.

JOHN R. RARICK, Democrat, of Baton Rouge, La.; born in Waterford, Ind., January 23, 1924; has resided in Louisiana for over 20 years; attended Louisiana State University and Tulane, graduated from the Tulane Law School, admitted to practice law in Louisiana in 1949, juris doctor, 1949; Judge Rarick resigned as district judge, 20th Judicial District, to declare his candidacy for the 6th District; served in the U.S. Army for 3 years in World War II; received two Battle Stars for the Rhineland and Ardennes campaigns, Bronze Star, Purple Heart, and was also decorated by the Belgian Government; captured in the Battle of the Bulge, spent 4 months in a German prison camp from which he escaped and after 13 days made his way back to the American lines; 32d degree Mason, K.C.C.H.; Order of the Eastern Star; Shriner; Disabled American Veterans; American Legion; and Veterans of Foreign Wars; married Marguerite Pierce of New Orleans; three children; elected to the 90th Congress November 8, 1966; reelected to the 91st and 92d Congresses.

SEVENTH DISTRICT.—PARISHES: Acadia, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Jefferson Davis, St. Landry, St. Martin (wards 2, 3, 4, and 5), and Vermilion (3 parishes). Population (1970), 412,558.

EDWIN W. EDWARDS, Democrat, of Crowley, La.; born August 7, 1927, Marksville, Avoyelles Parish, La., son of Clarence W. Edwards and Agnes Bronillette Edwards; attended public schools of Marksville, graduated at age 16; graduated from Louisiana State University with LL.B. degree (converted to doctor of laws in 1968) in January 1949 at age 21; married to Elaine Schwartzenburg in 1949; four children: Anna Edwards Hensgens, Victoria Elaine, Stephen Randolph, and David Edwin; Catholic; practiced law in Crowley, Acadia Parish, since 1949, senior partner of law firm of Edwards, Edwards and Broadhurst; past president and member of Crowley Lions Club; past president and member of International Rice Festival; member of Greater Crowley Chamber of Commerce; past adjutant and member of American Legion, Acadia Post 15; major, Civil Air Patrol; elected to Crowley City council in 1954 and reelected in 1958; elected to Louisiana State Senate, 35th Senatorial District, in 1964; elected to U.S. Congress in special election in October 1965 and reelected to 90th Congress in 1966; served as member of Public Works Committee in 89th and 90th Congresses; honoree of the 1968 Rice Festival, Crowley, October 1968; reelected to 91st Congress in November 1968 with 85 percent of the total vote—the sixth highest percentage received by a member of the U.S. House of Representatives; reelected to 92d Congress November 3, 1970; elected Louisiana-Mississippi Delegations' Whip, January 1967, reelected 1969; assigned to the Judiciary Committee (Subcommittee No. 4 and Special Subcommittee on Submerged Lands) and Committee on Internal Security, January 1969.

MADE LIB. REMARKS

James M. Ernest, Jr. Research Papers

NOTES ON PHILIP ARMSTRONG - From trip to Norfolk over weekend 1-3 May, 1976

Weetie came over to Lucas's twice. She said children were very upset about the Penthouse story and were being questioned by their friends. I showed her the advance copy of next month's article. She said $50,000 was not correct, as the older children got $21,000, but only $19,000 net after nine years in trust because of trust charges and stock market losses.

She said that Philip kept a "Death Book" with detailed instruction on what to do in case he died. She confirms that he always said he would die before 40. The "Death Book" said: "Close out checking account, remove contents of safe deposit box, etc." It closed with, "Ignore all advice from friends, relatives and well-meaning neighbors. They don't know what the hell they are talking about. I do." Included in the book were undated letters ready to be mailed to insurance companies, Social Security Administration, VA, etc. She had to do nothing but sign and date the letters.

She mentioned that Philip was an incurable nail biter, with nails bitten down almost to the root.

She mentioned that Philip's father and several relatives were alcoholic and that she has warned the children not to follow their example, but she did not describe Philip as an alcoholic, although she did mention that he liked to drink.

He was good with his hands and built a lot of things around the house.

When Philip's body was returned to the U.S., the funeral director promised to call her as soon as the body was on the ground, but she happened to see the casket being wheeled off the airplane on the 11:00 news. Philip's body and Steve Toth's were both wheeled off in flag draped caskets. She could see the funeral director standing nearby. He finally called her at 0300 to tell her the body was here.

Government at first refused to pay cost of shipping Philip from DC to NF and back to DC, but funeral director got nasty and they agreed to pay, but only for shipment by train. Funeral director paid the difference himself (she says) to bring him by ambulance.

She let older children see Philip in coffin & was sorry she did.

She received notice that VP Hubert Humphrey would attend the funeral. She sent a telegram to the White House asking that he not attend. When I asked her why, she said that Philip would have sat up in his casket if Humphrey had come.

Philip really wanted to be buried at sea, but he settled for cremation and a non-religious burial service. He was a sincere atheist, although Weetie and kids are Catholic.

James M Ennes Jr. Research Papers

THE SACLANT STORY

The NATO Navies In The Atlantic

Seven weeks after the capitulation of Nazi Germany and six weeks before the defeat of Japan, representatives of 50 nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco.

The date was 26 Jun 1945, and the world hoped it had at last learned how to keep peace.

Within four years, 10 European countries found themselves faced by a threat, the nature of which necessitated a more specific protection than that afforded by the UN Charter.

The charter contained a provision stipulating the right of its members, individually or collectively, to defend themselves against possible armed attack. The 10 European nations turned to the United States and Canada to underwrite their pledge of mutual security and on 4 Apr 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

In those 45 months, from June 1945 to April 1949, several things happened to convince the 12 countries of the need for a regional defense alliance.

The defeat of two great military and industrial powers, Germany and Japan, had left an immense vacuum to the east and west of the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of such favorable circumstances, the Soviet Union made use of the combined strength of the Red Army and world communism to pursue an expansionist policy which was soon to threaten peace and collective security.

After the German surrender, the Western democracies, true to their wartime pledges and to public demand, began to demobilize. The U. S. and the United Kingdom quickly withdrew the bulk of their armed forces from Europe. They demobilized most of their troops, with the exception of occupation forces and units committed in other parts of the world.

The armed strength of the Allied Forces in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was about 5 million men. One year later, their armed strength was about 88[illegible]0.

The Soviet Union maintained its armed forces at a wartime level. Men under arms amounted to more than 4 million. And it maintained its war industries.

On the political side, the western powers tried conciliation. They made many efforts to reach agreements with the Soviets and to make the UN an effective instrument of peace. They met with obstruction.

Soviet territorial expansion under Stalin had already begun during the war with the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania, Northeastern Germany and Eastern Czechoslovakia, an area of about 180,000 square miles occupied by more than 23 million people.



Confronted with Soviet expansion, the free countries of Western Europe recognized a need to seek the means of guaranteeing their freedom and security.

On 4 Apr 1949, 12 nations established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 12 original signatories are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



Soviet ships and aircraft observing Operation Safari included the following types: left top, Kresta II cruiser; center, intelligence ship; bottom, Hormone helicopter; above, long-range reconnaissance Bear aircraft. Right: VADM John J. Shanahan watches a passing ship from the bridge of his flagship.



than ever before and the Soviet Navy's capabilities significantly improved, "readiness is the key," said Admiral Kidd.

Ocean Safari was specifically tasked with establishing control over a sea area in order to enable NATO's Striking Fleet Atlantic to come to the aid of a "threatened" NATO nation. Such exercises allow NATO commanders to assess the readiness of their forces and to improve that readiness.

Part of a 75-day deployment for U. S. crews, Ocean Safari served to demonstrate NATO's ability to carry out extended operations at sea in all weather conditions. In addition to putting plans and procedures to the test, the exercise also demonstrated the strength of NATO at sea.

The results—in the eyes of the NATO units participating—were impressive. Summing up the worth of Ocean Safari, the senior at-sea commander, Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, USN, said, "There is no substitute for sustained at-sea operations if you want to stay healthy."

The feature article on Ocean Safari covers the various roles of the U. S. Navy ships which participated in this exercise. Here's a listing of the other allied ships and units which took part in the operation.

BRITISH
HMS *Ark Royal* (CVA)
HMS *Danae* (FF)
HMS *Hermes* (CVS)
HMS *Blake* (CCH)
HMS *Galatea* (FF)
HMS *Devonshire* (DLG)
HMS *Eskimo* (FF)
HMS *Tartar* (FF)
RFA* *Regent* (REFS)
RFA *Lyness* (AVS)
RFA *Olmmeda* (AOFL)
RFA *Olwen* (AOFL)
RFA *Pearleaf* (AOS)
RFA *Olna* (AAFL)
HMS *Bacchante* (FF)
HMS *Sovereign* (SSN)
HMS *Finwhale* (SS)
HMS *Otter* (SS)
HMS *Osiris* (SS)
HMS *Juno* (FF)
HMS *Rorqual* (SS)

*Royal Fleet Auxiliary

THE NETHERLANDS
HNLMS *Evertsen* (FF)
HNLMS *Van Galen* (FF)
HNLMS *Tjerk Hiddes* (FF)
HNLMS *Isaac Sweers* (FF)
HNLMS *Zuiderkruis* (AOR)
HNLMS *Zwaardvis* (SS)
HNLMS *Tijgerhaai* (SS)
HNLMS *Dolfijn* (SS)

NORWEGIAN
HNOMS *Stavanger* (DE)
HNOMS *Kinn* (SSC)
HNOMS *Kunna* (SSC)

GERMAN
FGS *Schleswig-Holstein* (DD)
FGS *Lutjens* (DD)
FGS *Emsland* (AO)
FGS *U-18* (SSC)
FGS *U-19* (SSC)

CANADIAN
HMCS *Frazer* (FF)
HMCS *Nipigon* (FF)
HMCS *Skeena* (FF)
HMCS *Preserver* (AOR)

ALLIED AIRCRAFT
Norwegian F-5s (*Freedom Fighters*)
Norwegian F-104s (*Starfighters*)
British *Buccaneers*
British *Canberras*
British *Nimrods*
British *Vulcans*
German F-104s (*Starfighters*)
German *Atlantics*
Dutch *Neptunes*

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

444 PRESIDENT OF COURT

U.S.A.

KELLY, REAR-ADMIRAL, JAMES WOODROW (CHAPLAIN CORPS) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief of Chaplains, Bureau of Naval Personnel (July 1965)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1913
EDUCATION: 1933 Ouachita College, Arkadelphia, Arkansas; 1952 Southern Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky
DATE OF COMMISSION: 22nd March, 1942
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st April, 1963
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Arlington Annex, Washington, DC 20370
HOME ADDRESS: Lonoke, Arkansas

U.K.

KEMPSELL, LIEUTENANT K. D., ROYAL NAVY
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commanding Officer, HMS Nurton 9 January, 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 6 January, 1931
EDUCATION: Spiers School, Beith
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Commissioned 1 December, 1956; Lieutenant 1 October, 1962
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 1st Command
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENT OF NOTE: Clyde Diving Officer; Scotland Command Bomb and Mine Disposal Staff Officer, Dartmouth; 1st Lieutenant HMS Kirkuton
PRIVATE ADDRESS: 21 Muirwood Drive, Currie, Midlothian *Telephone:* 031 449 2640

U.S.A.

KIDD, REAR-ADMIRAL ISAAC CAMPBELL, JNR., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 12 (August 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1919
EDUCATION: 1941 Naval Academy; 1961 National War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 19th December, 1941
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st December, 1965
COMMANDS: 1952-1953 Ellyson DMS 19; 1956-1958 Barry DD 933; 1961-1962 Destroyer Division 322; 1962 Destroyer Division 18.
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: FPO New York 09501
HOME ADDRESS: Annapolis, Maryland

U.S.A.

KING, REAR-ADMIRAL ED REUBEN, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Middle East Force (June 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1913
EDUCATION: 1936 Naval Academy; 1956 National War College; 1963 Naval Postgraduate School
DATE OF COMMISSION: 4th June, 1936
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st September, 1964
COMMANDS: 1943-1945 Black DD 666; 1949-1951 Massey DD 778; 1953-1955 John S. McCain DL 3; 1958 1959 Tuckee AO 147, 1959-1960 Destroyer Squadron 2[illegible] 1964-1965 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 8; 1965 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 12
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: (Persian Gulf) FPO New York 09501
HOME ADDRESS: 1[illegible] Beach Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee

U.S.A.

KING, REAR-ADMIRAL JEROME HENRY, JNR., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Anti-Submarine Warfare Group 1 (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1919
EDUCATION: 1941 Yale University; 1949 and 1951 Naval Postgraduate School; 1958 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 17th June, 1941
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 8th April, 1968
COMMANDS: 1953-1955 Bache DDE 470; 1960-1961 Destroyer Division 601; 1961-1962 Nuclear Weapons Training Center, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; 1962-1963 Yellowstone AD 27; 1965-1966 Destroyer Squadron 1
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: FPO San Francisco, California 96601

U.S.A.

KING, REAR-ADMIRAL THOMAS STARR, JNR., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION:
Deputy Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service (July 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1914
EDUCATION: 1936 Naval Academy; 1945 Naval Postgraduate School; 1952 Naval War College.
DATE OF COMMISSION: 4th June, 1936
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1964
COMMANDS: 1948-1949 Winslow AG 127; 1954-1955 Destroyer Division 202; 1959-1961 Observation Island EAG 154; 1961-1962 Destroyer Squadron 5 and Destroyer Division 51; 1962-1963 Destroyer Flotilla 5; 1965-1966 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 11
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Navy Department, Washington, DC 20390
HOME ADDRESS: Guemes Island, Anacortes, Washington

U.S.A.

KINNEY, REAR-ADMIRAL SHELDON HOARD.
CURRENT DUTY STATION:
Assistant Chief for Education & Training, Bureau [illegible] 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1918
EDUCATION: 1941 Naval Academy, 1948 Na[illegible] 1960 National War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 7th February, 1941
PROMOTED TO: Rear-Admiral 1st July, 1967
COMMANDS: 1943 Edsall DE 129; 1944 Bron[illegible] Taylor DDE 468; 1956-1958 Mitscher DL [illegible] 144; 1963 Amphibious Squadron 12, 1967-[illegible] 11
MAJOR AWARDS: Navy Cross
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Arlington Annex, Washin[illegible]
HOME ADDRESS: 661 South [illegible]s Rabbits Avenue

U.S.A.

KIRN, REAR-ADMIRAL LOUIS JOSEPH [illegible], NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: US Defence Attac[illegible] Naval Attaché for Air, United Kingdom (April 19[illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH: 1908
EDUCATION: 1932 Naval Academy; 1939 [illegible] 1948 Armed Forces Staff College; 1952 Naval W[illegible] Defense College, London
DATE OF COMMISSION: 2nd June, 1932
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st May, 1959
COMMANDS: 1941-1942 Scouting Squadron [illegible] Squadron 4; 1943 Bombing Squadron 92 [illegible] 1957-1958 Randolph CVA 15, 1959-1960 Carri[illegible] Carrier Division 5; 1963-1964 Key West Force
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: (London) Box 56, FPO N[illegible]
HOME ADDRESS: Milwaukee, Wisconsin

U.S.A.

KOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE PRICE [illegible], NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commandant, N[illegible] DC (June 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1910
EDUCATION: 193[illegible] Naval Academy, 1949 Naval [illegible]
DATE OF COMMISSION: 29th May, 1934
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1961
COMMANDS: 1942-1943 Headquarters Squ[illegible] 1944-1945 Humboldt AVP 21; 1955-1957 Naval [illegible] Oahu, Hawaii; 1958-1959 Fleet Air Wing 3; Flee[illegible] (NATO); 1959-1961 Naval Air Station Nort[illegible] Carrier Division 18; Anti-Submarine Carrier Gro[illegible] Wings, Atlantic Fleet; Fleet Air Wing 5, 19[illegible] Reserve Training, Glenview, Illinois; 1965-1[illegible] 1966-1969 US Naval Forces, Southern Comma[illegible] Naval District; additional duty: Commander, Sea Frontier & Commander, Panama Sector, Ne[illegible]
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Navy Yard Washington, [illegible]
HOME ADDRESS: Ruxton, Maryland

ARGENTINA

KOLLIKER FRERS, CAPTAIN R., ARGENTI[illegible]
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commanding Offi[illegible] January, 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 25 June, 1923
EDUCATION: Matura, Switzerland; Argentine [illegible] and Staff College; Naval War College (Superior [illegible]
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Captain 1 July[illegible]
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 1957 Co[illegible] Boat Flotilla; 1965 Commanding Officer Destro[illegible]
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Naval Air Force 1 1967-1968
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Base Aeronaval Cte Es[illegible]

U.S.A.

KOSSLER, REAR-ADMIRAL HERMAN JOSEP[illegible]
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commandant, 6t[illegible] duty: Commander, Naval Base, Charleston, Sout[illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH: 1911
EDUCATION: 1934 Naval Academy; 1955 Nati[illegible]
DATE OF COMMISSION: 31st May, 1934
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1961
COMMANDS: 1943-1946 Cavalla SS 244, 1950-52; 1955-1956 Sanborn APA 193; 1956-1[illegible] 1959-1961 Amphibious Squadron 10; 1964-1 Fleet; 1966-1968 Naval Forces, Philippines. C[illegible] Representative, Philippines
MAJOR AWARD: Navy Cross
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Naval Base, Charleston.
HOME ADDRESS: 31 Alton Parkway, Portsmo[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

...AL ADDRESS: Vallejo, California 94592
ADDRESS Washington, DC

...MAN, REAR ADMIRAL MASON BEHR, US NAVY
...ENT DUTY STATION
...ander, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet (March 1967); addi-...uty, Commander, Training Command, Pacific Fleet (June 1969)
...OF BIRTH 1914
...ATION 1935 Naval Academy; 1942 Naval Postgraduate School, ...aval War College, 1957 National War College
...COMMISSIONED 6th June, 1935
...OTED TO Rear Admiral 1st July, 1963
...ANDS 1948-1949 William R. Rush DD 714 1952-1954 Conecuh ...110; 1959-1961 Destroyer Squadron 16, 1963-1964 Cruiser-...er Flotilla 2
...AL ADDRESS San Diego, California 92132
...ADDRESS: Oak Park, Illinois

...GAL
...S, REAR ADMIRAL J C RIBEIRO, PORTUGUESE NAVY
...ATIONS: MMp/sd 1959; MM/mm 1a Cl. 1968, 2MM/mm 2a. Cl. ...962; MCp/ce 1963; MSNp/cah 1941, MC/I 1958, MCp/IDH 1960
...NT APPOINTMENT Comandante Chefe das Forcas Armadas de ...erde 9 December, 1967; Comandante Naval de Cabo Verde 29 ...er 1967
...OF BIRTH 8 October, 1908
...TION: EN. Escola Naval 1927; Av. Especializaçao em Aviacao ...CENG. Curso Elementar Naval de Guerra 1948, NCSO. Curson ...e Naval da Navegaçao 1956, ASAP. Curson Tactica Anti-Submarine ...al 1956; CSNG. Curson Superior Naval de Guerra 1962
...OF PROMOTIONS Aspirante Marinha 1927; Guarda Marinha ...o. Tenente 1932; Io. Tenente 1938; Capitao Tenente 1953; Capita...nte 1956; Capita de mar et Guerra 1961; Commodore 1965, Rear ...1968
...AL COMMANDS AT SEA Comandante do Centro de Aviacao ...Lisboa 1937; Comandante do NRP Macau 1939; Comandante de ...de Aviaçao Naval de Macau 1941; Comandante do NRP. DAO ...omandante de NRP Joao de Lisboa 1957; Comandante da Defesa ...) de Lisboa 1959; Comandante Naval dos Acores 1965; Coman-...efe das Forças Armadas e Comandante Naval de Cabo Verde 1967
...PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Viajem Lisboa-Calshot-...um Hidro-aviao Blackburn-Shark 1936; Chefe Brigada Aerea da ...Hidrografica de Cabo Verde 1946; Chefe Brigada Aerea de Missao ...ografica da Guiné Portuguesa 1948; Capitao do Porto de Macau ...apitao do Porto de Lisboa 1967
...AL ADDRESS. Ministerio da Marinha. *Telephone:* 368961 Lisboa 2
...ADDRESS: Rua Dom Constantino de Braganca 45 *Telephone:* ...Lisboa 3;

...A, REAR-ADMIRAL S.
...ATIONS: Fifth Class Order of the Sacred Treasure; Sixth Class ...the Rising Sun
...T APPOINTMENT: Chief Supply and Accounts Division, Mari-...f Office 20 January, 1968
...F BIRTH: 12 January, 1917
...TION: Graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, ...nd Accounts March 1937
...OF PROMOTIONS: Lieutenant Commander October 1953; ...der February 1955; Captain July 1962; Rear Admiral January ...

...US APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Staff Officer of Self Defence ...uary 1955; Chief, Supply & Accounts Division, Yokosuka ...District Headquarters August 1960; Chief, Account Sect... ...Staff Office January 1964; Deputy Chief, Supply and Accounts ...MSO January 1966
...L ADDRESS: Maritime Staff Office, Japan Defence Agency, ...asaka, Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan
...E ADDRESS: 1-28 Hanamidai, Hodogaya-Ku, Yokohama-Shi, ...-Ken, Japan

...REAR-ADMIRAL WALTER DONALD, US NAVY
...T DUTY STATION: Director, Budget and Reports, Navy Comp-...ly 1968)
...F BIRTH: 1917
...ION: 1941 Naval Academy; 1948 Naval Postgraduate School and ...53 Armed Forces Staff College; 1959 Naval War College
...OMMISSIONED: 7th February, 1941
...ED TO: Rear Admiral 20th January, 1968
...DS: 1953-1954 Kenneth D. Bailey DDR 713; 1959-1960 ... Division 302; additional duty Destroyer Squadron 30; ...3 Yosemite AD 19; 1965-1966 Destroyer Squadron 8
...L ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350
...DDRESS: 703 South 6th Street, Laramie, Wyoming

**** COMCARDIV 4

(AMERICA'S CARRIER DIVISION)

Sub-

hing

SPAIN
GARCIA-PARREO, y KADEN
DECORATIONS Campaign Medal 1936-1939; Military Medal, War Cross, Naval Cross of Merit, white badge, 2nd Class 1951 Cross of "san Hermenegildo" 1958; Plaque of "San Hermenegildo" 1968, Order of "Infante D. Henrique of Portugal" 1960
PRESENT APPOINTMENT Naval Attache to the Embassy of Spain 6 September, 1968
DATE OF BIRTH 20 January, 1916
EDUCATION Colegio de Nuestra señora del Pilar, Madrid Spain; Escuela Naval Militar, San Fernando, Cádiz, Spain
DATES OF PROMOTIONS Lieutenant Junior Grade 11 November 1939, Lieutenant 1 September, 1943, Lieutenant Commander 15 April, 1948, Commander 16 June, 1959 Captain 24 November, 1967
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA 1944-1945 "L.T.-22"; 1955-1956 "Meteoro"; 1960-1961 "Ulloa"; 1962-1963 "Legazpi"
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE 1949-1951 Aide to the Minister of the Spanish Navy
OFFICIAL ADDRESS 1669 Columbia Road, NW-111, Washington, DC 20009. *Telephone* 387-7612
PRIVATE ADDRESS 5916 Wellhonding Road, N.W., Washington, DC 20016

U.S.A.
GARRETT, REAR ADMIRAL (SELECTEE), FRANCIS LEONARD, (CHAPLAIN CORPS) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Fleet Chaplain, Atlantic Fleet (July 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH 1919
EDUCATION Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Caroline 1940, Emory University Georgia 1943; Wofford College 1967
DATE OF COMMISSION 11th February 1944
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral selected for promotion in June 196...
OFFICIAL ADDRESS. Norfolk, Virginia 23511
COMMANDS: Force Chaplain, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force 1965-1966

U.S.A.
GAY, REAR-ADMIRAL DONALD, JNR. (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Fleet Air Wings, Pacific Fleet (November 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH 1914
EDUCATION. 1937 Naval Academy; 1950 Armed Forces Staff College
FIRST COMMISSIONED. 3rd June, 1937
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1964
COMMANDS: 1947-1948 Fighting Squadron 38; 1948 Fighting Squadron 41; 1952-1953 Carrier Air Group 3; 1959-1960 Floyds Bay AVP 40; 1960-1961 Ranger CVA 61, 1963-1964 Carrier Division 18
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California 94035
HOME ADDRESS: BOX [illegible] Oak Harbor, Washington

U.S.A.
GAYLER, VICE-ADMIRAL NOEL ARTHUR, (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Director, National Security Agency (1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1914
EDUCATION: 1935 Naval Academy
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 6th June, 1935
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1961; Vice Admiral 28th September, 1967
MAJOR AWARDS: Navy Cross with 2 gold stars in lieu of second and third Navy Crosses
COMMANDS: 1944-1945 Fighter Squadron 12; 1951-1954 Air Development Squadron 3; 1956-1957 Greenwich Bay AVP 41; 1959-1960 Ranger CVA 61; 1962-1963 Carrier Division 20
OFFICIAL ADDRESS. Fort Meade, Maryland
HOME ADDRESS Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska 68113

U.S.A.
GEIS, REAR-ADMIRAL LAWRENCE RAYMOND (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief of Information (September 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1916
EDUCATION: 1939 Naval Academy; 1959 National War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 1st June, 1939
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1965
COMMANDS: 1947-1948 Fighting Squadron 3A; 1948-1949 Fighting Squadron 31; 1951-1952 Carrier Air Group 4; 1957-1958 Air Development Squadron 3; 1961-1962 Guadalupe Bay AVP 38; 1962-1963 Forrestal CVA 59; 1967-1968 Carrier Division 4
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350
HOME ADDRESS: Arlington, Virginia

Research Papers
James M. Barnes, Jr.

CO USS AMERICA

APRIL 1977: SAW A LETTER IN TOKAY SIGNED BY VICE-ADMIRAL ENGEL NOW DEPUTY CINCPAC.

U.S.A.
ENGEL, REAR-ADMIRAL BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commender, 14th Coast Guard District, Honolulu (April 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH 1914
EDUCATION 1938 Coast Guard Academy; 1957 Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED 2nd June, 1938
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st May, 1967
COMMANDS: 1953-1955 Air Detachment, Kodiak; 1955-1957 Air Station, Traverse City; 1960-1963 Coast Guard Air Station, Brooklyn

U.S.A.
ENGEN, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) DONALD DAVENPORT, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Head Aviation Plans Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (September 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH 1924
EDUCATION 1948 University of California at Los Angeles; 1951 General Line School; 1966 Naval Justice School; Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED 9th June, 1943
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral, selected for promotion on 6th June, 1969
MAJOR AWARDS: Navy Cross
COMMANDS 1960-1961 Fighter Squadron 21; 1962-1963 Carrier Air Group 11; 1964-1965 Kalmai AE 16; 1966-1967 America CVA 66
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington DC 20350
HOME ADDRESS 1740 Casa Grande, Pasadena, California

U.S.A.
ENGER, REAR-ADMIRAL WALTER MELVIN (CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command & Chief of Civil Engineers of the Navy (September 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1941
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 27th August, 1941
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 10th August, 1965
HOME ADDRESS: 1200 N. Nash Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209

U.S.A.
ENSEY, VICE-ADMIRAL LOT, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Director, J-4 (Logistics), Joint Chiefs of Staff (September 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1908
EDUCATION: 1930 Naval Academy; 1948 Armed Forces Staff College; 1952 Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 5th June, 1930
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st February, 1958; Vice Admiral 1st September, 1964
COMMANDS: 1942 Upshur DD 144; 1942-1943 Curry DD 817; 1944-1945 Blue DD 744; 1948-1949 Destroyer Division 172; 1949 Destroyer Division 112; 1954-1955 Achernar AKA 53; 1955-1955 Destroyer Squadron 2; 1962-1964 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 9
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
HOME ADDRESS: Quarters "A", Navy Yard, Washington DC

U.S.A.
EPES, REAR-ADMIRAL HORACE HARDAWAY, JNR., (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief, Far East Division, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff
DATE OF BIRTH, 1917
EDUCATION: 1937 College of Engineering, New York University; 1948 General Line School; 1959 Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 26th October, 1940
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st October, 1966
COMMANDS: 1948-1951 Fighter Squadron 33; 1953-1954 Air Development Squadron 5; 1954 Carrier Air Group 15; 1961-1963 Thetis Bay LPH 6; 1963-1964 Kitty Hawk CVA 63; 1967-1968 Carrier Division 1
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
HOME ADDRESS: 115 Loring Avenue, Pelham, New York

U.S.A.
ERLY, REAR-ADMIRAL ROBERT BROUSSARD, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans & Operations, Atlantic Fleet (June 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1914
EDUCATION: 1937 Naval Academy; 1953 Armed Forces Staff College; 1963 National War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 3rd June, 1937

U.S.A.
ETTER, REAR-ADMIRAL H[illegible] MC, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Assistant C[hief], Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (May 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH 1915
EDUCATION 1940 Duke University; 1956-[illegible]
FIRST COMMISSIONED 20th March, 1941
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st [illegible]
OFFICIAL ADDRESS Potomac A[illegible], Wa[illegible]
HOME ADDRESS 27 North Washington[illegible] nsylvania

UNITED KINGDOM
EVANS, REAR-ADMIRAL G. H. ROYAL [illegible]
DECORATIONS C B 1968
PRESENT APPOINTMENT Naval Deputy Europe, 1966
DATE OF BIRTH 15 January, 1917
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: [illegible] Admiral
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA HMS Nepal 1949-1950; HMS Modeste 1954-1955
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS [illegible] Recruiting, 1963-1964
OFFICIAL ADDRESS Allied Forces North
Telephone [illegible] 90
PRIVATE ADDRESS: Vale Cottage, North B[illegible]

U.S.A.
FAHY, REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD JOSE[illegible] US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commander [illegible] (May 1966)
DATE OF BIRTH 1910
EDUCATION 1934 Naval Academy; 1943 N[illegible]
FIRST COMMISSIONED 31st May, 1934
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st April, 19[illegible]
COMMANDS: 1944 Plunger SS 179; 1950-1[illegible] Laboratory New London, Connecticut; 1962[illegible] yard Vallejo, California; 1965-1966 San Fra[illegible]
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Main Navy Building
HOME ADDRESS: 1454 Shakespear Avenue

U.S.A.
FAIRFAX, REAR-ADMIRAL EUGENE GEO[illegible] US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander additional duty: Commandant, 17th Naval D[illegible] Alaska (July 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1916
EDUCATION: 1939 Naval Academy; 1948 Na[illegible]
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 1st June, 1939
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August [illegible]
COMMANDS: 1943-1945 Fighting Squadron [illegible] Squadron 98; 1946 Fighting Squadron 11; 1[illegible] 1961-1962 Ticonderoga CVA 14
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: FPO Seattle, Washington
HOME ADDRESS 1701 East Blount Street, Se[illegible]

U.K.
FARQUHARSON-ROBERTS, S. M.,
DECORATIONS: OBE 1959
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: In command H[illegible] 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 3 June, 1922
EDUCATION: Brighton College Courses [illegible]
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Lieutenant [illegible] Commander 30 June, 1955; Captain 31 Dec[illegible]
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA [illegible] 1952-1953; Berry Head 1969
PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS Joined first ship mainly destroyers in Atlantic, FAS[illegible] Forces; 1954-1955 Senior Instructor [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

.S.A.

AMAGE, REAR ADMIRAL, JAMES DAVID (NAVAL AVIATOR)
URRENT DUTY STATION Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Opera-ons, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (October 1967)
ATE OF BIRTH 1916
DUCATION 1939 Naval Academy, 1958 National War College, 1963 aval Postgraduate School
ATE OF COMMISSION 1st June, 1939
ROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st July, 1967
OMMANDS 1943-1944 Bombing Squadron 10 1944-1946 Bombing uadron 98, 1952-1954 Carrier Air Group 19, 1954-1955 Composite uadron 3, Transitional Training Unit, Pacific Fleet, 1958-1960 Heavy tack Wing 1, 1960-1961 Salisbury Sound AV 13, 1963-1964 Independ-nce CVA 62, 1967 Fleet Air, Whidbey Fleet Air Wing 4
FFICIAL ADDRESS (Pearl Harbor), FPO San Francisco, California 810
OME ADDRESS Honolulu, Hawaii

.S.A.

AMAGE, VICE-ADMIRAL LAWSON PATERSON
URRENT DUTY STATION Commander, Military Sea Transportation rvice (March 1967)
ATE OF BIRTH 1909
DUCATION 1931 Naval Academy, 1939 Naval Postgraduate School, 50 Armed Forces Staff College, 1955 Naval War College
ATE OF COMMISSION 4th June 1931
ROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st July 1956, Vice Admiral 15th July, 63
OMMANDS 1942-1943 Trout SS 202 1943-1944 Parche SS 384-46-1947 Submarine Division 52, 1951-1953 Submarine Squadron 6; 53-1954 Rankin AKA 103, 1958-1959 Cruiser Division 2, 1964-1966 st Fleet
AJOR AWARDS Medal of Honor, Navy Cross with Gold Star in lieu of ond award
FFICIAL ADDRESS Washington, D.C. 20390
OME ADDRESS New London, Connecticut

ITED KINGDOM

PER, VICE-ADMIRAL R. G., ROYAL NAVY
CORATIONS C.B. 1968
ESENT APPOINTMENT Director General Ships 1 May 1968, Chief al Engineer Officer 21 February 1968
TE OF BIRTH 27 August 1915
UCATION RNC Dartmouth, RNEC Keyham and RN C Greenwich
TES OF PROMOTIONS 1960 Rear Admiral 1968 Vice Admiral
NCIPAL APPOINTMENTS AT SEA 1940 Senior Engineer, HMS nburgh until sunk in 1942, 1952-1954 Engineer Officer, HMS Birming-(Korea)
HER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE Appointments in ualty Design Dept 1946-1951, 1955-1957, 1962-1964, IDC 1958; mand of HMS Caledonia Apprentice Training 1959-1960; Director of ne Engineering 1966-1968
ICIAL ADDRESS Block 'G', Ministry of Defence Offices, Foxhill,

VATE ADDRESS Innocks Lodge, Hinton Charterhouse, near Bath

A.

P, REAR ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) WILLIAM THEODORE, (NAVAL ATOR)
RENT DUTY STATION Commander, Patrol Force, 7th Fleet mander, US Taiwan Patrol Force, Commander, Fleet Air Wing 1 (Jul) Authorized to assume title of Rear Admiral
E OF BIRTH 1920
CATION 1943 Naval Academy, 1962 Naval War College; 19 Naval raduate School
E OF COMMISSION 19th June 1942
MOTED TO Rear Admiral, selection approved 6th June, 19 NANDS 1958-1960 Patrol Squadron 10; 1964-1965 Rankin AKA 1966-1967 Fleet Air Wing 3
CIAL ADDRESS: FPO Seattle, Washington 98770
E ADDRESS: 238 North Munn Avenue, East Orange, New Jersey

BONE, CAPTAIN A. R., ROYAL NAVY
ORATIONS: AFC 1951
ENT APPOINTMENT: HMS Dido 1 June, 1968
E OF BIRTH: 19 April, 1923
CATION: Saltley Grammar School, Birmingham
CIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 897 Squadron 1953-1955; Loch ort 1959-1960; Dido 1968-1969
ES OF PROMOTIONS: Commander 31 December, 1958; Captain 31 mber, 1964
ER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENT OF NOTE: Commanding Officer, Squadron 1953-1955; JSSC 1958-1959; Commander (Air), Lossie-h 1961-1962; Commander (Air), Ark Royal 1962-1963; CSO (air) to e 1965-1967
CIAL ADDRESS: HMS Dido, BFPO, Ships
ATE ADDRESS: 32 Monckton Road, Alverstoke, Gosport, Hants.

NIGERIA

AWF, CAPTAIN R. J., NIGERIAN NAVY
DECORATIONS M.B.E. 1953, O.B.E. 1966
PRESENT APPOINTMENT Chief of Staff (N.H.Q.) January 1968
DATE OF BIRTH 14 July 1925
EDUCATION St. Aloysius College, Chelsea College of Technology and Science
DATES OF PROMOTIONS Commander 28 January, 1965, Ag. Captain 13 April, 1968
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA 1957-1959 Survey Ship Pathfinder, 1960 NNS Nigeria (Algerine)
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE Commander of Naval Base, Apapa 1964-1969
OFFICIAL ADDRESS Naval Headquarters, Apapa *Telephone*: 45194
PRIVATE ADDRESS Naval Headquarters, Apapa *Telephone*: 46841

U.S.A.

REA, REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM FREELAND, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commander, 9th Coast Guard District, Cleveland (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH 1918
EDUCATION 1938 Mississippi State College, 1941 Coast Guard Academy
FIRST COMMISSIONED 19th December, 1941
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st July, 1968
COMMANDS 1953-1954 Kolmer, 1958-1960 Tamaroa, 1964-1967 Marine Inspection Office, New York

U.S.A.

REICH, REAR ADMIRAL ELI THOMAS
CURRENT DUTY STATION Deputy Comptroller of the Navy (October 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH 1913
EDUCATION 1935 Naval Academy; 1950 Armed Forces Staff College 1956 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
DATE OF COMMISSION 6th June 1935
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st February 1963
COMMANDS 1944 Sealion SS 315; 1945 Compton DD 705; 1943-1944 Officer-in-charge, Submarine Functional Training Unit Naval Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey 1951-1953 Standard DD 556 1956-1957 Submarine Squadron 8; 1957-1958 Airmill AC 56; 1960-1961 Canberra CAG 2; 1965-1967 Anti-Submarine Warfare Group 5
MAJOR AWARDS Navy Cross with two Gold Stars in lieu of subsequent awards
OFFICIAL ADDRESS The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20350
HOME ADDRESS 2810 36th Place N.W., Washington, D.C.

U.S.A.

RENKEN, REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY ALGERNON
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commandant, 9th Naval District (September 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH 1908
EDUCATION: Naval Academy 1931; 1939 General Line School, 1945 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 4th June, 1931
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st October, 1959
COMMANDS 1942-1944 Hambleton DMS 20, 1949-1950 Destroyer Division 101, 1955-1956 Mt. McKinley AGC 7; 1956-1957 Northampton CLC 1; 1960-1962 Service Squadron 3; 1965-1967 Service Force, Atlantic Fleet
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Great Lakes, Illinois 60088
HOME ADDRESS: 5924 Oak Place, Bethesda, Maryland

SWEDEN

RHZBORG, COMMODORE Rolf Sixon, ROYAL SWEDISH NAVY
DECORATIONS: R.S.O.; LKrVA; LKOS
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: C-in-C Royal Swedish Naval College 1969
EDUCATION: Staff course MHS
DATE OF PROMOTIONS: 1943 Sub-Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander 1952; Commander 1960; 1963 Captain; 1969 Commodore
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 1950, 1952, 1953 Captain S/M; 1964-1965 Captain S/M Flotilla
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Teacher in Naval Tactics; Royal Sw Naval Academy; Head of Planning Division Naval Staff 1966-1969
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Royal Swedish Naval College, 183 03 Taby, Sweden *Telephone*: 08/766 07 40
PRIVATE ADDRESS Ormvägen 38, 181 33 Lidingö Sweden

U.S.A.

RICE, REAR-ADMIRAL JOSEPH ENOCH (ENGINEERING DUTY)
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command (May 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1914
EDUCATION: 1936 Naval Academy; 1944 Naval Postgraduate School
DATE OF COMMISSION: 4th June, 1936
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st May, 1964
COMMANDS: Industrial Manager, 10th Naval District 1952-1954; 1961-1964 Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Industrial Manager, 4th Naval District; 1964-1965 Industrial Manager, Potomac River Naval Command; 1965-1966 Industrial Manager/Commander, Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Center and Assistant Chief, Bureau of Ships for Shore Electronics, Naval District, Washington, D.C.
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Main Navy Building, Washington, DC 20360
HOME ADDRESS: 903 [illegible]

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr. R
Jam

HO'S WHO

RIES, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) EDWIN ELIOT, (SUPPLY
US NAVY
NT DUTY STATION Director of Procurement Office of the
Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Logistics), additional duty
of Procurement Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
(Procurement and Production) (June 1967)
OF BIRTH 1921
TION 1943 Duke University, 1950 Stanford University, 1967
College
F COMMISSION 31st March, 1942
OTED TO Rear Admiral selected for promotion in June 1969
AL ADDRESS Washington, DC

T, REAR-ADMIRAL ROBERT WARING, US NAVY
ENT DUTY STATION Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School,
ey, additional duty Director Naval Management Systems Center
ongraduate School (October 1967)
OF BIRTH 1915
ATION 1938 Naval Academy, 1945 Naval Academy, Naval Post-
e School, 1947 Naval Training School, Massachusetts Institute of
logy, 1958 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
OF COMMISSION 2nd June, 1938
OTED TO Rear Admiral 1st June, 1965
ANDS 1952-1954 Taylor DDE 468, 1958-1959 Destroyer Division
959-1961 Atlantic Fleet ASW School, Norfolk, Virginia, 1961-1962
yer Squadron 25, 1967 Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 4
ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

EALAND
ONALD, SURGEON CAPTAIN J.
RATIONS Honorary Physician to the Queen (February 1963)
ENT APPOINTMENT Director of Naval Medical Services (June
OF BIRTH 24 January, 1915
ATION Bayble Public School, Nicholson Institute, Aberdeen
uity
S OF PROMOTIONS Surgeon Lieutenant 1st class 1 March, 1940;
Lieutenant Commander 1951 Commander, 1963 Captain
R PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE Surgeon Lieutenant of
Ajax during period of N. Sea, Greece 1940-1947 PMO Royalist
ZS 1958-1960
CIAL ADDRESS RNZN Hospital Auckland 9 NZ
ATE ADDRESS Rangimsana Oban Road, Brawn's Bay, Auckland

ED KINGDOM
ONALD CAPTAIN R.D.
ORATIONS C.B.E. 1967
ENT APPOINTMENT HMS Galatea 1968 Captain (D) 1st DS,
mber, 1969
E OF BIRTH 25 Februa. 1921
CATION Fettes College
ES OF PROMOTIONS 1957 Commander, 1965 Captain
CIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA 1954-1956 HMS Leeds Castle;
-1959 S O 104th Minesweeping Squadron, 1961-1964 HMS Fal-
th Captain (D) Londonderry Squadron 1968-1969
ER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE Commander Naval
er, Borneo 1965-1966
ICIAL ADDRESS HMS Galatea, BFPO Ships
VATE ADDRESS Spinner Ash, Tilmore, Petersfield, Hants.

A.
CK, VICE-ADMIRAL, WILLIAM PADEN, US NAVY
RRENT DUTY STATION Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
npower and Reserve Affairs) (1968)
E OF BIRTH 1915
UCATION 1937 Naval Academy, 1944 West Coast Sound School, San
o, 1956 National War College, 1964 George Washington University
E OF COMMISSION 3rd June, 1937
OTED TO Rear Admiral, 1st July, 1964; Vice Admiral 28th
ary, 1969
MANDS Woodworth DD 460 1944-1946; 1949-1950 Richard B.
erson DD 786; 1956-1957 Destroyer Division 22; 1961-1962 Destroyer
adron 28, Destroyer Division 281; 1963-1966 Chief of Information,
artment of the Navy; 1966-1967 Amphibious Group 2; 1967-1968
of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy
E ADDRESS: 1109 Gaillard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22304

CKAY, CAPTAIN I. S. S., ROYAL NAVY
ESENT APPOINTMENT: Captain (D) Dartmouth Training Squadron,
S Eastbourne December 1967
TE OF BIRTH: 11 September, 1924
UCATION: Nautical College, Pangbourne
TES OF PROMOTIONS: Commander June 1959 Captain June 1965

U.S.A.
MACPHERSON, REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT ANTHONY (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commandant, 8th Naval District (September, 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH 1910
EDUCATION 1933 Naval Academy, 1949 Armed Forces Staff College 1953 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
DATE OF COMMISSION 1st June, 1933
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st July, 1961
COMMANDS 1942-1943 Observation Squadron 4, 1956-1957 Cape Esperance T CVU 88, 1957-1959 Hancock CVA 19, 1962-1964 US Taiwan Patrol Force/Fleet Air Wing 1, 1964-1965 Anti-Submarine Warfare Group 5, 1965-1968 Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training, NAS, Corpus Christi, Texas, additional duty Commandant 8th Naval District

U.S.A.
MAHIN, REAR ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) HARRY PAUL, (MEDICAL CORPS) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Oakland, California (1969)
DATE OF BIRTH 1916
EDUCATION 1938 University of Iowa, 1942 University of Louisville
DATE OF COMMISSION 10th March, 1942
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral selected for promotion in June 1969
OFFICIAL ADDRESS Naval Hospital, Oakland, California

U.S.A.
McCAIN, ADMIRAL JOHN SIDNEY, JNR., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH 17th January, 1911
EDUCATION 1931 Naval Academy
DATE OF COMMISSION 4th June, 1931
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st April, 1959, Vice Admiral 1st September, 1963, Admiral 1st May, 1967
COMMANDS 1941-1942 O R SS 69, 1942-1943 Gurnet SS 253; 1943-1944 Dentuda SS 335, 1944 Gurnet SS 253; 1944-1945 Dentuda SS 335, Submarine Division 71 1949, 1949-1950 Submarine Division 51; 1953-1954 Submarine Squadron 6; 1954-1956 Monrovia (APA 31), 1957-1958 Albany CA 123, 1960 Command Information Bureau, NATO, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 1960-1961 Amphibious Group 2; 1961-1962 Amphibious Training Command Atlantic 1962-1963 Chief, Office of Information, Department of the Navy, 1963-1965 Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet; 1965-1967 Vice Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee, New York/Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier/Commander, Atlantic Reserve Fleet; 1967-1968 Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe

U.S.A.
McCLELLAN, REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS RUFUS (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy Commander, Plans and Programs, and Comptroller, Naval Air Systems Command (March 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1922
EDUCATION: 1942 Naval Academy; 1946 Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School; 1947 California Institue of Technology
DATE OF COMMISSION: 19th June, 1942
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1968
COMMANDS: 1959-1961 Patrol Squadron 49; 1961-1962 Patrol Squadron 30; 1964-1965 Rockbridge APA 228; 1965-1966 Fleet Air Wing 3, 1967-1969 Carrier Division 14
HOME ADDRESS: 1303 24th Street, South Arlington, Virginia 22202

U.S.A.
McCLELLAND, REAR-ADMIRAL JOSEPH JAMES, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief, Office of Boating Safety (March 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1916
EDUCATION: 1935 University of Washington; 1940 Coast Guard Academy; 1950 Stanford University; 1964 National war College; 1965 George Washington University
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 20th May, 1940
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 31st January, 1969
COMMANDS: 1945-1946 Vance; 1946 Potomac and Mistletoe; 1946-1947 Jackson; 1950-1951 Ivy; 1961-1963 Bibb; 1967-1968 Operations Division, 3rd Coast Guard District

U.S.A.
McCLENDON, REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM ROGER (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION:
Commander Carrier Division 9, (August 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1920
EDUCATION: 1950 US Naval School, General Line School, Newport; 1959 Naval War College; 1963 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
DATE OF COMMISSION: 17th March, 1942

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

*** COMMANDER SIXTH FLEET

, REAR-ADMIRAL LEO BOB (NAVAL AVIATOR) US

DUTY STATION Commandant, 12th Naval District, uty: Commander Naval Base, San Francisco (January 1968)
IRTH 1917
N: 1948 Georgetown University Law School; 1951 Air Univer- mmand & Staff School; 1958 Naval War College
OMMISSION 3rd April, 1942
TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1968
S. 1954-1956 Fighter Squadron 13; 1958-1960 Carrier Air 63-1965 Mattaponi AO 41; 1965-1966 Ranger CVA 61
ARDS Navy Cross
RESS 9124 Glenbrook Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030

, REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN DELMOND (NAVAL AVIATOR)

DUTY STATION: Chief, Office of Reserve, Coast Guard Head- rch 1968)
IRTH: 1914
N 1935 North Texas Agriculture College; 1939 Coast Guard 42 Naval Air Station, Pensacola
MISSIONED: 29th May, 1939
TO: Rear Admiral 17th December, 1967
S 1951-1953 Coast Guard Air Detachment, Kodiak; Coast Guard Air Detachment, Hawaii

NGDOM
AR-ADMIRAL N. H., ROYAL NAVY
ONS: M.V.O. 1960
APPOINTMENT: Captain, Royal Naval Engineering College, ymouth March 1967 Chief Staff Officer (Technical) to the -in-Chief, Western August 1969
IRTH: 5 April, 1919
N: Weymouth College
PROMOTIONS: Commander 31 December, 1957; Captain 30 Rear-Admiral 7 July, 1969
APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Engineer Officer HM Yacht 58-1960; Assistant and Deputy Director, Marine Engineering mperial Defence College 1966
ADDRESS: RNEC Manadon, Plymouth *Telephone:* 53740 ext. 3
DDRESS: 68 Firgrove Hill, Farnham, Surrey

MMANDER R. H., ROYAL NAVY
APPOINTMENT: HMS Resolution (Port) in command 24 April,

IRTH: 17 July, 1969
COMMANDS AT SEA: HMS Astute 1959; HMS Excalibur Porpoise 1963-1964; HMS Odin 1964-1965
ADDRESS: HMS Resolution, Clyde Submarine Base, Faslane, , Dumbartonshire *Telephone:* Helensburgh 4321
DDRESS: Woodland Cottage, Stubbington Lane, Stubbington

, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) JOHN LOUIS (SPECIAL ELLIGENCE) US NAVY
DUTY STATION: Intelligence Officer, Commander-in-Chief, (August 1968)
IRTH: 1920
N: 1942 Naval Academy; 1946 Naval Intelligence School; War College; 1957 Naval Postgraduate School
OMMISSION: 19th December, 1941
TO: Rear Admiral selected for promotion on 6th June, 1969
ADDRESS: FPO San Francisco, California 96601
RESS: Clarksville, Tennessee

L, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE), ALBERT RHOADES, INEERING CORPS.) US NAVY
DUTY STATION: Commanding Officer, Southeast Division, ies Engineering Command; District Civil Engineer and Officer- Construction 6th Naval District (September, 1967)
IRTH: 1921
N: 1944 Naval Academy; 1948 Rensselaer Polytechnic med Forces Staff College
OMMISSION: 7th June, 1944
TO: Rear Admiral selected for promotion in June 1969
1966-1967 13th Naval Construction Regiment and Deputy nd Naval Construction Brigade
DRESS: Charleston, South Carolina 29408

UNITED KINGDOM
MARTIN, REAR-ADMIRAL J. E., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: C.B. 1969, D.S.C. 1943
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Director General, Personal Services and Training (Navy) 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 16 May, 1918
EDUCATION: RNC Dartmouth
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: 1951 Commander; 1957 Captain; 1960 Rear-Admiral
PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Deputy Director, Naval Manpower Planning and Complementing at the Admiralty 1958-1960, Senior Naval Officer, West Indies and Commander British Forces, Caribbean 1963-1966; Flag Officer, Middle East 1966-1968; Director General Navy Personal Services 1968-1969
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Ministry of Defence (Navy), Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London S.W.1. *Telephone:* 01-930-9000 ext. 1643
PRIVATE ADDRESS: Carr House, Soberton, Southampton, Hants.

U.S.A.
MARTIN, VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM INMAN, (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy and Chief of Staff, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, and Chief of Staff, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic (1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1910
EDUCATION: 1934 Naval Academy; 1951 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 31st May, 1934
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1959; Vice Admiral 10th April, 1967
COMMANDS: 1943 Bombing Squadron 20, 1943-1944 Torpedo Squadron 10 (Enterprise CV 6 CV 6), 1944-1945 Night Carrier Air Group 90 (Enterprise CV 6); 1953-1955 Fleet All Weather Training Unit, Pacific, 1955-1956 Saipan CVLE 48; 1953-1955 Fleet All Weather Training Unit, Pacific, 1955-1956 Saipan CVL 48; 1958-1959 Airborne Early Warning Wing, Atlantic/Fleet Air, Argentia; Carrier Division 19 1959-1960; Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training 1961-1963; 1963-1964 Carrier Division 2; 1967-1968 6th Fleet, and Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe

UNITED KINGDOM
MASON, VICE-ADMIRAL D. H., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: C.B. 1 January, 1967; A.D.C. 1965
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commandant, Joint Services Staff College March 1968
DATE OF BIRTH: 7 February, 1916
EDUCATION: RNC, Dartmouth
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Commander 1 January, 1951; Captain 30 June, 1955; Rear Admiral 7 July, 1965; Vice Admiral 1 October, 1968
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: Coastal Forces, Frigates and Destroyers. Ending up in Command of HMS Oakley during the war; Commanded Woodbridge Haven, Mermaid, Urania, Undaunted, the last being as Leader during the time of resuscitation of the Londonderry Squadron.
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: NATO Allied Commander in Chief Channel 1956-1958; IDC 1958; Senior Naval Officer Northern Ireland and Director of Joint A/S School, Londonderry 1961-1963; Director of RN Tactical School 1963-1965, Chief of Staff to Commander Far East Fleet 1966-1967; J.S.S.C. 1968
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Commandant's House, J.S.S.C., Latimer, Chesham, Bucks. *Telephone:* Little Chalfont 2761

U.S.A.
MASON, REAR-ADMIRAL HARRY CHARLES, (ENGINEERING DUTY) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy Commander, Engineering Division, Naval Ship Systems Command (August, 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1916
EDUCATION: 1938 Naval Academy; 1949 Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School
DATE OF COMMISSION: 2nd June, 1938
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st February, 1968
COMMANDS: 1945-1946 Wadsworth DD 516; 1946 Ingersoll DD 652; 1951-19 Nicholas DDE 449; 1962-1965 Commanding Officer and Director, Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego
HOME ADDRESS: 6300 Anneliese Drive, Falls Church, Virginia 22044

U.S.A.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

*** COMNAVSECGRU

U.K.
COMPSTON VICE ADMIRAL P M, ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS C.B. 1967
PRESENT APPOINTMENT Deputy Squadron Allied Commander, Atlantic
DATE OF BIRTH 12 September, 1915
EDUCATION Epsom College
DATES OF PROMOTIONS Commander 1956, Captain 1956, Rear Admiral 1965; Vice Admiral 1968
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA HMS Orwell in Command & Captain D Plymouth 1957-1959, HMS Victorious 1962-1964; FOF Western Fleet 1967-1968
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE Naval Attaché, Paris 1960-1962; Chief British Naval, Washington, DC 1965-1967
OFFICIAL ADDRESS Saclant Headquarters, Norfolk, Va, USA
PRIVATE ADDRESS. Holmerwood Cottage, Strend, Nr. Petersfield, Hants. *Telephone:* Petersfield 3518

U.S.A.
CONNOLLY, VICE-ADMIRAL THOMAS FRANCIS (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) (November 1966)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1909
EDUCATION: 1933 Naval Academy; 1942 Naval Postgraduate School
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 1st June, 1933
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st April, 1960; Vice Admiral 1st November, 1965
COMMANDS: 1942-1944 Patrol Squadron 13; 1951-1952 Composite Squadron 6; 1956-1957 Corregidor T-CVU 58, 1957 Hornet CVA 12; 1961-1962 Carrier Division 7; 1965-1966 Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
OFFICIAL ADDRESS. The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350
HOME ADDRESS. Navy Yard, Washington, DC

U.S.A.
COOK, REAR-ADMIRAL RALPH EDWARD (SPECIAL DUTY) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Naval Security Group Command and Executive Assistant for Cryptology, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (June 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH 1915
EDUCATION: 1938 Montana State College, 1952 Naval Justice School
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 21st January, 1941
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st February, 1968
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Naval Security Station, 3801 Nebraska Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20390
HOME ADDRESS: Chevy Chase, Maryland

U.S.A.
COOPER, REAR-ADMIRAL DAMON WARREN (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Assistant Chief of Personnel Control, Bureau of Naval Personnel (August 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH. 1919
EDUCATION: 1941 Naval Academy, 1958 Naval War College; 1961 Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 7th February, 1941 PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1967
COMMANDS: 1944-1945 Torpedo Squadron 24; 1951-1953 Fighter Squadron 821; 1955 Fighter Squadron 143; 1955-1956 Air Task Group 3; 1959-1960 Attack Squadron 44; 1963-1964 Pine Island AV 12; 1964-1965 Ticonderoga CVA 14; 1966-1968 Patrol Force 7th Fleet; US Taiwan Patrol Force; Fleet Air Wing 1
OFFICIAL ADDRESS. Arlington Annex, Washington, DC 20370
HOME ADDRESS: Elizabethtown, Kentucky

U.S.A.
COPLE, REAR-ADMIRAL FREDERICK WILLIAM (SUPPLY CORPS) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commanding Officer, Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania (July 1966)
DATE OF BIRTH. 1916
EDUCATION. 1939 Naval Academy; 1953 Harvard University; 1960 Naval War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 1st June, 1939
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 30th May 1967
COMMANDS: 1965-1966 Navy Electronics Supply Office, Great Lakes, Illinois
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania7055
HOME ADDRESS: 111 North Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada

U.S.A.
COUSINS, VICE-ADMIRAL RALPH WAYNE (?) NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations) (1969)
DATE OF BIRTH 1916
EDUCATION 1937 Naval Academy
FIRST COMMISSIONED 3rd June
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 7th December July, 1968
MAJOR AWARD Navy Cross
COMMANDS 1959-1960 Nantahala
1965-1966 Carrier Division 9
7th Fleet Carrier Division 5
OFFICIAL ADDRESS The Pentagon
HOME ADDRESS Washington, DC

U.S.A.
COWAN, REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN STEPHEN NAVY
DATE OF BIRTH 1913
EDUCATION University of Pennsylvania
DATE OF COMMISSION 1st October
PROMOTED TO Rear Admiral 1st August
COMMANDS: 4th Medical
1946-1950 Naval Medical Field
North Carolina; 1964-1966 Naval
additional duty, Medical Officer, 4th Naval

U.S.A.
COWAN, REAR-ADMIRAL JOSEPH STEPHEN (?) NAVY
DATE OF BIRTH 1913
EDUCATION: 1937 University of Minnesota
FIRST COMMISSIONED. 1st October,
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 11th October
COMMANDS. 1944-1946 6th Medical
1964-1966 Naval Hospital, Philadelphia
HOME ADDRESS. Honolulu, Hawaii

U.S.A.
COX, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) DONALD
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chairman
Surface Missile Pilot Study and Deputy
Ship Missile Defense, Office of the Chief of
DATE OF BIRTH: 1921
EDUCATION: 1944 Naval Academy,
1961 Air War College
FIRST COMMISSIONED. 9th June, 1943
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral, selectee
COMMANDS: 1961-1963 Robinson
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon,
HOME ADDRESS: Farragut, Iowa

U.S.A.
CRAMER, REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN
CURRENT DUTY STATION. Military
of Defense (Public Affairs) (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1921
EDUCATION: 1943 Naval Academy
FIRST COMMISSIONED. 9th June
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st
COMMANDS. 1954-1956 Sirago
1961-1963 Submarine Division
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon
HOME ADDRESS 1120 East

U.S.A.
CRAWFORD, REAR ADMIRAL EARL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S.A.

MOORE, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) HOWARD SHACKLEFORD (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Deputy Director, National Military Command Center, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1920
EDUCATION: 1942 Naval Academy, 1953 Naval War College; 1968 University of Oklahoma
DATE OF COMMISSION: 19th June, 1942
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral selected for promotion 6th June, 1968
COMMANDS: 1959-1960 Heavy Attack Squadron 5; 1963-1965 Platte AO 24; 1965-1966 Forrestal CVA 59
HOME ADDRESS: 3657 North Military Road, Arlington, Virginia 22207

U.S.A.

MOORE, REAR-ADMIRAL, MICHAEL USIS, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Director, International Staff, Inter-American Defense Board (August 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1921
EDUCATION: 1942 Naval Academy; 1947 Naval Academy Naval Post graduate School; 1949 Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 1960 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 19th June, 1942
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1968
COMMANDS: 1953-1955 K-2 SSK 2; 1961-1962 Submarine Division 71; 1964-1967 Submarine Development Group 2
HOME ADDRESS: 1110 Fidler Lane, Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

U.S.A.

MOORE, REAR-ADMIRAL SAM HOWARD, US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East (October 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1918
EDUCATION: 1950 Naval School General Line School Monterey; 1958 Marine Corps Schools Quantico, Va; 1967 National War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 5th May, 1942
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1968
COMMANDS: YMS 415 1944-1945; 1945-1946 Mine Squadron 102; 1946 Destiny AV 216; 1946-1947 Scout AM 320; 1952-1953 Cushing DD 797; 1962-1963 Destroyer Division 102; 1965-1966 Chicago CG 11; 1967-1968 Destroyer Flotilla 7

U.S.A.

MOORER, ADMIRAL THOMAS HINMAN (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief of Naval Operations (August 1967)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1912
EDUCATIONS: 1933 Naval Academy; 1953 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 1st June, 1933
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st August, 1958; Vice Admiral 5th October, 1962; Admiral 26th June, 1964
COMMANDS: 1943-1944 Bombing Squadron 132; 1956-1957 Salisbury Sound AV 13; 1959-1960 Carrier Division 6; 1962-1964 6th Fleet; 1964-1965 Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet; 1965-1967 Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and Atlantic Fleet, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
HOME ADDRESS: Admiral's House, N Observatory, Washington, DC 20390

JAPAN

MOTOMURA, REAR-ADMIRAL T.
DECORATIONS: The Fifth Order of the Sacred Treasure
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commander Training Squadron 16 November 1965
DATE OF BIRTH: 9 October, 1917
EDUCATION: Naval Academy
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Lieutenant Commander 15 July, 1952; Commander 1 August, 1954; Captain 1 February 1959; Rear Admiral 1 January 1966
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: Commanding Officer, PF Nire; Commanding Officer, [illegible]shi, Commander, 1st Training Division 1963; Commander 3rd Escort Flotilla 1965
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Staff, Operations Division, Maritime Staff Office 1957; Staff Research Division, Staff College 1959; Chief Education Division, Officer Candidate School 1961; Chief, Administration Section, Maritime Staff Office 1963; Vice Commandant, Yokosuka Regional District Headquarters 1967
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Commander Training Squadron, c/o Yokosuka Regional District Headquarters, Nishihemi-Cho, Yokosuka-Shi, Japan
PRIVATE ADDRESS: 439, Tsunashima-Cho, Konoku-Ku, Yokohama-Shi, Japan

U.S.A.

MORAN, REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM JOSEPH (NAVAL AVIATOR) US

MEXICO

MORENO CORZO, CAPITAN DE FRIGATA, M., MEXICAN NAVY
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Director, Escuela de Aviación Na[illegible] September, 1967
DATE OF BIRTH: 8 May, 1922
EDUCATION: Primaria Elemental, Secundaria, H. Escuela Naval M[illegible] Escuela de Aviacin Naval y Escuela de Aviacin Naval Pensacola Fla.
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Guardiamarina 1 September, 1945, Te[illegible] de Corbeta 20 November, 1946; Teniente de Fragata 20 November, [illegible] Teniente de Navio 20 November, 1952; Capitan de Corbeta 20 Nov[illegible] 1956; Capitan de Fragata 20 November, 1962
PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Comandante de Avión Grumman 1950-1952; Flight Instructor, Escuela de Aviación Na[illegible] Comandante del Primer Escuadron Aeronaval 1953-1956; Subdi[illegible] Escuela de Aviacion Naval 1956; Comandante del Primer Escuadrón naval 1963
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Escuela de Aviación Naval, Las Bajadas, [illegible] Mexico *Telephone*: 2-36-42
PRIVATE ADDRESS: Grijalva 97, Fracc. Reforma, H. Veracruz, [illegible] Mexico *Telephone*: 2-40-93

UNITED KINGDOM

MORGAN, REAR-ADMIRAL P. J., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: C.B. 1967, D.S.C. 1942
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Flag Officer Royal Yachts 196[illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January, 1917
EDUCATION: RNC, Dartmouth
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: 1949 Commander; 1955 Captain; 1965 Admiral
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 1953-1954 HMS Cor[illegible] 1963-1965 HMS Bulwark
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Naval Attaché, A[illegible] and Teheran 1958-1960; Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans and Operatio[illegible] the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic 1961-1963
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: HM Yacht Britannia c/o BFPO Ships
PRIVATE ADDRESS: Conway House, The Fairway, Worplesdon, [illegible] ford, Surrey.

U.S.A.

MORRISON, REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE STEPHEN, (NAVAL AVIATOR)
CURRENT DUTY STATION:
Director, Electronic Warfare & Tactical Command System Division, of the Chief of Naval Operations (September 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1919
EDUCATION: 1941 Naval Academy
DATE OF COMMISSION: 7th February, 1941
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1967
COMMANDS: 1954-1955 Fighter Squadron 112; 1962-1963 Gu[illegible] AO 32; 1963-1964 Bon Homme Richard CVA 31
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350

U.S.A.

MORRISON, REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM L., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief Counsel for the US Coast [illegible] (January 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1914
EDUCATION: 1939 Coast Guard Academy; 1949 George Was[illegible] University Law School
FIRST COMMISSIONED: 29th May, 1939
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st January, 1968
COMMANDS: 1943-1945 Sellstrom; 1950-1951 Mackinac; 1951-19[illegible] Security Unit, Ellis Island, 1959-196[illegible] Yocona; 1960-1961 Dexter
HOME ADDRESS: 500 McCauley St, Washington Grove, Md.

U.K.

MOTT, CAPTAIN J. W., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: MVO 1956
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: In Command HMS Condor, RN Air [illegible] Arbroath
DATE OF BIRTH: 5th March, 1917
EDUCATION: Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; RM Engineering [illegible] Keyham, Devonport
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Commander 1949; Captain 1960
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENT OF NOTE: HM Yacht B[illegible] 1952-1956; Command Engineer Officer, Flag Officer Naval Air Co[illegible] 1DC 1964; Naval & Air attaché, Belgarde 1964-1966;
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: HMS Condor, Royal Naval Air Station, A[illegible] *Telephone*: Arbroath 2201

U.K.

MUCHLOW, COMMANDER H., ROYAL NAVY

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

UNITED KINGDOM
TROUP, REAR ADMIRAL J A R, ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: D S C 1943, and Bar 1945
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Flag Officer Sea Training 13 May, 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 18 July, 1921
EDUCATION: HMS Worcester, RNC, Dartmouth
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Commander 31 December, 1953; Captain 31 December 1959 Rear-Admiral 7 January, 1969
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: Submarines, Third Submarine Squadron, HMS Intrepid
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Staff of FOSM, Executive Officer HMS Victorious Naval Assistant to First Sea Lord Director of Naval Equipment, Captain of the Fleet, Home Fleet
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: HM Naval Base, Portland *Telephone:* Weymouth 2781

U.S.A.
TRUM, REAR-ADMIRAL, HERMAN JOHN III, (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION:
Commander, Anti-Submarine Warfare Group 5 (June 1969)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1917
EDUCATION: 1940 Naval Academy; 1958 Naval War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 6th June, 1940
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1967
COMMANDS: 1946 Combat Aircraft Service Unit (F) 48; 1946-1947 Fleet Aircraft Service Squadron 119, 1950-1952 Fighter Squadron 53, 1961-1962 Manatee AO 58; 1963-1964 Oriskany CVA 34; 1967-1969 Fleet Air Whidbey, Commandant 13th Naval District
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: FPO San Francisco, California 96601
HOME ADDRESS: 7535 Mercier Street, Kansas City, Missouri

JAPAN
TSUKUDO, VICE-ADMIRAL T
DECORATIONS: The Fifth Order of the Rising Sun 1938; The Fifth Order of the Sacred Treasure 1938
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commandant, Kure Regional District JMSDF
DTE OF BIRTH: 20 February, 1916
EDUCATION: Graduated Naval Academy 1936
DATE OF PROMOTIONS: Commander 16 August, 1953; Captain 1 August, 1958; Rear Admiral 1 July 1965 Vice Admiral 31 December, 1968
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: Commanding Officer, The 1st Submarine Flotilla 1965-1966
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Chief of Sections, Joint Staff Office, Defence Agency 1966-1967, Superintendent, Maritime Officers Candidate School 1968
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Headquarters Kure Rigional District JMSDF, 3-Chome Saiwai cho Kure-Si Hirosima-Ken Japan, *Telephone* Kure 22-5511
PRIVATE ADDRESS: 17-5 5-Chome Siroganedai Minato-Ku Tokyo-To Japan

UNITED KINGDOM
TURNER, VICE-ADMIRAL A. F., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: C.B. 1966; D.S.C. 1945
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Chief of Fleet Support 1967
DATE OF BIRTH: 25 June, 1912
EDUCATION: Stonyhurst College; Royal Naval Engineering College.
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: 1931 Entered RN; 1947 Commander; 1955 Captain; 1964 Rear-Admiral; 1968 Vice Admiral.
PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: DAMR 1960-1962; CSO(T) Mer 1962-1964; DGA (Naval) 1965-1967
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Ministry of Defence, Main Building, London, S.W.1 *Telephone:* 01-930 7022 ext. 2163
PRIVATE ADDRESS: 15 West Way, Rickmansworth, Herts.

U.S.A.
TURNER, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) FREDERICK CHARLES (NAVAL AVIATOR) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training (October 1968). Authorized to assume title of Rear Admiral
DATE OF BIRTH: 1923
EDUCATION: 1954 General Line School; 1961 University of Maryland, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
DATE OF COMMISSION: 1st December, 1943
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral, selectee for promotion on 6 June 1968
COMMANDS: 1961-1962 Fighter Squadron 32; 1962-1963 Carrier Air Group 3; 1965-1967 Sandoval APA 194; 1967-1968 America CVA 66
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas 78419
HOME ADDRESS: 9 Kennedy Road, Morris Plains, New Jersey

U.S.A.
TURNER, REAR-ADMIRAL MYRON GEORGE (DENTAL CORPS.) US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Inspector General, Dental, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1913
EDUCATION: 1936 Ohio State University
DATE OF COMMISSION: 15th August, 1938
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1966

UNITED KINGDOM
TWISS, ADMIRAL SIR F. R., ROYAL NAVY
DECORATIONS: K.C.B. 1965, C.B. 1962, D.S.C. 1945
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Chief of Naval Personnel and Second Sea Lord August 1967
DATE OF BIRTH: 7 July, 1910
EDUCATION: Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; Qual[illegible] Gunnery 1935; Naval Staff Co 1939; Imperial Defence College 1952
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: 1945 Commander, 1950 Captain, 1959 Rear Admiral, 1963 Vice Admiral, 1967 Admiral
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: 1946-1947 HMS Pe[illegible]; 1953-1954 HMS Coquette; Captain Fishery Protection and Mine Sweeping Squadron, HMS Ceylon 1957-1960; 1962-1963 Flotillas, Home Fleet
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Naval Secret 1960-1962, Commander Far East Fleet 1965-1967
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Chief of Naval Personnel and Second Sea Lord, Room 7373, Ministry of Defence (Main Building), Whitehall, London S.W.1.

U.S.A.
TYREE, VICE ADMIRAL JOHN AUGUSTINE, JNR., US NAVY
CURRENT DUTY STATION: Chief of Staff, US European Command (July 1968)
DATE OF BIRTH: 1911
EDUCATION: 1933 Naval Academy, 1954 National War College
DATE OF COMMISSION: 1st June, 1933
PROMOTED TO: Rear Admiral 1st July, 1959, Vice Admiral (Ret.) 1968
MAJOR AWARDS: Navy Cross with gold star in lieu of subsequent [illegible]
COMMANDS: 1941-1944 Finback SS 230, 1949-1950 Submarine Div[illegible] 62, 1954-1955 Bolstoort APA 136; 1955-1956 Submarine Squadron 1958-1959 Service Squadron 3, 1959-1960 US Naval Forces, [illegible] 1962-1964 South Atlantic Force
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Brussels, APO New York 09128
HOME ADDRESS: 6909 Oakridge Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland

JAPAN
UCHIDA, ADMIRAL K.
DECORATIONS: The Order of the Rising Sun; 4th Order of the Sacred Treasure; 5th Order of the [illegible]
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Chief of the Maritime Staff 1 July, 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 8 June, 1915
EDUCATION: Graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy
DATES OF PROMOTIONS: Lieutenant Commander June, 1952, Commander August 1953, Captain August 1957; Rear Admiral July 1964, Vice Admiral July 1967
PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Commander, 3rd Escort Flotilla September 1963, Chief, Intelligence Division, Maritime Staff Office July 1964; Chief, Operations Division, Maritime Staff Office July 1965
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Commander, Fleet Escort Force, c/o Yokosuka Regional District Headquarters, Nishihemi-Cho, Yokosuka-Shi *Telephone* 0469-[illegible]
PRIVATE ADDRESS: Nishi 1-9-14, Fukuoka-Cho, Iruma-Gun, Saitama-Ken *Telephone:* 0492-62-0987

JAPAN
UCHIDA, VICE-ADMIRAL Y.
DECORATIONS: 5th Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure 1944
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commander, Fleet Air Force January 1969
DATE OF BIRTH: 8 February, 1916
EDUCATION: Imperial Japan Naval Academy
DATE OF PROMOTIONS: Lieutenant Commander 1 June, 1954, Commander 16 February, 1955; Captain 1 August, 1959; Rear Admiral [illegible] 1965; Vice Admiral 1 January, 1969
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Commanding Officer Air Wing; Commanding Officer 2 Air Wing; Deputy Chief, Operations Division; Commander Air Training Command
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Shonan-cho Higashikatsushika-Gun Chiba JAPA

RELIEVED BY HIS AS CO AMERICA

JAPAN
UMEICHI, REAR-ADMIRAL T.
DECORATIONS: 6th Order of Merit
PRESENT APPOINTMENT: Commander, 3rd Escort Flotilla, 16 July 1968
DATE OF BIRTH: 8 December, 1918
EDUCATION: Naval Academy
DATE OF PROMOTION: 1 January, 1969
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS AT SEA: Commanding Officer of the D[illegible] Shimakami 1959; Commander, 32nd Escort Division 1965
OTHER PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS OF NOTE: Chief Staffs, 2nd Escort Flotilla 1961; Chief, Sub-Section Plans, Operations Planning Section, Operations Planning Division, M.S.O. 1964, Chief of Education Department, Officer Candidate School, 1966
OFFICIAL ADDRESS: Amarube Maizuru-shi, Kyoto-fu Maizuru District Headquarters

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



GREETINGS

FROM



GEORGE H. GOLDEN, JR., LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, U.S. NAVY

JULY 1972

SEPT. 1972

Let it be known by all who read the words inscribed herein that I am announcing my retirement from the United States Navy after 30 years service.

~~I would also like to add that my retirement coincides with another~~ milestone of life that is of equal importance to me. My 27th Wedding Anniversary.

I will retire from the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility, Portsmouth, Virginia, effective 1 September 1972.

I suppose it is only fitting for an "old salt" like me to retire from a command whose primary mission is to retire the ships in which we served. I am proud of my naval career and feel as though I have done my fair share. I have served on every type of ship from Destroyer Escorts to Aircraft Carriers, and I feel as though I have an intimate knowledge of those "mistresses of steel" who were my life's love. A knowledge that motivates my standards as Inspection Officer when I conduct "their" retirement inspections.

The navy has been good to me; but, I feel as though my twenty-two service awards ranging from our country's third highest, the Silver Star, to two Purple Hearts, attest to the fact that I was in turn "good for the navy". It goes without saying that the awards, and the letters of commendation, were directly attributable to those with whom I served, and at this time, I say, "Thanks".

~~My "Beloved Wife" and I have selected~~ Virginia Beach, Virginia as our permanent home of residence. Primarily because of our three wonderful daughters, now married also make it their home; and secondly, because we own our home here and it's next door to the Atlantic where the fishing, boating and water skiing provide us with great pastimes.

An open invitation is extended to each of you to be my house guest when you are in this area, to reminisce "old times", and once again to enjoy each others "camaraderie".

To celebrate my retirement, and our anniversary, Bessie Mae and I have planned a tour of the United States and Canada. I am enclosing a tentative schedule of our travel itinerary and hope to be able to visit many of you during our tour. For those of you whom we miss this year, hopefully we'll get to see you in the summer of '73. Remember, however, my door is always open.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPART	ARRIVE	PLACE	PERSON VISITING
9/2		Virginia Beach, Va.	
	9/2	Quakertown, Pa.	Mr. & Mrs. B.E. Welchman
9/4		Quakertown, Pa.	Route 4 Box 217
	9/4	Niagara Falls	27th Anniversary
9/6		Niagara Falls	
	9/6	Melvindale, Mich.	Mr. & Mrs. Leland Back
9/8		Melvindale, Mich.	18821 Reed Ave
	9/8	Rushville, Ind.	Mr. & Mrs. Clyde N. Copple
9/9		Rushville, Ind.	833 N. Harrison St.
	9/9	Indianapolis, Ind.	Mr. & Mrs. Jules Belaire
9/11		Indianapolis, Ind.	4118 North Webster
	9/11	Iowa City, Iowa	Sight Seeing
9/12		Iowa City, Iowa	
	9/12	Sioux Falls, So. Dakota	Sight Seeing
~~9/13~~		~~Sioux Falls, So. Dakota~~	
	9/13	Rapid City, So. Dakota	Sight Seeing Black Hills
9/15		Rapid City, So. Dakota	
	9/15	Yellowstone Park Wyo	Sight Seeing
9/17		Yellowstone Park Wyo	
	9/17	Salt Lake City, Utah	Sight Seeing
9/19		Salt Lake City, Utah	
	9/19	Reno, Nevada	Sight Seeing
9/21		Reno, Nevada	
	9/21	San Anselmo, Calif.	Mr. & Mrs. W.L. Back
9/26		San Anselmo, Calif.	43[illegible] The Alameda
	9/26	San Jose, Calif.	Mr. & Mrs Earl Back
9/30		San Jose, Calif.	2657 Bonbon Dr.
	9/30	Las Vegas, Nevada	Sight Seeing
10/2		Las Vegas, Nevada	
	10/2	Grand Canyon, Arizona	Sight Seeing
10/4		Grand Canyon, Arizona	
	10/4	Salida, Colo.	Mr. & Mrs. W.T. Sneddon
10/7		Salida, Colo.	Garfield Star Rt. Box 116
	10/7	Salina, Kansas	Sight Seeing
10/8		Salina, Kansas	
	10/8	Fort Smith, Arkansas	Sight Seeing
10/9		Fort Smith, Arkansas	
	10/9	Memphis, Tenn	Mr. & Mrs. Wayne Dillon
10/13		Memphis, Tenn	Mr. & Mrs. G.H. Robinson
	10/13	Columbus, Miss.	Mr. & Mrs. Jack Myers
10/16		Columbus, Miss.	Route 2 Box 46
	10/16	Rossville, Ga.	Mr. & Mrs. Jay Brandon
10/22		Rossville, Ga.	Mrs. Lillie Black
	10/22	Tallapoosa, Ga.	Mr. & Mrs. Clinton McNeese
10/23		Tallapoosa, Ga.	118 Alabama St.
	10/23	Decatur Ga.	Mr. & Mrs. James Back
10/25		Decatur Ga.	5959 Fairington Rd. Apt 14H
	10/25	Bradenton, Fla.	Mr. & Mrs. Claude Turner
10/26		Bradenton, Fla.	727 15th St.
	10/26	Disney World, Fla.	Sight Seeing

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

DEPART	ARRIVE	PLACE	PERSON VISITING
10/28		Disney World, Fla.	
	10/28	Daytona Beach, Fla.	Sight Seeing
10/29		Daytona Beach, Fla.	
	10/29	Charleston, S.C.	Mr. & Mrs. E.E. Turner
11/1		Charleston, S.C.	220-A Lawson Dr., AFB
	11/1	Virginia Beach, Va.	Home for a rest?

If the above dates of our visit do not meet with your approval, please respond as soon as possible.

RATINGS/RANK

Seaman Recruit - Seaman 2nd class - Seaman 1st class - Fireman 1st class - Machinist Mate 2nd class - Machinist Mate 1st class - Machinery Repairman 1st class - Chief Machinery Repairman - Ensign - Lieutenant Junior Grade - Lieutenant - Lieutenant Commander

DUTY STATIONS

Naval Station, San Diego, Calif - USS LAMSON DD-367 - USS DIXIE AD-13 - USS HAZELWOOD DD-531 - USS TIDEWATER AD-31 - USS BEATTY DD-756 - USS O'HARE DD-889 - Mine Craft Base, Charleston, S.C. - USS WISCONSIN BB-64 - USS MISSOURI BB-63 - USS NORTON SOUND AVM-1 - School Command, San Diego, Calif - Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii - Recruiting Station, Huntsville, Ala. - LDO School, Newport, R.I. - USS ABBOT DD-629 - USS VAN VOORHIS DE-1028 - Naval Station, Norfolk, Va. - USS LIBERTY AGTR-5 - Under Way Training Unit, Norfolk, Va. - USS RANGER CVA-61 - INACTSHIPMAINTFAC, Portsmouth, Va.

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

miral Kidd to command Atlantic Fleet

THE NAVY NEWS 21 MAR 75



M Frederick H. Michaelis

Admiral Isaac C. Kidd Jr., presently Chief of Naval Material, has been named to be the next Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He will succeed Admiral Ralph W. Cousins sometime in May.

The appointment, announced on Wednesday by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, ends several months of speculaton as to where Adm. Kidd's next assignment would be. That speculation arose in January when President Ford nominated Vice Adm. Frederick H. Michaelis to be the new Chief of Naval Material, but made no mention of Adm. Kidd's next assignment. Adm. Michaelis presently is serving as commander of the Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Simultaneous with Schlesinger's announcement was an announcement in Brussels by the Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Council that Adm. Kidd would be appointed the new Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, a position also held by Adm. Cousins. The job always goes along with the other two positons (Atlantic Command--a joint command of all the U.S. services--and the Navy's Atlantic Fleet).

A "Hail and Farewell" party (or Adm. and Mrs. Kidd and for Adm. and Mrs. Michaelis has been schedulld for 7-9 p.m. on April 15 at the Fort Myer Officers Club. The price has been set at $6.50 per person, and there will be music. For reservations and more information, contact Lt. Cdr. John Wooten, SC, MAT-013E, Crystal Plaza 5, Room 1118, OX2-0567.



ADM Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.

Publications, Inc., a private firm in no way connected with the Department of the Navy or with the Marine Corps. Opinions expressed by writers herein are their own considered an official expression by the Department of the Navy or by the Marine Corps. The appearance of advertisements in this publication does not constitute an Department of the Navy or by the Marine Corps of the products or services advertised.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CAPTAIN DAVID MARTIN COONEY

Captain Cooney was the CINCLANTFLT Public Affairs Officer who kept the lid tight on the LIBERTY story. I learned from Maury Bennett that he is now CHINFO (himself), and has been selected for REAR ADMIRAL.

REGISTER OF OFFICERS shows:

designator 1650
DOR (Captain) 1 July 1971
DOB 5 AUGUST 1930
Medals: Legion of Merit (what for? Liberty coverup?)
PEBD 16 June 1951
Qualifications: Naval War College, Command and Staff

Masters Degree in: International Relations or
International Law or
Foreign Affairs or
Foreign Area Studies.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

VOL 41-44

WORK IN PROGRESS Papers for Early Childhood Educators and Parents; Materials for Early Childhood Education.

* * *

WILSON, Michell 1913-1973

July 17, 1913 - February 28, 1973. American novelist and science writer. Obituaries: *New York Times*, February 2[illegible], 1973; *Publishers Weekly*, April 30, 1973.

* * *

WILSON, William Ritchie 1911-

PERSONAL: Born January 8, 1911, in Chicago, Ill., son of William Ritchie and Ethel Maude (Hopkins) Wilson; married Ruby M. Greding, October 26, 1940. *Education:* U.S. Naval Academy, B.S., 1933; University of Washington, M.A., 1964, Ph.D., 1967. *Home and office:* 4141 Ave. N.E., Seattle, Wash. 98105.

CAREER: U.S. Navy, 1932-63, retiring as captain. Commissioned as ensign, 1932; served on ships, 1932-38; language officer attached to U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 1938-41; served on U.S.S. Pope, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1941-42; prisoner of war in Japan, 1942-45; staff officer attached to Naval Support Group, Japan, 1946-48; served in Atlantic Destroyer minesweeper Command, 1948-50; intelligence duty in Washington, D.C., 1950-51, 1957-59; Tokyo, 1953-55; duty in Office Commander Atlantic, 1955-57, and Pacific, 1955-57; staff officer of Naval Forces, Japan, 1959-60; commander of U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Japan, 1960-63; University of Southern California, Los Angeles, assistant professor of Asian studies, 1967-71. *Member:* Association for Asian Studies, American Oriental Society, U.S. Naval Institute. *Awards, honors:* Military Legion of Merit with Combat V, plus oak leaf cluster; Bronze Star; Purple Heart; Bronze Cross (Netherlands); Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3rd class (Japan); Civilian: Certificate of Merit (Shogo from *Shuppan Bunka Kokusai Kenyukai*, 1972, for *Hogen Monogatari*.

WRITINGS: *Hogen Monogatari* (tale of the Rebellion in Hogen), Sophia University, 1971. Contributor to *Monumenta Nipponica* and others.

WORK IN PROGRESS: Translations from Mori Ogai for a collection of *Shiden* (historical biographies), edited by D. A. Dilworth and J. Rimer.

SIDELIGHTS: *Hogen Monogatari* is included in the UNESCO Collection of Representative Works, Japan Series.

* * *

WINCHESTER, A(lbert) M(cCombs) 1908-

PERSONAL: Born April 20, 1908, in Waco, Tex., son of Robert Stevenson and Mamie Katherine (Moore) Winchester; married Josephine Milam Walker, December 23, 1934; children: Betty Jo. *Education:* Baylor University, A.B., 1929; University of Texas, A.M., 1931, Ph.D., 1934; postdoctoral study at University of Chicago, 1940, Harvard University, 1952, University of Michigan, 1959, and University of Munich, 1960. *Office:* University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, Colo. 80631.

CAREER: Oklahoma Baptist University, Shawnee, professor of biology, 1937-43, head of department, 1937-43; Baylor University, Waco, Tex., associate professor of biology, 1943-46; Stetson University, DeLand, Fla., professor of biology, 1946-61, head of department, 1946-61; University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, professor of biology, 1962-, dean of College of Arts and Sciences, 1969-. *Member:* American Association for the Advancement of Science (fellow), American Society for Human Genetics, Genetics Society of America, Ecological Society of America, Sigma Xi, Elks, Lions.

WRITINGS: All with photographs and drawings by the author: *Zoology: The Science of Animal Life*, Van Nostrand, 1947, revised edition, 1961; *Biology and Its Relations to Mankind*, Van Nostrand, 1949, 3rd edition, 1969; *Genetics: A Survey of the Principles of Heredity*, Houghton, 1951, 3rd edition, 1971; *Heredity and Your Life*, Dover, 1957, 3rd edition, 1966; *Genetics Laboratory Manual*, W. C. Brown Co., 1958; *Heredity: The Science of Genetics*, Harper, 1962, 2nd edition, 1971; *Modern Biological Principles*, Van Nostrand, 1965, 4th edition, 1971; *Human Development and Inheritance*, C. E. Merrill, 1968; *Los Accesorios de la Reproduccion*, Editores Toray, 1970; *Concepts of Zoology*, Van Nostrand, 1971; *Human Genetics*, C. E. Merrill, 1971; *Human Sex and Reproduction*, C. E. Merrill, 1973; (contributor) *Atlas and Compendium of Human Body Defects*, National Foundation, 1970. Author of laboratory manuals for W. C. Brown. Contributor to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, *World Book Encyclopedia*, *Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia*, *American Peoples Encyclopedia*, *Young Peoples Science Encyclopedia*; contributor to *Journal of Heredity*, *Genetica*, *American Naturalists*, *American Biology Teacher*, and other professional journals.

* * *

WINDCHY, Eugene G. 1930-

PERSONAL: Born May 5, 1930, in Los Angeles, Calif., son of O. Eugene (an accountant) and I. Marguerite (Wiegand) Windchy; married Hiroko Uchiyama, December 10, 1[illegible]. *Education:* University of Illinois, B.S., 1952; also studied at U.S. Foreign Service Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 1957-59. *Home:* 1000 Sixth St. S.W., Apt. 601, Washington, D.C.

CAREER: Employed in the U.S. Information Agency, 1955-67. *Military service:* U.S. Army, 1952-54; became first lieutenant.

WRITINGS: *Tonkin Gulf*, Doubleday, 1971. Contributor to proceedings of U.S. Naval Institute, and national magazines, including *New Republic*, *Saturday Review*, and *Nation*.

WORK IN PROGRESS: A book on war prevention.

* * *

WINDOLPH, F(rancis) Lyman 1889-

PERSONAL: Born June 10, 1889, in Elizabeth Township, Pa.; son of Jacob Rathvon and Frances (Grugan) Windolph. *Education:* Franklin and Marshall College, A.B., 1908. *Office:* Windolph, Burkholder & Hartman, 121 East King St., Lancaster, Pa. 17602.

CAREER: Admitted to Bar of Pennsylvania, 1911, and to Bar of U.S. Supreme Court, 1931; Windolph, Burkholder & Hartman (attorneys), Lancaster, Pa., partner. Trustee, Franklin and Marshall College, 1923-28; Lancaster Free Public Library, director, 1935-49, 1953-69, president of board of directors, 1940-49. *Military service:* U.S. Army, 1918; became first lieutenant.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

KEY PERSONALITIES

BULKELEY, REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN DUNCAN COMCRUDESFLOT 8, 1966-67

CALVERT, REAR-ADMIRAL JAMES FRANCIS comcrudesflot 8, 1967-68

DACEY, REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN ELMER COMCRUDESFLOT 12, 1967-68 – KIDD HAS THIS COMMAND IN 1969

*ENGEN, REAR-ADMIRAL (SELECTEE) DONALD DAVENPORT CO, USS AMERICA, 1966-67

*GEIS, REAR-ADMIRAL LAWRENCE RAYMOND COMCARDIV 4, 1967-68

~~GUINN, REAR-ADMIRAL DICK HENRY COMCARDIV 4, 1965-67~~

~~HARTMANN, REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM COMCARDIV 10, 1966-67~~

HEALEY, REAR-ADMIRAL VINCENT PATRICK COMCRUDESFLOT 6, 1967-69

~~JACKSON, REAR-ADMIRAL PERCIVAL WILLIAM COMCARDIV 14, 1966-67~~

*KIDD, REAR-ADMIRAL ISAAC CAMPBELL, JNR.

~~LANHAM, REAR-ADMIRAL HARVEY PETER COMCARDIV 2, 1966-68~~

McNITT, REAR-ADMIRAL ROBERT WARING COMCRUDESFLOT 4, 1967

*McCAIN, ADMIRAL JOHN SIDNEY, JNR. CINCUSNAVEUR, 1967-68

*MOORER, ADMIRAL THOMAS HINMAN CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, SACLANT 1965-67

*MARTIN, VICE-ADMIRAL WILLIAM INMAN COMSIXTHFLT, COMMANDER NAVAL STRIKING AND SUPPORT FORCES, SOUTHERN EUROPE 1967-68

*PENKIN, REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY ALGERNON COMSERVLANT, 1965-67 (COMNINE SEPT 1967)

RICHARDSON, VICE-ADMIRAL DAVID CHARLES C6F August 1968 (relieved Martin?)

*TURNER, REAR-ADMIRAL FREDERICK CHARLES CO USS AMERICA, 1967-68

Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



Identical listings appear in 1968-69 and 70-71 (give or take a year) issues of WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA. I DID NOT find Mr. Feldman in earlier or later issues.

GEORGE JOSEPH FELDMAN - U.S. Ambassador to Malta during LIB affair

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ERNEST CARL CASTLE listing in 1971 Register of Naval Officers

Date of Service 1948
Date of Rank 1 February 1969
Rank: Captain
Date of Birth: 22 November 1925
Medals and Decorations: Silver Star
Special Qualifications: Surface Warfare
Post Graduate Study (no advanced degree received)
Did advanced study in Defense Intelligence
Pay Entry Base Date: 8 April 1947

He was listed in 1972-3 Washington area telephone book at:

3456 Woodburn Road
Annandale, Virginia

phone: 573-6961

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CAPTAIN WARD BOSTON (Jr. member of Court of Inquiry according to Navy Times 28JUN67, but not listed as a member on the Summary of Proceedings)
CAPTAIN WARD BOSTON, Jr.
JAG CORPS / date of service: 1948 /DOR 1NOV65/ /DOB 21JUN23
decorations: Legion of Merit
Qualifications: Naval War College / Law Degree
PEBD 30SEP42

LCDR ALLEN FEINGERSCH (also listed by Navy Times but not listed on Summary)
designator 1100
DOR 01OCT70/ /service 1957/ /DOB 26FEB33/ /PEBD 6AUG56/ Qual - surface warfare

---

LCDR HUBERT JOHN STRACHWITZ (as a Lieutenant, wrote letter home which was published in [illegible] saying he went to LIBERTY in boat with XO, [illegible] and other people from DAVIS) (paper was Norfolk Ledger Star - Jack Kestner story)
service: 1959
designator: 1400 (engineering duty officer)
DOR 1MAR68/ /DOB 21NOV37/ /PEBD 3JUN59/ QUAL Master's Degree - Bus. Admin.

CAPTAIN BERT MILTON ATKINSON, Jr. (member of court of inquiry)
service: 1945
designator: 1100
DOR 1NOV66/ /DOB 17AUG21/ /PEBD 6JUN45/ quals: surface warfare
industrial college of armed forces

CAPTAIN BERNARD JOHN LAUFF (member of court of inquiry)
retired august, 1969, with 1103 designator - regular retirement, voluntary
DOR 1JUL60/ /DOB 1919/

LCDR RICHARD FRANCIS KIEPFER
service 29SEP66/ /desig 2105/ /DOR 1SEP68/ /DOB 12APR37/ /PEBD 8SEP61/

~~JOHN W. BUNTING 1103 CAPTAIN retired 8/67 born 1916 DOR 1MAR63~~

DAVIS E. BUNTING 1103 CAPTAIN retired 1/66 born 1917 DOR 7JAN61

~~CURTIS WILSON BUNTING 1103 CAPTAIN retired 8/67? born 1920 DOR 1DEC67?~~

James M. Enres, Jr. Research Papers

MISC. NOTES

GENERAL JOSEPH GEVA was naval attache with Israeli embassy in Washington

*****

USS AMERICA MEDICAL OFFICERS were CDR John J. Gordon (senior med officer),
Lt. Donald P. Griffith (worked in OR with Gordon after Lib people came aboard)
Lt. Cdr. Flynn also worked in OR after he came back from Liberty
Lt. Frank N. Federico (made ward rounds)
Lt. George A. Luckier (also made ward rounds) (SIGNED MT MEDICAL RECORDS AS LUISIER)

*****

(AP STORY) "Secretary of State Dean Rusk promptly protested the incident to Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman, who apologized on behalf of his government."

*****

Liberty's arrival in Norfolk:
ship was met by VADM Frederick L. Ashworth, Deputy Cinclant fit
and by CAPT Charles J. Beers, Chief of Staff, COMSERVLANT

ship tied up at Pier 21
CINCLANT band played
Chamber of Commerce Hospitality Committee came

*****

TG 60.2 was USS Saratoga and her escorts according to 26JUL67 Navy Times story

*****

AMERICA NEWSMEN: 26JUL67 Navy Times story says 29 newsmen were aboard AMERICA at time of attack, including Bob Goralski of NBC, Bill Gill of ABC. Article says ships assembled in Sea of Crete. Article does not say, but Neil Sheehan was signing stories from America during this period.

*****

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LEMNITZER

GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER O-0012687
AT Branch
DOR 25 March 1955
DOB August 1899

A retired officer, recalled to active duty

November 15, 1972



No Fanfare

KNOWN for his outspoken manner (and big cigars), Adm. John S. McCain Jr. ended his 41 years of active duty November 1 quietly and without ceremony. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, until relieved by Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler in September, McCain "just didn't come to work today," said a close associate in CNO's office. The lack of fanfare was at the admiral's request. He and his wife Roberta plan to remain in the Washington area where a son and daughter live. Their older son, Lt. Cmdr. John Sidney McCain III, has been a POW since 1967.

...ily Visits

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CAPTAIN BUNTING - COMSERVRON EIGHT

Don't know which is which. There are three Captain Buntings, all retired shortly after attack:

CURTIS WILSON BUNTING, File #102915,
Captain
DOR 1 December 1960
DOB 1920
Retired (03 typo) August, 1967

DAVIS ELI. BUNTING, File #123694,
Captain
DOR 1 July 1961
DOB 1917
Retired (03 type) January, 1968

JOHN W. BUNTING, File #195721,
Captain
DOR 1 March 1963
DOB 1915
Retired (03 type) June, 1967

John William Bunting, 1107 (TAR)
DOB 27APR15
PEBD 14SEP42

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: DECK

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

MONDAY, 08 MAY 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSITITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1300 - Repair parties fall in at Repair Lockers for instruction. Personnel arrange own reliefs.

NOTES:

1. A Zone Inspection is scheduled for Saturday, 13 May 1967.

2. There will be a meeting of the Welfare and Recreation Committee at 0900 in the Crew's Lounge.

3. Enlisted Performance Evaluations (NAVPERS 792) for pay grade E-5 are due in the Ship's Office prior to 16 May 1967. They must be typed and submitted in duplicate.

4. To assist personnel who have recently reported aboard in becoming more familiar with the Officers and Chief Petty Officers on board, a series of biographical sketches concerning their Naval backgrounds will be published in the Plan of the Day.

The first biographical sketch concerns Commander William L. MC GONAGLE, Commanding Officer.

Commander William L. MC GONAGLE was born in Witchita, Kansas on November 19, 1925. He enlisted in the Navy in January 1943, and upon completion of the NROTC program at the University of Southern California in June 1947 was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy.

After a three year tour of duty aboard the USS FRANK KNOX (DDR-742) where he served as First Lieutenant, Gunnery Officer, ASW Officer, Engineering Officer and Communications Officer, Commander MC GONAGLE was ordered to the USS KITE (AMS-22). Aboard the KITE he served as Gunnery Officer, Engineering Officer, and Executive Officer. During his tour the KITE was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Korean Service Medal with six battle stars and the United Nations Ribbon for service during the Korean Conflict.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

In January, 1952, Commander MC GONAGLE was assigned to the U. S. Naval Advance Base, Bremerhaven, Germany where he was Officer-in-Charge of 18 German built and manned minesweepers engaged in clearance and check sweeping for mines planted during World War II in the Baltic and North Seas.

Upon promotion to Lieutenant in 1953, Commander MC GONAGLE was ordered to the U. S. Naval Communications Station, Philadelphia, where he served as Personnel Officer and Administrative Assistant. Upon completion of this tour in January 1955, Commander MC GONAGLE reported to the USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) as First Lieutenant. He served in this billet for two years before receiving orders to assume command of the USS MATACO (ATF-86).

From January, 1959 to June, 1961 Commander MC GONAGLE was an instructor in Naval Weapons, Operations and Tactics and Naval Leadership for the NROTC Unit at the University of Idaho.

From July, 1961 to July 1963, Commander MC GONAGLE served as Commanding Officer of the USS RECLAIMER (ARS-42). Prior to receiving orders in April, 1966 as Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) Commander MC GONAGLE served on the staff of COMSERVPAC as Current Operations Officer.

Commander MC GONAGLE is married to the former Jean Stoneham of Glendale, California. The MC GONAGLE'S have three children.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: E&S

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

TUESDAY, 09 MAY 1967

TAKE NAVY SHOWERS — SAVE WATER

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P3400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

NOTES

1. All departments are requested to submit prior to 19 MAY 67 their recommendations for advancement and participation in the August 1967 Navy-Wide examinations to the Ship's Office. This must be done so that the exams may be ordered. Compliance with this request at earliest convenience would be most appreciated.

2. The following is a list of the paydays for the rest of the cruise:

18 May	13 July	07 September
01 June	27 July	
15 June	10 August	
29 June	24 August	

3. All personnel interested in Volunteering for the Honor Guard leave their names at the Ship's Office.

4. SAVE WATER: Fact: the average water consumption per man for the past 6 days was 50 gallons per day.
Fact: the navy standard water consumption per man is 25 gallons per day.
HELP SAVE WATER "TAKE NAVY SHOWERS"

5. To assist personnel who have recently reported aboard in becoming more familiar with the Officers and Chief Petty Officers on board, a series of biographical sketches concerning their Naval backgrounds will be published in the Plan of the Da

The Second biographical sketch concerns Lieutenant Commander Philip M. ARMSTRONG Jr., Executive Officer.

The Executive Officer, LCDR P. M. ARMSTRONG, Jr., was born in Detroit, Michigan 4 July 1929. After graduating from Eastern High School in 1947, LCDR ARMSTRONG joined the Navy and was sent through recruit training at Great Lakes, Illinois. Upon completion of recruit training, he attended the Electronics Technician School at Memphis, Tennessee, where upon graduation he was rated Aviation Electronics Technician Third Class and was assigned to the "Hurricane Hunter" Patrol Squadron at Patuxent River, Maryland. In 1949, Mr. ARMSTRONG applied for a fleet appointment to the Naval Academy and was enrolled in the Academy preparatory at Bainbridge, Maryland, after which he was accepted for entrance into the Academy. After graduation, in June 1953, Mr. ARMSTRONG was commissioned Ensign USN and assigned to the USS McCAFFERY (DDE 860) where he served in all departments, completing his tour as Operations Officer in late 1955.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

From there he went as Gunnery Officer and First Lieutenant to the USS POINT SUELLING (LSD-30). In Early 1959 Mr. ARMSTRONG was ordered to the Third Naval District Staff as District Security and Disaster Control Officer. In 1960 he was ordered to the USS BETELGEUSE (AK-260) where he served as Engineer Officer, First Lieutenant and Executive Officer, after which in 1962 he was stationed in Washington at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. In July 1964 Mr. ARMSTRONG was ordered to Commander Naval Beach Group Two Staff as Operations and Plans Officer until February 1966 when he was assigned to his present billet.

LCDR ARMSTRONG is currently a resident of Pennsy[illegible]ia and is married to the former Marie Ryan KEARNEY of Dalton, Pennsylvania. The ARMSTRONG'S have five children.

P. H. ARMSTRONG
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO,NEW YORK 09501

DUTY DEPT: OPS

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thursday, 11 MAY 1967 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1300 - Repair Parties assemble in the mess hall.
1400 - Maneuvering Detail, man stations.

NOTES

1. The paint locker will be open for issue on Friday.

2. Personnel having Health and/or Dental Records in their possession are requested to return them to sick bay.

3. The fourth biographical sketch conerns Lieutenant Maurice Hoque BENNETT, Jr., Assistant Technical Research Officer.

LT BENNETT was born on 5 October 1935 in Bauxite, Arkansas where he attended Public Schools. After graduating from the University of Arkensas (Razorbacks) in 1958 he attended OCS at Newport, Rhode Island where he received his commission as an Ensign on 1 November of the same year. LT BENNETTS' first tour on active duty was as a Crypto Watch Officer, CINCWESTLANT, in Norfolk, Virginia Nov 58 - Dec 59. Subsequent duty stations have been: the U.S. Army Language School, Presidio of Monterrey, California (Jan 60 - Dec 60); U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland (Jan 61 - May 63); U.S. Naval Facility, Nicosia, Cyprus (Jun 63 - Mar 64) just prior to reporting aboard the Liberty, Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR, London, England (Mar 64 - Aug 66).
In addition to his regular duties LT BENNETT serves as Chairman of the Wardroom Committee as well as Legal Officer and Top Secret Control Officer.
LT Bennett is married to the former Joy Ashley and they have five children.

P.M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESEARCH

PLAN OF THE DAY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FRIDAY, 12 MAY 1967 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Field Day as required
1300 - Repair Parties muster on the Mess Deck
1400 - Special Maneuvering team take stations

NOTES

1. The Paint Locker will be open today for issue of paint. Extensive living area painting should be avoided before Zone Inspection.

2. Damage Control equipment will be inspected closely on zone inspection. Included will be:
   a. Weight record on CO2 bottles
   b. Missing dog wrenches
   c. Battle lanterns (Availability and operability)
   d. Damage Control Compartment Check-Off lists
   e. Fire plugs and hoses properly stowed and aligned.
   f. Steam tight globes and wire shields
   g. Gaskets and knife edges
   h. Proper dog adjustment
   i. Damage Control markings (X, Y, Z, @, etc.)

3. Zone inspection parties will be published in tomorrows plan-of-the-day.

4. The fifth biographical sketch concerns Lieutenant James C. PIERCE, Communications Officer.

The Communications Officer, Lieutenant James C. PIERCE was born in Clinton, North Carolina on 11 July 1924. He graduated from Clinton High School in May 1941 and enlisted in the U. S. Navy on 6 August 1941. He had his "boot" training in Norfolk, Virginia and was attending Radio School in Norfolk when Pearl Harbor was bombed. LT PIERCE was rated RM3 in March 1942 after completion of COMPOL School in Nanuton Heights, Conn and was then assigned to the SS WINONA as part of the Armed Guard Crew. He reported aboard the USS CAPELLA (AK-13) shortly after being advanced to RM2 in September 1942. He was next assigned to and was on board when the USS SARANAC (AG-24) was commissioned on 22 February 1943. On 1 May 1943 he was advanced to RM1. He was transferred from the SARANAC on 7 September 1945, and began his association with the Naval Security Group in January 1946 with the following assignments:

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NavRadSta, Bellmore, Long Island, N.Y.	January 1946 to February 1947
CinCLantFlt aboard USS POCONO (AGC-16)	February 1947 to December 1947
NavRadSta, Bellmore (He was advanced to RMC on 1 June 1949)	December 1947 to January 1950
NavCommSta Guam	February 1950 to September 1951
NavCommSta San Diego	October 1951 to September 1953
COMSUBCOMNELM, Naples, Italy	November 1953 to November 1955
CinCLantFlt, Norfolk, Virginia (He was assigned TAD to COMSECONDFLT aboard USS NORTHAMPTON (CLC-1) September and October 1957 and changed his rate to CTC in October 1957)	January 1956 to January 1958
NavCommFac, San Miguel Philippines (He was advanced to CTCS effective 1 November 1959)	February 1958 to February 1960
NavCommSta, Honolulu, Hawaii	February 1960 to April 1961

He applied for and was commissioned a LTJG Limited Duty Officer in May 1961. After schools in Newport, R. I. and Pensacola, Florida he was assigned to the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from September 1961 to May 1964. While there he served as the Communications Security (COMSEC) Officer, Communications Officer and Material Officer for the Naval Security Group Detachment. He was advanced to Lieutenant on 1 June 1963. He reported to CINCLANTFLT for the third time in June 1964 where he served as Assistant for COMSEC Operations, Assistant for COMSEC Plans and as Atlantic Fleet COMSEC Officer until September 1966. During the Dominican Crisis of 1965 he served as the Officer in Charge of the Naval Security Group Detachment with COMCARIBRON FOUR aboard the USS TACONIC (AGC-17). He reported to his present billet in October 1966.

LT PIERCE, in addition to his regular duties, serves as Chairman of the Recreation Council and also as SCORE Counseling Officer and Security Officer.

LT PIERCE is currently a resident of Virginia Beach, Virginia and is married to the former Pauline Marie ILLG of Bellmore, New York. The PIERCE's have four children.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ernest Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

DUTY DEPT: [redacted]

PLAN OF THE DAY

Monday, 15 MAY 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY:		WORKING UNIFORM:
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0715 SET THE ANCHOR DETAIL
0730 ANCHOR
1815 SET THE ANCHOR DETAIL
1830 UNDERWAY

---

1. All Hands should take every opportunity of the good weather to get the ship in the best shape possible prior to arrival in Abidjan.

2. The sixth biological sketch concerns LT George H. GOLDEN, Engineer Officer.

LT George H. GOLDEN was born in Chattanooga, Tennessee on August 18, 1924. Before enlisting in the Navy he attended Kirkman Vocational High School in Chattanooga. He enlisted in the Navy in June 1941 and was sent to San Diego, California for Recruit Training. Upon completion of recruit training, he was assigned to the USS LAMSON (DD-367) at Pearl Harbor. After the sinking of the LAMSON in the South Pacific, he attended Radioman School at Pearl Harbor and was assigned to the USS DIXIE (AD-14) operating at advance bases in the South Pacific. After being advanced to Machinist Mate 2nd Class early in 43 he attended two months of commando training in Noumea, New Caledonia. Upon completion of this training, he participated in 3 beach landings and then was transferred to the USS HAZELWOOD (DD-531). At the end of WWII he was assigned to the precommissioning detail of the USS TIDEWATER (AD-31) in Charleston, S. C. In 1946 he served in USS BENTTY (DD-756) until 1947 and then was transferred to the USS O'HARE (DD-889) after re-enlisting until October 1948 when he received orders to shore duty at the Mine Craft Base, Charleston, S.C. In January 1951, he was assigned to the precommissioning detail of the USS WISCONSIN (BB-64) in Portsmouth, Va. After commissioning of the WISCONSIN, he was transferred to the USS MISSOURI (BB-63), in September 1951, were he remained until she was decommissioned in February 1955 at Bremerton, Washington. His next assignment was to the USS NORTON SOUND (AVM-1) at Port Hueneme, Calif., were he changed his rate to Machinery Repairman and was selected for eight months of advanced metal work school. Upon graduation in August 1956, he was transferred to FASRON 117 at Barbers Point, Hawaii. In September 1958 he was assigned to recruiting duty at Huntsville, Alabama. In January 1960 he was promoted to Ensign in the Navy's LDO Program. He was next assigned to the USS ABBOT (DD-629), and then to the Staff of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONSOLIDATION 14 as Material/Engineer Officer. In August 1963 he was transferred to the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia were he was Harbor Master and Operations Officer of Hampton Roads until assigned to LIBERTY as Engineer Officer in August 1964. He is entitled to 15 campaign ribbons and medals, plus he earned 11 stars for major engagements during WWII, 2 for the Battle of the Philippines, and three during the Korean Conflict. In addition to his regular duties, LT GOLDEN serves as Career Counselor, Mine Marshall, and Reenlistment Officer.

LT GOLDEN is currently a resident of Tennessee and is married to the former Bessie Mae BECK of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The GOLDEN's have three children and reside in Virginia Beach.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESEARCH

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TUESDAY, 16 MAY 1967- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - All Hands assemble on the 01 level aft.
0900 - All Officers assemble in the wardroom.
(As announced) - Maneuvering Detail man stations.
~~1300 - Fire Drill~~
1330 - Condition 1 Romeo
1340 - Prepare to abandon ship
1500 - All Shellbacks assemble on the Mess Deck.

NOTES:

1. At the present rate of water consumption the ship will have enough water to last 2 1/2 days in port. We will be in port for four days. Do your part to prevent water hours.

```
**********************
*TAKE NAVY SHOWERS *
**********************
= = = = = = = = = = = =
=CONSERVE FRESH WATER =
= = = = = = = = = = = =
```

2. All Hands check new 1 Romeo diagram and assignments on bulletin boards.

3. Shots will be given in Sick Bay by the following schedule:

0900 - A - B
1000 - C - G
1400 - H - K
1500 - L - N

4. Effective 16 May 1967 all gear adrift will be confiscated and be placed in the lucky bag for auction.

5. All Enlisted Performance Evaluations for pay grade E-5 are due in the Ship's Office by 1200 today.

6. There will be a meeting of all Honorable Shellbacks on the Mess Deck at 1500. All new personnel who have reported aboard since last deployment bring proof of having crossed equator before.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

7. Would the person or persons who borrowed catalogs listing USAFI courses please return same to ENS LUCAS.

8. All members on active duty outside the United States or its possessions for more than ninety days, whether on permanent assignment, TAD, or with a deployed unit, are eligible to participate in the 10 per cent savings program.

Any member overseas may open a savings account by making an initial cash deposit with his disbursing officer, or by starting an allotment payable to the savings program. All deposits must be at least $5.00 and must be in multiples of $5.00. No deposit may exceed the amount of money that the member could have drawn on the payday immediately prior to the day of deposit. Reenlistment bonus, travel allowance on discharge, and lump-sum leave payments may be included by advances of pay may not be included in the amount of any deposit. There is no maximum amount that a member may have on deposit, but 10% interest will not be paid on amounts in excess of $10,000.00.

Repayment of savings account. All deposits plus interest will be paid to the member 90 days after his return to the United States. The member may settle his account before the end of this 90 day period by having his disbursing officer submit a change notification requesting immediate repayment.

An emergency payment of part or all of the member's savings account may be made at any time when the health and welfare of the member or his dependents would be jeopardized if the payment were not authorized. The member must request emergency payment in letter form from his Commanding Officer.

Deposits which are made by the 10th of a month earn interest from the first of that month, deposits made after the 10th earn interest from the first of the following month. Special payments WILL NOT BE MADE ON THE 9th OF EACH MONTH.

9. The seventh biographical sketch concerns LT James M. ENNES, Jr., Electronics Material Officer.

The Electronic Material Officer, LT James M. ENNES, Jr., was born in Newark, New Jersey, 26 April 1933. He first entered the Navy on a minority enlistment in 1951, serving in Yokosuka, Japan, aboard the USS GENERAL G. M. RANDALL (TAP-115). He achieved the rating of Teleman First Class, and returned to civilian life in 1954.

In September, 1961, after receiving his BA degree at San Francisco State College, Mr. ENNES returned to military service via Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island. His first assignment was aboard the USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY (LST-1167) where he served as Gunnery Officer, First Lieutenant, Communication Officer and Operations Department Head. During 1964 and 1965 Mr. ENNES filled various billets in Washington, D. C. , and in the office of of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Pentagon. From April 1966, until his transfer to the LUNOKOY in April, 1967, he was assigned to the Staff, Commander Second Fleet, aboard the fleet flagship USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148).

In addition to his regular duties LT ENNES serves as Custodian, Welfare and Recreation Fund and as Photographic Officer.

LT ENNES is married to the former Teresa Latshaw of Kansas City, Missouri, and has three children.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (ACTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: SUPPLY

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -WEDNESDAY, 17 MAY 1967- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1300 - Repair #3 muster on the mess decks. Supply own Watch reliefs.

NOTES

1. During GQ yesterday many traffic violations were observed. All Hands are reminded that traffic flow at General Drills is: Up & Forward on Starboard Side
Down & Aft on Portside.

2. All Hands are cautioned that potential fire hazards exist throughout the ship. Loose trash should be cleaned up and G. I. cans should be emptied at every evolutions. Cigarettes are a particular hazard. Forgotten cigarettes in ashtrays can fall out and cause fires, particulary at night. Also - Don't throw cigarette butts over the side. There are ample Butt Kits throughout this ship.- USE THEM.

Anyone who has ever been through a fire at sea can appreciate the fear and helplessness of having nowhere to run. Remember the BENNINGTON and several more recent cases where dozens of Sailors were killed in fires caused by pure carelessness.

3. Personnel who received advancement certificates/awards on 5 May 1967 may pick up individual pictures on the mess decks at 0800 today.

4. Shots will be given in Sick Bay by the following schedule - 0900 O - R; 1000 S - Z; 1400 - 1600 Stragglers.

5. The eighth biographical sketch concerns Lieutenant Stephen S. TOTH, The Operations Officer and Navigator.

Lt Stephen S. TOTH graduated from St. George's Preparatory School, Newport, Rhode Island, and after one year at the Virginia Military Institute entered the U. S. Naval Academy. On receiving his commission as an Ensign in the U. S. Navy in 1963, LT TOTH was assigned to the USS DEWEY (DLG-14) where he served as Assistant Communications Officer, Assistant CIC Officer, Assistant Navigator, COMTAC Publications Control Officer, Mess Caterer, and Postal Officer. In 1964, LT TOTH was transferred to the USS ALBANY (CG-10) first as the Electrical Material Officer and later as the ASW Officer. After several Mediterranean deployments, LT TOTH was assigned in November 1966 to his present billet aboard the LIBERTY. In addition to his regular duties, LT TOTH serves as Intelligence Officer, Postal Officer and Wardroom Mess Caterer.

LT TOTH is a resident of Virginia Beach, Virginia.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESH

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

Thursday, 18 MAY 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1.

NOTES

1. The following named men are to muster on the fantail for small arms practice at the time indicated. Reliefs should be arranged.

1300	1330	1400	1430
KELLY, G.	HEANEY	QUINTERO, T.	CLIFFANT
TRACY	PAPIDES	McCALLISTER	RUSSELL
LANDIS	SIX	KERNER	PEETOM
SHAW	BOWEN	CONCEPCION	WARWAS
UBER	CASPER	PURCELL	EASTON
GAUTHIER	PAYAN	HANDY	LUCAS
FREESE	COLSTON	BEAVER	SLAVENS
VANDERSHUUR	LARKINS	LEIMAN	LONG
FOLLIN	ROSSI	REILLY, T.	BRONG
REILLY, R.	WILSON	WHEELER	BLANCHARD
HOLDEN	BECHTEL	LaPAR	DUEA
LENAU	PIERSON	DUCHARD	SUPER
BUNDY	COOK	ARFSTEN	BACSKAY
BENNETT	VICKERS	MEADORS	HOAR
WOOD	KIRK	KRINER	JACKSON

2. Tentative recommendation for advancement in rating are due by 1200 today in order that tests may be ordered in Abidjan.

3. SOME ADVICE TO THOSE WHO NEED TO BORROW MONEY.

Never borrow money needlessly, but when you do borrow, borrow wisely. Remember that lending institutions compete with one another just as retail merchants do. Interest rates vary just as widely as car prices and should be shopped for just as carefully.

A poor loan risk must pay a higher rate for his money to offset the greater risk, but never let a lender tell you that you are a poor risk because you are a Navy man. It is simply not so.

Ask your lender if he adheres to Department of Defense Standards of Fairness (published in DOD directive 1344.7 of 2 MAY 1966 and available to all lending agencies). If he does, he will provide you with three forms which will outline in more than usual detail the exact terms of the loan and guarantee other protections for you; if he does not, you would be well advised to look for another lender.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Even quality lenders vary widely in the interest rates charged. The following bar graphs illustrate the dollar cost of a $3,000 thirty-six month loan from five different better quality lenders. Finance companies and retailers offering "easy credit" usually charge much more. Dwell carefully on the differences before you ask for your next loan.

BANK "A"	$360
FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS AT 1/5%	$445
FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS AT 1%	$555
BANK "B"	$727
NAVY TIMES ADVERTISOR TOUTING "LOW RATES"	$975

4. Payday will be held in reverse alphabetical order. Z's first; A's l[illegible]

5. The ninth biographical sketch concerns Lieutenant James C. O'Connor, Th[illegible] Technical Analysis Officer.

Lt O'Connor was born in Troy, N.Y. on 21 DEC 1939. He lived in and attended schools in Saratoga Springs, N.Y..
Lt O'Connor received his B.S. from Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y. in June 1962. After receiving his degree, Mr. O'Connor came on active duty as a member of the Naval Reserve and attained the rate of Radarman Second Class while serving on board the USS RHODES (DER-384). Upon completion of Officer Candidate School in late 1963, he was commissioned Ensign, USNR. Subsequent to being commissioned, Mr. O'Connor has had duty in Washington, D.C. and at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In September 1966 he reported to the USS LIBERTY where he is the 22nd division Officer. In addition to his regular duties, Lt O'Connor serves as Special Services Officer and Welfare and Recreation Officer.
Lt O'Connor is married to the former Sandra Lawrence of Amsterdam. They have one son and currently resides in Norfolk, Va.

P.M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James W. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

DUTY DEPT: OPS

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Friday, 19 MAY 1967 - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 1236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Bridge and After Steering Special Sea Detail man stations
0900 - Honor guard report to Armory to draw gear and proceed to 01 level forward for practice.

1. The ship will swing ship this morning to compensate magnetic compasses.

2. The following personnel are assigned to the Honor Guard.

CTSN SCARBOROUGH	SKSN PURCELL
CTSN WOOD	SN HANDY
CTSN PAGELER	SN PURCELL
CTSN DANIELS	SN2 DAVID

3. Field day will be at the discretion of Department Heads. The paint locker will remain open today to expedite covering of red lead.

4. The tenth biographical sketch concerns Lieutenant (junior grade) Lloyd C. PAINTER, Technical Operations Officer.

LTJG PAINTER was born 1 May 1941 in Dos Palos, California. He attended grammar school and High School in the Dos Palos Area. Upon graduation from high school in 1959, LTJG PAINTER enrolled at Fresno State College. After completion of a 5 year course in Criminal Psychology, he received his B.S. degree, March 4, 1965. LTJG PAINTER entered O.C.S., Newport, R.I. for a 16 week Officer Indoctrination Course. Upon completion, he was commissioned an ENSIGN, USNR. LTJG PAINTER's first tour of duty was on Midway Island. In April of 1966, he was assigned to the USS LIBERTY, Research Department. On January 2, 1967, LTJG PAINTER was promoted to the rank of LTJG.

5. The Supply Office will be open today from 0800-1000 for deposits in the 10% savings program. In order to prevent disruption of regular routine deposits will be accepted only between 0800 and 1000 on the day following paydays.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESEARCH

PLAN OF THE DAY

FRIDAY, 26 May 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0900 - All Officers assemble in Wardroom.
1300 - General Drills

NOTES:

1. Arrival time at next port of call is presently uncertain. All hands are advised that mail might close out on short notice. All hands are further advised of matters involving security and unintentional disclosing of ship's classified movements.

2. Present intentions are to have general drills on a daily (except possibly Sunday & Holiday routine) until further notice.

3. The ship has become used to steaming on independent and relaxed duty for the past few cruises. Our present and future area of operations will call for many changes in routine and operating procedure. A smooth transition to a different environment will require the cooperation and hard work of all hands. I'm sure that all hands will adapt to these new requirements quickly and satisfactorily.

4. The Commanding Officer would again like to express his appreciation and pride in the manner in which ship's company got underway on such short notice. This is an indication of the professional manner in which future assignments will be carried out by LIBERTY. WELL DONE!

5. Now is the time to order your correspondence courses. Some courses are mandatory before you become eligible for your next higher rate. Don't keep putting it off. Order them through either the training room in Research spaces or in the Ship's Office.

6. Personnel desiring to have their shot cards brought up to date, are requested to present their cards at Sick Bay today at 0930.

7. The following information on the Underwater Demolition Team is taken from CINCLANTFLTNOTE 1500 for the information of All Hands:

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Requests for UDT Duty and School are submitted to EPDOLANT for enlisted men and to BUPERS for Officers via the Commanding Officer and the appropriate screening center. Applications must reach EPDOLANT or BUPERS 60 days prior to class reporting date. The UDT school is 16 weeks long and is conducted three times annually in January, April and August. Any personnel wishing further information on the UDT program may obtain it from the Ship's Office.

8. Volunteers are requested in all rates and ratings who meet the following eligibility requirements for duty aboard the USS NITRO (AE-23). The USS NITRO is scheduled to complete a major FAST conversion in August 1967 at Baltimore, Maryland. The precommissioning crew will assemble at the Fleet Training Center, Norfolk in July for PRECOM training. Homeport of USS NITRO is scheduled to be Davisville, Rhode Island.

a. Serving on board a SERVLANT unit (with no minimum time requirement on board).

b. Must have eighteen (18) months obligated service from July 1967, or execute an agreement to extend (prior to transfer) in order to have sufficient obligated service.

c. No mark in professional performance below 3.0 during the previous marking period, and no record of disciplinary offenses since January 1967.

d. A history of prolonged indebtedness is disqualifying, as selections for new construction/major conversion duty is considered to be rewarding and is reserved for deserving personnel.

9. UNIDTED STATES SAVINGS BOND/FREEDON SHARE CAMPAIGN

The United States Savings Bond/Freedom Share Campaign began on 1 May and will extend until 2 June 1967. This year there is an additional advantage to enrollment in a Savings Bond plan. On 1 May the U. S. Treasury Department placed on sale a new "Freedom Share" which will pay interest at the rate of 4.74% and mature in 4 1/2 years. The new notes will be issued in denominations of $25, $50, $75 and $100, but they will be available only through regular Savings Bond plans and must be accompanied with the purchase of at least an equal amount of Series "E" Bonds. Together, the two types of securities provide an ideal savings opportunity.

10. The tenth biographical sketch concerns the Medical Officer, LT Richard F. KIEFER, MC, USN.

Lieutenant KIEFER was born on 12 April 1937 in Brooklyn, New York. Education: B.A. from Columbia College 1958. 1 year post graduate work for M.A. in Chemistry from Columbia, followed by M.D. from Seton Hall in 1963. After internship and surgical residency, began military service at U. S. Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, N. H. in September 1965. Assigned to duty as Medical Officer USS LIBERTY in May 1967.

11. DON'T FORGET TOMORROW COOK'S NIC DAY! ALL YOU C[illegible]

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK 09501

DUTY DEPT. DECK

PLAN OF THE DAY

TUESDAY, 30 MAY 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Half mast the colors
0800 - Commence Holiday Routine
1000 - Protestant Services in Crew's Lounge
1030 - Catholic Services in Crew's Lounge
1220 - Hoist colors
1300 - Movie on the Mess Deck
1400 - Movie in the Wardroom

NOTES

1. Brunch will be served today in the Mess Hall and Wardroom.

2. Payday will be held on Wednesday, 31 May 1967.

3. The ship expects to arrive at Rota sometime Thursday morning.

4. Today is Memorial Day. This day is set aside in honor and memory of the dead whether they be loved ones, friends or enemies --All men in death are brothers. Easter, Christmas, Thanksgiving and Memorial Day all have special significance to all of us in one way or another. Special religious services will be conducted today in the crew's lounge. Personnel who have never attended lay services on board, as well as the regular attendees are encouraged to attend.

5. Any Officer desiring to apply for an Engineering Duty Only (14xx) designator, contact the Executive Officer prior 15 June.

6. The eleventh biographical sketch concerns Ensign Malcolm M. WATSON, Main Propulsion Assistant.

ENS WATSON was born 2th December 1939, in Robeson County, North Carolina. Upon receiving a BA degree from Mars Hill College, he joined the Navy, as an Aviation Officer Candidate. He reported aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in April, 1966. He served in the Operations Department as Administrative, Personnel Officer, Assistant Operation Officer, and Assistant Navigator.

In April, he transferred to the Engineering Department, where he presently serves as Main Propulsion Assistant and Division Officer for M and R Divisions.

ENS WATSON has previously served in the Marine Corps Reserve and the North Carolina National Guard.

P. [redacted], LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT. WASH

PLAN OF THE DAY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THURSDAY, 31 MAY 1967 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0100 Advance all clocks to +1 Alpha time zone
0800 Payday
1300 General Quarters (see note 1)

NOTES

— 1. If weather precludes General Quarters, Repair parties muster for instruction at Repair lockers.

— 2. The Ship expects to arrive at Rota, Spain tomorrow morning.

WARD — 3. All E-4 and over with over four years and officers [illegible] (NAVPERS 2040) and instruction sheets in the pay line. Forms should be returned today to the supply office.

★ — 4. Due to the present area of operations all beards and long side burns must be removed. Reasonable mustaches may be worn if neatly trimmed. These do not include "handle-bars","Ben Turpins" or other unusual types of growth. This will be effective by reveille on 1 June 1967.

— 5. All hands are reminded that LIBERTY will be operating with the Sixth Fleet and many routines will be changed. A smooth and even transition to this new environment by all hands will be required to ensure that LIBERTY maintains her excellent reputation.

— 6. The Ship expects to have mail waiting on the pier upon her arrival. Since our stay at Rota will be of short duration, mail will probably close out early after our arrival. All hands are encouraged to write home today as it may be some time before outgoing mail leaves the ship again. Any additional information will be promulgated as soon as it can be determined.

— 7. It has been noted that military courtesy has been very lax lately. All hands are reminded that when addressing officers,"Sir" will be used, or "Mr. in some instances or Lieutenant, etc. This applies to all officers inspite of rank except the Commanding Officer, who will be addressed as "Captain" and answered as "Sir". Saluting has also been lax. The Commanding Officer will be saluted Each and every time he is encountered. There are no exceptions except when you are uncovered. In the event that you are uncovered, come to attention and say "good morning", etc as appropriate. This also applies to all officers, except that officers other than the Commanding Officer need be saluted only on your first meeting of the day.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Should the Commanding Officer appear in a compartment (messing, berthing, or working) where several personnel are, the first man to see him should call the area to attention. If men are eating they should remain seated at attention. If not eating, they shall come to attention. The man calling the group to attention shall salute and greet the Captain for the entire group. The group shall carry on only after being told to do so by the Commanding Officer. It is not necessary to call for attention for other officers other than the Commanding Officer.

These rules are a matter of simple military courtesy and will be strictly adhered to. If necessary, and if laxity persists, disciplinary action will be taken. The USS LIBERTY is a part of a military organization and will govern itself accordingly. All officers and petty officers will be expected to ensure compliance to the above regulations.

8. All Hands are reminded of the opportunity to enroll in the 10% savings program and the new series of bonds paying a higher rate of interest. Both of these programs offer an excellent opportunity to let your money work for you. For further information see the Disbursing Officer.

9. It is regretted that more information concerning LIBERTY future operations is not now available. As information becomes available, within security limitations, word will be promulgated. All hands are asked not to speculate as to what is going on at this time.

10. Be prepared to darken ship at any time in the future. All hands are reminded that no smoking will be allowed on main deck or other exposed areas during hours of darken ship.

11. The sounding and security patrol is responsible for making rounds throughout the ship periodically during the night. It is possible that leaks and/or fires may develope between these rounds. Anyone who observes what he thinks is something unusual or unsafe should report immediately to the OOD. Every one has Security Responsibilities.

12. Congradulations are extended to DK3 Juan A. CRAIG and Mrs. CRAIG on the birth of their son, Juan A. CRAIG Jr. on 29 May 1967.

13. The twelvth biographical sketch concerns Ensign Richard P. TAYLOR, Supply and Disbursing Officer.

Ens Richard P. TAYLOR, SC, USNR, graduated from Edina-Morningside High School Edina, Minnesota in 1961. He went through NROTC as a contract student at U. of Minnesota, and graduated in 1965. Ens TAYLOR was commissioned 18 Dec 65, and reported to Navy Supply Corps School in Athens, Georgia 22 Feb 1966 for six months training. He graduated from Navy Supply Corps School 18 Aug 1966.

Ens TAYLOR reported to COMCRUDESLANT Supply Representatives Office Norfolk, prior to receiving orders to USS LIBERTY. He met the LIBERTY on 24 NOV 66 in Dakar, Senegal, to become Supply and Disbursing Officer.

Ens TAYLOR's home town in now Excelsior, Minnesota.

P. M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: ENG

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thursday, 01 JUN 67 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

0001 - Mail will close out
0800 - Fresh water wash down
0930 - Station the anchor detail
1000 - Moor at pier 1, Naval Station, Rota, Spain

1. The ship will arrive in Rota this morning to re-provision and re-fuel. All hands working parties will be required to perform this expeditiously. The ship expects to get underway immediately upon loading.

2. More information will be passed as it becomes known.

3. Yesterday GQ revealed the following Zebra-setting discrepancies:

DOOR or FITTING	DISCREPANCIES	DOOR or FITTING	DISCREPANCIES
1094-2	2 dogs won't close. possibly warped	1-147-2	2 dogs frozen
1-46-2	2 inoperative dogs	Fr 140 Port	life jacket locker left opean
1-130-2	missing dog wrench	01-129-2	no secured sign
1-108-2	broken wedge	Fr 105 CL	life jacket locker open
1-61-1	not completely dogged	1-37-2	not completely dogged
1-37-1	not completely dogged		

4. The duty section slated for Wed.,24 MAY 1967 in Abidjan will be the in-port duty section in Rota.

5. Enlisted Performance Evaluations (NAVPERS 792) for pay grade E-6 are due in the Ship's office by 0800, 16 June 1967. They must be typed in duplicate.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

6. There are two incoming baskets in the Log Room reserved and marked for (a) completed Validation cards, and (b) completed INSURV DEFICIENCY cards. All personnel are requested to insure that cards are submitted promptly and accurately

7. The following personnel are assigned to Validation Teams as listed and will muster with Lt. Golden at 0900 02 JUN 67 on the mess deck for instructions in validation. Arrange watch reliefs for this instruction.

1	2	3	4	5
LEMAY, EM2	REGER, EM3	RANDALL, IC1	OLIPHANT, ET3	NEESE, SF1
NEEDMAN, CT3	HALBARBIER, ET3	MAREGARP, CT3	BOSTIC, EMFN	HAZEN, GMG3
HANDY, SKSN	VICKERS, SKSN	DIGERNIMO, IC3	COLSTON,SN	KOSSI, SN
		MEADORS, SN		DEMORI, SF3
6	7	8	9	10
MARTIN, MM1	DYE, MM3	OWENS, BT2	BROWN, BT3	HOBSON,MM3
BOOTH, MM3	HAUCK, MM3	SIMPSON, FN	KELLY, BT3	THORN, MM3
FISHER, MM3	JOHNSON, FN	KIDD, BT3	CADMAN, FN	SCHALEY,EN3
				BEATTIE,FN

Stock No. verfication VALDEZ, SK2

8. The thirteenth biographical sketch concerns Ensign John D. SCOTT, Damage Control Assistant.

ENS SCOTT was born in Knoxville, Tennessee on June 8, 1943. In 1957, he moved to Charlotte, North Carolina where he attended public schools. After graduating from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, he attended Officer Candidate School at Newport, Rhode Island where he received his commission as Ensign (USNR) on March 18,1966. Upon completion of OCS, he reported for instruction at Naval Damage Control and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare school in Philadelphia for a period of 10 weeks. Subsequently, he was TAD at COMSERVRON EIGHT staff for a period of 3 months where he served in the capacity of Assistant Public Affairs Officer. Upon the USS LIBERTY'S arrival in Norfolk in AUG 66, ENS SCOTT reported aboard for his tour of active duty.
In addition to his regular duties as Damage Control Assistant, ENS. SCOTT serves as Electrical Officer, Repair Officer, NBC Defense Officer, and M.D.C. coordinator.

9. The Uniform of the Day for entering port will be:

OFFICERS & CPO'S: Tropical Khaki Long
ENLISTED: Tropical White Long

W.M. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESH

PLAN OF THE DAY

Monday, 05 June 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Deck department rig and check-out highline gear
1300 - All Honorguard personnel assemble at the armory

NOTES

1. All hands are reminded of COMSIXTHFLEET's visit on Wednesday. Get the ship as clean as possible.

2. Congratulations are extended to Mr. WATSON who was promoted to Lieutenant junior grade on 03 June 1967.

3. The fourteenth biographical sketch concerns Ensign Malcolm P. O'MALLEY, Personnel Officer/Assistant Operations Officer.

Ensign O'MALLEY, the LIBERTY's newest officer, was born on October 15, 1944 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In 1962 he entered the University of Minnesota and joined the NROTC program. Graduating with a political science degree, he was commissioned in December 1966. From that time until he joined the ship in February, Ensign O'MALLEY was either going to naval schools in Norfolk or packing to catch the ship in Monrovia.

Though his primary duty is Assistant Operations Officer, he is also the ship's secretary and administrative and personnel officer.

4. LIBERTY GENERAL REGULATIONS - Art. 4225. LIGHTS No person shall:

a. Turn on any light other than standing lights, between Taps and Reveille, in any living space, passageway, officer, mess deck, lounge spaces unless such light is incident to the performance of assigned duties or is authorized by proper authority.

b. During periods when the ship is darkened, turn on any flashlight or hand lantern that has not been altered to produce a dim red light on any weather deck or in any space visible from without the ship, and then only when such light is necessary to the performance of his assigned duties.

P. L. ARMSTRONG, LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: RESEARCH

P L A N O F T H E D A Y

WEDNESDAY, 07 JUNE 1967

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

1300 - General Drills

NOTES:

1. All Hands are reminded that the first INSURV progress report is due 0800, 16 June based on items submitted through 15 June.

2. The following reports, etc. are due in the next few days:

Recreation Committee
Recreation Council
Wardroom Audit

3. A zone inspection is tentatively scheduled for 1000, 17 June 1967.

4. The fifteenth biographical sketch concerns Ensign David G. LUCAS, First Lieutenant/Gunnery Officer.

Ensign LUCAS was born on 18 March 1942 in Martinsburg, West Virginia. He graduated for West Virginia University in August of 1964 with a B.S. degree in Journalism, majoring in advertising. He entered Officer Candidate School, Newport, R.I., in May of 1966 and was commissioned Ensign USNR in September. After reporting to LIBERTY, he assumed the duties of Main Propulsion Assistant and in February of 1967 became First Lieutenant/Gunnery Officer.

In addition to his regular duties ENS LUCAS serves as Public Affairs Officer and Information and Education Officer.

ENS LUCAS is married to the former Paula POORENUGH of Cockeysville, Maryland. The LUCAS' have one daughter.

5. UCMJ Article 107 - False Official Statements.

Any person subject to this code who, with intent to deceive, signs any false record, return, regulation, order, or other official document, knowing the same to be false, or makes any other false official statement knowing the same to be false, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

W. M. ARMSTRONG, JR., LCDR, USN
Executive Officer

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Letters to the Editor

This section is open to unofficial communications from within the naval service on matters of general interest. However, it is not intended to conflict in any way with Navy Regulations regarding the forwarding of official mail through channels nor is it to substitute for the policy of obtaining information from local commands in all possible instances. Do not send postage or return envelopes. Sign full name and address. Address letter to Editor, ALL HANDS, (NOP-00723) Navy Internal Relations Activity, Office of the Chief of Information, Washington, D. C. 20350.

Shotline Comment

SIR: The picture on the inside back cover of the May ALL HANDS with the caption "A young sailor prepares to fire the shotline as his ship nears the pier," is an embarrassment to ship handlers. Any self-respecting young officer would be ashamed to admit he could not maneuver his ship close enough to the pier so the boatswain's mate could send the messenger over by heaving line. I would like to believe your picture is staged and is not as the caption says.

Here at the Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek, we have a very fine ship handlers' course where young officers perfect the skill of bringing their ship alongside so the boatswain's mate can hand the mooring line to the line handler on the pier. Any commissioned officer who must rely on a line throwing gun is in need of our ship handling course. — CDR D. L. Burson.

● *The photo is not staged; however, the ship in question may be innocent of all charges. The caption which accompanied the photo in the mail does not specify the activity in which the ship was engaged—which could just as easily have been underway replenishment. ALL HANDS jumped to an unwarranted conclusion, and stands corrected. We are happy to have the opportunity*

Academy Sports

SIR: On behalf of the Naval Academy Athletic Association, I would like to express our sincere thanks for the publication of the article "Navy's Sports at Annapolis" in the June 1975 issue of ALL HANDS.

Mr. Ellen Rabey has done an excellent and thorough job in writing the article. We are particularly pleased at how she has covered all aspects of the Naval Academy's intercollegiate and intramural programs. Even more important, she was able to convey the philosophy under which we operate our programs. — CAPT J. O. Coppedge, USN(Ret), Director of Athletics, U.S. Naval Academy.

● *Judging from the number of compliments we have received on Mrs. Ellen Rabey's article, your letter comes as no surprise. Her description of the philosophy behind the intercollegiate and intramural programs, we feel, will do much to encourage America's top high school athletes to obtain appointments to attend the U. S. Naval Academy.—Ed.*

Extensive Coverage

SIR: Thank you for the extensive coverage given Pacific Fleet units in the July 1975 issue of ALL HANDS.

A lot of men and women put in literally hundreds of hours of hours supporting the Fleet so they will be up and ready for both routine and emergency operations such as those de-



Red Sea Storm

SIR: In reference to the [illegible] editor in your July 1975 [illegible] "Soviet Union attacks Israeli [illegible] editor's comment [illegible] this [illegible] Instead of [illegible] the narrow [illegible] both sides [illegible] while several [illegible] in 1956. A [illegible] ship [illegible] and [illegible] Lardner.

● *The [illegible] from you [illegible] the Red Sea [illegible] surpass [illegible] the Star. [illegible]*

Legion's Freedom [illegible]

SIR: As [illegible] American [illegible] June 1975 [illegible] mention the [illegible] However, we [illegible] that the article's [illegible] and the Freedom [illegible] described [illegible] Freedom II.

Our [illegible] the second [illegible] be presented [illegible] America's [illegible] the Freedom [illegible] Legionnaires [illegible] working to [illegible] and the Freedom [illegible] success of the project.

Your public [illegible] information would be very [illegible] ated. — James C. Watkins, Director, National Public Relations Division, American Legion.

● *Thanks very much. We are always happy to [illegible] and where [illegible] American [illegible] this project.*

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROBERT D. LOOMIS

* * *

LOOMIS, Robert D.

PERSONAL: Born in Conneaut, Ohio; son of Kline (a mayor) and Louise (Chapman) Loomis; married Gloria Colliani, 1956; children: Diana. *Education:* Duke University, B.A., 1950. *Home:* 35 East Ninth St., New York, N.Y. *Office:* Random House, Inc., 457 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

CAREER: Random House, Inc., New York, N.Y., senior editor.

WRITINGS: (Editor) *William March Omnibus*, Rinehart, 1956; *The Story of the United States Air Force*, Random, 1959; *Great American Fighter Pilots of World War II*, Random, 1961; *All About Aviation*, Random, 1964.

* * *

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

JOHN KENT COOLEY

CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

* * *

COOLEY, John Kent 1927-

PERSONAL: Born November 25, 1927, in New York, N.Y., son of John Landon and Ruth (Robinson) Cooley; married April 2, 1950 (divorced); married second wife in 1970, children, (first marriage) Katherine Anne, (second marriage) Alexander. *Education*: Attended University of Zurich, 1948-49, University of Vienna, 1951-53, Dartmouth College, A.B. (cum laude), 1952; graduate study, New School for Social Research, 1954, and Columbia University, 1964-65. *Office*: c/o *Christian Science Monitor*, Hotel St. George, Beirut, Lebanon.

CAREER: Began as reporter, 1948, free-lance foreign correspondent, 1949-57; civilian clerk, editor, and interpreter with U.S. military groups and Department of State in Austria, 1949-51, 1952-53; personnel clerk for civilian contractor, and editor of weekly newspaper for construction workers on U.S. air base, Ben Guerir, Morocco, 1952; editorial writer for *New York Herald Tribune*, 1954; U.S. Army Engineers (Mediterranean), Nouasseur, Morocco, 1955-57, civilian translator, then intelligence analyst and public information officer; *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Mass., special North Africa correspondent with assignments in other Mediterranean countries, 1958-64, staff correspondent based in Beirut, Lebanon, 1965—. Also free-lance correspondent for *New York Herald Tribune* in central Europe, 1949-51, 1952-53, Morocco, 1953, for *Christian Science Monitor*, 1954-58, Radio Press International, 1957-60, *Observer* and Observer Foreign News Service, 1960-64, Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1961-64, *Newsweek*, 1962-64, *New York Times*, 1964. *Military service*: U.S. Army, Signal Corps, cryptographer in Vienna, Austria, 1946-47. *Member*: Phi Beta Kappa. *Awards, honors*: Foreign correspondent fellowship, Council on Foreign Relations, 1964-65; citations from Overseas Press Club of America, 1967 and 1969, for best interpretive reporting of foreign affairs.

WRITINGS: *Baal, Christ and Mohammed: Religion and Revolution in North Africa*, Holt, 1965; *East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive*, Walker, 1965; *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs*, International Scholarly Book Services, 1973. Contributor to textbooks and encyclopedias; also contributor of articles on current affairs and literature and the arts to *Commonweal*, *Reporter*, *American Mercury*, *Christ*, *This Week*, *Wort und Wahrheit* (Vienna), *World Affairs Abroad*, and *Musical Courier*.

WORK IN PROGRESS: A book on the Kurds and Kurdistan.

SIDELIGHTS: Cooley speaks French, German, Spanish, and Russian, and has reading competence in Arabic, Portuguese, and Italian. His report on Chinese Communism in Africa, *East Wind over Africa*, was termed by reviewers both objective and valuable. James Kritzeck wrote of *Baal, Christ, and Mohammed*: "For the first time in English, the history of civilization in North Africa is written here, by the distinguished correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, with all the hard coin and delicate vision often missing in historians' work. . . . Mr. Cooley's focus is sharply upon the cultural force of religion . . . such a focus provides us with a uniquely illuminating method of ordering and understanding the masses of unwieldy facts which make up the long, checkered history of that region."

* * *

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA
1974-1975

COOLEY, JOHN KENT, [illegible] Nov. 25, 1927; s. John Landon and Ruth (Robinson) C.; A.B. Dartmouth, 1952; student U. Zurich, 1948-49, U. Vienna, 1951-53; New Sch. Social Research, 1954; Columbia, 1964-65; m. [illegible] Apr. 1970; [illegible] Katherine Anne, [illegible] Katherine, Mar. 31, 1970, [illegible] Alexander. With U.S. Dept. State and Def. Service, 1949-51; [illegible] North Africa, 1951-53; [illegible] Middle East, Central Europe, 1957-64; [illegible] Mediterranean countries, 1958-64; staff correspondent based in Beirut, Lebanon, 1965—; [illegible] Christian Science Monitor, 1965—; [illegible] NBC radio and television news, 1961-62; [illegible] Am. Radio, 1965—; [illegible] with MBS, 1967; [illegible] Council on Foreign Relations, 1964-65; [illegible] Overseas Press Club of America (N.Y.C.), Author: Baal, Christ and Mohammed: Religion and Revolution in North Africa, 1965; East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive, 1965; Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, 1973. Contbr. to textbooks, encyclopedias, articles on current affairs, literature and the arts to Commonweal, Reporter, Am. Mercury, Christ, This Week, Wort und Wahrheit (Vienna), World Affairs Abroad, Musical Courier. Home: [illegible] Office: c/o Christian Science Monitor, Hotel St. George, Beirut, Lebanon.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

1

NEIL SHEEHAN

CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

SHEEHAN, Neil 1936-

PERSONAL Born October 27, 1936 in Holyoke, Mass.; son of Columbus Joseph (a farmer) and Mary (O'Shea) Sheehan; married Susan M. Margolis (a staff writer under the name Susan Sheehan on *New Yorker* and author of *Ten Thousand A.M.*), March 30, 1965; children: Maria Gregory, Catherine Fan. *Education:* Boston College, student, 1952-54; Harvard University, B.A. (cum laude), 1958. *Home:* 4909 Klingle St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016. *Agent:* Robert Lescher, 155 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021. *Office:* *New York Times*, 1920 L St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

CAREER United Press International bureau chief, Saigon, Vietnam, 1962-64; *New York Times*, New York, N.Y., news staff, 1964—, as reporter in New York, 1964, foreign correspondent in Indonesia, 1965, and Vietnam, 1965-66, Pentagon correspondent, Washington, D.C., 1966-68, White House correspondent, 1969, special investigative reporter, Washington, D.C., 1969—. *Military service:* U.S. Army, 1958-62; received Army Commendation Medal. *Awards, honors:* Silver Medal of the Page Richard Club of Philadelphia, 1964; Louis M. Lyons Award for conscience and integrity in journalism, 1964.

WRITINGS: *The Arrogance of Power*, Random House, 1971.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA

1974-1975

SHEEHAN, NEIL, journalist. Holyoke, Mass. Oct. 27, 1936. s. Columbus Joseph and Mary (O'Shea) S. A.B. cum laude, Harvard, 1958; LittD (hon.), Columbia Coll., Chgo., 1972. m. Susan Margolies Mar. 30, 1965; children—Maria Gregory, Catherine Fan. Various positions with U.P.I., Saigon, Vietnam, and Indonesia, 1962-65; reporter, N.Y. Times, N.Y.C., Washington, 1964—; author of Pentagon Papers, 1971. Served with U.S. Army, 1958-62. Recipient Louis M. Lyons award for conscience and integrity in journalism, 1964; Silver medal Page Richard Club Phila., 1964; certificate of appreciation for best article on Asia, Overseas Press Club Am., 1965; Ist Ann. Dept. Pearson prize for excellence in investigative reporting, 1971; Columbia Journalism award, 1972; Sidney Hillman Found. award, 1972; Page One award Newspaper Guild N.Y., 1972; Distinguished Service award and Alumni medallion Sigma Delta Chi, 1972; citation of excellence Overseas Press Club, 1971; Guggenheim fellow, 1971—; Alfa Stevenson fellow, 1971. Author: The Arrogance of Power, 1971; Center to The Pentagon Papers, 1971; also articles, book revs. to popular mags. Home: 4909 Klingle St NW Washington DC 20016

2

NEWS RELEASE INFORMATION

PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT

NAME (First, Middle Initial, Last) WILLIAM A. MC [illegible]

RANK/RATE CDR USN

BIRTHDAY (Day, Month, Year) 17 NOV 19[illegible]

HOME ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State)
207 OAK GROVE ROAD, NORFOLK VA

PARENTS' MARTIAL STATUS (Martial status is held confidential and is not published)

__ Divorced __ Seperated X Father Deceased X Mother Deceased

PARENTS' NAME (First, Middle Initial, Last)

PARENTS' ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State)

MARRIED PERSONNEL ONLY

WIFE'S MAIDEN NAME (First, Middle Initial, Maiden Name)
EMMA V. [illegible]

WIFE'S ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (City, State)
COLEVILLE, CALIFORNIA

CHILDREN (Name, Age)

CINDY	15		
SANDRA	11		
WILLIAM L. JR	7		

DATE ENTERED SERVICE (Day, Month, Year) 22 JAN 1944

DATE REPORTED TO LIBERTY (Month, Year) APR 1966

HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE (Name, City, State) COACHELLA VALLEY, INDIO, CALIFORNIA
COACHELLA VALLEY UNION HIGH, COACHELLA X Graduated __Attended __years
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIF. 3 OF 5 CALIF (B.A. HISTORY 1949) U. OF IOWA (U.S. ED 1961)

HOBBIES AND INTERESTS
READING, PHOTOGRAPHY, SWIMMING, SAILING, WOOD WORKING

FUTURE PLANS (Naval Career, Type of Civilian Job Desired, etc.)
NAVAL CAREER

NAME(S) OF HOMETOWN NEWSPAPER

I hereby consent that any of the above information (except parents' martial status) may be published by the Public Affairs Officer or used by him in any manner with the approval of the Commanding Officer.

W. [illegible] (signed) 6 Jan 1967 (date)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

3

JAMES A. LINEN III

MR. JAMES A. LINEN OF CHICAGO
IS SOME SORT OF [illegible]



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

5

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SEIZED
RESCUED

6

MISC. BACKGROUND

HOUSE INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNICATIONS

MESSAGES

DATA ON INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS (ISR. SAID WE SENT AA MEANING IDENTIFY YOURSELF. SIGNAL BOOK SHOWS AA DOES NOT MEAN IDENTIFY YOURSELF.)

FOLDER II

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

7

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1967

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Keene:

Please accept my deepest sympathy in the death of your son, Petty Officer Richard Walter Keene, Junior, at sea.

While I realize that words are inadequate to express true feelings at a time like this, it is my prayer that you will find comfort in the knowledge that your sacrifice is a monument to America's selfless and enduring search for peace.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in expressing this Nation's gratitude and our personal sympathy in your time of bereavement.

Sincerely.

Mr. and Mrs. Richard Walter Keene, Senior
Eighteen Dublin Lane
Poughkeepsie, New York

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8

•••••••••••••••••• NOTICE OF TEMPORARY RETURN FROM USS LIBERTY ••••••••••••••••••
(VE OLE [redacted] UNSINKABLE
AJTR-5

Issued in solemn warning this.29.day of..JULY.1967 to the relatives and friends and neighbors of.Dr..Richard.Kiefer.....

Very soon he will be in your midst to spend a few days leave and once again live as a human being with freedom and justice engaged in life, liberty, and a somewhat unknown pursuit of happiness.

In making your preparations to welcome him back to society, you must make allowances for the very crude enviroment from which he has unwillingly absented himself.

He must be handled with extreme care, show no alarm if he prefers to stand stiff instead of sitting in a comfortable chair. Keep cool as he pours gravy on his dessert or he mixes peaches with whiskey. Be tolerant with his language, If his vocabulary has changed, with or without accent, you must understand that Navy "GRAMMAR" is slightly different from what is used by real people. In a relatively short time he can be taught to speak properly.

For a little while after he is home, until he is completely "house-broken", be exceptionally watchful when he is in the company of women; particularly those who are young and beautiful,or those who are easily offended. His intentions are sincere, although dishonorable.

Keep in mind that beneath his lean and rugged exterior there is a heart of gold, The only thing of value he has left. Treat him with kindness and occasionally a case of beer and now and then a fifth of Canadian Club and you will be able to rehabilitate that which is now a hollow shell of the proud Civilian you once knew. Don't feel hurt if he sits down at the table and feeds himself as though someone were going to steal his food. If he shuns dehydrated potatoes, dehydrated scrambled eggs, dehydrated milk, beans, chipped beef, pancakes, stew and meatloaf, don't mind because they will all remind him of his recent African Cruise. Feed him slowly and he will soon adjust to normal eating habits.

Please show no alarm if he prefers to stir his coffee with an oversized spoon or when he calls the food chow, the bed the rack, and the movies a flick. Don't be amazed when he salutes in the presence of superiors. Never make any flattering remarks about the Air Force, Army, or Coast Guard, and above all the Marines in his presence. Please don't blow any whistles while he is taking a shower, because it may prove to embarrass the neighbors. He is actually harmless, though his actions may seem a little strange. However, while in the Navy he is taught to kill. Tell the neighbors to get their kids off the streets, lock their daughters in their rooms, and fill their refers (refrigerators) with beer. Get his "Civies" out of the closet! He'll be home in [redacted] days.

Truthfully yours,
Uncle Sam"

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

9

DECOMMISSIONING OF
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)



Southgate Annex to Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

1100 28 June 1968

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Built by

OREGON SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION
Portland, Oregon

Launched

May 1945

Converted by

WILLAMETTE IRON & STEEL COMPANY
Portland, Oregon

Commissioned

30 December 1964
PUGET SOUND NAVY SHIPYARD
Bremerton, Washington

Decommissioned

28 June 1968
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

MISSION

The mission of LIBERTY was to conduct technical research projects, in support of U. S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which included electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications.

HISTORY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a Victorty Ship. Christened the STARS VICTORY, she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland,Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan, during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The ship was selected by the Navy for conversion to a technical research ship a was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's Commissioning on December 30, 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Wash. under the new name of LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten towns and cities in the United States which are located in the following states: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. After commissioning, LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal on the way to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia. LIBERTY made four operational deployments to the South Atlantic off the west coast of Africa. While on her fifth deployment, she was attacked on 8 June 1967 in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea by jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats. Thirty-four men lost their lives and another two hundred were injured. Permanent repairs were made to her hull in Malta and she returned to the States on 29 July 1967. LIBERTY began her deactivation phase prior to decommissioning on March 4, 1968 at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PROGRAM

BAND SELECTIONS
Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four Band

INVOCATION
Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL,
Chaplain Corps, U. S. NAVY

READING OF SHIP'S HISTORY
Lieutenant Wallace I. WHITE, U. S. NAVY
Executive Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

REMARKS
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PLANK OWNER RECOGNITION
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

PROGRAM

READING OF ORDERS TO DECOMMISSION USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
Captain Charles J. BEERS, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, Naval Inactive Ships
Maintenance Facility, Norfolk, Virginia

HAULING DOWN OF COLORS
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

CUSTODY OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) TRANSFERRED TO
NAVAL INACTIVE SHIPS MAINTENANCE FACILITY
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON, U. S. NAVY
Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

BENEDICTION
Lieutenant Commander Francis L. HARREL
Chaplain Corps, U. S. NAVY

BAND SELECTIONS
Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Four BAND

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COMMANDING OFFICER Donald L. BURSON, LCDR, U. S. NAV

Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON was born in Houston, Texas on May 12, 1934. After graduating from the University of Texas he entered Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island in August 1956. His first tour of duty was aboard the USS BLUE (DD-744) as Fire Control Officer. During this tour he was awarded the China Service Medal for participation in the Formosa Patrol. After attending nine weeks of Gunnery Officer School, San Diego, he returned to BLUE as Gunnery Officer, and was appointed Lieutenant (junior grade), and received the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in operation in support of Quemoy. In December 1959, he reported to the Military Sea Transportation Service Office, Houston, Texas as Executive Officer and Naval Control of Shipping Officer. He was promoted to Lieutenant in February 1961. His next assignment was a two year tour as Executive Officer aboard the USS DIRECT (MSO-430) which operated in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean and the Mediterranean. He reported aboard the USS AUCILLA (AO-56) as Operations Officer in November 1963. He was awarded the Bronze Star in lieu of a second award for the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for participation in the Dominican Republic Contingency. During this time AUCILLA operated in the Western and Northern Atlantic, and Caribbean as part of the Second Fleet. In August 1965 he reported to CINCLANTFLT staff as Frequency Control Officer in the Communications Division. He was appointed Lieutenant Commander in December 1965 and served at CINCLANTFLT until reporting aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in June 1967 as Executive Officer. He assumed command of LIBERTY on October 02, 1967. He will report to the USS PALM BEACH (AGER-2), as Commanding Officer in August. He is married to the former Miss Dorothy Virginia Curtis of New York City. The BURSON's have two sons.

PREVIOUS COMMANDING OFFICERS

Commander Daniel T. MIFLAND, Jr. - 30 Dec 64 - 25 Apr 66
Commander William L. McCONGLE - 25 Apr 66 - 02 Oct 67
Lieutenant Commander Donald L. BURSON - 02 OCT 66 - 28 Jan

OFFICERS

Executive Officer.....LT Wallace I. WHITE, Jr.
Chief Engineer.....LT John J. BILLINGTON
Operations Officer.....LTJG David G. LUCAS
Supply Officer.....LTJG Edward A. ADAMS, Jr.
First Lieutenant.....LTJG Malcolm P. O'MALLEY

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

MMCS Richard J. BROOKS

FIRST CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

BT1 George W. BATON
DC1 Donald F. DAVIS
*SD1 Eddie G. ELDER
RM1 William M. EMERY
MM1 Charles M. MARTIN
RM1 Thomas L. VAN CLEAVE
CS1 Gordon J. WEDIG

SECOND CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

ET2 Ricky L. ALEXANDER
CS2 Garry L. BARTON
ETR2 John F. CANNON
SH2 Henry E. DURZENSKI, Jr.
MM2 Jerry G. HOBSON
MT2 Charles K. HAUCK
MM2 James R. PATTERSON
YN2 Martin D. PENLEDGE
EN2 Elmer F. RASMUSSEN
EM2 Richard J. REGER
DC2 James C. SMITH
MR2 Larry B. TIDRY

* Plank Owner

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

13

THIRD CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

EM3 Richard E. ANDERSON
EM3 Samuel A. BELL, Jr.
SFM3 Danny M. BLANTON
MM3 John E. BOOTH
BT3 Don[illegible]. BOTCHER
EM3 "J" "C" COLSTON, Jr.
SFM3 Duilio DEMORI
SFM3 George A. EVANS
RM3 Eddie T. GREEN
SD3 Troy L. GREEN
SK3 Edward D. HANDY
SM3 Richard L. HARRIS
HM3 Ronald L. HURLEY
MM3 Duane L. JOHNSON
BT3 Robert C. KIDD
*IC3 John [illegible] SER
SK3 [illegible] N. LEHMAN
SH3 Thomas W. LEMOND
EM3 James A. MARAIO
MR3 Wlater C. McDANIEL
BT3 David B. MILLER
IC3 Kenneth J. MORRIS
BT3 Richard G. MUMFORD
ETR3 Arthur M. PASCALE
EM3 Roger D. PEMBERTON
SK3 Jesse H. PERDUE, Jr.
SK3 Harvey L. PURCELL
MR3 David RAMEY
SK3 [illegible]un J. ROSE
SK3 Victor J. ROSSI
EN3 Ronald W. SCHNEIDER
BT3 Michael [illegible]. SIMPSON
QM3 Larry J. [illegible]LAVENS
BT3 Joseph D. [illegible]OUDT

FIREMEN - SEAMEN - [illegible]WARDSMEN

FN Benjamin G. AISHE
SA Henry A. BEALER
FN Maurice A. BRODEUR
EMFN Luther R. BURRESS
FN Robert L. BUXTON
SN [illegible]
SA Berkley A. CULBERSON
TN Rodolfo A. DIAZ
FN Thomas M. GREEN
SN Lowell S. JONES
SN David J. KISIEL
SN Charles M. LAKO, II
FN Gerald F. LOSASSO
SN Robert L. McCALLISTER
SN Walter D. MCHAFFIE
*TN Renegio N. MERCADO
SN Brent W. MOORHEAD
SN [illegible]
SN Thomas A. QUINTERO
SFMFN Michael R. RAPINAC
SN Stephen J. RICHARD
SA Raymond THOMEN
TN Pedro P. WATAN
SN Tommy W. WHEELER
SN James L. WILLIS, Jr.

* Plank Owners

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

14

Commissioning of

UNITED STATES SHIP

LIBERTY

(AGTR-5)



PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD

Bremerton, Washington

30 December 1964

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



NAVAL COMMISSIONING

The commissioning ceremony signifies the beginning of the ship's career of service to the country. The breaking of the commission pennant at the truck simultaneously with the hoisting of the national ensign and the union jack officially mark the ship's status — "In Commission." Thenceforth, the Commanding Officer and the Ship's Company have the responsibility of bringing the ship to a peak of readiness equal to any demand placed upon her by our country in peace or war.

UNITED STATES SHIP

LIBERTY

AGTR-5

Built by

OREGON SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION

PORTLAND, OREGON

⚓

Launched

May 1945

⚓

Converted by

WILLAMETTE IRON AND STEEL COMPANY

PORTLAND, OREGON

⚓

Commissioned

December 30 1964

PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD

BREMERTON, WASHINGTON

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



UNITED STATES SHIP LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

MISSION AND PURPOSE OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The mission of the USS LIBERTY will be to conduct technical research operations in support of U. S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communication systems such as satellite communications.

★

HISTORY OF LIBERTY

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May of 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Suyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Liberty was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research Ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the 10 cities and towns in the United States named LIBERTY. These towns and cities are located in the following States: Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas.

★

DATA OF INTEREST

Length overall 455 feet
Draft (full load) 29 feet
Beam 60 feet
Displacement 11,500 Tons
Propulsion, Steam turbine – single screw 8500 HP
Boats 26 foot Motor whaleboat, capacity 22
33 foot Perrsonnel boat, capacity 45
33 foot Utility boat, capacity 45
24 CO, inflatable lifeboats, capacity 15

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



ROBERT E. HARRIS
Captain, U.S. Navy

Captain Robert E. Harris, USN, was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 17 February 1917. He entered the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, in June 1936, and graduated in June 1940.

After service in the Engineering Department of the USS PENNSYLVANIA, Captain Harris put the USS WASHINGTON in commission on 15 May 1941, and served in her Engineering Department until April 1943. During this period the ship saw service with the British Home Fleet on the Murmansk Patrol, and off Guadal Canal.

From May 1943 to June 1945, the Captain attended postgraduate school at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass. He graduated with a Master of Science Degree in Naval Construction and Engineering, and was designated an Engineering Duty Officer. He then spent four years at the U. S. Naval Shipyard at Charleston, South Carolina, in the Production, Industrial Relations, and Planning Departments.

On 15 May 1949, the Captain put the USS SALEM in commission as Engineering Officer, and served in her through several tours in the Mediterranean as COMSIXTH Fleet Flagship until July 1951. The Captain was then ordered to the Department of Marine Engineering at the United States Naval Academy, where he administered the instruction of midshipmen in Fluid Mechanics and Thermodynamics for the next three years.

In July 1954, the Captain reported to the U. S. Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, as head of the Technical Administrative Services Department, and second in command. This was followed by tours with the Board of Inspection and Survey, Washington, D.C. (1958-60), and in the Bureau of Ships (1960-63).

On 1 July, 1963, the Captain assumed duties as the Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Industrial Manager USN Thirteenth Naval District.

Captain Harris is married to the former Joanne G. Smullin, of Collingswood, N. J. Captain and Mrs. Harris have a son and a daughter—Michael, who is attending Western Washington State College in Bellingham, Washington, and Kim, who lives at home.



REAR ADMIRAL W. E. FERRALL, USN

Rear Admiral Ferrall assumed duties on 21 July 1964 as Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, with his headquarters at the U. S. Naval Air Station, Seattle, Washington. His last assignment was Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command and Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District with headquarters at Fort Amador, Canal Zone.

William Edward Ferrall was born in Columbiana, Ohio on 8 September 1903. He attended Crafton High School and entered the U. S. Naval Academy on 11 June 1923. After graduation, he served in the USS WEST VIRGINIA, USS COLORADO and USS WATERS. After completing submarine instruction at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, he served on the submarines USS BONITA and USS BASS. Upon completion of graduate studies at the University of California, he returned to sea duty, assuming command of the USS SEA DRAGON, and for outstanding service as Commanding Officer during World War II was awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Bronze Star.

When detached from command of the SEA DRAGON in 1943, he had duties in the Navy Department, Staff Submarine Force Pacific, and commanded a Submarine Squadron and Division in the Pacific.

As Commanding Officer of USS HAYFIELD in the Korean theatre, he received a Gold Star in lieu of the third Bronze Star.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in March 1955, he was assigned as Chief of the Naval Group, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey; Commander Mines Force, Atlantic Fleet; and served as Director, Plans and Policies with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

18

U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

COMMISSIONING CEREMONIES

30 December 1964

Band Selections

Thirteenth Naval District Band

★

Invocation

Commander P. J. Bakker, CHC, USN
Chaplain, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

Welcoming Remarks and Introduction of Distinguished Guests

Rear Admiral Floyd B. Schultz, USN
Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

Remarks and Introduction of Principal Speaker

Rear Admiral William E. Ferrall, USN
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District

★

Commissioning Address

VADM H. N. Wallin, USN (Ret.)

★

Reading of Navy Department Order to Commission U. S. S. LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

Rear Admiral William E. Ferrall, USN

6

Ensign, Jack and Commission Pennant are hoisted as the band plays the National Anthem. The ship is now in commission.

★

Reading of Commanding Officer's orders and assumption of command

CDR D. T. Wieland, USN

★

First watch is set by the Executive Officer

LCDR J .A. Mazzolini

★

Benediction

Commander P. J. Bakker, CHC, USN
Chaplain, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

★

Band Selections

Thirteenth Naval District Band

7

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



VICE ADMIRAL HOMER NORMAN WALLIN, U.S. NAVY

Vice Admiral Wallin, born in Washburn, North Dakota, December 6, 1893, attended Washburn High School, Jamestown College and the University of North Dakota, all in North Dakota, before his appointment to the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, from his native state in 1913. He graduated and was commissioned Ensign in March 1917.

After graduation in 1917, VADM Wallin served aboard the battleship NEW JERSEY. He then reported for duty under postgraduate instruction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was appointed Assistant Naval Constructor in September 1918.

In July 1941 Admiral Wallin reported for duty as Material Officer on the staff of the Commander, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet aboard the USS CALIFORNIA. Following the Pearl Harbor attack he was assigned as Fleet Salvage Officer and had charge of the salvage of many vessels of the Pacific Fleet. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, in September 1942.

From November 1942 to August 1943 Admiral Wallin served as Maintenance and Damage Repair Officer on the staff of Admiral Halsey, Commander, South Pacific Force, and for that service was awarded the Legion of Merit.

Returning to duty in the United States, Admiral Wallin was Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Ordnance, Seattle, Washington from October 1943 to November 1946, and for his services in that assignment received a Letter of Commendation with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon from the Secretary of the Navy.

Transferred to Philadelphia in November, 1946, he served as Commander of the Naval Shipyard there until January, 1949, when he assumed command of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth, Virginia. In March 1950 he had technical charge of the refloating of the Battleship MISSOURI. He was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Ships in February 1951. After two and a half years in that position, he asked to be relieved in order to return to his native Northwest and take command of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. This request was granted and on August 27, 1953 he assumed command of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit and the Commendation Ribbon, Admiral Wallin has the Victory Medal, Atlantic Fleet Clasp (USS NEW JERSEY); and is entitled to the American Defense Service Medal, Fleet Clasp, the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal; the American Area Campaign Medal; and the World War II Victory Medal.



CDR DANIEL T. WIELAND, JR., USN
Commanding Officer

CDR Daniel T. Wieland, Jr., was born at Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania, on August 2, 1922 and subsequently entered the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland in July 1942. Upon commissioning as Ensign June 6, 1945 he served as Assistant Gunnery Officer in USS JOHN R. PIERCE (DD-753) in the Pacific area.

Commander Wieland remained in the Pacific area as Gunnery Officer aboard the USS ENDICOTT (DMS-35) for the next three years. The ship operated extensively in the China area during this period.

The University of Nebraska at Lincoln was Commander Wieland's home for the next two years where he served as Ordnance and Gunnery Instructor.

July of 1951 found Commander Wieland commanding the USS OSPREY (AMS-28). During his tenure the OSPREY was awarded the Navy Unit Citation and Korean Presidential Unit Citation. Commander Wieland was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with combat "V" for his service during the thirteen months aboard OSPREY. During this period OSPREY was engaged in combat minesweeping operations on both coasts of North Korea and was engaged by shore batteries on eight different occasions.

Commander Wieland was then reassigned to the Advanced Mine Countermeasures Course for the next 32 weeks. Upon completing the course he assumed command of the USS JUBILANT (AM-255). He decommissioned JUBILANT at Orange, Texas in April 1954.

His next assignment was Officer-in-Charge of the Combat Information School at the Fleet Training Center, Charleston, S.C.

From June 1956 until May 1958 he was assigned to the Joint U. S. Military Mission of Aid to Turkey at Istanbul, Turkey. His primary field during this period was Ordnance and Gunnery and Minesweeping advisor to the Turkish Fleet and Naval Academy. This tour of duty was followed by a one year tour as Executive Officer of USS WILLARD KEITH (DD-775).

In September 1959 Commander Wieland assumed command of USS ROBERTS (DE-749). He commanded ROBERTS until September 1961, when he was assigned as Director Training and Operations, U. S. Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek, Va. Commander Wieland served in this capacity until ordered as Prospective Commanding Officer USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) in August 1964.

Research Papers
James W. Ermes, Jr.





LCDR JOHN A. MAZZOLINI, USN
Executive Officer

LCDR John A. Mazzolini, born on 15 September 1928, received his early education in Holyoke, Massachusetts and at Billard Academy New London, Connecticut. He attended the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York where he graduated in December 1950 with a BS degree, Third Officer's License and was commissioned as Ensign in the Merchant Marine and U.S. Naval Reserve.

He entered the Navy in June 1951 and was ordered to the USS MANATEE (AO-58) as assistant First Lieutenant and served as Navigator and Operations Officer. He attended the U.S. Navy Salvage School then at Bayonne, New Jersey, graduating in March 1953 as Salvage Officer and Salvage Diver. He was then ordered to the USS SHAKORI (ATF-162) where he served as Executive Officer. During this assignment he was accepted for augmentation into the regular navy. In March 1954 he was ordered to the USS SHANNON (DM-225) where he served as Operations Officer. In January 1956 he was ordered to the staff Commander Mine Squadron Four as Communications Officer. In March 1957 he was ordered to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Training Division as head of the Seamanship and Navigation desk. At this time he co-authored the 13th edition of Knight's Modern Seamanship. In February 1959 he attended the General Line School, Monterey, California. Upon graduation he attended the Engineer Officer's School, San Diego, California. In February 1960 he was ordered to the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) as Main Propulsion Assistant. In May 1961 he was ordered to assume the duties of Engineer Officer. This was followed in October 1962 by a tour of duty with the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Korea before being ordered to the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) for duty.

Lieutenant Commander Mazzolini is married to the former Martha L. Wilson of Tucson, Arizona. They have three children: Jacqueline, age 8; Joele, age 6, and John, age 3. His family is currently residing in Sedona, Arizona.



MR. GEORGE WIRTZ, General Manager
Willamette Iron & Steel Company

Willamette Iron & Steel Company is recognized as a major ship conversion and repair yard. During World War II, the company was engaged in the defense program under Bureau of Ship's contracts. A total of 72 vessels of twelve different types were built, converted, or completed, including troop transports, aircraft carriers, patrol craft, mine sweepers, landing ships, barracks vessels and lighters at a total value of approximately $175,000,000,000.

In the past ten years, the company has successfully completed contracts for the conversion and repair of ships, both naval and civilian, aggregating in excess of eighty million dollars.

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) OFFICERS

CDR DANIEL T. WIELAND
Commanding Officer

LCDR JOHN A. MAZZOLINI
Executive Officer

LCDR ROBERT J. CORRADO
Research Department Head

LT JOHN B. STOCKTON
Research Officer

LT JAMES S. ERVEN
Research Officer

LT RICHARD H. LEE
Electronics Material Officer

LT DONALD H. PEOPLES
Research Officer

LTJG RAYMOND FINK
Research Officer

LT LESTER A. MORCERF
Operations Officer

LT GEORGE H. GOLDEN
Engineering Officer

LTJG JOHN T. LILLIS
Main Propulsion Assistant

ENS HARRY GRAY
Damage Control Assistant

LTJG JOHN B. PERKINS
Supply Officer

ENS LARRY G. BRANNAN
Disbursing Officer

LTJG SID E. MERIDITH
First Lieutenant

ENS MICHAEL D. SWEENEY
Deck Division Watch Officer

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) CREW

SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

Johnston, F.L. Smith, W.R.

CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS

Barrigar, E.
Boyle, F.W.
Clemmer, C.H.
Haller, B.J.
Jones, K.A.
Miller, H.C.
Quick, E.R.
Thomson, D.D.
Wines, J.D.

FIRST CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Bailey, R.J.
Bey, R.
Brown, L.S.
Brown, N.R.
Butler, C.R.
Daniels, G.F.
Hill, K.C.
Leach, E.H.
Novosel, J.
Olson, R.H.
Ormsby, L.R.
Perry, R.L.
Ware, P.A.

SECOND CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Baker, D.
Bales, L.
Berry, T.W.
Bird, T.A.
Boyer, R.
Breisch, T.C.
Dahlstrom, H.J.
Davidson, B.R.
Donaldson, G.C.
Ehscheid, A.R.
Ellison, T.L.
Field, F.
Franco, J.A.
Gales, R.E.
Hickman, L.V.
Luttrell, J.E.
Miller, J.W.
Pickard, [illegible]
Preston, D.R.
Reitz, A.E.
Ruiz, R.G.
Shawley, A.
Stenzel, D.L.
Street
Wachtstetter, R.A.
Washam, G.D.
Welty, D.C.
Westerby, C.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) CREW

THIRD CLASS PETTY OFFICERS

Allen, R.W.
Baker, E.R.
Binzer, D.H.
Blabac, J.R.
Bullock, E.
Casale, R.
Davis, R.E.
Hall, T.E.
Harrison, D.O.
Huggins, G.W.
King, C.E.
King, G.
Kohl, T.A.
Krokos, S.L.
Lilly, I.
Melton, J.D.
Mick, K.R.
Millis, T.B.
Neary, J.J.
Nixon, L.
O'Classen, F.J.
Pierce, J.C.
Polk, J.A.
Rehm, R.E.
Reynolds, J.D.
Schuele, J.D.
Shepard, J.L.
Snell, W.
Spicher, J.C.
Stark, E.E.
Stoddard, G.D.
Stowell, W.C.
Taylor, R.W.
Valano, G.
Wolford, G.P.
Wentzel, W.L.
West, D.L.

FIREMEN AND SEAMEN

Ary, S.P.
Bagan, R.M.
Ballard, J.
Barry, R.M.
Blaney, T.F.
Bonsignore, J.A.
Booe, M.J.
Brummett, H.L.
Busson, M.H.
Butterbaugh, C.I.
Buxton, G.
Cockrell, J.A.
Conner, J.D.
Devaney, T.R.
Dixon, D.M.
Edwards, W.
Ferrell, A.
Fischer, R.N.
Ford, D.M.
Funk, C.E.
Graziula, C.
Gilman, R.C.
Grandlund, C.L.
Hutchings, L.N.
Karn, S.L.
Keentus, H.M.
LaVergne, R.
Lynch, D.
Maloney, J.P.
Marmon, E.G.
McLendon, H.W.
Mola, E.D.
Morgan, G.T.
Newman, R.L.
O'Brien, O.
Pattno, M.S.
Pfohl, J.K.
Rice, E.V.
Ringenli, L.J.
Roberts, W.M.
Robinson, C.T.
Rogers, L.G.
Sasso, H.
Sainz, D.D.
Seman, M.A.
Sollenberger, W.
St. Clair, R.A.
Susaman, C.R.
Sweetats, M.A.
Tarter, J.B.
Valentyn, J.W.
Vogt, R.L.
Wilkison, T.H.
Willmart, D.G.
Willson, T.H.
Zeiler, W.A.
Zimmerman, J.L.

FIREMEN AND SEAMEN

Amos, R.
Anderson, L.
Baker, D.
Barton, G.
Bass, J.M.
Beattie, F.M.
Bethel, R.
Bobbit, T.
Boles, K.
Brown, F.(n)
Brown, F.J.
Bush, M.A.
Carr, J.
Chavers, J.
Cloniger, S.
Cooke, L.B.
Cotten, J.E.
Cronise, J.
Cutright, A.
Cvetan, S.
Daudelin, G.
Dye, G.
Edwards, L.
Fleming, J.
Fowler, R.W.
Gilson, R.D.
Gonzalez, E.
Gurchik, S.
Hauber, T.I.
Hazen, D.
Hemphill, N.G.
Hendirx, E.
Hight, B.M.
Hinkle, L.R.
Huff, T.J.
Jenkins, A.
Jewell, G.
Kasecky, J.
Kinser, J.H.
Kloskin, L.S.
Koch, R.K.
Koromah, G.M.
Laine, R.
Lumpkins, D.
Marfil, S.
McRae, G.
Meaux, E.
Mercado, R.
Moody, J.W.
Nelson, L.B.
Ottani, R.F.
Pahides, S.
Pecue, J.W.
Perkins, E.G.
Peters, S.L.
Pfeile, C.
Relliford, W.D.
Ringe, R.A.
Sales, D.L.
Shellhame
Smith, C.D.
Snyder, L.W.
Strother, L.
Tomczak, D.
Tromblee, H.I.
Turner, G.L.
Veroni, L.
Wagoner, D.L.
Wallace, J.
Walraven, R.M.
Ward, J.W.
Watson, N.
Williamson, J.K.
Winters, C.L.
Woods, B.R.
Zwart, L.L.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

22



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

23

Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization

H.O. 102

VK
391
.I6
U6
1969

International Code of Signals

As adopted by the Fourth Assembly of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization in 1965

For Visual, Sound, and Radio Communications

United States Edition, 1969

Published by the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office
under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1969

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

118,839

For sale by authorized sales agents of the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office; also by Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $4

CHAPTER 2—SECTION 1

DISTRESS—EMERGENCY

Code	*Meaning*	*Cross Reference*
	ABANDON	
*AA	Repeat all after . . .	
*AB	Repeat all before . . .	
AC	I am abandoning my vessel.	
AD	I am abandoning my vessel which has suffered a nuclear accident and is a possible source of radiation danger.	
AE	I must abandon my vessel.	
	AE 1 I (or crew of vessel indicated) wish to abandon my (or their) vessel, but have not the means.	
	AE 2 I shall abandon my vessel unless you will remain for me, ready to assist.	
AF	I do not intend to abandon my vessel.	
	AF 1 Do you intend to abandon your vessel?	
AG	You should abandon your vessel as quickly as possible.	
AH	You should not abandon your vessel.	
AI	Vessel (indicated by position and/or name or identity signal if necessary) will have to be abandoned.	
	ACCIDENT—DOCTOR—INJURED/SICK	
	Accident	
AJ	I have had a serious nuclear accident and you should approach with caution.	
AK	I have had a nuclear accident on board.	

I am abandoning my vessel which has suffered a nuclear accident and is a possible source of radiation danger..... AD

I am proceeding to the position of accident..... SB

*Procedural signals for repetition.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

H.O. 102

INTERNATIONAL CODE OF SIGNALS

FOR VISUAL, SOUND, AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

UNITED STATES EDITION

1969



U.S. NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

H.O. 102

International Code of Signals

As adopted by the Fourth Assembly of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization in 1965

For Visual, Sound, and Radio Communications

United States Edition, 1969



Published by the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office
under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1969

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, J

CHAPTER 1

SIGNALING INSTRUCTIONS

		Page
Section 1.–	Explanations and General Remarks	3
Section 2.–	Definitions	4
Section 3	Methods of Signaling	5
Section 4.–	General Instructions	6
Section 5.–	Flag Signaling	9
Section 6.–	Flashing Light Signaling	11
Section 7.–	Sound Signaling	13
Section 8.–	Radiotelephony	14
Section 9.–	Signaling by Hand Flags or Arms	15
Section 10.–	Morse Symbols, Phonetic Tables, Procedure Signals	18
	Single-Letter Signals	22
	Single-Letter Signals with Complements	23
	Single-Letter Signals between Icebreaker and Assisted Vessels	24

CROSS INDEX

General Signal Code	Chapter 2, Page 27
Medical Signal Code	Chapter 3, Page 97
Distress and Life-saving Signals and Radiotelephone Procedures	Chapter 4, Page 131
Nationality Identity Signals for Ships and Aircraft	Appendix, Page 141
Indexes	Index, Page 149
Index for Signaling Instructions and General Signal Code	Index, Page 151
Index for Medical Signal Code	Index, Page 155

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CHAPTER 1—SECTION 6

FLASHING LIGHT SIGNALING

1. A signal made by flashing light is divided into the following parts:

   a The **call**. It consists of the general call to the identity signal of the station to be called. It is answered by the answering signal.

   b The **identity**. The transmitting station makes "**DE**" followed by its identity signal or name. This will be repeated back by the receiving station which then signals its own identity signal or name. This will also be repeated back by the transmitting station.

   c The **text**. This consists of plain language or Code groups. When Code groups are to be used they should be preceded by the signal "**IC**". Words of plain language may also be in the text when the signal includes names, places, etc. Receipt of each word or group is acknowledged by "**T**".

   d The **ending**. It consists of the ending signal "**AR**" which is answered by "**R**".

2. If the entire text is in plain language the same procedure is to be followed. The call and identity may be omitted when two stations have established communications and have already exchanged signals.

3. A list of procedure signals appears in Chapter 1, Section 10, Pages 20 and 21. Although the use of these signals is self-explanatory, the following notes might be found useful:

   (*a*) The **General call signal** (or call for unknown station) "**AA AA AA**" etc., is made to attract attention when wishing to signal to all stations within visual signaling distance or to a station whose name or identity signal is not known. The call is continued until the station addressed answers.

   b The **Answering signal "TTTT"** etc., is made to answer the call and it is not to be answered until the transmitting station ceases to make the call. The transmission starts with the signal "**DE**" followed by the name or identity signal of the transmitting station.

   c The letter "**T**" is used to indicate the receipt of each word or group.

   d The **Erase signal "EEEEE"** etc., is used to indicate that the last group or word was signaled incorrectly. It is to be answered with the erase signal. When answered, the transmitting station will repeat the last word or group which was correctly signaled and then proceed with the remainder of the transmission.

   e The **Repeat signal "RPT"** is to be used as follows:

      (i) by the transmitting station to indicate that it is going to repeat ("I repeat"). If such a repetition does not follow immediately after "**RPT**" the signal should be interpreted as a request to the receiving station to repeat the signal received ("Repeat what you have received");

      (ii) by the receiving station to request for a repetition of the signal transmitted ("Repeat what you have sent");

      (iii) The **Special Repetition signals** "**AA**", "**AB**", "**WA**", "**WB**", and "**BN**" are made by the receiving station as appropriate. In each case they are made immediately after the repeat signal "**RPT**".

      Examples:

      "**RPT AB KL**" "Repeat all before group **KL**".

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CHAPTER 1—SECTION 9

SIGNALING BY HAND FLAGS OR ARMS

Signaling by Semaphore

1. A station which desires to communicate with another station by semaphore may indicate the requirement by transmitting to that station the signal **"K1"** (KILO UNAONE) by any method. If the stations are close to one another the attention sign may be made instead.

2. On receipt of the call, the station addressed should hoist the answering pennant at the dip or make the answering sign, or, if unable to communicate by semaphore, should reply with the signal **"YS 1"**.

3. The sender will make the attention sign and wait until the answering pennant is hoisted close up, or the answering sign is made by the station addressed, commencing transmission after a reasonable pause.

4. The signal should always be made in plain text, figure and numbers or correction of semaphore signal are always to be spelled out in words.

5. At the end of each word the arms are to be dropped to the breast position. When double letters occur the arms are to be dropped to the breast position after the first letter is made and then moved out to the second letter without a pause. The erase signal is a succession of E's.

6. The reception of each word is to be indicated by the receiving station making the letter "T". If this letter is not made the word is to be repeated.

7. All signals will end with the ending signal "$\overline{AR}$".

Morse Signaling by Hand Flags or Arms

1. A station which desires to communicate with another station by Morse signaling by hand flags or arms may indicate the requirement by transmitting to that station the signal **"K2"** by any method. The call signal "$\overline{AA}$ $\overline{AA}$ $\overline{AA}$" may be made instead.

2. On receipt of any call the station addressed should make the answering signal, or, if unable to communicate by this means, should reply with the signal **"YS2"** by any available method.

3. The call signal "$\overline{AA}$ $\overline{AA}$ $\overline{AA}$" and the signal "T" should be used respectively by the transmitting station and the addressed station.

4. Normally both arms should be used for this method of transmission but in cases where this is difficult or impossible one arm can be used.

5. All signals will end with the ending signed "AR".

M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes Jr.

PROCEDURE SIGNALS

A bar over the letters composing a signal denotes that the letters are to be made as one symbol.

1 Signals for voice transmissions (radiotelephony or loud hailer):

Signal	Pronunciation	Meaning
Interco	IN-TER-CO	International Code group follows(s)
Stop	STOP	Full stop
Decimal	DAY-SEE-MAL	Decimal point
Correction	KOR-REK-SHUN	Cancel my last word or group. The correct word or group follows

2 Signals for flashing light transmission:

AA AA AA etc.	Call for unknown station or general call
EEEEE etc.	Error signal
AAA	Full stop or decimal point.
TTTT etc.	Answering signal
T	Word or group received

3. Signals for flags, radiotelephony, and radiotelegraphy transmissions:

CQ	Call for unknown station(s) or general call to all stations. *Note.* When this signal is used in voice transmission, it should be pronounced in accordance with the letter spelling table.

4 Signals for use where appropriate in all forms of transmission:

AA	"All after ..." (used after the "Repeat signal" (RPT) to means "Repeat all after ...")
AB	"All before ..." (used after the "Repeat signal" (RPT) means "Repeat all before ...")
AR	Ending signal or End of Transmission signal.
AS	Waiting signal or period
BN	"All between ... and ..." (used after the "Repeat signal" (RPT means "Repeat all between ... and ...")
C	Affirmative YES or "The significance of the previous group should be read in the affirmative".
CS	"What is the name or identity signal of your vessel (or station)?".
DE	"From ..." (used to precede the name or identity signal of the calling station).

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CHAPTER 2—SECTION 1

DISTRESS—EMERGENCY

Code	Meaning	Cross Reference
	ABANDON	
*AA	Repeat all after . .	
*AB	Repeat all before . .	
AC	I am abandoning my vessel	
AD	I am abandoning my vessel which has suffered a nuclear accident and is a possible source of radiation danger	
AE	I must abandon my vessel. AE 1 I (or crew of vessel indicated) wish to abandon my (or their) vessel, but have not the means. AE 2 I shall abandon my vessel unless you will remain by me, ready to assist.	
AF	I do not intend to abandon my vessel AF 1 Do you intend to abandon your vessel?	
AG	You should abandon your vessel as quickly as possible.	
AH	You should not abandon your vessel.	
AI	Vessel (indicated by position and or name or identity signal if necessary) will have to be abandoned.	

ACCIDENT—DOCTOR—INJURED/SICK

Accident

AJ	I have had a serious nuclear accident and you should approach with caution.	
AK	I have had nuclear accident on board.	
	I am abandoning my vessel which has suffered a nuclear accident and is a possible source of radiation danger	AD
	I am proceeding to the position of accident	SB

*Procedural signals for repetition.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

APPENDIX

NATIONALITY IDENTITY SIGNALS FOR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

Allocated to	
AAA ALZ	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMA AOZ	SPAIN
APA ASZ	PAKISTAN
ATA AWZ	INDIA (REPUBLIC OF)
AXA-AXZ	AUSTRALIA (COMMONWEALTH OF)
AYA AZZ	ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
BAA BZZ	CHINA
CAA CEZ	CHILE
CFA CKZ	CANADA
CLA-CMZ	CUBA
CNA-CNZ	MOROCCO (KINGDOM OF)
COA-COZ	CUBA
CPA-CPZ	BOLIVIA
CQA-CRZ	PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS PROVINCES
CSA-CUZ	PORTUGAL
CVA-CXZ	URUGUAY (ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF)
CYA-CZZ	CANADA
DAA-DTZ	GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
DUA DZZ	PHILIPPINES (REPUBLIC OF THE)
EAA-EHZ	SPAIN
EIA-EJZ	IRELAND
EKA-EKZ	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ELA-ELZ	LIBERIA (REPUBLIC OF)
EMA EOZ	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
EPA-EQZ	IRAN
ERA-ERZ	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ESA-ESZ	ESTONIA
ETA-ETZ	ETHIOPIA
EUA EWZ	BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
EXA EZZ	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
FAA FZZ	FRANCE AND GROUP OF TERRITORIES REPRESENTED BY THE FRENCH OVERSEAS POST AND TELECOMMUNICATION AGENCY
GAA GZZ	UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
HAA HAZ	HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
HBA HBZ	SWITZERLAND (CONFEDERATION)
HCA HDZ	ECUADOR
HEA HEZ	SWITZERLAND (CONFEDERATION)
HFA HFZ	POLAND (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)
HGA-HGZ	HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
HHA HHZ	HAITI (REPUBLIC OF)
HIA-HIZ	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
HJA HKZ	COLOMBIA (REPUBLIC OF)
HLA HMZ	KOREA (REPUBLIC OF)
HNA HNZ	IRAQ (REPUBLIC OF)
HOA HPZ	PANAMA
HQA HRZ	HONDURAS (REPUBLIC OF)
HSA HSZ	THAILAND
HTA HTZ	NICARAGUA
HUA HUZ	EL SALVADOR (REPUBLIC OF)
HVA HVZ	VATICAN CITY STATE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C. 20374

IN REPLY REFER TO

NHC/AR
Ser 1785
31 December 1984

Lieutenant Commander James M. Ennes, Jr., USN (Ret.)
[redacted]

Dear Lieutenant Commander Ennes,

In response to your recent request, we have been able to identify the 1962 and 1969 editions of the International Code of Signals. It does not appear that there was an edition published between those years. I am enclosing the title page for each and the double letter designations for the "A" series. You will note that the 1969 edition was adopted by the fourth assembly of the inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization in 1965.

I hope the enclosed documents are helpful.

Sincerely yours,

D. C. Allard

Dean C. Allard
Head, Operational Archives Branch

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

VK
391
.I6
U6
1962
v.1

H.O. No. 103

(FORMERLY H.O. PUB. 57)

The 1931 International Code of Signals

American Edition

(Corrected Reprint 1962)

Volume I

For Visual and Sound Signaling

Published by the U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy

Address All Reports of Errors and Suggestions For Additions or Improvements to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1962

NAVY DEPARTMENT
AUG 3 0 1962
LIBRARY

For sale by authorized Sales Agents of the U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office. . . . . Price $2.25

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

TWO-LETTER SIGNALS

ABANDON

A C Aircraft *indicated if necessary* will have to be abandoned.
A D I must abandon my vessel.
A E I shall abandon my vessel unless you will stand by me.
A F I, or crew of vessel indicated, wish to abandon my, or their, vessel but have not the means.
A G I do NOT intend to abandon my vessel.
A H You should abandon your vessel as quickly as possible.
A I You should NOT abandon aircraft. I shall attempt to take you in tow.
A J You should NOT abandon your vessel.
A K Do you intend to abandon your vessel?

ACCIDENT

A L Accident. Man, or men, dangerously injured.
A M Accident has occurred. I require a doctor.
A N Boiler accident has occurred. I require a doctor.

AFLOAT AND AGROUND

A O I am afloat.
A P I am aground.
A Q Aground seriously damaged—*Am. Is, Are.*
A S I am aground and likely to break up. Require immediate assistance.
A T I am aground and require immediate assistance.
A U I am aground. Send what immediate assistance you can.
A V I am aground. Will you endeavor to tow me off?
A W I CAN NOT be refloated by any means now available.
A X I may be refloated if prompt assistance be given.
A Y You will be aground.
A Z You will be aground at low water.
B A Are you afloat?

AHEAD AND HEADWAY

B C Full speed ahead.
B D I have headway.
B E I have headway. My engines are going ahead.
B F I CAN NOT make headway.
B G You should go ahead.
B H You should go ahead easy.
B I You should go ahead full speed.
B J You should keep going ahead.
B K You should keep your engines going ahead.

AIRCRAFT

B L Airplane is down in position indicated and requires immediate assistance.
B M Airplane reported in distress is receiving assistance.
B N Aircraft are engaged in taking off and landing on, or near, this vessel. You should NOT approach too near.
B O Aircraft *indicated if necessary* left at time indicated.
B P Aircraft *indicated if necessary* is seriously damaged Will you take off mail and passengers?
B Q Airship is down in position indicated and requires immediate assistance.
B R Airship reported in distress is receiving assistance
B S All is ready to receive you at mooring mast.
B U I am about to alight to make good defect. Will you stand by me?
B V I am alighting in position indicated; am short of petrol.
B W I am alighting in position indicated with engine trouble.
B X I am alighting to pick up crew of disabled aircraft in position indicated.
B Y I am forced to alight. Stand by to pick up crew.
B Z I shall endeavor to fly to the land now.
C A I sighted an airplane at time indicated in position indicated steering course indicated.
C B I sighted an airship at time indicated in position indicated steering course indicated.
C D Sea is smooth enough for you to alight near me.
C E Sea is too rough for you to alight.
C F You CAN NOT be received at mooring mast at present.
C G You should alight as near to me as possible.
C H You should alight to leeward of me; I am stopped.
C I You should alight to windward of me; I am stopped.
C J You should prepare to receive me, or airship indicated, at mooring mast, *at time indicated.*
C K You should NOT approach moon[illegible] mast.
C L Can you communicate with the airplane?
C M Can you communicate with the airship?
C N Have you sighted or heard of airplane in distress?
C O How much longer can you remain in the air?
C P Is airplane in a condition to proceed?
C Q Is airship in a condition to proceed?
C R Is the sea smooth enough for me to alight near you?

ALONGSIDE

C S You should endeavor to come alongside.
C T You should NOT come alongside.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RESTRICTIONS ON DISCUSSING ATTACK

30 June 1967 Plan of the Day:

"The Secretary of Defense has released to the press portions of the unclassified information obtained by the court of inquiry. Ship's members are authorized to discuss with others only what is contained in the news release and no more. In other words you can say no more than exactly what the news release says. To avoid any possibility of disclosing classified information it is highly recommended that all hands refrain from discussing the incident with others, particularly news media representatives. The news release has not yet been received but will be promulgated to all hands when received. Any discussions with news media representatives are to be reported to the Executive Officer right away, giving the name of the individual you talked with, who he works for, and what information was given to him."

1 July 1967 Plan of the Day:

"Copies of the summary of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry investigating the attack on LIBERTY are held by all officers. It is highly recommended that all hands borrow their Division Officers copy and read the report. Any statements or comments to others is confined to the exact wording in this report."

22 July 1967 Plan of the Day:

"Interviews and statements to news media concerning the attack on LIBERTY 08 June are not to be given by individuals. If you are approached by someone wanting an interview or statement inform them that they must contact the Public Affairs Officer at CINCLANTFLT who will make all arrangements. Also, inform the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer of the request made to you. The only information that ships company is allowed to discuss is that already made available to the press. Therefore, there is nothing new that we would be able to tell them in an interview."

28 July 1967 Plan of the Day:

"INTERVIEWS or STATEMENTS to the PRESS. A reminder that we are still limited in statements we may give to the press. If someone wants to question you or have an interview, inform them they must submit their request to CINCLANTFLT who will make all arrangements. Also, inform the Executive Officer that someone has asked you for a statement."

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

In '67 Attack

[illegible]

[illegible] Israeli [illegible] the U.S. Liberty [illegible] Mediterranean [illegible] Israeli [illegible] Rock [illegible] Israel [illegible] test [illegible] radio [illegible] Rock [illegible] shore [illegible] [illegible] Arab [illegible] that [illegible] ones.

Det[illegible]ing [illegible] brou[illegible] sai[illegible] bridge[illegible] that [illegible] script [illegible] after[illegible]

It s[illegible] closed [illegible] memb[illegible] used in [illegible] such as those involved in the Liberty incident.

[illegible] the transcripts [illegible] Lawrence L. Wi[illegible]llen (D-Mo[illegible]ed the De[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS

PHASE I

REPORT

OF THE

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

UNDER AUTHORITY OF

H. Res. 201

MAY 10, 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
60-499 WASHINGTON : 1971

[redacted]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

F. EDWARD HEBERT, Louisiana, *Chairman*

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
G. ELLIOTT HAGAN, Georgia
CHARLES H. WILSON, California
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana
RICHARD C. WHITE, Texas
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia
ROBERT A. ROLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
HAROLD RUNNELS, New Mexico
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
BOB WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
CARLETON J. KING, New York
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey
G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST, Virginia
C. W. (BILL) YOUNG, Florida
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

F. EDWARD HEBERT, Louisiana, *Chairman*

SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
W. C. (DAN) DANIEL, Virginia

LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey

JOHN T. M. REDDAN, *Counsel*
JOHN F. LALLY, *Assistant Counsel*
RICHARD A. RANSOM, *Professional Staff Member*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia, *Chairman*
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
JOHN T. M. REDDAN, *Counsel*
JOHN F. LALLY, *Assistant Counsel*

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 24, 1971

HON. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is a report entitled "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications" dated [illegible] unanimously approved by the appointed members of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee concerning this review. This report is based on extensive investigations and hearings which were held during the past year and a half concerning the responsiveness of Department of Defense communications in crisis situations and the effectiveness of that Department's management of its communications systems.

You will note that there are deletions from the report. These are security deletions which have been made on the recommendation of the Office of the Directorate of Security Review of the Department of Defense.

I shall appreciate your early approval of the report so that it may be printed.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN,
Chairman, DOD Worldwide Communications Subcommittee.

Approved for printing
F. Edward Hébert, Chairman
May 10, 1971

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	1
Scope of committee inquiry	1
Scope of clearance	2
Findings and conclusions	3
Recommendations	7
Communications concerning U.S.S. *Liberty*, June 7–8, 1967	9
JCS 6722302 June 1967 to CINCSTRIKE	9
JCS 050710Z June 1967 to CINCEUR	9
Preliminary telephone call	9
Formal message	10
CINCEUR 080625Z June 1967 to CINCUSNAVEUR	10
CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z June 1967 to Commander, 6th Fleet	10
Commander, 6th Fleet 080617Z June 1967 to U.S.S. *Liberty*	11
Communications concerning U.S.S. *Pueblo*, January 23, 1968	11
Package I—230152Z January 1968	11
Package II—230115Z January 1968	12
Critic message transmission	13
Court of inquiry conclusions	13
Observations	14
Communications concerning EC-121, April 14, 1969	14
First spot report 150115Z April 1969	14
First followup to spot report 150307Z April 1969	14
Second followup to spot report 150529Z April 1969	15
Critic 150544Z April 1969	15
Department of Defense communications management structure	15
Military department organization	17
Defense Communications Agency	19
Office of the Secretary of Defense	20
Cost of communications—$3 billion or $6 billion?	20
Weaknesses of divided management responsibility for DCS	22
Weaknesses in DCA engineering staff	25
Procurement of Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment	26
Automatic Digital Switch procurement	27
Modem procurement	28
Procurement of secure voice address system	28
AUTODIN switch procurement	29
System engineering facility	29
In-station processing impedes speed of service	31
Satellite Communications System—Victim of the decisionmaking process	33
Development of communications specialists	34
Introduction of civilian management into DCA	34
Survivability of the DCS	37
Problems in secure voice communications	38
Program for CRITICOMM-AUTODIN integration	39
Summary observations	41

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

AUTODIN—Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM—Automatic Secure Voice Communications System
AUTOVON—Automatic Voice Network
CINCEUR—Commander-in-Chief Europe
CINCPACFLT—Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSNAVEUR—Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces Europe
COMNAVFOR JAPAN—Commander, Naval Forces Japan
CRITICOMM—Critical Intelligence Communications System
DCA—Defense Communications Agency
DCEC—Defense Communications Agency Engineering Office
DCS—Defense Communications System
DSCS—Defense Satellite Communications System
DSSCS—Defense Special Security Communications System
DSTE—Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment
DTG—Date-time-group
IDDF—Internal Data Distribution Facility
NAVCOMSTA—Naval Communications Station
NSA—National Security Agency
SEF—System Engineering Facility
SITREP—Situation Report
SPINTCOMM—Special Intelligence Communications System
TRI-SAT—Tri-Service Tactical Satellite Program
TRI-TAC—Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLDWIDE COMMUNICATIONS—PHASE I

PREFACE

Communications channels are the central nervous system of any military organization. It is through those channels that the tactical outposts report to intermediate and national headquarters logistics requirements, administrative data, intelligence data and hostile contacts. Conversely, those channels serve as the path for dissemination of command decisions to lower echelons and, ultimately, to the tactical units in the field, sea and air. The function of defense communications was succinctly described by one witness as "the hand-maiden which serves command and control". Just as the nervous system must be stimulated by the brain, the communications system requires a decision by the command authorities for its activation.

Several developments in recent years have accented the absolute necessity of reliable and efficient military communications. The worldwide deployment of U.S. forces has required extensive long-range systems which are capable of maintaining contact with all those forces at all times. The deployment by potential enemies of intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched missiles has reduced the reaction time of this Nation, and has emphasized the need for communications which would provide the earliest possible notification to offensive and defensive U.S. forces in the event of a launch of such missiles. Finally, the centralization of command and control in national command authorities has made it imperative that information of any incident, which might possibly result in a critical situation, be brought to the attention of national authorities immediately. And, in order to permit those authorities to exercise effective command and control of their widely dispersed forces, communications must enable them to disseminate their decisions to all subordinate units under any conditions within a matter of minutes.

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard testified before the subcommittee that, "The entire communications capability must be integrated to provide the headquarters command and control people with knowledge of the situation and performance of all the military forces of the United States, and permit the headquarters to direct forces wherever they may be, and under whatever command they may be". The Department of Defense, in an effort to obtain communications systems which are capable of responding to those requirements, has expended large amounts, both for hardware procurement and for research and development. That Department has initiated and continued construction of systems utilizing the most sophisticated electronic equipment and employing the most advanced technology in all phases of communications. As a result of those actions, the Department of Defense has a most elaborate and a most expensive worldwide

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

communications network. It has been estimated that more than $3 billion has been invested in communications systems and equipment, and that annual expenditures for communications support exceed $5 billion.

SUBCOMMITTEE INQUIRY

Notwithstanding the scope and sophistication of the communications networks and systems of the Department of Defense, several incidents, which occurred during the past several years, have cast some doubt as to whether those systems are being effectively utilized. Additionally, there have been criticisms from several sources directed at the effectiveness of the management of defense communications. As a result of those questions, a review of the Department of Defense Worldwide Communications Networks was ordered by Chairman L. Mendel Rivers, House Committee on Armed Services, on July 14, 1969. In directing that inquiry, Chairman Rivers expressed an interest in improving communications reliability, promoting maximum efficiency and eliminating waste. He directed that the inquiry determine the effectiveness of communications management, its goals, as well as the economy and the efficiency of its operation. On January 8, 1970, the chairman appointed a subcommittee composed of Hon. Robert H. Mollohan (D-W.Va.), chairman, and Hon. Durward G. Hall (R-Mo.) to conduct hearings relative to Department of Defense communications.

Because of the scope and the complexity of the subject matter, the subcommittee limited this initial phase of its hearings to two areas:

1. The responsiveness of defense communications in crisis situations; and

2. The effectiveness of the Department of Defense management of its communications system.

The crisis situations examined by the subcommittee were three international incidents—the Israeli attack on U.S.S. *Liberty* on June 9, 1967; the North Korean seizure of U.S.S. *Pueblo* on January 23, 1968; and the North Korean shoot-down of an unarmed EC–121 reconnaissance aircraft on April 14, 1969.

The subcommittee began hearings on March 2, 1970, and continued them in September, October, and November. Since much of the subject matter of the inquiry was of a classified nature, all hearings were in Executive session. In addition to the testimony of the witnesses, the subcommittee was furnished with considerable information in the form of answers to written interrogatories. The Department of the Navy also furnished the subcommittee with the reports of the Naval Courts of Inquiry in the U.S.S. *Liberty* and U.S.S. *Pueblo* incidents. The subcommittee also made use of previous reports of this and other congressional committees concerning the communications facilities of the Department of Defense.

SECURITY CLEARANCE

The Department of Defense was requested to review this report for national security purposes. The word "deleted" indicates the portions which were removed at the suggestion of that agency.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research
Papers

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The subcommittee finds that:

1. Communications systems are only as good as those who operate and use them in the command and decisionmaking process. The fragmented and overlapping responsibility for communications within the Department of Defense has resulted in inefficient and ineffective management of that essential defense support function. Some examples of that poor management are:

a. The Department of Defense estimates of its total expenditures for communications have underestimated those expenditures by almost $3 billion. The inability to accurately report those costs resulted from the absence of a centralized management for communications, and the lack of an accounting system to determine those costs.

b. The Department of Defense Satellite Communications System will not achieve operational capability for some time. That system has lagged several years behind commercial systems because of the "clumsy decisionmaking process" in the field of communications in Department of Defense.

c. In one procurement, the Department of Defense decision to terminate the contract was delayed for 13 months after issuing a "stop work" order to the contractor. During the year of inaction, before the contract was terminated, the contractor's costs increased by approximately $2.74 million.

d. Responsibility for management of the Defense Communications System is divided between the Defense Communications Agency and the military departments. That division has interfered with the efficient utilization of the Defense Communications System.

e. The Defense Department, in its survivability studies, has failed to devote sufficient attention to an evaluation of the effects that sabotage, or limited warfare, would have upon the Defense Communications System.

f. Survivability studies have demonstrated that the overseas portion of the Defense Communications System would be vulnerable in the event of a nuclear attack.

g. The time required for processing of messages, before and after their electronic transmission, has prevented any significant improvement in "writer-to-reader" time despite installation of automatic switch equipment. Statistics reflect that an average of 70 minutes is required for processing a "flash" message, whereas the average time for electronic transmission of such a message is only 5 minutes.

2. Unresponsive communications systems of the Department of Defense delayed the execution of command decisions and retarded the transmission of information to command officials in critical international situations. That lack of responsiveness was demonstrated by delayed messages during the following incidents:

a. Four messages, ordering that U.S.S. *Liberty* be moved away from the coasts of Israel and the United Arab Republic, were directed to the ship on June 7–8, 1967. The first of those messages was released by the sender about 13 hours before the time the ship was attacked, while the last was released for transmission 3½ hours before the attack. None of them had reached *Liberty* prior to the attack. Two messages were misrouted to the Pacific rather than to the Mediterranean. One

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

of those, upon being retransmitted to the Pentagon, was diverted [illegible] to Fort Meade rather than U.S.S. *Liberty*. The other was not [illegible] on Fleet Broadcast until 9 hours after the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*. One copy of a message was lost in a relay station and never recovered. All experienced inexcusable delays for installation processing.

b. On January 23, 1968 two messages were dispatched from U.S.S. *Pueblo* with a Pinnacle designation. That designation denoted a message of major significance and required immediate delivery to national command authorities. As a result of delays for processing, these messages required 2½ and 1½ hours, respectively, before they were delivered to national command authorities in Washington.

c. Three messages, reporting that an EC–121 aircraft was being tracked by North Korean aircraft, were dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Korea on April 15, 1969. Those messages required 1 hour, 16 minutes; 3 hours; and one-half hour, respectively, for transmission to Washington.

3. The lack of effective secure voice communications systems was identified as the most serious deficiency in Department of Defense communications.

4. The military departments have neglected programs for the development of officers with a proficiency in the field of communications. Time spent in achieving an expertise in communications does not receive the proper recognition by promotion boards.

5. The CRITICOMM-AUTODIN integration program should be deferred until tests have conclusively demonstrated that AUTODIN will provide transmission which is at least as effective as the existing CRITICOMM system.

6. The Defense Communications Agency engineering offices appear unqualified for the tasks assigned to them.

a. About half of the recently assembled staff of the System Engineering Facility do not possess the qualifications to perform system engineering. It was estimated that those persons will require a training period of 3 years before they will be qualified to perform that function.

b. The Defense Communications Engineering Office has compiled a poor record in the preparation and review of engineering specifications for equipment procurements. In two instances the products manufactured according to specifications were unusable. In three other procurements the correction of deficiencies in engineering specifications resulted in cost overruns from 66 percent to 100 percent above the original contract prices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense should take the following actions in an effort to improve the management and efficiency of Department of Defense communications:

1. Responsibility for all Department of Defense communications, including strategic and tactical systems, the Defense Communications System, all systems supporting command and control, and all communications integral to weapons systems, should be centralized in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications).

2. Due to the urgency of this problem, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) should be afforded every sup-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

port necessary for completion of his program to identify all communications resources during fiscal year 1971.

3. In order that all communications costs may be properly identified, an accounting system should be established which would identify all communications expenditures, including tactical, strategic, those supporting command and control, and those which are integral to weapons systems.

4. Each military department should initiate a program for the education and training of officers as communications specialists. Those officers who specialize in communications should be assured that they will be afforded an opportunity for professional advancement.

5. The charter of the Defense Communications Agency should be revised to centralize all responsibility for management of the Defense Communications System in the Director Defense Communications Agency. The Defense Communications Agency should be assigned management responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the entire system. Until management responsibility is centralized, either in DCA or in a designated military department, the DCS cannot efficiently function as a system.

6. The charter of the Defense Communications Agency should be revised to permit the introduction of some civilian communications experts into the management structure of Defense Communications Agency. Consideration should be given to placing civilians, with a demonstrated communications proficiency, in the vice director position and those deputy director positions which require technical expertise. Consideration should also be given to placing civilians, with a demonstrated communications proficiency, in the program management positions at Defense Communications Agency.

7. The engineering structure of the Defense Communications Agency should be objectively analyzed to determine the need for an engineering staff, the size of the staff required and the proficiency of the incumbents. Particular attention should be paid to the System Engineering Facility and whether its staff possesses the qualifications to perform [illegible] engineering.

8. A program should be initiated to improve the efficiency of Department of Defense communications through the reduction of in-station processing time. Responsibility for this program should be assigned to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications).

9. A program should be initiated to improve the quality of the personnel who operate defense communications facilities. Responsibility for the selection, training, assignment and evaluation of operating personnel for the Defense Communications System should be assigned to the Director, Defense Communications Agency.

10. The military departments should be prohibited from using the Defense Communications Agency as a terminal assignment for officers before retirement.

11. The Department of Defense decisionmaking process should be improved in order to permit military communications systems to keep pace with developments in commercial systems, thus avoiding a repetition of the delay experienced with the satellite communications program.

12. Survivability studies of defense communications should be broadened to analyze the potential effect of limited war, sabotage and

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

other possible situations which would result in damage to their communications.

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. *LIBERTY*

JUNE 7–8, 1967

Hostilities commenced between Israel and the United Arab Republic on June 5, 1967. On that same date at 2015 hours, the Commander, 6th Fleet, ordered all his surface and air units to stand off at least [illegible] miles from the coasts of the belligerent nations. At the time of that order, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not assigned to 6th Fleet, but was [illegible] operational control of Commander-in-Chief Europe. On June 7th at 0601 hours, U.S.S. *Liberty* was transferred to the operational control of Commander, 6th Fleet. At the time of her transfer, her operational orders, dated June 1st, directed that the closest permissible approach to the coast of the United Arab Republic would be 12.5 nautical miles, while she could approach no closer than 6.5 nautical miles to the coast of Israel. No action was taken by the Commander, 6th Fleet, on June 7th to cause U.S.S. *Liberty* to conform to [illegible] previously issued to all other 6th Fleet surface and air units.

During the afternoon of June 7th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reposition U.S.S. *Liberty* to move her farther from the coasts of the belligerent nations. In implementing that decision, a series of five messages from JCS and U.S. commanders in the European Command were directed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and other addressees. None of these messages had reached *Liberty* by 1259Z hours on June 8th, 13½ hours after the first message was released for transmission. The circumstances surrounding the misrouting, loss and delays of those messages constitute one of the most incredible failures of communications in the history of the Department of Defense.

Those five messages will be discussed seriatim. Each is described according to its date-time-group [illegible] numeral designation assigned by the originator of the message reflecting the date and hour, month, and year of its release. At the time of the U.S.S. *Liberty* incident, the date-time-group was not an accurate reflection of the time the message had been released by the sender to the communications center, although, in most instances, the difference in the time was an interval of only a few minutes, e.g. JCS 072230Z was released to the communications center at 072241Z. Each date-time-group includes the letter "Z" designating the Greenwich time zone, thus all times are standardized.

JCS 072230Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCEUR

This message contained the first directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relocation of U.S.S. *Liberty*. It was directed to the Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR), for action. Information copies of the message were addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR); Commander U.S. 6th Fleet; Commander Task Force 64; U.S.S. *Liberty*; and others. This message modified the operational orders of U.S.S. *Liberty* by directing that her closest permissible approach to the coasts of the United Arab Republic and Israel should be 20 nautical miles and 15 nautical miles, rather than 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles, respectively.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

This message was released from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Army Communications Station, at the Pentagon, for transmission at 2214Z hours, June 7th. The action copy of the message to CINCUSNAVEUR was transmitted from the Army communications station at 1255Z hours, June 8th, [illegible] hours after its receipt in station. Two [illegible] four copies, addressed to Commander Task Force 67 [illegible] *Liberty*, were not transmitted until 2316Z hours, June 8th, [illegible] were incorrectly routed to the Naval Communications Station [illegible] pines. From that station they were sent to Navy Communications Station, Asmara, where they were placed on Fleet Broadcast at 2153Z hours, June 8th, 25 hours after the date-time-group of the message, and about 9½ hours after the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*.

This message lost some of its significance, since it was canceled by a subsequent message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described in the next section.

JCS 080110Z JUNE 1967 TO CINCUS

Preliminary telephone call

One hour and nine minutes after releasing the above 072230Z message for transmission, the Joint Chiefs became more concerned over relocating U.S.S. *Liberty* and decided that 20 and 15 nautical miles was too close to the coasts of [illegible] for safety. At 0721Z hours, June 7th, a JCS representative made a telephone call to the Command Center duty officer at Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). In that call, a verbal directive was issued to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center duty officer to order U.S.S. *Liberty* to operate no closer than 100 nautical miles to the coasts of the belligerents. The duty officer at CINCUSNAVEUR was also told that a message formalizing the verbal directive would follow later. However, the JCS might as well have omitted that telephone call since it proved completely ineffective in accelerating action at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. It is true that, as a result of the telephone call, a message incorporating the oral directive was prepared at CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters for dispatch to Commander, 6th Fleet; but despite the urgency indicated by the JCS call, the release of that message for transmission was delayed until the formal notification message from JCS had been received.

Formal message

The promised confirmatory message was not released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until 080110Z, more than an hour after the telephone call to CINCUSNAVEUR. That delay is not necessarily significant, since JCS could reasonably have expected an immediate and intelligent response to its telephone directive. This message, JCS 080110Z, canceled the earlier JCS 072230Z message and directed that U.S.S. *Liberty* should remain at least 100 nautical miles from the coasts of any of the belligerent nations.

An immediate precedence[2] was assigned to this message, whereas the 072230Z message had been assigned a priority precedence, thus

[1] Department of Defense has informed the subcommittee that the original message was addressed to CTFG1, but that an apparent operator error caused it to be addressed to CTF67 when it was prepared for transmission.

[2] There are four Department of Defense precedence categories: flash, immediate, priority, and routine, in diminishing order. These designations indicate the desired speed of delivery. They serve as a guide to operating personnel in processing, transmission and delivery of the message.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

indicating the increased concern of the Joint Chiefs concerning the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. This message was also released to Army Communications Station at the Pentagon for transmission. The action copy of this message was again addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Europe, with information copies addressed to CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander, 6th Fleet, Commander, Task Force 60 and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. A delay of 44 minutes occurred at the Army Communications Station, Pentagon, before the message was transmitted to CINCEUR, the action addressee at [illegible]. Rear Adm. Francis J. Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Communications, testified before the subcommittee that although 44 minutes was an inordinate amount of time for processing such a short message.

The delay in processing the action copy of the message is insignificant, however, when compared with the [illegible] incoming of the information copies addressed to Commander, Task Force 64, and to U.S.S. *Liberty*. First, there was a delay of 2 hours, 23 minutes before those messages were transmitted from the Army Communications Center, Pentagon, at 0836Z. The only explanation for that delay was that messages of equal or higher precedence were awaiting transmission before this message arrived at station. The Department of Defense, however, was unable to furnish the subcommittee with any documentary evidence which would support that explanation.

The information copies of the message, addressed to U.S.S. *Liberty* and Commander, Task Force 64, were finally transmitted at 0950Z, but, once again, those messages for addressees in the Mediterranean area were misrouted to Naval Communications Station, Pamplona. A subcommittee witness testified that the misrouting was due to an erroneous routing indicator which had been assigned to the message by a civilian clerk in the Army Communications Center, Pentagon. Upon its arrival at the Naval Communications Station, Pamplona, the error was recognized, the routing indicator was corrected to Naval Communications Station, Morocco, and the message was retransmitted within an hour. That correction should have taken those copies of the message to the Mediterranean area and ultimately to the addressees, except that the message was routed to pass through the Army Communications Station, Pentagon. That station, instead of transmitting the messages to the Navy Communications Station, Morocco, to which they were addressed, sent them to National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Md., where they were filed without further action. The only explanation given for this inexcusable conduct was that clerical personnel had misread the routing indicator. Needless to say, those messages had not reached either U.S.S. *Liberty* or Commander, Task Force 64, by 1200Z hours, June 8, 1967.

USCINCEUR 0806252 JUNE 1967 TO CINCUSNAVEUR

JCS message 080110Z was received at CINCEUR headquarters at 0212Z hours, June 8th. That headquarters, in a telephone conversation with CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters at 0325Z hours, directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take the JCS message for action. That oral order was confirmed by a formal message directed to CINCUSNAVEUR for action, with information copies to Commander, 6th Fleet and U.S.S. *Liberty*, among others. The formal message, how-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

over. Was not received until 0625Z hours. No explanation was offered for the 3-hour delay in preparing that message at CINCEUR headquarters. A further delay of 30 minutes occurred in the message center at CINCEUR before the message was transmitted.

In order to ensure getting this message to its addressees it was transmitted concurrently over two alternate relay paths. The necessity for the alternate transmission was clearly demonstrated by the loss of the message at the Primaseca, Germany, Army DCS relay, the first station on one of the transmission paths. As a result of that loss, there was no further transmission of that copy of the message. The explanation offered for the loss of that message was that the

*** station was being operated under a condition code of alert or emergency by the consolidation of certain units and evacuation of units from Frankfurt. Heavy traffic volumes resulted from the excessive evacuation of units and from unofficial teletype circuits. The number of qualified personnel was inadequate to ensure effective processing of traffic.

The second transmission route succeeded in getting the message to CINCUSNAVEUR and to Commander, 6th Fleet, by 0735Z hours on June 7th. The information copy directed to U.S.S. *Liberty*, however, had to pass through additional relay stations and it could be placed on fleet broadcast for dissemination to U.S.S. *Liberty*. That meandering route through relay stations consumed almost 9 hours. During that time, there were long installation delays for processing of the message, and there was a delay of more than 2½ hours in passing the message from an Army DCS Communications Station at Asmara to the Navy Communications Station located within a mile of the Army station. Finally, the message was placed on the fleet broadcast at 1616Z hours, June 8th,[1] at which time U.S.S. *Liberty* was limping back to port with her dead and wounded, and so severely damaged that she was subsequently scrapped.

CINCUSNAVEUR 080752Z JUNE 1967 TO COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET

The headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) received three separate messages directing the repositioning of U.S.S. *Liberty*. Those messages and the times of their receipt were:

(a) A telephone call from the JCS reconnaissance center at 2350Z, June 7th.

(b) An information copy of JCS 080119Z message which was received at this headquarters at 0312Z hours, June 8th.

(c) A telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th.

Despite the urgency which must have been obvious by that time, no action was taken at that headquarters for more than 3½ hours after the initial telephone call. It was not until after receipt of the telephone call from CINCEUR at 0325Z hours, June 8th that CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters stirred into action. At that time, the duty officer directed that a teletype conference be established with Commander, 6th Fleet. That conference circuit was established, and

[1] A garbled version of this message was placed on fleet broadcast at 1⅔Z, June 8th, and there was some question whether it had been received by U.S.S. *Liberty*. But as Rear Admiral Fitzgerald testified, "it is a moot point whether the ship received it or not for two reasons. If it did receive it, it was probably useless to them, and I maintain two, even if they had received it. It wouldn't have made any sense to them because all it said was to take some other JCS message for action. Some higher commander, and they wouldn't have known what that other message was because, as we know, that other message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which they had the information copy on, didn't get to them."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

at 0745Z hours, Commander, 6th Fleet, acknowledged receipt of the [illegible] order to take action upon the JCS message. The text of [illegible] confirmed by CINCUSNAVEUR format message 050[illegible]Z was received by Commander, 6th Fleet, at 0751Z hours, [illegible]

For some unexplained reason, U.S.S. *Liberty* was not informed of either of these messages to Commander, 6th Fleet.

COMMANDER, 6TH FLEET 050517Z JUNE 1967 TO U.S.S. LIBERTY

Upon receipt of the messages from CINCUSNAVEUR, the only action remaining for Commander, 6th Fleet, was issuance of the order to U.S.S. *Liberty* to comply with the instructions directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not until 0917Z hours, June 5th, however, over 3 hours after his receipt of the order, that Commander 6th Fleet took action to message directed to U.S.S. *Liberty*. Although the operators had manifested their concern about repositioning U.S.S. *Liberty* by low priority calls which gave him advance notice of the order, the Commander, 6th Fleet chose not to use the voice circuit. Nor he passed the order to the ship. Rather, he used the normal communications system for transmission of his message.

After its release to the communications center aboard the flagship, U.S.S. *Little Rock*, that message was delayed for more than 1 hour and a quarter before it was transmitted at 1035Z hours. The explanation for the delay was that there were other flash precedence immediate messages being prepared for transmission at the time the message was received in the message center aboard U.S.S. *Little Rock*. The message arrived at the Army DCS station at Asmara by 1215Z hours, June 5th. The DCS station, however, instead of delivering it to the nearby Navy station for fleet broadcast, missent it to the Navy Communications Station, Greece. It was returned to Army DCS station at Asmara and finally delivered to the Navy Communications Station at 1516Z hours, June 5th, 6 hours, 8 minutes after its release by Commander, 6th Fleet, and more than 10 hours after he had been ordered to act upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction. The message was transmitted on fleet broadcast at 1525Z hours, June 8th, more than 3 hours too late to alert U.S.S. *Liberty* to the danger of her position.

The circumstances surrounding the transmission of those five messages could be considered a comedy of errors were it not for the tragic results of the failure to move U.S.S. *Liberty*. At 1210Z hours, June 8, 1967, U.S.S. *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli aircraft and, at at 1245Z hours, she was torpedoed by Israeli patrol boats. As a result of those attacks, 34 officers and men were killed, while 75 were wounded, and the ship sustained such severe damages that it was never restored to duty. At the time of those attacks, U.S.S. *Liberty*, through no fault of hers, had not received any of the above-described messages. If the communications system had been responsive, she should have had several hours during which she could have placed some distance between herself and the coast, thereby probably avoiding the attack.

Should there be any doubt that those failures of the communications system were critical, the following excerpts from the findings of fact of the Naval Court of Inquiry, convened to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the attack on U.S.S. *Liberty*, would appear to conclusively resolve them:

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] • • • *Liberty* [illegible] prior to the attack, [illegible] • • •

[illegible] to the [illegible] from the time of the CNO • • •

[illegible] to [illegible] C.N.S. *Liberty* [illegible] 8 June. The Ships knowledge [illegible] have received at [illegible] other important [illegible] to the events which terminated [illegible] 8 June the Ship.

[illegible] *Liberty's* original [illegible] 1st what the Flash on the Ship which, if she had received it, would have [illegible] her being further [illegible].

Consideration and [illegible] of many delayed communications [illegible] related to *Liberty* during the [illegible] ship, the failure of command [illegible] ship made prior to the attack which, among other things, would have [illegible] ship, as a minimum, to be heading further off shore from [illegible] 0512Z actual position • • •

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING U.S.S. PUEBLO
JANUARY 23, 1968

On January 23, 1968, U.S.S. *Pueblo*, a U.S. Navy auxiliary general environmental research vessel utilized for intelligence collection, was located off the coast of North Korea. That morning the ship established communications with Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, Japan, to send a situation report (SITREP), two technical reports and a service message. At 0350Z January 25, *Pueblo* was still using her transmitter when a North Korean submarine chaser (SO-1) came into view. There were several flag-hoist signal exchanges between *Pueblo* and the North Korean craft which continued several minutes. Then at 0350Z the communicating officer of *Pueblo* released the first of two messages designated Pinnacle. Pinnacle is a flagword which identifies the message as having major significance and requires immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government. In addition to its Pinnacle designation, the message was assigned a "flash" precedence, thereby identifying it for most rapid processing, transmission and delivery.

PINNACLE I—250352Z JANUARY 1968

This message reported the encounter with the North Korean patrol craft, the exchange of flag-hoist signals, and the Korean signal "Heave to or I will fire". It concluded with *Pueblo's* intention to remain in the area, if considered feasible, or to withdraw slowly to the northeast.

This message was received by the Kamiseya station at 0350Z hours. It was then relayed at 0400Z hours to Commander, Naval Forces, Japan where it was received at 0413Z hours. Despite its Pinnacle designation, which required immediate delivery to National Military Command authorities at the seat of government, this message was delayed at the headquarters of Commander, Naval Forces Japan, for 47 minutes before it was finally released for retransmission at 0500Z hours. Rear Adm. Francis Fitzpatrick, Assistant Chief of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Naval Operations for Communications and Electronics, to this is the delay in that headquarters was not consistent with the Pinnacle designation of the message or with its flash precedence. He explained the the delay was caused by the decision-making process at the headquarters and that "involved in that decision process was the routing the message to those it out of * * * intelligence channels, and put it into the general service channel." What some time was required for such processing, it almost appears to have been an intolerable delay in retransmitting a Pinnacle-flash message.

At 0500Z hours, the headquarters of Commander, Naval Forces Japan, relayed the message to Naval Communications Station, Japan, for relay to the remaining addressees. At this station the message was transmitted to the Navy addressees via the Navy Command Operational Network, a dedicated network,[1] and was transmitted to all other addressees via the Defense Communications System, the common user system. The former network performed fairly well with each of the Navy addressees receiving the copy of the message by 0533Z hours—33 minutes after it had been relayed by Commander, Naval Forces Japan, and 1 hour, 45 minutes after it had been transmitted from U.S.S. *Pueblo*. The Defense Communications System was decidedly slow in transmitting the message to the other addressees for whom it was responsible. The message was introduced into the DCS at 0505Z hours. It did not reach any of its addressees, even those in Japan, until 0600Z hours, and it was 0624Z hours before it reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff—1 hour and 16 minutes after being transmitted from Japan and 2 hours, 34 minutes after it had been sent from U.S.S. *Pueblo*.

PINNACLE II—230715Z JANUARY 1968

This message was also assigned a "flash" precedence and transmitted from U.S.S. *Pueblo* at 0418Z hours. It stated that the submarine chaser, which had been joined by three PT boats, had sent a message, "Follow in my wake. I have pilot on board". It further reported U.S.S. *Pueblo* was departing the area at ½ speed "under escort". Pinnacle II was considered by the U.S. Navy as a "trigger" message, as it provided conclusive evidence that the conditions described in Pinnacle I were more than routine harassment.

Transmission of this message to Kamiseya was instantaneous and it was received in that station at 0418Z hours. From there it was relayed to Commander, Naval Forces Japan at 0424Z hours. In that headquarters, this message also experienced a delay which was not consistent with its Pinnacle designation or with its flash precedence. It was 39 minutes after receipt in that headquarters before Commander, Naval Forces Japan, passed the message to its communications station at 0503Z hours for transmission to the remaining addressees. As with Pinnacle I, the Naval Command Operational Network was used to route the message to Navy addressees while Defense Communications System was used for all others. The message was delayed briefly at Naval Communications Station, Japan, before being introduced into the Naval Command Operational Network at 0510Z hours. That

[1] A dedicated network, or circuit, is one used exclusively for transmission of a particular type of information, in this instance Navy operational orders. It is distinguished from a common user system which transmits all traffic of Department of Defense without regard to its originator or content.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

network performed satisfactorily in getting the message to each of the Navy addressees by 0525Z hours.

The message was delayed for 18 minutes at Naval Communications Station, Japan, before it was introduced into the Defense Communications System at 0521Z hours. The cause of that delay could not be determined. The performance of that system in transmitting this message was better than it had been with the earlier Pinnacle I. Copies reached all addressees within 36 minutes of the time it was transmitted. It reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 0557Z hours—36 minutes after being introduced into the DCS, and 1 hour, 39 minutes after it had been transmitted by U.S.S. *Pueblo*.

CRITIC MESSAGE TRANSMISSION

In addition to the above-described transmission, both Pinnacle messages were also given a Critic[1] message format. That format entitled them to transmission via the CRITICOMM network. Their rapid transmission in that dedicated system presented a sharp contrast to their sluggish movement through the command's Defense Communications System.

It was not until Pinnacle II was received at Kamiseya and Commander, Naval Forces Japan, that the CRITICOMM network was realized. After receipt of that message at 0518Z hours, Kamiseya Station gave it a Critic format and introduced it into the CRITICOMM network at 0526Z hours. Seven minutes later that Critic message was delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. The Kamiseya Station then placed a Critic designation on the earlier Pinnacle I message and introduced it into the CRITICOMM network at 0440Z hours. This message referred to as Critic II, required only 6 minutes for transmission to Washington, where it was received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 0446Z hours. Another Critic message was released by the Commander, Naval Forces Japan, Headquarters after that Headquarters received Pinnacle II. That Critic message was assigned a date-time-group of 0435Z and was received in Washington, D.C. 4 minutes later at 0439Z hours.

The value of the CRITICOMM transmission can be clearly seen when its performance is compared with the Defense Communications System. Whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed via CRITICOMM at 0446Z hours—21 minutes after U.S.S. *Pueblo* had originated its Pinnacle II—they did not receive notification through the Defense Communications System until 0557Z hours—1 hour, 39 minutes after Pinnacle II had been transmitted from U.S.S. *Pueblo*.

COURT OF INQUIRY CONCLUSIONS

The Naval Court of Inquiry, which was convened to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the seizure of U.S.S. *Pueblo*, was critical of the deplorable relaying of the messages from U.S.S. *Pueblo*. That court stated in its opinions: "The delays in transmission of U.S.S. *Pueblo's* OPREP-3 messages (Pinnacles I and II) from Kamiseya to NAVCOMSTA (Naval Communications Station) Japan and higher commands were grossly excessive." The court of

[1] Critic is a designation assigned to a message which is believed to contain information which should be brought to the attention of the National Command Authorities.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

inquiry also stated "despite the fact that [illegible] were available between COMNAVFOR JAPAN [illegible], Naval Forces Japan and CINCPACFLT [illegible] Pacific Fleet), the Fleet Commander was not [illegible] and kept current of the developments in the U.S.S. *Pueblo* [illegible]. Information he received was delayed about 1½ hours; too late to be of use."

CONSEQUENCES

Those "grossly excessive" delays in retransmission of the Pueblo messages from U.S.S. *Pueblo* were at least partially responsible for the failure of U.S. forces to come to the aid of that ship. That failure resulted in the death of one sailor, the long imprisonment of [illegible] remainder of the crew and the loss of the vessel. The Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, which investigated the seizure of U.S.S. *Pueblo*, found that the loss of the ship had these other consequences:

> The apparent capability with which armed forces of the North Korean Government boarded and captured a U.S. Navy vessel in international waters [illegible] destroyed the image of invincibility and prestige enjoyed by our country for the past 150 years. The damage this incident has caused our Nation is, in truth, tremendous * * *
>
> The capture of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* resulted in a serious compromise of our Nation's intelligence capability * * *
>
> The compromise of a great deal of classified information, involving naval operations, tactical and otherwise, also represents a very serious intelligence loss * * *

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING EC–121, APRIL 14, 1969

At 2159Z hours, April 14, 1969, an EC–121 of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One left Atsugi Air Force Base, Japan, on a reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan, off the coast of North Korea. The flight of the aircraft was tracked by a U.S. station in South Korea.

That tracking station at 0534Z, April 15th, detected North Korean aircraft tracking EC–121. It continued tracking the North Korean aircraft until 0422Z when the track was dropped. At 0436Z, the track of the North Korean aircraft was once again observed by the station in South Korea. That station dispatched four messages addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several other addressees concerning North Korean surveillance of EC–121.

FIRST SPOT REPORT 150145Z APRIL 1969

This message reported that North Korean aircraft were probably reacting to EC–121. An immediate precedence was assigned this message and it was transmitted at 0454Z April 15th. It was not received at the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center in Washington until 0615Z, April 15th—1 hour, 16 minutes after the time of its transmission from South Korea.

FIRST FOLLOWUP TO SPOT REPORT 150503Z APRIL 1969

This message reported that two North Korean aircraft being tracked were headed east toward EC–121. It also mentioned the time that the

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

track had first been observed and when it was finally observed. The message was assigned an "immediate" precedence. Although the exact time of transmission of this message is not known, it was determined that, "it is reasonably certain that it would have been transmitted within 5 to 10 minutes of the DTG (date-time-group)". This message was not received at the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center until 0507Z, April 15th, 3 hours, 4 minutes after its date-time-group.

SECOND FOLLOWUP TO SPOT REPORT 150520Z APRIL 1969

This message reported that EC-121 had disappeared from the surveilling radar screens. It was assigned a flash precedence that was transmitted as approximately 0520Z. The message was received at JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center 53 minutes later at 0553Z.

CRITIC 150547Z APRIL 1969

This message, which was designated Critic, reported that Korean air surveillance facilities reflected the possible shootdown of the U.S. reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan by two North Korean aircraft. As a result of its Critic designation, this message reached the National Military Command Center within 10 minutes of the date-time-group. It provided National Command authorities with the first information concerning the shootdown, as it reached Washington before any of the reports of the North Korean surveillance which had been transmitted much earlier.

Each of the earlier reports of the North Korean surveillance of EC-121 failed to satisfy the speed of service objectives established by the Department of Defense. Two of those messages carried an immediate precedence, while the third had been assigned a flash precedence. According to those objectives, a "flash" message should be transmitted in less than 10 minutes; an "immediate" in no more than 30 minutes; a "priority" in less than 3 hours, a "routine" in less than 6 hours. Actually, the flash message required 38 minutes, and the immediate messages 1¾ hours and 3 hours, respectively.

Our examination of these three situations has caused grave concern over the performance which could be expected from Department of Defense communications, generally, and the Defense Communications System specifically, in a general war situation. In each of the situations examined by the subcommittee, communications could be carried on under the most favorable circumstances. No facilities had been disabled, either temporarily or permanently; no enemy jamming was experienced; and there was no restriction upon use of any of the various modes of communications available. Despite those almost perfect communications conditions, messages were lost, misrouted and missent, while others experienced intolerable delays for in-station processing. In each instance, there appeared to be some reluctance to use voice communications circuits, in spite of the greater speed those circuits would provide in relaying orders or reports. In both the *Liberty* and *Pueblo* incidents, the most prominent failures occurred in facilities which were part of the Defense Communications System. The overall effect was that parties who had a need to know—in one instance the commanding officer of a ship and, in the other, National Command authorities—were deprived of that knowledge because of a

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

lack of responsiveness on the part of Department of Defense communications systems.

Subcommittee witnesses were quick to point out that the lack of communications responsiveness could be traced, as noted in one instance, to telephone personnel performance. Power had to be restored before the communications systems were not responsible for the failure to get messages to their addressees in time to be effective. There does not appear to be any logical basis for such a divorce of the operating personnel from the communications systems. The operating personnel and system hardware are essential complementary components of the system. Modern communications systems, notwithstanding their sophistication, are only as effective as the people who operate and maintain them. Until the Department of Defense recognizes the importance of the selection, training, supervision and evaluation of the personnel assigned to the operation of its communications systems, [illegible] concentrates on their improvement, no significant improvement in communications is possible. The subcommittee hearings revealed a reluctance to recognize the potential for improvement which exists in this most critical area. Any suggestion that the operation of the Defense Communications System could be improved by assigning to the Director, Defense Communications Agency, responsibility for the selection, training and evaluation of its operating personnel, or even responsibility for evaluation of the performance of its stations, is rejected on the ground that it suggests a communications command. That attitude is exemplified by the following colloquy between Chairman Moorhead and Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, Director, Defense Communications Agency:

Mr. MOORHEAD. Well, we have three [illegible] here, and these three [illegible] I would regard as the highest and best [illegible] in Europe. Communications broken down very badly, to put it honestly, in each of the three theaters. We are expending $1 billion, and you have just stated that, with the communications control that you presently have, in response to Congressman Hall's question, you can't assure that any better delivery process could be expected than has been the performance record in the past.

I am sure you have carefully evaluated this, and others have, also, at the highest levels in the Pentagon. But obviously, something rather drastic has to be done.

General KLOCKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. MOORHEAD. And it seems that your problem is in personnel and control rather than in the command or management or operations system of DCS itself.

General KLOCKO. I am not certain that it is a communications failure. I don't think that it was a communications failure in the DCS, and I think that having the people assigned to DCA would not have corrected any of the mistakes that took place in these instances, sir.

• • • • • • •

Mr. MOORHEAD. You know, I don't think there is any question but what DCS is reliable, as such. But my concern is the utilization of it properly, and that goes back to the personnel point.

You seem to be very firmly convinced that any assumption of personnel responsibility on your part would not be feasible.

General KLOCKO. Let me put it this way. In any consolidation of more responsibility in DCA, this would be almost my last priority. There are others that I would put well beyond that, which would be in the field of planning, programing, the operational direction over expanded portions of the communications system.

But a command in the control of the people in the system would be very low. There are others that would produce much more effectiveness.

• • • • • • • •

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Since it was personnel over rather than equipment [illegible] was responsible for the communications system [illegible] that a determined effort must be initiated to improve the [illegible] personnel and, thereby, to improve the Defense Communications System. Testimony reflected that the Department of Defense had initiated a program to automate its communications center, thereby reducing the possibility of personnel error. But regardless of automation, there is still a personnel requirement, which means, and [illegible] the quality of that group [illegible] must be improved in order to improve system efficiency. This subcommittee does not suggest the specific form which that improvement of operating personnel should take, whether communications command or otherwise. Our only concern is that it be undertaken immediately and that it be vigorously implemented. We believe that the Director, DCA, must be given responsibility for supervision of the personnel operating the DCS. We further believe that he should be responsible for evaluating the performance of the operating personnel and the DCS facilities.

A transfer of that authority to the Director, DCA, might result to a degree the control of military commanders over their communications facilities which have been assigned to the DCS. However, since those facilities comprise only one-fourth of the total Department of Defense telecommunications assets, they would still have under their direct control sufficient communications systems, equipment, and personnel to satisfy their tactical and combat support requirements. It has been demonstrated, repeatedly, that the present divided responsibility for the Defense Communications System has resulted in unresponsive communications. The Nation has already suffered incalculable damage from that lack of responsiveness. It cannot afford any repetition in this very critical period. It is imperative that immediate action be taken to upgrade the [illegible] of all communications personnel, particularly those assigned to the Defense Communications System.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

On May 21, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard established the Office of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications). Mr. Packard testified before the subcommittee that shortly after he took office, he became aware that the Department of Defense had a serious problem in the management of communications. He found responsibility fragmented and a need for centralized authority and control of resources. He said there was no place where he could learn how much was being spent on communications, and that there was no appropriate means for coordinating the substantial portion of communications under control of the military departments. In order to correct those deficiencies, he established the new office referred to above. That office is responsible for all areas of telecommunications except electronics and telecommunications integral to weapons systems. It will establish telecommunications policy and serve as central point for coordination and review of telecommunications plans and affairs.

Some effort to consolidate communications responsibility at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level was long overdue. The com-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] communications management efforts, which existed in the Department of Defense prior to establishment of the new office, was considered overlapping and fragmented. The fragmentation in responsibility and poor management practices have been recognized for years as the following quote from a study of the Defense Communications System, dated February 1967, indicates:

"In summary, the lack of guidance of the Defense Communications Board has led to a lack of [illegible] As a consequence, the responsible military departments have developed communications systems which [illegible] Each, however, faces a serious question as to the [illegible] which the worldwide communications systems of the DOD can be integrated, provided or evaluated and existing procedures.

Given a set of criteria, methods, techniques and procedures for [illegible] communications responsibilities [illegible] Vandenberg, [illegible] State, Natural Bureau of Standards, [illegible] the Director of Defense Communications should be increased at least to [illegible] resources cannot be obtained, however, without the presence of [illegible] tion between participating elements, [illegible] at OSD, JCS, DCS, [illegible] levels and agreement on common goals to be achieved, and the [illegible] reach these goals. While organizational changes might make solution of the problems of the Defense Communications structure easier, the inherent weaknesses of the structure can be strengthened only through adequate management and procedural changes."

MILITARY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure of Defense communications is based upon the resources of the military departments. The departments are responsible for engineering, installing, manning and operating Defense communications facilities, including those segments designated DCS, for the Unified and Specified Commands,[1] and their component combatant commands, and for the inservice logistic and administrative support commands. To carry out these basic communications support functions, each military department has organized a separate communications command in continental United States with field elements located in each commander-in-chief's geographical area of responsibility, i.e., Europe, Pacific, etc. Each of those communications commands is headed by an officer of flag or general rank. They are in the direct chain of command of the military departments and report through the chief of the service and the secretary of the department to the Secretary of Defense. The field elements of the military departments' communications commands perform the necessary communications support function for the Unified and Specified Commands and their combat component commands.

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) is a Department of Defense agency, established in 1960 to manage the Defense Communications System (DCS), which was established at that same time. The DCS was formed in furtherance of the Department of Defense Telecommunications Policy Objective of "obtaining maximum possible

[1] Combatant forces of the United States and their direct support are assigned to seven Unified and one Specified Command for the performance of military missions. Forces from each of the military departments are assigned to the commands and are under the full operational command of the commander-in-chief of that command while so assigned. The Unified Commands have missions oriented to a particular fraction of geographic area while the Specified Command, SAC, is responsible for a strategic offensive mission.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] interconnection and compatibility of long-line telecommunications systems consistent with military requirements". Prior to that time, each of the military departments had developed, independently, its own telecommunications system designed to satisfy its peculiar military requirements. While those systems were similar, each satisfied unique requirements, and largely used different equipment. Thus, there was little capability for interoperation of the systems; and in many instances, two or more services operated duplicate facilities at many points throughout the world. In an effort to reduce communications costs, to eliminate such duplicate facilities, and to improve the responsiveness of long-distance communications, it was decided to segregate, within the DCS, the long-distance facilities of the military departments (the so-called strategic communications) into a "single worldwide complex consisting of an integrated point-to-point communications facilities, personnel, and [illegible] within the Department of Defense". That decision has no effect upon tactical communications which remained under the exclusive control of the military departments.

Testimony before the subcommittee reflects that, at present, about 25 percent of the total communications assets of the Department of Defense is designated as DCS facilities. Another 25 percent is [illegible] communications supporting field units, ships and aircraft. The remaining 50 percent, described by the Director, DCA, as "nontactical and non-DCS", includes post, camp and station communications facilities, intercept and surveillance communications, Army area communications systems and some integrated networks.

The Director, DCA, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, exercises operational direction[7] of operating elements of the DCS and exercises management control[8] over those research and development, planning, engineering and programing activities of the military departments, unified commands and other Departments of Defense agencies of those areas of endeavor which directly support the establishment and progressive improvement of the DCS. In addition, the Director, DCA, is responsible for obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DOD long-haul, point-to-point communications resources. According to the testimony of the Director, DCA, his direction of the operating elements does not encompass command of the DCS operating facilities.

The military departments have been assigned responsibility for the operation of the DCS, including the provision and maintenance of its facilities, the training and assignment of personnel, the supply and service of the facilities and all other actions required to provide the actual communication service. The military departments are also responsible for engineering, procurement and other activities incident to the expansion or improvement of the DCS. Thus, while DCA exercises operational direction of the operating elements of the DCS,

[7] Operational control is defined in the DCA Charter as the authoritative direction necessary to ensure effective operation of the DCS. It includes authority to direct the operating elements of the DCS, assign tasks to these elements, and supervise the execution of those tasks; consolidation of DCS operational facilities to accomplish DCA's mission; establish and prescribe a single set of standards, practices, methods and procedures for the performance and operation of the DCS, and analyze the system performance and operation of the DCS.

[8] Management control as defined in the DCA Charter means authority for the direct supervision, coordination and review and, within approved programs, the continuing supervision, review and guidance to achieve the management objectives outlined in this directive.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

it has no authority over the personnel and facilities which comprise the DCS, since those are all controlled by the military departments.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Before establishment of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) in May 1970, overall communications policy direction and resource management were exercised by various elements within the staff of the Secretary of Defense. Four assistant secretaries of Defense and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, each had responsibility for a portion of communications management which was divided among those offices along functional lines. Such functional organization was not appropriate for the management of communications, since each office performed only its own functional responsibility, with the result that communications was not considered as a system requiring integrated and unified consideration and a corporate management. While the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics was designated as the "staff focal point" for communications, there were many communications functions over which that office had no authority to coordinate and control communications, which was within the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Administration. Instead of a single office with authority to coordinate all communications activities carried on by the military departments and DCA, portions of those activities were supervised by numerous offices within the OSD staff. Those fragmented and overlapping responsibilities resulted in inefficient and ineffective communications management throughout the Department. For example, the Department did not have readily available such elementary management information as its total communications costs and its total communications resources. This and other examples of those loose management practices will be discussed in the following sections of this report.

COST OF COMMUNICATIONS—$3 BILLION OR $6 BILLION?

The Department of Defense estimates of its annual communications costs in recent years possibly have missed the mark by as much as $3 billion. Since no formal system of accounting for communications costs was maintained until 1969, the Department was unable to supply any firm figures for those costs. In the absence of firm figures, the Department furnished congressional committees with what it termed "approximate levels of expenditures". Those figures varied widely among different Department of Defense witnesses. For example, this subcommittee took testimony from two witnesses concerning communications costs. Deputy Secretary David Packard testified that the estimated costs for fiscal years 1970 and 1971 were $2.31 and $2.6 billion, respectively, while Mr. Thomas Moran, Deputy Comptroller, Department of Defense, placed those estimates at $2.75 and $2.51 billion for the same years. In November 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, placed the fiscal year 1970 estimate at $3.06 billion. Those discrepancies were explained by Deputy Secretary Packard as follows:

> • • • The figures, I think that I submitted in response to your question, were a little higher than this • • • I think they are. That simply reflects the fact

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] Defense. But again I don't [illegible] Moran be [illegible] communications [illegible] Congress [illegible] local [illegible] to [illegible] items.

Subsequently, the hearings disclosed that, in furnishing the figures, the Department of Defense was only reporting about half of its overall communications expenditures. That fact was disclosed in the testimony of Mr. Moran that those figures were only for "classified communications" costs. He explained that classified communications exclude command and control communications and those communications delivered with a weapons system. Some idea of the impact that exclusion of those items has upon the total expenditure can be gleaned from the following testimony of Mr. Moran:

Mr. EARLY. Mr. Moran, if the estimated [illegible] communications [illegible] could check me on the supply of weapons systems with [illegible] which the [illegible] cost of the Department of Defense communications, do you have even an approximation of what the costs would come to?

Mr. MORAN. [illegible] command and control, along with the communications I have given you, it would increase that number in 1971 by $5.175 billion.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. You mean it would increase it by that amount or to that and that?

Mr. MORAN. It would increase it by that amount.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. By that amount.

Mr. MORAN. In other words, we have $2.515 billion and $5.175 billion, or roughly $7.7 billion.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. In other words we have $[illegible] billion a year of cost in our communications system in the Department of Defense?

Mr. MORAN. In command, control and communications. Now when you get into command and control, I might explain a bit for clarity. Of that $5.175 billion in command and control, $1.321 billion is military salaries and wages. You see these are not communicators in the classical sense, they are people who staff the command headquarters.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. That is a cost of communications though?

Mr. MORAN. Command and control, yes, sir. And you have about $1.363 billion of operations and maintenance costs. That is to maintain the building, and the terminal devices, and salaries of civilian people.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. But all of this is a legitimate assignment of costs to the field of communications?

Mr. MORAN. To the field of command, control and communications.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. You couldn't have communications if you didn't have officers and men to staff it.

Mr. MORAN. Many of these people I think at the command headquarters are carrying out functions other than communications.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Then what you are giving us is an outside cost figure?

Mr. MORAN. I believe this is an outside cost figure, yes, sir. I want to add again I still have excluded from this communications delivered with a weapons system. That would be the communications on board of a ship and, as you know, that is substantial.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Do you have a rough estimate of those you could give us?

Mr. MORAN. I don't have an estimate on that, I am sorry.

In view of the inability to even approximate the cost of communications delivered with a weapons system, except for Mr. Moran's statement that it would be "substantial", it appears that an estimate of $3 billion for total communications costs is much more realistic than the $3 billion figure usually cited by the Department of Defense officials.

Notwithstanding the installation of an accounting system for communications in 1969, the witnesses were unable to offer much

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] improvement for improvement in the near future. Mr. Packard said: "We are putting the figures together for the 1972 budget as we could, as we can, but I don't want to give this committee the impression that we have precision yet". Mr. Louis deRosa, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, indicated that his office will not be equal to the task for some time. He testified that he had been unable to locate personnel to staff his resource management section, and as a result will be handicapped in attempting to review the communications budget submissions of the military departments. Mr. deRosa testified that the "major difficulty will come in budgeting to break down, for example, how much of the O & M funds (operation and maintenance funds) are going to communications * * * so if it is considered economical to do this, it would still take several years to get the services to conform to a new budgeting procedure designed to break out these returns."

Loose management practices in the Department of Defense result in a complete loss of control over communications assets. It is imperative that such control be established if any significant improvement is to be expected in any phase of communications management. If we are to accomplish that control, the resource management function of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications should be staffed as expeditiously as possible, and he should be directed to conduct an intensive effort to identify all communications costs in the current fiscal year. That identification should include all expenditures for procurement, operation and maintenance, and research and development for the DCS, tactical communications, "non-DCS and nontactical", command and control communications, as well as communications delivered with weapons system. Such visibility of communications resources is an essential preliminary step to effective management.

WEAKNESSES OF DIVIDED MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DCS

According to its charter, the mission of the Defense Communications Agency is to "ensure that the Defense Communications System will be so planned, engineered, established, improved and operated as to effectively, efficiently and economically meet the long-haul, point-to-point telecommunications requirements of the DOD" and to "obtain the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DOD communications resources". In performing that mission of DCA, the director has been delegated authority to exercise management control and operational direction of the operating elements of the DCS. Since the DCS stops at the mainframe of bases, posts, camps and stations, the authority of DCA stops at the same point, a point considerably short of the total nontactical communications system of the Department of Defense.

While granting that apparently broad management authority to the DCA, and its director, the charter provides that the Secretaries of the military departments shall be responsible for exercising operation and maintenance management of the facilities and resources that are assigned in support of, or related to, the DCA. That separation of management responsibility has had a serious impact upon the effective and efficient operation of the DCS. All communications resources, including those designated DCS, are the property of the military depart-

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

tients. And all operating personnel, including those assigned to ... operation of DCS facilities, are controlled by those agreements. The net effect of that divided responsibility is that instead of a system, there is a conglomerate ... Navy, and Air Force ... designated DCS, over which DCA has little, if any, authority. Moreover, the military departments control the purse strings of the DCS in that they furnish the funds for the procurement of equipment and supply the manpower for engineering, construction of stations and installation of equipment. It is possible for future programs for the DCS to be reprogramed unilaterally by a military department to other purposes without approval from DCA.

One example of the poor results of that divided management responsibility is found in the poor performance of the DCS AUTOVON system. AUTOVON is the DCS automatic voice network ... telephone system containing preemption equipment which permits high priority users to seize circuits already being used by other ... when circumstances demand such action. Of more than 17,000 AUTOVON access lines, some 9,000 have some preemption capability and about 4,000 having preemption capability through the dial or key call. It was intended as a command and control system, but it is also used for general administrative purposes. At its inception, the investment cost for AUTOVON was estimated at $40 million. Through fiscal year 1971, however, the investment cost had exceeded ... $92 million. The annual operating cost for AUTOVON in fiscal year 1971 was $129 million. Throughout its brief history, AUTOVON has been plagued by a poor completion rate. Less than half the AUTOVON calls initiated can be completed.[1] The cause of that poor completion rate was identified long ago as an inadequate number of ... lines from subscriber locations to the AUTOVON terminal ... The access line inadequacy prevents call completion in two ways—by not permitting the caller to obtain access to the system or, once having gained access and his call having traversed the system, by not permitting its egress to the party called. Since the military departments, which are responsible for the leasing of access lines, have been unwilling to subscribe for the required number of those lines, DCA has been unable to improve the responsiveness of the system. General Klocko testified that his authority to improve AUTOVON, as with other DCS systems, is limited to suggesting that the military departments acquire the requisite number of lines. When they rejected his suggestion, he presented the issue to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who sustained the position of the military departments, and directed him to study the possibility of a reconfiguration of the existing access lines in order to improve efficiency. He testified that the reconfiguration study has been completed, and he is now working with the services attempting to persuade them to reconfigure their access lines.

General Klocko candidly admitted that he regarded his lack of authority to direct the acquisition of desired equipment and operation of that equipment as a weakness in the DCA management structure. He testified that he believed a proposed revision of the DCA charter, extending the DCS to end facilities, e.g. telephone exchanges, local base distribution exchanges, on-line computers, etc., would improve DCA management. His answers to the following questions illustrate,

[1] As a basis of comparison, the commercial Direct Distance Dialing system and the Government's Federal Telecommunications System each average about 75 percent call completion.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

however, that the proposed revision would have little effect in im-
pro ing his authority.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. But the question we are trying to get the answer to is [illegible] or not, under the revised charter authority so far as you are concerned, you will not have [illegible]?

General KLOCKO. No, sir.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. You will not have it?

General KLOCKO. I will not have it.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. In other word, this does not change your posture in any sense in regard to your authority, this kind of a decision?

General KLOCKO. That is correct. As far as the decision, not where I stand now, I haven't even made a recommendation. I don't even think about PAN's.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Then what this change really does is make it possible for you to present your view?

General KLOCKO. It makes it possible for me to think about it, and to put in recommendations, to work with the departments on problems associated with this type of equipment.

Such a limited change would do little to improve the management problem which exists in the AUTOVON and the other systems of DCA. The heart of the DCA management problem was succinctly stated by General Klocko as follows:

When it comes to ordering the departments to do things which cost money, they always question it because they have certain statutory rights on the handling of their funds which we have to circumvent.

Unless DCA is granted that authority, it will not be able to exert sufficient impetus to improve management of the DCS.

Another example of an effect of the divided management responsibility is the lack of DCA authority over the DCS facilities and operating personnel. Those facilities and personnel are under the authority of the military departments. DCA has no authority over the selection, training and assignment of operating personnel assigned to DCS facilities, nor does it have any authority to evaluate the performance of personnel or the facilities. That point was brought out during General Klocko's testimony when Chairman Mollohan asked:

May I ask you specifically, do you have any role at all in the education or training programs for the personnel who are to man these systems?

General KLOCKO. No, sir. Directly, no. If we find that there are deficiencies in the training, this is part of the management control I mentioned earlier that I would mention to the Military Department or to JCS. Primarily to the Military Department.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. But you do not prescribe any course which they should take?

General KLOCKO. No, sir.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. That is the responsibility of the separate commands?

General KLOCKO. That is correct, sir.

As a result of the flagrant errors attributed to DCS personnel during the transmissions to U.S.S. *Liberty*, Admiral Fitzpatrick was interrogated concerning disciplinary measures which DCA could take against DCS facilities or operating personnel whose performance was substandard. His testimony reflected that no action could be taken by DCS:

Mr. LAILY. That is the question I had. The JCS, as I understand your previous testimony, would be unable to take any action against the Army station if they "fumbled" this message, is that correct?

Admiral FITZPATRICK. That is correct.

* * * * * * *

Mr. LAILY. Could the DCS take action?

Admiral FITZPATRICK. No, sir.

* * * * * * *

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Mr. Bailey. Do you think we have enough in the Constitution at the present time to [illegible] Defense Agencies, for instance, the Navy, the Department of Defense involved with Navy aircraft, the procurement of aircraft? Would you recommend?

Secretary [illegible]. Well, I am not sure. Frankly, I am not sure. I would say, for example, the success of the DCA, for instance, is due to the fact that we have been able, without Congressional action, to [illegible] responsibility for the operation of the Defense Communications System, also since [illegible] without [illegible] necessary awards, how else to correct it, but to distribute discretionary procedures where that was necessary.

Mr. Monagan. What you are saying is that DCS does not have any direct authority over the various components of its system.

Admiral Fitzpatrick. They do not have authority currently, I mean I [illegible] they do not have authority to [illegible] the Army or the Navy or the Air Force, "You will [illegible] money, you will assign personnel, you will use your resources to do this." It is against the law.

DCA's lack of authority to direct military departments action for the improvement of the DCS, and its inability to direct disciplinary action against operating personnel, whose errors have caused DCS to perform poorly, are symptoms of the fundamental weaknesses which make it an impotent organization. Its authority has not been sufficient for management of DCS as a system. Consequently, the DCS has been unable to function efficiently as a system; it is merely an association of facilities that together [illegible] attempting to act in concert, but without central authority to direct its actions.

Mr. deRosa testified that he thought that the Director, DCA, should be authorized to train operating personnel, and to evaluate their performance, as well as the performance of the DCS facilities. He frankly admitted, however, that no action had been initiated to grant that authority to the director. It appears that no action will be taken as the following testimony of Deputy Secretary Packard indicates:

> I think the basic structure in which the services are responsible for providing the forces, including the maintenance of the forces, is the appropriate configuration, and I don't see the mechanism of making a change that would not involve some much more complex problems and difficulties than we have in trying to utilize the services and keep them under effective control.

Witnesses who testified during the hearings generally agreed that establishment of the DCS and DCA had produced a significant improvement in long distance Department of Defense communications. From our examination, it is obvious that strengthening the management of the DCS can bring about another significant improvement. The cost of that improvement would be the relinquishment by the military departments of their responsibility for operation and maintenance management of the DCS to DCA. If the DCS is to function as a system rather than as a group of associated entities, it is essential that the entire operation be managed by a single authority. The objectives of an effective, efficient, economic system established by the DCA charter can only be accomplished by such centralized management. If the military departments are unwilling to cede their DCS management authority to DCA, then the Secretary of Defense should consider the alternate possibility of abolishing DCA and designating one military department as the action agency for overall operation of the DCS. In any event, immediate steps must be taken to improve the management of DCS by the designation of one organization with complete responsibility for effective management of the system.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

WEAKNESSES IN DCA ENGINEERING STAFF

The engineering responsibility for the DCS, like most other responsibilities of that system, has been divided between the DCA and the military departments. DCA has been assigned responsibility for engineering the DCS as a system while the military departments have been assigned the tasks of "detailed engineering in support of DCA" and "performing installation engineering". General Klocko testified that the military departments are responsible for engineering the subsystems such as AUTOVON and AUTODIN while DCA has the responsibility of engineering the entire system of the DCS.

In 1963, the DCA engineering office, known as DCEO was established. That office soon became involved in the preparation of detailed engineering specifications for various equipments being procured for DCS subsystems. In some cases, DCEO drafted the detailed engineering specifications, while in others it reviewed and approved specifications which had been drafted by personnel of the military departments. During the subcommittee's investigation, five procurements [illegible] were based upon specifications either drafted or approved by DCEO were examined. In each of those procurements, deficiencies in the specifications resulted in products which were unusable. Actions taken to correct the deficiencies resulted in substantial cost increases and long delays in production of the equipment. A brief summary of each of those procurements follows.

PROCUREMENT OF DIGITAL SUBSCRIBER TERMINAL EQUIPMENT

Each subscriber to the AUTODIN subsystem requires terminal equipment to obtain a means of system ingress and egress. This terminal equipment consists of a computer control unit, similar to a small computer, and paper tape and card input/output devices. Such terminal equipment had been leased from manufacturers until an economic analysis conducted by DCA demonstrated that substantial savings could be realized through Government procurement of the terminals. Although terminals were commercially available for purchase as well as lease, DCA drafted detailed engineering specifications for Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment (DSTE) which would satisfy subscriber needs.

In June 1965, a fixed-price contract was awarded General Dynamics Electronic Division for procurement of 1,046 terminals at a cost of $45 million. The procurement was supervised by the Department of the Army. Delivery of the equipment was to commence in April 1966 and to be completed by November 1967.

By summer 1966, it was learned that the terminals, being manufactured according to the DCA specifications, were unacceptable. Since the prime emphasis of the specifications involved the security of the equipment, the contractor produced terminals enclosed in cabinets that were too large and heavy; they did not allow convenient access for operation of the equipment and for maintenance. As General Klocko described it, "There were some major mistakes made, particularly in the case of the DSTE, where the specification was applied by the contractor in a way which made an unworkable piece of equipment, and it turned out that, although it complied with the specifications, it was unusable to all intents and purposes". The contractor

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

was ordered to stop work and the specifications were reviewed by a board composed of representatives of DCA and the military departments. The board concluded that "the Government appears to be basically at fault for allowing such a series of changes to be imposed to have approached the production stage." It further found that there was inadequate coordination and exchange of information among the various Department of Defense offices involved in the program. That board believed that coordination of all of the interested agencies could have prevented production of the inoperable equipment. The original specifications were then modified and the efforts of the contractor were redirected. The cost of that modification and redirection was approximately $50 million, thus increasing the unit cost from about $45,000 to $73,000 each. In addition, the initial delivery date was set back to December 1968. Delivery under the contract had not been completed at the time of General Klocko's testimony before the subcommittee in September 1970. Other contract modifications had increased the contract price to $79 million by September 1970. In addition, there were contractor claims arising from the contract totaling about $5 million. Thus, the total cost of the DSTE is now about $84 million, roughly an 86 percent increase over the original contract price.

General Klocko testified that less than half of the finished terminals which have been delivered are being used by subscribers. The remainder are being stored at a signal depot. He admitted that many of the Department of Defense subscribers prefer to continue using commercial terminals they leased while the procurement of DSTE lagged. He attributed subscriber reluctance to replace their leased equipment with Government-owned terminals to the greater versatility of the leased equipment, which is able to perform more functions than the Government-owned DSTE.

AUTOMATIC DIGITAL SWITCH PROCUREMENT

A fixed-price contract for procurement of 11 automatic digital switches for the Defense Special Security Communications System was executed in July 1966 with International Telephone & Telegraph for $6.9 million. By early 1967, National Security Agency determined that the switch being manufactured according to specifications which had been prepared by Defense Communications Agency and approved by Director, Defense Research and Engineering, would not satisfy the operational requirements of its user. The inadequacy of the switch was described by General Klocko in the following testimony, "I would say that the major problem was in working out this requirement in translating this requirement into the actual specification, and the engineering involved with this procurement". He further admitted that the engineering specifications were defective and that the responsibility for their defectiveness lay with the DCA program manager and the DCA engineering staff working with him.

When it was learned that the switch being manufactured was unsatisfactory, an effort was made to revise the specifications to correct the deficiencies. That effort consumed more than a year and it was not until August 1968 that the amendment to the contract was furnished to the contractor. It was soon learned that the contract

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

price would be substantially increased as a result of the amended specifications.

On August 14, 1968, the contractor was ordered to stop work on the contract. That "stop work" condition prevailed until September 1969 when the contract was terminated. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in January 1969, ordered the procurement reduced to three switches, if they could be obtained for the original contract price. But the contractor informed the Defense Department in February 1969 that three switches would cost an additional $8.8 million. That proposal was debated by the various Department of Defense offices which were interested in the contract, i.e. Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics; Director, Defense Research and Engineering; Defense Communications Agency; National Security Agency; Deputy Secretary of Defense for another 8 months before the decision to terminate the contract was finally reached on September 11, 1969. During that 13-month period, while the various management entities of the Department of Defense sought to reach a decision, the contractor's cost increased by about $2.74 million.

This procurement demonstrated the weakness of the fragmented management of Department of Defense communications, as well as the weakness of the engineering office of the Defense Communications Agency.

MODEM PROCUREMENT

In June 1965, a contract was entered with Hughes Corp. for production of 450 high-speed wireline modems at a price of $1,360,000. A modem is a modulator-demodulator device for converting digital signals produced by data equipment to analog form for transmission via voice frequencies and, conversely, analog signals to digital. The contract provided for delivery to commence in April 1966 and to be concluded by June 1967. Detailed engineering specifications for the modems were drawn by Army and approved by DCA.

Technical problems encountered in the manufacture of the modems set the initial delivery date back to January 1967. During tests of the preproduction models in November 1966, it was learned that the modems being manufactured according to the Government specifications would not satisfy operational requirements. The contractor proposed numerous changes to overcome deficiencies in the engineering specifications at a cost of $659,000. Since there was no assurance that those changes would produce a completely acceptable modem, the contract was terminated.

DCA has advised the subcommittee that 65 modems were produced, but that none of them could be used in operational systems. As an alternative, they have been utilized in an experimental system of the Army. The contractor is claiming $910,000 under this contract which only produced a modem which couldn't be used in an operational system.

In 1969, another contract was entered with Hughes Corp. for production of 218 modems at a cost of $2.5 million.

PROCUREMENT OF SECURE VOICE ACCESS SYSTEM

The Secure Voice Access System is a component of the Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVOCOM) of DCS.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

In order to hasten procurement of that component, a letter contract was awarded Philco-Ford in October 1969 to produce it. The contract price was subsequently negotiated at $9.7 million.

By July 1969, that contract had been modified 49 times. Many of those modifications resulted from deficiencies in the specifications which had been drawn by the Army and approved by DCA. Those modifications had increased the contract price by approximately $5 million, an increase of about 90 percent. DCA's proposed history of the AUTOSEVOCOM system offered a possible explanation for the deficiencies by stating that, "the various AUTOSEVOCOM specifications should have been more thoroughly coordinated with DCA and the other Mildepts by the Army."

AUTODIN SWITCH PROCUREMENT

In furtherance of the DCA plan to extend the AUTODIN system to overseas areas, a contract was entered with Philco-Ford in 1966 for procurement of 11 automatic switches at a price of $31.3 million. The engineering specifications for that switch were drafted by DCA. A subsequent increase in quantity to 13 switches increased the contract price by about $5 million. By September 1970, however, the cost of those switches had increased to $62.5 million, a 160-percent increase over the original contract price. General Klocko testified that contract changes were largely responsible for the increased costs. He further stated that several of those contract changes were necessary because of deficiencies in the engineering specifications.

The inadequacy of the DCA engineering office has been recognized by the Department of Defense. Mr. DeRosa, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, when asked to furnish an appraisal of that staff, indicated that he believed it needed improvement. He stated:

> I have recognized that the drawing up of specifications is one of the weaknesses in our procurement processes. I have several times with the program people who are in charge of the programming, working with DCEO, which is our engineering branch, and have told them to look into the problem to see whether we are properly drawing specifications. Whether we are drawing them in too much detail or not enough detail, it could be either of these.
>
> I haven't yet put a fix on the drawing up of specifications. As you recognize it is a very, very difficult thing to do, to draw up a specification which a contractor can take and produce exactly what is required.

SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FACILITY

In 1969 DCA established an additional engineering office, System Engineering Facility (SEF), to discharge its responsibility for conceptually engineering the future DCS. The authorized strength of SEF for fiscal year 1971 is 121 persons with an ultimate strength of 147. DCA has estimated the total investment cost for SEF will be approximately $7.8 million, and that its annual operating cost will be approximately $2.4 million. General Klocko distinguished system engineering, which he identified as the responsibility of SEF, from system engineering, which he identified as the responsibility of DCEO. He further described the mission of SEF as follows:

> Its system engineering talent will generate the essential technical foundation necessary to provide a long-range DCS plan acceptable to the Secretary of Defense. This plan will set forth all the information required to decide what the future DCS shall be, which path of evolution from the present DCS shall be followed, what

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

research and development must be emphasized, and which have already improved facilities of the DCS must be implemented on the most cost effective basis.

My ability to conceptually evaluate the DCS of the future will be based on my familiarity of this Agency to be concerned with the state of the art of computer technology by the military departments and industry, to the best knowledge of what is technologically feasible 10 years from now, to apply this knowledge effectively and efficiently to the design of a system responsive to future user requirements, and to technically oversee the transitional paths spanning the next 10 years.

* * * * * * *

This total effort will require complete understanding of today's system and its configuration, the military departments' ongoing R. & D. programs, future user requirements, and concepts to fulfill these requirements. It will require comprehensive planning among all the system components. Further, it will require that planning sequences be well documented, and that subsystem plans and implementation plans for near-term improvements to the DCS are in accord with the Secretary of Defense's selected evolutionary scheme.

It would appear that a system engineering plan should have been the basis for the DCS at its inception. The failure to develop such a plan before constructing the DCS has no doubt contributed to some of the problems of the system. Although it appears that the major subsystems have been substantially completed and are now operating, a system plan should be developed in order to insure that the future DCS will be better planned and more responsive to the requirements of its users.

According to the testimony of Mr. deRosa, system engineering is a highly specialized area of communications which requires personnel with wide experience. He questioned the ability of the SEF staff to perform that function. He said that he believed that of the staff presently employed at SEF did not possess the qualifications for system engineering. He went on to say that it would require a training period of 3 years in order to qualify those people. And he further testified that he believed it would be difficult to recruit additional people who are qualified system engineers because of the salary limitations at SEF.

Mr. deRosa testified that his concept of the function of SEF differed from that of General Klocko. Because of the limited capabilities of the staff in the field of system engineering, Mr. deRosa testified that he thought that SEF would be a group of fairly technical project managers rather than system engineers. He stated his view of the function of SEF as follows:

> I would like to see it perform a monitoring function rather than a complete, self-contained engineering facility. For the reason I mentioned before, that is to say it is extremely difficult to get one organization with the depth of competence in each of the required technologies necessary to be able to handle everything.

The subcommittee also noted that the establishment of SEF has not eliminated DCA need for contractor support in the field of system engineering. Moreover, Mr. deRosa testified that he did not believe that requirement could be eliminated even after SEF is fully operational. In fiscal year 1970, more than $3.7 million was obligated by DCA for contractor support, and in fiscal 1971 over $2.2 million has already been obligated. Those figures are a considerable increase over the $1.6 million obligated in fiscal 1968 and $3 million obligated in fiscal 1969. The steady increase in contractor support costs for system engineering appears to confirm Mr. deRosa's belief that SEF will not provide complete in-house system engineering capability.

An objective evaluation of the entire DCA engineering staff is indicated in view of the poor record of the DCA engineering staff.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] of the [illegible] Examination Service [illegible] is used for DCAS or Washington and in other modes to [illegible] ...ssages by [illegible] ...ssages [illegible] exist for a DCAS [illegible] ...ssages [illegible] ...ssages [illegible] ...ssages

James M. Ennes, Jr., Research Papers

The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) appears to be the natural point for that coordination of the efforts of all Department of Defense communications facilities. That office should be able to exert statutory control over the various communications facilities and thereby solve this problem which has degraded defense communications.

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS—VICTIM OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The overlapping authority of the several Department of Defense offices sharing responsibility for telecommunications has had a detrimental effect on the development of some systems which are needed by the military departments. An example of such a retardation in development occurred with the Defense Satellite Communications System.

The Director, DCA, testified that in May 1970, authorization was obtained to proceed with the DCA program for an operational satellite communications system. He further testified that the system known as Phase II Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) will not attain a full operational capability [illegible] Since commercial systems reached operational capability several years ago, that schedule puts the DSCS at an increasing distance behind the commercial systems. That delay is even more difficult to understand in view of the Phase I R. & D. satellite communications system that DCA has had under development for a number of years. We recognize that the military system must satisfy requirements which do not occur in commercial systems, e.g., transportable ground terminals which can be set up in an unprepared location within a very short time. Nonetheless, it appears that efficient, aggressive management, not only in DCA but also in the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, would have permitted the program to keep pace with commercial developments.

When Deputy Secretary Packard was asked to explain why the satellite communications program was so retarded, he said:

> Well, I think the answer to that is that we just have a relatively clumsy decision-making process in a great many areas there. Frankly, I am very concerned that we have all sorts of programs that so many people will have to get into the decision-making, it takes us a year or two or longer to make as good a decision as we should.
>
> I don't know whether we can get an improvement in that process, but that is just the difficulty. You see that system impinges on all of the three services, on the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs, and by the time you get everybody reviewing the thing, a lot of time has gone by. I hope we can, by getting an office that is specializing in this business, I hope we can improve that decisionmaking. I am sure that is all it is.

The Deputy Secretary's uncertainty that the Pentagon's decision-making process can be simplified is not at all reassuring. The delay which occurred in the satellite communications program should not be permitted to recur. The centralization of communications authority in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for telecommunications should result in a reduction of the time needed to approve a communications system. This subcommittee is particularly interested in that problem since it will again be faced in the TRI-TAC and TRI-SAT programs of the Department of Defense. Both of

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] operations for a unified approach to tactical communications [illegible] objectives, and the other for a unified tactical [illegible] communications system, have no military operations, as well as [illegible] Department of Defense officers and others. In my opinion [illegible] the same setups in the Intercontinental that the DSCS program [illegible] will fall far short of the target dates for their operational capability.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS

Modern military communications, and particularly those systems comprising the DCS, utilize complex electronic equipment. Because of that complexity, the development of an expertise in the field of communications requires years of training and experience. Such specialized, technical expertise, however, receives little consideration from military promotion boards when officers are considered for promotion, particularly to the flag or general officer level. Those boards prefer officers possessing broad experience with emphasis on command of tactical units. For that reason officers who are interested in advancing their military careers have been unable to devote the time necessary for the development of expertise in the communications field. Although some communications specialists have attained flag or general officer rank, they are the exception. As a result of these promotion practices, few of the flag and general officers who have been assigned to top management positions at DCA have had the opportunity to develop the proficiency in communications which is necessary for the supervision of a communications system. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Rosa, in discussing the paucity of communications specialists in the higher ranks, said:

> I am also aware of the proficiency that I find on the part of a few general officers in communications who have managed to refute the general rule that you can't get ahead in a specialized function such as communications and become a general officer. • • • There are isolated cases where you do have some who, by, in general, one of the best ways of progressing is to be an all-around type of officer rather than a specialized function.

Mr. de Rosa suggested that the military departments should initiate programs for the development of communications specialists in order to satisfy their requirements for such officers. The subcommittee accepts that excellent suggestion and adds the recommendation that these career development programs for communications officers should be established immediately. In order that the military careers of officers who elect to specialize in communications will not be jeopardized, the military departments' promotion boards must give equal weight to such training and experience when evaluating officers at all promotion levels. The development of such a specialist corps should improve the military communication structure throughout. Such a program would also insure that the flag and general officers assigned to DCA would possess the proficiency required for effective management of the DCS.

INTRODUCTION OF CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT INTO DCA

DCA was organized along military lines and has continued as a military organization. Its charter provides that the director, vice director and the deputy directors shall all be flag or general officers.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] have always been a matter of [illegible] DCA has wished to consider [illegible] in practice, [illegible] management. The most prominent weakness noted in DCA was the need for more technical proficiency at the [illegible] levels.

The preceding sections of this report indicate that the military participants were not developing [illegible] in all aspects of communications. The absence of such a specialty corps has been most pronounced in the flag or general officer ranks. [illegible] career specialists about those ranks primarily because of technical proficiency. As a result of that selection process, many of the officers assigned to the top management positions at DCA have not possessed the technical proficiency which is essential for the effective and efficient management of a major communications system. While most of those officers have had some communications experience, it has largely been incidental to their military assignment, thus they are lacking in the expertise which the position demands. Although no causal relationship can be established, there is a suspicion that many of the unfortunate embarrassing and [illegible] experiences of DCA might have been averted if the [illegible] communications men who have been managing the agency. It also appears that, unless DCA can obtain a management [illegible] communications direction, it is doomed to repeat its prior mistakes. Since a sufficient number of flag and general officers with the communications proficiency necessary to satisfy the needs of DCA are not currently available, it is believed that some civilian communications experts should be introduced into the management levels of DCA. That proposal was supported by the testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications deRosa. The opinions of these men are particularly valuable in this respect since both have had many years of experience in the communications and electronics fields.

According to the testimony of Mr. deRosa, it has been difficult for him to determine the communications proficiency of the incumbents in the top positions at DCA. He stated that "their record indicates a reasonable exposure to communications and it is difficult to determine their proficiency in the field from their record". He further stated that he has recommended to Secretary Packard the assignment to DCA of

> "* * * more civilian communicators in the top positions. At the vice director level, it would be quite valuable to have a deputy who had made a career of communications as a civilian and who would maintain continuity over many periods of time in the same way that the Deputy Director for NSA does there."

Mr. deRosa further recommended that he would prefer civilians as program managers and in the deputy director positions "requiring high technological inputs such as planning and systems operation". Deputy Secretary Packard testified that he believed that infusion of some civilian communications experts would improve the management of DCA. He testified that he was studying the merits of altering the DCA Charter to provide for naming a civilian, either as Director or Vice Director, DCA. In discussing the merits of a civilian director for DCA, Mr. Packard said:

[illegible] Secretary Packard [illegible] to have a policy, even if [illegible] General, who [illegible] experience in the business and can stay [illegible] long enough to truly have an impact on it.

The military group of [illegible] rotation of its personnel [illegible] to be the key Secretary's [illegible] that statement has been [illegible] to the problem of DCA. This was brought out during the testimony of Mr. deRosa in discussing the rotation of communications program managers. He pointed out that rotation interferes with acquiring proficiency. He said:

I think one of the weaknesses is the rotation system. * * * You can't [illegible] from one area to the other every three years and continue productivity and [illegible]

Deputy Secretary Packard also expressed some concern about the frequent rotation of specialists. He testified concerning his efforts to overcome that problem, as follows:

We have got a commitment from the service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs that they are going to leave officers in their personnel management programs to get better people and those programs, to do a better job of planning and have certainty in these programs, particularly the specialty assignments, long enough so they can get an effective job done.

Mr. deRosa also pointed out another practice which does not contribute to the improvement of the DCA management. He testified that most of the officers assigned to DCA by the military departments are on their terminal assignments. He stated that executives of that department's officers were within 2 years of retirement and that many of them were lacking in communications experience. While that practice might be beneficial to the officer in permitting him an opportunity to contact prospective employers during his terminal assignment, it certainly is not beneficial to DCA. Such assignment practices must cease.

Introduction of some civilian communications experts into the top management of DCA should have a salutary effect on the organization. They would provide the communications expertise, the lack of which appears to have been a factor in some of the DCA engineering problems. Moreover, they would provide continuity to the organization, its plans and programs, since they would not be affected by military rotation. This is not to suggest that DCA should be converted into a civilian organization. We believe that it should retain its military character with a military director and military officers in those positions which do not demand technical proficiency. We believe, however, that a civilian deputy director would be an invaluable asset to the director, since he would possess the experience essential to the operation and future development of a communications system; furthermore, since he would not be subject to transfer every 3 or 4 years, he would be able to bridge the gaps between military directors and could provide continuity to the organization. Similarly, civilians with the requisite technical proficiency should be introduced into those deputy director positions which require a technical background, e.g., plans, operations. Finally, consideration should be given to the use of qualified civilians as DCA program managers. Such an introduction of qualified civilians into management positions at DCA would work to the advantage of the agency in two ways—it would raise the level of technical proficiency of the system managers and it would provide continuity to the management since those individuals would not be subject to military rotation.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SURVIVABILITY OF THE DCS

The Defense Communications System is [illegible] ... ces of the United States and [illegible] With military forces [illegible] capability from the White House to the [illegible] provides the principal means for [illegible] of the Department of Defense there is a requirement that it be capable of performing [illegible] that survivability, the DCA [illegible] ... survivability studies. Those studies are conducted with the aid of computerized damage assessment models to determine the [illegible] each weapon causes at command and communications centers and at various points in the communications system.

Those studies analyze what are a critical user's [illegible] center, would have the capability of communicating with his subordinates at their local location during the course of and after an enemy attack. An initial analysis is conducted and is supplemented by special studies relating to specific military problems. These studies have been devoted almost exclusively to an assessment of the impact of nuclear attacks. Mr. Joseph Kreck, Chief of Survivability Section, DCA, testified that only one study has been conducted of the effects of conventional warfare upon the DCS. According to Mr. Kreck, that study was conducted about 5 years ago and has not been updated. He further testified that the survivability studies have not addressed the impact of sabotage upon DCS facilities in continental United States or elsewhere.

The Department of Defense concern with the effects of a nuclear attack cannot be criticized. The impact of a nuclear attack, however, should not be permitted to obscure the effects that limited warfare or sabotage would have upon the system. Both these conditions are distinct possibilities and some realistic assessment of their effects is essential if survivability studies are to serve any useful purpose. Testimony indicated that the various studies of the effects of nuclear attack have not produced any significant data changes. Since repeated studies of the effects of nuclear attack are not furnishing much new information, it appears that other attack scenarios should be simulated in order to ascertain their effects. Prudent management of Department of Defense communications dictates that future studies should be devoted to ascertaining the survivability of the system in situations of limited warfare, sabotage and all other probable scenarios which would result in damage to the system.

The simulated studies, which have been conducted, indicate there would be tremendous degradation of the DCS in the event of a nuclear attack. For example, one study conducted several years ago demonstrated that the effectiveness of the two principal DCS subsystems—AUTOVON, the Automatic Voice Network, and AUTODIN, the Automatic Digital Network, would both be greatly reduced. That study indicated that AUTODIN would have [deleted] survivability. At [deleted] minutes after an attack, it would be reduced to [deleted] of its effectiveness in continental United States and the Pacific areas, while it would be reduced to [deleted] effectiveness in

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Europe. The United States and Pacific systems would suffer [illegible] degradation at late time, but, for all practical purposes, the system would be adequate. Interestingly, a study performed [illegible] for the volume, the AUTOVON system would be somewhat more survivable. As selected, Britain's chief attack to cost [illegible] United States, it would be reduced to [illegible] percent of its effectiveness. While in Europe and the Pacific area, it would be reduced to [illegible] percent of its prior worth. While the United States and Europe's systems would retain at about the same rate of survivability, the Pacific system would suffer further degradation at a later period. This same study revealed that high frequency radio would be [illegible] communicationwise for several months after an attack. But that after that it would be restored to about [illegible] percent effectiveness. These studies assumed that there had been no targeting of communications facilities, but that they had suffered only incidental damage. If the facilities themselves were targeted, the loss of service would be much more severe. The inescapable conclusion of the studies appears to be that the DCS was designed for peacetime rather than wartime operation.

Since the AUTOVON and AUTODIN subsystems constitute the backbone of the DCS, their reduction to [illegible] indicated by the DCA studies would have a severe impact upon the total Department of Defense communications capability. The impact would be most serious with respect to communications from individual command authorities to the unified commands in Europe and the Pacific. Since both those systems utilize sophisticated electronic switching, restoration of optimum service would probably require considerable time, if it could be accomplished under wartime conditions. Consequently, some alternate transmission method would have to be utilized if national command authorities were to exert any influence in a continuing combat situation. In view of the tremendous reduction in the [illegible] capability of the DCS resulting from a nuclear attack, it appears that adequate high-frequency radio systems should be maintained in a standby capacity by DCS to fill the void left by reduction of the voice and digital networks. Admittedly, the limited speed of transmission of high frequency radio restricts its general use in normal DCS operation. Its demonstrated survivability, however, makes it an extremely valuable standby asset which should be maintained in a state of readiness in both transportable and fixed configurations.

PROBLEMS IN SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS

Two of the military witnesses who testified before the subcommittee declared that the greatest deficiency in existing defense communications is the lack of an effective secure voice system. Their criticism was not directed at the security of the systems. It was the voice quality of the AUTOSEVOCOM, the DCA Worldwide Secure Voice System, and the various tactical secure voice systems which was pointed out as the deficiency. The synthesized reconstructed voice was described as having a "Donald Duck" quality, which makes identification of the speaker very difficult. The problem was described by Brig. Gen. Lee Paschall, Deputy Director, Command, Control and Communications, U.S. Air Force, as follows:

> It is a technology, I think as much as anything. We just don't know how to do it well enough so that people will want to use it as a matter of course * * * My

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[deleted] of Defense plans to be place also, we need a the sort of technology that will enable us to do just [deleted] to the strategic system or to the tactical system. We can't serve same kind of protection.

In subsequent testimony, General Rocko agreed that secure voice was the most critical technology in present defense communications. He further testified that secure voice is an expensive technique. His testimony was corroborated by cost figures supplied by Department of Defense. The figures reflect that the AUTOSEVOCOM costs were approximately $45,000 investment cost, and approximately $7,000 annual operating cost, per subscriber.

Despite its substantial costs, the performance of the AUTOSEVOCOM subsystem has been poor. Testimony before the Subcommittee reflected that only about [deleted] of the calls attempted are completed. That poor completion rate is even more serious than it appears, since AUTOSEVOCOM is limited to a relatively small number of subscribers among the command echelons. Further testimony reflected that the preparations to an AUTOSEVOCOM call constitute considerable time. When General Rocko interrogated concerning a determinate delay in placing a secure voice call from Commander, Naval Forces Japan, to 5th Air Force at the time of the *Pueblo* seizure, he stated:

But I would go back to the AUTOSEVOCOM, [deleted] Aside from what you described there, I would say that was a matter of setting up a security voice transmission and [deleted] authentication [deleted]

The technological problem was described by General Paschal as an easy method of converting from analog (voice) to digital (data) and reconverting to analog so that speech does not have to be synthesized through a device called a vocoder. He further testified that, though there is some technological breakthrough, an expensive program will probably be required for solution of the problem. Mr. Colton subsequently testified that, in his estimate, no technological breakthrough was imminent, and that he believed that funding for research and development in the field of secure voice should be doubled.

[7 lines deleted]

The subcommittee hearings clearly demonstrated the need for improvement of the existing secure voice equipments. In view of the urgency expressed by witnesses, the improvement of that equipment should be accorded a very high priority in Department of Defense communications programs. The testimony concerning the recent progress in the development of new equipment was encouraging. However, until that equipment can be deployed, the secure voice problem will continue. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) should initiate an examination of the effort of all military departments and agencies in this field. His examination should determine whether the equipment under development will satisfy the military requirements and, if so, how soon it can be deployed. He should also determine whether the current funding for research and development in the secure voice area is adequate.

PROGRAM FOR CRITICOMM-AUTODIN INTEGRATION

The Critical Intelligence Communications System (CRITICOMM) is a dedicated network operated [deleted] for the transmission of intelligence communications. In addition to its general use, CRITI

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COMM was designed with features which are like the rapid transmission to National Command Authorities of messages of critical importance. At the present time, attempts to the maximum extent permitted for the transmission of short information to the necessary analog addressees. Testimony reflected that messages or groups for this special handling have been transmitted in an average of 4 to 6 minutes over the past several years. Testimony concerning the transmission of three C'rite messages connected with the attack on U.S.S. *Pueblo*, reflected that those communications had been received at the National Military Command Center within 4, 6, and 7 minutes of their transmission.

The CRITICOMM network performed satisfactorily from the time of its inception. It became apparent in the early 60's, however, that the [illegible] principal relay points if the system were to continue its expanded transmission. Another defense intelligence communications network, the Special Intelligence Communications System (SPINTCOMM), was also in need of automation at the same time. A plan was devised by the Department of Defense to interface CRITICOMM with SPINTCOMM to permit them to operate in an automatic mode at the switching points, and, ultimately, to combine them into the Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS). Defense Communications Agency prepared a plan for the development of DSSCS. That plan provided a four-phase program with installation of the automatic switches to occur during the third phase. In September 1969 the contract for procurement of the automatic switches was terminated after considerable difficulty had been encountered during their manufacture (see pp. 2758 for a description of those difficulties).

When it had become apparent that the switch being procured would not meet the operational requirements of the CRITICOMM System, both National Security Agency and Defense Communications Agency sought alternative methods for satisfying the need for automatic switching. NSA proposed the use of a device it utilized at its headquarters, known as the Internal Data Distribution Facility (IDDF), as a switching device at the nodal points of the system. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering and the Defense Communications Agency proposed that the AUTODIN subsystem be modified in order to permit it to transmit the CRITICOMM traffic. The alternate proposals were examined by the staff of DCA, which rejected the IDDF proposal on the basis of cost effectiveness. According to General Rincke, the DCA study concluded that installation of the IDDF switch would require an increase of [deleted] operating personnel, whereas the AUTODIN modification would permit the use of existing equipment without any significant increase in operating personnel. Consequently, a program was initiated to modify the AUTODIN system to enable it to meet the requirements of NSA.

That program, according to testimony received by the Subcommittee, will cost $24.5 million. It is presently in the conceptual stage and will soon arrive at the point where modified equipment will be procured for the test program. Testimony further reflected that the test program will begin in the latter part of fiscal year 1972 and that, if the tests satisfy the NSA requirements, the modification of the AUTODIN system will be completed by 1973.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The subcommittee witnesses testified that the present CRITICOMM system will be inadequate during the test period, and that it will not be replaced unless AUTODIN can satisfy the NSA requirements. Deputy Secretary Packard testified he was convinced that the AUTODIN system has the capability of satisfying NSA requirements, provided certain problems could be worked out. He stated, however, that his authorization of the program was contingent upon a demonstration that AUTODIN, as planned, could do the job.

Over a period of several years, the CRITICOMM system has proven its value by rapid transmission of vital national security information to the appropriate command authorities. In view of the present international relations, which give no indication of stabilizing, it appears that the requirements for such a rapid data-transmission system will continue in the foreseeable future. In order to satisfy that requirement, it is imperative that the CRITICOMM system be maintained until an adequate replacement has been thoroughly tested. Accordingly, we believe that no action to phase out CRITICOMM should be initiated until the tests of the planned AUTODIN system conclusively demonstrate that AUTODIN would at least equal the transmission speeds of CRITICOMM. If these tests demonstrate that AUTODIN cannot satisfy those requirements, then a new alternative should be sought. Meanwhile, however, CRITICOMM should be maintained.

SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

President Nixon eloquently portrayed the critical role of communications in our national defense when he said, "When a war can be decided in 20 minutes, the Nation that is behind will have no chance to catch up." In order to be equal to their task in such a war, communications must have the capability of transmitting intelligence into the National Military Command Center and, conversely transmitting command and control decisions from that center to forces in the field within a very few minutes. This subcommittee's examination of the responsiveness of communications during the *Liberty*, *Pueblo*, and EC-121 incidents, raised a question whether the Department of Defense Communications Systems, generally, and the Defense Communications System, in particular, would be equal to that task. In those incidents, the performance of the Defense Communications System fell far short of meeting that standard. Several witnesses have testified that improved equipment, installed since those incidents, should result in better performance today. But despite the continuing programs for improvement of communications hardware, there does not appear to have been a commensurate improvement in the performance of the Defense Communications System, as evidenced by the failure to reduce in-station processing time, and the failure to improve completion rates for AUTOVON and AUTOSEVOCOM. Furthermore, no assurance could be obtained that the DCS would prove more efficient if faced with a similar crisis today. That point was brought out during the interrogation of the Director, DCA:

Mr. HALL. The clincher is to ask the General one question: Given another scenario like the *Liberty*, are you confident in your own mind that now we would have the necessary communications to promptly, and effectively complete the command decision?

James S. M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Central Air Force Navy Department Coast Guard

Mr. [illegible] Thank you [illegible] Mr. Chairman.

[illegible] imperative that [illegible] coordinator of the DCS [illegible] December [illegible] tors, so that we can be [illegible] co-ordinate [illegible] Political collaboration [illegible] intelligence systems [illegible] Worldwide situation [illegible]

One study [illegible] communications [illegible] day's [illegible] best utilize the latest [illegible] Similarly, its [illegible] better [illegible] The heart of the problem is [illegible] all levers of the [illegible] made to [illegible] the Department's [illegible] essential step [illegible] of Department of Defense [illegible] of the Assistant [illegible] That new office, however, must be strongly supported [illegible] tary, if its efforts [illegible] modifications are to be effective. Moreover, the [illegible] please the reorganization of Defense [illegible] and with the sense of urgency that it [illegible]

Of equal importance [illegible] the performance of the Defense Communications System, in order to obtain that improvement, the [illegible] of the DCS must be reorganized and greatly strengthened. The DCS must be conceived as a system, and a single manager [illegible] maintenance from end to end. Such a step is essential if its performance is to be significantly improved. The system must also be provided with management personnel possessing the proficiency in communications necessary for the effective, efficient and economic operation of a worldwide system. Obtaining such a management proficiency is essential if the myriad of problems, which have plagued the Defense Communications System throughout its first decade, are to be overcome.

Having equipped its armed forces with the finest communications equipment, at a cost of undetermined billions, this Nation has a right to demand efficient management and operation of that equipment. It also has a right to demand faultless performance of all Defense communications during periods of crisis. The Department of Defense must ensure that those demands are satisfied.

O

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(C) 081430-37Z. Secretary McNAMARA came on the line and CAPT THOMAS provided the following information directly to him via unclassified telephone:

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR directed LIBERTY to establish immediate communications with any Mediterranean area communication station and directed NAVCOMMSTA Morocco to take all available actions to establish communications with LIBERTY. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081340Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT issued CRITIC message: "LIBERTY at 31-23N/33-25E hit by torpedo starboard at 081230Z." (COMSIXTHFLT 081349Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR situation report Sum Total 001 to JCS, CNO and USCINCEUR quoted distress messages relayed from LIBERTY by SARATOGA at 081237Z and 081245Z. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081400Z.)

(C) CTF 63 recommended USS PAPAGO be diverted at maximum speed to 31-23N/33-25E to assist LIBERTY. (CTF 63 081410Z.)

(C) NAVCOMMSTA Morocco advised CINCUSNAVEUR LIBERTY unable to identify attacking boats. After attack helicopter circled the ship, believed to be Israeli. (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 081412Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv reported that Israeli aircraft and MTB's erroneously attacked LIBERTY. Israelis send abject apologies. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081414Z.)

(C) 081415Z. LCDR CARTER, DIRNSA, telephoned CAPT COOK, DIRNAVSECGRU, to request that he pass by telephone to SECDEF McNAMARA info about LIBERTY and the number of personnel aboard. As CAPT COOK was not in his office at the moment, CAPT THOMAS, Deputy DIRNAVSECGRU, accepted the call. First attempts to reach Secretary McNAMARA personally by phone were unsuccessful. CAPT THOMAS held the line until Secretary McNAMARA came to the telephone [redacted] at 081430Z.

(U) JCS authorized USCINCEUR to use whatever force required to defend LIBERTY from further attacks. (JCS 081416Z/JCS 7354.)

(U) CTF 60 081416Z to AMERICA and SARATOGA clarifies rules of engagement.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 2 advises of inability to communicate with LIBERTY on any circuit; briefs rules of engagement issued to pilots. (COMSIXTHFLT 081425Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 3 advises that communications with LIBERTY established by NAVCOMMSTA Greece. (COMSIXTHFLT 081426Z.)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

18 June (C) USDAO Tel Aviv provided synopsis of findings of Israeli Court of Inquiry, although findings not yet reviewed by Israeli JAG. Synopsis provided by LCOL EFRAT, aide to MGEN ~~ITZHAK~~ RABIN, IDF Chief of Staff.

"It is concluded clearly and unimpeachably from the evidence and from comparison of war diaries that the attack on USS LIBERTY was not in malice; there was no criminal negligence and the attack was made by innocent mistake.

"Attack rose out of a chain of three events, each of which by itself is understandable.

"First mistake was decisive. Navy and AF hq had received a number of wrong reports stating El Arish was being shelled from the sea. This wrong information formed the background and main ~~main~~ factor leading to attack on LIBERTY... IDF CNO and assistants were convinced that shelling was being done by unidentified ship or ships which were discovered at the time near the shore off El Arish. Even the officers who knew of the identification of LIBERTY early the same morning did not connect LIBERTY with the unidentified ships said to be shelling El Arish. The IDF Navy is not responsible for the mistaken report of shelling and the reasons for the mistaken report are outside the scope of the inquiry at hand. The Navy and AF hq took the reports at face value.

"Second mistake which added to first resulted in aircraft attack on LIBERTY was a mistaken report that LIBERTY was steaming at 30 knots. This mistake has two significances. When LIBERTY was identified in morning, her max speed was determined from Jane's Fighting Ships to be 18 knots. Therefore, even if the unidentified ship were thought to be LIBERTY, the fact that she was reported to be making 30 knots would have denied the identification. In accordance with IDF Navy standing orders, an enemy ship in any waters which is attacking Israeli ships or shelling the Israeli shore may be attacked. If there is no

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

info of enemy ships in the area, any ship or ships discovered by radar which are determined to be cruising at a speed above 20 knots may be considered an enemy. Since the speed of the unidentified ship was fixed at 28 to 30 knots, the IDF Navy was entitled to attack without further identification in view of the background info on the shelling of El Arish. IDF naval ops section had ordered the MTB's who reported LIBERTY's speed as 30 knots to recheck and only after confirmation of that speed was the info considered reliable and aircraft were sent to attack. The question of possible negligence in establishing the speed at 28-30 knots when in fact LIBERTY's max speed is 18 knots is discounted by the IDF CNO who testified, 'that such estimations require expertise. In an MTB there may be great discrepancies in fixing the speed of a vessel moving in front of it, especially if the estimate was made only over a short interval of time. It is quite feasible that there may be such a mistake even if you measure it twice or more.' As a result of the incident maybe the standing order should be reconsidered but no criminal negligence is found in the MTB's fixing of LIBERTY's speed.

"Third mistake caused execution of the second stage of attack on LIBERTY, this time with torpedos from MTB's. This was the mistaken identification of LIBERTY as the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir. Here I (that is, the officer conducting the inquiry, who LCOL EFRAT identified parenthetically as COL Ram RON, former Israeli Military Attache to Washington, D. C.) must state my doubts whether the identification was not done with a certain overeagerness, as this happened when serious doubts were already beginning to arise as to the identification as an Egyptian ship. It has been established by the evidence of the CO of the MTB Div that the doubts which had begun to arise in the pilots as to their accuracy of identification did not get to the CO of the MTB Div at that time, but he already knew that the ship was not a destroyer but ... in identification. On the other hand, I (again, COL RON) must state the extenuating circumstances and difficulties of identification under the following conditions: (1) ship was covered with thick smoke; (2) when asked to identify itself, the ship did not do so and behaved suspiciously; (3) it appeared to the division commander that there was a gun on the forecastle of the ship and that the ship was firing toward the MTB's. These observations were recorded in the war diary at the time of action. If we add to these factors that under the circumstances when the ship was completely covered with smoke there was, in fact, apparently a great similarity between it and EL QUSEIR. Two officers, a CDR and a LT on two different MTB's who had no communications between them both identified the ship at the same time as EL QUSEIR. The IDF CNO decided that on the basis of reports

James M Ennes, Jr Research Papers

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* XR DEF 12 US

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1 4 9 7 5

1967 JUN 18 AM 8 22

DEFENSE DEPT. 6-18-67

NNNNVZCZCONA895
PP RUEHC RUSHOI RUEHGE
ActionDE RUQMVL 0928/1 1691815
ZNY CCCCC
P 181038Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
Info TO RUEPNW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/JCS
RUEPNAA/CNO
RUENSC/DEPT STATE
RUQNCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEOPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUDLKD/CINCNAVEUR
RUEHDA/JCS
INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUENDT/USCINCEUR
RUFPBK/CINCEUR-USEUCOM
RUTMKN/CG SIX ZERO PT TWO
RUFPBU/USAFE
RUFPAG/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKRE/CG SIX ZERO
RUDLKD/USDAO LONDON
RUFJC/USDAO PARIS
RUEHGR/USDAO MOSCOW

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ST
C O N F I D E N T I A L 0928/1 JUN 67
SECTION 1 OF II.
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COURT OF INQUIRY IN USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

1. ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO EVENING 17 JUNE. LTC EPPAT, AUDF TO GENERAL RABIN, IDF COS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. GENL RABIN EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL REGRETS TO THE CNO USN FOR THE SAD MISTAKE OF THE USS LIBERTY INCIDENT.

B. GEN RABIN DECIDED TO PROVIDE VIA ALUSNA A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF IDF COURT OF INQUIRY ALTHOUGH THOSE FINDINGS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FINAL REVIEW FROM CO. SHINGAR, THE IDF JAG.

C. AFTER REVIEW AND TRANSLATION TO ENGLISH, A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE USG EITHER THROUGH AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV OR ISRAELI EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. THE SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IDF COURT OF INQUIRY AS TAKEN DOWN VERBATIM BY ALUSNA FROM COL EPPATS ORAL PRESENTATION IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

"A. IT IS CONCLUDED CLEARLY AND UNIMPEACHABLY FROM THE EVIDENCE AND FROM COMPARISON OF WAR DIARIES THAT THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY WAS NOT IN MALICE; THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND THE ATTACK WAS MADE BY INNOCENT MISTAKE.

CONFIDENTIAL

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

on hand that this identification was feasible. Therefore, I (again, COL RON) have come to the conclusion that there was certainly no criminal or serious negligence in this case.

"Finally, I (COL RON) hope to add that a grave additional mistake not less decisive than the three above mistakes made by IDF was made by the LIBERTY itself. On this question, I (COL RON) have the evidence of the IDF CNO and JAG which complement each other and from which it is clear that the American ship acted with lack of care by endangering itself to a grave extent by approaching excessively close to the shore in an area which was a scene of war and this at a time when it was well known that this area is not one where ships generally pass. This without advising the Israeli authorities of its presence and without identifying itself elaborately. Furthermore it appears that the ship made an effort to hide its identity first by flying a small flag which was difficult to identify from a distance; secondly, by beginning to escape when discovered by our forces and when it was aware of the fact that it had been discovered; thirdly, by failing to identify itself immediately by its own initiative by flashing light and refusing to do so even when asked by the MTB's. From all this I (COL RON) conclude that the ship LIBERTY tried to hide its presence in the area and its identity both before it was discovered and even after having been attacked by the AF and later by the Navy and thus contributed a decisive contribution toward its identification as an enemy ship."
(USDAO Tel Aviv 181630Z.)

(U) 182045Z. JCS Fact Finding Team returned to Washington. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE 3 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. ATTACK ROSE OUT OF A CHAIN OF THREE MISTAKES, EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF IS UNDERSTANDABLE: FIRST MISTAKE WAS DECISIVE. NAVY AND AF HQ HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF WRONG REPORTS STATING EL-ARISH WAS BEING SHELLED FROM THE SEA. THIS WRONG INFORMATION FORMED THE BACKGROUND AND MAIN FACTOR LEADING TO ATTACK ON LIBERTY. IDF CNO AND ASSISTANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT SHELLING WAS BEING DONE BY UNIDENTIFIED SHIP OR SHIPS WHICH WERE DISCOVERED AT THE TIME NEAR THE SHORE OFF EL ARISH. EVEN THE OFFICERS WHO KNEW OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY EARLY THE SAME MORNING DID NOT CONNECT LIBERTY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS SAID TO BE SHELLING EL ARISH. THE IDF NAVY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT OF SHELLING AND THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKEN REPORT ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY AT HAND. THE NAVY AND AF HQS TOOK THE REPORTS AT FACE VALUE.

SECOND MISTAKE, WHICH WHEN ADDED TO FIRST RESULTED IN AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON LIBERTY, WAS A MISTAKEN REPORT THAT LIBERTY WAS STEAMING AT 30 KNOTS. THIS MISTAKE HAS TWO SIGNIFICANCES: A. WHEN LIBERTY WAS IDENTIFIED IN MORNING, HER MAX SPEED WAS DETERMINED FROM JANES FLIGHTING SHIPS TO BE 18 KNOTS. THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WERE THOUGHT TO BE LIBERTY, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REPORTED TO BE MAKING 30 KNOTS WOULD HAVE DENIED THE IDENTIFICATION.

PAGE 4 RUQMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDF NAVY STANDING ORDERS, AN ENEMY SHIP IN ANY WATERS WHICH IS ATTACKING ISRAELI SHIPS OR SHELLING THE ISRAELI SHORE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF THERE IS INFO OF ENEMY SHIPS IN THE AREA, ANY SHIP OR SHIPS DISCOVERED BY RADAR WHICH ARE DETERMINED TO BE CRUISING AT A SPEED ABOVE 20 KNOTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ENEMY. SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED SHIP WAS FIXED AT 28 TO 30 KNOTS, THE IDF NAVY WAS ENTITLED TO ATTACK WITHOUT FURTHER IDENTIFICATIO. IN VIEW OF THE BACK-GROUND OF INFO ON THE SHELLING OF EL ARISH, IDF NAVAL OPS SECTION HAD ORDERED THE MTB'S WHO REPORTED LIBERTY'S SPEED AS 30 KNOTS TO RECHECK AND ONLY AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THAT SPEED WAS THE INFO CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND AIRCRAFT WERE SENT TO ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEGLIGENCE IN ESTABLISHING THE SPEED AT 28-30 KNOTS WHEN IN FACT LIBERTY'S MAX SPEED IS 18 KNOTS IS DISCOUNTED BY THE IDF CNO WHO TESTIFIED QUOTE THAT SUCH ESTIMATIONS REQUIRE EXPERTISE. IN AN MTB THERE MAY BE GREAT DISCREPANCIES IN FIXING THE SPEED OF A VESSEL MOVING IN FRONT OF IT, ESPECIALLY IF THE ESTIMATE WAS MADE ONLY OVER A SHORT INTERVAL OF TIME. IT IS QUITE FEASIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH A MISTAKE EVEN IF YOU MEASURE IT TWICE OR MORE UNQUOTE. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT MAYBE THE STANDING ORDER

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL 928, 181030Z JUNE 67 SECTION 1 OF 11

PAGE 5 RUGMVL 0928/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BUT NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS FOUND IN THE MTB'S FIXING OF LIBERTY'S SPEED.

THIRD MISTAKE CAUSED EXECUTION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF ATTACK O. LIBERTY, THIS TIME WITH TORPEDOS FROM MTB'S. THIS WAS THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF LIBERTY AS THE EGYPTIAN SUPPLY SHIP EL QUSEIR. HERE I (THAT IS, THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHO LTC EERAT IDENTIFIED PARENTHETICALLY AS COL RAM ROM, FORMER ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.) MUST STATE MY DOUBTS WHETHER THE IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE WITH A CERTAIN CARELESSNESS AS THIS HAPPENED WHEN SERIOUS DOUBTS WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION AS AN EGYPTIAN SHIP. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE OF THE C. O. OF MTB DIV THAT THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEGUN TO ARISE IN THE PILOTS AS TO THEIR ACCURACY OF IDENTIFICATION DID NOT GET TO THE C. O. OF THE MTB DIV AT THAT TIME, BUT HE ALREADY KNEW THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT A DESTROYER BUT A SUPPLY OR MERCHANT SHIP AND THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED EXTRA CAREFULNESS IN IDENTIFICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, I (AGAIN COL RON) MUST STATE THE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFICATION UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
BT

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 9:07 A.M. 6/18/67

CONFIDENTIAL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

014985

1967 JUN 18 AM 9 15

Action JTJTDTELSIX
NEA-11 ONOVZCZ CONAH98
PP RUENC RUEHDT RUEHCP
DE RUQMVL 0928/2 1691139
Info ZNY CCCCC
SS-25 P 181713Z JUN 67
FM USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL
GPM-3 TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPJS/ OSD
L-1 /CNO
RUEHC/DEPT STATE
H-1 RUQKCF/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEDPSA/UNCSTRIKE
IO-2 RUDLKD/USCINCEUR
RUEKDA/JCS
EUR-2 INFO RUEPJS/DIA
RUEHDT/USUN
INR-11 RUFPRA/KINCLUR-USEUCOM
RUTPRN/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
SS RUFPBW/SAFE
RUFPAC/CINCUSAREUR
RUTKFE/CTG SIX ZERO
ISA-1 RUDLKD/USDAO LONDON
RUEJDC/USDAO PARIS
FILE-1 RUEHOR/USDAO MOSCOW

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0928/2C O N F I D E N T I A L
FINAL SECTION OF UI.
(1) SHIP WAS COVERED WITH THICK SMOKE. (2) WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF, THE SHIP DID NOT DO SO AND BEHAVED SUSPICIOUSLY. (3) IT APPEARED TO THE DUTY CDR THAT THERE WAS A GUN ON THE FORE-CASTLE OF THE SHIP AND THAT THE SHIP WAS FIRING TOWARD THE MTB'S. THESE OVSERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN THE WAR DIARY AT THE TIME OF ACTION.

IF WE ADD TO THESE FACTORS THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE SHIP WAS COMPLETELY COVERED WITH SMOKE THERE WAS, IN FACT, APPARENTLY A GREAT SIMILARITY BETWEEN IT AND EL QUSEIR, TWO OFFICERS, A CDR AND A LT ON TWO DIFFERENT MTB'S WHO HAD NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEM BOTH IDENTIFIED THE SHIP AT THE SAME TIME AS EL QUSEIR. THE IDF CDR DECIDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF REPORTS ON HAND THAT THIS IDENTIFICATION WAS FEASIBLE. THEREFORE I (AGAIN COL RON) HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO CRIMINAL OR SERIOUS NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE. FINALLY I (COL RON) HAVE TO ADD THAT A GRAVE ADDITIONAL MISTAKE NOT LESS DECISIVE THAN THE THREE ABOVE MISTAKES MADE BY IDF WAS MADE BY THE LIBERTY ITSELF. ON THIS QUESTION, I (COL RON) HAVE THE EVIDENCE OF THE IDF CNO AND JAG

CONFIDENTIAL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PAGE 3 RUOMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER AND FROM WHICH IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN SHIP ACTED WITH LACK OF CARE BY ENDANGERING ITSELF TO A GRAVE EXTENT BY APPROACHING EXCESSIVELY CLOSE TO THE SHORE IN AN AREA WHICH WAS A SCENE OF WAR AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS AREA IS NOT ONE WHERE SHIPS GENERALLY PASS, THIS WITHOUT ADVISING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OF ITS PRESENCE AND WITHOUT IDENTIFYING ITSELF ELABORATELY. FURTHERMORE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SHIP MADE AN EFFORT TO HIDE ITS IDENTITY FIRST BY FLYING A SMALL FLAG WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY FROM A DISTANCE; SECONDLY BY BEGINNING TO ESCAPE WHEN DISCOVERED BY OUR FORCES AND WHEN IT WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, THIRDLY BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ITSELF IMMEDIATELY BY ITS OWN INITIATIVE BY FLASHING LIGHT AND BY REFUSING TO DO SO EVEN WHEN ASKED BY THE MTB'S. FROM ALL THIS I (KOL ROM) CONCLUDE THAT THE SHIP LIBERTY TRIED TO HIDE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND ITS IDENTITY BOTH BEFORE IT WAS DISCOVERED AND EVEN AFTER HAVING BEEN ATTACKED BY THE AF AND LATER BY THE NAVY AND THUS CONTRIBUTED A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD ITS IDENTIFICATION AS AN ENEMY SHIP." END QUOTE.
COMMENTS: 1. ALL ABOVE IS AS DICTATED BY LTC EFRAT WHO WAS TRANSLATING FROM A DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN HEBREW.

PAGE 4 RUOMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. LTC EFRAT PAUSED AT ONE POINT IN HIS READING TO POINT OUT THE GOI HAD RECEIVED A STATEMENT FROM USG SAYING THAT LIBERTY HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED SIX HOURS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK RATHER THAN ONE HOUR AS STATED IN AN EARLIER USG COMMUNICATION.
3. LTC EFRAT PROBABLY NOTED ALUSNA'S APPEARANCE OF SURPRISE AND INCREDULITY AS HE READ OFF SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN HE FINISHED HIS READING HE ASKED WHAT ALUSNA THOUGHT OF THE FINDINGS QUOTE OFF THE RECORD UNQUOTE. ALUSNA PRETENDED HE HAD NOT HEARD THE QUESTION AND THANKED THE COLONEL FOR HIS TIME. THE BURDEN OF DIPLOMACY BORE HEAVILY ON ALUSNA WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE:
A. THE IDF NAVY STANDING ORDER TO ATTACK ANY SHIP MOVING AT MORE THAN 20 KNOTS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.
B. TWO OF THE IDF JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. FIRST THEY SAY THAT SINCE THE SPEED OF THE UNIDENTIFIED WAS AS HIGH AS 30 KNOTS THEY COULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS LIBERTY. THEN THEY SAY THE SHIP WAS FEASIBLY IDENTIFIED AS EL QUSEIR. END QUOTE 30 KNOT SHIP COULDN'T HAVE BEEN LIBERTY UNQUOTE IT FOLLOWS QUSEIR HAS A MAX SPEED OF 14 KNOTS, FOUR LESS THAN LIBERTY. IF THE IT ALSO COULDNT HAVE BEEN EL QUSEIR.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CONFIDENTIAL
-3-USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL 928, 181030Z JUNE 67 SECTION II OF II

PAGE 5 RUQMVL 0928/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L.
C. THAT A PROFESSIONAL NAVAL OFFICER OF THE RANK OF COMMANDER COULD LOOK AT LIBERTY AND THINK HER A 30 KNOT SHIP IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.
D. THE SMOKE WHICH COVERED LIBERTY AND MADE HER DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY WAS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE IDF AF ATTACKS.
4. WHILE WALKING TO THEIR CARS, LTC ERRAT MENTIONED THAT GEN RABIN HAS NEVER BEEN SO ANGRY AS WHEN HE READ THE CURRENT NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE COMMENT ON THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. ALUSNA REMARKED THAT HE TOOK NO NOTICE OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTING ON THE INCIDENT.
5. ALUSNA WAS CALLED TO FLO EARLIER IN THE DAY TO RECEIVE A COPY OF IDF CNO LETTER OF REGRET AND CONDOLENCE TO CNO USN. ALUSNA WAS INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL DELIVER THE ORIGINAL TO ADM MCDONALD.
6. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. GP-3
BT

* NEWSWEEK, JUNE 19, 1967 PERISCOPE COLUMN, SAID IN PART:

"...HIGH WASHINGTON OFFICIALS BELIEVE ISRAELIS KNEW LIBERTY'S CAPABILITIES AND THAT THE ATTACK MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN ACCIDENTAL. ONE HIGH LEVEL THEORY HOLDS THAT SOMEONE IN THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES ORDERED THE LIBERTY SUNK BECAUSE IT HAD INTERCEPTED MESSAGES WHICH REVEALED ISRAEL HAD STARTED THE FIGHTING..."

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O AT 9:31 A.M. 6/18/67

CONFIDENTIAL

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLAS

IMMEDIATE

081715Z JUNE 1967
FROM USS LIBERTY
TO NAVCOMMSTA GREECE

UNCLAS
SITREP FOLLOWS - AIR ATTACK

1. AT TIME 081205Z, COURSE 283T SPEED 5KTS, POSITION 31-35.5N 33-29E, SHIP ATTACKED WITH UNIDENTIFIED JET FIGHTERS BELIEVED ISRAELI. APPROX SIX STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP. AT TIME 081225Z THREE TORPEDO BOATS, ONE IDENTIFIED AS ISRAELI, APPROACHED STARBOARD QUARTER AT HIGH SPEED. HULL NUMBER 206-17. AT APPROX 081427Z TOOK TORPEDO BOAT UNDER FIRE AT 2000 YARDS. BOATS LAUNCHED TORPEDO ATTACK AND STRAFING RUN. ONE TORPEDO PASSED APPROX 75 YARDS ASTERN. ONE MINUTE LATER TOOK TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE. SHIP HAS TEN DEGREE STARBOARD LIST. WATERTIGHT BOUNDARY ESTABLISHED. AM HOLDING. AFTER ATTACK TORPEDO BOATS CLEARED TO EAST ABOUT FIVE MILES. CLEARING AREA AT TEN KNOTS.

2. PHOTOS OF AIRCRAFT AND BOATS TAKEN. AFTER ATTACK COMPLETED, TWO ISRAELI HELOS ORBITED SHIP AT 500 YARDS. TIME 081255Z. ISRAELI INSIGNIA CLEARLY VISIBLE. PHOTOS TAKEN. SEVERAL PROJECTILES RECOVERED FROM TOPSIDE AREA. NUMBER DEAD ESTIMATED TEN, SEVERELY WOUNDED 15, TOTAL WOUNDED 75, NUMBER MISSING UNDETERMINED.

3. SHIP UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION. WILL REPORT PERSONNEL CASUALTIES ASAP.

4. EXTENSIVE SUPERFICIAL TOPSIDE DAMAGE. LOWER DECKS FORWARD DESTROYED.

5. COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY LIMITED. WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJECTILES AS DIRECTED. SHIP WILL REQUIRE DRYDOCK AND EXTENSIVE REPAIRS.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FLASH
0814242 JUNE 1967
FM USE TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO WHITE HOUSE
OCE
CNO
DELTA STATE
COMSIXTHFLT
CINCUSTRIKE
CINCNAVEUR
JCS
INFO CIA
USUN
CINCEUR USEUCOM
CTG 60.2
USAFE
CINCUSAREUR

(READDRESSAL)
FM NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
INFO USS LIBERTY
ATHENS USDAO

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0825 JUN 67.

ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT. ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT 08[illegible]2002, POSITION 31-25N 33-33E. MAY BE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SENT ABJECT APOLOGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR ZONE COASTS.
CP-3

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE
081953Z
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO CTF 60
INFO USS AMERICA / USS SARATOGA / CTG 60.2 / CINCUSNAVEUR /
USS DAVIS / USS MASSEY / COMDESRON 12 / USS PAPAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

E2A UTILIZATION

A. MY 081640Z JUN 67 NOTAL

1. IN VIEW COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEMS REF A OF LIBERTY, DESIRE YOU POSITION ONE E2A TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATION RELAY AND PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION TO LIBERTY TO AID IN RENDEZVOUS WITH DAVIS AND MASSEY.

2. LAUNCH ONE E2A ASAP RELIEVING ON STATION UNTIL RENDEZVOUS LIBERTY AND DESTROYERS EFFECTED. CONTACT LIBERTY ON E4.4B 6720 KCS.

3. INSURE E2A APPROACHES NO CLOSER TO EGYPT COAST THAN NECESSARY FOR RADAR AND COMMUNICATION CONTACT WITH LIBERTY. IN NO CASE CLOSER THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES.

4. WHILE E2A IS AIRBORNE MAINTAIN TWO E4 ARMED CAP READY TO LAUNCH IN TEN MINUTES.

5. DESIRE HOURLY SITREPS.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PRIORITY
181105Z JUN 1967
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO USS LIBERTY
INFO USCINCEUR / AMEMB VALLETTA / ASD PA / COMSIXTHFLT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. ASSOCIATED PRESS STORY FILED 17 JUNE FROM MALTA BY COLIN FROST STATES QUOTE SENIOR CREWMEN OF THE U.S. NAVY SHIP LIBERTY ARE CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL'S AIR AND TORPEDO ATTACK ON THEIR SHIP, WHICH COST 34 AMERICAN LIVES, WAS DELIBERATE, A RESPONSIBLE SOURCE SAID FRIDAY IN VALLETTA. THEY HAVE TESTIFIED TO THIS EFFECT TO THE NAVY INQUIRY COURT NOW IN SECRET SESSION ABOARD THE SHIP. THEIR BELIEF WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ENOUGH TIME TO IDENTIFY THE SHIP AND ON THE INTENSITY OF THE ATTACK UNQUOTE.

2. STORY LATER STATES QUOTE OFFICIALLY, LIBERTY'S TASK WAS TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION WITH AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN THE WAR TORN MIDEAST THAT WERE PLANNING AN EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM THEIR AREAS. BUT ALL MILITARY MEN IN THIS FORTRESS ISLAND LONG VERSED IN THE WAYS OF WAR TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT THE LIBERTY WAS ALSO UNDER ORDERS TO INTERCEPT AND EVALUATE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF FIGHTING ISRAELI AND ARAB FORCES. FOR FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE ATTACK THE SHIP HAD BEEN UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE FROM ISRAELI PLANES CIRCLING OVERHEAD, INNER QUOTE WE WERE FLYING OLD GLORY AND IT'S ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY SHOULDN'T KNOW WHO WE WERE, END INNER QUOTE, ONE SURVIVOR SAID UNQUOTE.

3. WHILE SOME OTHER MATERIAL IN THE STORY WAS RELEASED BY OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN, THE ABOVE QUOTES APPEAR TO BE BASED EITHER ON UNAUTHORIZED INTERVIEWS OR THE REPORTER'S CONJECTURE. SINCE HE EXPRESSED A STRONG BELIEF THAT THE ATTACK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACCIDENTAL TO THE TF 100 PAO BEFORE LIBERTY ARRIVED IN MALTA, THE LATTER POSSIBILITY IS NOT UNLIKELY. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE HE ATTEMPTED TO CONVERSE ON THIS SUBJECT WITH LIBERTY CREWMEN ASHORE. BECAUSE OTHER REPORTERS MAY ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW UP, YOU MAY FEEL IT APPROPRIATE TO REPEAT PREVIOUS ADMONITION TO YOUR FINE CREW TO REFRAIN FROM SPEAKING ABOUT MATTERS UNDER INVESTIGATION UNTIL FINDINGS OF COURT OF INQUIRY HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

P 072230Z JUN 67
FM JCS
TO USCINCEUR
INFO CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 67
USS LIBERTY
HQNASAUD
NASAEUR OFF GEROA
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRU
ADIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT
DIRNAVSECGRUEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L JCS 7337 J-3 SENDS
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67
1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VARIED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.
CHANGE CPA WAR TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM.
GP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

F L A S H

FM USS SARATOGA
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 60

(NO CLASS RECD)
FOLLOWING RECD FROM USNS LIBERTY
"I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33.25E 31.23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT.
REQ IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE."

NOTE: NO AUTHENTICATION RECEIVED.
INTERCEPTED E04.04 FROM USS SARATOGA.

(This is version intercepted on COMDESRON 12 flagship at 0813002 JUN 67.)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
0813052
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO USS LIBERTY

UNCLAS
YOUR FLASH TRAFFIC RECEIVED. SENDING AIRCRAFT TO COVER YOU.
SURFACE UNITS ON THE WAY. KEEP SITREPS COMING.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FLASH

081340Z
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO USS LIBERTY
INFO COMMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

UNCLAS
1. ESTABLISH IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY MED AREA COMMSTA.

2. NAVCOMMSTA CAMS MOROCCO TAKE ALL AVAILABLE ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH USS LIBERTY. REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.

3. FOR USS LIBERTY. REQUEST CONFIRM REPORT OF ATTACK.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE

1417477 JUN 1967

FM SECDEF
TO USCINCEUR / CINCUSNAVEUR / COMSIXTHFLT / CTF SIX ONE / CTF 100 /
VALLETTA / ATHENS / USS TIDEWATER / USS LIBERTY / STATE DEPT /
CINCLANT / CNO

UNCLAS

DEF 7890 FROM OSD (PA)
SUBJECT: DOD STATEMENT ON COURT OF INQUIRY, USS LIBERTY.
FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED BY DOD ON MORNING OF
14 JUNE: QUOTE A U. S. NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY IS IN SESSION AT
VALLETTA, MALTA, WHERE THE USS LIBERTY HAS ARRIVED. THE COURT,
UNDER REAR ADMIRAL ISAAC C. KIDD, USN, IS INQUIRING INTO ALL
ASPECTS OF THE ATTACK. THE COURT IS EXPECTED TO BE IN SESSION
APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT WILL BE MADE
PUBLIC WHEN ITS COMPLETED REPORT IS READY. PARA MANY RUMORS
AND REPORTS ABOUT THE ATTACK HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING. THE DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE HAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SOME OF THESE RUMORS
AND REPORTS. OTHERS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON PARTIAL EVIDENCE. SOME
APPEAR TO BE ACCURATE ON THE BASIS OF PRESENT INFORMATION HERE,
WHICH IS INCOMPLETE. UNTIL THEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL
HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENT. UNQUOTE.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE

142145Z JUNE 1967

FM CINCUSHAVEUR
TO USS AMERICA / USS LIBERTY
INFO COMSIXTHFLT / CTF 60 / CTF 100 / CHINFO

UNCLAS

1. REQUEST AMERICA AND LIBERTY FORWARD TO THIS HEADQUARTERS INFO CHINFO TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL NEWS INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED ON BOARD PERTAINING TO LIBERTY INCIDENT BY IMMEDIATE CLASSIFIED MESSAGE.

2. ALSO REQUEST AMERICA AND LIBERTY ADVISE IN SAME MESSAGE TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED ABOARD PERTAINING TO LIBERTY INCIDENT.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE

282051Z JUNE 1967

FM SECDEF
TO USCINCEUR
INFO SECNAV / SECSTATE / CINCUSNAVEUR / CINCLANT / CINCLANTFLT /
COMSIXTHFLT / USS LIBERTY / USS PAPAGO / AMEMB VALLETTA /
USDOCO SOUTH NAPLES

UNCLAS E F T O DEF 9078 FROM ASD(PA) SGD GOULDING USDOC SOUTH
FOR RADM KIDD
SUBJECT: NEWS RELEASE USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

1. MY DEF 8990 DTG 272241Z CANCELLED.

2. NARRATIVE AND UNCLASSIFIED TESTIMONY SENT TO USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR AND COMSIXTHFLT HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED TO PRESS. IF MEMBERS OF CREW NOW DESIRE TO GIVE INTERVIEWS AND RESPOND TO PRESS QUERIES ABOUT THE ATTACK ITSELF THEY ARE AUTHORIZED TO DO SO. OTHER SUBSTANTIVE QUERIES ABOUT ATTACK WILL BE HANDLED BY OASD(PA). NARRATIVE AND TESTIMONY REFERRED TO ABOVE ARE ONLY PORTIONS OF COURT OF INQUIRY THAT HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED. NORMAL SECURITY PROCEDURES ARE OTHERWISE APPLICABLE.

[redacted]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PRIORITY

281930Z JUNE 1967

FROM CHINFO
TO CINCUSNAVEUR / COMSIXTHFLT / NSA NAPLES / CINCLANTFLT / COMSERVLANT /
USS LIBERTY / COMFIVE

UNCLAS

PRESS RELEASE ON USS LIBERTY

1. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT A PRESS RELEASE CONSISTING OF A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY AND A STATEMENT BY C.O. USS LIBERTY WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS BY OASD (PA) TODAY.

2. WHEN THIS MATERIAL IS RELEASED, ANY FOLLOW-UP SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS WILL BE REFERRED TO OASD (PA). COMMANDS ARE REQUESTED TO SEE THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE SO ADVISED.

3. FOR NSA NAPLES. REQUEST PAO ADVISE RADM KIDD AT CINCSOUTH.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE
282147Z JUNE 1967
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO USS LIBERTY

IMMEDIATE
272241Z JUNE 1967
FROM SECDEF
TO USCINCEUR / CINCUSNAVEUR / COMSIXTHFLT

UNCLAS DEF 8990 USCINCEUR ATTN GENERAL BUCCHINAL FROM ASD (PA).
SGN GOULDING HAS SENT TO YOU BY COURIER A COPY OF PRESS STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED HERE SUMMARIZING THE COURT OF INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS. THIS IS FOR YOUR PERSONAL USE ONLY. WHEN THE MATERIAL IS RELEASED IN WASHINGTON, ALL SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED HERE. COPY OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. NO REPEAT NO SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN ASD (PA).

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY
301401Z JUNE 1967
FROM CINCUSNAVEUR
TO USS LIBERTY
INFO USCINCEUR / COMSIXTHFLT / NSA NAPLES / SECDEF / SECSTATE /
AMERICAN EMBASSY MALTA / CHINFO / CINCLANTFLT / CINCLANT / COMSERVLANT /
COMSERVRON EIGHT / USDOSOUTH / CONFAIRMED

UNCLAS

SECDEF FOR OASD PA. USDOCOSOUTH FOR RADM KIDD.
USS LIBERTY PRESS QUERIES/INTERVIEWS
A. USS LIBERTY 291005Z JUN 67 PASEP.
B. SECDEF 9078 DTG 282051Z JUN 67 (NOTAL).

1. COMMANDING OFFICER AND ANY MEMBER OF LIBERTY CREW WHO SO DESIRES ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND TO QUERIES AND GIVE INTERVIEWS AT MALTA AT TIME CONVENIENT TO CO. NARRATIVE TESTIMONY REFERRED TO IN REF B ARE ONLY PORTIONS OF COURT OF INQUIRY THAT HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED. NORMAL SECURITY PROCEDURES ARE OTHERWISE APPLICABLE. CREW MEMBERS ARE LIMITED TO RESPOND TO INQUIRY ABOUT ATTACK ONLY WITHIN GUIDE LINE SET FORTH IN PRESS RELEASE DISCUSSED IN REF B. ANY SUBSTANTIVE QUERIES CONCERNING ATTACK OR ANY OTHER PHASE OF LIBERTY INCIDENT MUST BE REFERRED TO OASD (PA) FOR RESOLUTION, AS DIRECTED PARA 2 REF B.

2. COPIES OF AFOREMENTIONED PRESS RELEASE ARE BEING HAND DELIVERED THIS DATE TO CO USS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN EMBASSY MALTA.

3. IRVING R. LEVINE, NBC ROME, HAS REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH RADM KIDD PLANNED PM 30 JUNE. A COPY OF PRESS RELEASE WILL BE GIVEN TO LEVINE TODAY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HE WILL STILL BE INTERESTED IN INTERVIEWS WITH LIBERTY CO AFTER SEEING THE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS. ALL CONCERNED WILL BE ADVISED OF RESULTS OF THIS DISCUSSION.

4. IF PRESS INTERVIEW IS REQUIRED, CDR COONEY COMSIXTHFLT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER WILL ASSIST AS NECESSARY.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

IMMEDIATE

011240Z JULY 1967
FM NAVSUPPACT NAPLES
TO CINCUSNAVEUR / USS LIBERTY / COMSIXTHFLT / SECDEF / SECSTATE /
AMEMB MALTA / CHINFO / CINCLANT / CINCLANTFLT / COMSERVLANT /
COMSERVRON EIGHT / USCINCEUR / USDOCOSOUTH

PRIORITY

301853Z JUNE 1967
FM NAVSUPPACT NAPLES
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO USS LIBERTY / COMSIXTHFLT / SECDEF / SECSTATE / AMEMB MALTA /
CHINFO / CINCLANT / CINCLANTFLT / COMSERVLANT / COMSERVRON EIGHT /
COMFIARMED / USCINCEUR / USDOCOSOUTH

UNCLAS
SECDEF FOR OASD PA USDOCOSOUTH FOR REAR ADMIRAL KIDD.
USS LIBERTY INTERVIEWS

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 301401Z JUN 67

1. INTERVIEW OF ABOUT ONE HOUR DURATION OF RADM KIDD CONDUCTED BY IRVING R. LEVINE OF NBC IAW PARA 3 REF A. INTERVIEW REQUESTED BY NBC. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (GARBLED) WORK OF DOD LIBERTY NEWS RELEASE, OR STATEMENTS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED.

2. AT CONCLUSION OF INTERVIEW AND UPON READING DOD RELEASE MR LEVINE STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED INTERVIEW MORE THAN SATISFACTORY AND THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO HOME OFFICE THAT CREW NOT PROCEED TO MALTA FOR INTERVIEW OF LIBERTY C.O. NBC WAS TOLD C.O. AVAILABLE, BUT DID NOT SEEK PUBLICITY.

3. AT PRESENT NO OTHER REQUEST FOR INTERVIEWS ARE PENDING.

4. UNEDITED TAPE RECORDING OF TOTAL INTERVIEW AND ALL CONVERSATION ASSOCIATED THEREWITH FORWARDED TO CINCUSNAVEUR AND CHINFO BY CERTIFIED AIR MAIL.

5. CDR COONEY SENDS.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NAVAL MESSAGE
DD FORM 2110 28 REV 3-91 S/N 0107-705-4000

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE EXT NR	PAGE	PAGES
			OF	

DATE	TOR TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY
10 JUN 67			

MESSAGE NR	DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECE-DENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

COURIER ..... 10 JUNE 1967

KR NR 06755
O 0917442 JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 60
USS AMERICA
USS LIBERTY
BT
UNCLAS ECAP 349665. SUBJ: INFORMATION CONCERNING USS LIBERTY
1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE USS LIBERTY WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AT THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. TODAY. THE CASUALTY LIST ON THE LIBERTY NOW STANDS AT 9 DEAD, 75 WOUNDED (INCLUDING AT LEAST 15 SERIOUSLY) AND 22 MISSING. THE SKIPPER OF THE LIBERTY SAYS THAT HE BELIVES THAT SOME OF THE 22 MISSING MEN MAY BE FOUND IN THE FLOODING COMPARTMENTS OF THE SHIP NO NEXT-OF-KIN HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED YET.
THE LIBERTY RENDEZVOUSED WITH TWO DESTROYERS AT 1225 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME ABOUT 420 MILES ESE OF SOUDHA BAY, CRETE. ONE DOCTOR AND ONE CORPSMAN FROM EACH DESTROYER WENT ON BOARD THE LIBERTY. AT 0430 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME, HELICOPTERS FROM THE AMERICA MET THE LIBERTY ABOUT 385 MILES FROM SOUDHA BAY. 15 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE AMERICA. A TOTAL OF ABOUT 35 ARE EXPECTED TO BE MOVED BY CHOPPER TO THE AMERICA, PLUS THE NINE BODIES. AT 0530 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME THE LIBERTY RENDEZVOUSED WITH THE AMERICA. NOW THE LIBERTY AND TWO DESTROYERS ARE PROCEEDING TO SOUDHA BAY. THE LIBERTY IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT SOUDHA BAY 0630 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW. THEY ARE MAKING ABOUT 18 KNOTS. THE AMERICA PUT SERVERAL OFFICERS AND MEN ABOARD THE LIBERTY TO HELP MAN HER.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CANNOT SPECULATE ABOUT THE FATE OF THE 22 MISSING MEN BEYOND THE INFORMATION ABOVE. IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS " WAS EGYPT AND ISRAEL NOTIFIED THAT THE LIBERTY WAS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ?" A DEFENSE DEPABTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, "WE ARE CHECKING INTO THAT".
IN ANSWER TO QUERIES, IT MAY BE SAID THAT THE THREE TECHNICAL

DISTRIBUTION

(PAGE ONE ONLY)

00 01 02 03 0405

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)
0917442

James M Ennes Jr. Research Papers

NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY FORM 2110/28 (REV. 3-81) S/N 0107-705-4000)

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE EXT/AUTOVON	PAGE	PAGES
DATE: 13 JUNE 1967	TOR/TOD	ROUTED	CHECKED BY	OF

MESSAGE NR	DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

REPRESENTATIVES ABOARD THE LIBERTY WORK FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
BT

DISTRIBUTION
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)
091712

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2... 3611 5/N 0107 705 4000

RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE EXT NR	PAGE	PAGES
DATE	TOR TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		OF	
19 JUL 1997	10222					

MESSAGE NR	DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL (MSG. NR)	SECRET	ROUTINE	SPECIAL
	0313?5Z	ACTION			000			
		INFO						

FM: CG SIXTH FLT

TO: USS LIBERTY

BT

UNCLAS

YOUR FLASH TANNIFIC TRECEIVED SENDING AIRCRAFT TO COVER YOU.

SURFACE UNITS ON THE WAY. KEEP SITREPS COMING.

BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LIBERTY

DISTRIBUTION

(PAGE ONE ONLY)

REC-COUNTER

00 01 02 03 04

X X X X X

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

0313?5Z

NAVAL MESSAGE
OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (RE... 3-91) S/N 0107-705-4000

RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE EXT NO		PAGE	PAGES
			ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		OF	
DATE: 30 JUN 67	TIME TOD: 1610Z						

MESSAGE NO	DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	EXTRA
20735	301401Z		ACTION			00000			
			INFO				PPPPPP		

FM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS LIBERTY

INFO: USCINCEUR / COMSIXTHFLT / NSA NAPLES / SECDEF / SECSTATE / AMERICAN EMBASSEY MALTA / CHINFO / CINCLANTFLT / CINCLANT / COMSERVLANT / COMSERVRON EIGHT / USDOSOUTH / CONFAIRMED /

BT
UNCLAS E F T O

SECDEF FOR OASD PA. USDOCOSOUTH FOR RADM KIDD, USS LIBERTY PRESS QUERIES/INTERVIEWS

A. USS LIBERTY 291005Z JUN 67 PASEP
B. SECDEF 9088 DTG 282051Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

1. COMMANDING OFFICER AND ANY MEMBER OF LIBERTY CREW WHO SO DESIRES ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND TO QUERIES AND GIVE INTERVIEWS AT MALTA AT TIME CONVIENT TO CO. NARRATIVE TESTIMONY REFFERED TO IN REF B ARE ONLY PORTIONS OF COURT OF INQUIRY THAT HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED. NORMAL SECURITY PROCEDURES ARE OTHERWISE APPLICABLE. CREW MEMBERS ARE LIMITED TO RESPOND TO INQUIRE ABOUT ATTACK ONLY WITHIN QUIDE LINE SET FORTH IN PRESS RELEASE DISCUSSED IN REF B. ANY SUBSTANSIVE QUIRIES CONCERNING ATTACK OR ANY OTHER PHASE OF LIBERTY INCODENT MUST BE REFERRED TO OASD PA. FOR RESOLUTION, AS DIRECTED PARA 2 REF B.

2. COPIES OF AFOREMENTIONED PRESS RELEASE ARE BEING HAND DELIVERED THIS DATE TO CO USS LIBERTY AND AMERICAN EMBASSEY MALTA.

3. IRVING R. LEVINE, NBC ROME, HAS REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH LIBERTY CO AND RADM KIDD. INTERVIEW WITH RADM KIDD PLANNED PM 30 JUNE. A COPY OF PRESS RELEASE WILL BE GIVEN TO LEVINE TODAY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF HE WILL STILL BE INTERESTED IN INTERVIEWS WITH LIBERTY CO AFTER SEEING THE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ATTACK ON LIBERTY WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS. ALL CONCERNED WILL BE ADVISED OF RESULTS OF THIS DESCUSSION.

4. IF PRESS INTERVIEW IS REQUIRED, CDR CONEY COMSIXTHFLT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER WILL ASSIST AS NECESSARY.

BT
REF:A: USS LIBERTY PRESS CONFERENCE--USDOC SOUTH FOR RADM KIDD
REF:B: SUBJECT OLN NEWS RELEASE USS LIBERTY COURT OF INQUIRY

DISTRIBUTION
(PAGE ONE ONLY)

N.U-EF

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 011 023 024

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)
301401Z

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

'It's a Message From the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to the USS Liberty'



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

CO 6/13

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

UNCLASSIFIED

12

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

A SAMPLE OF

1985 MAIL FROM

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

AND GOVT. OFFICIALS

IT IS MOSTLY

EVASIVE.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FOLDER #2

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332

IN REPLY REFER TO

JAG:21.2:KM:srw
CF-49-79
OCT 11 1983

Mr. James M. Ennes
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in response to your letter dated September 21, 1983, inquiring about the Navy's Court of Inquiry which was conducted into the circumstances of the attack on the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) which occurred on June 8, 1967.

The questions contained in your September 21, 1983, letter with its enclosure and in the past correspondence directed by you to our Office have been carefully reviewed. With regard to your contention that the approved official record of the incident, compiled in the days immediately following the tragedy, does not, in all respects, conform to your recollection of the events, your attention is invited to the Third Endorsement on the proceedings, dated November 3, 1967, in which the Judge Advocate General concluded that the proceedings were conducted in substantial compliance with the requirement of the Manual of the Judge Advocate General and were therefore legal.

Sincerely,

T. K. WOODS, JR.
Captain, JAGC, U. S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Investigations)

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830
21.2:19:8500590
22 Jan 1986

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Your letter to Senator Dariel J. Evans concerning the Israeli attack on the USS LIBERTY was recently forwarded to us for reply. In June of 1967, the U.S. Navy conducted a Court of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances surrounding this incident.

In your letter, you cite three findings of fact contained in the Record of Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and allege that there is some evidence contrary to those findings. As in any inquiry of this magnitude, there is going to be conflicting testimony and evidence. It is the duty of a Court of Inquiry to hear testimony, evaluate evidence and review all of the available information concerning an incident and thereafter weigh the evidence and draw its conclusions based upon that evidence. The Court of Inquiry into the attack of the USS LIBERTY made its findings of fact after a careful and thorough consideration of all the information available.

We hope this information will assist you.

Sincerely,

Paul F. Carroll

PAUL F. CARROLL
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Investigations)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

1 February 1986

Captain Paul F. Carroll, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant JAG (Investigations)
Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332

COPY

Dear Captain Carroll:

I have received your letter 5830 21.2:19:8500590 22 Jan 1986.

I wrote originally to Senator Daniel J. Evans because previous responses from your office have been evasive and unsatisfactory. I am sorry that your letter is equally evasive and does not address the questions that I have asked.

Captain Carroll, my letter to Senator Evans did not allege that there is some evidence contrary to [the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry into the attack on the USS Liberty.]" The whole point of my letter is that the transcript of that Court of Inquiry contains no evidence whatsoever to support the Court's key findings and a great deal of evidence to refute them. This is a violation of JAG regulations. Under normal circumstances that report would not, could not, and should not have been approved. It is fatally flawed. The entire United States Government, from the Department of State to the White House and the United States Navy points to that report as the conclusive and official last word on the USS Liberty matter. Yet it is clear that none of the defenders of the report have taken the trouble to read it. My hope is that someone in our government will do that.

During my military career I have on several occasions served as member and senior member of Navy boards and courts of inquiry. As a result, I have been intimately familiar with the JAG Manual as regards such panels. One of the requirements which was always prominent in my mind is that findings of fact and opinion must be supported by evidence (including testimony) and that the evidence must be included in the report of the proceeding. In other words, findings of fact and opinion must have some logical relationship to the evidence reviewed by the panel, and a person later reviewing the report should be able to find the evidence. Granted, someone reviewing the file may not attach the same weight to individual scraps of evidence that the board did and may even disagree with the findings, <u>but he should be able to find some evidence, however small, in support of the board's findings</u>. In other words, findings of fact and opinion must logically proceed from the evidence; they cannot be fanciful or based upon politics, command influence or some whim of the panel. In the unlikely event that the panel ignores its responsibility, then reviewing authorities, including JAG, must see that the record is corrected.

None of that happened here. The whole point of my letter and others by my frustrated shipmates is that the Court of Inquiry file in this case does not contain one scrap of evidence in support of several key findings, but contains much to refute them. Anyone reviewing the evidence contained in that file would inevitably reach a conclusion on certain key points quite opposite of that reached by this Court.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

COPY

These are not the unsupported and fanciful views of a disgruntled survivor. That opinion of the Court of Inquiry file was originally given to me privately by an officer then on the JAG headquarters staff who studied the file in detail as part of his official duty. More recently another quite senior JAG officer studied the file in depth and reached the same conclusion. The flaws, in fact, are so obvious that they jump out at anyone who takes the time to read the file.

For instance, when the report was first complet in London, CINCUSNAVEU (Admiral McCain) asked his staff legal officer (then-Captain Merlin Staring) to prepare a forwarding endorsement. But Captain Staring found the report so filled with errors and conflicts that he refused to prepare the endorsement and advised Admiral McCain to withhold the report until the flaws could be removed. Apparently because of pressure from Washington, Admiral McCain ignored the advice and signed the flawed report. The legal officer has told me that he was so concerned that he might be associated with that shoddy piece of work that he wrote a personal letter to his seniors at JAG explaining the circumstances and disassociating himself from the report. And this was not some young maverick. Merlin Staring later became Judge Advocate General of the Navy and retired as a rear admiral.

When the report reached JAG, it was seen to be so deeply flawed that JAG was compelled to prepare an almost unprecedented 32 page summary whose obvious purpose was to attempt to gloss over some of the report's many shortcomings. The flawed report was ultimately approved by CNO and the Navy has ever since blindly insisted that CNO's approval makes the report "legal" and "final." That may be legally so, Captain Carroll, but the flaws still exist and are evident to anyone who takes the time to read the report. Even Admiral Thomas Moorer, who as CNO was responsible for the report's ultimate approval, agrees today that it is seriously flawed and should be reinvestigated.

Finally, I must address your closing assertion that the findings were made "after a careful and thorough consideration of all the information available." That is not so.

For instance, I was officer of the deck during most of the seven hour period immediately preceding the attack. From my hospital bed in Naples I sent a sworn statement to the Court describing the steady 12 knot wind, the freely flying flag, the extensive low level reconnaissance and other key details. My statement was received by and read to the Court of Inquiry. Yet my statement was not entered into evidence and is not mentioned anywhere in the record of proceedings. One must wonder why. Could it have been omitted because it disagrees so strongly with the Findings? Its removal, for whatever reason, was irregular and improper.

The court reported a finding of fact or opinion that the American flag may have hung limp at the mast on a windless day. My sworn statement and testimony from several crewmen said otherwise. No one and not one scrap of evidence supports the finding that the flag "may have hung limp." But, more important, anyone who has ever been to sea knows that Courts of Inquiry need never speculate about weather conditions. These are recorded every thirty minutes in the ship's weather log. The weather log was available and was reviewed by the court. It shows 12 knots of wind across the deck. But the court chose not to enter that log into the record. One must wonder why. Like my own sworn

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

COPY

testimony, was the weather log ignored because it conflicts so strongly with the Findings? Whatever the reason, the removal of that log was improper.

So, Captain Carroll, the fact is that at least two members of your staff and a retired Judge Advocate General of the Navy have all reviewed that file and have found it seriously flawed. Anyone reviewing the file will find the same flaws. Yet your office continues to pretend that the emperor is fully clothed.

The point is: the court did not hear all the evidence, did not evaluate all the evidence it heard, did not observe the requirements of the JAG manual, did not assure that all its findings are supported by and consistent with evidence and did not produce a satisfactory report.

I am certain, for instance, that you could not have written the letter you did if you had taken the trouble to examine that file.

Won't you ask some responsible person on your staff to review the file, particularly with a view toward finding at least some scrap of evidence, no matter how small, to support each of the Findings? Won't you let me, the USS Liberty Veterans Association and Senator Evans know the results of that review?

Sincerely,

cc: The Honorable Daniel J. Evans

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830
21.2:19:8500590
14 Feb 1986

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
USS LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION
P. O. Box 789
Woodinville, WA 98072

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This responds to your recent letter to Mr. Chase Untermeyer, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) that asks for a new review of the Court of Inquiry report on the USS LIBERTY attack in 1967. Your request was referred to the Office of the Judge Advocate General for response.

The Court of Inquiry proceedings were previously reviewed and approved by the Navy chain of command. Additionally, we understand that the Government of Israel offered an immediate apology and accepted responsibility for the incident. United States Goverment claims on behalf of the men, who were killed and injured in the attack, and compensation for damage to the LIBERTY were also reportedly paid. In view of the foregoing, further review of the proceedings is not appropriate.

I hope that this information will assist you in this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul F. Carroll

PAUL F. CARROLL
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate
General (Investigations)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DANTE B FASCELL, Florida, Chairman

LEE H HAMILTON Indiana
GUS YATRON Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J SOLARZ New York
DON BONKER Washington
GERRY E STUDDS Massachusetts
DAN MICA Florida
MICHAEL D BARNES Maryland
HOWARD WOLPE Michigan
GEO W CROCKETT JR Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON Connecticut
MERVYN M DYMALLY California
TOM LANTOS California
PETER H KOSTMAYER Pennsylvania
ROBERT G TORRICELLI New Jersey
LAWRENCE J SMITH Florida
HOWARD L BERMAN California
HARRY REID Nevada
SHEL LEVINE California
EDWARD F FEIGHAN Ohio
TED WEISS New York
GARY L ACKERMAN New York
BUDDY MACKAY Florida
MORRIS K UDALL Arizona
ROBERT GARCIA New York

WILLIAM S BROOMFIELD Michigan
BENJAMIN A GILMAN New York
ROBERT J LAGOMARSINO California
JIM LEACH Iowa
TOBY ROTH Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J SNOWE Maine
HENRY J HYDE Illinois
GERALD B H SOLOMON New York
DOUG BEREUTER Nebraska
MARA D SILJANDER Michigan
ED ZSCHAU California
ROBERT K DORNAN California
CHRISTOPHER H SMITH New Jersey
CONNIE MACK Florida
MICHAEL DEWINE Ohio
DAN BURTON Indiana
JOHN McCAIN Arizona

JOHN J BRADY JR
Chief of Staff

Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

February 13, 1986

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President
~~U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association~~
P.O. Box 789
Woodinville, Washington, 98072

Dear Mr. Meadors:

Thank you for your letter of February 4 regarding certain basic questions concerning the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry into the June 8, 1967 attack on the U.S.S. Liberty. I appreciate hearing from the U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association on this matter.

In an effort to be of help I have contacted appropriate Department of Navy officials to request a report. As soon as that information is received I will be in touch with you again.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Dante B. Fascell

Dante B. Fascell
Chairman

DBF:gbg

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 3, 1986

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President
U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association
P. O. Box 789
Woodinville, WA 98072

Dear Mr. Meadors:

Thank you for your letter of January 11.

With respect to our correspondence over the past months, I wish to emphasize that the Department of State accepts the handling of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry in the Liberty case, acting on the behalf of the U.S. Government, and regards the case as closed.

With respect to the Court of Inquiry and its findings, the U.S. Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, is the agency responsible for the conduct of the Court. Since the Department of State has no further comment or information to provide on the conduct or findings of the Court of Inquiry, any further questions should be addressed to the U.S. Navy.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Wilcox Jr.
Director
Office of Israel and
Arab-Israeli Affairs

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DANIEL J. EVANS
WASHINGTON

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 10, 1986

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Thank you for your recent letter requesting my continued assistance regarding the Department of the Navy.

I have asked the appropriate Navy officials to further review your case and will be in touch with you again as soon as I receive their response.

Sincerely,

DANIEL J. EVANS
United States Senator

DJE:xsn

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROBERT W. THABIT

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW

OFFICE:
(212) 682-3481, 2

801 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 801
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

TELEX: 621131
ANSWER: THABITR

January 9, 1986

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Moynihan:

I recall having had the pleasure of meeting you personally when you were the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations.

I do want to note my appreciation for your speaking out on the Pollard Case, as you are more familiar with such matters than most Members of Congress. It was most shocking to many Americans to learn that despite the close cooperation of U.S. and Israeli intelligence that Israeli wanted much more.

In view of your increased awareness in the field of intelligence , I wonder whether you might consider taking steps to review the U.S.S. Liberty Affair. As you no doubt know, some 34 American Sailors were killed by Israeli Deferse Forces in 1967 in an unwarranted and unprovoked attack.

You would, in doing so, be joining a large number of Americans who believe that the matter has been covered up. I believe it merits a Senatorial inquiry and hope that you will sponsor such an inquiry.

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. THABIT

RWT/clp

bcc: Mr. Jim Ennes

James M Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 27, 1986

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
PO Box 789
Woodinville, Washington 98072

Dear Mr. Ennes:

I very much appreciate your letter on the incident involving the U.S.S. Liberty.

This issue is one of considerable importance to me, and I am glad that you took the time to send me your opinions.

You may be sure that I will remember your views if this matter comes to the Senate floor for a vote.

Sincerely,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 6, 1985

Ms. Selma Abdo
4982 Elgin Circle
Syracuse, New York 13215

Dear Ms. Abdo:

I very much appreciate your having taken the time to bring to my attention your views regarding the attack on the USS Liberty in June of 1967.

This issue is one of considerable importance to me, and I am glad to have your views on it.

Sincerely,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION

Stan White Chairman
Joseph L. Meadors President
Robert Casale Vice President
Joyce Casale Secretary-Treasurer
Paul N. McCloskey Legal Advisor
James M. Ennes Jr. Historian

P.O. BOX 780, WOODINVILLE, WASHINGTON 98072

September 18, 1985

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Weinberger:

The Department of Defense has been quoted in the press as referring to "rigged photographs" being submitted by the Soviet Union in regard to the recent incident in East Germany.

However, this is not the first time that "rigged photographs" have been submitted to the Department of Defense in order to provide an excuse for an unprovoked incident.

In 1982, the State of Israel submitted to the United States, their second version of the June 8, 1967, attack on the USS LIBERTY. On page 23 of that report (enclosed), the Israelis commit the same crime you have accused the Soviets of.

Even if you were to examine the photographs closely, you would not be able to determine that the ship the Israelis mistook the USS LIBERTY for, the El-Quseir, was 180 feet shorter, had 1/2 the beam, 1/4 the displacement, totally different deck arrangement, and not near the antenna array of the USS LIBERTY. Not to mention that the picture the Israelis used was taken before the huge dish shapped antenna was placed on the stern of the ship. The picture of the USS LIBERTY shown in the Israeli 1982 version of the attack is not the same ship that sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean in June, 1967.

This is only one of many discrepancies included in this version. On behalf of the survivors of the attack and families of the 34 men who did not survive, I am asking you for a copy of the Department of Defense critique (and comparison) of both the Israeli 1982 version and the Israeli 1967 version (the "Yerushalmi Report 1/67") of the attack on the USS LIBERTY. I am also requesting a copy of the Israeli responses to questions that resulted from the critiques and comparisons performed by the Department of Defense on each of these versions.

Sincerely,

Joseph L. Meadors
President
c/o Aramco, P.O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON DC 20350 2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

3000
Ser 611B/5U414350
25 OCT 1985

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President, USS LIBERTY Veterans
Association
c/o Aramco
P. O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Dear Mr. Meadors,

I am responding to your recent letter to Secretary Weinberger requesting a copy of a Department of Defense critique on the 1982 and 1967 Israeli reports of the attack on USS LIBERTY.

Using the information you provided, a thorough search has been made of Defense Department records to identify the data you requested. Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate any such critique, nor is there any evidence of such a critique having been conducted.

We appreciate your interest in obtaining information pertaining to the USS LIBERTY attack, and regret that we are unable to comply with your request. While I believe we have conducted an exhaustive review of available files, we would be pleased to renew our efforts if there were additional information to point us in a direction we have been unable to identify.

P. D. BUTCHER
COMMODORE, U. S. NAVY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION

Stan White, Chairman
Joseph L. Meadors, President
Robert Cassle, Vice President
Joyce Cassle, Secretary Treasurer
Paul N. McCloskey, Legal Advisor
James M. Ennes Jr., Historian
P.O. BOX 780, WOODINVILLE, WASHINGTON 98072

November 6, 1985

Commodore P. D. Butcher
Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans, Policy and Operations)
Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350-2000

Re: 3000
Ser 611B/5U414350
29 OCT 1985

Dear Commodore Butcher:

Thank you for responding to my recent letter to Secretary Weinberger.

We would appreciate it if you would expand a little on a comment you made in that response. Specifically, your statement that there is not "any evidence of such a critique having been conducted."

On June 8, 1967, the State of Israel attacked and totally destroyed a US Navy ship, the USS LIBERTY, under conditions that are, to say the least, suspicious. That attack left 34 men dead and 171 wounded.

Israel has submitted not one, but two different official versions of the attack.

Why hasn't the Department of the Navy bothered to analyze either of these two reports? 34 men are dead and a US Navy Ship is totally destroyed. Isn't the Department of the Navy even remotely curious as to what the attackers have to say about the incident?

I am sure you can understand our concern in this matter.

We respectfully request you to take steps to remedy this situation by assigning the appropriate personnel, knowledgeable in the USS LIBERTY incident, to critically analyze both of these Israeli reports, compare them with the US Navy Court of Inquiry Report into the attack, and submit a copy of these critiques to Congress and the USS LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION.

Sincerely,

Joseph L. Meadors
President
c/o Aramco, P.O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

3000
Ser 611/5U414366
29 NOV 1985

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President, USS LIBERTY Veterans
Association
c/o Aramco
P. O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Dear Mr. Meadors,

Thank you for your recent letter in which you ask for further explanation of the results of our search for the document you described in your last letter. You also requested that the Navy complete a critique of the 1967 and 1982 Israeli reports of the USS LIBERTY attack for submission to Congress and the USS LIBERTY Veterans Association.

Using the description you provided, a thorough search of records and archives from all applicable sources was conducted. No document was identified. Further, no record of disposition or reference to such a document was located. It was on that basis that you were advised of the lack of evidence supporting the existence of a DOD critique.

Following the attack on USS LIBERTY, the U. S. Navy Court of Inquiry heard testimony, reviewed all available information concerning the incident, and drew conclusions based on that evidence. Findings of fact were made after a careful and thorough consideration of all the information available. The Government of Israel offered an immediate apology and accepted complete responsibility. They later paid U. S. Government claims on behalf of the men who were killed and injured in the attack and compensation for damage to the ship.

Your continuing interest in the circumstances surrounding the attack on USS LIBERTY is understood. The conclusions reached by the Court of Inquiry, and Israel's admission of responsibility and payment of damages, were sufficient grounds to close this case. In view of this, further action is not considered warranted.

Sincerely,

P. D. BUTCHER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Assistant Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Plans, Policy
and Operations)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

U.S.S. LIBERTY VETERANS ASSOCIATION

Stan White, *Chairman*
Joseph L. Meadors, *President*
Robert Casale, *Vice President*
Joyce Casale, *Secretary-Treasurer*
Paul N. McCloskey, *Legal Advisor*
James M. Ennes, Jr., *Historian*
P.O. BOX 789, WOODINVILLE, WASHINGTON 98072

December 7, 1985

Rear Admiral P. D. Butcher
Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans, Policy and Operations)
Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350-2000

Re: 3000
Ser 611/5U414366
29 NOV 1985

Dear Admiral Butcher:

Thank you for responding to my letter of November 7.

It is not our intent to test your patience, but, with all due respect, we feel your statement that the "Findings of fact were made after a careful and thorough consideration of all the information available" is incorrect. I'll give you one example.

According to an article in the December, 1985, USS LIBERTY NEWSLETTER written by Captain Joseph M. Tully, Jr. USN (retired), the Commanding Officer of the USS SARATOGA at the time of the attack, the Sixth Fleet received the authenticated message from the USS LIBERTY, "Under attack by unidentified air and surface units. Request immediate assistance."

Captain Tully immediately launched his Ready Strike Group consisting of 4 F4 fighters, 4 A4 fighter bombers and 4 A1 fighter bombers, all conventionally armed.

Those aircraft were recalled almost immediately after launch.

Both the SARATOGA and the AMERICA were then ordered to ready similar strike groups to be launched in support of the LIBERTY in 90 minutes.

This was ignored by the Court.

I can give you many more examples of pertinent information pertaining specifically to the attack on the USS LIBERTY that was available for the Court to review but, for whatever reason, they chose to ignore.

Our question to you, Admiral, is, "Why were the aircraft recalled and who gave the order?"

Sincerely,

Joseph L. Meadors
President
c/o Aramco, P.O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

3000
Ser 611/5U414373

31 DEC 1985

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President, USS LIBERTY Veterans
Association
c/o Aramco, P.O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Dear Mr. Meadors,

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the attack on USS LIBERTY. Although I understand your continuing interest, as I indicated in my letter of 29 November, 1985, the attack on USS LIBERTY was previously investigated by a duly constituted Court of Inquiry. The findings of that body were reviewed by the chain of command and the case is now closed. There are no plans to reexamine the circumstances associated with this incident. Accordingly, I regret I am unable to answer your question.

Sincerely,

P. D. BUTCHER
REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. NAVY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS (PLANS,
POLICY AND OPERATIONS)

As you know, Adm T. H. Moorer, USN (Ret.) is interested in the same question. Perhaps you could (In the meantime) efforts might open up the case.

I cannot provide any additional information.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LEON E. PANETTA
18TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MARKETING, CONSU
AND NUT
HOUSE ADMINIS
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL AND POLICE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC HUNGER

DEPUTY MAJORITY WHIP

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 29, 1986

WASHINGTON OFFICE
339 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202 225-2861

DISTRICT OFFICES
383 ALVARADO STREET
MONTEREY, CA 93940
408 649-2836

HOLLISTER, CA
408 637-6050

SALINAS, CA
408 424-2229

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CA
805 541-3400

SANTA CRUZ, CA
408 423-1836

Captain J. M. Tully, Jr.
Rt. 3 Box 539
Carmel, California 93923

Dear Captain Tully:

Thank you for contacting my office to express your views on the 1967 incident involving the U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering ship Liberty. I appreciate the benefit of your views in this matter and a copy of the article from "Navy Times."

As you know, controversy still clouds the Israeli attack on the Liberty, which resulted in the deaths of 34 sailors and the wounding of 171 others. Although Israel has apologized for the attack, there are still many unanswered questions. In 1971, the House Armed Services Committee investigated the attack. No conclusions were drawn concerning the motive for the attack.

More recently, the case of accused spy Jonathon J. Pollard and the revelation that Israel had been spying on the United States has renewed interest in the case of the Liberty. You will be interested to know that the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations has opened a new case file on the attack and is in the process of sifting through information relative to the case. A formal investigation is not, however, scheduled at present.

Rest assured that I will follow this matter closely and that I will remember your concern. Thank you, again, for getting in touch.

Sincerely,

LEON E. PANETTA
Member of Congress

LEP/ktk

#3

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

STROM THURMOND
SOUTH CAROLINA

The President Pro Tempore

UNITED STATES SENATE
January 7, 1985

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President, USS LIBERTY Veterans Association
c/o Aramco, P. O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Dear Mr. Meadors:

Thank you for your letters concerning the tragedy of the USS LIBERTY.

As you know, the U. S. Navy conducted a Court of Inquiry in June, 1967, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack on the USS LIBERTY. As in an inquiry of this magnitude, there is going to be conflicting testimony and evidence. It is the duty of a Court of Inquiry to hear testimony, evaluate evidence and review all the available information concerning an incident and thereafter weigh the evidence and draw its conclusions based upon that evidence. The Court of Inquiry into the attack of the USS LIBERTY made its findings of fact after a careful and thorough consideration of all the information available. This investigation report was reviewed by Committees in Congress and others. I doubt it would serve any useful purpose to reopen the investigation which was conducted almost 20 years ago.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond

Strom Thurmond

ST:uc

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 16, 1986

Mr. Gip D. Oldham, Jr.
6008 E. University Boulevard
Dallas, Texas 75206

Copy

Dear Mr. Oldham:

Assistant Secretary Ball has aked me to reply to your letter of January 2, concerning the attack upon the U.S.S. Liberty.

As our correspondence of November 22 with Senator Gramm's office pointed out, the responsibility for compiling and assessing facts related to the Liberty case lies exclusively with the Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General. At no point has the Department of State had any formal responsibility to either obtain or assess facts in the case.

Information memoranda, such as the Salans Memo to which you refer, are prepared on a variety of subjects for the purely informational use of Department principals. These internal memoranda do not purport to be final findings of fact, nor do they connote any formal Department of State review of the matters discussed within.

To confirm the information provided in the November 22 correspondence, the Government of Israel completed payment of damages for the Liberty in 1983, fulfilling the settlement negotiated in 1980.

If you have additional comments or questions concerning the Liberty case, I recommend you contact the Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Wilcox
Director
Office of Israel and
Arab-Israeli Affairs

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

JOHN P. EAST
NORTH CAROLINA

COMMITTEES
JUDICIARY
ARMED SERVICES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 26, 1986

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President
U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association
P.O. Box 789
Washington, D.C. 98072

Dear Mr. Meadors:

Thank you for your note and accompanying article on the tragic affair involving the USS Liberty. I am familiar with several of the accounts of this incident. I believe that it would be best if the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense would answer all of the questions that have been raised by this strange and terrible attack on one of our ships.

The President could order the departments involved to open the files on this case, or Congress could so direct by including such language in an authorization or appropriation bill. However, neither prospect seems to be likely at this time. It would certainly take more than one Senator to get the momentum going on such a project. Frankly, in spite of lobbying efforts, there is no great desire to reopen this case on the part of Congress or the Executive Branch.

I can understand the desire that motivates the former crew of the USS Liberty to demand that all of the facts be disclosed. Unfortunately, the chance of that happening in the near future is unlikely.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

John P. East

John P. East
United States Senator

JPE:jrt

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
DELAWARE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 20, 1985

NOT RECEIVED UNTIL JAN 13, 1986 (?)

Mr. Joseph L. Meadors
President
U.S.S. Liberty Veterans Association
c/o Aramco
P.O. Box 1168
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Dear Mr. Meadors:

I have received a reply (a copy of which is enclosed) from the Department of State concerning the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967. I presume that this response will be totally inadequate in assisting you in your efforts to determine exactly what took place on June 8, 1967. Therefore, having received your letter of November 10, I have made another inquiry on your behalf, this time with the Department of Defense.

If you have any additional comments or requests, please do not hesitate to contact me again.

Sincerely,

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senator

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANDY IRELAND
10th District, Florida

PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

[illegible]
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
OVERSIGHT AND EVALUATION

COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

[illegible]
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES AND
SPECIAL SMALL BUSINESS PROBLEMS

HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

January 3, 1986

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2416 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON DC 20515
(202) 225-5015

FLORIDA OFFICES
120 WEST CENTRAL AVENUE
P.O. BOX 9447
WINTER HAVEN, FL 33883
(813) 299-[illegible]

[illegible] 8TH AVENUE [illegible]
[illegible] 1220
BRADENTON, FL 33506
(813) [illegible]

1803 RICHMOND ROAD AT BARLOW HIGHWAY
P.O. BOX 8758
ARCADIA, FL 33803
(813) 627-8018

Mr. Thomas O. Ditges
P.O. Box 11
Fedhaven, FL 33854

Dear Mr. Ditges:

Thank you for again contacting me concerning the attack on the U.S.S. Liberty.

There are currently no plans for further investigation of this tragic incident. The Department of Defense and the Department of State are satisfied with the results of the investigation conducted immediately following the attack on the Liberty. Should plans develop to reopen this case, I will surely share your views with the appropriate officials.

Please continue to share your views with me on issues of concern. Best regards.

Sincerely,

Andy Ireland

API:aa

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANDY IRELAND
[illegible] District, Florida

PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

[illegible]

[illegible] MINORITY MEMBER
[illegible] AND EVALUATION

COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

[illegible]

[illegible] MINORITY MEMBER
EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES AND
[illegible] SMALL BUSINESS [illegible]

HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2416 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5015

FLORIDA OFFICES
120 West Central Avenue
P.O. Box 9447
Winter Haven, FL 33883
(813) 299-4041

[illegible] 6th Avenue West
P.O. Box [illegible]
Bradenton, FL [illegible]
(813) 746-0760

1803 Richmond Road at Dantow Highway
P.O. Box 6755
Lakeland, FL 33803
(813) 687-8018

December 2, 1985

Mr. Thomas O. Ditges
P.O. Box 11
Fedhaven, FL 33854

Dear Mr. Ditges:

Thank you for contacting me with your concern over reports that Mr. Leon Klinghoffer is being nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor. I appreciate having your views on this matter.

I am aware that there were press reports, shortly after Mr. Klinghoffer's murder, stating that the New York congressional delegation intended to submit Mr. Klinghoffer's name for the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Although I have the greatest sympathy for the Klinghoffer family, I agree with you that the Congressional Medal of Honor is a military award and is not applicable in this situation.

As for the Marines killed and wounded in Lebanon, none of these men were decorated with the Congressional Medal of Honor. Furthermore, it is my understanding that none of the seamen on the U.S.S. Liberty received this award.

Please continue to share your views with me on matters of concern. Best regards.

Sincerely,

API:aa

Jr. Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

PAUL SIMON
ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
JUDICIARY
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 2, 1986

Dr. Jack G. Shaheen
School of Fine Arts and Communications
Department of Mass Communications
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Edwardsville, Illinois 62026-1001

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your letter concerning James Ennes' correspondence.

I have asked a member of my staff to spend a little time investigating the points he raised.

My best wishes.

Cordially,

Paul Simon
United States Senator

PS/sh

Research Papers
James M. Ennes, Jr.

230 S. Dearborn
Kluczynski Bldg., 38th Floor
Chicago, IL 60604
312/353-4952

3 West Old Capitol Plaza
Suite 1
Springfield, IL 62701
217/492-4980

8787 State St.
Suite 212
East St. Louis, IL 62203
618/398-7707

250 West Cherry
Room 116-B
Carbondale, IL 62901
618/457-3653

PHIL GRAMM
TEXAS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 4, 1985

Mr. Otis Davenport
Otis Research and Report
~~P.O. Box 12388~~
Dallas, Texas 75225

Dear Mr. Davenport:

I have received a reply from the Department of State in response to my inquiry on your behalf and am enclosing a copy of the reply for your information. If I can be of further service on this matter, please let me know.

Yours respectfully,

Phil Gramm

PHIL GRAMM
United States Senator

PG/wawr

Enclosure

at least Phil Gramm took the trouble to check into the inquiry. Senator Bentsen + Congressmen Bartlett gave their shallow stereotyped opinions without looking into the matter.

Dallas, Texas
12/16/85

The same two letters were rec'd by a friend in Longview, Texas from Gramm.

GDOJr.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 22

Copy

Dear Senator Gramm:

Thank your for your inquiry of November 6 concerning the 1967 Israeli attack on the USS Liberty.

Questions about the Israeli attack on the Navy communications vessel USS Liberty, which occurred during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, have risen from time to time over the years. The charge most often raised has been that Israel deliberately attacked the Liberty, knowing it was a U.S. naval vessel. The Department of State has no information corroborating this allegation.

The U.S. Government has officially reviewed the incident. In 1967, a U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry made a full investigation of the attack. Officers and men of the Liberty testified at this inquiry, and communications messages to and from the ship were reviewed thoroughly. The Court concluded it did not have sufficient information to make a judgment about the reasons for the Israeli action against the Liberty. The proceedings transcript of the Court of Inquiry has been available to the public for several years from the Department of Defense. Naturally, it would be inappropriate for the Department of State to comment upon these proceedings, which did not fall under our jurisdiction.

The Israeli Government also conducted an inquiry into the incident in 1967, and the Israel Defense Forces historical staff issued a study of the subject in 1982. The Department of State was not involved in preparing these Israeli documents, nor were they formally submitted to the Department for official review. I can only stress that examination and reconciliation of accounts or testimonies does not fall under the Department of State's purview, and that responsibility for any further review rests with the Department of Defense. Any of your con-

The Honorable
Phil Gramm,
United States Senate.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

stituents who have new information or grave concerns about the U.S. Government's review of the incident may wish to directly contact the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

As you know, Israel stated that the attack was the result of confusion and error by its armed forces during the war. At the time of the incident the Government of Israel apologized immediately, accepted complete responsibility, and offered to pay compensation for the deaths and injuries caused to American personnel by the attack. The Israeli Government paid in full in 1968 and 1969 the U.S. Government claims for $3,323,500 on behalf of those killed and $3,452,275 on behalf of those injured of the Liberty crew. Although monetary compensation for wrongful death or injury is not adequate recompense for the pain and suffering involved, the families and individuals concerned received the full amount of these claims. In 1980, Israel agreed to pay the U.S. Government $6,000,000 as compensation for damage to the vessel.

In closing, let me note again that responsibility for analyzing the USS Liberty incident rests with the Department of Defense, and that Israel accepted complete responsibility and paid compensation for its attack.

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosures:

Correspondence returned.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers