HISTORY OF USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
30 December 1964 - 31 December 1966

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a victory ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY (AG-168), she was launched in May 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in the Atlantic and the Pacific, including Sasebo Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The SIMMONS VICTORY was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron & Steel Company in February 1963. The conversion culminated in commissioning on 30 December 1964 at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name USS LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the ten cities and towns in the United States named Liberty. These towns and cities are located in the following states:

Indiana	New York
Illinois	North Carolina
Missouri	Pennsylvania
Mississippi	South Carolina
Kentucky	Texas

Since her commissioning the ship has been a test, research and development platform for the Navy's Communications Projects. The need for this type of ship became apparent as modern communications including earth satellites, produced many phenomena not consistent with current research data. As a highly mobile and sophisticated station, the LIBERTY is sent to various areas to participate in experiments with new communications methods. The ship also has a limited capability of conducting routine hydrographic and oceanographic observations.

After commissioning LIBERTY spent approximately a month in Bremerton, Washington undergoing outfitting before her transit through the Panama Canal. Under the Command of Commander Daniel T. MCELAND, Jr., USN, she arrived in her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia on 23 February 1965. LIBERTY left Norfolk on 2 April conducting roll stabilization tank test, shakedown at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and specialized training prior to her return to Norfolk on 10 May.

On her initial deployment from 15 June 1965 through 22 October 1965, LIBERTY visited the Canary Islands; Lagos, Nigeria; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Capetown, South Africa; and Dakar, Senegal.

Social functions by and for the ship's company were enjoyed in all ports. The Ivory Coast Armed Forces in Abidjan staged an outdoor cookout for the crew, replete with native food and drink. LIBERTY sailors swapped hats, danced in a torrential tropical downpour, and returned to the ship drenched but delighted with new foods and friendships.

After this Abidjan visit, in a message to the State Department and the LIBERTY, United States Ambassador Morgan praised the Officers and Crew for their contribution toward cementing Ivorian - American relations.

LIBERTY delivered Peace Corps and Project Hand Clasp material to African ports during her second deployment from 4 January 1965 through 22 March 1966, and revisited old friends in Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

Port calls are eagerly awaited by LIBERTY personnel since her employment schedule involves periods of three to four months independent steaming, with port visits of only two or three days after three to four weeks at sea. To enable her to fulfill her operational commitments, she is capable of feeding, her crew for 120 days; cruising 15,000 miles without refueling; supplying her crew with 12,000 gallons of fresh water daily; and caring for the crew with a modern sick bay including dental facilities and a Medical Officer is assigned for each deployment.

For underway entertainment, LIBERTY is outfitted with a complete hobby shop, including a slot car racing track, various athletic gear for games and skeet shooting, daily movies, a well stocked library, and complete ship's store and soda fountain facilities. Fishing is frequently enjoyed as is an occasional volleyball game topside while underway, sunbathing, topside cookouts and talent programs.

These extensive facilities and capabilities of LIBERTY are but tools to implement her mission. The goodwill and spirit generated by her crew are, in turn, reflections of her competence in executing this mission. She has been officially commended by a Department of Defense Agency for the excellence of her Research operations. Admiral T. H. MOORER, Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, visited LIBERTY on 25 May 1966 and subsequently expressing his appreciation for a fine briefing on LIBERTY research operations and commented that he was very favorably impressed with the condition of the ship and the appearance of the crew.

During her import period, following the second deployment, Commander Daniel T. KIRKLAND, Jr., USN of Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania, relinquished command of the LIBERTY to Commander William L. MCGONAGLE, USN of Wichita, Kansas on 25 April 1966. Among the visiting dignitaries were RADM H. A. [illegible], Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and Commodore B. W. [illegible], USN, Commander Service Squadron EIGHT.

The LIBERTY's third operational deployment extended from May to 10 August 1966. Dakar, Senegal; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola, and Monrovia, Liberia, were visited by LIBERTY during this cruise. The LIBERTY in keeping with her rapidly growing reputation as "an embassador of goodwill", again delivered material for the Peace Corps and Project Hand Clasp to various African ports. In addition, 6,000 pounds of books were presented to the Nigerian Armed Forces by the LIBERTY.

The LIBERTY departed Norfolk, Virginia, the ship's homeport, on her fourth cruise 1 November 1966. Thus far during her present deployment the LIBERTY has visited Las Palmas, Canary Islands; Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The LIBERTY again embarked with materials and books for distribution in several west African countries.

The second anniversary of the commissioning of USS LIBERTY was observed at sea with a ceremony consisting of cutting a cake to celebrate the occasion and a short speech by the senior "plank owner" still aboard, LT George E. COLEMAN, USN, Engineering Officer. There were only forty other plank owners aboard at this time.

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USS LIBERTY is a unit of the United States Atlantic Fleet assigned to the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and administratively assigned to and under the operational control of Commander, Service Squadron EIGHT.

The year 1966 ended with LIBERTY on station with all hands diligently exerting every effort to fulfill the mission assigned.

DATA OF INTEREST

Crew: 17 Officers, 300 Enlisted Men

Length: Overall 455 feet

Draft: (full load) 29 feet

Beam: 60 feet

Displacement: 11,500 tons

Propulsion: Steam turbine - single screw 8,500 hp

Boats: 26 foot Motor whaleboat, capacity 22

33 foot Personnal boat, capacity 45

33 foot Utility boat, capacity 45

24 CO2 inflatable lifeboats, capacity 15

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: ENG

PLAN OF THE DAY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Saturday, 06 MAY 1967 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4236.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P3400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0800 - Continue Field Day
1300 - Commenced Holiday Routine
1300 - Matinee in the Mess Hall
1400 - Matinee in the Wardroom

NOTES

1. There will be a cookout on the 01 level aft (weather permitting) on Sat., 13 MAY at 1630. Anyone interested in providing entertainment (cowboy, vocal groups, etc) please submit names to Ship's Office.

2. A mess inspection is scheduled for 1000, Saturday, 13 May.

3. Commencing today shirts may be removed topside. When shirts are worn, hats will also be worn. When stripped to the waist, hats will NOT be worn. Bridge watch will be in full uniform.

4. A satellite communications system known as TRISCOMSI (Technical Research Ship Special Communications) has recently been installed aboard. The system employs high power microwaves concentrates into a very narrow beam of RF energy. This energy field is considered dangerous to health and can result in damage to certain sensitive parts of the human body. This danger area exists in the direction that the antenna is pointed and extends 600 feet in that direction, and is approximately 20 [illegible] wide.

To preclude the possibility of injury no one will be allowed on the 01 level aft of the superstructure during the periods of operation.

Operation periods between reveille and taps will be announced over the 1MC. At all other times the position of the antenna should be noted. The normal stow position of the antenna is pointing directly up. Where doubt exists, the OOD should be contacted before entering the danger area. The operating spaces are out of bounds to all hands, except assigned personnel, at all times.

5. Because this ship will visit areas where malaria is prevalent, CHLOROQUINE PRIMAQUINE tablets will be dispended to all personnel each week.

As a preventive measure, containers will be placed in serving line on the mess decks.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



THE COMMISSION PENNANT

The distinctive mark, other than the National Ensign, of a ship of the Navy in commission is a flag or pennant at a masthead.

The commission pennant traces its origin back to various sources.

During the days of chivalry noblemen were identified by a personal pennant or banner.

There is a story of a sea battle in which the Dutch raised a broom to their masthead to indicate their desire for a clean sweep. The British replied with a horsewhip to show their intentions toward the Dutch.

The commission pennant as shown here combines both the banner and whip.

The pennant presented to Captain [redacted] today is the one used aboard during his tour of command.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)
FPO, NEW YORK, 09501

DUTY DEPT: SUPPLY

PLAN OF THE DAY

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -FRIDAY, 05 MAY, 1967- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALL INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE PLAN OF THE DAY CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY REGULATION 4230.

UNIFORM OF THE DAY		WORKING UNIFORM
OFFICERS & CPO'S:	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI	TROPICAL WASH KHAKI
ENLISTED:	CLEAN DUNGAREES	DUNGAREES

CARRY OUT THE ROUTINE PLAN OF THE DAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH USS LIBERTY INSTRUCTION P5400.1, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED HEREIN:

0730 All Hands fall in on the 01 level aft for presentation of advancement certificates and awards.
0815 (about) Commence field day.
1300 All off duty helmsmen and the after steering General Quarters Team report to after steering for instruction and drill.

NOTES

1. The following named personnel will recieve awards and certificates at 0800. Uniform for recipients is Tropical White Long. All other personnel may wear working uniforms:

ABLE, Charles J.	JOHNSON, Melvin P.	REDENBAUGH, Wayne J.
AMEEN, Timothy P.	MYERS, David V.	KILO, Albert C.
ANDERSON, James M.	RITENBURG, Douglas	[illegible], James H.
BENNETT, Joseph A.	SCHNELL, Robert J.	[illegible], Glenn E.
BOWEN, Larry L.	AIMETTI, Americo F.	[illegible], Dennis A.
CALLIGAN, John J.	BROWN, Francis	MATTHEWS, James A.
CARPENTER, Joseph	BRUMMETT, Gary W.	WHITE, Stanley W.
CONVERSE, Jerry L.	CARNAHAN, David [illegible]	RAMMELSBERG, Albert
KIKLEBERRY, Dennis M.	DEMORI, Duilio	BROOKS, Richard J.
GALLO, Ernest A.	FISHER, John W.	SMITH, James C.
JONES, Charles F.	HALBARDIER, James T.	BYRD, Charles E.
KEENE, Richard W.	HAUCK, Charles [illegible]	SMITH, Thomas B.
LANDIS, Calvin L.	HALEN, [illegible]	STOUDT, Joseph D.
STURMAN, Richard S.	TOURNEY, [illegible] F.	WARD, Jerry W.
MOWREY, John R.	MEYER, Stephen E.	HIGGINS, Alan

2. Yesterday's General Quarters went more smoothly than anticipated considering the number of new men assigned. It is planned to muster and instruct Repair Parties separate from General Quarters until they are well organized and trained. When these Repair Party sessions are scheduled, personnel should arrange for their own watch reliefs/standbys ahead of time.

3. Nobody likes to drill. When we become proficient at all general drills, further drilling will be held to a minimum. All hands should make a concerted effort to learn as quickly as possible so that we may have a relaxed and enjoyable cruise.

4. Beginning Friday, 05 MAY 67 the Ship's Office will be open for personal business to all enlisted personnel between the hours of 0800 and 1130.

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3. To assist personnel who have recently reported aboard in becoming more familiar with the ship, the following brief history is provided:

History of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

The USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May of 1945 by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., Portland, Oregon. She saw service in both the Atlantic and Pacific, including Buyong Bay, Pusan during the Korean War. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. The ship was selected by the Navy for conversion to a Technical Research Ship and was delivered to the Willamette Iron and Steel Co. in February 1963. The conversion culminated in the Ship's commissioning on 30 December 1964 at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington under the new name LIBERTY. The name was selected to honor the 10 cities and towns in the United States named LIBERTY. These towns and cities are located in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas.

On her maiden voyage from Bremerton to her homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, the LIBERTY stopped for a port visit in Rodman, Panama, Canal Zone. Sea trails took her to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the ports of Key West, Florida and Montigo Bay, Jamica. The LIBERTY recently departed for her fifth cruise to South Atlantic waters. Ports visited during the past four deployments include Santa Cruz and Las Palmas in the Canary Islands; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Capetown, Republic of South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola and Monrovia, Liberia.

The mission of the LIBERTY is to conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy Electronics Research Projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communication.

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) is a unit of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, assigned to the Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and under the operational control of Commander Service Squadron EIGHT.

P. M. ARMSTRONG
Executive Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

31 August 1983

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes,

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of July 19, 1983, in which you seek information concerning the mission of the USS ANDREW JACKSON (SSBN 619) in June 1967. The request was forwarded to this command by Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet.

Unfortunately, the documents you seek are not available at this command.

Sincerely,

David W. Thomas

David W. Thomas
LCDR USN
Force Public Affairs Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

26 August 1983

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes,

This is a final response to your Freedom of Information Act request of July 19, 1983, in which you requested information concerning the mission of the USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-619) in June 1967.

Enclosed is the Patrol Upkeep schedule for Rota, Spain from January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967. However, the CINCLANT Transit Order 57-67 and COMSUBRON SIXTEEN Transit Order 234-67, requested in your letter, were destroyed in accordance with existing procedures prior to 1970.

The direct cost of search and duplication services performed in complying with your request has been determined to be under $30, therefore, you will not be billed.

Any additional available information regarding your request will be provided directly to you by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare) (OP-02).

Sincerely,

Owen J. Redferrer

OWEN J. REDFERRER
Captain, U. S. Navy
Public Affairs Officer

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANTHONY PEARSON (CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE) CLAIMS SSGN ANDREW JACKSON OPERATED WITH THE LIBERTY. THE LOGS SHOW SHE CAME TO ROTA FROM WEST (SET CLOCKS AHEAD) ON CINCLANT TRANSIT ORDER. THEREFORE, AJ WAS MAKING TRANSIT OF ATLANTIC (WHILE CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS) FROM UNITED STATES TO SPAIN. ∴ WAS NOT OPERATING IN THE MED AS PEARSON CLAIMS. ALSO, SHE APPROACHED ROTA FROM WEST (LOW EASTERLY SOURCE).

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NAVPERS 1930/10 (Rev. 10-52) (10) **DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET** S/N 0106-004-1300

USS Rodney M. Davis (DD-668) DESCRIPTION OF (a) DATE Wednesday 19 June 19 57

ALL HANDS FROM _____ TO _____

REMARKS

00-04 Underway conducting Special Operations in accordance with Fleet Exercise 9-57. All Personnel operations in accordance with Operation Order 4-57.

P. C. Holbrook
LT. U.S. NAVAL RESERVE

04-08 Underway as before. Steaming in company with [illegible] in accordance with Operation Order 4-57. [illegible] Steaming as before. [illegible] Steaming as before. [illegible] Steaming as before

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



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USS LIBERTY'S DECK LOGS

FOR 8 JUNE 1967.

THESE ARE NOT THE ORIGINAL LOGS. THEY WERE REWRITTEN AT McGONAGLE'S DIRECTION AND SIGNED BY HIM. OFFICERS WHO ACTUALLY STOOD THOSE WATCHES SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. THEY WERE NOT. I THINK SOME OF THE LOGS WERE CHANGED. IS THIS PART OF THE COVER-UP?

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DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

AT [illegible] ARE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

DISTANCE FROM [illegible] TO [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

REMARKS

22-24 STEERING INDEPENDENTLY ENROUTE FROM FIRE SCHOOL TO OP-AREA COURSE 15 BTB. SPEED 10 KNOTS TAKE CONCURRENT MUSTER 7-63 CONDITION OF READINESS III MODIFIED AND MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE IS SET THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. BOILER NR (1) AND 1/2 GENERATING. 2 & 3 OFF ON THE LINE. OFF 15 C.B. THIS VESSEL @ 1200 C/C TO 120 M.P. BTB. [illegible] W.A. MILLERSDALE LCF. K.I.N.

22-24 STEAMING AS BEFORE @ 1233 C/C TO 178. @ 1315 C/C TO 186 @ 1336 C/C TO 193. @ 1354 C/C TO 174. [illegible] W.A. MILLERSDALE LCF. K.I.N.

23-12 STEAMING AS BEFORE @ 1443 CEASED USE RADAR CHECK @ 1519 C/C TO 233. @ 1532 C/C TO 5 KNOTS. @ 1538 SECURED ALL MOTOR MINESET. @ 1543 DISTANCE [illegible] UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT SPOTTED (1) [illegible] NOT PAST @ 1549 THEN RETURNED TO HANGAR @ 1550 AT 1553 THE UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT CIRCLED [illegible] 1554 C/C TO 233. [illegible] W.A. MILLERSDALE LCF. K.I.N.

23-16 STEAMING AS BEFORE. [illegible] SPEED IS ON THE ORDER 15KB EXECUTED THE ASEA AT GENERAL QUARTERS (DRILL) 1521 SET MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE THROUGHOUT SHIP. 1524 AT [illegible] STARTED EVASION ON CURTAIN FIRE 12 MILES 135° STARTED EVASION ON CAPT BEARING 138, RANGE 25 MILES. 1540 SET MATERIAL CONDITION YOKE THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. 1710 SECURED FROM GENERAL QUARTERS (DRILL) SET CONDITION OF READINESS III MODIFIED THROUGHOUT SHIP. 1900 [illegible] EVASION COURSE ANTICIPATE THAT SOUNDING GENERAL QUARTERS. LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF BEARING 85-91 DEGREES. LARGE FIRES FOR MUCH DENSER FIRE DISCOVERED. FIRES ARE LOCATED. FIRES ARE ABEAM PORT. FIRES TO YOUR STARBOARD. UNDER OPERATION AND ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT. BEARING COORDINATES STEERING COURSE AND INTERVALS. RUNS OVER THE SHIP. THERE WERE TORPEDO CLUSTERS. ABEAM ASTERN OF THE SHIP. WITH PLANES AND HEAVY SMOKE. A TOTAL OF EIGHT OFFICERS AND MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF WOUNDS RECEIVED DURING THE AIR ATTACK. ONE OFFICER KILLED BY 40 MM. ONE MAN KILLED AT MACHINE GUN #2. ONE DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE PORT QUARTER SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE 01

[illegible] U. S. N. - RETIRED

ENCLOSURE (1)

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DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5 DATE Thursday 8 June 67

0-12 LEVEL PORTSIDE AFT SIGHTED 4 TORPEDO PLANES ATTACKING FROM PORT BEAM. TORPEDOES PASSED UNDER STERN. ALL PLANES STRAFED SHIP WITH MACHINE GUN AND ROCKET FIRE. ALL PLANES WERE IDENTIFIED AS ISRAELI MIRAGE JETS. ALL PLANES WERE SEEN TO BE FLYING FROM THE EAST AND RETURNED IN THAT DIRECTION AFTER ATTACK. ALL PLANES WERE SEEN TO BE FLYING FROM THE EAST AND RETURNED IN THAT DIRECTION AFTER ATTACK. HELICOPTER SIGHTED ON PORT BEAM AT 1145 AFTER SIGNALING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STARBOARD QUARTER. LIGHT DISCLOSED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING JP5 FUEL. ALL PORT SIDE GUNS MANNED AND TRAINED ON HELICOPTER. COMMANDING OFFICER ORDERED HOLD FIRE. HOWEVER GUN 53 OPENED FIRE ON CENTER OF THE THREE PLANES. COMMANDING OFFICER ORDERED GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING. AFTER PERMISSION TO BE FIRING WAS GIVEN GUN 53 FIRED QUITE SEVERAL MORE ROUNDS BEFORE THE TORPEDO ATTACK. AS THE STARBOARD AFTER COMMANDER STRAFING RUN PLANES SIDE OF THE SHIP. 1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 FEET ASTERN OF THE SHIP. 1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS. TWENTY-FIVE MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND INTO STRAFING FIRE. TORPEDO HIT IN VICINITY OF THE RADIO ROOM COMMUNICATIONS CENTER. ABOUT THIRTY-TWO MEN WERE AT THEIR GENERAL QUARTERS STATION THIS AREA AND ABOUT 6 SHOT WERE FOUND INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THESE SPACES DIED AS EITHER RESULT OF BURNING. THE FOLLOWING DIED AS A RESULT OF THE AIR / TORPEDO ATTACKS

LCDR PHILIP F. ARNOLD USN 626 72 72
LT STEPHEN C. [illegible] USN 695 [illegible]
LT JAMES M. STEELE USN 6[illegible]
CTR MELVIN L. SMITH USN 993 93 9[illegible]
CTC RAYMOND D. [illegible] USN 571 13 79
CTC [illegible] T. WALTON USN 234 91 8[illegible]
CTR DAVID W. [illegible] USN 810 04 82
CTC DONALD E. MASSENGALE USN 779 94 80
CTC PHILLIPE C. TIBBITTS USN 904 32 89
CTA ROBERT R. EISENBERG USN 774 09 80
CTC THOMAS A. THORNTON USN 997 97 91
CTA JAMES L. CONVERSE USN 799 78 99
CTSN CARL G. HYGREEN USN 758 37 [illegible]
CTI CURTIS B. DARNELL USN 514 52 84
CTI TOM F. SMITH USN 850 72 94
CTSN LAWRENCE D. [illegible] USN [illegible]
CTSN JAMES L. LEWIS USN 997 54 67
SN ROBERT A. BLANCHARD USN 771 77 33

[illegible]

QMSN THEODORE L. ACREE

James M. Eagles Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

VIA USCGC ALERT WMEC DESIGNATION -38 DATE (Day) 1 (Month) June (Year) 43

DEPARTURE FROM ROTA, SPAIN TO CPA - NORA

REMARKS

11-4 DAILY SN CARL L. HOAR, USN, 774 41 49
ICFN DAVID (NMN) SHAHAN, USN, 866 17 83
RM 2 JOHN F. SPENCER, USN, 473 41 77
GM 2 ALEXANDER N. THOMPSON, USN, 790 47 81
GM3 FRANCIS (NMN) BROWN, USA, 779 76 76
CTA ALAN (NMN) HIGGINS, USN, 788 42 67
CTO WILLIAM B. ALEXANDRIAN, USN, 837 44 44
ALLEN M. BLUE, CIVILIAN, 531 48 8369 (M)
CTA RONNIE T. CAMPBELL, USN, 534 13 [illegible]
CTA JERRY L. ROSS, USN, 779 41 55
CT. JAMES [illegible]. KUPPER, USN, 511 31 [illegible]
CTA ANTHONY P. MENDOZA, USN, 777 [illegible]
SGT JOHN L. HARPER, USMC, 488 [illegible]
FCA EDWARD E. REINMEYER, USMC, [illegible] 04 14

THE NUMBER OF INJURED WHO [illegible] NAMES NOT AS FOLLOWS: INJURED PERSONNEL

CT. REGINALD M. ROBINSON, USN, 331 53 81 SWEARING, MULTIPLE LEFT LEG
CTA JOSEPH D. ANDERSON, USN, 331 74 77 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE
EM2A RICHARD E. [illegible], USN, 851 71 84 LACERATION FIFTH DIGIT, LEFT HAND
EM2A JOSEPH W. AINSWORTH, USNR, 647 93 17 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE
CT. RICHARD F. [illegible], USN, 986 20 18 SWEARING, MULTIPLE
CTSN [illegible] B. BENEDICT, USN, 199 85 79 SWEARING, MULTIPLE
CT. [illegible] T. BINGHAM, USN, 521 32 48 PUNCTURE WOUND, RIGHT AND LEFT KNEE
SN GERALD F. RITCHIE, USN, 810 46 99 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT LEG
WILLIAM EDWARD L. BIBLOCK, 83-1, FLEET BURNS, FACIAL
CTA GLEN J. ROBINSON, USN, 774 83 89, BURN, FIRST DEGREE, RIGHT KNEE
CSS SALVATORE (NMN) BOCCELLA, USN, 796 97 41, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT AND LEFT HANDS
FN JOHN R. SMITH, USN, 892 19 47, BURN, FIRST DEGREE, LEFT FOREARM
FN DONALD A. RITCHIE, USNR, 779 61 97, LACERATION, THIRD DIGIT, LEFT HAND.
CTA LARRY L. BOWEN, USN, 796 35 68, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS
CTA STEVEN V. BROWN, USN 813 41 39, SWEARING, MULTIPLE

[signature] [illegible]

James M. Eames Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS [illegible] PAGE 7 DATE THURSDAY 8 JULY 1943

REMARKS CONTINUED

[illegible] UNIT

BT's FRANK T BROWN, USN, 784 65 65, BURNS, FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE, AND LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH LEGS, LEFT CHEST, AND BACK

THE VIRGIL A BRANNEN/RAD, USNR, 784 43 49, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE

BT's JAMES W BRAMMER JR, USNR, 6434 49 62, FACIAL BURNS, FIRST DEGREE, FACIAL

CT's RONALD D. BUCK, USN, LACERATION, FIFTH RIGHT HAND

FN DENNIS R. BYRD, USN, 6420 69 31, CONTUSION AND ABRASION, RIGHT FOREARM

CT. RICHARD C CROUCH, USN, 6420 19 13, [illegible]

CTs DAVID W. LANGHAM, USN, 6420 49 85, CONTUSION, [illegible]

CT. JEFFREY M. CRONKHITE, USN, 6420 19 62, [illegible] MULTIPLE

[illegible] CONTUSION, MULTIPLE

CT. FRED M. CONDREY, USN, 6420 49 38, [illegible] AND CONTUSION, LEFT KNEE

CTs FRANK J. CIESIELSKI, USN, 6420 [illegible] AND CONTUSIONS AND LACERATIONS

SN. T C COULTER JR., USN, 784 [illegible] WOUND, LEFT SHOULDER AND ABDOMEN

YI AUTREY C CRACKEN/RM, USN, 6420 [illegible] WOUNDS

SN. ERNIE A DUKE, USN, 6420 [illegible], [illegible] MULTIPLE

FN GEORGE R [illegible], USN, 6420 [illegible] CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, RIGHT LEG

CTSN RODNEY A DALLY, USN, 6420 [illegible], BURN, FIRST DEGREE, RIGHT FOOT, AND [illegible], RIGHT KNEE

CTSN [illegible] USN, [illegible], [illegible], STRAIN

SMIs [illegible], USN, [illegible], [illegible] WOUNDS

CTs [illegible] USN, [illegible], CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, [illegible]

CTs [illegible] USN, [illegible], PUNCTURE WOUNDS, RIGHT THIGH, AND CONTUSIONS, BUTTOCKS

[illegible] USN, [illegible], ABRASIONS, LEFT CHEST

CTSN [illegible], USN, [illegible], CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

CTSN, [illegible] USN, [illegible], CONTUSIONS, LEFT KNEE

CT. LLOYD D. [illegible] USN, [illegible], CONTUSIONS, BOTH KNEES

CTs [illegible], DENNIS M., USN, [illegible], PUNCTURE WOUND, MULTIPLE, LEFT CHEST AND THIGH

SN. DONALD F [illegible], USN, [illegible], [illegible] WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

CTs [illegible] USN, [illegible], LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE

RDs RONALD S. [illegible], USN, [illegible], ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS, RIGHT FOREARM

[illegible]

[illegible] U. S. N. [illegible]

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

James M. Bradley Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY AGTR-5 [illegible] 19[illegible] DATE JUNE 8 1967

[illegible] FROM Bells Watch TO 0001-0800

REMARKS

1815 HOURS

CTSN R.F. GRANTHAM, USN, RECEIVING AND CONTROLLING [illegible]
SEA STEVEN E. GUARDIAN JR., USN, 347 83 49, CONTROLLING [illegible]
SPECIALIST.

CTA DAVID W. HOWARD, USN, 119 73 49, INTERFACE [illegible]
MONITOR.

RMSN DONALD F. WARREN, USN, 421 44 99, RIGHT OF [illegible]
RIGHT CHEST.

SN LAWRENCE D. WILSON, USN, 418 90 45, [illegible]
CONTUSION, RIGHT KNEE.

CTA CHARLES A. MEADOWS, USN, 157 [illegible], RECEIVING
MONITOR.

SN DONALD [illegible] STOUT, USN, 444 [illegible] FRACTURE AND LACERATION,
SCALP, LEFT [illegible]

CTA ALAN [illegible] KELLY, USN, [illegible] GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL
WOUND, MIDDLE CHEST.

CTA TOM A. MIELE, USN, 411 [illegible] SUPERFICIAL SHRAPNEL WOUNDS
TO THIGH AND ABDOMEN, USN, 410 45 [illegible] PENETRATING AND CONTUSION
BOTH ARMS.

SN THOMAS F. IRWIN, USN, 417 [illegible] SHRAPNEL WOUND, MULTIPLE

CTA [illegible] [illegible] USN, 411 [illegible] SHRAPNEL WOUNDS
MULTIPLE

CTA [illegible] [illegible], USN, 411 [illegible] SHRAPNEL WOUNDS
MULTIPLE

FP [illegible] KELLY, USN, 411 76 [illegible], SHRAPNEL RIGHT KNEE AND
ABDOMEN, BOTH KNEE

[illegible] F. KELLY, USN, 411 [illegible] CONTUSION
BOTH LEGS

CTSN EUGENE H. KIRK, USN, 411 41 50, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
SN TROY T. NICHOLS, USNR, 411 76 09, CONTUSION, RIGHT [illegible]
SCALP.

FN STEVEN T. KRUSHANSKY, USNR, 411 [illegible] SHRAPNEL LEFT KNEE
AND ABDOMEN, LEFT FOOT

CTA JOSEPH W. KOSLAN, USN, 411 49 74, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE
SN RUSH F. SPIVEY, USNR, 411 [illegible], SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, FIFTH
DIGIT, RIGHT HAND

CT; DONALD E. HUGHES, USN, 411 [illegible] CONTUSION AND ABRASIONS
MULTIPLE, BOTH KNEE

SN JOHN D. LEMAR, USNR, 411 [illegible] SHRAPNEL WOUNDS
MULTIPLE

CTA CHARLES F. LARSON, USN, 411 41 44, LACERATION, RIGHT HAND
AND CONTUSION BACK

[illegible]

[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

BACK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY DATE 5 DATE Thursday 8 June 67

(Day) (Hour) (Minute)

(Ship, Cont.

CTA, Calvin L. Landis, USN, 777 54 3, Engineman Second, Multiple Wounds, Right Thumb, Right Forearm and Scalp

CTA, Stevens T. McPhee, USN, 401 72 M, Signalman, Multiple Fx, Right Tibia

1/Lt. Ruben Tilden Weaver, USNR, [illegible] Lacerations, Multiple, Right Thumb, Right Forearm and Scalp

CTA, Leonard M. Weeks, USN, 713 56 41, Engineman and Gunner's Mate, Multiple

Sn. Thomas W. Weymouth, USNR, 417 44 3, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple

CT, Joseph E. Wenzel, USN, 514 88 82, Lacerations, Multiple

CTA, Raymond W. Wiedbrauk, USN, 556-[illegible] Contusions of Left Lower Leg

CTA, Robert W. Wood, 401 94 82, USN, Lacerations, Fourth and Fifth Fingers, Right Hand

S/Sgt. Bruce F. Wotawa, USMC, [illegible] Fx, Lacerations, Multiple

Fn, Grady F. Wyrick, USNR, [illegible] 73, Contusions, Multiple Both Knees

Army Spec. 4, Harold [illegible], USA, [illegible] 84 05, Contusions, Multiple Both Knees

Sn, Sherman P. Yarbrough, USN, 554 92 09, Lacerations, Multiple

CTA, John L. Yarbrough, USN, 492 14 21, Contusion, Face, Left Ankle, and First Digit, Right Hand

Sn, Timothy L. Yarbrough, USN, 559 21 52, Lacerations, Multiple

CTC, James L. Yarbrough, USN, 241 12 52, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple

CTSN, Patrick H. [illegible], USN, [illegible] 41 21, Lacerations, Left Knee and Left Knee

Sn, Robert L. Mc Allister, USN, 414 41 80, Laceration, Third Digit, Left Hand

CTA, David J. Mc Feeran, USN, 554 74 98, Fracture, Nasal, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple

CTSN, Fredrick [illegible] Mc Intosh, [illegible] USN, 241 44 71, Lacerations, Multiple, Both Hands

Sergt. Joseph L. Mcmanus, USMC, 471 84 54, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple

CTA, Stephen E. Meaders, USN, 777 43 03, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple

Fn, David B. Miller, USNR, 514 88 54, Burn, First Degree Left Elbow, and Laceration, Left Hand

SFC, Kenneth D. Morse, USN, 456 77 21, Contusions and Abrasions, Multiple, Head

Pfc, John Paul [illegible], USMC, 554 09 43 Contusions, Left Hand

[illegible]

[signature] U. S. N.

James M. Eames Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS _____ PAGE _____ DATE _____

FROM _____ TO _____

WHEN

1115 HRS

ATS EUGENE (NMN) OWENS, USN, 597 55 47, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT HAND.

FTM DONALD W. ENGLAND, USN, 540 53 17, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, BOTH LEGS.

SA STEPHEN (NMN) ERVINE, USN, 745 94 78, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

FTM HERBERT F. ERVINE, USN, 158 60 18, [illegible], RIGHT HAND.

CTA DENNIS R. ERVING, USN, 544 54 77, [illegible]

FTA JR. [illegible], USN, USNR, 396 [illegible], LACERATIONS AND CONTUSIONS, RIGHT SHOULDER AND RIGHT ARM AND SHOULDER.

ATS GERALD W. ERVINE, USN, 572 [illegible], ABRASION, LEFT WRIST

FTM HERBERT F. ERVIN, USN, 158 [illegible], ABRASION, LEFT LEG

SA1 EDWARD G. FERRARI, USN, [illegible] CONTUSION, LEFT LEG

SN GERALD M. FIELDEN, USNR, 396 07 20, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE.

FT1 PAUL L. FIELDS, USN, 436 72 14, SPRAINED, WRIST, LEFT THUMB, AND CONTUSION RIGHT ARM.

CTA FLOYD M. FILLMORE, USN, 363 56 47, SPRAINED, WRISTS, MULTIPLE

FTA U.C. FIN-REMI, USN, LACERATION, RIGHT SHOULDER, SCALP

SMA [illegible], USN, 411 81 24, ABRASION, LEFT KNEE

SN THOMAS [illegible], USNR, 396 [illegible], CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

ATS GARY F. FRANKLEBEN, USN, 549 90 38, LACERATION, LEFT KNEE

SN JAMES E. FRANKLIN, USN, 421 81 45, SPRAINED, WRIST, RIGHT FOREARM

FTA RICHARD T. FRIEDE, USNR, 491 [illegible], CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

F.A.A. SN THOMAS T. FRIEDEN, USN, 513 52 46, GUN SHOT AND LACERATED WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SN ROBERT E. FRIST, USN, 09-10-10, CONTUSIONS, SCALP

CTA CHARLES L. FOWLEY, USN, 455 42 83, SPRAINED, WRISTS, MULTIPLE.

CTA ROBERT A. SCHERBARTH, USN, 392 80 19, PUNCTURE WOUND, LEFT WRIST

FTA KENNETH M. SCHERLEY, USNR, 496 01 53, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

SN EDWARD W. SCHNEIDER, USN, 540 40 53, CONTUSION, RIGHT KNEE

CTA ROBERT T. SCHNELL, USN, 548 60 84, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

SA1 VINCENT J. SCHULMAN, USN, LACERATION, BACK

CTA MAURICE A. SAWYER, USN, 467 54 96, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE

CTA1 DAVID A. SCHAU, USN, 506 30 56, SPRAINED, WRIST, LEFT KNEE

[illegible]

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH MONTH

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

BACK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LIBERTY PAGE 6 DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 1967

(Day) (Mo.) (Year)

REMARKS (CONT'D)

0-4. SHIFT TRICK

PN1 RICHARD E. SIMPSON, USNR, 417 92 08 CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE BODY AREAS.

CTA1 ARNOLD E. DIX, USN, 777 28 73, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

SN LARRY T. SLAYDEN, USNR, 414 98 00, SHRAPNEL AND GUN SHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE.

QM3 JAMES C. SMITH, USNR, 777 49 71, CONTUSION, RIGHT ELBOW

RMSN TERRY D. SMITH, USN, 416 81 03, TRAUMATIC ARTHRITIS LEFT KNEE

SN1 THOMAS R. SMITH, USN, 415 04 97, LACERATIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH HANDS.

CTA3 DENNIS C. SNYDER, USN, 414 84 84, WOUNDED, SHRAPNEL, LEG

SN LARRY L. SOMER, USN, 412 81 13, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

MM3 THOMAS D. STOUT, USN, 836 40 42, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, BOTH ARMS

CTA1 JOHN R. SUTTER, USN, 747 82 72, ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS MULTIPLE, BOTH LEGS

CTA1 ARLON R. SUMMEY, USN, 722 04 86, MUSCULAR STRAIN.

CTA1 CHARLES T. THOMS, USN, 729 [illegible], ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS AND LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN.

CTA1 ARNOLD T. THOMPSON, USN, 431 [illegible], SHRAPNEL WOUNDS LEFT FOREARM AND LEFT THIGH

PN3 LARRY R. THOMAS, USN, 412 82 43, LUMBOSACRAL MUSCULAR BACK STRAIN.

ETA1 RAMON R. TORREGROSA, USN, 772 [illegible], SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

SA1 PHILLIP F. TRACEY, USN, 722 82 58, LACERATION, RIGHT BRAIN, RIGHT HAND

PN SEFERINO [illegible], USN, 567 31 78, CONTUSIONS, MULTIPLE, CHEST AND LEFT ARM

CTA1 SANTIAGO VARGAS, USN, 412 08 34, LACERATION, LEFT ANKLE

SN4 [illegible] VELBER JR., USN, 530 41 22, LUMBOSACRAL STRAIN.

MM1 THOMAS L. VAN CLEAVE, USN, 288 38 72, LACERATION, RIGHT ARM

SA CARL E. VICKERS, USNR, 777 40 78, LACERATIONS, TOES AND FOURTH DIGIT, RIGHT HAND

RM3 TERRY W. WARD, USN, 777 76 47, GUN SHOT AND SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

SN RICHARD L. WEAVER, USNR, 999 32 43, SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

ETA1 GORDON T. WEBB, USN, 428 42 74, CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, RIGHT THIGH

SN GEORGE [illegible] WILSON JR, USNR, 428 84 98, LACERATIONS AND GUN SHOT WOUNDS, MULTIPLE

PN3 DANIEL B. WOOD, USN, 764 87 99, ABRASIONS LEFT HAND.

CTA1 ROBERT E. YAGER USN, 840 45 43 CONTUSIONS AND ABRASIONS, MULTIPLE, RIGHT SIDE.

[illegible]

[illegible] U. S. N. REPORTER

TO BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF NAVAL PERSONNEL AT THE END OF EACH SHIFT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS LST 871 PAGE 6 ZONE DESCRIPTION +12 DATE THURSDAY 8 JUNE 44

AT/PASSAGE FROM _____ TO _____

REMARKS

12-16 cont'd

MM1 Robert M. Dye, USN, 594-47 67, laceration and burn, first degree, left forearm.

Ryan Thomas E. VanDerSchaaf, USN, 870 94 90, laceration, face, right, left hand.

CTC Timothy P. Rooney, USN, 724 83 93, [illegible], left hand.

CTC David V. Myers, USN, 840 45 31, [illegible], both hands.

PTC Gregory L. Wilson, USN, 584 76 [illegible], laceration, left hand.

CTM2 Robert M. Lantz, USN, 840 45 [illegible], laceration, both hands.

CTM2 Edward W. Bechtel, USN, 870 [illegible], laceration, right hand.

SN Victor T. Bocci, USN, [illegible], laceration, left hand, and abrasion, right knee.

CTC David W. Page, USN, 940 39 51, contusions and abrasions, multiple.

CTC Terry A. [illegible] Ford, USN, 745 35 94, contusions, both legs.

CTM2 Robert B. VanDeventer, USN, 814 49 97, lacerations, right hand.

Ryan (Felix(um)) Boctor III, USN, 765 91 41, [illegible], wound, [illegible], right, right hand.

MM2 Richard Brooks, USN, 459 42 43, laceration, knee, bilateral, abrasions, and abrasion, multiple.

Officer wounded on 9 June 1944:

Lt. William L. McGonigal, USN, 94444/1130, shrapnel wounds, multiple.

LT Thomas G. O'Connor, USNR, 407345/1105, shrapnel wounds, multiple.

ENS David E. Lewis, USN, 334574/1105, flash burns, facial.

LT Maurice R. Bennett, USN, 438185/1310, flash burns, facial, and shrapnel wounds, multiple.

LT James M. Eakes, USN, 453590/1105, shrapnel wounds, multiple.

LT Richard P. Kiefer, USNR (MC), 310107/1105, lacerations, multiple.

LT George E. Goldon, USN, 379333/1105, shrapnel wounds, multiple.

WT2 Lloyd S. Painter, USNR, 648374/1105, laceration, right hand, and abrasions, right flank.

CTM2 Richard P. Taylor, USNR, 649114/1105, shrapnel wounds, multiple.

SN2 Malcolm M. Jortson, USNR, 649098/1105, contusions and abrasions, multiple.

Commanding

U.S.N. Secretary

James M. Eakes Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS [illegible] DATE [illegible]

James M. Barnes Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS [illegible] [illegible] DATE [illegible]

EXPENDITURE FROM _____ TO _____

REMARKS

[illegible] ON'T UNTIL [illegible] MILES FROM PRESENT POSITION THEN TURN [illegible] MAGNETIC. [illegible] MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM COMSUBLANT, "ESCORT PROCEEDING MAX SPEED OF DESTROYERS."

[illegible] EXPERIENCING EXCEPT DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING [illegible] VARIOUS COURSES AT 16 KNOTS. [illegible] WITH SIDE MARKINGS ON TRIB [illegible] FUSELAGE [illegible] RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE DELIVERED FROM [illegible] BEING WRITTEN ON BACK OF CARD, "DO YOU HAVE CASUALTIES" [illegible] CONTINUING VARIOUS COURSES.

[illegible]

W. J. McDONALD CDR USN

[illegible] VARIOUS COURSES AT 16 KNOTS [illegible] SHIFTED STEERING CONTROL BACK TO BRIDGE. STEADIED ON COURSE [illegible] (PIC)

[illegible]

W. J. McDONALD CDR USN

[illegible] U. S. N. [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

James M. Eagles, Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

James M. Eagle, Jr. Research Papers

DECK LOG—REMARKS SHEET

USS [illegible] (DE-[illegible])

DATE [illegible]

[illegible]

12-16 Steaming as before. 1200 to 1215 [illegible] Turned over the Executive Officer [illegible] Left Key West Harbor Two Whistle (2sec) Blasts. 1215 Two Whistle (2sec) Blasts on Tug Boat to Starboard. 1216 To Anchorage. 1220 to 1230 [illegible] Left Port Anchor Three Whistle (3sec) Blasts. 1230 to 1240 To Operations. 1240 To Navigation. 1241 To Anchorage. 1242 To Navigation. 1243 To Anchorage. 1244 To Navigation. 1245 To Anchorage. 1246 To Navigation. 1247 To Anchorage. 1248 To Navigation. 1249 To Anchorage. 1250 To Navigation. 1251 To Anchorage. 1252 To Navigation. 1253 To Anchorage. 1254 To Navigation. 1255 To Anchorage. 1256 To Navigation. 1257 To Anchorage. 1258 To Navigation. 1259 To Anchorage. 1300 To Navigation. 1301 To Anchorage. 1302 To Navigation. 1303 To Anchorage. 1304 To Navigation. 1305 To Anchorage. 1306 To Navigation. 1307 To Anchorage. 1308 To Navigation. 1309 To Anchorage. 1310 To Navigation. 1311 To Anchorage. 1312 To Navigation. 1313 To Anchorage. 1314 To 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COMMANDER 6th FLEET
RADIO LOGS

UNFORTUNATELY, THESE START
ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER CAPT.
JOSEPH TULLY IN CARRIER
USS SARATOGA RECEIVED AND
ANSWERED LIBERTY'S CALL
FOR HELP.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CHAN	GROUP	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHELT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1305Z	SET CONTINOUS WATCH THIS CKT///BAKER RMSA
	RS DE SCHEMATIC REQ RADIO CHK K
	RS DE SCHEMATIC RDO CHK K
	RS DE SCHEMATIC RDO CHK K
1306Z	RS DE SCHEMATIC K
	RS DE SCHEMATIC (LONG COUNT) K
	RS DE SCHEMATIC RDO CHK K
1307Z	RS DE SCHEMATIC IF YOU READ ME GIVE ME LONG COUNT K
	(LONG COUNT) RS AR
	RS DE CP K
	RS DE SCHEMATIC BE ADVISED YOU ARE BARLEY WEAK AND RD K
	AA DE AA REQ U GIVE ME LONG COUNTS K
	CP DE BELMONT STA SCHMATIC WORKING RS REQ U STAND BY
1308Z	CP DE FC K
	RS DE SCHMATIC REQ SHORT COUNT K
1309Z	CP DE FC K
	(AA STATION TUNING ON FREQ)
	RS DE C CORRECTION DE SCHMATIC REQ LONG COUNT K
	(CW ON FREQ)
1309Z	CP DE F FC K
	UKN DE C CP SAY AA IN K
	CP DE FC INT COMM RS K
	DE CP IMI K
	CP DE FC INT COMM RS K
	FC DE CP REF UR LAST - REG-STA SCH HAS COMM RS K
	(PUTTING NEW REC ON RS)
	SCH DE RS K
1310Z	RS DE CP RDO CK K
	RS DE CP RDO CK K
	RS DE CP (LONG COUNT) RDO CK K
	ALL STA THIS NET DE SCH BE ADVISED THIS STATION HAS LOST
	LOST CONTACT WITH RS- REQ MAINTAIN STRICT LISTING WATCH
	RS DE CP K
	SCH DE AA R AR
	SCH DE FC R AR
	SCH DE CP R AR
	SCH DE CP K
	DE SCH K
	DE CP INT CW BACKROUND K
	DE SCH C K
	DE SCH C WILL BRING UP REC NOW K
	DE CP R AR

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BAKER HMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1315Z	T...O...L...E...//MIC
1315Z	NO SIGS AT THIS TIME
	CP DE FT K
	CP DE FT K
	RS/2 DE SCH/2 K
	RS DE SCH HOW COPY K
	CP DE SCH K
	CP DE SCH K
	DE CP K
	DE SCH R CW NOTHING K
	DE CP COPY STA ANR COPY STA ANR K
	DE SCH REQ SAY AGAIN K
	DE CP COPY STA ANR -INT COMM STA RS K
	DE SCH R UR LAST NEG COMM RS K
1320Z	DE CP R AR
	SCH DE CP REQ LONG COUNT FOR TUNNING K
	DE SCH (COMPLIED) K
	DE CP REQ LONG COUNT FOR TUNNING K
	RS DE SCH K
	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
	CP DE SCH K
	UNK DE CP IMI K
	CP7 DE SCH K
	DE CP K
	DE SCH R INT ANYTHING FROM RS K
	DE CP NEG K
	DE SCH BE ADVISED THIS STA NOTHING RS K
1324Z	DE CP R AR
	(CW ON REC QSA1 UN READABLE)//MIC
	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
1328Z	RS DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
	(NOTHING HEARD FROM RS THIS STA)
	SCH DE CP K
	CP DE SCH INT ORZ K
	DE CP BE ADVISED GOING TO TUNE AROUND FREQ K
1329Z	CP DE SCH RS WAS 1KC LOW AWHILE AGO K
	J DE CP K
	DE J K
	DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
	DE J (COMPLIED)
	DE CP IMIM K
	DE J RS WAS 1KC LOW K
	RS DE SCH K
	RS DE J K
	RS DE J KJ
1331Z	RS DE SCH REQ U GIVE ME SHORT COUNT K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	UNIT	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMBIXTHELT	BAKER RWSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1331Z	T....O....L....E....
	RS DE SCH U ARE WEAK AND UNREADABLE K
	DE RS IMI K
	(NOTHING HEARD)
	CP DE FC K
	CP DE FC K
1332Z	SCH DE FC K
	SCH DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
	FC DE SCH K
	SCH DE FC INT COMM RS K
	DE SCH RS VERY WEAK AND UNREADABLE K
	DE FC REQ U PASS TO RS- CAN U IDENTIFY NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS INT COPY K
	DE SH R STAND BT K
	RS DE S SCH INT U IDENTIFY GUNBOATS K
	SCH DE CP REQ LONG COUNT K
1333Z	RS DE SCH INT IDENTIFY NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS K
	SCH DE CP RDO OK K
	CP DE SCH GOOD AND READABLE AR
	(STA TESTING ON FREQ)
	SCH DE CP REQ SHORT COUNT K
	CP DE SCH (COMPLIED) K
	DE CP LOUD AND CLEAR AR
1334Z	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
	(CP CAUSING INTERFERENCE TO SCH)
	RS DE SCH INT NATIONALITY OF GUNBOATS K
1337Z	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K
1338Z	(CW ON FREQ)
	RS DE SCH K
1339Z	(CW UNK)
	RS DE SCH K
	RS DE SCH RDO OK K
	CP DE FC K
	UNK DE CP IMI K
	DE FC INT COMM RS K
	UNK DE CP IMI QRA K
	CP DE FC RDO K
	FC DE CP NEG COMM RS-ARE MAINTAING COMM WITH SCH-SCH DOES NOT HAVE COMM RS K
	RS DE SCH K
	(UNK CW)
	RS DE SCH REQ LONG COUNT K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHELT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS

TIME	FROM	TO	TRANSMISSION
1340Z	T....O...L...E....		
	RS	DE SCH	REQ LONG COUNT K
	(UNK CW)		
	UNK	DE CP	IMI K
	SCH	DE FC	K
	RS	DE SCH	C-C K
	MM	DE SCH	STAND BY K
	RS	DE SCH	REQ LONG COUNT K
1338Z	RS	DE SCH	REQ LONG COUNT K
	FC	DE SCH	K
	SCH	DE FC	K
		DE SCHL	IN REF UR LAST-NG CONTACT RS K
	SCH	DE CP	K
	FC	DE SCH	R AR
	SCH	DE CP	HAD RS QSA5 BEFORE ATTACK-REQ HE COME UP ORESTES ON A SIX MEGGER K
	RS	DE SCH	BE ADVISED U WERE QRK5-PLUS-
	CP	DE SCH	UNDERSTNAD U WERE QRK5-REQ HE COME B 6 MEGGER ORESTES K
	SCH	DE FC	K
	SCH	DE FC	K
	SCH	DE FC	K
		DE SCH	K
		DE FCC	REQ U GIVE ME WRITTEN AUTHENTICATION K
		DE SCH	IMI K
		DE FC	(COMPLIED)
1390Z		DE SCH	R AR
	RS	DE SCH	BE ADVISED R FC COPIES U QRK5 BEFORE APPROX 30 MIN ATTACK K
	RS	DE SCH	REQ LONG COUNT K
1353Z	(CW UNK)		
	SCH	DE FC	K
	FC	DE SCH	K
	SCH	DE FC	REQ U PROVIDE ME WITH REQUESTED INFO ASAP K
		DE SCH	R AR
	FC	DE SCH	K
		DE FC	REQ LONG COUNT K
		DE SCH	REQ LONG COUNT K
		DE FC	(COMPLIED) K
	SCH	DE FC	HOW COPY K
		DE SCH	R AR
1355Z	SCH	DE FC	REQ TO KNOW IF YOU RECEIVED MY 9711 OVER BROAD CAST K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	STATION			REMARKS
1355Z	T....O....L....C....			
	SCH	DE	FC	REQ TO KNOW IF U RECEIVED KR NR 05711 IMI REQ TO KNOW IF U RECEIVED KR NR 05711 K
		DE	SCH	STAND BY AR
	RS	DE	CP	K
1357Z	SCH	DE	CP	K
	SCH	DE	CP	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	CP	I JUST HEARD STA RS L/C- REQ U TRY AND CONTACT HIM K
		DE	SCH	R AR
	RS	DE	SCH	REQ LONG C"UNT K
	FC	DE	DR	K
		DE	FC	STAND BY K
	SCH	DE	CP	INT HEAR STA RS CALLING U K
	RS	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	CP	REQ U ADVISE RS IAM READING HIM FIVE BY K
		DE	SCH	R AR
	RS	DE	SCH	BE ADVISED CP READING U FIVERS-SND TRAFFIC AR
	BELMONT	DE	CP	K
	N0021	DE	CP	K
	BELMONT	DE	CP	K
		DE	N0121	HAVE TRAFFIC AS NET K
		DE	CP	PASS TRAFFIC K
		DE	N0121	PASS TO BELMONT CALL EXT 021-INFORM 021 ATTORNEY-PILELY REQ A CANCEL HIS REP HIS IMPEACHMENT THIS EVENING REQ CONFORMATION FROM N021 K
	N0121	DE	SCH	IMI Q AA 021 K
		DE	N0121	(COMPLIED)
		DE	SCH	R - BE ADVISED (NOTHING HEARD)
	N0212	DE	BELMONT	K
		DE	N0212	K
		DE	BL	#/VR K
		DE	N0212	UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE FLASH TRAFFICK (BRK)
	SCH	DE	FC	
		DE	CP	INT NOTIFY THAT I AM COPYING RS _ FIVERS K
	FC	DE	SCH	AFFIRM ON THAT K
		DE	FC	R AR
	SCH	DE	FC	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	FC	K
1400Z		DE	FC	STILL NEED CONFIRMATION K

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RADIO LOG

AGENCY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1400Z	T....O....L....E....			
	RS	DE	FC	INT REC MY LAST K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	REQ U COME TO ME ON 1@3PF AND ETA@2A
	CP	DE	FC	REQ U PASS TO RS FROM CONSIXTHFLT K
		DE	FC	INT IDENTIFY GUNBOAT K
	RS	DE	DEL	K
	RS	DE	FAN	K
	ALL STA	THIS NET I AM WORKING STA RS FIVE BY BOTH WAYS CP AR		
	CP	DE	FC	K
	CP	DE	FC	K
	FAN	DE	CP	REQ U PAS TO STA RS -CAN U IDENTIFY GUNBOATS K
		DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	RS	K
		DE C	CP	I PASS FROM FAN-STA FC REQ TO KNOW IF U CAN IDENTIFY ATTACHING GUNBOATS K
	CP	DE	RS	ASS K
	CP	DE	FC	REQ U HAVE RS AUTHENTICATE K
	FAN	DE	FC	K
		DE	FF	K
	FAN	DE	FC	REQ U PASS TO CP TO PASS TO RS CAN U IDENTIFY AND AUTHENTICATE K
1423Z	FC	DE	RS	WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIR-CRAFT OR THE VESSELS- BELEIVE TO BE ISRAELI HELICOPTERS THAT CIRCLED SHIP AF AFTER ATTACK-WE ARE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT-BELEIVED TO ISRAELI HELO TH THAT CIRCLED SHIP AFTER ATTACK- POSSATIVE IDENTIVICATION WAS NOT MADE WILL HAVE CO FROM SHIPS PHOTOS K
	RS	DE	FC	COPY-ESTIMATE HOW LONG TO TAKE INFORM K
		DE	FAN	STANDY BY AR
	CP	DE	FC	REQ U PASS UR LAST TO RS K
1441Z	CP	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	FC	RELAYED MY LAST TO CP-REQ THAT CP RELAY MY LAST TO RS K
	FAN	DE	FC	K
		DE	FAN	RELAY TO CP TO RELAY TO RS WHAT IS UR PRESENT CONDITION K
	FC	DE	FAN	STAND BY AR
	CP	DE	FAN	REQ U PAS TO CP FROM FC -WHAT IS UR PRESENT CONDITION K
	FF	DE	FC	LAST WORD IS CONDITION K

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RADIO LOG

COMSIXTHFLT	BARER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS

TIME				TRANSMISSION
1415Z	T....O...L...E....			
	UNK	DE	RS	IMI K
	RS	DE	CP	I PASS FROM FC WHAT IS UR POSITION K
		DE	CP	THAT WORD IS CONDITION K
		DE	RS	FREQ 24----
	FAN	DE	CP	BE ADVISED THAT LAST WORD K
	CP	DE	RS	POSITION SAME AS BEFORE K
		DE	CP	POSITION SAME AS BEFORE K
		DE	FAN	U COME UP IN THE CLEAR K
	RR	DE	BC	MESSAGE FOLLOWS-Z-081400Z FM FAN -TO RS BT UNCLAS REF A 081340Z JUN 67 1. NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO NOW ON THE AIR TERMINATION DIRECTED REF A 2. FREQ 23064 AND 22581 IMI 22581 KCS SHIFT TRANSMITTER FREQ TO 24[illegible] IMI 24096 AND 22162 3. REQ U COME UP IN THE CLEAR INITIAL BT K
	RS	DE	BC	ALL STA THIS NET BC BE ADVISED IF U HEAR STA RS REQ U CONTACT THIS STA OR ANY OTHER STA ASAP K
		DE	RS	R R
	BC	DE	CP	K
	BC	DE	SH	K
	FAN	DE	CP	K
		DE	FAN	K
	DE	DE	CP	AM ATTEMOTING TO TERMINATE RS WITH THIS STA
1420Z	BC	DE	FAN	K
	BC	DE	FT	K
	BC	DE	FT	K
	RS	DE	FT	K
	CP	DE	RS	ARE U ABLE TO BRING UP THESE MITTERS K
		DE	CP	NEG K
		DE	RS	R AR
		DE	CP	K
	FAN	DE	FC	K
	FC	DE	FAN	K
		DE	FC	RELAY TO RS WHAT IS PRESENT CONDITIONK
		DE	RS	K K
		DE	CP	INT ABLE TO BRING UP TRANS MITTERS K
		DE	RS	NEG NOE K
	FAN	DE	CP	K
	FC	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	FC	K
		DE	CP	RS ADVISED CAN NOT BRING ANY OTHER MITTER UP ON THE AIR K
	CP	DE	DT	K
		DE	DT	REQ CHANGE (CORECTION) CHALLANGE K

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	UNIT	STATION	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11755 KCS

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1425Z	T....O....L....E.....			
	FAN	DE	FC	K
		DE	CP	RS ADVISED THAT POSIT SAME AS BEFOR K
		DE	FC	DONT DESIRE POSITION-DESIRE CONDITIONK
		DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	K
	CP	DE	J	FC WANTS TO KNOW CONDITIO K
	CP	DE	RS	K
	DE	DE	SCH	REQ TO KNOW UR CONDITION K
	RS	DE	CP	K
1428Z	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	RS	WE ARE UNABLE IDENTIFY AIRCRAFT K
	RS	DE	CP	R- INT ZNB IJ IMI INT ZAS IJ K
	CP	DE	RS	REQ IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE K
				TORPEDD STARBOARD MIDSHIPS LISTING
				AT APPRIX 9 DEG -CASUX CASULATIES
				-AFFIRM IMPERATIVE REQ NAVIGATION AID
				REQ CONSITING- DOT KNOW 1@14@5Z-
				31 35.5 MIN N [illegible] 29 E
	CP	DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	CP	IMI K
	CP	DE	RS	(COMPLIED) K
	RS	DE	CP	I ROGER UR LAST-INT ZNB IJ K
	BELMONT	FC	FAN DE CP	(PASSED WHAT WAS REC FROM STA RS K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	DO U ROGER MY LAST K
		DE	RS	UNABLE TO AUTHENTICATE IMMEDIATE
				DUSTRUCTION CARRIED OUT K
		DE	CP	BE ADVISED STA RS UNABLE TO
				AUTHENTICATE TO IMMERGENCY DUSTRUCTIOJ
				HAS BEEN CARBIED OUT K

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RADIO LOG

ADDRESS	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSLYTHELT	BAKER RWSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS

TIME			TRANSMISSION
	CP	DE FAN	K
	CP	DE BELMONT	K
		DE CP	K
		DE BELMONT	INT READY TO COPY K
		DE CP	R K
		DE BELMONT	REQ SITREP -YR HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY WHOM K
	RS	DE CP	K
	RS	DE CP	K
	BELMONT	DE CP	K
	BELMONT	DE CP	K
		DE RS	-O- UNDERWAY 8 KNTS .43 MAGNETIC AT 1430Z
	ANY STA THIS NET	DE RS	-O-UNDERWAY 8 KNTS .43 MAGNETIC AT 1430Z K
		DE CP	R AR
		DE RS	UNDERWAY 8 KTS COURSE .43 MAGNETIC TIME 1430Z K
	CP	DE FAN	K
	SCH	DE FAN	K
		DE SCH	K
		DE FAN	K
	SCH	DE FAN	K
	SCH	DE (COUT OUT	
	BELMONT	DE (COUTOUT	
	SCH	DE FAN	PASS TO CP FOR TRANS TO RS -BT CAN U IDENTIFY ATTACKERS ALSO WHAT IS UR PRE CONDITION K
	BELMONT	DE DE	IMI
	RS	DE SCH	INT REC MSG CONCERNING CONDITION- AND ATTACKERS U ATTEND TO MSG @1414Z
	BELMONT	DE DP	IMI K
	BELMONT	DE CP	UNABLE TO COPY K
	FAN	DE SCH	K
	SCH	DE FAN	ZFR REQ K
		DE SCH	R AR
		DE FAN	K
1443Z	CP	DE FAN	K
	CP	DE FAN	K
	CP	DE FAN	K
	FAN	DE SCH	I WILL RELAY K
		DE FAN	R -RELAY TO RS - ASSIST IS ON THE WAY BT K
		DE SCH	R AR
	RS	DE SCH	K

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RADIO LOG

Name	Operator	Page	Group	Frequency
COMSIXTHFLT	BAKER RVSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS

Time	Transmission
1443Z	T....O...L.....E....
	RS DE SCH K
	RS DE SCH K
	CP DE SCH K
	DE CP REQ U PASS TO RS FROM FC ASSIS ON WAY K
	DE CP R AR
	RS DE CP I PASS FROM FC ASSIST ON THE WAY K
	FC DE CP K
	UNK DE RS R R THANK U MUCH AR
	DE RS K
	RS DE SCH K
1447Z	DE CP RELAY FROM FC ASSIST IS ON THE WAY K
	SCH DE FAN RELAY TO RS NOTIFY FC WHEN ASSIST ARRIVES ON SCENE K
	SCH DE FAN INT COPY MY LAST K
	DE SCH C-GIVE TO CP NOW K
	DE FAN R AR
	CP DE SCH K
	SCH DE FAN BELIEVE RS COPYING US STA K
	RS DE SCH K
	RS DE SCH REQ RELAY TO FC COPR---
	RS DE SCH REQ U ADVISE WHEN ASSIS ARRIVES K
	RS DE SCH REQ U NOTIFY WHEN ASSIS ARRIVES K
	DE CP K
	DE CP HAVE TOP HAND K
	CP DE SCH K
	DE RS R R AR
	FAN DE SCH R-RS-ROGERS LAST AR
	DE CP K
	SCH DE RS REQ TO KNOW WHAT TYPE OF ASSIS IS COMING K
	DE CO R AR
	SCH DE RS REQ TO KNOW WHAT TYPE OF ASSIST IS COMING K
	RS DE SCH STAND BY K
1452Z	SCH DE FAN STAND BY AR
	DR DE CP K
	DR DE CP STATION REQ U COME UP 64.4H K
	CP DE DR RR WE ARE UP NOW REQ TP PUT UP COUNTER ALSO REQ TO KNOW IF THIS IS TRANSMIT AND REC K
	SCH DE RS ASSIST AS REQ-ARE U COPYING KR BCST K
	RS DE SCH R AR
	RS DE SCH REF UR LAST- ASSIST AS REQUIRED ON THE WAY-U COPY KR BCST K
	DE SCH K
	DRS DE SCH R U AST AND REQ U STAND BY K
	SCH DE FAN REQ U COPR TO RS- ASSIST AS REQ AS REQUESTED K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	PAGE	NET	FREQUENCY
CONSULTHELT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1455Z	T....O....L....E....			
	SCH	DE	RS	R R AR
	CP	DE	DR	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	CP	DE	DR	REQ PUT COUNTER FOR A ROX TWO MIN K
		DE	CP	UNDERSTAND U WANT HIM TO PUT COUNTER FOR TWO MIN INT C C K
		DE	DR	C K
		DE	RS	WE HAVE INTEL PHOTS AND SURFACE VESSELS-BUT NO MEANS OF DEVEL-INT MEANS OF DEVEL SAME K
	FAN	DE	CP	K
		DE	FAN	ZUU AR
	CP	DE	FAN	PASS TO RS -ZUE AND REQ TO KNOW WHETHER HE IS COPYING KR K
	RS	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	RS	K
		DE	SCH	REF UR LAST ZUE-AND REQ TO KNOW ARE U COPYING KR K
	RS	DE	SCH	ARE U CAPABLE OF COPYING KR BCST K
	SCH	DE	RS	NEG K
		DE	SCH	R AR
15ØØZ		DE	FAN	R AR
	RS	DE	CP	K
	SCH	DE	CP	K
		DE	SCH	K
		DE	CP	REQ U PASS TO FAN THAT HE HAS CARRIED OUT EMMERGENCY DISTRUCTION K
		DE	SCH	ZOF CP-CARRIED OUT IMMERGENCY DIS K
		DE	FAN	R AR
	FAN	DE	DR	K
		DE	FAN	K
		DE	DR	REQ U TAKE OUT GUARD G8 NET K
15Ø1Z		DE	FAN	R AR
	CP	DE	DR	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
		DE	DR	ADVISE WHEN WE HAVE HIM G8 K
		DE	CP	R AR
15Ø2Z	G8	DE	DR	K
	G8	DE	DR	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	DR	K
15Ø3Z		DE	C	QRZ DR K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	BAKER RM3A	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1503Z	T....O....L....E....			
1504Z	SCH	DE	RS	ASSIST HAS ARRIVED K
	FAN	DE	BELMONT	R3 HAS ADVISE ASSIST HAS ARRIVED K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	CP	STA N CP K
	SCH	DE	RS	ZFR LAST ASSIST NOT BEEN CONFIRMED K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	CP	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	DR	IMI UR LAST K
		DE	CP	READ HIM C/R BOTH WAYS TRANS-REC K
	SCH	DE	DR	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	SCH	DE	CP	K
		DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	CP	REQ U PASS TO RS STA BELMONT WANTS TO KNOW WHAT FORM OF ASSIST ARRIVED K
1510Z	CP	DE	FF	K
	DR	DE	FAN	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	FAN	REQ ADVISE RELAY TO CP ASSIST HAS NOT ARRIVED K
		DE	DR	R AR
	SCH	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	SCH	K
		DE	CP	INT GET MY LAST TO PASS TO RS K
	CP	DE	SCH	UR WEAK K
		DE	CP	R R REQ U PASS TO RS REQ U PASS TO RS STA BELMONT WANTS TO KNOW WHAT FORM OF ASSIST HAS ARRIVED K
1510Z				
	SCH	DE	FAN	BELMONT TYPE OF ASSIST ARRIVE REQ U INFORM CP ASSIST HAS NOT ARRIVED K
		DE	SCH	ASSIST HAS NOT ARRIVED K
	CP	DE	SCH	ASSIST HAS NOT ARRIVED K
1511Z		DE	CP	ASSIST HAS NOT ARRIVED INT C K
		DE	SCH	C C K
	SCH	DE	RS	RDO CK K
	RS	DE	SCH	L/C K
1512Z	SCH	DE	RS	---- (CUT OUT)
		DE	CP	R R NEG AR
		DE	SCH	C/R K
	RS	DE	SCH	K
1515Z		DE	RS	RDO OUT K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	VIEW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BAKER 9NSA	1	BELMONT	11255Z

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
1515Z	T....O....L....E....	
	RS DE CP	I READ U L/C K
	SCH DE RS	RDO CK K
	SCH DE RS	RDO CK K
	RS DE SCH	K
	SCH DE RS	R AR
	FAN DE RS	K
	RS DE DR	L/C K
	RS DE FAN	BE ADVISED U HEAR L/C BY SCH AND FAF K
	FAN DE RS	WE ARE UNABLE TO REYAL K
	DE FAN	R AR
	DR DE CP	K
	CP DE DR	K
	DE CP	PASS FROM CONTROL CO [illegible] ON TRFC CONTROAL K
1519Z	RS DE CP	K
	CP DE RS	K
	RS DE CP	I WILL RELAY K
	CP DE RS	REQ U ZOD FAN AND MYSELB K
	ALL STA DE CP	ZOD RS AR
	RS DE CP	INT CRU K
	CP DE RS	CRU K
	DE RS	REQ ZOD WHEN WE DO K
	DE CP	R AR
	CP DE C	K
	CP DE FAN	K
	CP DE FAN	K
	SCH DE FAN	RDO CKT K
	DE SCH	K
	SCH DE FAN	NEG TRF FROM CP K
	DE AA	ESCORT ON THE WAY ASSIST DAMAGE AND IF POSSIBLE CONTINUE COURSE FIGURE 340 MAX SPEED UNTIL 100 MILES FROM PRESENT POS-THEN TURN 270 K
	DE SCH	INT C (READ BACK)
	DE RS	NEG NEG K
	RS DE CP	K
	DE CP	REF U LAST ZUE K
	DE CP	INT CRU K
	DE SCH	ZUE K
	DE CP	STATE IT K
	RS DE SCH	K
	SCH DE CP	IF U HAVE TRAFFIC PASS IT K
	DE CH	ME A A SANCD FOLLOWS----

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTWELT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT	11266 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1527Z	T....O....L....E.....			
	SCH	DE	CP	K
		DE	SCH	IMI FROM ESCORT TO PASSING SAME
1531Z		DE	CP	UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT APPROACHING STA ROCK STAR K
1533Z		DE	CP	I RELAY FROM RS- THREE UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT FLYING TOWARDS RS K
1534Z		DE	FAN	R AR
	SCH	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	FAN	ADD TO MY LAST TO RS-IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVED ACEPT MEDICAL ASSIST CARE FOR DEAD IF OFFERED K
		DE	SCH	REQ U IMI K
		DE	FAN	PRESENT POSITION 270 ESCORT AND IF POSSIBLE PRESENT 340 MAX K

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*RADIO LOG

COMSIXTHFLT	BAKER RMSA	1	BELMONT 11285 KCS

1540Z	SCH	DE	FAN	REQ U CORR LAST TO RS (SAME INFO AS BEFORE)
		DE	SCH	REQ U SAY WORD BEFORE ASSIST K
		DE	FAN	IMI K
		DE	SCH	ESCORT ON THE WAY K
		DE	SCH	R AR
	BELMONT	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	SCH	SENDING MSG TO U ON ORDER WIRE K
		DE	SCH	K
1542Z		DE	FAN	PASS TO RS IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVED EXCEPT MEDICAL ASSIST AND CARE FOR THE DEAD IF OFFERED K
	RS	DE	DR	RDO CK K
	DR	DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	DR	G/R K
	FC	DE	DR	INT WISH ME TO PASS LAST K
		DE	FAN	R AR
	RS	DE	DR	YOU ARE FAD BUT READABLE SAY 2 TIMES K
	RS	DE	DR	I PASS FROM FC ESCORT ON THE WAY ASSESS ASSESS DAMAGE DAMAGE AND AND IF IF POSSIBLE POSSIBLE CONTINUE CONTINUE COURSE COURSE FIGURED 340 FIGURED 340 MAX SPEED SPEED UNTIL 100 MILES 100 MILES K
	DR	DE	FAN	CONFIRMATION BACK AND FORTH K
		DE	DR	ZUJ AR
	RS	DE	DR	K
		DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	DR	I PASS FROM FAN IF OTHER THAN U.S. ASSIST ARRIVES ACCEPT MEDICAL ALL MEDICAL ASSIST AND CARE FOR DEAD IF OFFERED K
	DR	DE	RS	WHAT STA SENDS K
		DE	DR	I PASS FROM FC K
	DR	DE	RS	R AR
1545Z	DR	DE	FC	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	FC	REF UR LAST ON CVA LINK REQ U CEASE SENDING I HA E IMMEDIATE TFC FOR U K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	CP	REQ U GEF CONFIRMATION STA BELMONT OF ESCORTS TO RS K
		DE	DR	REQ TO KNOW WHC ESCORTS IS K
		DE	FAN	ZUJ ZR
	CP	DE	DR	ZUJ ON THAT FANF GETTING NOW AR
1556Z	FAN	DE	DR	IMI K
		DE	FAN	DESTROYERS MAX SPEED K
		DE	DR	R ZUJ AR

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	BAKER OMGA	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME				REMARKS
1556Z	T....O...L....E....			BAKER OFF TO BEST /////MIC
		DE	DR	IMI K
		DE	CP	IMI VERIFICATION K
	DR	DE	FAN	HAVE PASS THIS INFO TO BEL VIA NOTHER MEANS K
		DE	DR	R AR
	CP	DE	DR	FAST HAS PASS TO BELMONT K
	DR	DE	CP	IMI PASS INFO VIA NOTHER CKT K
1558Z		DE	DR	R ZUJ AR
	RS	DE	CP	R CK K
		DE	RS	C/R K
		DE	CP	R SAME AR
		DE	DR	INT QSA K
		DE	RS	WEAK BUT READABLE
		DE	DR	R COPY SAME AR
	DR	DE	CP	R CK K
	BEL	DE	CP	K
		DE	BEL	WEAK K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	N1Ø21	COPIED FC K
	DR	DE	CP	REF LAST INFOR BEL HAS REC BY OTHER MEANS K
1559Z				
	B CAT	DE	DR	K
	SCH	DE	FC	K
	FC	DE	SCM	R
		DE	FC	PASS TO STA RS REQ UR FIGS 18ØØZ ESTIMATED QTH K
	FC	DE	SCH	ZUJ K
	RS	DE	SCM	K
	RS	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	RS	K
		DE	SCH	ZOD FC REQ TO KNOW 18ØØZ QTH K
	SCH	DE	RS	R AR
	RS	DE	BEL	K
	RS	DE	BEL	K
	RS	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	FAN	QRZ BEL INT QSA THIS STA K
	FAN	DE	RS	QSA2 AND CANNOT READ BEL K
		DE	FAN	R AR
	BEL	DE	RS	K
	BEL	DE	CP	I READ RS L/C AND FC ADVISED THAT STA PROVIDE ESCORT FOR RS AT SPEED QSB K
		DE	FC	K
		DE	SCH	K
16Ø5Z	CP	DE	DR	K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CALLSIGN	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BEST RM?	2	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
16ØSZ	T....O....L....E....			
	CP	DE	DR	INT QSO WHELLUS AFB ANY MEANS K
		DE	DR	ZOF SCH TO ALL STAR NEED TO MNOW HOW MANY AND TYTES OFF AIRCRAFT WERE LAUNCHED FOR CONTINCENCY WHAT TIME FIE AIRCRAFT REVOVER NEED ASAP
		DE	DR	R AR
	SCH	DE	DR	INT COPY K
		DE	SCH	RELAY PLS (BKN)
	RS CP	DE	(QRM)	BIG DIPPER AND MAIDORK
	CP	DE	RS	R AR
		DE	DR	ZBD NEED TO KNOW HOW AND TYPES WERE LAUNCHED FOR CONTINGENCY WHAT TIME DID AIRCRAFT R[illegible] NEED ASAP K
16Ø7Z		DE	SCH	ZUJ K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	CP	REF LAST I HAVE COMM WITH WHEELUS AFB HOWEVER CANNOT READ U THIS CTK B
	CP	DE	RS	O K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	REF LAST OUR 18ØØZ QTH 31.35N 33.32E BT NW AT 1Ø KNTS K
		DE	CP	R AR
1611Z	FC BEL	DE	CP	ZBD RS 18ØØZ QTH 31.35N 33.321 BT INW AT 1Ø KNTS K
		DE	FC	R AR
		DE	DR	INT ZULU K
	DE	DE	CP	C K
		DE	DR	R AR
	CP	DE	RS	INT TIME 16Ø^Z
		DE	RS	C K
		DE	CP	R AR
	DR	DE	CP	CORR MY LAST TO READ .....
		DE	FC	K
	CP	DE	RS	K
	BEL	DE	CP	TMI K
		DE	BEL	REPEAT K
		DE	CP	C C K
	RS	DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	REQ C SPPEDLL OF ALL ESCORTS K
		DE	CP	R MATADOR VIG DIPPER K
		DE	RS	R TKS AR
	CP	DE	FC	K
	DR	DE	FCZ	INT QSO CP K
		DE	DR	R TRY TO PASS K
		DE	FC	I QSL FOR RS POSIT 18ØØZ QTH K
		DE	DR	R AR

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RADIO LOG

AGENCY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	BEST R/T	1	BELMONT	11255 KC.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1611Z	T....O....L....E....			
	RS	DE	CP	ALL STAR ACK QTH K
	RS	DE	DR	FC REC TO KNOW QTH K
		DE	RS	C 31.35N 33.32E 1800 QTH K
		DE	DR	INT HIS WILL BE 1800Z BE ADVISED IT IS 1620Z
		DE	RS	C IT WILL BE OU R POSIT AT 0600Z K
		DE	FC	R REQ ZOF BEL AND PASS TO RS EXPECT DEST WILL REV WILL U 0700Z TOMORROW K
	RS	DE	DR	K
		DE	RS	K
		DE	DR	ZBD FC PASSED K
	BEL	DE	CP	K
		DE	BEL	K
		DE	CP	CORR MY LST CMS TO BE THAT WILL BE HIS 1800Z QTH K
		DE	BEL	R AR
		DE	CP	DID U GET INFO FM FC ABOUT REDV TIME TOMORROW K
	CP	DE	BEL	NEG K
		DE	CP	IN ACCEPTED FM FC TO RS EXPECTING DEST TO REDV APPOX 0700Z TOM K
1619Z		DE	BEL	READ BACK K
		DE	CP	C C K
	RS	DE	FAN	K
	CP	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	CP	K
		DE	FAN	K
		DE	CP	ZOF RS TOR JCS 081110Z K
	RS	DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	STA FAN INT TOR 081110Z K
	CP	DE	RS	IMI AA JCS K
		DE	CP	COMPLIED K
1621Z	CP	DE	RS	R ZUJ AR
	DR	DE	BEL	K
	RS	DE	BEL	K
	FAN	DE	BEL	K
1623Z	FAN	DE	DR	K
	FT	DE	FAN	K
	FAN	DE	FT	K
		DE	FAN	CK TRAND MITTER OFF AIR K
		DE	FT	R ZUJ ZUJ AR
	CP	DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	REF LAST AOUT JCS MSG, WE HAVE NO WAY OF DETERMING TOR FILES DESTROYED K
		DE	CP	R INT RECP OF MSG K
		DE	RS	NOT AWARE K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	SHEET	GROUP	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHELI	REST PV3	1	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME				DESCRIPTION
1623Z	T....0... L...E.....			
		DE	CP	R AR
	BEL	DE	CP	BEL K
		DE	CP	STA PS HAVE NO WAY DERTEM.TOR FILES DESTROYED ALSO AND DO NTO ACK RECPT K
1628Z		DE	BEL	REPEAT AA ACK J K
		DE	BEL	FC @706Z REQ FC CONF/ EXPECT TO -----
	FC	DE	BEL	REQ CONF RDV TIME ESCORT TO RB K
	FC	DE	SCH	K
		DE	FC	K
		DE	SCH	-O-@01 26Z FM SCH TO FC BT UNCLAS LAUNCH FOR A1H @816@2Z FOR SUDA BAY GREECE WITH --------
		DE	FC	IMI AA SUDA BAY K
		DE	SCH	COMPLIED K
		DE	FC	IMI AA WITH K
		DE	SCH	COMPLIED K
163@Z		DE	FC	R AR
	DR	DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	CP	INT CONF FM FC FOR BEL K
		DE	DR	ZUG K
		DE	CP	R AR
	DR	DE	FC	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	FC	REF AA LAST SUBJ NOT BEING DISCUSSED ANOTHER CKT K
		DE	DR	R AR
	CP	DE	DR	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	REF FC CONF --SUBJ BEING BISSUCSED ELSEWHERE K
		DE	CP	INT C K
		DE	DR	C K
		DE	CP	R AR
	DR	DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	
		DE	CP	INT TFC FOR WHEELUSE K
		DE	BD	K
		DE	DR	INT QSO WHEELUS ATT K
		DE	CP	ZUG HOWEVER I CAN PASS VIA ATHENS AF K
		DE	DR	R B C HAS COMM WITH WHEELUS AND STILL ASKING REPLY FM B C AS TO WHETHER HE K
	CP	DE	FAN	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	FAN	PASS TO RS JCS MSG @@1602Z TOR NTO INT HE REC THE MSG K
		DE	CP	R AR

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RADIO LOG

COMSIXTHFLT	REST RM3	2	RELMON T	11288 KHZ.

TIME				
1636Z	T....O....L....E.....			
	RS	DE	CP	INT REC JCS MSC TOR NOT IMPORTANT K
1640Z	CP	DE	RS	ZUJ AR
	FC	DE	SCH	K
	SCH	DE	FC	K
		DE	SCH	ZBD IBA COME F511 K
1641Z		DE	AA	R/R
	SCH	DE	FT	K
	SCH	DE	FT	K
		DE	FT	ZES 2 K
		DE	SCH	ZFR I WASS PASSING TO FC K
	SCH	DE	FC	QSY LAST K
1643Z	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
		DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	DID I UNDERSTND ARE UR FILES DESTRYED OR SEALED UNAVAILABEL K
		DE	RS	COMM SPACE WAS DESTROYED DURING ATTACK AND DO NOT QSL MSG K
		DE	CP	R AR
	FAN	DE	CP	K
		DE	FAN	K
		DE	CP	J K
		DE	FAN	H AR
	SCH	DE	FC	K
		DE	SCH	K
		DE	FC	QSD CVA LINE K
1646Z		DE	SCH	R AR
	FC	DE	SCH	K
		DE	FC	K
		DE	SCH	QRZ CVA REQ QRV QRK K
		DE	FC	ZUJ AR
	SCH	DE	FC	QRK 4/5 K
		DE	SCH	R AR
	CP	DE	FC	K
1654Z	NO SIGS.			
1656Z		DE	FAN	COUNTING REC TUNNING AND XMTER ALIC)
1658Z	(EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE BEING PASSED)			
1701Z	EXERCISE TFC			
1706Z	YAPD	DE	CP	RELAYED EXERCISE TFC .....TE
	SCH	DE	CP	INT QRK K
		DE	SCH	W/RINT BLAND BRAVO W/D NR 5 K
		DE	CP	COMPLIED K
	SCH	DE	FC	BLNK B-FR IS VSWVZN K
	FC	DE	SCH	R-INT C PBLNK FR IS VSWWZN K
		DE	FC	R AR
1712Z	FC	DE	JR	K

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*RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATION	ITEM	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CCMSIXTHFLT	BEST RM3	2	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	INCOMING
1712Z	T....O....L....E....
	WW DE CP IMI K
	WW DE CP R R ZDK W/D NR 5 ---SEE FILES
	(WW WEAK ANDUNREADABLE)
1715Z	STEADY KEY ON HICOMM NOW)
	RS DE DR K
	RS DE L2 K
	DR DE RS K
	DR DE FC QRZ RS AR
	RS DE DR K
	DR DE RS K
	RS DE DR K
	DR DE RS R K
	DR DE RS INT QRU K
	DE DR R R ZUJ AR
1719Z	(STEADY KEY ON HI COMM)
	DR DE DR K
	DR DE RS K
	DE DR ZBD TOP HAND -REQ UR TOR OF STA FC 080917Z MIM 080917Z K
	DR DE RS U GARBLED RELAY CP K
	DE DR R AR
	CP DE DR K
	CP DE DR K
	CP DE DR R-ZOF RS-BT FM TOPHAND REQ UR TOR OF FC 080917Z K
	CP DE BEL INT TOR 1764Z INT C K
	DE CP I DONT KNOW K
	CP DE BEL R ZUJ AR
	SCH DE BEL K
	SCH DE BEL K
	BEL DE SCH K
	DE BEL R INT TOR FOR W/D NR 5 1764Z INT C K
	DE SCH C ZOJ AR
	CP DE RS O O O K
	RS DE CP R ZUJ AR
	CP DE RS U W/BUT RED-FM USS LIBERTY -TO CNO -INFO CINCUSNAVEUR JCS CINCLANTFLT COMSIXTHFLT COMSERVLANT BT UNCLAS SITUATION FLOOLOING AIR ATTACK 1. AT TIME 081205Z WHILE SHIP ON COURSE 283 SPD 5KTS POSIT 35. CORR 35CORR 31-35.5N 33-29E EAST SHIP ATTACKED BY UNIDENTIFIED JET FIGHTERS BELIVED TO BE ISARELI APPROX 6 STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP APPROX 6 STRAFING RUNS MADE ON SHIP APPROX 081225Z 3 TORP BOATS ONE IDENTIFIED AS

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	GROUP	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHELT	BEST HM3	2	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1721Z	T....O....L....E.... (CONTIUED)			3 TOR BOATS ONE IDENTIFIED AS ISRALEI APPROACHED SHI : STBD QUARTER HI SPEED HULL Nº 1 BOAT WAS 206 -17 APPROX Ø81427Z TOOK TORP BOATS UNDER FIRE WITH 5Ø CALIBMACH GUNS RANGE 2ØØØ YDS. TORP BOAT LAUNCHED TORP AND STRAFING ATTACK. TOR HIT STBD SIDE SHIP HAS 1Ø# STBD LIST WATER TIGHT BOUNDRIES ESTABLISHED AND HOLDING AFTER ATTACK TORP BOATS CLEARD TO EAST AVOUT FIVE MILE CLEARING AREA AT 1Ø KTS. 2. PHOTOS OF AIRCRAFT AND BOATS TAKEN AFTER COMPLETED TWO ISRALEI HELOS ORBITED SHIP AT ABOUT Ø81255Z RANGE 5ØØ YDS ISRALEI INSIGNIA CLEARLY VISIBLE PHOTOS TAKEN SEVERAL PROJECTILES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED FROM TOPSIDE AREAS NR DEAD EST 1Ø NR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED EST 15 TOTAL WOUNDED 75 NR MISSING CURRENTLY UNDERTERMINED 3. SHIP UNABLE TO CARRY OUT MISSION WILL SUBMIT CASREPT ASAP, SEPERATELY 4. EXTENSIVE SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TOPSIDE LOWER DECK SPASES FWD DESTROYED. 5. COMM CAP LIMITED WILL PROVIDE FILM AND PROJECTILE RECOVERED AS DIRECT WHIP WILL REQ DRYDOCKING AND RE-REFITTING.
	CP	DE	RS	INT COPY K
		DE	CP	(MANY IMI AS COMPLIED)
	RS	DE	CP	R Ø81715Z AT 1742Z AR
	CP	DE	RS	R AR
	CP	DE	FC	DISREGARD AR
1745Z	CP	DE	FC	SENDING ZDK Ø81715 TO CP ...PS
	CP	DE	FC	ZFR AR
		DE	SCH	R QSL 17Ø2Z K
	RS	DE	GOLF	K
	CP	DE	GOLF	K
		DE	CP	K
		DE	GOLF	REQU RELAY TO RS DTG ETA Ø6ØØB BT DOES RS HOLD EMPRESS DOROTH Ø81612Z K
		DE	CP	REQ U SPELL UR CALL SIGN PHONETIC K
	CP	DE	GOLF	G A Y T I M E G O L F (SAID SAME)
	GG	DE	CP	REQ IMI Ø6ØØB TO Ø81612Z K
		DE	GG	COMPLIED K
	GG	DE	CP	QS B ***ED
	RS	DE	CP	PASSED FROM GG K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CALL	FREQUENCY
COVSIXTHFLT	BEST RM3	2	BELMONT	11255

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1759Z	T....O....L....E....			
	CP	DE	RS	R AR
	RS	DE	DR	TOPHAND REQ UR ETR FC @80917Z K
	DR	DE	RS	I READ BACK K
	RS	DE	DR	WA FC IS @80917Z K
18Ø1Z	DR	DE	RS	AS AR
	DR	DE	CP	K
		DE	DR	K
		DE	CP	BE ADVISED TOPHAND IS Q9Ø ON 1H K
	CP	DE	DR	IMI K
		DE	CP	COMPLIED K
18Ø3Z	CP	DE	DR	R AR
	DR	DE	FC	INT QSO WITH AR
	DR	DE	RS	WE DO NOT HAVE ANY INFO ON @80917Z ATT SPACES ARE BLOCKED OFF K
	QG	DE	FC	REF UR LAST TO RS CONCERNING DTG @80917Z BE ADVISED RS CANNOT COPY [illegible] FLT BCST K
		DE	QG	R AR
	QG	DE	CP	K
		DE	QG	K
		DE	CP	REQ ------
		DE	CP	IMT WA RDVU K
		DE	QG	R WA RDVU -MAKE K
		DE	CP	ZUJ AR
	FC	DE	SCH	Q K
		DE	FC	K
	FC	DE	SCH	-O-@817@@Z FM SHOC TO IAC 93@6 CLONT ACEX BY NATO UNCLAS SHOC 112 EXER WIDE AWAKE /67 A. [illegible] B. FR IS VSWWZN THRU C. BACKWOOD D. NINE E. REPT F. @817@@Z EXER EXER EXER BY K
18Ø8Z	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	CP	DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	CP	7@@ PM QG REQ U TAKE COURSE 3@@ FOR RDVU MAKE FOUR HOUR POSIT REPT THIS CKT QI K
	RS	DE	CP	INT COPY K
		DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	CP	INT QSL K
	CP	DE	RS	IMI AA RDVU K
		DE	CP	COMPLIED K
	RS	DE	CP	INT QSL MY LAST K
	RS	DE	CP	K
	RS	DE	CP	K
1813Z	RS	DE	FC	QRZ CP K

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RADIO LOG

UNIT	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	REST RM2	2	BELMONT	11265 KCSL

TIME	FROM	TO	TRANSMISSION
1813Z	T....O....L....E.....		
	DE	CP	INT QSL K
	DE	CP	INT QSL LAST FM GC K
	DE	RS	R K
	RS	DE	FC K
	RS	DE	BEL K
	RS	DE	BEL K
	CP	DE	FC K
	FC	DE	CP K
	DE	CP	ZOF RS-WERE U FLYING US.COLORS AT TIME OF ATTACK K
	DE	CP	IMI K
	SCH	DE	FC K
	DE	SCH	K
	DE	FC	INT QSO RS K
	DE	SCH	AS AR
	RS	DE	SCH K
	DE	RS	K
	DE	SCH	ZOF RS-FM FC P - WERE U FLYING US COLORS AT TIME OF ATTAC K K
	SCH	DE	RS ZUE K
	FC	DE	SCH ZBD RS ZUE K
1820Z	DE	FC	R AR
	GC	DE	FC K
	SCH	DE	RS K
	RS	DE	SCH K
	SCH	DE	RS BT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO STEER COURSE FIC 360 MAGNETIC WE HAVE NO FACILITES AVAILABLE FOR POSIT K
	SCH	DE	GC R I COPIED AR
	GC	DE	FF K
	FC	DE	GC K
	DE	FC	BT AS OF 2002 RECOMUTE RDVU TIME WITH RS AND ADVISE BT K
1823Z	DE	GC	R AR
	BEL	DE	PAW K
	DE	BEL	R AR
	DR	DE	PAW (PASSING TFC NOT CONCERNING)
	FC	DE	SCH K
	DE	FC 7	K
	DE	SCH	ZBD RS BT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO STER COURSE FIC 360 MAGETIC WE HAVE NO FACILITES FOR POSIT BT K
1826Z	BEL	DE	FC R AR
	DE	FC	RDO CK K
	DE	BEL	R/R K
	DE	FC	W/R AR
	RS	DE	BEL RDO K

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RADIO LOG

CONSXITHFLT	BEST RM3	2	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1831Z	T....O....L....E.....			
	RS	DE	BEL	RIDO CK K
	DR	DE	BEL	RIDO CK K
		DE	DR	W/R K
		DE	BEL	R AR
	BEL	DE	SCH	W/R K
	RS	DE	CP	RIDO CK K
	RS	DE	CP	RIDO CK K
	CP	DE	RS	K
		DE	CP	W/R INT TFC K
	RS	DE	CP	G/R INT TFC K
	CP	DE	RS	ZUG K
	DR	DE	FC	INT QSL @81651Z (YQJQ) K
	FC	DE	BEL	K
	BEL	DE	FC	K
		DE	BEL	ZBD DEVIL INT COMM WITH DR K
		DE	FC	R COMM THIS NET ZFR MY TFC ON BRAVO K
1837Z		DE	BEL	R AR
	FC	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	FC	K
		DE	DR	REF UR LAST DO NOT HOLD SUBJ MSG K
		DE	FC	R AR
	RS	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	RS	K
		DE	DR	ZUJ ZR
	CP	DE	BEL	K
	BEL	DE	CP	K
		DE	BEL	(QRM5)
	BEL	DE	CP	QSA1 K (BELMONT)
		DE	BEL	INT RELAY TOPS [illegible]15Z VIA ANY MEANS K
		DE	CP	AS AR
	FC	DE	DR	K
	BC	DE	DR	K
	DR	DE	FC	K
		DE	DR	REF THAT MSG INT U GONNA SEND IT K
		DE	FC	R ZUJ AR
	RS	DE	CC	K
	CC	DE	RS	[illegible] THRU CP K
		DE	CC	R AR
	CP	DE	BEL	REF MY LAST INT AND K
	BELL	DE	CP	IMI K
	CP	DE	BEL	COMPLIED K
	BEL	DE	CP	WE ARE CK QRX K
		DE	BEL	R AR
		DE	FC	REF MY LST ON TASK CR ORESTES MSC DOES NOT NEED TO BE RELAYED K
		DE	[illegible]	R AND REF U MSG [illegible]81615Z JUST RCD THIS STA K
1851Z		DE	FC	R AR

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	DATE	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CVASIXTHELT				

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1851Z	T.....O.....L.....E.....
R	RS DE FC K
	FC DE RS K
	RS DE FC BT DO YOU HAVE CAPABILITY OF SHIFTING FREQ OF THIS NET K
	DE RS BELIEVE AFFIRM HOWEVER IF WE ARE NOT CONTACTED IN 15 MINS WILL SHIFT BACK TO THIS NET K
	DE FC R WILL PASS TO NC AND DO NOT SHIFT AT THIS TIME
	CP DE FC INT QSO BEL K
1853Z	BEL DE CP K
	BEL DE CP K
	BEL DE CP K
	BEL DE CP K
	DR DE CP K
	CP DE DR K
	DE CP INT QSO BEL K
	DE DR R ZUU AR
	BEL DE DR K
	DR DE BEL WEAK BUT READABLE K
	DE DR R QRZ FC K
	PAW DE BEL K
	DE PAW K
	DE BEL K
	DE PAW K
	DE DR K
	FC DE DR K
	PAW DE FC K
	DE PAW K
	DE FC R ZOF BEL RS BELIEVES HE HAS CAPABILITIES OF SHIFTING FREQ THIS NET HOWEVER IF COMM NOT ESTAVLISHED WITHIN 15 MINS AFTER SHIFT HE WILL RETURN THIS FREQ K
	DE PAW K
	BEL DE PAW (PASSED)
	DE BEL PASS TO ER TO PASS TO RS IF HE KNOWS FREQ 48 K
	DE PAW K
	DE DR BEL REQ TO RS IF HE KNOWS FREQ FOR 48 K
	DE PAW K
	DE DR K
	DE RS K
	DE ER (PASSED)
	DR DE RS R AR
	BEL DE DR K
	DE BEL C K
	DE DR C K
40662	DE BEL R AR

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1916	RB DE BUUB CAT K
	(LATE ENTRY--BEL ADVISED AT APPROX 1916Z FAN TO ADVISE BC TO QAP RS ON 48 AND ADVISE)
	RS DE BC K
	PAW DE FC K
	AA DE BEL K
	BEL DE FAC ZCN FM STA RS ON 48 K
	DE BEL R WOULD YOU
	BEL DE BC K
	AA DE BEL REQ LONG COUNT K
	DE BC (COMPLIED)
	AA DE BEL
	BEL DE BC (OFF FREQ)
1920Z	BC DE BEL R AR
	BEL DE PAW REQ NET K
	DE BEL R AR
	RS DE PAW K
	RS DE PAW K
	RS DE PAW K
	PAW DE BEL INT ZCN RS THIS NET K
	PAW DE BEL K
	PAW DE BEL K
1924	PAW DE BEL K
	BEL DE PAW K
	DE BEL INT QSO RS K
	DE PAW ZUG K
	DE BEL R AR
	CP DE GTG K
	GTG DE CP K
	DE GTG INT CKT 48 K
	BEL DE FC K
	BEL DE FC K
	DE FAN STA BLC COPY RS LOUD AN D@ CLEAR ON 48 K
	DE KEEP COM WITH RS ARE SHIFM ING THIS NET K
	DE FAN R AR
	BEL DE GTG K
	GTG DE FC QSY 48 K
	DE GTG R AR
1926	YAPD DE BEL QSY 48 AR (THISTA QSY'D)
	(6720KCS)
	BEL DE [illegible] IMI K
	DE [illegible] REQ PASS TO BC INT QRV ON HA@2HC K
1928	RS DE BC R AR
	FC DE SCH K
	RS DE SCH K
1930	[illegible]ARLIER ON FREQ)

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION		
1930Z	T.....O.....L.....E		
		DE BC	C&R QRU AR
	RS	DE CP	K
		DE RS	R K
		DE CP	C&R AR
	RS	DE FC	RDO CK K
		DE RS	R K
		DE FC	R AR
	RS	DE SCH	RDO CK K
1931Z	AA	DE BC	ZUJ
	RS	DE SCH	RDO CK K
		DE RS	C&R K
	RS	DE SCH	QRU AR
	BEL	DE DR	K
	FC	DE DR	K
		DE FC	K
		DE DR	INT QSA K
		DE FC	L&C K
		DE DR	INT REPLY TO ME LAST K
		DE FC	ZUG K
		DE DR	R AR
	FC	DE FT	K
		DE FC	K
		DE FT	W&R AR
1935	BEL	DE DR	REQ NET
	BR	DE FC	K
		DE DR	K
		DE FC	INFO BEING PASSED VISUAU
1936		DE DR	R AR
	RS	DE BC	RDO CK K
		DE RS	L&C K
1939		DE BC	SAME QRU AR
	RS	DE BC	K
		DE RS	K
		DE BC	REQ YOU CONFIRM THE NR DEAD ALSO WOUNDED (SERIOUSLY) K
1942		DE RS	ZUJ AR
1944	MM	DE SCH	W&BR K
	BC	DE MM	RDO K
	MM	DE FC	L&C AR
	BC	DE BEL	INT TFC FM TOP HAND TO PASS TO RS K
		DE BC	ZUG ZUJ
1947	BEL	DE RS	K
	CP	DE RS	K
	RS	DE CP	K
	RS	DE BC	K
	BC	DE RS	R RSF LAST 18 DEAD BEF-

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RADIO LOG

OPNAV FORM 3616-1 (Rev. 11-68) Supersedes Form 3552 Dec. 1 Obsl. 0107-700-1050

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CALL	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION			
1947	T.....O.....L.....E			
				WEEN 15 AND 25 SERIOUSLY
				WOUNDED 100 INJUREDK
		DE	BC	J K
		DE	RS	AFFRIM K
		DE	BC	INT NR MISSING K
1949Z		DE	RS	NEC K
1950	BEL	DE	BC	(PASS INFO ABOUT WOUNED TO BELMONT)
		DE	BEL	R AR
	RS	DE	GTG	K
	GTG	DE	FC	ADVISED OFF FREQ AND LOUD B/GROUND SQUEAL K
	RS	DE	GTG	K
	GTG	DE	RS	K
	RS	DE	GTG	BT UNDERSTAND UAR PRE-SENTLY 300(QSA1)
		DE	RS	ZUJ
		DE	RS	REQ RELAY FOR STA CALL-ING ME K
		DE	GTG	BT BELIEVE U AR PRESENT-LY ON COURES 300 SPD 1(
				INT C K
	GTG	DE	SCH	ZUJ
	RS	DE	FC	INT QSA K
1953	SCH	DE	FC	RELAY TO RS FM GTG (ABOVE INFO)
	GTG	DE	RS	REF LAST THAT IS AFFRIMATIVE K
		DE	GTG	R AR
	GTG	DE	FC	K
		DE	GTG	K
		DE	FC	ADVISED HE STILL OFF FREQ K
		DE	GTG	R AR
	FC	DE	BEL	K
		DE	FC	K
		DE	BEL	???????
	BEL	DE	FC	QSO COUNT K
	BEL	DE	SCH	WKT QSO RS K
1955	BEL	DE	SCH	141 K
	BEL	DE	SCH	QSA1 RELAY THRU FC K
	BC	DE	BEL	K
	BEL	DE	BC	K
	RS	DE	BEL	K
	RS	DE	BEL	K
		DE	[illegible]	K
1957		DE	BEL	R AR
	FC	DE	[illegible]	K
		DE	FC	K
		DE	DR	NEVER RECIED VISUALLY SEND VIA 615 K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
1957	T.....O.....L.....E
	DE FC R AS AR
	DR DE FC N/C
2000	AA DE BEL K
	BEL DE ULCER K
2015	BC DE SCH K
	BC DE SCH K
	SCH DE BC K
	BC DE SCH INT QSO BEL K
2016	DE BC AS AR (N/C)
	DE SCH ZOF BEL INT MSG HE WANTS ME TO RELAY TO RL K
	DE BC REQ COUNT K
	DE SCH (COMPLIED)
	DE BC IMI K
	DE SCH REQ PASS TO BEL TO GIVE YOU MSG HE WANTS ME TO PASS TO [illegible] K
	DE BC ZUJ77J K
	DE SCH C K
	DE BC ZUU AR
	BEL DE BC K
	MW HAS BEL AND ADVISE HE IS ANS BC BUT ZOF [illegible]STA ALSO
	BEL DE MW PASS IN BLIND BEL HAS BAD MITTER OUT
	SCH DE BC K
	DE SCH K
	DE BC ZUC QSO BEL K
	DE SCH R AR
2018	BEL DE FC REC YOU PASS AND TFC FOR RS VIA SCH AND I WILL RELAY AR
	RS DE SCH RDO CK K
	SCH DE RS R&R K
	RS DE SCH R L&C AR
2025	RS DE FC RDO CK K
	BC DE RS K
	RS DE CSC K
	DE RS GIVE SCH CALL AND RELAY K
	DE BC IMI K
	DE RS (COMPLIED)
	DE BC R AR
	RS DE BC K
	DE RS K
	DE BC ZUU K
	SCH DE BC K
2019	DE SCH R K (SCH TRYING TO HOLD RDO CK WITH RS NC TFC) ####
2019	DE SCH O K
	DE FC K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	UNIT	CALLSIGN	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2Ø19	T.....O.....L.....E FC DE SCH Q K
2Ø21	SCH DE FC [redacted] (NET IN USE AR SCH DE FC URV K DE SCH -O-Ø819ØØZ FM SACEUR TO E3D2/ NATO UNCLAS SHOC 114/67 SF/OM WT BCST LISTEN WATCH CKT HZ331 - C WA 114/67 DEACTIVATED
2Ø24	DE FC R AR
	BC DE BEL (HOLDING RDO CKS)
2Ø26	RS DE FC K FC DE RS K DE FC MSG -FM YOJO TO RS STEELJAW 7Ø2 WILL AIRBORNE AT APPROX. 21ØØZ TO ASSIST RS IN NAVIGATION AND COMM UNICATIONS BT K
2Ø28	FC DE RS QSA 1 PASS THRU BC K BC DE FC K DE BC K
2Ø29	DE FC ZOF RS (LAST MSG) DE BC R AR RS DE BC K DE RS K DE BC (PASSED MSG) BC DE RS IMI AA 21ØØZ K DE BC (COMPLIED)
2Ø3Ø	DE RS R AR FC DE BC K DE FC K DE BC RS CDL UR LAST K DE FC R AR RS DE BC K BC DE RS K DE BC NEED TO KNOW ON THE RNR OF SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IF THE NR 15 TO 25 ARE INCLUED IN THE NR 1ØØ OF THE WOUNDED K
2Ø34	DE RS ZUJ AR BC DE RS K DE BC K
2Ø35	DE RS REF LAST AFFRIMATIVE K RS DE BC K BC DE RS K DE BC NEED NAMES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED K (FOR CNO)
2Ø4±	DE RS AS AR RS DE CTC K DE RS K DE CTC R AR

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	OPR	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2041	T.....O.....L.....E
	BC DE BEL INT QSO FC K
	BEL DE FC INT QRZ K
2044	DE BEL ZUG AR
	RS DE BC K
	DE RS K
	DE BC REQ COUNT K
	DE RS (COMPLIED)
	DE BC RS MEDIUM AND RADABLE K
2047	(ALL STAS TRYING TO GET FT SEL HAS O TFC FOR HIM)
2052	NO SIGNALS-CONCERNING THISTA
2057	NO SIGNALS-CONCERNING THISTA
2102	NO SIGNALS
2107	BC DE RS RDO CK K
	DE BC L&C AND DO U HAVE INFO YET K
	DE RS ARE YOU REFERRING TO NAMES OF WOUNDED K
	DE BC I AM REFERRING TO LIST OF DEAD AND WOUNDEDK
	DE RS BE ADVISED SHIP WILL SUBMIT PERSONNEL CASREPT ASAP K
2109	DE BC ZUJING AR
2115	RS DE SCH RDO CK K
	RS DE BEL RDO CK K
	FAN DE RS REQ LONG COUNT K
2116	DE FAN (COMPLIED)
	FAN DE RS W&ORM REQ RELAY THRU ANOTHER STA K
	DE FAN IMI K
	RS DE FAN K
2117	FAN DE FC (PASSED INFO FM RS)
2120	RS ADVISED BC THAT CASREPT LIST IS BEING DRAFTED NOW AND WILL PASS VIA THIS CKT ASAP
2125	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING THISTA
	RS DE CP K
	DE RS K
	DE CP INT QSL @@@11@Z FM JCS K
	DE RS IMI DTG K
	DE CP COMPLIED K
2128	DE RS ZUJ AR
	CP DE RS K
	DE CP K
2129	DE RS REF LAST JCS @@@11@Z AS AR
	CP DE CP K
	RS DE CP K
	CP DE RS K
	RS DE CP K
	CP DE RS REF LAST @@@11@Z IT IS NOT KNOWN YET THAT SPACE IS BLOCKED -

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RADIO LOG

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2129	T.....O.....L.....E
	IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH-BELIEVE MSG DESTROYED K
	DE CP R AR
CP	DE FC K
FC	DE CP K
CP	DE FC K
IR	DE FC INT QSO CP K
2132 CP	DE IR K
IR	DE CP K
CP	DE IR ZUJ K
FC	DE IR ZUC QSO CP K
	DE FC ZOF CP ACCORDING ROUTING INST JCS 060110Z WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUBJ MSG HELD SY RS K
2134	DE IR J K
FC	DE IR K
	DE FC K
	DE IR IMI K
	DE FC (COMPLIED)
CP	DE IR K
2136	DE CP R FC'S LAST AR
2140	BEST OFF TO EARLES
BM	DE PET 1 K
	DE PET 1 RELQ NET
RS	DE
BEL	DE MM ZOF CONT QSY THE I MEGGER TO NUCO JAK (LOGGING IN ONLY TRANSMISSIONS CONCERNING RS-----MIC ON
2148	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING ROCK STAR
2153	NO SIGNALS CONCERNING ROCK STAR
2202	RS DE FF K
FF	DE RS K
RS	DE FF L/C AR
	DE FF RELENQUISH NET AR
BEL	DE MM REQ NET FOR RDO CK RS K
RS	DE MM RDO CK K
MM	DE RS W/UNREADABLE ARE YOU RELAY THROUGH FF K
FF	DE MM K
	DE FF K
	DE MM NO TRFC WITH RS PASS NEG TRFC WITH RS K
	DE FF R - FOR RS FOLLOWING FROM MM (COMPLIED)
MM	DE A QSY 6200- TO A013PE 2202 AUT MTN HOW COPY
FREQUES?	DE RS HAVE 0 FOR U K

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RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2153	T.....O.....L.....E
	DE FF GA K
	FF DE RS WITH IMMEDIATE TFFC K
	DE FF K
	FF DE RS -0-082202Z FM RS TO CINCNAV INFO BUPERS BUMED NAVAL FINANCE CENTER CLEV COMFIVE CNO CINCUSNAVEUR CINCLANTFLT COMSIXTHFLT COMSERVLANT COMSERVRONEIGHT BT UNCLAS PERSONEL CASREPT 1. KNW DECAND NEXT OF KIN LTCD P.M. ARMSTRONG ALSO USN 569[illegible] 1100 MRS. MARIE K. ARMSTRONG 131 CAYNCA ROAD VIRGINIA BEACH VIRGINIA, 23461 QM3 FRANCIS(NMN) BROWN USN 778 76 70 MRS. AND MRS. WADE BROWN 3323 6 AVE. TROY N.Y. CT3 ALLEN (NMN) HIGGINS USN, 788
62	62 97 MR AND MRS WILBER C HIGGINS 219 FIDDLERS GREEN BOVER DELEWARE, SN CARL LUIS HOAR USN 774 46 48 MRS AND MRS. JAMES B. HOAR GROUP 3. NAVERINO OHIO JOHN DAVID (NMN) SKOLAK USN 850 17 83 MR AND MRS. RUDOLPH SKOLAK 2318 WEST. 19 AVE. GARY INDINIA PC2 JOHN CLARANCE SPICHER 473 41 77 USN MRS LINDIA LEE SPICHER 79[illegible] HAMPTON BLVD NORFOLK VIRGINA GMC3 ALEXANDER NEIL THOMPSON JR USN 770 47 21 MRS GALE E THOMPSON 4 CRYSTAL DRIVE WARWICK R.I. LT. STEPHEN SPENCER TOTH USN 6[illegible] 61 3/11 CAPT JOSEPH CHARLIE TOTH USN PARA RET PARA 301 53 ST. VIRGINIA BEACH VIRGINIA - FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF PERSONNEL AS MISSING IN ACTION - LT JAMES C. PEERCE USN 649805/6462 649 64 805/ 6462 MRS BAULIENE M. PEERCE 1633 WILDWOOD DR. VIRGINIA BEACH VIRGINIA - REQUEST CINCNAV NOTIFY NEXT OF KIN - ADDITIONAL DETAILS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BT
	FC DE RS HOW COPY K
2222	RF DE RS K
	RS DE FF K
	DE RS HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO -
	DE FF ZUJ AR
	RS DE [illegible] K
	DE [illegible] FOLLOWING LIST OF PERSONNEL LISTING AS MISSING ACTION
	ALAN BLUE CIV 531423327 GG-7 MRS KATHY A. BLUE 11605 ROCKWOOD DR. SILVER SPRINGS MD. CT2 R.J. KEMPBALL USN USN 506 13 23 MRS ELIZABETH KALEIN CAMPBELL 46A DOORWOOD RD. MONTROSE SCOTLAND, CT2 ROBERT B. ESENBURG USN 776 09 35 MR AND MRS BENJAMIN ENESBERG 703 SOUTH LEXINGTON PARK WAY SAINT PAUL MINN. CT1 WARREN E. HERSEY USN 903 67 11 MR AND MRS WARREN O. HERSEY 17 PINE STREET STONEHAM MASS. CTCN LAWERENCE P. HAYDEN 873 53 70 - USN MR AND MRS JAMES

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RADIO LOG

AGENCY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
2222	T.....00000....L....E HUSTON BAYDEN 1411 ALSTON HUSTON TEXAS CT1 CURTIS A. CRAVES 519 58 24 USN MR AND MRS BURTRON D. CRAVES 13211 ORANGE FORTH LAURDERDALE FLA. CT3 DIAMERROPH RO MIRCRRAF USN 778 82 75-18 AL DUBLIN LANE WAQUCKKEEPSIE NEW YORK CTCN JAMES L LENAU USN 997 55 58 MR AND MRS LEANDER JOSEPH LENAU 735 EAST STATESTREET UNION MISSIOURI (MARIE) CTC RAYLOND E LIND USN 571 13 74 MRS CAY LINN 33 CARAVAGGIO SCALA D. APT 39. NAPLES ITALY- RS DE FF CA AFTER ITALY K DE R S SAY AGAIN AA ITALY - CTCN DAVID W. MARLBOROUCH B16 04 86 USN MR WILLIAM J. MARLBOROUCH 92 VANNAIS STREET SPRINGFIELD MASSM. CTSN CARL C. NYGREN USN 788 3716 MR ARVID CARL NYGEN 3512 TUSCOA ST. SEAFORT N.Y. CTC MELVIN DOUGLAS SMITH USM 493 95 96 MRS JUDITH ANN SMITH 304 MORENO COURTS WARRENGTON FLA. FF DE RS H/C K DE FF CDT IT K
2248	RS DE FF R CA ALL AFER FLA K RS DE FF R FF DE RS K RS DE FF THIS MISSING IN ACTION OR WOUNDED IN ACTION K DE R S LIST IS OF PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION K AA FLA K DE RS AA FLA 99797 91 MR WILLIAM RAY THORTON 215 NORTH RACE STREET SPRINGFIELD OHIO CT2 A.P. MENDLE USN 777 62 87 NO NEXT OF KIN KNOWN CT1J.M LUPTON 511 21 28 USN NO NEXT OF KIN KNOWN PHILLIP CHARLES TIEDTKTK USN 914 32 84 MR ARTHUR L. TIEDTKE 16 30 ETHEL COURT MODESTO CALIF CT1 FREDRICK JAMES [illegible] USN 236 31 86 MRS AUDREY JANE WALTON 2735 MILITARY ROAD

DATE	PAGE NO.

James M. Emmons Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

AGENCY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
CONSIXTHFLT	BEST RM3	2	BELMONT	11255 KCS.

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
	E	NIAGRA FALLS ,NEW YORK CT1 JOHN CALEO SMITH JR. USN 237 77 94 MRS SANDRA ANN SMITH 23A RONDES BURY ROAD N.W.6 LONDON CPL ED WARD E. REHMEYER USMC 21 20 919 MRS AND MR. EDWARD E REHMEYER JR. BOX NR 4 RAILROAD PENNA.
	FF DE RD	IMI
	DE FF	K
	RS DE FF	K
	RS DE FF	K
	FF DE RS	REQ U CORR CT2 RICHARD W KEENE SR 20 18-MR RICHARE WALTER RICHARD WLATER KEENE SR K
	RS DE FF	BELEIVE U BEING CALLED BY DG K
	RS DE FF	R U MSG THROUGH PENNA BELEIVE U BEING CALLED BY DG ON RED K
	FF DE RS	R -REQ CORR 3. A EDITIONAL AVAILABLE DETAILS WILL BE SUBMITTED ASAP REQ CINCNAV NOTIFY NEXT OF KIN K
	FF DE RS	ALL AT THIS TIME K
	RS DE RF	R U MSG AR
	DC DE FF	K
	FF DE DC	ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH RS PRESNT POSIT WILL ADVISE PRESENT EXT WHEN GET RS PRESENT LOCATION K
	DG DE FF	K
	DE DG	K
	DG DE FF	I HAVE RS 0100 POSIT DO U WANT K
	DE DG	C K
	DG DE FF	NUCO PSDM UNNUCO NUCO BV VS BR UNNUCO COURSE 000PD 10 KTS K
	FF DE DG	R AR
2359Z	END OF RADIO DAY 08 JUNE 67 PERARSON RM2	

DATE	PAGE NO.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY	OPERATOR	CREW	CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY
COMSIXTHFLT	PEARSON PT2	STAD	HI-COMM	6720

TIME	TRANSMISSION	
0001Z	NES RADIO DAY FOR 09 JUNE 67 PEARSON AND EARLS ON WATCH	
0045	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME	
0050	NOTHING COPIED FROM RS AT THIS TIME	
	FF DE DF	K
	DE DE DG	RS DRT HUDO UP DU FU [illegible] HUDO DU FR DO L[illegible] UNABLE 2498 WHE AIRCRAFT IN XXXA AREA UNABLE TO BLOCK FOR FREQUENCE IN DUE TO GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS ETA STILL 0600Z
	DG DE FF	R AR
0130	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME	
0135	NOTHING COPIED UP TO THIS TIME FM RS	
0145	NOTHING HEARD FM RS	
0200	NOTHING HEARD FM RS	
0215	NOTHING HEARD FM RS	
0230	NOTHING HEARD FM RS	
0236	RS DE FC	K
	FC DE RS	K
	RS DE FC	LOUD AND CLEAR AR
0247	DE HD	REQ EUCOM PAO FOR IMM RESP REF MY 081702Z
		67 REST OF MSG ON PAPER VIA O/W FM FANFAIR
0315	QSY HI-COMM TO E4.4D...MM..	
0325	ANY STA THIS NET DE RS	REQ LONG COUNT FOR RECVR TUNING
	DE FC	LONG COUNT GIVEN K
	RS DE FC	K
0326	RS DE CP	K
0328	CP DE RS	U ARE WEAK BUT READABLE K
0329	DE FF	COUNTING FOR RECVER TUNING AND XMITTER ID
	RS DE FC	RAD CK K
	FC DE CP	K
	CP DE FC	K
	FC DE CP	WEAK AND READABLE INT U INCREASE POWER K
0340	SHIFTING MITTER ON 1400	
0342		BACK UP ON HI-COMM
	DE RS	REQ FIRST HELO BRING WEBR
		AA G
	BC DE RS	AA BT - UNCLAS FIGURES 1. REFERENCE MY 082202Z
		REQ ADD FOLLOWING LIST TO DEAD SM GARY BLANCHARD
		771 77 22 MR EARL T. BEARCHARD

DATE	PAGE NO.
09 JUNE 67	ONE

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

* RADIO LOG

ACTIVITY: CO SIXTHFLT	OPERATOR	DRW	CKT/AT	FREQUENCY

TIME	TRANSMISSION
0412Z	2279 SOUTH PARKWAY WITCHITA KANSAS
	DE PS 2. R F HY 082200Z DEC AND FOLLOWING LIST
	OF MISSING- JUDY LEWIS PAGER SST NBR 1694002
	SHERRY S YAPER 477 WEST SST DELIEF, TARRY TER
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	ZNJ WHEEL TO OTTO K
	DE PS STANDING BY AR
0415	SCH DE BP R/BP ALSO ROG K
	CP DE FF K
	FF DE FC K
	FC DE D K
	D DE FC K
	D DE D REQ ASSURE GUARD TO ALERT NETS
	D DE FC R AR
0417	CP DE FC RDO OK K
	RS DE FC RDO OK K
	RS DE CP K
	CP DE RS K
	RS DE CP GA TO FC K
	CP DE RS R -0-090355Z FM USS LIBERTY TO CINCNAV=INFO P
	BUPERS CHIEF BUMED NAVAL FINACE CENTER CLEV,
	COMFIVE-CNO-COMUSNAVEUR-CINCLANTFLT-COMSIXTH
	FLT-COMSERVLANT-COMSERVPOM 8-BT CP DE TR S H/C
	SO FAR K
	RS DE CP REQ SAY AGAIN AA FM K
	CP DE RS R -AA FM [illegible] PS ETC.....
	(IMMED PRIOR
	RS DE ##AA CEAN [illegible] FIVE'S WILL ZOF K
	CP DE RS WILL PASS TO A K
	A DE RS NAVY GRV K
	AA NAV FINACE CENTER CLEV. - COMFIVE-CNO-
	CINCUSNAVEUR-CINCLANTFLT-COMSIXTHFLT-COMSERVL/
	ANT-COMSERVPOM 8-BT A TE PS H/C SO FAR K
	RS DE SA R GRV K
	A DE RS AA BT- UNCLAS 1. REF UY 082200Z- REQ ADD FOLL-
	OWING TO LIST OF DEAD NAVY RAY BLANCHARD- 771
	77 22 NR EARL T. [illegible] 2279 SOUTH PARKWAY
	WITCHITA KANSAS 2 TE PS H/C SO FAR K
	RS DE REQ REQ FROM 22 TO BLANCHARD K
	A DE PS R- 22 TO BLANCHARD- 22 EARL T. BLANCHARD
	[illegible] TE PS H/C [illegible] K
	[illegible] R REQ [illegible] K/KANSAS K
	[illegible] DE PS [illegible] KANSAS- 2. REF UY 082200Z DEC AND FOLLOWING
	TO LIST OF MISSING JUDY LEWIS PAGER SST NBR
	1199477Z SHERRY S. YAPER 477 OAKD LEJEUNE
	SENT TO T*/CE SST DELEE TARRY TERRY

DATE	PAGE NO.

James M. Eneg... Research Papers

OPNAV FORM 5010-1 (Rev. 11-38) Continued

Time	Transmission
	CE A DE RS K
	RC DE ULCER POSSIBLE CORP-
	LEWIS HAPER- 199 44-----
	NEXT OF KIN NOT AVAILABLE -BT END OF MESSAGE
	UC DE RS ST CP DE RS K
	IMI AA TERROR K
	CP DE U C K
	[illegible] DE CP FOR CORP-
	CP DE U [illegible] REST- RELIEF K
0442Z	CP DE FC K

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OPNAV FORM 3144-1 (9-64)
0103 214 4190

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SHIP WEATHER OBSERVATION SHEET

USS Liberty AGTR-5 DATE (GMT) Thursday 8, June 19 67

AT/PASSAGE FROM Rota, Spain TO OPS - AREA

TABLE 1

TIME (GMT)	WINDS ☐ ✓ IF ESTIMATED: Direction (True)	Force (Knots)	VISIBILITY (Miles)	WEATHER (Symbols)	BAROMETER (Inches)	TEMPERATURE (Degrees and tenths): Dry Bulb	Wet Bulb	CLOUDS: Amount (Tenths)	Height	Type	SEA WATER TEMP. (Degrees and tenths)	SEA WAVES: Direction (True)	Period (Seconds)	Height (Feet)	SWELL WAVES: Direction (True)	Period (Seconds)	Height (Feet)
00	325	7	10	CLR	29.90	—	—	—	—	—	72	—	—	—	—	—	—
01	310	5	10	CLR	29.89	—	—	—	—	—	72						
02	297	6	10	CLR	29.89	—	—	—	—	—	72		CALM		CALM		
03	316	8	10	CLR	29.90	—	—	—	—	—	72		CALM		CALM		
04	334	9	10	CLR	29.91	—	—	—	—	—	72		CALM		CALM		
05	315	10	10	CLR	29.91	—	—	—	—	—	72		CALM		CALM		
06	320	8	10	CLR	29.91	—	—	—	—	—	72		CALM		CALM		
07	130	4	10	CLR	29.93	—	—	—	—	—	74		"		"		
08	315	5	10	CLR	29.93	—	—	—	—	—	74		"		"		
09	357				29.93	—	—	—	—	—	74		"		"		
10	290	7	10	CLR	29.93	—	—	—	—	—	74		"		"		
11	265	7	10	CLR	29.90	—	—	—	—	—	74		CALM		CALM		
12																	
13																	
14																	
15																	
16																	
17																	
18																	
19																	
20																	
21																	
22																	
23																	

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

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SHIP

VA-64

Attack Squadron Sixty-Four is a light jet attack squadron equipped with Douglas A4c "SKYHAWK" aircraft. The squadron is skilled in the delivery of all types of special and conventional weapons. VA-64 is commanded by CDR [illegible] C. Spayde, Jr., USN, who relieved CDR J. E. Kneale, USN, in June.

When not deployed, VA-64 is homebased at NAS [illegible] Field, Florida.

SENT BY
WAYNE KYLE
POB 1171
PALMDALE, CAL
93550

VA-64 PARTICIPATED IN
ABORTED LATE RESCUE
ATTEMPT FROM
USS AMERICA





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REPORT OF THE JCS
FACT FINDING TEAM

USS LIBERTY INCIDENT

8 June 1967

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

27 MAY 1982
Ref: 82 DPOI-615

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in response to your May 18, 1982 Freedom of Information Act request for a copy of the Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967.

A copy of the report is enclosed. Portions have been excised as they are currently and properly classified and therefore exempt from disclosure under the provisions of 5 USC 552(b)(1). The Initial Denial Authority is Major General Charles W. Dyke, U.S. Army, Vice Director, Joint Staff.

I am required by law to advise you of your right to administratively appeal the decision that has denied you part of this document. Such an appeal should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Pentagon, Washington, D. C. 20301 and should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" on the envelope. Your appeal must offer justification for reversal of the initial denial and must be received by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) no later than 45 working days after receipt of this letter. A copy of this letter should be included (if one was provided).

Sincerely,

Charles W. Hinkle
Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosure

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At approximately 1210Z, 8 June 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) was attacked by Israeli aircraft in the vicinity of 31°-23'N, 33°-25'E. This position was about thirteen (13) miles from the Minaret at El Arish, which was bearing 142°T. LIBERTY was attacked subsequently by Israeli motor torpedo boats at or about 1253Z, 8 June 1967, and was severely damaged. LIBERTY's mission was governed by directives emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Pursuant to orders approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Fact Finding Team of five members was constituted from the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ... examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1 June to 8 June 1967 which terminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) on 081210Z June 1967."

3. Major General Joseph J. RUSS, USA, was designated senior member. Terms of Reference were also provided. (See Annex A, Part IV)

4. The Fact Finding Team began its examination before the formal approval of the Terms of Reference on the oral authority of the Director, Joint Staff. The activities visited and the persons interviewed are listed in Annex B, Part IV, conforming to the following schedule:

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Date	Place/Activity	
Friday 9 June	Washington, D. C.	Preliminary preparations
Saturday 10 June	Washington, D. C.	Director, J-3 Deputy Director for Reconnaissance J-3 [illegible] and [illegible] Representative
Sunday 11 June	Washington, D. C.	Study and continued preparations
Monday 12 June	Washington, D. C.	Service action officers Mr. Pat [illegible] White House Staff
Tuesday 13 June	London; enroute Stuttgart, Germany	USNAVEUR USEUCOM
Wednesday 14 June	Stuttgart; enroute COMSIXTHFLT	USEUCOM
Thursday 15 June	On board USS LITTLE ROCK	COMSIXTHFLT
	Enroute and at Malta	USS LIBERTY; Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry; and COMSIXTHFLT
Friday 16 June Saturday 17 June	Enroute and in London	USNAVEUROOM Senior member, Naval Court of Inquiry
Sunday 18 June	Enroute	
Monday 19 June Tuesday 20 June	Washington, D. C.	Senior Aide, Office of CNO; Dep Dir for Reconnaissance; CDO(ONOC)

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5. Inasmuch as the Fact Finding Team was not a legal investigative body, in conducting its examination the Fact Finding Team observed the following constraints:

a. Interviews were not conducted under oath.

b. Individuals were not warned of their rights nor designated as interested parties.

c. Interference with the Naval Court of Inquiry was avoided.

d. Impact upon LIBERTY's personnel was held to a minimum.

e. Representatives of the military services were invited to accompany the team; Captain W. CRAVEN, Office of Chief Naval Operations (OP-03R) and Captain C. A. TURNER, Staff CINCUSNAVEUR, did accompany the team throughout the European itinerary.

6. No insurmountable difficulties were encountered. However, note is made of the following:

a. Travel to Asmara is extremely difficult. As a consequence, determination of pertinent facts originating at that location were obtained by telephone and/or by message.

b. The focus of damage and destruction in LIBERTY was on the bridge and in the communications facilities. Consequently, there were no records or communications files surviving which could be examined, nor were there any surviving key communications personnel available who had direct knowledge and reliable power of recall. For this reason the Fact Finding Team accepted such information as the Navy Court of Inquiry had been able to deduce and which was provided by the senior member, Navy Court of Inquiry.

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c. The Fact Finding Team received JCS message 7[illegible]6, DTG 142258Z June on 15 June on board Flagship, [illegible]. This message advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the precept to the Fact Finding Team, and that it had added to the Terms of Reference a requirement to "...incorporate in your report any official US public statements which bear on your findings." Actions to comply with this necessitated obtaining pertinent information and material by other than direct interview in some instances.

7. Compilation of all known official US public statements has been completed. Careful review of these statements reveals that none have a bearing on the findings presented herein. In view of this fact, they are not included as a part of this report but are retained on file in the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group.

8. In Part II, Section I, the Findings of Fact are amplified by discussion. The discussion is provided as a device for making available various opinions which cannot be categorically stated as facts but which contribute to a fuller understanding of the situation relating to the incident under study.

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PART II

FINDINGS OF FACT

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SECTION 1

PERTAINING TO COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIONS

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FINDINGS OF FACT

[redacted] OF OPERATIONAL AND CONTROL AUTHORITY

1. During May 1967, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) had been operating off the West African coast under the operational control of [redacted], a subordinate command of [redacted].

DISCUSSION:

This is the normal command control arrangement for technical research ships (TRS) under the administrative command chain in the Atlantic.**

a. [redacted]

DISCUSSION:

a. USNS VALDEZ, as a USNS ship manned by a civilian crew, was not placed under operational control of a USEUCOM subordinate commander.

b. Deployment of USS LIBERTY is the first instance of the operation [redacted] in the Mediterranean under the operational control of the area commander since the Cyprus incident.

[redacted] (See Tab 3)
[redacted] 5838, DTG 052235Z November 65. (See Tab 1)

NOTE: ANNEX C, PART IV, CONTAINS ALL MESSAGES REFERRED TO HEREIN.

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[illegible] Subsequent to approval by the JCS/JRC, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 303 Committee, the JCS/JRC, through COMSERVRON 6,* initiated movement of USS LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean by way of Rota, Spain. USS LIBERTY arrived Rota on 31 May where her logistics were completed. CONTROLT publications delivered, repairs effected and special technical equipment and personnel boarded.

[illegible]:

[illegible]pproval procedure is designed to insure that military implications and capabilities, as well as diplomatic and international political risks and ramifications, are fully weighed.

b. The stop at Rota was required to insure USS LIBERTY would have available the necessary operational and logistics support information providing for coordination and support of her operations in the area.

c. Enroute Rota USS LIBERTY had experienced machinery derangements to the propulsion system and to a significantly important antenna.

d. It was also necessary to provide augmentation of capability by special technical equipment required by her mission; [redacted] personnel also joined at Rota. [redacted]

*COMSERVRON 6 MSG, DTG 240020Z May 67. (See Tab 4)

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4. In my May [redacted] submitted five (5) proposed operating areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and recommended that USS LIBERTY operate in Operation Area 1 (33°-31E to 3-E ; further, that adjustment in closest points of approach to land and adjustments in the operating areas should be changed as necessary for operational and safety reasons. See Chart 1, Annex E, Part III.

RECOMMENDATION:

Not applicable.

5. Commanders were made aware of this deployment as information addressees on sailing orders issued by COMSERVRON 8 to USS LIBERTY to go to the Eastern Mediterranean.

DISCUSSION:

a. Conversations with the respective commanders indicate that this was the extent of knowledge each had regarding the ship's mission.

[redacted]

b. It would appear that custom and usage may have enabled this sort of intercommand exchange in [redacted] channels to become compartmented. Close monitorship should be exercised over these staff activities by the commander in view of the unusual degree of confidence reposed in these highly-technical, specialized personnel.

[redacted] COMSERVRON 8 MSO, DTG 240020Z May 67. (See Tab 4)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

6. On 1 June 1967, the JCS/JRC directed* USS LIBERTY to proceed to operational control of USCINCEUR upon entering Rota and this was accomplished. USCINCEUR, in turn, requested** CINCUSNAVEUR to assume operational control as USS LIBERTY passed sea buoy inbound to Rota.

DISCUSSION:

a. This action is consistent with previous policy guidance disseminated*** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which outlined, among other things, that operational control would be effected by the cognizant unified and specified commander through the Naval component commander to a specific fleet or force commander.

b. It was further noted that the procedures for developing schedules for the USS LIBERTY while in the USCINCEUR area of responsibility were specifically outlined**** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 June 1967.

7. . . On 1 June USCINCEUR informed# the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the expected ready for sea date (1 June) of USS LIBERTY and requested guidance with respect to schedule, operating areas, and any special requirements. He also instructed CINCUSNAVEUR to establish procedures to insure daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) and Planned Intended Movement (PIM) reports as required by current reconnaissance reporting instructions. CINCUSNAVEUR so instructed USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

This reflects the unfamiliarity with a TRS capability and its performance (i.e., the imposition of transmitting require-

*JCS MSG 6499, DTG 291602Z May 67. (See Tab 7)
**USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 300932Z May 67. (See Tab 11)
***JCS MSG 5838, DTG 052235Z November 65. (See Tab 1)
****JCS MSG 7206, DTG 062050Z June 67. (See Tab 35)
#USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 010035Z June 67. (See Tab 14)

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of the LIBERTY, but completely prudent for other types of Naval ship operations".

c. [redacted], assuming operational control of USS LIBERTY on 31 May, instructed* the ship to enter Rota for fuel and loading of technical material and personnel and, when ready for sea on 1 June, to depart for the Eastern Mediterranean. General instructions were given pertaining to steering in international waters and to communications matters. Technical operations were directed in accordance with technical specifications to be issued separately.

Comment:

a. This directive associates with routine operational matters; [redacted]

It is difficult to see how the military judgment of a commander can be exercised without this knowledge.

b. From this message, it is not obvious that "technical direction" would not flow from the commander [redacted] and that the commander would not be knowledgeable of such direction.

d. On 1 June, the JCS/JRC provided** [redacted] with USS LIBERTY's schedule. This directed USS LIBERTY depart Rota 2 June when ready for sea and proceed during period 2-6 June via Gibraltar Straits thence via Northern African Coastal route to 34N-32E. Closest point of approach to Spain, Tunisia, Sardinia,

*[redacted], DTG 311750Z May 67. (See Tab 13)
**JCS MSG 0724, DTG 011545Z June 67. (See Tab 15)

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...Crete, Algeria, and Libya were stipulated. Thereafter, ... to operate in Operation Area 2 subject to 12.5 NM closest point ... Egyptian, United Arab Republic and 6.5 NM closest point of ... Israel.

DISCUSSION:

a. This schedule is complete in itself and does not explain the rationale supporting the route or operating position selected.

[redacted] was being sent in direct support of the SIGINT requirements, as well as those of CINCUSNAVEUR and USCINCEUR. In discussion with these commanders, all disclaimed knowledge of this aspect other than to speculate that, in the course of events, [redacted] None felt that USS LIBERTY was available to be responsive to tasks directly imposed by himself.

b. USCINCEUR passed* action to CINCUSNAVEUR, who directed** USS LIBERTY to proceed as instructed in the schedule previously provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was issued by CINCUSNAVEUR who had delayed action pending receipt of a report from USS LIBERTY that repairs to an antenna had been completed. When so reporting, USS LIBERTY also advised*** that she would depart [redacted], 2 June, and proceed at best speed.

DISCUSSION:

In the light of future events, the words in USS LIBERTY's report "proceed at best speed," in accordance with previous

*USCINCEUR MSG, DTG 012030Z June 67. (See Tab 19)
**CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 020717Z June 67. (See Tab 21)
***USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021132Z June 67. (See Tab 22)

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instructions, are significant. However, this is a significance not readily apparent to readers on 2 June in view of USS LIBERTY's subsequent movements to comply with her understanding of the urgency of her employment reflected in COMSER/ROU 6 Movement Directive "...best possible speed." The team was informed that the Commanding Officer of USS LIBERTY stated that this was the first instance in which he had ever been ordered to use best speed.

11. USS LIBERTY departed* Rota at 1111Z, 2 June. Her movement report conformed to her ordered track and indicated a speed of advance of 15 kts with an estimated time of arrival at Operation Area 3 (32N-33E) of 0300Z on 8 June; thereafter, to operate within a circle of 50 miles radius. This report also advised that USS LIBERTY would guard NAVCOMSTA Morocco teletype broadcast until 0001Z on 7 June when a shift to the NAVCOMSTA Greece teletype broadcast would be made.

DISCUSSION:

Commands received this movement report and compared the intention with the track USS LIBERTY had been directed to follow - no significant disagreement was apparent. Thereafter, despite unavailability of daily Position Reports (POSIT reports), assumption persisted that USS LIBERTY would be and was where such projections indicated. (This becomes significant on 7 June when USS LIBERTY's 070800Z POSIT report** is received and indicates USS LIBERTY is about one day ahead of assuming commencement of her 9 June assignment.)

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

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12. USS LIBERTY reported* its 2400Z position on 2 June and also reported passing three Soviet ships steaming in column. In this report to CINCUSNAVEUR, and various information addressees, USS LIBERTY cautioned that daily situation and position reports might be delayed to avoid transmitting at times which could have a deleterious effect on the execution of the primary mission. This was received by CINCUSNAVEUR 031133Z.

DISCUSSION:

a. The caveat that mission performance could preclude transmitting routine general service communications seems to have lulled all echelons into accepting non-receipt of position reports.

b. Such surveillance platforms must suspend technical operations when transmitting; therefore it is customary practice to select suitable operational opportunities to effect the transmission of outgoing traffic in least time. This normally, does not affect the operations of the ship, especially in a peacetime environment.

13. CINCUSNAVEUR advised** COMSIXTHFLT and the SIXTHFLT Service Force Commander on 3 June that USS LIBERTY would conduct extended, independent [redacted] operations in the Eastern Mediterranean pursuant to the schedule of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, inter alia, and indicated the requirement that logistic support be provided by those commanders. Pertinent instructions were to be provided USS LIBERTY by COMSIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

This message is consistent with their correct understanding that the effected commands had a support role only and not one extending to active control of USS LIBERTY's movements.

* USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 022108Z June 67. (See Tab 24)
** CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 031016Z June 67. (See Tab 25)

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14. COMSIXTHFLT indicated his desire to visit the USS LIBERTY. However, previous instruction had been issued stating that association of the SIXTHFLT with the USS INTREPID should be avoided. Based on this precedent, this visit to the USS LIBERTY was not accomplished.

DISCUSSION:

When USS LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT, the latter wanted to board her to see what he could do for her and what she could do for him in other than [redacted].

15. On 5 June, hostilities between Israel and the United Arab Republic broke out.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

16. On 5 June CINCUSNAVEUR cancelled previous geographical guidance for employment of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 6C) and instructed* that the Task Force ships and aircraft be operated no closer than 100 NM from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria, and United Arab Republic and no closer than 25 NM from the coast of Cyprus. Other Task Forces to be addressed separately. It was explained that this was dictated by consideration which made it desirable to complicate the situation for the Russian warships moving into or in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as to improve the fleet's posture for tasks relating to the Israeli-United Arab Republic hostilities which might be imposed by higher authority. COMSIXTHFLT promulgated** orders to carry out the above to SIXTHFLT units that day (5 June).

* CINCUSNAVEUR MSG, DTG 051352Z June 67 (See Tab 26)
** COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 052015Z June 67 (See Tab 29)

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[illegible]:

3. This directive accommodated COMSIXTHFLT desire to [illegible] order to pursue necessary and routine training without, in any way, making it possible for such normal routine activity to be misinterpreted by the Middle East belligerents or by the Russians. The "broad benefit" as [illegible] stated.

4. COMSIXTHFLT stated that this was the day he expected higher authority would have notified USS LIBERTY's orders in the interest of her safety; that had he not unequivocal operations control and concomitant understanding of USS LIBERTY's mission, he would have rendered such a judgment on 7 June. It was accepted that the mission was overriding. This right was reinforced by:

(1) USS LIBERTY's ordered positioning was consistent with the requirements of mission as [illegible].

(2) The fact of US neutrality and the operation of this unarmed naval vessel in international waters under such circumstances did not contribute to a feeling of apprehension.

(3) In the event evacuation or related other tasks were required of the SIXTHFLT, utilization of the [illegible]



(4) COMSIXTHFLT stated that had the USS LIBERTY been under his complete operations control, he too would have placed her where she was directed to operate in order to utilize her as envisioned in paragraph (3) above.

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17. . . On 6 June, CINCUSNAVEUR advised* COMSIXTHFLT that USS LIBERTY would be changed to his operational control at 070001Z, 7 June, "in order to facilitate area command and control" and satisfy any "requirement for protection." COMSIXTHFLT was instructed to operate USS LIBERTY in accordance with the schedule issued** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to derive maximum benefit from USS LIBERTY's [redacted] capabilities. Authorization was also granted to modify the above mentioned schedule for safety reasons as dictated by the local situation. In this multiple-addressee message, USS LIBERTY was directed to change to COMSIXTHFLT operational control at 070012Z. [redacted] USS LIBERTY was also informed that no position reports had been received since the 022400Z June report. USS LIBERTY was directed to submit future reports of position as of 070012Z and to raise precedence of the reports to IMMEDIATE, modifying the USCINCEUR address to internal indicator for JRC."

DISCUSSION:

The above position report instruction changes were prompted by a request by USCINCEUR JRC, who notified CINCUSNAVEUR that USS LIBERTY situation and position reports were being considerably delayed due to competition with a large volume of other PRIORITY traffic. This change was designed to get these reports into the "quiet part of the radio day and to make them less competitive with the large volume of high precedence traffic that all NAVCOMSTAs in the area were being deluged with.

*CINCUSNAVEUR NSO, DTO 061357Z June 67. (See Tab 3C)
**JCS NSO 6724, DTO 011545Z June 67. (See Tab 18)

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18. At 2000Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY notified* the Movement Report Office, London, among others, that she would shift to the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at 0001Z, 7 June. At 2206Z, 6 June, USS LIBERTY reported** for operational control to COMSIXTHFLT, effective at 0001Z, 7 June. Among other things, she also reported fuel state and endurance. USS LIBERTY also appraised COMSIXTHFLT that Condition of Readiness THREE modified had been assumed and that self-defense capability was "limited to four .50 caliber machine guns and small arms."

DISCUSSION:

The significant content of this routine administrative action by USS LIBERTY is the overt inclusion of the description of her self-defense capability. The Commanding Officer stated that this was premeditated response intended as a tactful, although obtuse, reminder of USS LIBERTY's movement into the Eastern Mediterranean and into the focus of hostilities which the new geographical restrictions on SIXTHFLT in the CINCUSNAVEUR message had high-lighted.

19. On 6 June (about three hours after USS LIBERTY originated her reporting message and 29 hours prior to its receipt by COMSIXTHFLT) COMSIXTHFLT sent*** USS LIBERTY a message of instructions. This message referred to the Arab/Israeli situation and cited the unpredictability of United Arab Republic actions. It directed USS LIBERTY to conduct operations in accordance with the schedule provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR movement order and CINCUSNAVEUR sailing order. USS LIBERTY was directed to maintain a high state of

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062000Z June 67. (See Tab 33)
**USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 062036Z June 67. (See Tab 34)
***COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 062349Z June 67. (See Tab 36)

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readiness against attack or threat of attack and to report "any threatening or suspicious actions directed against her or any diversion from schedule necessitated by external threat. Advise if local situation dictates change in area of operation assigned by reference JCS schedule." Contact report requirements were defined. USS LIBERTY was also instructed to copy Morocco teletype broadcast and to utilize TF 60 tactical circuits as required "...although not assigned to TF 60." USS LIBERTY was required to ACKNOWLEDGE. This message was never brought to the knowledge of the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY.

DISCUSSION:

a. This message reflects a contradiction. Attention is invited to:

(1) The fact that it directs USS LIBERTY to copy the Morocco Fleet teletype broadcast;

(2) The fact that USS LIBERTY's original movement report advised* that she would shift to Azmara Fleet teletype broadcast at CHOP time (070001Z June).

b. USS LIBERTY did not receive the COMSIXTHFLT message. Consequently, USS LIBERTY did, in fact, shift to Azmara. However, there is no indication that this was a factor in the mis-handling errors in the communications of operational directives addressed to USS LIBERTY.

c. When USS LIBERTY failed to acknowledge this message, COMSIXTHFLT initiated tracer action through the ship-shore terminal to ascertain if it had been delivered. This was not completed prior to attack on USS LIBERTY, but did ascertain non-delivery for reasons cited in the section following, dealing with the flow of directives and analyses of the transmission modes.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 021330Z June 67. (See Tab 23)

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[illegible] to 31-16N, 28-54E and indicated a PIM of 16.[illegible] kts [illegible]. Thence stationary within [illegible] NM of 31-45N, [illegible]. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at [illegible]Z (an interval of [illegible] hours and 28 minutes after being transmitted by "USS LIBERTY").

DISCUSSION:

a. The various recipients received this as their first positive knowledge of USS LIBERTY's actual position. [illegible] Incidentally, in this report it is shown that because of PRIORITY precedence previously used for these reports, those reports for 3, 4, 5, and 6 June had been backlogged and delayed in delivery and in two instances, erroneously filed without delivery.

b. This indicated that USS LIBERTY had speeded up to the Movement Report Speed of Advance indicated on Departure Note; rather, USS LIBERTY had proceeded "at best speed" to arrive Operations Area 3 "as soon as practicable." The missing position reports contained the movement report adjustments indicating this.

c. By the time various JRCs received this information, the USS LIBERTY was almost one day ahead of the schedule promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by mid-afternoon on 7 June, Washington time, was nearing a closest point of approach 100 NM from the United Arab Republic and Israeli coasts. (See chart 2, Annex S, Part IV)

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 070908Z June 67. (See Tab 39)

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to satisfy technical requirements. No action resulted prior to attack on USS LIBERTY. (See chart 1, Annex I, Part IV)

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable other than to observe that this was overtaken by the attack on USS LIBERTY.

20. (C) About 2213Z, 7 June, the JCS/JRC notified** [redacted] information to various addressees including Chief Naval Operations, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT and USS LIBERTY) that USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to United Arab Republic was changed to 20 NM and closest point of approach to Israel was changed to 15 NM. It also advised that "...in view present situation Eastern Mediterranean, operation area specified in JCS schedule for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate.".

DISCUSSION:

a. This action was taken by message and it should be observed that it occurred only a short interval prior to a more significant JCS/JRC action sequence. It was consistent with established, approved routine and normal procedures set forth in SM 676-66*** and the JCS/JRC charter.

b. This change in USS LIBERTY's Schedule Track [redacted] was prompted by a question raised by Chief Naval Operations concerning the prudence of sending USS LIBERTY to a position so close to the area of hostilities.

[redacted]

**JCS MSG [redacted], DTG 072230Z June 67. (See Tab 42)
***Enclosure to JCS 2150/214-2, dated 19 August 1966

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not accompanied by a clarification of USS LIBERTY's mission without which no commander could have exercised military judgment.

23. About 072350Z June, and subsequent to discussions between representatives of JCS/JRC and Office of Chief Naval Operations, the Director, J-3, OJCS authorized Chief, JRC, to request USCINCEUR to apply the geographical restrictions of 100 NM closest point of approach to United Arab Republic and Israel, 25 NM closest point of approach to Cyprus, which were in effect on SIXTHFLT units, to USS LIBERTY. In view of the haste necessitated by USS LIBERTY's nearness to this geographical restriction, the JRC initiated a phone call to Headquarters, CINCUSNAVEUR.

DISCUSSION:

a. Early in the day Chief Naval Operations had raised a question concerning the ordered movement of USS LIBERTY. As a result of a query to JCS/JRC, he had been advised that technical reasons [redacted] were overriding. However, this did result in initiation of action to adjust the closest point of approach to 20 NM as indicated in the preceding fact. In view of the modified geographical restrictions of 100 NM on SIXTHFLT units and the inadequacy of the justification advanced by JCS/JRC, Chief Naval Operations again required his staff to press for modification of USS LIBERTY's movements, at least to conform to SIXTHFLT geographical restrictions.

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[illegible] arrived were not aware of the modified geographical restrictions which permitted SIXTHFLT units to operate to a 12½ NM closest point of approach. The same message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Chief Naval Operations had been received as follows:

CNO	JCS (JCS Msg Center)	Time Difference
071548Z	071630Z	42 minutes

The analysis of communications in Annex D, Tab [illegible], treats this incident in more detail. However, it is a fact that this is one of several instances. All indicate that Navy message processing procedures generally result in earlier delivery of the same message to Navy addressees than do the procedures in effect to and through the JRCC message center for serving the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Note that this change of closest point of approach of USS LIBERTY to 100 NM occurred only about one hour after the 20 NM modification to USS LIBERTY's schedule.

24. JCS/JRC Duty Officer placed the call via secure voice and contacted CINCUSNAVEUR Operation Duty Officer, who was requested to have USS LIBERTY comply with COMSIXTHFLT message, DTG 071530Z, which restricted SIXTHFLT units to remain beyond 100 NM of Israel and United Arab Republic coast and 25 NM from Cyprus. Brevity of time was explained as the reason for the call. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer advised that they would get the message right out to SIXTHFLT.

DISCUSSION:

a. In CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters there are three co-located duty officers:

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these watch personnel come under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff (J-6).

b. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer was the watch officer exercising cognizance over [redacted]

c. Unlike the previous procedure, this action was contrary to customary usage in that it:

(1) By-passed the USCINCEUR's JRC in going directly to the component headquarters.

(2) Employed voice communications, vice record communications, to initiate an action.

(3) Was initiating an action orally on a watch-to-watch basis rather than passing information of intent to do so at a future time, which seems to have been usual practice.

25. The CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer informed the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and drafted an appropriate message for dispatch to COMSIXTHFLT as follow-up action in accordance with verbal assurance given to the JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Captain and the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer contacted the CINCUSNAVEUR Deputy Chief of Staff, advising him of the JCS/JRC phone call and the proposed course of action. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that release be deferred pending receipt of an authoritative indication that the JCS/JRC action had been officially approved (i.e., in this case, a Date-Time Group reference).

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response to oral communications from higher authority only if evidence of its official status were available. This was defined to mean:

(1) If transmitted by a flag/general officer;

(2) If evidence were provided that a record directive had, in fact, been approved AND released (such as an assigned message Date-Time-Group, cite number, etc.) and was beyond recall other than by official cancellation.

b. Staff personnel stated that use of a secure circuit nor use of an authenticator would have been an accepted substitute for this evidence of verification that the oral communications, from other than a flag/general officer, had been approved by an authority in the other headquarters.

26. In response to the order of the Deputy Chief of Staff, CINCUSNAVEUR, the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer placed a call to USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact with the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer who was advised that the JCS/JRC had verbally requested USS LIBERTY be moved (as indicated above) and advised that the Date-Time-Group of the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was required before he could take action on the request. The USEUCOM Command Duty Officer said he would call back.

At about the same time, the JCS/JRC Duty Officer called USEUCOM headquarters and was put in contact with the JRC watch officer, who was advised of the verbal request made to the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer. He explained that USCINCEUR had been by-passed in the interest of saving time; that CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "HAD promised to take action."

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Duty Officer's request. On the basis of the [illegible] Officer's call and his use of the word "had" in his message, both USEUCOM duty personnel assumed no further action was required.

DISCUSSION:

a. At USEUCOM headquarters the JRC is physically separated from the USEUCOM Command Center. These two facilities are in the same building but are on separate levels. There are the following key watch personnel:

(1) USEUCOM Command Duty Officer

(2) USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer

b. JCS/JRC Duty Officer employment of the word "had" in his conversation to USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer which informed him of action JCS/JRC assumed was in progress at CINCUSNAVEUR, based on the phone call contact with CINCUSNAVEUR's Operations Duty Officer, misled the USEUCOM Duty Officer into believing CINCUSNAVEUR had acted or would act. He took no further action.

27. Approximately three hours passed without action or additional communications between CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters and USEUCOM headquarters on this matter. Subsequently, CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer (CCDO) called USEUCOM headquarters and this time was put in contact with USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer. NAVEUR CCDO asked what action was being taken by USEUCOM headquarters. USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer answered by asking the same question of the CINCUSNAVEUR CCDO, i.e., what action was being taken by CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters. He was advised CINCUSNAVEUR action was being withheld pending

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requesting the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message or to provide an USEUCOM Date-Time-Group. The call terminated.

DISCUSSION:

Note carefully that unlike the initial call to USEUCOM, when the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer was reached, this call put CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer into contact with the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer.

28. Prompt action was then taken by the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer in contacting the JCS/JRC Duty Officer to obtain the Date-Time-Group of the JCS message. The requested information was promptly relayed to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer. Coincident with this event (080325Z) the JCS/JRC message was placed in the hands of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer.

DISCUSSION:

a. The expedition with which this required action was accomplished by USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was, of course, coincident with the eventual availability of the Date-Time-Group at the NMCC message center. It is possible that the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer might have obtained the JCS/JRC message Date-Time-Group had he been contacted initially instead of the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer. In assessing the NMCC message center procedure, some skepticism exists.

b. The fact is evident, however, that USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer, being more experienced in such matters, had a better appreciation of the urgency connected with this, as well as more intimate knowledge of the standard procedure for quick reaction adjustments to [redacted] operations.

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USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer, necessary action would have been set in motion precluding this delay of about three hours.

89. CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer directed a teletype conference with COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer be set up on secure teletype circuit. This was done by 0410Z and for the next thirty (30) minutes effort was made to pass the JCS/JRC message. Transmission difficulties resulting from atmospheric made this difficult and COMSIXTHFLT acknowledgement was not obtained until about 0804552. CINCUSNAVEUR also sent a confirmation message* which COMSIXTHFLT received at 0805182.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

90. COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer prepared a message to USS LIBERTY to carry out the JCS/JRC message direction. This was processed and ultimately ready for presentation to Assistant Chief of Staff (OPS) for release by 0630Z on 8 June. However, because of his preoccupation in activities with COMSIXTHFLT and his Chief of Staff in preparation for Secretary of Defense directed press conference, the message was not released until 0913Z. The message, although assigned an IMMEDIATE precedence, was not transmitted to NAVCOMSTA Morocco for relay to USS LIBERTY until 1035Z 8 June because of delays incident to transmission of other equal or higher precedence messages. USS LIBERTY did not receive this message.

*CINCUSNAVEUR WIFenote, DTG 0804552 June 67. (See Tab 49)
**COMSIXTHFLT MSG, DTG 0809172 June 67. (See Tab 53)

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directly to COMSIXTHFLT, that press and media representatives be thoroughly briefed on SIXTHFLT operations as part of the effort in progress to refute United Arab Republic allegations that the SIXTHFLT was actively supporting Israel. The briefing was to be conducted forenoon, 8 June, on the USS AMERICA and COMSIXTHFLT and his key staff officer had been engaged in preparations since 0600 local time.

31. The COMSIXTHFLT message to USS LIBERTY was received by NAVCOMSTA Morocco at 081053Z and delivered onward over Defense Communications System (DCS) to DCS Station Asmara (Army Communications Center, Asmara). DCS Station Asmara, through operator error, delivered the message onward to NAVCOMSTA Greece. NAVCOMSTA Greece sent it back, whereupon, it was delivered to NAVCOMSTA Asmara at 081510Z and placed on the teletype broadcast at 081525Z. USS LIBERTY's communications equipment had been destroyed in the meantime, during the attack.

DISCUSSION:

This is an over-simplified statement of the facts. The communications flow analysis (Annex D , Tab 6) highlights the situation existing at NAVCOMSTA Greece as a consequence of having to handle Foreign Broadcast Intercept Systen (FBIS) traffic. This is a non-military activity and it was dumping a high volume of high precedence traffic on NAVCOMSTA Greece, with an adverse impact on military communications.

32. USS LIBERTY's 080800Z POSIT/OTHREP report was the movement report indicating 31-34N, 33-30E and that USS LIBERTY would remain within 30 NM of that point. It was received by COMSIXTHFLT at 081120Z.

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Not applicable.

33. USS LIBERTY reported* by IMMEDIATE message, having been orbited by three DELTA Wing single-engine jet aircraft three times at 31-27N, 34-00E at 080650Z. These were not identified. Their altitude estimated to be 5,000 feet at two miles. USS LIBERTY stated that no amplifying report would be submitted. COMSIXTHFLT received this at 080920Z.

DISCUSSION:

COMSIXTHFLT was not alarmed by this because USS LIBERTY's indication of no further reports was taken to mean that the overflight was routine and was not indication of any apprehension by USS LIBERTY. It is to be noted that at least one other report of overflight of USS LIBERTY by an aircraft earlier in the Mediterranean transit had been made by USS LIBERTY.

34. USS SARATOGA reported** at 081235Z that a FLASH message on the Navy High Command tactical voice circuit had been received from USS LIBERTY reporting, "I AM UNDER ATTACK. MY POSIT 33-25E, 31-23N. I HAVE BEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE." It was determined that USS LIBERTY had all antennas in this strafing attack.

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

*USS LIBERTY MSG, DTG 080742Z June 67. (See Tab 51)
**USS SARATOGA MSG, DTG 081235Z June 67. (See Tab 54)

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35. (C) At 081237Z, USS SARATOGA relayed a message* received from USS LIBERTY on CINCUSNAVEUR's Single Side Band circuit, reporting, "Unidentified gunboats approaching vessel now."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable; to fix time of event only.

36. NAVCOMSTA Greece relayed a USS LIBERTY message** to COMSIXTHFLT reporting, "At 081253Z we have been hit by a torpedo starboard side, listing badly, request assistance immediately."

DISCUSSION:

Not applicable.

*See Tab 55
**See Tab 56

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ADDITIONAL

RELATED FACTS

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CINCUSNAVEUR

COMSIXTHFLT

USCINCEUR/CNO/CINCLANTFLT/CTF SIX ZERO/
CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO/CTF SIX ONE/CTF SIX TWO/
USS ENTREPID/CTF SIX FOUR/CTF SIX THREE/

EASTMED OPS (U)

A. MY 202300Z MAY 67

1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A LARGER AND MORE SUITABLE OPERATING AREA FOR TF 60, THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PARA SIX, REF A ARE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. ROUTINE TRAINING OPERATIONS MAY BE CONDUCTED NORTH AND WEST OF THE LINE CONNECTING 36-00N9, 28-30E8 AND COAST OF LIBYA AT 23-00E5.

B. NO AIR OPS AUTH WITHIN ONE ZERO ZERO MILES OF THE UAR.

GP-3

N312

N3

DTG 271052Z MAY 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

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FROM: JCS DATE: 29 MAY 67 INFO:

TO: CINCLANT
USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSERVLANT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSERVRON 8
USS LIBERTY

JCS 6499 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

1. FOR CINCLANT: UPON PASSING SEA BUOY INBOUND ROTA O/A 31 MAY REQUEST CHOP LIBERTY OPCON USCINCEUR.

2. FOR USCINCEUR: UOPN ASSUMING OPCON REQUEST MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENT EASTERN MED. WILL PASS SKED ASAP. GP-4

DRAFTER: ED/JBH	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (DELTA)
DOCUMENT MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS		PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	ACI NR. 39498
ADD		ADD NR.
ACI		
DTG		DTG 291602Z MAY
SUSPENSE		

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

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

GO RUDLVD
DE RUEDSPAA216 1500001
[illegible]
[illegible] MAY 67
FM COMSERVRON EIGHT
TO RUTBP/USS LIBERTY
RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
INFO RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLVD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUEDAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

RUTBPC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUTVC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUEPBK/USCINCEUR
RUTBPE/COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT
BT

PAGE TWO RUEDSPAA016
A. MY 251500Z APR 67 NOTAL
B. CINCLANTFLT [illegible] MAY 67 NOTAL
1. FOR COMSERVLANT: ORIG TAKES REF B FORAC.
2. FOR LIBERTY: CANCEL THE UNEXECUTED PORTION OF REF A.
3. SHOP TO USCINCEUR ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
4. [illegible] CINCLANT/[illegible] AND CINCLANTFLT INFORMED YOUR [illegible].
OP-A
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION															
ACTION DEPARTMENT															
N3															
NSGS															

(PAGE 1 OF ____)

COM			
TOR			
SSN	30/[illegible]		
SSN			

DTG 30 [illegible] : MAY 67





(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2300/2 (REV 10-65)

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NNNNCZCKDA343ZCN7B082
PP [redacted]
DE RUFPBK 031 1501150
ZNY CCCCC
P 3[illegible]932Z MAY 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO [redacted]/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUFRF/[redacted]AIRMED

[redacted]ENAAA/CNO
PUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
PUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
PUEDNKA/COMSERVRON 8
[redacted]JUA/USS LIBERTY

ECJC/JRC 05586. USNAVEUR FOR N-32 SUBJ:
USS LIBERTY (U) REF JCS 6499 29/1602Z MAY 67 (NOTAL).
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF, REQUEST YOU ASSUME OPCON OF USS LIBERTY WHEN

PAGE 2 RUFPBK 031 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SHIP PASSES SEA BUOY INBOUND TO ROTA O/A 31 MAR 67 AND PREPARE FOR
EXTENDED OPERATIONS IN EASTERN MED. GP-4
BT



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CC 41



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FOR ,RC
CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCUSNAVEUR 7-67 (U)
A. [illegible] 3009322 MAY 67 NOTAL
B. CONSERVPAC EIGHT 2400202 MAY 67 NOTAL
C. CINCUSNAVEUR 3113512 MAY 67 NOTAL
D. CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 50-66(NOTAL
E. CINCUSNAVEURINST 4235.2D NOTAL
F. CINCUSNAVEUR/USCONMARLANTINST 02000.-B
(NOTAL
G. NAVEURPROP MANUAL OF 1 JUN 66 NOTAL
H. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03125.5B NOTAL

1. UPON SHIP TO CINCUSNAVEUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A, ENTER ROTA FOR FUEL AND LOADING TECHNICAL/LOGISTICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL SPECIFIED REF B,

2. UPON COMPLETION OF FUELING AND LOADING AFTER RECEIPT OF NAVEUR/SIXTHFLT MED PUBS BEING DELIVERED

22(5) ...CCC
021148 94(25) IP(7) FP(1) BFR(1)...

022400
056

CORRECTED REF ORIG SVC 311[illegible]/MAY67/MT/2

	PAGE	TIME OF ACCEPT	DATE TIME SENT
[illegible]	2	31/1941Z	3117502 MAY 67

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[illegible] JUNE: DEPART
[illegible] REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTENDED
[illegible] TO BE CONDUCTED IAW
[illegible] SEPARATELY.

[illegible] INTERNATIONAL WATERS DURING TRANSIT AND
[illegible] AT ENTION DIRECTED APPENDIX VIII, ANNEX
[illegible] FOR CLAIMS AND TERRITORIAL SEAS.

[illegible] 6.

[illegible] CONFIRMATIONS IAW REF F.
[illegible]

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VV KXC027ZCDKA009VV TVB004
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPBK 002 1520115
ZNY
O 010035Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUEPJS/JCS
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUDAC/USS LIBERTY

ECJC/JRC 08685. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-32 AND N-31. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A: USS LIBERTY 300608Z MAY 67 (NOTAL)
B: CINCUSNAVEUR 311790Z MAY 67
1. FOR JCS. REF A STATES THAT USS LIBERTY EXPECTS TO BE RFS 011400Z JUN 67 FROM ROTA. INTEND SHIP PROCEED TO EASTERN MEDITERRAN EAN WHEN READY AS OUTLINED REF B. AWAITING YOU GUIDANCE WITH ESPECT TO SCHEDULE, OPERATING AREA AND ANY SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
2. FOR USNAVEUR. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND ARRANGE FOR LIAISON OFFICER TO MEET USS LIBERTY WITH DOCUMENTS AS REQUESTED REF A. SCHEDULE AND OPERATING AREAS WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP. FURTHER REQUEST YOU ESTABLISH REPORTING PROCEDURE TO INSURE

PAGE TWO RUFPBK 002 S E C R E T
SITREPS AND PIM REPORTS FROM USS LIBERTY ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z DAILY, AND THAT ANY INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED ASAP IAW CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. GP-4.
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
NB

(PAGE 1 OF ____)
COR
TOR
SDA 01/0300
DNS

DTG 010035 JUN 67

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NAVEUR NCU LON 7100/3 (REV 10-65)

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NNNNVV KXC108ZCDKA015
OO RUDLKD
DE RUEPJS 07C 1520326
ZNY EEEEE
O 210309Z MAY 67 ZFF1 LEDGEND ZFF3.. INFORM ME WHEN THIS MESSAGE IS RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES ANS BY ABS
FM JCS
TO RUFPBK/USCCNCEUR
INFO RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT

RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUTPRC/COMSIXTTFLT
RUCIJUA/USS LIBERTY
BT
UNCLAS 6714 J3 SENDS.
SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)
REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD THE USS LIBERTY AT ROTA, SPAIN UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE.
BT

md500

ORIGINATOR SECTION	
ACTION DEPARTMENT	
CHRONOLOGY	
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DTG 010309 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LOR 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

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NNNNVVV KXCE98
ZZZZZKA0288730017TVV TVB009
OO RUDLKD
DE RUFPBK 811 1520430
ZNY
O 010418Z JUN 67
FM USCINCEUR
TO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEPJS/JCS

[redacted]

NEDAC/USS LIBERTY
BT

ECJC/JRC 08656. JCS FOR JRC, USNAVEUR FOR N-31 AND 32.
SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)
REF A JCS 6714, 018309Z MAY 67
B [redacted]

1. PER REF A, REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO HOLD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA PENDING ARRIVAL OF THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BEING PROVIDED BY DIRNAVSECGRU ACTION, AS OUTLINED REF B.
2. REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ WHEN PERSONNEL ARE ABORD AND SHIP'S PLANNED DEPARTURE TIME. GP-4
BT

NNNN

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

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N5G2

PAGE 1 OF

COM

TOR 0617/01

EOR

DOR

DTG 010419 JUN 67

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-63)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operations (J-3) in supervising worldwide reconnaissance activities. He is the principal agent assisting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising reconnaissance operational direction over the unified and specified commands. The Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), according to its charter, supports the Deputy Director for Reconnaissance, and is operated continuously under a JCS/JRC Duty Officer. The JRC is not organizationally under the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

The NMCC is operated under a Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) who is continuously on duty. For this reason there are five DDOs and flag/general officer rank personnel who rotate on duty.

Neither the JRC nor the NMCC is subordinate to the other. Their interrelationship is not formally spelled out.

DISCUSSION:

a. The JRC charter provides that it function under the authority and direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subject to the supervision and guidance of the Director, Joint Staff.

b. Because of the sensitivity and classification associated with the reconnaissance operations which it is required to "supervise," "coordinate," "monitor," and in some instances "control" in actual practice, the JRC is autonomous in relation to the NMCC. The same applies to the JRC at Headquarters, USEUCOM.

c. In both locations the JRCs are physically separate from the command centers.

d. It is important to note that all queries by higher authority regarding military operations, including incidents,

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are directed to the [illegible] in this case, had no knowledge of the operation of USS LIBERTY prior to the attack.

e. At Headquarters, USNAVEUR, the Operations Duty Officer is the Duty Officer having cognizance over reconnaissance operations. He is subordinate to the Command Center Duty Officer and the Duty Captain and is physically co-located within the Command Center.

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(JCS): Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124). See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL; CONTROL.)*

DISCUSSION:

While this term is used in assigning responsibility to a commander, in actual practice the direction of the platform's movements is controlled by another higher authority (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The commander's function, consequently, is not consistent with this definition and use of this term is a potential source of confusion and misunderstanding. It would seem that an early determination should be made either:

(1) To amend the procedure to make the commander's responsibility complete with respect to what operational command is customarily accepted to mean; or

* JCS Pub 1, page 139.

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te TRS and special operation ships only.

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SECTION 2

SUPPORTING JUSTIFICATION

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WITH THE USS LIBERTY

1. . . . The means of communications available for the issuance and transmission of operations directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY from 1 through 8 June 1967 were a combination of Defense Communications System (DCS) and Navy voice and teletype dedicated networks. Of particular note was the interrelationships of transferring messages from the DCS relay stations to the appropriate NAVCOMSTA dedicated networks.

2. The USS LIBERTY departed Rota, Spain, on 2 June 1967, with the following communications arrangements:

a. Copy Morocco fleet teletype broadcast to receive general service communications until 7 June 1967, at which time, shift to Asmara Navy teletype broadcast.

b. Transmit to any shore Naval Communications Station to deliver any outgoing general service messages.

c. Copy Morocco [redacted] broadcast to obtain [redacted] traffic.

d. Transmit to Morocco to deliver outgoing [redacted] Traffic.

e. Set up direct teletype communications [redacted] when position [redacted] is favorable.

3. . . . There were eight key messages pertinent to the USS LIBERTY incident of which four message directives were originated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four messages by subordinate commanders, carrying out the JCS directives. These messages contained instructions regarding the assigned operating

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paragraphs. Detailed analysis outlined in the tabs dealt only with key addressees. There were many other miscellaneous addressees on these messages.

4. On 29 May 1967,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to assume operational control of the USS LIBERTY upon arrival at Rota, Spain. Subsequent messages between USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USS LIBERTY indicate this message was received and operational control was assumed by USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and ultimately by COMSIXTHFLT on 7 June 1967.

5. On 1 June 1967,** the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to sail the USS LIBERTY on 2 June 1967 and established schedule and area of operation with a final position at 32°N, 33°E. This JCS directive also established closest points of approach to the United Arab Republic (UAR) of 13NM. The USS LIBERTY, in her 2 June 1967 position report*** indicated receipt of the JCS directive by stating her estimated arrival at the final destination (080300Z Jun 67).

6. Due to hostilities between the UAR and Israel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 7 June 1967,**** directed USCINCEUR by priority message to change the USS LIBERTY's closest point of approach to 20NM for the UAR and 15NM for Israel. Because it was mis ent to the Pacific by the Department of the Army Communications Center, this message was not received by the USS LIBERTY prior to attack.

REASON: Since a majority of US Navy Mobile Fleet messages are destined for the Pacific, local procedures in the Department of the Army Communicat .n Center allow direct transmission to the communications center serving the task

* JCS msg 6777/2916022 May 67 (Tab 7, Annex C)
** JCS msg 6724/0114452 June 67 (Tab 14, Annex C)
*** USS LIBERTY msg 022108Z June 67 (Tab 24, Annex C)
**** JCS msg 7337/0722302 June 67 (Tab 42, Annex C)

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Cheltenham, Maryland. After preliminary review of the message and noting a task force addressee, the routing clerk in the Department of the Army Communications Center assigned the San Miguel, Philippines routing indicator on the assumption that the addressee was in the Pacific. Detailed explanation of routing and delay times is contained in Tab 1, Annex D.

7. By immediate message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 June 1967,* directed USCINCEUR to cancel previous JCS directive establishing 20 nautical mile limit and established 100 nautical mile limit. This message was not received by the USS LIBERTY.

REASON: A series of personnel errors resulting in misrouting the message to the Pacific area for the same reason as stated for previous message in paragraph 6. Subsequent retransmissions were required which delayed the ultimate broadcast (after the attack) to the USS LIBERTY. Tab 2, Annex D, provides complete details of delay times and misrouted data.

8. While the previous paragraphs have dealt with the delivery of JCS message directives to the USS LIBERTY, the following paragraphs will outline subordinate command directives concerning USS LIBERTY operation.

9. On 6 June 1967, ** CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume operational control of USS LIBERTY at 070001Z June 1967 and further stated that operational area might be modified, for safety reasons, as dictated by the local conditions. This directive also requested that position reports be changed to "as of 1800Z" and upgraded to immediate precedence. The USS LIBERTY was instructed to "Chop" to COMSIXTHFLT at 070001Z.

* JCS msg 1947/080110Z June 67 (Tab 25, Annex C)
** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 061357Z June 67 (Tab 30, Annex C)

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by the USS LIBERTY in her message, also on 6 June 1967,* as she reported to COMSIXTHFLT acknowledging the change of operational control as of 070001Z.

10. The COMSIXTHFLT message on 6 June 1967,** instructed USS LIBERTY to change operational control to COMSIXTHFLT and provided instructions regarding threats of attack, logistical requirements, contact reports with unidentified or hostile ships/aircraft, and emergency action procedures. Specific instructions regarding communications procedures were also given. This message was probably undelivered to the USS LIBERTY since she shifted to the Asmara broadcast on 7 June 1967 as originally scheduled by her 2 June 1967 movement report (see Tab 24, Annex C).

11. USCINCEUR message on 8 June 1967,*** directed CINCUSNAVEUR to take for action the JCS directive changing the closest points of approach to UAR and Israel to 100 nautical miles. Prior to dispatch of this message, various efforts had been made by telecon, voice and teletype, to pass the action and a copy of the JCS message directive to COMSIXTHFLT. This action was completed approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes prior to dispatch of USCINCEUR message. See Tabs 3 and 4, Annex D for analysis. Since direct circuits were used, the USS LIBERTY was not included in any of the telecon transmissions between CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT. The USS LIBERTY was an addressee on the USCINCEUR directive which was placed on the Asmara fleet broadcast at 081059Z. Since records were not available from the USS LIBERTY, receipt of the USCINCEUR message could not be confirmed. It should be noted, however, that this directive

* USS LIBERTY msg 062036Z June 67 (Tab 34, Annex C)
** COMSIXTHFLT msg 062349Z June 67 (Tab 36, Annex C)
*** USCINCEUR msg 080625Z June 67 (Tab 49, Annex C)

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[illegible] no mention of new geographical constraints, but only stated "This confirms reference a (telecon between USCINCEUR) to take reference b (JCS directive which was missent to the Pacific and not received by the USS LIBERTY) for action."

12. The final directive to be discussed is the COMSIXTHFLT instructions* establishing a new closest point of approach of 100 nautical miles to the UAR and Israel. The directive was in response to CINCUSNAVEUR action outlined in a message** relayed via telecon. After internal staffing and delay in preparation and transmission due to equal or higher precedence traffic, the COMSIXTHFLT message was broadcast to and received by NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco, approximately one and one-half hours prior to the attack on the USS LIBERTY. The NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco relayed via the DCS Major Relay at San Pablo, Spain, to DCS Major Relay (Army Communications Center) Asmara. Due to a personnel error, resulting in sending the message to NAVCOMMSTA, Greece, which sent it back for delivery to NAVCOMMSTA, Asmara, the message was not placed on the fleet broadcast until 061525Z, some three hours after the attack. It is apparent that the USS LIBERTY did not receive the message. (See Tab 5, Annex D)

13. The following paragraphs are designed to provide a basis for assessing the USS LIBERTY communications capability.

14. During the transit of the USS LIBERTY to its designated position, a quality communications product was being obtained, and criticomm special circuits to the communication shore station (Morocco) were good. The USS LIBERTY shifted from the Morocco broadcast to the Asmara broadcast at 0700012 in accordance with information given in USS LIBERTY movement report, DTG 021330Z.

* COMSIXTHFLT 060917Z June 67 (Tab 53, Annex C)
** CINCUSNAVEUR msg 060455Z June 67 (Tab 48, Annex C)

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[illegible] which has fewer customers, may provide better service, [illegible] be more responsive to rerun requests. This is a [illegible] fruitful procedure because Naval Communication Stations [illegible] these areas offer a larger choice of frequencies, are [illegible] simultaneously keyed, and cover a larger area of the Mediterranean, thus requiring fewer shifts of broadcasts. The crew aboard the USS LIBERTY verified the excellent quality of communications prior to the attack. Further attesting to this is the fact that only 14 out of approximately 1000 messages required a rerun on a one time [illegible]. Of these 14, only six were applicable to the USS LIBERTY. Of the six, three had previously been obtained, which indicates some lack of good record keeping.

15.

16. [redacted]

17. Although the attack resulted in a complete loss of communications, emergency restoration of HICOM voice capability was completed within minutes of the attack. All USS LIBERTY communications immediately after the attack were via HICOM voice network.

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SUBSECTION II

STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to and concurrent with the hostilities between the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Israel, traffic volume in the Mediterranean area communications stations almost doubled during the week prior to the USS LIBERTY incident. Naval Communication Station (NAVCOMMSTA) Greece particularly was loaded with large amounts of Flash and Immediate traffic. A special channel for Flash and Immediate message traffic to State Department Athens was set up from NAVCOMMSTA, Greece and soon became backlogged. During the period 5 - 10 June 1967 inclusive, records of the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center indicated that 610 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) messages were received. Of these, 317 were Operational Immediate and 15 were Flash, or 54% of the total 617. (See Tab 5, Annex D, for comparative analysis of message volume for 1 - 12 February and 1 - 12 June.)

2. The overall increased volume of high precedence message traffic, Operational Immediate and Flash, had a direct bearing on the ability to transmit instructions to the USS LIBERTY. Specifically, the COMSIXTHFLT Communications Center had seven Operational Immediate and one Flash message which were in station at the time of release of COMSIXTHFLT message 080917Z to the USS LIBERTY regarding new constraints on geographical limits of operation. Other communications centers at other locations had the same situation existing. Directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the delay in delivery of the 7 June USS LIBERTY position report was due to high precedence communications. For this same reason

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[illegible] for 3, 4 and 5 June were also delayed. The [illegible] delays or non-receipt of position reports, it was assumed by all echelons that the USS LIBERTY was on schedule and proceeding to on-station location, while in actuality, the ship was on station nearly one day in advance of initially established arrival time.

3. Originators of messages destined for the European area raised the precedence of their traffic to improve delivery time. Many high precedence messages contained large numbers of addressees, thereby delaying rapid delivery. Some operation orders sent by electrical means were very lengthy (i.e., 13AF Seymour Johnson AF Base 00349/301730Z May, 28 pages, 32 addressees; and CINCAFSTRIKE 88847/2800512 May, 46 pages, 81 addressees). Very lengthy messages tend to clog communication circuits causing backlogs of equal and lower precedence traffic. The principles of communication economy demand that originators use the lowest precedence permittible, use as few addressees as are necessary, and be brief and concise. Application of these principles help preserve the integrity of communication networks, permits more rapid delivery of all traffic and reduces possible backlog delays; however, in this Middle East situation, these principles were widely violated.

4. At 051200Z June USCINCEUR imposed "Minimize" on originators of teletypewriter messages within European Theater, but did not request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further impose "Minimize" on messages into the theater. This message was transmitted about the same time CINCUSNAVEUR requested "Minimize" be imposed. In an attempt to overcome backlogs, communication personnel stood extra watches (watch off and watch on in some cases) and ordered additional communication channels where possible.

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5. As a separate but related item, a NATO emergency action message exercise was conducted in the midst of the period subsequent to the attack on the USS LIBERTY when there was extensive high precedence message traffic and when "Minimize" had already been imposed to reduce abnormal amount of traffic. These high precedence exercise messages interferred with actual high precedence traffic associated with the attack on the USS LIBERTY. Additionally, this incident is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of communications facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over which the US military commander cannot exercise control. (See Tab 6, Annex D, for NATO Wide Awake 9-67 Information.)

6. As a consequence of this JCS Fact Finding Team, procedural disparities between commands and communications center activities became apparent.

a. The application of date time groups is accomplished in several different methods, with no direct meaningful correlation. For example, one command assigns the DTG as it is received at the message center. Another command assigns the DTG at the time it is released, while still another assigns the DTG just prior to preparation for transmission.

b. The procedures for processing outgoing messages by the NMCC message center, Pentagon, are unnecessarily delaying JCS traffic. The requirement to administratively process outgoing messages prior to receipt and transmission by the Department of the Army Communications Center is questioned.

c. The present methods of assignment of routing indicators for the addressees does not minimize personnel errors. In the case of communications to the USS LIBERTY, personnel

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error in routing indicator assignment was a major factor causing untimely delivery of critical messages. Further discussion and specific cases are provided in Subsection I of this Annex.

c. The difference in procedures for transmission and delivery of messages from the originator to the primary action agency has been highlighted during this study. In one instance, two command centers located in the same building but served by different communications centers, were addressees on a specific Flash message. However, one command center received the message approximately one hour before the other command center was aware of its existence. (See Tabs 7 and 8, Annex D, for specific examples.)

e. Personnel manning of the communications centers contacted by the team is below established authorized strength. Verification of need for additional personnel was evidenced by the necessity for augmenting shifts and compressing schedules which have been in existence, in one instance, for the past fourteen months. In addition, individuals performing such functions as routing indicator assignments, tape preparation and torn tape relay are, for the most, inexperienced individuals with minimum time in service (one to two years). This factor contributes to personnel errors introduced into the preparation and transmission of messages. Supervisory officer personnel are very junior and rarely have in excess of one or two years length of service; yet they are in positions where exercise of judgment could be a key factor in selecting the order in which important messages of the same precedence should be sent.

f. The practice aboard technical research ships (TRS) (USS LIBERTY) of combining general service and [redacted] in a single package causes delay

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[illegible] routing of general service traffic. In each of these [illegible], the general service traffic has to be segregated and [illegible] message created for the general service portion. [illegible] the mission and employment of the TEC probably justifies this practice, the procedure should be defined as a standard so that operational control authorities can treat it on the basis of exception to the ordinary route.

9. It was the expressed opinion at USCINCEUR and COMSIXTHFLT that the Defense Communications Systems (DCS) performs satisfactorily during normal peacetime periods but was not responsive in crisis periods. The lack of flexibility in routing of communications traffic and ability to augment, on a contingency basis, was cited as particular deficiencies.

9. The CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT expressed the inability of the DCS to react to all needs and emphasized that dedicated circuitry would always be a requirement if effective command and control is to be accomplished. COMSIXTHFLT amplified this desire by stating "he would trade one ship for effective communications," emphasizing his dissatisfaction with current capabilities of equipment and facilities.

10. The Deputy, USCINCEUR, stated that communications at Stuttgart, Germany, despite the mobile configuration currently being employed, are far superior to those previously provided at Camp Des Loges, France.

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[illegible]

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS ITEMS

1. The increased volume of traffic during the Middle East crisis highlighted the need to augment the Defense Communications System (DCS) on a contingency basis, to support unforeseen trouble areas. This augmentation should not necessarily be in terms of hardware but also in terms of:

a. Calling up additional leased circuits.

b. Circuit rearrangement.

c. Manpower pools.

d. Elimination of relays by establishing direct circuits between points of high traffic volume.

2. The impact of introducing into the DCS a volume of high precedence traffic, from a National Communications System (NCS) Operating Agency (i.e. State Department) during a crisis period, degrades the already overloaded DCS. This situation emphasized the lack of prior consideration to handle the NCS and other (NATO) agency traffic over DCS facilities.

3. The introduction of NATO exercise traffic into the DCS during crisis periods, such as occurred on 8 June 1967 is illustrative of the potential for degrading US military communications by shared use of facilities and satellite programs with NATO and other national entities over whom the US military commander cannot exercise control.

4. From an analysis of communications, the need for traffic management of communications was apparent. Institution of re-routing around trouble areas or making maximum use of direct circuits are means to alleviate pressure points which result in times of crisis.

5. As a result of the JCS Fact Finding Team examination regarding the USS LIBERTY, numerous procedural deficiencies were revealed:

a. Assignment of improper precedence and excessive number of addressees was observed.

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b. Procedure for assignment of date time group is not consistent within or between command/services.

c. The methods of and procedures for assignment of routing indicators exposes a means for personnel error. The use of such advancements as automatic scanners and application of Automatic Data Processing would eliminate personnel error, reduce manpower requirements, improve quality of transmission and reduce message handling times.

d. As evidenced by a specific message directly related to the USS LIBERTY incident, the methods of transmitting a message from an originator to two addressees in the same location (Pentagon) are different, resulting in one addressee receiving the message in advance of other addressees which require an additional relay point. For efficiency and operational expediency, messages should flow to the addressees in the most direct route.

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PART III

RECOMMENDATIONS

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RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The interrelationship between the Deputy Director for Operations, as senior watch officer within the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC) be formalized.

2. The term "Operational Control" not be used in assigning responsibility to a commander of a unified and specified command or subordinate command for [redacted] operations when, in fact, his responsibility is not intended to be fully consonant with that term as defined in JCS Publication No. 1. If a new descriptive term is required, it should be promulgated.

3. The current policy guidance whereby [redacted] requirements are validated and approved be continued.

4. The procedures governing the control of [redacted] platforms be made more definitive with respect to [redacted] platforms, and be disseminated to insure:

a. Commanders of unified and specified commands, as well as major component commanders, have a clearer and mutual understanding of the relative importance of [redacted] activities within their respective areas of responsibilities.

b. [redacted]

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4. Artificial "barriers" between operational elements of staffs and the [redacted] staff elements which apparently have emerged [redacted] be specifically reviewed and eliminated in order to improve the value and timely utilization of the [redacted] at all major command echelons.

5. The present JCS/JRC charter and policy guidance defined in SM 676-66, dated 12 August 1966, be continued as an effective modus operandi for the rapid reaction control of the [redacted] but that JCS/JRC adhere to the established procedures whereby JRC must deal with JRCs in the established chain.

6. The necessary clarification of the authority delegated JRC duty personnel to issue oral directives in the name of the commander concerned be issued within and to all affected commands as soon as possible, establishing a system of authentications, if necessary, to achieve quick reaction capability.

7. There should be no independent operations in a commander's area without his being informed, and his responsibility clearly defined.

8. All echelons appreciate that ships of LIBERTY class are defenseless, and that it is impossible for an operational commander to protect it adequately without negating its usefulness; i.e., without providing escort and combat air patrol (CAP) he can only react to attack once initiated or threatened, which in this case was too late.

9. A specific exception and procedure be spelled out for [redacted] platforms, the nature of whose missions preclude adhering to standard movement reporting.

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10. The exploitation of available technology be accelerated to modernize message handling and routing procedures to minimize impact of relative scarcity of qualified career personnel in the current and expanding environment of extremely rapid and high volume communications.

11. The need for dedicated command and control circuitry, as opposed to use of common user circuitry, be carefully reevaluated in view of this incident.

12. As a matter of urgency, the Department of Defense Communications Satellite program be accelerated to achieve shipboard terminals as soon as practicable in order to improve the capability of fleet control communications.

13. Possible undesirability of amalgamating NATO-US military communications and communications satellite programs be carefully reviewed.

14. The impact on the Defense Communications System (DCS) by National Communications System (NCS) communications should be carefully surveyed in light of the impact of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Department of State traffic on the military DCS communications stations in this crisis situation.

15. The Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) study the procedures used to find and apply the correct routing indicators for addressees of messages with the object of finding a modern method which will minimize personnel errors.

16. The impact of the DCS function on a communications station should be reviewed, with respect to the manning and experience levels of the communications station; that the personnel allowances and requirements of communications stations be reexamined.

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17. The Defense Communications Agency establish a traffic management capability, as opposed to circuit management, in order to provide for dispatching the flow of traffic through unburdened DCS paths to effect prompt relief of congestion during contingencies.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] GENERAL JOSEPH R. RUSS, USA, [illegible],
CHIEF, JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
GROUP, OJCS

[illegible] Fact-Finding Team (U)

[illegible] are herewith designated senior member of an [illegible] fact-finding team to examine the circumstances relating to [illegible] and transmission of operational directives to the [illegible] associated with events during the period 1 June to [illegible] 1967 which culminated in the attack on USS LIBERTY [illegible] on [illegible] June 1967.

[illegible] The team shall comprise the following members whose security clearances are as indicated:

Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA, [illegible], TS/SI
Rear Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, USN, [illegible], TS/SI
Colonel William A. Garrett, USAF, FR [illegible], TS/SI
Captain William D. Owen, USN, [illegible], TS/SI
Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF, FR [illegible], TS/SI

[illegible] are also to request the Military Services to designate a point of contact to facilitate your obtaining such assistance from the Services as you may require.

1. Your fact-finding study shall include:

a. The means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USS LIBERTY.

b. The specific orders:

(1) Issued to the USS LIBERTY between 1 June and 8 June 1967.

[illegible]

[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4. You are directed to report your [illegible] together with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR to inquire into the circumstances leading to and connected with the armed attack on the U.S. LIBERTY will inquire into administrative, disciplinary, and internal matters within that command which are not within the scope of the examination by the fact-finding team. This fact-finding team will not infringe upon the prerogatives of the court of inquiry.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

B. Spivy

B. B. SPIVY
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Copy to:
[illegible]
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
DIA
NSA
CSAF
CNO

2

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANNEX B

ITINERARY

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ITINERARY

DEPARTED	Washington, D. C.	2020	12 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	0815	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1655	13 June 1967
ARRIVED	Stuttgart, Germany	1910	13 June 1967
DEPARTED	Stuttgart, Germany	1400	14 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1935	14 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens Greece	0805	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1000	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1015	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1025	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS LITTLE ROCK	1235	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	USS AMERICA	1240	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	USS AMERICA	1243	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Athens, Greece	1440	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Athens, Greece	1445	15 June 1967
ARRIVED	Malta	1815	15 June 1967
DEPARTED	Malta	0700	16 June 1967
ARRIVED	London, England	1330	16 June 1967
DEPARTED	London, England	1330	18 June 1967
ARRIVED	Washington, D. C.	1645	18 June 1967

James M. Ennes, II Research Papers

NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
John S. McCAIN, Jr. ADM, USN	CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
J. D. WYLIE, Jr. RADM, USN	Deputy, CINCUSNAVEUR	13 June 1967
W. J. HANLEY, Jr. CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff	13 June 1967
W. M. HATCH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence	13 June 1967
E. E. LEE CDR, USN	Admin Officer/Head, Plans Policy	13 June 1967
R. C. SMITH CAPT, USN	Head, ISIC	13 June 1967
E. L. COLAVOTTI LT, USN	Asst Ship Operations	13 June 1967
R. F. ROEMER CDR, USN	Asst for Carrier & Special Wpns Ops	13 June 1967
C. A. TUTNER CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Logistics	13 June 1967
L. R. RAISH CAPT, USN	Asst Chief of Staff, Communications	13 June 1967
[redacted]		
G. D. JORGENSEN CDR, USN	Command Center Duty Officer	13 June 1967
	COMSIXTHFLT	
W. I. MARTIN VADM, USN	COMSIXTHFLT	15 June 1967
C. H. SMITH CAPT, USN	Chief of Staff	15 June 1967
E. I. KASTEN CAPT, USN	Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations	15 June 1967
	CINCUSNAVEUR (Board of Inquiry)	
I. C. KIDD RADM, USN	Chairman	15 June 1967
B. M. ATKINSON CAPT, USN	Member	15 June 1967

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ANNEX C

SUMMARY OF MESS/GES

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SUMMARY OF MESSAGES

EFFECTING

LIBERTY MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS

	DTG	ORIGIN	ADDRESSEMENT
1.	052235Z NOV	JCS (5838)	TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, INFO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS, OPS CONTROL OF TRS W/B EFFECTED THRU COMPONENT COMMANDS.
2.	241212Z FEB	USCINCEUR	DIRECTED COMPONENTS TO CLEAR ALL ITEMS REQUIRING DECISION WITH USECOM.
4.	240020Z MAY	COMSERVRON 8	DIRECTED LIBERTY TO DEPART ABIDJAN ASAP FOR ROTA.
5.	241732Z MAY	LIBERTY	TO ALCON GIVING ETA ROTA AT 31200CZ MAY AND ETA OP AREA OFF PORT SAID 05[illegible]CZ (FULL INDICATION COMSIXTHFLT HAS THAT LIBERTY TO BE STATIONED OFF EGYPT).
6.	271052Z MAY	CINCUSNAVEUR	OUTLINE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF OPS AND DEFINED [illegible] NM CPA UAR LIMITATION.
7.	291602Z MAY	JCS (6499)	TO CINCLANT AND USCINCEUR APPROVING DIVERSION OF LIBERTY TO EAST MED. INFO LIBERTY.
9.	300040Z MAY	CINCLANTFLT	CINCLANT AND OTHERS - DIRECT LIBERTY CHOP TO USCINCEUR UPON ARRIVAL ROTA. INFO LIBERTY.
10.	300202Z MAY	COMSERVRON 8	DIRECTS LIBERTY TO CHOP TO USCINCEUR.
11.	300932Z MAY	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR INFORMING OF RESPONSE FOR ASSUMING OP CONTROL OF LIBERTY UPON ARRIVAL AT ROTA.
12.	310828Z MAY	LIBERTY	PIM REPORT

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			TO USNAVEUR DEPART RITA FOR EAST MED.
14.	[illegible] JUN	USCINCEUR	[illegible]
15.	[illegible] JUN	JCS (6724)	[illegible]
16.	[illegible] JUN	[illegible]	[illegible]
17.	[illegible] JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	[illegible]
18.	011845Z JUN	JCS (6724)	[illegible]
19.	012030Z JUN	USCINCEUR	[illegible]
20.	012120Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	HOLDS LIBERTY UNTIL REPAIRS COMPLETED
21.	020717 JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	LIBERTY - [illegible] TO PROCEED ON 2 JUN [illegible] JCS MSG 011845Z JUN.
22.	021132Z JUN	LIBERTY	REPAIRED AT 0212307 DEPARTED AT THAT TIME AT BEST SPEED.
23.	021330Z JUN	LIBERTY	USNAVEUR AND OTHERS - MOVEMENT REPORT SHOWING ETA 080300Z AT 32N and 33-31E.
24.	022108Z JUN	LIBERTY	ALCON - DEPARTED RITA.
25.	031016Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT THAT LIBERTY WOULD BE CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OPS IN EAST MED AND REQUESTED LOG SUPPORT. INFO LIBERTY.
26.	051352Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT - OPA OF 130 NM TO JAR AND OTHERS.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

27.	051550Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT, AIR AND SURFACE OPS CPA 25 NM FROM CYPRUS IS AUTHORIZED.
28.	051934Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO ALCON - ADVISED OF 4-HR POSITREP OF 18-HR ETA LIBERTY AND ADVISED SHE HAD ASSUMED CONDITION OF READINESS THREE.
29.	052015Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO CTF 61 - CPA OF 100 NM TO VAR AND OTHERS.
30.	061357Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT, DIRECTING OPCON OF LIBERTY AT [illegible].
31.	061410Z JUN	USCINCEUR	TO USCINCEUR, SHIPS LIBERTY ET AL, REL ISRAELIS AND FREE AS OF 1800 Z 8 JUNE.
32.	061844Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO ALCON - POSITION REPORT OF LIBERTY.
33.	062000Z JUN	LIBERTY	CHOP REPORT.
34.	062036Z JUN	LIBERTY	ADVISED COMSIXTHFLT OF STATUS AND ACKNOWLEDGED OPCON CHANGE SCHEDULED FOR 070001Z.
35.	062050Z JUN	JCS (7206)	OUTLINES PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING SCHEDULE FOR LIBERTY WHILE IN USCINCEUR AOR.
36.	062349Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO LIBERTY OUTLINING OPCON GUIDANCE.
37.	070259Z JUN	JCS (7239)	TO COMSIXTHFLT - CJCS REQUESTED VERIFICATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO COMM OR CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ISRAEL.
38.	070626Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	CONFIRMED TO THE JCS AND OTHERS THAT VOICE CONTACT BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND TEL AVIV HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. ALSO STATED NO COMM WITH ISRAELI FORCE EXISTED.
39.	070908Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION REPORT AS OF 070800Z AND ETA AT 31-45N and 33-30E at 072300Z.
40.	071503Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	ADVISED JCS AND OTHERS OF AIR OPS OF 5-6 JUN AND ALSO ADVISED OF 100 NM CPA FOR AIR AND SURFACE OPS.

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	DTG	FROM/TO	BRIEF TEXT
42.	072230Z JUN	JCS (7337)	CHANGED CPA TO 20 NM AND GAVE OPTION TO MODIFY [illegible] TASKING (0115452) AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE. INFO LIBERTY.
43.	072350Z JUN	JCS(JRC)-TELECON	TO USNAVEUR, ADVISING THAT CPA OF LIBERTY WAS BEING CHANGED TO 100 NM. MSG TO FOLLOW.
44.	080030Z JUN	JCS(JRC)-TELECON	TO USCINCEUR ADVISING OF CALL TO USNAVEUR AND SAME INFO AS GIVEN TO USNAVEUR.
45.	080113Z JUN	JCS (7347)	CONFIRMED 100 NM CPA AS RELAYED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.
46.	080325Z JUN	USNAVEUR - TELECON	TO USCINCEUR REQUESTING DTG OF JCS MSG. USCINCEUR OBTAINED AND RELAYED TO USNAVEUR.
47.	080410Z JUN	USNAVEUR - TELECON	TO COMSIXTHFLT, AUTHORIZED TEXT OF JCS 080113Z AND REQUESTING TAKE FORAC. OFFICIAL MSG TO FOLLOW. (TRANSACTION COMPLETED AT 080415Z).
48.	080455Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO COMSIXTHFLT CONFIRM TELECON BY WIRENOTE.
49.	080625Z JUN	USCINCEUR	TO USNAVEUR, OFFICIALLY CONFIRMING 080412Z ACTION COMPLETED BY TELECON. INFO LIBERTY.
50.	080634Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO COMSIXTHFLT GIVING POSITION AS 31-45N and 33-30E WITHIN 30 NM FOR NEXT 24 HOURS.
51.	080742Z JUN	LIBERTY	TO NIXON - ADVISED OF BEING CHALLENGED BY TWO JET AIRCRAFT.
52.	080856Z JUN	LIBERTY	DESTROYING SUPERSEDED MATERIAL DUE TO CURRENT SITUATION AND SHALLOW WATER.
53.	080917Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	TO LIBERTY - DIRECTED NEW CPA OF 100 NM. REQUESTED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. (NOT RECEIVED PRIOR TO ATTACK).
54.	081235Z JUN	LIBERTY	RELAYED BY USS SARATOGA. ADVISED OF ATTACK.
55.	081237Z JUN	SARATOGA	LIBERTY'S REPORT OF THREE MTBS APPROACHING.

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	DTG	ORIGIN	ADDEE/TEXT
[illegible].	081253Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	DIRECTS AMERICA TO LAUNCH A/C TO ASSIST LIBERTY.
[illegible].	081254Z JUN	LIBERTY	RELAYED BY SARATOGA, ADVISING OF TORPEDO ATTACK.
[illegible].	081301Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA GREECE	TO JENATEUR - RELAYED INFO RECEIVED FROM LIBERTY VIA VOICE NICOM THAT TORPEDO HIT ON STARBOARD. OCCURRED AT 0812532.
[illegible].	081316Z JUN	CTF 60	DIRECTS BOTH AMERICA AND SARATOGA TO LAUNCH FOUR A/C IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY. REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.
61.	081320Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR AND AIG 998 - CONFIRMED LIBERTY ATTACK. INDICATED A/C BEING DEPLOYED.
61.	081339Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	CNO INFORMED OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN. FACT THAT LIBERTY POSIT ON EDGE OF UAR CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND PILOTS ARE TO DEFEND LIBERTY, NOT TO PENETRATE CLAIMED LIMIT. DESTRUCTIVE FORCE BY A/C AUTHORIZED.
62.	081340Z JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	TO LIBERTY - REQUEST CONFIRMATION AND ADVISED TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH ANY STATION.
63.	081410Z JUN	CTF 63	RECOMMENDS PAPAGO BE DIRECTED TO ASSIST.
64.	081412Z JUN	NAVCOMSTA MOROCCO	LIBERTY REPORTED UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKERS, HELOS CIRCLE SHIP AFTER ATTACK, POSSIBLY ISRAELI.
65.	081414Z JUN	USDAO TEL AVIV	REPORTED TO WHITE HOUSE AND OTHERS INCLUDING COMSIXTHFLT, THAT ATTACK WAS A MISTAKE.
66.	081416Z JUN	JCS (7350)	AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND LIBERTY AGAINST FURTHER ATTACK.
67.	081417Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	RELAY THE 081339Z (081349Z) MSG TO USCINCEUR AND OTHERS.
68.	081425Z JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USCINCEUR INFORMED OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS.

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	DTG	ORIGIN	ADDEE/TEXT
70.	0814302 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INSTRUCTS VP A/C TO REMAIN 100 NM FROM COAST AND BORDER OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT.
71.	0814392 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	FIRST SITREP FOR DEAD EXCEEDS OF 50 WOUNDED ON LIBERTY.
71.	0814552 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	LIBERTY UNDERWAY AT 8 KTS COURSE 340PM.
72.	0815142 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMS ALL HIGHER AUTHORITY ONLY COMM WITH LIBERTY VIA NICOM NET.
73.	0815172 JUN	CINCUSNAVEUR	INFORMS COMSIXTHFLT THAT ONLY NEWS RELEASES WILL BE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.
74.	0815212 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	INFORMED USCINCEUR AND OTHERS THAT TEL AVIV HAS RECEIVED REPORT THAT ISRAEL A/C AND MTBS HAD ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED THE LIBERTY AT 0612002.
75.	0815292 JUN	JCS (7369)	USE OF FORCE WITHDRAWN.
76.	0816092 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	USE OF FORCE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED.
77.	0816492 JUN	COMSIXTHFLT	ALL A/C RECALLED AND ACCOUNTED FOR.

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ROUTINE | ROUTINE | NONE

FROM: JCS DATE: 06 NOV 65 INFO:

TO: CINCPAC
CINCLANT

INFO: CNO
USCINCEUR
CINCSOUTH
CINCSTRIKE
CINCPACFLT
CINCLANTFLT

JCS 5335. J-3 SENDS.

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR TRS OPERATIONS (U)

REFS:

B. CNO MEMO OP-922YE/RH 00230P9R, 27 OCT (TOTAL)

1. SUGGESTED GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED BY THE REFERENCES FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIPS. THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REF AND IS ISSUED FOR USE IN GENERAL PLANNING FOR SIGINT SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS WHEN REQUIRED.

A. DESCRIPTION. SPECIAL MODIFIED FORMER MERCHANT SHIPS CONFIGURED TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION.

B. MISSION.

GRAPTEX: THW/QJ

REFERENCE OFFICE: GP-3

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 1 OF 4

ADD 25
ADI
DTG
SUSPENSE 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ADI NO. 70183

DTG 0522357

ENTIRE MSG

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(2) CLASSIFICATION OF DETAILS OF SPECIFIC NATURE OF MISSION: REQUIRES HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE

(3) DIVERSION FROM MISSION. THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR [redacted] PURPOSE ONLY. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILL BE MADE ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF JCS PUB 2 (UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES), PARAGRAPHS 30229 AND 30245 APPLY.

C. THE MISSION OF THE TRS IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.

D. CONTROL OF TRS. MSTS ?

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SHIP. MILITARY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE SHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE COGNIZANT UNIFED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER THROUGH THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO A SPECIFIC FLEET OR FORCE COMMANDER.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

70183

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Cdr Roem

MC
1914

Recd
File

NMVV XXB344ZCZCDBA025PBD 015PBD 015
RUFPBK 895 0881435
Y EEEE
2914122 MAR 67
USCINCEUR
FO CINCUSNAVEUR
2412122 FEB 67
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
USASAEUR

CLAS ECJCO 02094. USAFE FOR OTR,
NAVEUR FOR N-32, USAREUR FOR AEAGC-A, USASAEUR FOR
PN-E. SUBJ: MESSAGE ADDRESSEES.
REQUEST THAT ADDRESSEES ON YOUR MESSAGE TRAFFIC PERTAINING TO
OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATERE AND REQUIRING AN
PERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BE LIMITED TO THIS
EADQUARTERS AND THOSE IN-THEATER AGENCIES ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
ASIS. ALL PLANS AND PROGRAMS REQUIRED BY CURRENT
RECTIVES TO BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL ARE EXAMPLES OF MESSAGE
RAFFIC REQUIRING AN OPERATIONAL DECISION BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

GE 2 RUFPBK 895 UNCLAS E F T O
AS APPROPRIATE, THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST APPROVAL,
OORDINATE WITH, OR INFO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND/OR OTHER
JOR COMMANDS ON THEATER PLANS AND PROGRAMS

C.S.





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241212 FEB 67

UNCLASSIFIED FEB.

USCINCEUR 241212Z

NAVEUR NCU LOH 2100/1 (REV 10-62)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

VV PPNG297APN366ZCMA9942ZCYMD264
PP RUTPRC
DE RUCIJUA 539C 1458245
ZNY CCCCC
P 241732Z MAY 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
INFO RUEDNKA/COMSERVLANT
RUEDNKA/CINCLANTFLT
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEPJS/JCS/JRC
RUEDNKA/CINCLANT/JRC

HUQLMD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT

RUTKC/COMNAVACTS ROTA
RUTKC/NAVSTA ROTA
BT

A. YOUR 240828Z MAY 67
1. DEPARTED ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST 240538Z MAY. SOA 15 KTS. ETA ROTA 310000Z MAY. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY FIVE HOURS WILL BE NECESSARY TO LOAD TECH SUPPORT MATERIAL/PERS AND REFUEL. THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSANDS GALLONS NSFO WILL BE REQUIRED. ETA OPAREA OFF PORT SAID 961400Z JUN 67. REF A PERTAINS
2. DO NOT HOLD ANY COMSIXTHFLT INSTRUCTIONS/OPLANS/OPORDERS/TAPV NOTES/ETC. IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO HAVE THEM DELIVERED ON ARRIVAL ROTA.
3. UNCDIR WILL INCLUDE FOLLOWING COMMANDS AS INFO ADDEES ON DAILY PIM REPORT AFTER ENTRY INTO MEDITERRANEAN: CINCUSNAVEUR/COMSIXTHFLT/DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.
GP-4
BT

FLAG ACT...3.....

TOR 250335Z MAY 67 NY 273/25 CNO.....DRB

2 4 1 7 3 2Z MAY 67

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ROSTER OF PERSONS VISITED

USCINCEUR

NAME	POSITION	DATE VISITED
David A. BURCHINAL GENERAL, USAF	Deputy, CINCEUR	14 June 1967
W. J. McCAFFREY M/GEN, USA	Director Operation Directorate (J-3)	14 June 1967
David I. LIEBMEN B/GEN, USAF	Deputy Director for Command and Control	14 June 1967
James FEELY, Jr. B/GEN, USMC	Deputy Director for Operations	14 June 1967
W. G. KILLE COL, USAF	Chief Operation Center Division	14 June 1967
R. L. ROYEM COL, USAF	Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
R. S. QUIGGINS COL, USAF	Deputy Chief, JRC (J-3)	14 June 1967
G. G. LITTLE CDR, USN	Staff Officer, JRS (J-3)	14 June 1967
C. K. RUSSELL L/COL, USA	JRC Watch Officer (J-3)	14 June 1967
L. N. BERGMAN L/COL, USAF	Staff Officer, Operations & Readiness Divisions (J-6)	14 June 1967
[redacted]		
CAPT HERMES USA	DCA-Europe Operations	14 June 1967

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE: [illegible] | INFO PRECEDENCE: [illegible] | SPEC. ACTIVITY: [illegible]

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT DATE: 7 JUN 67 INFO:

TO: JCC

INFO: [illegible]

[illegible]

A. JCS 070259Z JUN 67

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO REPEAT NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COMSIXTHFLT AND ANY ISRAELI SOURCE EITHER MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY AND NONE REPORTED BY ANY COMSIXTHFLT SUBORDINATE COMMAND. CONFIRMATION OF LATTER HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS BY FLASH MESSAGE. WILL ADVISE ASAP.

2. AT AMEMB TEL AVIV REQUEST AS SET FORTH IN HIS 2[illegible] MAY 67 HAVE ACTIVATED RADIO VOICE CIRCUITS. TRANSMISSIONS LIMITED TO TEST COUNTS AND SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ABOVE REPORTED TO SECSTATE IN MY 010155Z JUN 67.

GP-3

NOTE: UNABLE TO LOCATE REF. JCS 070259Z

DRAFTER: TW/[illegible] | RELEASING OFFICER: | RELEASED AT (BULB): 8

DOCUMENT MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1

REFERS TO MESSAGE: ADD / ADI 75 / DTG / SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACC NO.: [illegible]/91

ADD NO.:

DTG: 070[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
FLASH	IMMEDIATE	NONE

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT DATE: 7 JUNE 67

TO: JCS

INFO: CNO
CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
CIA

DIR

A. COMSIXTHFLT 070625Z JUN 67

B. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.

1. PRIOR TO 052315Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LONGITUDE OR WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 240 MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 130 MILES. AT 052315Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 12 MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.

3. ON 5 MAY BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAI. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (DTG)
REQUEST MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.		PAGE 1 OF 3
REPEAT TO ADDRESS: ADD / ADI / DTG / SUSPENSE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	43119
		DTG 071503Z

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
FLASH	IMMEDIATE	NONE

DISTRIBUTION

ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 0915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM 0826Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER.

4. ALL SIXTHFLT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAI COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING FIGURES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OR UTILIZED BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.

5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (DTG)

DOCUMENT MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 12 YR INTERVALS; NOT AUTO. DECLASSIFIED.

PAGE 2 OF 3

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	ADI NR.
ADO		43119
ADI		ADD NR.
DTO		DTG 071503Z

SITEPLAN

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ACTION PRECEDENCE: FLASH	INFO PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE	SPECIAL HANDLING: NONE

SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1

ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT.

OP-3

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PAGE 3 OF 3

43119

071532

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

	INFO PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE	SPECIAL HANDLING: NONE

DISTRIBUTION

[redacted] DIRECTOR DATE: 6 JUNE 67 INFO:

[redacted] DIRECTOR

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRIORITY | NONE

FROM: JCS 9 JUN 67 INFO

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 67
USS LIBERTY

JCS 7331 J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REF: JCS 6724/011545Z JUN 67

1. IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION EAST MED, OPERATING AREA SPECIFIED REF FOR GUIDANCE ONLY AND MAY BE VAIRED AS LOCAL CONDITIONS DICTATE.

2. CHANGE GPA UA TO 20 NM, ISRAEL 15 NM.

GP-4

[redacted]

DRAFTER: ED/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

REFERS TO MESSAGE

95

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

1 OF

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2

CALL TO NAVEUR 7 JUNE 0350Z

This is Major Bresdlove in JRC in Washington

Yes, say again, who is this?

Major Bresdlove in JRC. I would like to speak with your duty officer, please.

This is Lt Thompson.

Are you familiar with LIBERTY operations?

No Sir, I have someone who can.

Yes, and who will that be, please?

Lt. Galapotti, Wait one.

Yes sir, major?

Yes, Major Bresdlove in JRC in Washington. Have some word for your reference USS LIBERTY. Do you have a pencil and ready to copy?

Yes sir.

O.K. I am making reference to a COMSIXTHFLT msg DTG 071903Z June which you were an info addee on.

Yes sir.

Now, we request the LIBERTY Comply.

Request LIBERTY to --

Comply.

I can't get that word -- spell please.

Comply - c o m

Right

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3

Comply with new SIXTHFLT

Yes.

OP area defined last sentence.

You are coming in garbled Major - defined

Last sentence.

Last spell out, please, you are still coming in garbled.

S e n t e n c e

Ah, right.

Maybe I'd better start over so you can get texture

No sir, I can read up to request the LIBERTY comply with op area defined.

Last sentence in para 1

Last sentence in para 2

of COMSIXTHFLT

of COMSIXTHFLT

Msg 071503Z June (Yes) until further notice (Yes) and that is NOT CLOSER THAN

Not closer than

100

100

Nautical miles

Nautical miles ———

to Israel (right), Syria (right), Egypt (right - that's UAR) and 25 NM - that is two five

25 NM

to Syprus (right) end of message. (right) Now read back please.

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JRC msg - is this DTG or verbal?

This is verbal I am giving you right now, it will be followed by a written message in the morning.

Right - reference COMSIXTHFLT msg 071503Z Jun, request LIBERTY comply to 6th Flt op area defined last sentence para 2 of SIXTHFLT msg 071503Z until further notice and not closer than 100 NM to Israel, Syria, UAR and 25 NM to Cyprus - is that affirmative?

That is affirmative.

And you are Major --

Major Breedlove.

Spell last name, please.

B r e e d l o v e

That's Major Breedlove, in JRC EUCOM?

No JRC Washington and May I have a spelling on your name?

G a l a p o t t i, Lt. Galapotti. I'll send it down to 6th Flt and you say there will be a follow on?

Yes, there will be a follow on.

Yes sir.

Yes, I called because time is getting short to where she will be in those limits.

Looks to me like she's almost there.

Yeah, that's right so go mushy, mushy.

Yes sir, Roger, we will go to 6th Flt and info her and she will probably li li or something and (this word is garbled) away.

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CK

OK, will get that out right how to 6th FLT on this.

Thank you.

You're welcome.

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

DISTRIBUTION FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: CJCS-1(6) DJS-3(7-9) SJCS-3(10-12) J3-8(13-20) JRC-3(21-23) GEN LEMNITZER-1(24) ANMCC/NEACP/NECAP FILE-1(CY#1) (20) CV

CY#2 DACC CY#3 JRC COMEBACK

ADV CYS#4 AND #5 TO NMCC

080110Z JUN 67

FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
CONSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION
JCS
JRC
SJCS

COORDINATION
CNO
CAPT KING

JCS 7347 J 3 Sends. ZFF-3

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REFS: a. JCS 7337/072230Z Jun 67 (Message Follows)

b. CONSIXTHFLT 071503Z Jun 67 (NOTAL) (Message Follows)

22

1. (U) Cancel ref a.

2. Req LIBERTY comply new op areas defined last sentence para 2 ref b, until further notice, i.e., not closer than 100 NM to ISRAEL, SYRIA, EGYPT and 25 NM to Cyprus. GP-3

REFS ARE:
a JCS 7337
b-IN 61629

DATE 7 TIME
MONTH JUN YEAR 1967
PAGE NO. 1 NO. OF PAGES 1

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
SAM ROREX, JR.
Capt, USN
Chief, Secon Programs Div, JRC

PHONE 50581

SIGNATURE
MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD
Captain, USN

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PERSON/OFFICE OF ORIGINATOR
JCS 7347/080110Z
Reconnaissance Center

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VV [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

0514172 JUN 67

[illegible]

[illegible] DESTROYER

[illegible] CRUISER

[illegible] SHAPE

[illegible] SAFE

[illegible] SAREUR

[illegible] SLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT

[illegible] CINCLANT

[illegible] CINCLANTFLT

[illegible] CINCONAD

[illegible] COMIDEASTFOR

[illegible] CINCSTRIKE

[illegible] CINCUSNAVEUSA

[illegible] ZERO

[illegible] 67

[illegible] FLT

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

8

FF1-3
N62
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Contingency Watch Team
To: CINCUSNAVEUR
Via: Deputy Chief of Staff

Subj: USS LIBERTY Incident

1. The following is a reconstruction of the sequence of events prior to and after receipt of JDS 080110Z by the Contingency Watch Team composed by Captain R.D. STEELE (Duty Captain), Commander O.D. JORGENSEN (Command Center Duty Officer), and Lieutenant E.L. GALAVOTTI (N3 Duty Officer) for the period of 2230Z, 7 June to 0630Z, 8 June.

TIMES	EVENTS
072350Z	Major BREELOVE, JRC [illegible], called the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center on the VOCOM and asked to speak to the Operations Duty Officer. LT GALAVOTTI, the N3 Duty Officer, took the call. Major BREELOVE gave him a verbal directive to have the USS LIBERTY comply with the latest COMSIXTEFLT operating area restrictions as delineated in the last sentence, paragraph 2, of COMSIXTEFLT message 071503Z until further notice; that is, not to operate closer than 100 nautical miles to Israel, Syria, UAR, or closer than 25 nautical miles to Cyprus. Major BREELOVE, when questioned, did not have a message date/time group, but said a message would follow later.
	LT GALAVOTTI then informed the Duty Captain, CAPT STEELE. The Command Center Duty Officer was aware of the message, and that LT GALAVOTTI, under CAPT STEELE's direction, was originating a message to COMSIXTEFLT.
080000Z	LT GALAVOTTI and CAPT STEELE were ready with their message to COMSIXTEFLT.
080010Z	CDR JORGENSEN and CAPT STEELE advised CAPT HANLEY of the call from Major BREELOVE, and of the message which had been drafted for release to COMSIXTEFLT.
	CAPT HANLEY directed us to hold up release of the message. He was concerned because JRC came direct to CINCUSNAVEUR with only a verbal directive and without a date/time group

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of a message and had by passed USCINCEUR. He wanted something more concrete than just a phone call since we had been burned in the past when a phone call directive was not backed up with a message. CAPT HANLEY directed the Command Center Duty Officer to call USCINCEUR, advise them of the phone call from Major BREELOVE, and that we were ready to comply, and requested that USCINCEUR confirm this directive with JRC [illegible] us a date/time group. CAPT HANLEY further [illegible] that we were to release our message to COMSIXTHFLT if we received the date/time group from USCINCEUR.

050030Z The Command Center Duty Officer, as directed, called USCINCEUR and advised LCOL WAGNER of the call from Major BREELOVE. The above information from CAPT HANLEY was passed. LCOL WAGNER said he would call back.

050325Z The Command Duty Officer called USCINCEUR, LCOL RUSSELL, and asked what action had been taken on the USS LIBERTY. LCOL RUSSELL asked what action CINCUSNAVEUR had taken and was advised that we were still waiting for a call back from LCOL WAGNER. The Command Duty Officer then suggested that LCOL RUSSELL call Major BREELOVE, get a date/time group, or give us a directive (date/time group) from USCINCEUR.

LCOL RUSSELL called back shortly with JCS date/time group [illegible]. As he was relaying this information the Duty [illegible] handed the JCS [illegible] [illegible] received. [illegible]

The Command Center Duty Officer then [illegible] set up a Telecon [illegible] COMSIXTHFLT [illegible] COMSIXTHFLT's [illegible] officer.

[illegible] Considerable [illegible] caused by [illegible] After being [illegible] to establish a [illegible] JORDENSEN had the radio operator [illegible] [illegible] and request a Telecon with the [illegible] soon as possible.

[illegible] Two way Telecon was established, with [illegible] having difficulty receiving [illegible] COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, [illegible] they did not hold [illegible]. [illegible]

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to him three times before receiving an acknowledgement at 0440Z. He followed this immediately with a wireless "FROM CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND DUTY OFFICER TO COMMANDING DUTY OFFICER BE ADVISED TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC. [illegible] MESSAGE FOLLOWS."

CDR SLUSSER advised CDR JORGENSEN didn't hold JCS 7337/072230Z (Reference A to JCS 080110Z) and requested a copy. Since CINCUSNAVEUR did not hold JCS 072230Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that we would call USCINCEUR for it.

080507Z CDR SLUSSER was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR FORAC message was 080455Z.

080515Z After talking to LCOL RUSSELL at USCINCEUR, CDR JORGENSEN sent the following message to CDR SLUSSER "RECEIVED FROM USCINCEUR FOR YOUR INFO JCS 072230Z WAS GENERAL GUIDE LINES CONCERNING "USS LIBERTY" OP AREA WITH DISTANCE RESTRICTIONS FROM MID EAST COUNTRIES. HAS SINCE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AND THUS CANCELLED. THE RESTRICTIONS IN JCS 080110Z ARE MORE STRINGENT."

080521Z Received receipt for above.

2. The times and events listed in paragraph 1 indicate every action the watch team took within its authority to insure that the USS LIBERTY received the new operating restrictions as expeditiously as [illegible].

3. This statement is submitted after a careful review of [illegible] by each individual watch team member and constitutes [illegible] took place.

CAPT R.D. STEELE, USN

CDR S.D. JORGENSEN, USN

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UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	INNER	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
ACTION		DDCO		
INFO				

03 JUN 67

FROM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO CONSIXTHFLT

INFO

UNCLAS EFTO

[illegible] 050110Z JUN 67

1. TAKE FORAC.

READD: SSN/11[illegible]/TL/#2/08 JUN 67/01
O 08[illegible]Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO USCINCEUR
JCS [illegible]
CNO
CINCUSNAVFLT

ORIGINATOR SECTION X3

ACTION DEPARTMENT X3

Ins. 080455, Jun 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCU LON 2000/1 (REV 10-66)

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MAT

RETURN TO MSG CEN

[illegible]

[illegible]

DE [illegible] 011 1590525

ZN

C [illegible] JUN 67

FM [illegible]

TO [illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO RUDAC/USS LIBE

TO

[illegible]/COMSIXTHFLT

[illegible]/JCS

ECJC/JRC 09045 [illegible]NAVEUR FOR [illegible]

JCS FOR JRC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). REF A. FONECON LTC RUSSELL, THIS HQ AND CDR JORGENSON, DUTY OFFICER, NAVEUR, [illegible] JUN 67. REF B. JCS [illegible], [illegible] JUN 67.

(C) THIS CONFIRMS REF A TO TAKE REF B FORAC. GP-3

BT

[illegible]

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/1 (REV 10-63)

[illegible]

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

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

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

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Z 0702[illegible] JUN/67 ZFF[illegible]
FM JCS
TO RUTPCR/CONSTMTHPL
INFO RUFPBW/USCINCEUR
RUDLAD/CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFPBW/CINCUSAFE
TEN/DIA

JCS 7239 /CJCS SENDS.
SUBJ: UAR ALLEGATIONS OF US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL (U)
1. UAR AUTHORITIES HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY HAVE INFORMATION, PERHAPS THROUGH INTERCEPTS, THET US PERSONNEL WERE TALKING WITH THE ISRAELIS, OR WERE OTHERWISE INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISRAELIS, LEADING THE UAR TO BELIEVE THAT WE MAY HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.
2. YOU ARE AWARE OF UAR ALLEGATIONS THAT US CARRIER AIRCRAFT WERE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND ALSO OF OUR PROPMT AND VIGOROUS DENIAL. WE HAVE YOUR

PAGE TWO RUEPJS 002 S E C R E T
ASSURANCE THAT SIXTH FLEET AIRCRAFT WERE NOT WITHIN 200 MILES OF EGYPT, SYRIA OR ISRAEL.
3. REQUEST THAT YOU VERIFY ASAP THET THERE HEVE BEEN NO COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT OR ANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET AND THE ISRAELIS. IF THERE WERE ANY TYPE COMMUNICATIONS OR OTHER CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, PROVIDE COMPLETE DETAILS ASAP.
4. OF EQUAL INTEREST TO US WOULD BE ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE US TO ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO GET YOU TO INTERVENE IN THE WAR. FYI THERE HEVE BEEN ALLEGATIONS FROM UAR SOURCES TO THIS EFFECT.
5. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO COMMENT IF, BUT ONLY IF, THEY HAVE INFORMATION BEARING ON ALLEGATIONS OF US PARTICIPATION IN, OR COLLUSION ZITH, ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS. GP-3
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION
ACTION DEPARTMENT
N3

(PAGE 1 OF ____)
CON
TDR 06/11/17
SGN
SGN

DTG 070259 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED DD)

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
IMMED	IMMED	NONE

FROM: JCS DATE: 02 JUN 67 INFO:

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY

S 5724 J-3 SEND

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY SKED (U)

1. WHEN RFS REQUEST SAIL LIBERTY IAW FOLLOWING SKED:

A. 2 JUN DEPART ROTA.

B. 2-8 JUN. ENTROUTE VIA GIBRALTAR STRAIT CPA AS SAFE NAV PERMITS. THAN VIA NORTHERN AFRICA COASTAL ROUTE TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E. CPA MOROCCO MALTA 3 NM CLAIMED DIST 3 NM. CPA SPAIN TUNISIA SARDINIA SICILY CRETE 7 NM CLAIMED DIST 6 NM. CPA ALGERIA LIBYA UAR 13 NM CLAIMED DIST 12 NM.

C. 9-30 JUN. CONDUCT OPS SOUTH OF 32-00N AND BETWEEN 33-00E AND 34-00E. WHILE CONDUCTING OPS CPA UAR 12.5 NM CPA ISREAEL 6.5NM

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DGY/JFD		

DOCUMENT MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

REF TO MESSAGE: 65

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACI NO. 40571

ADD NO.

DTG 011562
011562

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-INVED.	NONE	NONE

2. (U) REQUEST JCS (JRC) CNO CINLANT (JRC)
CINCLANTFLT BE INCLUDED AS INKO ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS,
DAILY SITREPS AND INCIDENT REPORTS.
3. (U) ENROUTE TECH TASKING IAW REF.
4. (U) PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING JULY AXED FOLLOW.

SP-3

DRAFTER | RELEASING OFFICER | RELEASED AT (DTG)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 OF 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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

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(WHEN FILLED IN) NAVAL MESSAGE

RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	WHEN	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
CDB		ACTION					
1 JUN 1967	FOR	396			X		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: USS LIBERTY//USCINCEUR

INFO: [redacted]

CINCLANTFLT//COMSERVLANT//NAVCOMMSTA [redacted]

DEPARTURE OF USS LIBERTY FROM ROTA

A. USCINCEUR [redacted]/JRC 08686 DTG 010419Z JUN 67

B. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305 Z

1. IN REPLY TO PARA 2 OF REF A, REQUIRED EXTRA PERSONNEL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT MATERIAL ARE NOW ABOARD USS LIBERTY AT ROTA.

2. FOR USCINCEUR [redacted] SINCE A COMMUNICATION ADVISORY MESSAGE IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THAT SHIPS SPECIAL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA [illegible] HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IS UNDER REPAIR, [redacted] HAVE DIRECTED [illegible] TO REMAIN ROTA UNTIL [redacted] SYSTEM [redacted] REPAIRED. [illegible] FOR USS LIBERTY. REQUEST ADVISE ETR. [redacted]. SAILING ORDERS WILL FOLLOW IAW REF B.

GP-4

(PAGE 1 OF 1)

GDN	
TOR	
CAN	1245
DATE	

ORIGINATOR SECTION [redacted]

ACTION DEPARTMENT N3 NSGB

DTG 012120, JUN 1967

(WHEN FILLED IN)

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

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

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[illegible]

CONTROL NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
C04256/3/J4	2		2	03/1345Z	0213302 JUN 67

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FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: COMSIXTHFLT -ZFF 3

INFO: USCINCEUR/COMASWFORSIXTHFLT/TF 60

SIXTHFLT MOVEMENTS

A. JCS 201910Z MAY 67
B. CINCUSNAVEUR 271052Z MAY 67

1. REF A IS THE ONLY RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS IN GENERAL ISSUED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. REF B PROVIDED GEOGRAPHICAL GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TF 60. REF B IS HEREWITH CANCELLED.

2. THE THREAT IMPOSED BY THE MOVEMENT OF SOME 30 RUSSIAN WARSHIPS AND SUPPORT SHIPS INTO THE EASTERN MED, PLUS AN ESTIMATE OF SOME 8-9 RUSSIAN SUBS PROBABLY CONCENTRATED IN SAME AREA, DICTATES THAT THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF THE FLEET SHOULD NOW BE EXPLOITED TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR

02

N3

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THE RUSSIANS TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE ON OUR MOVEMENTS, PLACE A STRAIN ON THE TENUOUS RUSSIAN LOGISTIC BASE FOR THEIR FLEET, AND (IN LIGHT OF TODAY'S OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES) IMPROVE OUR POSTURE FOR QUICKLY CARRYING OUT WHATEVER TASKS THAT MAY BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES ARE PROVIDED FOR PRESENT DISPOSITION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TF 60:

A. OPERATE FAST CARRIER TASK GROUP SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN EASTERN MED/AEGEAN NO CLOSER THAN 100 MILES FROM COASTS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL, AND UAR;

[redacted]

4. OTHER TASK FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY.

GP-3

NAVEDTRA NCU LOM 2100/22 (9-65)

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NAVAL MESSAGE

(WHEN FILLED IN)

5 JUN 67	T-1	454				XXX		

FROM: CINCUSNAVEUR

TO: CONSTANTEPLE

INFO: UNCLASSIFIED//CTF 60

CYPRUS FLIGHT RESTRICTION

1. AIR AND SURFACE OPERATIONS NO CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE (25) MILES FROM COAST OF CYPRUS ARE AUTHORIZED.

GP-4

Return to Office

Plotted

CIO

1166

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ACTION TAKEN

NNNNHIVV KXC384VV AGB213VV PRC891
CO RUTPRC
DE RUTPRC 166 1562015
ZNY SSSSS
O P 092015Z JUN 67
FM CONSIXTHFLT
TO RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
INFO RUTPRE/CTF SIX THREE
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTKRD/CTU SIX SEVEN PT TWO PT TWO
RUTKRD/CTG SIX SEVEN PT TWO
RUFRF/CTF SIX SEVEN
RUTPRQ/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT

TF 60 MOVEMENTS
A. CONSIXTHFLT OPORD 155-67 (DTG 272239Z MAY 67)
1. GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS TO TF 60 SHIP MOVEMENOQ AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS IMPOSED BY REF A AND OTHER DIRECTIVES OF HIGHER AUTHORITY HEREBY REVISED. OPERATE TF 60 IN THE AEGEAN SEA AND EASTERN MED (EAST OF 25-00E7) NO CLOSER THAN 100 MILES FROM COASTS OF LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND UAR. 3 100 MILE RESTRICTION FOR FLIGHT OPS VICINITY CYPRUS HAS BEEN RESCINDED AND FLIGHTS ARE NOW AUTHORIZED TO WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS. DO NOT ENTER

SECRET





(WHEN FILLED IN)

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PAGE TWO RUTPRC 166 S E C R E T
TERRITORIAL WATERS OF DODECANESE ISLANDS UNLESS DIRECTED TO CONDUCT TRANSIT BETWEEN CYPRUS AND GREECE.
3. THE THREAT IMPOSED BY THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET WARSHIPS AND THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF 8-9 SOVIET SUBMARINES DICTATES THAT THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF THE CVA GROUP BE EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO SOVIETS, AGGRAVATE THE SOVIET LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND IMPROVE TF 60 POSTURE TO CARRY OUT WHATEVER TASKS MAY BE LEVIED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.
4. TO INCREASE READINESS POSTURE OF TF60 DESIRE YOU DIRECT CARRIER TASK GROUPS TO POSIT 34-30ID 30-00E3, EACH CVA GROUP MOVING SEPARATELY TO THAT POINT WITH A RANDOM [illegible] 1. UPON ARRIVAL PROCEED TO VICINITY 33-45ID 32-00E3. THERE [illegible] OPERATE OF 60 WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS ESTABLISHED BY [illegible] ONE ASWE UTILIZING RANDOM PIMS AND UTILIZING PERIODS OF HIGH SPEED TO DENY SOVIETS THE CAPABILITY TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCES IN A PARTICULAR AREA FOR SURVEILLANCE. DISPOSITION/OPERATION AT YOUR DISCRETION TO PROVIDE BEST POSTURE FOR DEFENSE AND TASKING AS REQUIRED.
4. AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TOFORECDICT EXACTLY WHAT TASKS WILL BE ASSIGNED. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS INSTRUCTIONS OF HIGHER

PAGE THREE RUTPRC 166
AUTHORITY BECOME MORE CLEAR, [illegible] 60 OR THE MOVE WITHIN LIMITATIONS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS.
5. FOR CTF 63. WHEN NOT JOINED WITH TF 60 FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT, DESIRE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP UTILIZE DIVERSIONARY COURSES WITHIN LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY REQUIRED RDVU.
GP-3
BT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]

[illegible] REP/[illegible]/COMSIXTHFLT 0813152 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] USS LIBERTY REPORTED UNDER ATTACK AT POS[illegible] [illegible], WAS HIT BY TORPEDO AND WAS LISTING BADLY. [illegible] HEREBY DECLARED HOSTILE BY COMSIXTHFLT [illegible] [illegible] P[illegible]. LIBERTY MESSAGE AUTHENTICATED.

2. [illegible] DIRECTED TO GO TO PROCEED TOWARD SCENE. TASK FORCE [illegible] POSIT 34.[illegible].

3. [illegible] TO LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S AND [illegible] FOUR ARMED A1'S WITH FIGHTER COVER [illegible] USS LIBERTY. PILOTS DIRECTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF [illegible] [illegible] WILL LAUNCH, WILL RELIEVED ON STATION.

4. [illegible] ACFT ON SCENE ONE HOUR AND 30 MINS AFTER [illegible] [illegible] LAUNCH AT 1345Z.

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED BY (CLASS)
[illegible]		

DOCUMENT MARKING	PAGE	PAGES
[redacted]	1 OF 1	

REFERS TO MESSAGE		
AGO	NONE	AG. NO. 42925
ARI		AGO NO.
OPS		DTG 0513282
SURPRISE		

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

mc-500

[redacted] C/JNC 08[redacted]. USNAVEUR [redacted] N-31
[redacted] JNC. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U). [redacted] A. MY
[redacted] 08582, 212053Z JUN 67. B. CINCUSNAVEUR
[redacted] JUN 67.
1. [redacted] A REQUESTS SITREPS AND PIN REPORTS FROM USS
[redacted] ARRIVE THIS HQ NLT 0430Z DAILY. [redacted] B DIRECTS THE USS
[redacted] SUBMIT THE DAILY SITREP MESSAGE AS OF 0400Z HOURS
[redacted] PRECEDENCE.
2. [redacted] RECEIPT OF USS LIBERTY SITREPS AND PIN REPORTS AT THIS
HQ [redacted] BEEN CONSIDERABLY BEYOND TIME REQUESTED IN REF A.
[redacted] INSURE REPORTS BE ASSIGN
[redacted] PRECEDENCE OF IMMEDIATE
[redacted] SUBMITTED DAILY AS DIRECTED. GP-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DRAFTING SECTION
SECTION DEPARTMENT
N3

0611552
0614Z JUN 67
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCD / ON 2100/2 (NRV 10-65)

TVV KNC331VV NSBM520 KCA894
CC RUGKRG RUGKRG
DE RUGKC 1666 1571915
ZNY
C 061844Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO RUGKRG/CINCUSNAVEUR
INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUEHAAA/CNO
RUEHNA/CINCLANT
RUEHNA/CINCLANTFLT

mcloc

RUEPSDN/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR
RUCIHSA/NFOIO

RUTPRD/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRF/COMFAIRMED
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO

PAGE TWO RUGKC 1666
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPC/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
BT

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
SITREP/POSIT
A. YOUR 061307Z JUN 67
1 061800Z5 POSIT 34-18N6 024-06E2. PIM 101/16
2. MY 032020Z5, 042050Z1, AND 051934Z9 ARE
DTG PRIOR PIM REPORTS. REF A PERTAINS. SUBSEQUENT
PIM REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO COMSIXTHFLT.
3. TEMPORARY REPAIRS HAVE RETURNED TRSSCOMM.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TO SATISFACTORY
OPERATIONS.
[illegible]

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT





NSGE
N3

	2102/16
	12

DTG 061844 Jun 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

NNNNVV KXC025VV BBM934VIX
DE NGR RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
GB8701

PP RUQKRQ
DE RUQKC 1978 1582052
ZNY
P 062000Z JUN 67
FM USS LIBERTY
TO AIG TWO FOUR ZERO--TO MRO LONDON--INFO USCOMEASTLANT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUENAAA/CNO
RUEDNMA/CINCLANT

120-025

mc

RUEDSPA/COMSERVRON EIGHT
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR

RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
RUTRF/COMFAIRMED

PAGE TWO RUQKC 1978
RUTKRE/CTF SIX ZERO
RUFRD/CTF SIX FOUR
RUTPCR/NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
RUQPNA/NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
BT

JCS PASS TO JRC
CINCLANT PASS TO JRC
USCINCEUR PASS TO JRC
CONFIDENTIAL, PPP MOVREP 062000Z8 LIBERTY AGTR-5, REF 021330Z9 011 18//
CMG SO LIBERTY AFTR-5, 11//
CMG CHP 070001Z8 COMSIXTHFLT, 12//
CFN 062000Z8, 070001Z8, 13//END
GP-4
BT

ORIGINATOR SECTION

ACTION DEPARTMENT

N3 NSGE

MRO

TOR 06/11/25

062000 Jun 67

WHEN FILLED IN

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

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION [illegible]

INFO [illegible]

DTG JUNE 6 2050 67

FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR

INFO: CNO
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT
CTF 64
USS LIBERTY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
DISTRIBUTION:
JCS
JMC
SJCS

COORDINATION:
CNO
Radm Swanson
76033

JCS 7206 . J-3 sends.

SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U)

REFS: a. JCS 6724/011545Z Jun 67
b. JCS 5838/032235Z Nov 65 (NOTAL)

1. Request procedures outlined herein be followed in developing schedules for LIBERTY while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility:

a. Planning/approval of routine monthly sked:

(1) [redacted] state requirements to CINCUSNAVEUR including recommended ports of call.

DATE	TIME
06	1700
MONTH	YEAR
JUN	1967
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
R. G. ANDERSON
LCdr, USN
Recon Programs Div
Joint Recon Center, J-3

PHONE 50581

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
MERRIWELL W. VINEYARD
Captain, USN
Dir, Joint Reconnaissance Center

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
GP-3.

D FORM 1 NOV 65 173 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED

JCS 7206/062050Z

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ABBREVIATED MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION		R.O.ANDERSON LCDR, USN	50581
INFO			

(2) CINCUSNAVEUR prepare sked to fulfill requirements including dates/areas of ops, CPA's, ports of call for logistics and pass plan to USCINCEUR.

(3) USCINCEUR review and pass sked to JCS(JRC) for approval. Proposed skeds are required by JCS NLT 20th of the month preceeding the month for which the sked is submitted.

(4) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval or modifications.

(5) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(6) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

b. Modification of approved sked due to changes in technical tasking:

(1) [redacted] state requirement to JCS(JRC).

(2) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of modification.

(3) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(4) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

c. Modification of approved sked involving a change of 48 hours or less for operational reasons:

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
GP-3.	

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION		R.C. ANDERSON	
INFO		LCDR, USN	50681

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders and inform JCS(JRC) and USCINCEUR of reason for the change.

d. Modification of approved sked involving a change of more than 48 hours for operational reasons:

(1) CINCUSNAVEUR pass proposed modification to USCINCEUR.

(2) USCINCEUR review and pass to JCS(JRC) for approval.

(3) JCS(JRC) obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval.

(4) USCINCEUR pass for action.

(5) CINCUSNAVEUR issue sailing orders.

2. (U) Ref a is the existing approved sked for June 1967.

3. (C) The following should be addressees on all messages pertaining to skeds or sked changes:

JCS (JRC)

[redacted]

USCINCEUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

[redacted]

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	5		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
GDS	

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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ABBREVIATED and/or CONTIN ION SHEET

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION		R.G. ANDERSON LCDR, USN	50681
INFO			

[redacted]

NOTE: USS LIBERTY is not an addee on these msgs.

4. (U) Ref b provides guidance on contingency planning for TRS ops.

5. (U) Fo[redacted] Request you provide CINCUSNAVEUR your recommended duty sked ASAP. OP-3.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		4	4		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OP-3.	

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 173-1 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT DATE: 06 JUN 67 INFO:

TO: USS LIBERTY

INFO: CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
JCS
CNO

COMSERVLANT
COMSERVRON EIGHT
CTF SIX ZERO
CTF SIX FOUR
NKOIO
NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
CINCLANT
CTF SIX THREE
CTF SIX SEVEN
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCAMS MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A. CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z JUN 67 NOTAL

B. JCS 011545Z JUN 67 NOTALB

C. SLINCUSNAVEUR 311750Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL

D. CINCUSNAVEUR 011305Z JUN 67 NOTAL

E. COMSIXTHFLT OPORD 1-66 NOTAL

F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL

1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHFLT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF

B. C AND D.

2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF UAR ACTIONS, MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY

DRAFTER: ED/LJH | RELEASING OFFICER | RELEASED AT

DOCUMENT MARKING: DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS. | PAGE 1 OF

REFER TO MESSAGE | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ADD

175

062J493

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ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPEC. HANDLING
IMMED	IMMED	NONE

VERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.

3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.

4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHFLT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.

5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN SIXTHFLT

6. COMSIXTHFLT OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT REQUIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS. IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.

7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.

A. COPY KRA BROADCAST. ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY KRA BCST.

B. IF PERMENANT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.

C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO TF 60 UTILIZE TF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIRED

D. AUTHORA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.

RELEASING OFFICER	
CAPT	

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS.

4 717

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[illegible] CDOM (13)cps/C [illegible]

[illegible]

BK CY: RF(3)(15)mjs/VP

ADD DIST: J6(1) (15)rdm/W PER CAPT JOY



[illegible] 1593917 J6.

[illegible] WFM CVS JRC(3)(18)jow/VP PER LTC RUSSELL

[illegible] 67

[illegible]

[illegible] LIBERTY

INFO RUEPUS/JCS

RUFPBM/USCINCEUR

[illegible]

[illegible]/CINCLANT

[illegible]/CINCLANTFLT

[illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR

[illegible]/CTF SIX FOUR

[redacted]

[illegible]/CTF SIXTEEN

[illegible]/CTF SIX SEVEN

BT

5550

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ROCKSTAR IRW UNDER ATTACK [illegible]

[illegible] SEEN HIT. REQUEST IMMED ASSISTANCE.

TOR [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CUFRLC [illegible]

[illegible] / 1242 [illegible]

[illegible] SA

[illegible]

[illegible] S

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PART TWO EUTPRC 352 S

ECIN 48140 (2of2)

USS LIBERTY OPERATIONS

A. JCS 079545Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

B. JCS 080110Z JUN 67 (NOTAL)

C. COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z JUN 67H

1. PARA 1 REF C IS MODIFIED BY REF B. PROCEED INNER TO OPERATE WITHIN A 25 MILE RADIUS OF POSIT 33-40NS/32-3[illegible] UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. DO NOT APPROACH COAST OF UAR, ISRAEL, SYRIA OR LEBANON CLOSSR THAN ONE HUNDRED MILES, AND CYPRUS CLOSER THAN TWENTY-FIVE MILES.

2. NO TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED TO LIBERTY.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GP-3

BT REF: 079545 and 080110 Cannot identify in SMD
62349 ECIN [illegible]

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XXX

XRAJ [illegible]
Z [illegible] 0P12359
FM USS [illegible]
TO RUD[illegible]
INFO [illegible]
[illegible] ZEHC
BT
[illegible] CLASS [illegible]
FOLLOWING [illegible] FROM USNS LIBERTY.
[illegible] ATTACK. [illegible] POSIT 33.25E 31.23N. [illegible] HAVE BEEN HIT.
[illegible] PORTION)
NOTE: [illegible] RECEIVED. INTERCEPTED [illegible] FROM
USN [illegible]
BT

[illegible]

[illegible] SR 482/88 [illegible]

NO [illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8 Jun 67 13 [illegible]

[illegible]179VV BBN979V KJF386

[illegible] 1591237

[illegible]

[illegible] JUN 67

[illegible]ATOGA

[illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR

[illegible]/CONSIXTHFLT

[illegible]/CTG SIX ZERO PT ONE

[illegible]/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

[illegible]

[illegible] RECEIVED FROM ROCKSTAR ON CINCUSNAVEUR SINGLE SIB [illegible] & UNIDENTIFIED GUNBOATS APPROACHING VESSES NOW UNQUOTE

CON	
TOR	1391
SIN	
SIN	



DTG 081272 JUN 67

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVEUR NCW LON 2100/1 (REV 10-65)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



[illegible] 13 07z

.VV KXC183VV
[illegible]ZZ RUTPP
DE RUTPRC 078 1591250
[illegible]
[illegible] 051250Z JUN 67
FM CCXSIXTHFLT
TO RUTPP/USS SARATOGA
RUTPP/USS AMERICA
[illegible] RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTPP/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO
BT

COMM NOTE: NAVEUR NOT IN [illegible].
THIS IS COURTESY COPY.

1. AMERICA LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S TO PROCEED TO 31-23N 33-25E TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK BY GUNBOATS. PROVIDE FIGHTER COVER AND TANKERS. RELIEVE ON SIVKION. SARATOGA LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A-1'S ASAP SAME MISSION.
GP-4
BT

[illegible]

[illegible] Jan 67

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NAVY DEPARTMENT

[illegible] 67
[illegible] GREECE

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] VIA VOICE HICOM FROM USS LIBERTY

[illegible] 0812532 WE HAVE BEEN HIT BY A TORPEDO
[illegible] LISTING BADLY REQ ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY
[illegible]

[illegible] WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

33(8) ...CDG 03420C
SN(4) 00(2) 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09H(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
[illegible] IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
[illegible] + 34 34 61 107

CONTROL NO.	PAGE OF PAGE	TIME OF RECEIPT	DATE TIME GROUP
[illegible]	1 1	[illegible]	[illegible] JUN 67

NAVCOMMSTA GREECE 081301 Z

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VV XXC243VV AGB546VV NYC988
***.*ZZ RUDLKD
DE RUTPRC 104 1591452
ZNY
Z 081452Z JUN 67 — SEND
FM COMSIXTHFLT
INFO RUDLKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
Z 081316Z JUN 67 — FILE
FM CTF SIX ZERO
TO USS AMERICAO
USS SARATOGA
INFO COMSIXTHFLT
TASK FORCE SIX ZERO
BT

DEFENSE USS LIBERTY
1. FOR AMERICA: LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S ASAP TO PROCEED TO:
31 23N9/33-25E3 TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK
BY GUNBOATS. PROVIDE TANKERS AND FIGHTER COVER.
2. FOR SARATOGA: LAUNCH 4 ARMED A1'S RELIEVE ON STATION OVER
LIBERTY.
3. FOR ALL: PLAN TO RELIEVE ALL ACFT ON STATION OVER USS LIBERTY
AS REQUIRED.

PAGE TWO RUTPRC 104 S E C R E T
4. DEFENSE OF USS LIBERTY MEANS EXACTLY THAT. DESTROY OR DRIVE OFF
ANY ATTACKERS WHO ARE CLEARLY MAKING ATTACKS ON LIBERTY.
REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. DEFEND YOURSELF IF ATTACKED.
CF-4
BT

MC/OC

1527/P

JF1316 Jan 67

3

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV. 10-65)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] AND PROTECT TO CINCUSNAVER ONLY XXX

[illegible]
[illegible] — FOR NAVFOR ONLY
[illegible] 1931349
[illegible]
[illegible] 67 — READD
[illegible]
TO [illegible]
[illegible] CINCUSNAVEUR
[illegible] SIX ZERO
[illegible] JUN 67 — 0210
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] INCIDENT
1. [illegible] CINCUSNAVEUR INST P03120.5B FORCES ATTACKING LIBERTY ARE
[illegible] HOSTILE
2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY
[illegible] CONTROL THE SITUATION. DO NOT USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED.
[illegible] PURSUE ANY UNIT TOWARDS LAM
L
PHA
[illegible] PURPOSES. PURPOSE
OF COUNTERATTACK IS TO OBJECT LIBERTY ONLY.
3. BRIEF ALL PILOTS CONTENTS THIS MSG. IN ADDITION BRIEF PILOTS THAT
EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL LIMIT ONLY 12 MILES AND LIBERTY RIGHT ON
[illegible]. [illegible] NOT FLY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE EXCEPT AS REQUIRED
TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS PARA 2 ABOVE. BRIEF FIGHTER COVER THAT ANY
ATTACKS ON WSTACFAIRCR
ST, LIXHROQ, OR THEY THEMSELVES IS
HOSTILE ACT AND PARA TWO ABOVE APPLIES.
GP-4
ST

ORIGINATOR
DEPARTMENT

CON	
TOR	1400/F
SSN	
SGN	RC

DTG 081339 JUN 67

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[illegible]
[illegible] CINCUSNAVEUR

TO USS LIBERTY

INFO NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE
NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN

UNCLAS

1. ESTABLISH IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY MED AREA COMMSTA.

2. NAVCOMMSTA CAMS MOROCCO TAKE ALL AVAILABLE ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH COMM WITH USS LIBERTY REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.

3. FOR USS LIBERTY:REQUEST CONFIRM REPORT OF ATTACK.

MAR THIN MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

[illegible] 034200
[illegible] 09(1) 09B(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 09O(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) [illegible] 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(8)
008(1) IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) HATMAP(1)
CPA(1) + 34 94 107

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C11662/2/[illegible]	1 1	08/16112	081340Z JUN 67

CINCUSNAVEUR 081340 Z

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[illegible] [illegible]C273
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]3355:VV PRE687
[illegible]
DE [illegible] 687 1591410
ENY
[illegible] JUN 67
[illegible] SIX THREE
TO [illegible] COMSIXTHFLT
[illegible] [illegible]/CTF SIX ZERO
[illegible] [illegible]SNAVEUR
[illegible] PAPAGO
BT

SALVAGE OPERATIONS
A. [illegible] [illegible]3232 JUN 67 NOTAL
1. [illegible] COMSIXTHFLT: RECOMMEND PAPAGO BE DIVERTED AT MAXIMUM SPEED TO PROCEED VICINITY 31-23N9 33-25E3 TO ASSIST LIBERTY.
2. FOR PAPAGO, IF COMSIXTHFLT CONCURS DIVERT FROM PRESENT POSIT AND PROCEED TO VICINITY POSIT PARA ONE TO ASSIST LIBERTY. ADVISE [illegible] ETA UPON ARRIVAL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT SALVAGE OPERATIONS TO ASSIST LIBERTY AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.
[illegible]-4
BT

cc/mc

J.C

[illegible] 16 [illegible]

[illegible] 081410 JUN 67





(WHEN FILLED IN)

[illegible] 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

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~~[illegible] VIC TO FROM 080245Z9 UUNTIL~~
~~[illegible] SOVIET PCE YP IDENTIFIED VIC TO [illegible] SOVIET DD38~~
~~[illegible] VIC TO [illegible] AND SAMPSON AS [illegible]~~

[illegible]

[illegible] 22z

mc/oc

[illegible] 67
[illegible] NOROCCO
[illegible] SNAVEUR

[illegible] UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ATTACKING BOATS
[illegible] BOATS AFTER ATTACK HELICOPTER CIRCLED THE SHIP
[illegible] TO BE ISRALIE.



CON	
TOS	14Z7/8
CON	
SOR	R

C

NS

DTG 081412, Jan 68

(WHEN FILLED IN)

[illegible] CU LOG 2101/2 (REV 10-65)

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[illegible] 2085
[illegible] JUN 67
[illegible] TEL AVIV ISRAEL
TO [illegible]/WHITE HOUSE
[illegible]
[illegible]/[illegible]
[illegible] DEPT STATE
[illegible]/[illegible]SIXTHFLT
[illegible]
[illegible]/[illegible]NAVEUR
[illegible]/[illegible]
INFO [illegible]/DIA
[illegible]
[illegible]-USEUCOM
[illegible] SIX ZERO PT TWO
[illegible]
[illegible]/[illegible]NCUSNAVEUR
[illegible]/[illegible] SIX ZERO
BT

0825 JUN 67.

ALUSNA CALLED TO FLC TO RECEIVE REPORT . ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTBS ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT [illegible]/1200Z, POSITION [illegible] 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR ZONE COASTS. GP-3.
BT

FLAG ACT.....

TOR: [illegible] JUN 67 NR: 5[illegible] CWO.....///(PGD)///

CITE [illegible] 8 9 1 4 1 4Z JUN 67

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[illegible]ECKDA132ZCEGC123
[illegible] PUBLKD
DE RUEBNS 8140 1591424
[illegible]
[illegible] 0014[illegible] JUN 67 ZFF3 - INFORM ME WHEN THIS MSG RECEIVED BY ALL ADDEES (ANS BY 5705)
[illegible] JCS
[illegible] PUF[illegible]K/USCI[illegible]EUR
[illegible] FLTMCN/COMSIXTHFLT
[illegible]LKD/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT

JCS 7354 JCS SEND -
- YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE WHATEVER FORCE REQUIRED TO DEFEND USS LIBERTY FROM FURTHER ATTACKS.
BT



mc/oc

TIME	1439/P
DATE	081416 JUN 67

3

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

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RELAY NO COPY TO OC

[illegible] AB2536VV PRC075

[illegible] KD3936/5

[illegible] 67

[illegible] DIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)

[illegible] SIX ZERO

[illegible] SIX ZERO PT TWO

[illegible] CONSIXTHFLT [illegible]

[illegible] COMMUNICATE WITH USS LIBERTY ON ANY CIRCUIT. [illegible] RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ISSUED TO PILOTS: QUOTE: YOU [illegible] TO USE FORCE INCLUDING DESTRUCTION AS NECESSARY TO [illegible] SITUATION. DO NOT USE MORE FORCE THAN REQUIRED. DO NOT [illegible] LAND FOR REPRICAL PURPOSES. PURPOSE OF CONTER- [illegible] LIBERTY ONLY. ADDITIONALLY, ALL PILOTS BRIEFED [illegible] LIMIT ONLY TWELVE (12) MILES AND LIBERTY [illegible] BETWEEN LIBERTY AND SHORELINE [illegible] TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF ABOVE. FIGHTER COVER [illegible] THAT ANY ATTACKS ON ATTACK AIRCRAFT, LIBERTY, [illegible] HOSTILE ACT AND ABOVE APPLIES. UNQUOTE.

[illegible]	
[illegible]	1442/8
[illegible]	
[illegible]	R

[illegible] 081425, JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

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RNNNNVV KXC221VV A38540904 0[illegible] 15 02z
*****ZZ RUTPRQ
DE RUTPRC 097 1591430
ZNY EEEEE
Z [illegible] JUN 67
FM COMSIXTHFLT
TO RUFRF/CTF SIX SEVEN
RUTPP/CTF SIX SEVEN PT TWO
RUFHS/PATRON SIGONELLA
RUTKC/PATRON ROTA
INKO RUTPP/CTF SIX ZERO
RUTHWO/CINCUSNAVEUR
BT
UNCLAS
VP REQUIREMENTS
1. INSTRUCT ANY VP ACFT AIRBORNE AT THIS TIME OR PREPARING TO LAUNCH TO REMAIN WEST OF TZUVUJLNDREES EAST LONGITUDE AND REMAIN AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED MILES FROM COAST AND BORDERS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED.
2. BE PREPARED TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO CTF 60/COMSIXTHFLT REQUIREMENTS.
BT



LDR	
TOR	1502/8
SSN	
RDR	TC

DTG 081430, Jun 67

UNCLASSIFIED

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ANNEX "C"

CHARTS

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ANNEX F

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JCS,

DATED 16 JUN 67

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS GROUP

18 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Fact-Finding Team (U)

1. The Fact-Finding Team established in accordance with MJCS 271-67, dated 15 June 1967, has substantially completed gathering of all pertinent data relating to the issuance and transmission of operational directives to the USS LIBERTY associated with events during the period 5 June to 8 June 1967, which culminated in the attack on the ship on or about 0812102 June 1967.

2. The final report of the Fact-Finding Team is being completed as a matter of priority and will include a complete compilation of record information, as well as an analysis of all related facts. Appropriate recommendations will be submitted.

3. Preliminary examination of the information available indicates the following:

a. There were four (4) messages disseminated during the period of 7-8 June 1967 from higher headquarters to subordinate echelons containing revisions to previous instructions regarding the assigned operating location of the LIBERTY. Since each of these message transmissions contained instructions for substantially increasing the closest point of approach (CPA) to the UAR and Israel, the receipt of any one of these by the USS LIBERTY would undoubtedly have resulted in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene of action than underway between Israel and the UAR. Although the USS LIBERTY was either an action or an information addressee on each of these directives, there is no evidence available to confirm that the ship's Captain received any one of them.

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An identification of these directives and a brief summary of each follows:

Identification	Remarks
(1) JCS message #7[illegible]7 DTG 0[illegible]Z Jun 67 Action: USCINCEUR Info: CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY, and others	Advised in view of situation in E. MED., operating areas previously specified for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." Designated CPA 20 NM from UAR and 15 [illegible] from Israel.
(2) JCS message #7347 DTG 060110Z Jun 67 Action: USCINCEUR Info: CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY, and others	Requested LIBERTY comply with geographical constraints imposed on 6th Fleet units, "i.e., not closer than 100 NM Israel, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM Cyprus."
(3) USCINCEUR message ECJB/JRC 09085, DTG 060852Z Jun 67 Action: CINCUSNAVEUR Info: COMSIXTHFLT, USS LIBERTY, JCS, and others	Confirms verbal instructions to "take for action" JCS 7347 (a.(2) above)
(4) COMSIXTHFLT message DTG 060917Z Jun 67 Action: USS LIBERTY Info: JCS, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and others	Directs LIBERTY to "proceed immediately" to new operating location. "Do not approach coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 NM and Cyprus closer than 25 NM. Acknowledge."

b. A preliminary examination has been made of the circumstances relating to each of the above. The failure of the USS LIBERTY to receive any one of these time-critical revisions to operational directives can be attributed to a combination of (1) human error, (2) high volume of communications traffic, and (3) lack of appreciation of sense of urgency regarding the movement of the LIBERTY.

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c. In recognition of the fact that the ship was approaching her initially assigned area (12.5 NM UAR and 6.5 Israel), action was initiated through the JCS/JRC Duty Officer direct to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center via secure voice, requesting that LIBERTY be instructed to comply with previous geographical constraints imposed by COMSIXTHFLT on air and sea units, i.e., no closer than 12 NM from UAR and Israel and 50 NM from Cyprus. NAVEUR advised JCS/JRC Duty Officer that prompt action would be initiated to inform COMSIXTHFLT. By separate action, both JCS/JRC Duty Officer and CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer informed the USCINCEUR Command Center. Some four hours and forty-five minutes elapsed before these instructions were relayed to COMSIXTHFLT for action. Based on preliminary analysis of available information, the following findings apparently contributed to this delay:

(1) JCS/JRC did not use normal command channels but, in the interest of expediency, issued operational instructions direct to a component commander (CINCUSNAVEUR). Proper follow-up action was taken to advise USCINCEUR of the request for action passed to CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer and that he had taken action. At its envelope, this was an unwarranted statement and was misleading.

(a) While these actions in themselves resulted in some misunderstanding in the minds of duty officers in both the EUCOM and NAVEUCOM Command Centers as to who had the action responsibility, delay in dissemination of these operational directives cannot be solely attributed to the JCS/JRC action in initially bypassing CINCEUR, since verbal confirmation of the authenticity of these instructions (Date-Time-Group of JCS message) via secure voice communication was received by the CINCUSNAVEUR Duty Officer simultaneously with his being handed a hard copy of the message.

(b) It can be further deduced that the existence of a verbal CINCUSNAVEUR policy requiring verification, either in the form of a message Date-Time-Group or call from a General/Flag officer, before action can be taken on telephone instructions emanating from higher headquarters, effectively precluded exercise of judgment by the duty officer and the possibility of an earlier response on the part of the LIBERTY.

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(3) The JCS message directive regarding new geographical constraints for USS LIBERTY movements was transmitted to and received by USCINCEUR approximately two hours after verbal notification. CINCUSNAVEUR received the message directive approximately three hours from time of verbal notification. COMSIXTHFLT received the directive via CINCUSNAVEUR four hours and forty-five minutes from notification to USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR. COMSIXTHFLT instructions to LIBERTY were broadcast ten hours and thirty-five minutes from original initiation of the action to relocate LIBERTY.

(4) The reasons for delays on the Flagship of COMSIXTHFLT were internal staffing, a delay in transmitting due to other traffic of the same and higher precedence, and the commander and his staff were deeply involved in high priority press activity directed by DOD and plans for evacuation of dependents.

4. Notification of the additional task to incorporate official US public statements based on the findings was received on the afternoon of 15 June 1967. Although Public Affairs statements available in the European Command have been reviewed, those available in the Washington area have not as yet been fully analyzed. All those reviewed to date indicate no bearing on the findings.

5. There appears to be no evidence to indicate the existence at any time of conflicting instructions pertaining to the operation of the USS LIBERTY.

6. The team met with the senior member of the court of inquiry convened by CINCUSNAVEUR on 15 June 1967 in Malta. In order to preclude infringement upon the prerogatives of that group, information pertaining to receipt and reaction of the LIBERTY to operational directives was obtained by the team from facts previously collected by the court of inquiry. Subsequently, at Hqs CINCUSNAVEUR, an exchange of facts was mutually beneficial to both efforts.

JOSEPH R. RUSS
Major General, USA
Chief, JCCRO

Copy to: Director, Joint Staff

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Watch Log

OFF: Major Breedlove

NCO: Hart McNulty

TIME LOCAL	MSG/CALL PHONE/TO	MESSAGE OR EVENT
2000	TO NAVEUR (Haleott)	Passed instructions to hold the USS LIBERTY outside 100 NM of Isreal, Syria, Egypt and 25 NM of Cyprus, per Capt Norex-Capt Vineyard's instructions. (see classified tape 3 footage 192/210
2010	TO EUCOM* Russell	passed the above info to EUCOM. Msg is being dispatched.

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FROM: 07/0730 TO: 07/1930 June 67
ACTION
INFORMATION
COPY TYPE DATE
James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



FULL
[illegible]
[illegible] ITPVUXTGTWAGXTUTUGTH W LDEG XTVTY
[illegible]
TVBIJH
TXPTF
[illegible]
[illegible] 342 [illegible] KJ
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
*****ZF RUTPRU[illegible] - Relay
[illegible] RUTPRG [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] JUN 67
[illegible]
TO [illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR
[illegible]/CNO
[illegible]

A. [illegible] TEL AVIV [illegible] JUN 67
1. [illegible]
2. [illegible] CONSTRUCTIE
[illegible]. [illegible] 4 [illegible] SOUNDED.
[illegible]
[illegible]

Burned Copy FFB
FOR JCS
[illegible]

CON	
TOR	[illegible]
SIN	
SEN	R

[illegible] 081439 Jun 62
3

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NAVEUR NCU L/N 3100/3 (REV 10-62)

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Liberty

RELAY

VV [illegible]2410E CNL VV AGS545VV NYC007

[illegible]

[illegible] 1591455

[illegible] JUN 67

[illegible] CONSIXTHFLT

TO [illegible]/USCINCEUR

INFO AIG NINE NINE EIGHT (TO CINCUSNAVEUR)

[illegible]/CNO

[illegible]/JCS

[illegible]/COMFAIRMED

[illegible]/CTF SIX ZERO

[illegible]/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

[illegible]

CONTFLASHSITREP 06005 CONSIXTHFLT DEIYTEE

1. FOLLOWING MSG REC FROM USDAO TEL AVIV.

QUOTE: ALUSNA CALLED TO FLO TO RECEIVE REPORT.

ISRAELI AIRCRAFT AND MTB'S ERRONEOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. SHIP AT [illegible]. POSITION 31-25N 33-33E. MAYBE NAVY SHIP. IDF HELICOPTERS IN RESCUE OPERATIONS. NO OTHER INFO. ISRAELIS SEND ABJECT APOLIGIES AND REQUEST INFO OF OTHER US SHIPS NEAR WAR COAST. UNQUOTE.

2. AT [illegible] LIBERTY REPORTED UNDERWAY AT EIGHT(8) KNOTS, [illegible] DEGREES MAGNETIC.

CP-4

[illegible]

mc/oc

[illegible]	
[illegible]	1512/P
[illegible]	
[illegible]	RC

[illegible] 081455 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2300/2 (REV 10-65)

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] NHTPNC 114 1391311

[illegible] JUN 67
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]CINCUSNAVEUR
[illegible]MISTA MOROCCO
[illegible]MISTA B
LEUK
[illegible]NAVCOMMSTA ASMARA
[illegible]NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN
[illegible]NAVCOMD LONDON

mc/oc

[illegible] LIBERTY APXISES SHE HAS CARRIED OUT EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF
[illegible] CRYPTO PUBS AND KEY CARDS.
[illegible]LY COMM VIA CINCUSNAVEUR HICOM E04.04.



COM	
TOR	16 5 [illegible] 65
EDN	
SGN	

DTG 081514 Jun 66

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NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTED BY	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	AIR MAIL
[illegible]	ACTION	XXX			
PHONE EXT. NO.	INFO	[illegible]			

FOR COMMUNICATION USE ONLY

TAPE CUTTER

[illegible]

[illegible] AMERICA, USS SARATOGA

[illegible] BEEN INFORMED BY TELEPHONE AT 0815002 THAT [illegible] [illegible] FOLLOWS ON SOBERTY AFFAIR WILL BE MADE [illegible] AT WASHINGTON LEVEL. NO FOLLOWS TO BE MADE ON

[illegible] ON [illegible] TO [illegible].

(PAGE 1 OF ____)

CCN			
TOR			
DSN	1078		
DGN			

[illegible] 517 [illegible] 67

(WHEN FILLED)

[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



[illegible] 4[illegible]682VV NYC979

[illegible]

[illegible] 022 1528428

[illegible] RUFPBK RUTPRC RUFPBV RUFIC RUFRF RUEDNKA

[illegible] RUECPSA RUTKRE RUTPCR

[illegible] 291521V

ZNY CCCCC

[illegible] JUN 67

[illegible]THFLT

[illegible]INCEUR

[illegible]NAVEUR

[illegible] SHAPE

[illegible]EAFE

[illegible]UKAREUR

[illegible] PLANT AMCOGEN FRANKFURT

[illegible]FIRMED

[illegible]LANT

[illegible]FLT

[illegible]D

[illegible]FOP

[illegible]TRIKE

[illegible]EAFSA

[illegible] ZERO

[illegible] JUN 67

[illegible]FLT

Dupe file
8-C-3332
JAW 3

MC/SDO

[illegible] 116 N A T O

[illegible] AND FINAL TO CONSIXTHFLT CRITIC 1-67

[illegible] RECEIVED FROM FLO THAT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

[illegible]LY ATTACKED US SHIP AT 051200Z, POSIT 31-25N, 33-33E.

[illegible] SHIP. IDF HELOS IN RESCUE OPS. NO OTHER INFO ISRAELIS

[illegible]. SIXTHFLT SENDING ASSISTANCE.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]CKDA165ECEDA668
[illegible] MUDLKD
[illegible] R[illegible]JS 017C 1591[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] JUNE 67 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] PBX/USCINCEUR
[illegible] PUTPRC/CONS[illegible]THFLT
[illegible]/CINCUSNAVEUR

[illegible] 15 52z
mc/oc

JCS7369 JCS SEND
[illegible] JCS 7354/DS1416Z
[illegible] ADM RIVERO TO GEN BURCHINAL 8 JUN
1. CONFIRMING REF TELECON DISCONTINUE USE OF
FORCE AUTHORIZED BY REF [illegible] GP-4
BT

CONTROL SECTION	
CONTROL DEPARTMENT	
NS	

CONTROL	
TOR	15522/68
STAT	
DRN	

DTG [illegible] 21, JUNE 67

3 (WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/3 (REV 10-65)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers



James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] K-C25VV AGB722VV PRC144
[illegible] RUDLKD
[illegible] CCCCC ZFD RUTPRC 051 1688724
[illegible] ZZ RUFPBK RUFRI RUFPBVL RUDLKD RUDLAM RUENAAA RUEPJS RUTPP
RUDLHA RUFPAG
[illegible] RUTPRC 128 1591649
[illegible]
[illegible] JUN 67
[illegible] CONSIXTHFLT
[illegible] USCINCEUR
[illegible] NINE EIGHT-TO CINCUSNAVEUR SDO
MC
[illegible]
[illegible] ZZ10 PT TWO

[illegible] CONSIXTHFLT 081645
1. [illegible] AMERICA AND SARATOGA HAVE BEEN RECALLED AND ARE
[illegible]
2. [illegible] TED TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IF REQUIRED.
[illegible]
BT



(PAGE 1 OF ____)

CON	
TOR	09/1322
RGN	
SGN	

[illegible] 081649 JUN 67

(WHEN FILLED IN)

NAVEUR NCU LON 2100/2 (REV 10-65)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

ANNEX B

COMMUNICATIONS TABS

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] MESSAGE [illegible]

"JCS MILS MESSAGE"



*Cancelled by JCS 7347, DTG 080110Z (Elapsed time between events, 2 hrs 40 min).

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY JCS MESSAGE 7347/080112Z June 1967

"JCS 100 MILE MESSAGE"



* Guam sent message to Kunia with instructions to relay to Morocco. Kunia misrouted to DACC in error.

In all cases, delays in transmission from the DACC were caused by the unusually large amount of flash precedence traffic and other immediate precedence traffic which was also awaiting transmission. Messages are handled by precedence in the order received in DACC; first in, first out by precedence. During period of such large volume of traffic, it is virtually impossible to determine if the subject matter of a message warrants its transmission before another message of the same precedence.

@ NSA dead-end terminal. Could not relay over General Service Communications. Did not return to DACC. Filed without action.

TAB 2 to
Annex D

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE USCINCEUR MESSAGE

FCJC/JRC 09045/080625Z June 1967

Confirms telecon to CINCUSNAVEUR to take JCS 080110Z for action.



No evidence this message was received by the USS LIBERTY, based upon information provided by US Navy Court of Inquiry.

Tab 4 to

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE COMSIXTHFLT, DTG 080917Z June 1967

"COMSIXTHFLT 100 MILE IMPLEMENTING MSG TO USS LIBERTY"



Delayed due to internal staffing and in station traffic of equal or higher precedence traffic.

Delayed by equal or higher precedence traffic.

Misrouted through personnel err to NAVCOMMSTA Greece.

Volume of in station traffic precluded giving attention to this missent message.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

TAB 5 to

[illegible] Station [illegible]

[illegible]

1 Feb	1,0[illegible]	1 Jun	[illegible]
2 Feb	1,2[illegible]	2 Jun	[illegible]
3 Feb	1,2[illegible]	3 Jun	[illegible]
[illegible] Feb	1,0[illegible]	[illegible] Jun	[illegible]
5 Feb	976	5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Feb	[illegible]	6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Feb	1,0[illegible]	7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Feb	1,0[illegible]	8 Jun	[illegible]
9 Feb	[illegible]	9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Feb	[illegible]	10 Jun	[illegible]
11 Feb	77[illegible]	11 Jun	[illegible]
12 Feb	92[illegible]	12 Jun	[illegible]
Total	12,002	Total	1[illegible],0[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] Communications Unit London

I. [illegible] Handled

[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	

[illegible] Communication Station Saigon

I. [illegible] Handled

1 Feb	[illegible]	1 Jun	[illegible]
2 Feb	7,13[illegible]	2 Jun	[illegible]
3 Feb	7,[illegible]	3 Jun	[illegible]
4 Feb	6,64[illegible]	4 Jun	[illegible]
5 Feb	4,[illegible]	5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Feb	5,[illegible]	6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Feb	6,[illegible]	7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Feb	7,[illegible]	8 Jun	[illegible]
9 Feb	7,70[illegible]	9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Feb	7,71[illegible]	10 Jun	[illegible]
11 Feb	[illegible]	11 Jun	[illegible]
12 Feb	4,[illegible]	12 Jun	[illegible]
Total	80,103	Total	39,[illegible]

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	37
6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Jun	31
8 Jun	95
9 Jun	13
10 Jun	16
Total	223

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	10[illegible]
6 Jun	15[illegible]
7 Jun	11[illegible]
8 Jun	80
9 Jun	73
10 Jun	9[illegible]
Total	69[illegible]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Station Guam

I. [illegible] Handled

1 Feb	3,901	1 Jun	[illegible]
2 Feb	5,775	2 Jun	[illegible]
3 Feb	6,240	3 Jun	[illegible]
4 Feb	5,[illegible]	4 Jun	[illegible]
5 Feb	3,[illegible]	5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Feb	3,160	6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Feb	5,[illegible]	7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Feb	6,521	8 Jun	[illegible]
9 Feb	6,[illegible]	9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Feb	6,935	10 Jun	[illegible]
11 Feb	5,293	11 Jun	[illegible]
12 Feb	4,419	12 Jun	[illegible]
Total	69,122	Total	112,[illegible]

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	96
6 Jun	203
7 Jun	114
8 Jun	281
9 Jun	162
10 Jun	341
Total	1,190

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	134
6 Jun	216
7 Jun	163
8 Jun	181
9 Jun	181
10 Jun	179
Total	1,055

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Naval Communication Station Manager

I. Messages Handled

1 Feb	7,[illegible]	1 Jun	[illegible]
2 Feb	7,[illegible]	2 Jun	[illegible]
3 Feb	8,[illegible]	3 Jun	[illegible]
4 Feb	7,[illegible]	4 Jun	[illegible]
5 Feb	[illegible]	5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Feb	[illegible]	6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Feb	7,[illegible]	7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Feb	8,[illegible]	8 Jun	[illegible]
9 Feb	[illegible]	9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Feb	[illegible]	10 Jun	[illegible]
11 Feb	7,[illegible]	11 Jun	[illegible]
12 Feb	5,[illegible]	12 Jun	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	Total	[illegible]

II. Flash Messages Handled

5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Jun	[illegible]
7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Jun	124
9 Jun	12
10 Jun	3
Total	[illegible]

III. Service Messages Handled

5 Jun	[illegible]
6 Jun	107
7 Jun	[illegible]
8 Jun	[illegible]
9 Jun	[illegible]
10 Jun	[illegible]
Total	749

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

AVAL MESSAGE

9 June 1967

MESSAGE NUMBER DATE TIME GROUP (GCT)
191 14 16 00

FROM: COMSIXTHFLT

TO: CINCUSNAVEUR

INFO: COMSTRIKFORSOUTH

EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67

1. THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY AT 9812392Z SET OFF A CHAIN OF EVENTS REQUIRING EXTENSIVE HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO BE INTRODUCED FOR MANY HOURS INTO A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH ALREADY HAD IMPOSED MINIMIZE TO REDUCE THE ABNORMAL VOLUME OF TRAFFIC CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.

2. EXERCISE WIDE AWAKE 9-67 WAS CONDUCTED 081700Z6. THE FIRST COPIES OF THE NATO MESSAGE LACKED ONE PHONETIC LETTER IN LINE BRAVO, THUS MAKING NATIONAL AUTHENTICATION OF NATO MSG INITIALLY IMPOSSIBLE. A CORRECTION MSG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED. NUMEROUS COPIES OF NATIONAL MSG CONTAINED QUOTE 5-67 EXQUISE WIDE 9-67. DUE TO THE ECHO EFFECTS OF USEUCOM/ACE COMMAND REACTION COMMUNICATIONS, NATIONAL AND NATO VERSIONS (INCLUDING DUPLICATIONS), WERE RECEIVED IN EXCESS OF 125 TIMES DURING A TWO HOUR PERIOD OVER ALL CIRCUITS AVAILABLE TO COMSIXTHFLT. THESE HIGH PRECEDENCE EXERCISE MESSAGES INTERFERED WITH ACTUAL HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATTACK ON USS LIBERTY.

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. SINCE WIDE AWAKES ARE SACEUR INITIATED EXERCISES, IT IS ASSUMED THAT WIDE
AKE 9-67 WAS IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE SACEUR WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EXISTING
ITUATION AT 081730Z6. HOWEVER IT IS SUBMITTED THAT PROCEDURES SHOULD EXIST
[illegible] HIGHER NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN PREVENT EXERCISE INTERFERENCE WITH
[illegible]TUAL EMERGENCY.

. IT IS URGED THAT IN THE FUTURE ALL COMM/ALERT EXERCISES BE SUSPENDED
WHENEVER ACTUAL ALERTS OR DEFCONS HAVE BEEN DECLARED AND WHEN ACTUAL SIXTEEN
EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS OR MINIMIZE HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT.

67-4

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

(Stated policy that ATTEMPT will ope

0715032 (Date Time Group of Message)

0716302

0716302 → Received at DACC Advance copies transmitted

0716302 → NMCC Message Center

0716332 → Transmitted to NMCC

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

[illegible] USSR, Syria and Israel]

Navy

071548Z

Received at Navy Comm Center via Cheltenham

071548Z

Transmitted to Flag Plot

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USS LIBERTY MESSAGE 080742Z

(Overflight by two jet aircraft)



Delays attributed to equal or higher precedence traffic.

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1

A

19

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

2

NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
FILE

AN IMPORTANT CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACK & SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUCH BACKGROUND INFORMATION RE ATTACK, "RESCUE," COMMAND AND CONTROL, TIME ZONES, PERSONNEL

MESS PERTINENT DOCUMENTS FROM THIS FILE, INCLUDING "LESSONS LEARNED, CAN BE FOUND IN THE HOOVER LIBRARY

FOLDER 19

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
200 STOVALL STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332

IN REPLY REFER TO

5720
Ser 14[illegible]384
29 AUG 1985

Mr. James Miller
[redacted]

Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal

Dear Mr. Miller:

This is in response to your letter of June 7, 1985, received in this office on June 13, 1985. That letter appeals the decision of Rear Admiral D.H. McDowell, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Security Group Command, to partially deny your request for information concerning the USS LIBERTY. Your letter is considered a request for a final determination under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (1982).

Both your letter of appeal and the requested document have been carefully reviewed and, for the reasons stated herein, your appeal must be denied.

The excised portions of the document consist of classified material, the release of which would jeopardize national security. The document has been reviewed for possible declassification and, as a result of this review, it has been concluded that the withheld portions remain properly classified under the criteria set forth in Executive Order No. 12,356. 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). Accordingly, the withholding of this classified information is authorized by both statute and regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982); 32 C.F.R. § 701.9(a)(1) (1984).

This letter constitutes final denial of your request. As the Secretary of the Navy's designee for this purpose, the undersigned is the individual responsible for this action. 32 C.F.R. § 701.9(a)(1) (1984). You are further advised of your right to seek judicial review.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Slater

RICHARD L. SLATER
Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Assistant Judge Advocate General
for the Secretary of the Navy

FOLDER 14

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

4

Judge Advocate General
Department of the Navy
200 Stoval Street
Alexandria, VA 22322

7 June 1985

Subject: FOIA Appeal U.S.S Liberty Documents

Reference: FOIA Request dated 11 July 83
NSCC ltr. dated 10 Aug. 83
Naval Hist. Center ltr.to J. Miller dated 6 Oct 83
FOIA Appeal to NSCC dated 8 Mar 84
Ltrs. to NSCC dated 6 July84 and 17 Dec.84
NSCC ltr. dated 4 Mar.85
Magt ltr. dated 23 May 85

Gentlemen:

This is an appeal under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. This appeal concerns the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) documents provided under their cover letter of 23 May 85 signed by Mr. C.J. Henriksen. These documents contain excised passages and documents excised in total which are a small part of the total yet are too numerous to cite. My appeal is for release of all excised documents and all excised passages.

The background for this appeal concerns the controversial nature of this attack. Many sources including virtually all surviving crew members of the Liberty are convinced the attack was deliberate. Continued witholding of NSGC documents on an 18 yearild historical event under exemption (b)(1) gives the clear appearance of a foreign policy decision and not a decision based on national security.

The FOIA gives agencies discretionary authority to release classified documents via declassification. Thus continued non-release of these documents could legitamately be interpreted as evidence of a continuing U.S./ Israeli coverup. In other words if Israel bears no culpability for a deliberate attack as claimed, then why continue to withold these more sensitive documents which would provide more information and in turn support the Israeli claim of innocence.

Please consider that E.O. 12356 expressly forbids the classification of information to protect unlawful conduct from public disclosure:

> In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of the law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency. (E.O.12356, Section 1.6(a))

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

5

The term "law" embraces treaties, and at the time of the Israeli attack on the Liberty(1967), the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Israel and the United States(TIAS 2948, 5 UST, Pt. 1,550) was in effect. That Treaty provides that

> "Each party shall at all times accord equitable treatment to the persons, property, enterprises, and other equitable interests of nationals and companies of the other party.
>
> (Article I)
>
> Between the territories of the two Parties, there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.
>
> (Article XIX, section 1)
>
> Vessels of either Party shall have the liberty...to come with their chargoes to all ports, places, and waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation.
>
> (Article XIX, section 3)
>
> There shall be freedom of transit through the territories of each Party, by the routes most convenient for the international transit:.... for articles of any origin en route to or from the territories of such other Party.

There can be no doubt that the well coordinated Israeli Naval/Air attack on the Liberty, even if inadvertent, violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. It therefore constitutes a violation of law, and, accordingly, may not be afforded protection of exception (b)(1) by the terms of the Executive Order's own exception.

As provided by law I look forward to your response within 20 days, however if more time is required in order to provide full responses to the points cited in this appeal, then please advise me of your response date and I will concur with any reasonable date you provide.

Sincerely,

James Miller

James Miller
3402 E. 125th St.
Burnsville, MN 55337

Encl:
NSCC ltr. dated 23 May 85

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

6

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
3301 NEBRASKA AVENUE N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20390 -5212

5720
Ser GH/ 7063
23 MAY 1985

Mr. James Miller
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Miller:

This is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act [illegible] for the release of a document on the U.S.S. LIBERTY generated by [illegible] Security Group historian.

I am pleased to inform you that the declassification review of this document has been completed and substantially all of the records contained in this document have been declassified to enable release. A copy of the declassified document is enclosed, and I have determined that any allowable fees associated with your request be waived.

While most of this document is now releasable, some portions have been found to be still properly classified in accordance with current classification standards. These portions have been deleted in order to protect the interests of national security. All deletions made fall within the provisions of Exemption 1(5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)); consequently, to the extent that deletions were found necessary and have been made pursuant to this exemption, your request must be denied.

Because your request has been partially denied, you are advised that it is your right under the FOIA and Title 32, Section 701.9, Code of Federal Regulations, to appeal this determination. To be considered, any appeal must be in writing and be received within 45 days from the date of this letter. It is recommended that a copy of this letter be attached to any appeal, and that the letter of appeal and the envelope both bear the notation "FOIA Appeal." Any appeal should be addressed to the designee of the Secretary of the Navy who is the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22322.

The official responsible for the partial denial of your request is RADM D. H. McDowell, USN, Commander, Naval Security Group Command. If you have any questions concerning this response, Mr. Dean Clatterbuck, 202-282-0235 is familiar with your request and will endeavor to assist you in any way possible.

You have now received a copy of all releasable records and documents held by the Naval Security Group Command Headquarters which relate to the U.S.S. LIBERTY.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

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Your patience and cooperation during the time required to complete the declassification review is appreciated, and we trust that the enclosed information will prove to be useful to you.

Sincerely,

G. G. HENRIKSEN
Special Assistant for Security
By direction of the
Commander, Naval Security Group Command

Encl:
(1) Copy of declassified File on U.S.S. LIBERTY

NOTE: THE FILE RELEASED WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO ME WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY (WITHOUT DELETIONS). I MADE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE FILE NUMBER (NSA LIBERTY FILE 5750-1) AND ASKED FOR RELEASE UNDER FOIA SOON AFTER MY RETIREMENT FROM THE NAVY IN 1978. I WAS TOLD THE FILE COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED. IN 1982 I PERSONALLY ASKED GEORGE HENRIKSEN TO HELP. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT THE FILE COULD NOT BE FOUND. NOW SUDDENLY IT APPEARS.

THE ORIGINAL FILE, HOWEVER, CONTAINED A GREAT MANY MESSAGES, INCLUDING ONE FROM AMEMB TEL AVIV PLEADING ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL TO KEEP THE ISRAELI EXCUSE PRIVATE BECAUSE IT "STRIPS THE ISRAELI NAVY NAKED" (BY MAKING IT LOOK INCOMPETENT IF THEIR STORY IS TO BE BELIEVED.)

2

J. M. Ennes
27 FEB 1986

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

8

Reviewed for declassification as authorized by

Executive Order 12356 on 11 April 1985
(Date)

Present Classification and Special Handling Requirements:

UNCLASSIFIED	FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRET	SI CODEWORD
TOP SECRET	SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM
	PA INFORMATION
	FOIA EXEMPTION

Reason for extension of classification (if applicable):

____ Military plans, weapons, or operations

____ Vulnerabilities or capabilities relating to the national security

____ Foreign government information

____ Intelligence activities, sources or methods

____ Foreign relations/activities

____ Scientific, technological or economic matters

____ Nuclear materials or facilities

____ Cryptology

____ Cryptographic Security

Authority: COMNAVSECGRU (GNI/IGN)

Next Scheduled Review Date: Not Applicable

Item(s): Sanitized copy of NAVAL SECURITY GROUP FILE ON U. S. S. LIBERTY

NEW NAVSECGRU 5510/6 (REV 8-82)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Table of Contents

Introduction

The LIBERTY Incident

Chronology of Events

Annex A Historical Sketch of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

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Appendix II Research Operations Department Personnel Information

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~~SECRET~~

Introduction

~~(S)~~ The development of the Middle East crisis in May 1967 led to the diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from her normal operating area off the coast of West Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

(U) Arab-Israeli hostilities commenced on 5 June 1967. On 8 June, while operating in international waters off the coast of the United Arab Republic, LIBERTY suffered an unprovoked attack by air and naval forces which resulted in 34 deaths, ~~numerous~~ injuries and extensive damage to the ship.

(U) On 9 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a Fact Finding Team "to examine the circumstances relating to the issuance and transmission of operations directives to the LIBERTY associated with events during the period 1-8 June which culminated in the attack on LIBERTY..." The Team submitted its report to the Director, Joint Staff, on 21 June.

~~(S)~~ To provide complete support to the JCS Fact Finding Team, on 10 June DIRNSA directed his staff to fully document the following:
responsibility vis-a-vis the JCS(JRC) and other authorities for LIBERTY's operations;
the basis and rationale for selection of the operating areas, definition of all aspects of the mission which would influence positioning the platform and identification of the degree to which the mission might have been degraded were LIBERTY confined to operating in waters no closer than 100 nm from the coasts of Israel and Egypt and 25 nm from Cyprus. A report was submitted to DIRNSA on 11 June.

(U) A Court of Inquiry was convened by CINCUSNAVEUR on 10 June to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on LIBERTY. The findings of the Court were submitted to and approved by CINCUSNAVEUR on 18 June and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for review. A summary of proceedings was released to the press on 28 June.

~~(S)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR activated TF 100 at 120001Z June to supervise dry-docking of LIBERTY at Malta in order to prevent disclosure of classified information and equipment to unauthorized personnel. TF 100 was disestablished 151500Z June.

(U) DIRNAVSECGRU directed that a history of the LIBERTY incident be compiled for Naval Security Group files to record the facts and to document lessons learned. This document, The LIBERTY Incident, has been prepared in response to the DIRNAVSECGRU requirement.

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The LIBERTY Incident

The development of the Middle East crisis during the period 15-23 May 1967, resulted in the declaration on 23 May. The same day, requested that the JCS authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to an operating area off Port Said

The request to deploy LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean was the result of

requirement to develop optimum data for providing direct support to U.S. forces which might become involved in the crisis.

These requirements could be fully satisfied only with a seaborne platform.

responsibility for LIBERTY operations, including the rationale for selection of areas of deployment, is documented in a Report to the Director, NSA -- USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) 23 May-8 June 1967 of 11 June 1967.

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At JCS direction, LIBERTY was ordered to Rota, Spain, to prepare for extended deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. The stop at Rota was required to insure that LIBERTY would have available the necessary operational and logistic support information concerning the coordination and support of her operations in the area. En route Rota, LIBERTY had experienced difficulty with the propulsion system and with her [illegible] antenna. At Rota, repairs were effected, NSA and Navy and technical support materials were provided to LIBERTY. On 2 June, the ship departed Rota for Area 3, one of five operating areas approved by JCS. (See Annex B.)

JCS 011545Z June 1967 specified a closest point of approach (CPA) of 12.5 nautical miles (nm) to the UAR and 6.5 nm to Israel.

The diversion of LIBERTY to the Mediterranean brought the ship into USCINCEUR's area of responsibility; consequently, operational control of LIBERTY passed from CINCLANT to USCINCEUR.

Arab-Israeli hostilities commenced at approximately 0507002 June.

To "facilitate command and control and any possible requirement for protection during Middle East hostilities," CINCUSNAVEUR changed operational control of LIBERTY to COMSIXTHFLT at 0700012 June. requested JCS to take immediate action to change LIBERTY's operating area from Area 3 to Area 2 to meet tasking requirements. No action on this request resulted prior to the attack on LIBERTY. In the meantime, CNO had challenged the prudence of sending LIBERTY to a position so close to the area of hostilities. In reply to a query to JCS(JRC), CNO was informed that technical reasons were overriding. The CNO/JCS dialogue prompted the issue of JCS 072230Z June 1967 which changed LIBERTY's CPA to the UAR to 20 nm and to Israel, 15 nm. The message also advised that the operating area specified in JCS 011545Z June 1967 was "for guidance only and may be varied as local conditions dictate." At the moment, JCS representatives were not aware of COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June 1967 which reported that as of 032015Z June, no Sixth Fleet units were permitted within 100 nm of Israel, Syria or Egypt, or within 25 nm of Cyprus. This message, which CNO received some 41 minutes before it was received in JCS(JRC), led CNO to press again for modification of LIBERTY's movements to conform at least to Sixth Fleet geographical restrictions. Subsequent discussions between JCS and CNO representatives led to JCS 080110Z June 1967 which canceled JCS 072230Z June 1967 and limited LIBERTY's CPA to Israel, Syria or Egypt to 100 nm and to Cyprus, 25 nm. This change in CPA to 100 nm was directed approximately two hours after the 20-nm modification.

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Messages modifying LIBERTY's CPA to the WAR to 100 mm were never received by the ship because of communications delays and routing errors. (See entries for JCS 080110Z and COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z, both June 1967, in Chronology of Events.)

LIBERTY had reported being orbited by three unidentified delta-wing, single-engine, jet aircraft three times at 080050Z at position 31-27N/34-00E and had stated that no amplifying report would be submitted. COMSIXTHFLT was not alarmed, for LIBERTY's indication that there would be no further reports was interpreted to mean that the overflight was routine and that there was no apprehension on the part of the ship.

At 081205Z, two or more unidentified jet aircraft, in five or six attacks from various angles, conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks on LIBERTY while she was on course 283 true steaming at five knots at 31-35.5N/33-29E. At 081235Z, the ship sustained a torpedo hit on the starboard side amidships.

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28 April [redacted] CONSERVRON 8 281502Z directed LIBERTY to depart Norfolk 2 May 1967 for operations off the west coast of Africa. The cruise was to include port visits at Abidjan, Luanda, Libreville, Monrovia and Las Palmas [redacted] and return to Norfolk on 25 August 1967.

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Chronology of Events

15 May (U) Egyptian armor dug in on Israel's southern frontier.

22 May (U) After serving as the bumper force which had separated the Arabs and Israelis for a decade, the U. N. Emergency Force, having been elbowed out of the Sinai Peninsula, was totally withdrawn from Egypt.

23 May (U) President NASSER of Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba, blockading Elath, Israel's only southern port. All vessels of Israeli registry and oil tankers of all nations were to be denied passage into the Gulf of Aqaba.

~~(S)~~

~~(C)~~ In order to augment coverage in the area, requested JCS(JRC) to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to Rota, Spain, in preparation for deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean.

~~(C)~~ JCS 2321722/JCS 6457 approved diversion of LIBERTY recommended in and passed the message to CINCLANT for action.

24 May ~~(C)~~ CONSERVE 2400302 directed LIBERTY to depart Abidjan as soon as possible and proceed to Port Said via Rota, Spain.

~~(C)~~ 2417302Z. LIBERTY departed Abidjan. ETA Rota 3120002. (USS LIBERTY 2417322.)

29 May ~~(C)~~ JCS requested CINCLANT to chop operational control (opcon) of LIBERTY to USCINCEUR upon ship's arrival at Rota, Spain, on or about 31 May. Additionally, JCS requested USCINCEUR to make preparations for extended deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. (JCS 2916032/JCS 6499.)

~~(C)~~ requested JCS approval of suggested operating areas for LIBERTY and proposed Area 3 as the initial area, subject to "adjustment as necessary for operational or safety reasons."

Note: ~~(C)~~ Operating areas submitted for JCS approval are charted in Annex B.

~~Encl~~

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30 May

(A) CINCLANTFLT ordered COMSERVLANT to direct LIBERTY to chop to USCINCEUR upon arrival Rota and to ensure that CINCLANT JRC and CINCLANTFLT were kept informed of LIBERTY movements. (CINCLANTFLT 3000402.)

(B) COMSERVRON 8 directed LIBERTY to chop to USCINCEUR upon arrival Rota. (COMSERVRON 8 3002022.)

(C) LIBERTY advised USCINCEUR: position at 3005[illegible]Z May 1967 was 26-OON/14-15W; proceeding Rota 15 knots; ETA Rota 0109002 June 1967, at which time LIBERTY would chop to USCINCEUR. (USS LIBERTY 3006082.)

(D) USCINCEUR requested CINCUSNAVEUR to release opcon of LIBERTY as the ship passed the sea buoy inbound to Rota. (USCINCEUR 3009322/ECJC/JRC 08588.)

31 May

(E) 3108002. LIBERTY position 36-30N/010-24W; position of intended movement (PIM) coastal, northerly, 15 kts. (USS LIBERTY 3108282.)

(F) CINCUSNAVEUR directed LIBERTY, upon chop to CINCUSNAVEUR, to enter Rota for fuel and loading, then to depart for the Eastern Mediterranean. (CINCUSNAVEUR 3117502.)

(G) [illegible]

1 June

(H) USCINCEUR requested JCS guidance regarding LIBERTY schedule, operating area and special requirements. Requested CINCUSNAVEUR to establish reporting procedure to ensure SITREP's and PIM's from LIBERTY and reports of any incidents as soon as possible in accordance with reconnaissance reporting instructions. (USCINCEUR 0100352/ECJC/JRC 08685.)

(I) JCS requested USCINCEUR to hold LIBERTY at Rota until otherwise directed. (JCS 0103092/JCS 6714.)

(J) USCINCEUR directed CINCUSNAVEUR to hold LIBERTY at Rota pending arrival of additional personnel being provided by DIRNAVSECGRU. (USCINCEUR 0104192/ECJC/JRC 08686.)

(K) LIBERTY 0800 position 36-30N/06-46W; PIM 055, 16 knots; ETA Rota 0108452. Final report until departure from Rota. Will chop to CINCUSNAVEUR at 0109002 and remain Rota awaiting further orders. (USS LIBERTY 0107122.)

(L) LIBERTY was directed to delay sailing until NSA personnel and NAVEUR and SIXTHFLT publications were aboard, and to submit position reports as of 2400Z daily, including PIM for next 24 hours. (CINCUSNAVEUR 0113052.)

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(46) JCS requested USCINCEUR to deploy LIBERTY on 2 June from Rota, Spain, to Area 3 and stipulated a closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya and the UAR of 13 nautical miles (nm) during the transit. Upon arrival in Area 3 on or about 9 June, the CPA stipulated by JCS was to be 12.5 nm to the UAR and 6.5 nm to Israel. (JCS 011545Z/JCS 6724.)

(47) CINCUSNAVEUR advised USCINCEUR that the additional personnel and technical support material were aboard LIBERTY at Rota, but that the ship's departure was being delayed for repair of antenna control hydraulic system. (CINCUSNAVEUR 012100Z.)

2 June (48) LIBERTY directed to depart Rota when ready 2 June. (CINCUSNAVEUR 020717Z.)

(49) LIBERTY reported that temporary repair of TRSSCOMM system had been completed; system operational. RPS and ETD Rota 021230Z. (USS LIBERTY 021133Z.)

(50) 021230Z. LIBERTY departed Rota. (USS LIBERTY 022108Z.)

(51) 022400Z. LIBERTY position 36-12N/003-29W; PIM coastal, easterly, 15 kts. (USS LIBERTY 022108Z.)

3 June (52) CINCUSNAVEUR advised COMSIXTHFLT that LIBERTY would be conducting independent surveillance operations in Eastern Mediterranean and requested logistic support. Pertinent instructions to LIBERTY to be provided by COMSIXTHFLT. (CINCUSNAVEUR 031016Z.)

(53) 032400Z. LIBERTY position 37-10N/004-03E; PIM coastal, easterly, 15 knots. TRSSCOMM hydraulic system again failed; leaks beyond capacity of ship's force to repair until spare parts received next port of call. (USS LIBERTY 032028Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 231620Z June 1967.)

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~~(C)~~ 061800Z. LIBERTY position 34-18N/024-06E; FIM 107/16. (USS LIBERTY 061844Z.)

~~(C)~~ LIBERTY declared her intention to chop to CONSIXTHFLT at 070001Z. (USS LIBERTY 062036Z.)

~~(C)~~ JCS outlined procedures to be followed in developing LIBERTY schedules while the ship was operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. (JCS 062050Z/JCS 7206.)

~~(C)~~ LIBERTY MOVEREP formally announced chop to CONSIXTHFLT at 070001Z. (USS LIBERTY 062[illegible]Z.)

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Note: (U) This message was not delivered to addressees. It was transmitted by LIBERTY to the Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco, where it was received at 0403592 June 1967. There is no evidence that the message was refiled in common-user, i.e., GENSER, channels. (CINCUSNAVEUR 2316202 June 1967; Court of Inquiry.)

4 June (U) 0424002. LIBERTY position 37-22N/011-15E; PIM 11-20 until 0501302, thence 106/15. (USS LIBERTY 0420402Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 2316202 June 1967.)

Note: (U) This message was not delivered to addressees. It was transmitted by LIBERTY to the Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA, Morocco, where it was received at 0505102Z June 1967. There is no evidence that this message was refiled in common-user channels. (CINCUSNAVEUR 2316202 June 1967; Court of Inquiry.)

5 June (U) At approximately 0700Z, Israel initiated a land and air attack against Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces.

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR canceled previous geographical guidance for employment of Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 60) and instructed that ships and aircraft be operated no closer than 100 nm from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria and the UAR, and no closer than 25 nm from the coast of Cyprus. (CINCUSNAVEUR 0513522; CINCUSNAVEUR 0518502.)

Note: (U) LIBERTY was not an addressee of these messages. At the time these messages were released, LIBERTY was under opcon of CINCUSNAVEUR. The following day, CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume opcon of LIBERTY and directed LIBERTY to chop to COMSIXTHFLT at 0700012 June.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT directed Sixth Fleet units to observe CPA to Lebanon, Syria and UAR of 100 nm, and to Cyprus, 25 nm. (COMSIXTHFLT 0520132.)

(U) 0524002. LIBERTY position 33-20N/019-10E; PIM 106/15. (USS LIBERTY 0519342.)

6 June (U) CINCUSNAVEUR directed COMSIXTHFLT to assume opcon of LIBERTY in order to "facilitate command and control and possible requirement for protection during Mid-East hostilities" and directed LIBERTY to chop to COMSIXTHFLT at 0700012. (CINCUSNAVEUR 0613572.)

(U) USCINCEUR requested LIBERTY SITREP's and PIM reports be forwarded with Immediate precedence as of 1800Z. (USCINCEUR 061410Z/ECJC/JRC 08941.)

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(U) COMSIXTHFLT 0623492 issued opcon orders to LIBERTY which became effective 0700012.

Note: (USS) This message was not received by LIBERTY until after the attack. Although it had been transmitted by NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 0705392 on the JRTT broadcast as JR WR 2077, LIBERTY personnel do not recall receiving it. (Court of Inquiry)

7 June (USS) 0700012. LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT.

(USS) 0708002. LIBERTY position 33-06N/028-54E; PIM 109/16.5 kts until 0723002; thence stationary within 25 nm of 31-45N/33-30E. (USS LIBERTY 0709052.)

(USS) COMSIXTHFLT message to JCS stated that at 0520152 June 67, the operating area for Sixth Fleet ships was expanded to include all of the Eastern Mediterranean, except that no operations, either surface or air, were permitted within 100 miles of Israel, Syria, or Egypt, or within 25 miles of Cyprus. (COMSIXTHFLT 0715032.)

Note: (USS) At 0520152 LIBERTY was under CINCUSNAVEUR opcon. Chop to COMSIXTHFLT was effected at 0700012.

(USS)
requested JCS to take immediate action to change LIBERTY's operating area to Area 2 in order to satisfy tasking requirements.

(USS) In view of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, JCS gave USCINCEUR authority to vary LIBERTY operating area as local conditions dictate, and changed CPA to UAR and Israel to 20 nm and 15 nm, respectively. (JCS 0722302/JCS 7337.)

Note: (USS) LIBERTY did not receive this message until after the attack. The Department of the Army Communications Center (DACC), which serves the JCS, misrouted the message to NAVCOMMSTA Philippines via the DCS relay station at Kunia, Hawaii, for delivery to LIBERTY. NAVCOMMSTA Philippines relayed to DCS major relay station at Davis, California, at 0817002. The message was eventually received by NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 0871232 (9 hours and 22 minutes after the attack) for transmission to LIBERTY. (Court of Inquiry.)

8 June (USS) JCS sent a message to USCINCEUR (INFO USS LIBERTY) canceling JCS 0722302 and requesting that LIBERTY comply with the CPS established by COMSIXTHFLT 0715032; i. e., not closer than 100 nm to Israel, Syria, or Egypt, or 25 nm to Cyprus. (JCS 0801102/JCS 7347.)

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I [illegible] the message to [illegible] DACC [illegible] NAVCOMMSTA Philippines [illegible] Kunia.

Note: ~~(TS)~~ LIBERTY did not receive this message. ~~It was erroneously routed by DACC to Kunia~~. It was received by NAVCOMMSTA Philippines from Kunia at 080400Z. NAVCOMMSTA Philippines relayed to NAVCOMMSTA Guam at 080449Z, whence it was forwarded to Kunia with instructions to relay to Morocco. Kunia routed it to DACC, in error, where it was received at 080502Z. DACC routed it to NSA. NAVCOMMSTA Asmara never received the message for transmission to LIBERTY. (Report of Inquiry.)

~~(TS)~~ DACC routed the message to NSA, where it could not be relayed via GENSER circuits. NSA did not return it to DACC, but filed it without action. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

~~(TS)~~ Other circumstances surrounding delivery of JCS 080110Z June 67 are particularly significant.

[illegible] LIBERTY's proximity to the Sixth Fleet geographical limits necessitated swift action. At 072300Z, the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer had contacted the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "via secure voice" and requested him to have LIBERTY comply with the geographic restrictions established by COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June 67. Brevity of time was given as the reason for the call. This action was contrary to customary usage in that it by-passed USCINCEUR in going directly to the component commander, CINCUSNAVEUR, and employed voice rather record communications to initiate an action. When questioned, the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer did not have a DTG to quote, but he stated that a message would follow later.

[redacted] At CINCUSNAVEUR headquarters there are three collocated duty officers: the Duty Captain; the Command Center Duty Officer; the Operations Duty Officer (i.e., the N3 Duty Officer). It was the Operations Duty Officer who had taken the call. He subsequently informed the Duty Captain, and, at the latter's direction, drafted a message for release to COMSIXTHFLT. The Duty Captain and the Command Center Duty Officer briefed the Deputy Chief of Staff who directed that release of the message be deferred pending receipt of a message or other authoritative indication that the JCS(JRC) action had been approved, and further, that the Command Center Duty Officer call the USEUCOM staff to appraise them of the facts and request that they call JCS(JRC) to confirm the verbal directive and obtain the DTG of the confirming message. (CINCUSNAVEUR policy requires that no movement of ships or aircraft be effected in response to oral communications from higher authority unless transmitted by a flag or general officer, or if evidence is provided that a record directive (message DTG or cite number, etc), has, in fact been approved and released and is beyond recall by other than official cancellation.)

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The Command Center Duty Officer placed a call to USEUCOM headquarters at 080030Z and gave all the facts to the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer who stated that he would call back. At approximately the same time, the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer called USEUCOM headquarters and advised the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer of the verbal directive to CINCUSNAVEUR and explained that USCINCEUR had been by-passed in the interest of saving time and that the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "had promised to take action." Almost immediately thereafter, the USEUCOM Command Duty Officer called the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer to inform him of the call from the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer. On the basis of the call from the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer and his statement that the CINCUSNAVEUR Operations Duty Officer "had promised to take action," the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was misled into believing that CINCUSNAVEUR had acted or would act. Both USEUCOM personnel assumed that no further action was required; none was taken.

Approximately three hours had passed without action or additional communications between CINCUSNAVEUR and USEUCOM headquarters on this matter when, at 080325Z, the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer called USEUCOM and was put in contact with the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer. With the CINCUSNAVEUR inquiring first, each duty officer asked the other what action was being taken by his respective headquarters. The USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer was advised that CINCUSNAVEUR action was being withheld pending a return call from USEUCOM in response to CINCUSNAVEUR's earlier call which had requested a confirming DTG of the JCS message. It was suggested that he call JCS(JRC) requesting the DTG of the JCS message or provide a USEUCOM DTG. The call terminated. Prompt action was then taken by the USEUCOM JRC Duty Officer who called the JCS(JRC) Duty Officer, obtained the DTG of the JCS message (JCS 080110Z June 67), and passed the information to the CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer, who at the same moment received the JCS message via normal Navy channels (sometime between 080325Z and 080355Z).

At 080410Z, CINCUSNAVEUR in a teletype conference, passed JCS 080110Z to COMSIXTHFLT, advised him to take it for action and followed up with a formal tasking message, CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z June 67. Meanwhile, at 080425Z, USCINCEUR had directed CINCUSNAVEUR by telephone to take JCS 080110Z for action and followed up with a confirming message, USCINCEUR 080625Z June 67. Finally, COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 67 directed LIBERTY to proceed to a position within a 25-mile radius of 33-40N/32-03E and imposed a CFA of 100 nm to "UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon" and 25 nm to Cyprus.

(Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

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(U) 0804232. USCINCEUR directed CINCUSNAVEUR by phone to take JCS 0801102 for action. Conversation was confirmed by subsequent message. (USCINCEUR 080635Z/ECJC/JBC 09045.)

~~46~~ 0804402. CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer finally succeeded in passing JCS message to COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer, telling him to "be advised to take JCS 080110Z for action. Official message follows." (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR 080455Z directed COMSIXTHFLT to take JCS 080110Z for action.

~~46~~ 0805072. COMSIXTHFLT Staff Duty Officer was advised by CINCUSNAVEUR Command Center Duty Officer that 080455Z was the DTG of the FORAC message. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) 0806502. Two delta-winged aircraft orbited ship three times at 31-27N/34-00E. No identification visible. Estimated altitude 5,000 ft.; estimated distance, 2 mi. (USS LIBERTY 080742Z.)

~~46~~ 0807272. CINCUSNAVEUR received USCINCEUR 080625Z. (See 080425Z entry, above.) (CINCUSNAVEUR 132109Z.)

~~46~~ 0808002. LIBERTY position 31-45N/033-30E; FIM within 30 nm of above position. (USS LIBERTY 080634Z.)

(U) 0809562. Another unidentified aircraft circled the ship. (Court of Inquiry.)

~~46~~ COMSIXTHFLT directed LIBERTY to proceed immediately to operate within a 25-mile radius of position 33-40N/32-30E, and, until further notice, not to approach the coast of UAR, Israel, Syria or Lebanon closer than 100 miles, and Cyprus closer than 25 miles. (COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z.)

Note: ~~46~~ LIBERTY did not receive this message until after the attack when it was "delivered by hand on 10 June 1967." NAVCOMMSTA Morocco received the message from COMSIXTHFLT at 081050Z and entered it into DCS for delivery to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 081100Z. DCS major relay Seville (San Pablo), Spain, transmitted to DCS relay station at Asmara at 081200Z (LIBERTY was attacked by aircraft at 081203Z.) Through operator error DCS station Asmara relayed to NAVCOMMSTA Greece at 081215Z. NAVCOMMSTA Greece sent it back to DCS station Asmara whence it was relayed to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 081510Z for transmission to LIBERTY. In the meantime, LIBERTY's communications equipment had been destroyed during the attack. (Court of Inquiry; Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) 0809262. Another unidentified aircraft circled LIBERTY. (Court of Inquiry.)

~~46~~ U.S. ambassador in Cairo was authorized to evacuate all Americans if he deemed it necessary; was advised to consult friendly embassies (French, Italian) about arranging joint diplomatic action to prevent major attacks on westerners. (CINCUSNAVEUR 080942Z / 090002Z / 090719Z.)

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(U) 0811582. Single aircraft sighted approaching ship from 135 degrees, relative, five to six miles distant, altitude approximately 7000 ft. (Court of Inquiry.)

(U) 0812052. While on course 283, at speed 5 knots, at position 31-35.5N/33-29E, LIBERTY was attacked by unidentified fighter; six strafing runs. (USS LIBERTY 0817152.)

Note: (U) The record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry fixes the actual time of the initial air attack at 0812032. This information was released to the press on 28 June 1967 by CHINFO.

(U) Both the Court of Inquiry and the Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team recorded that LIBERTY was steaming in the vicinity of 31-27N/33-23E when she was attacked.

(U) 0812252 (approximately). Three torpedo boats, one identified as Israeli, approached LIBERTY on starboard quarter at high speed. (USS LIBERTY 0817152.)

(U) 0812352. LIBERTY sustained torpedo hit starboard side amidships. (Court of Inquiry.)

THIS SECTION CONTAINED EXCERPTS FROM USAF MOBILE [redacted] INTERCEPT STATION HAHN, GERMANY (STATION A55L) OF ISRAELI TROOP, AIRCRAFT AND SHORE STATION AT NATSOR BETWEEN 1250Z AND 1312Z AS THEY CONDUCT ATTACK AND SEEK TO SEE AMERICAN FLAG FOR THE FIRST TIME AT 1312Z. THIS INTERCEPT HELPED PERSUADE SOME U.S. LEADERS THAT THE ATTACK MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGN IDF HQ DID NOT KNOW OF THE FLAG, NO NEED FOR TORP & HELO NECESSARILY TO KNOW, AND IN ANY CASE THE WHOLE EXCHANGE COULD HAVE BEEN STAGED.

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two spaces >

(CVA 60)

(U) 081235Z. USS SARATOGA reported to CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT that a message from BOOKSTAR (LIBERTY) had been intercepted: "I am under attack. My position 31-32N/33-25E. I have been hit. Request immediate assistance." (USS SARATOGA 081235Z.)

(U) SARATOGA reported message from LIBERTY: "Unidentified gun boats approaching vessel now." (USS SARATOGA 081237Z.)

(U) 081245Z. SARATOGA reported interception of another LIBERTY message: "Under attack and hit badly." (USS SARATOGA 081245Z.)

(CVA 66)

(C) 081250Z. COMSIXTHFLT ordered USS AMERICA and SARATOGA to proceed to 31-23N/33-25E to provide fighter cover and defend LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 081250Z.)

(U) 081254Z. SARATOGA reported message from LIBERTY: "Hit by torpedo starboard side. Listing badly. Need assistance immediately." (USS SARATOGA 081254Z.)

(U) NAVCOMMSTA Greece reported message from LIBERTY received via NICOM net: "LIBERTY hit by torpedo starboard side at 081253Z. Listing badly. Req assistance immediately." (NAVCOMMSTA Greece 081301Z.)

starboard

(U) 081305Z. COMSIXTHFLT advised LIBERTY of receipt of flash messages, stated that aircraft and surface units were on the way, and directed, "Keep SITREP's coming." (COMSIXTHFLT 081305Z.)

(S) 081316Z. CTF 60 directed AMERICA to launch four armed A4's, SARATOGA, four armed A1's, to defend LIBERTY. (CTF 60 081316Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 1 to CINCUSNAVEUR: At 081252Z USS LIBERTY reported under attack at posit 31-23N/33-25E. Hit by torpedo ... listing badly. TF 60 directed to report to proceed toward scene. AMERICA directed to launch four armed A4's and SARATOGA, four armed A1's with fighter cover to defend LIBERTY. ETA first aircraft on scene one hour 30 minutes after launch. Estimate launch 1345Z. (COMSIXTHFLT 081320Z) 081320Z

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(C) COMSIXTHFLT informed AMERICA and SARATOGA that forces attacking LIBERTY declared hostile, authorized use of force including destruction. (COMSIXTHFLT 081339Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR directed LIBERTY to establish immediate communications with any Mediterranean area communication station and directed NAVCOMMSTA Morocco to take all available actions to establish communications with LIBERTY. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081340Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT issued CRITIC message: "LIBERTY [illegible]-23N/33-25E hit by torpedo starboard at 081230Z." (COMSIXTHFLT 081349Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR situation report Sum Total 001 to JCS, CNO and USCINCEUR quoted distress messages relayed from LIBERTY by SARATOGA at 081337Z and 081345Z. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081400Z.)

(C) CTF 63 recommended USS PAPAGO be diverted at maximum speed to 31-23N/33-25E to assist LIBERTY. (CTF 63 081410Z.)

(C) NAVCOMMSTA Morocco advised CINCUSNAVEUR LIBERTY unable to identify attacking boats. After attack helicopter circled the ship, believed to be Israeli. (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 081412Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv reported that Israeli aircraft and MTB's erroneously attacked LIBERTY. Israelis send abject apologies. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081414Z.)

(C) 081415Z CAPT CARTER, DIRNSA, telephoned CAPT COOK, DIRNAVSECGRU to request that he pass by telephone to SECDEF McNAMARA info about LIBERTY and the number of personnel aboard. As CAPT COOK was not in his office at the moment, CAPT THOMAS, Deputy DIRNAVSECGRU, accepted the call. First attempts to reach Secretary McNAMARA personally by phone were unsuccessful. Capt Thomas held the line until Secretary McNamara came to the [illegible] at 081430Z.

(U) JCS authorized USCINCEUR to use whatever force required to defend LIBERTY from further attacks. (JCS 081416Z/JCS 7354.)

(U) CTF 60 081416Z to AMERICA and SARATOGA clarifies rules of engagement.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 2 advises of inability to communicate with LIBERTY on any circuit; briefs rules of engagement issued to pilots. (COMSIXTHFLT 081425Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 3 advises that communications with LIBERTY established by NAVCOMMSTA Greece. (COMSIXTHFLT 081426Z.)

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(U) NAVCOMMSTA Morocco reported message received from LIBERTY via hi[illegible] command (HICOM) voice net "...[illegible]BERTY unable to identify attac[illegible] craft. After attack a hole [illegible]led the ship. Believed to be Israelian." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco (CAMS) 0814[illegible])

~~(C)~~ 081430-37Z. Secretary McNAMARA came on the [illegible] and CAPT THOMAS provided the following information directly to him via unclassified telephone:

Allowance

NAVSECGRU	officers;	enlisted
CENSER	9 officers; 15½	enlisted
Total	officers;	enlisted

Three NSA civilian personnel (not in uniform) aboard. additional enlisted augmented over the allowance, above.

Unclassified mission of the ship from OPNAVINST 05727.1B:

"To conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy electronics research projects which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems such as satellite communications."

Affirmed that satellite communications are unclassified.

Confirmed location of incident at approximately 13 miles off shore.

SECDEF inquired whether JCS had directed retirement to 100 miles. Could not confirm.

(Op-94C1 memo of 21 June 1967.)

Note: ~~(C)~~ The cryptologic personnel figures provided to SECDEF were actually the on-board count as of 3 June 1967: officers; __ enlisted plus additional __ for a total of enlisted; three civilians; grand total, __. Technically speaking, the allowance of cryptologic personnel at the time was __ officers, enlisted. (See Appendix II to Annex A.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT recalled all Sixth Fleet aircraft in view of USDAO Tel Aviv report that Israelis erroneously attacked LIBERTY and subsequently had sent abject apologies. (~~COMSIXTHFLT~~ 0814392.)

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(U) CONSIXTHAT Follow up NL 1 and Final [illegible] [illegible]. USDAO Tel Aviv received word that Israeli aircraft and MTB's erroneously attacked US [illegible] at 0812 [illegible] 31-25N/33-33E. May be Navy [illegible] Israeli helicopters conducting rescue operations. Israelis send abject apologies. (CONSIXTHAT 0815[illegible]Z.)

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(U) 081440-45Z. CAPT THOMAS briefed Op-94, RADM WEEKS, on the conversation with Secretary McNAMARA.

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 5 reports LIBERTY underway at 081430Z at 8 knots, course 340. (COMSIXTHFLT 081455Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 6 advises that he has directed that the DD's (names to follow) proceed at maximum sustained speed to assist LIBERTY, and that air cover will be provided when DD's approach Egyptian coast within 100 miles. (COMSIXTHFLT 081502Z.)

proposed that be deployed for operations Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean "...to insure continuous on station coverage to replace USS LIBERTY..."

~~(U)~~ COMSIXTHFLT reports that LIBERTY "has carried out emergency destruction of all crypto pubs and key cards," and that the only communications are via CINCUSNAVEUR AICOM Voice Net E04.04 (COMSIXTHFLT 081514Z.)

(U) CINCUSNAVEUR advised COMSIXTHFLT that SECDEF VANCE directed that all news releases on LIBERTY affair will be made at Washington level. No releases to be made on ship. (CINCUSNAVEUR 081517Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT was directed to hav. LIBERTY proceed, if possible, "on northerly course in order that rendezvous with assisting ships is as far from shore as possible." (CINCUSNAVEUR 081518Z.)

(U) USDAO Tel Aviv advised JCS, CNO, et. al., that Israelis were arranging helicopter for ALUSNA to overfly LIBERTY to attempt to communicate. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081528Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 7 reports COMDESRON 12 in USS DAVIS (DD937) with USS MASSEY (DD778) proceeding at best speed to rendezvous with LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 081552Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT canceled his 081339Z which declared forces attacking LIBERTY hostile and authorized use of force. States use of force no longer authorized. (COMSIXTHFLT 081609Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 8. 1. LIBERTY damage: flooding stopped; nine-degree list; torpedo hit amidships starboard; radar, gyro, fathometer inoperative. 2. Casualities (approximate): four dead, three severely wounded, 50 wounded. 3. LIBERTY position 081600Z, 31-35N/33-32E; course NW; speed 1w knots. (COMSIXTHFLT 081621Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 9. All aircraft from AMERICA and SARATOGA recalled and accounted for. USS PAPAGO (ATF 150) diverted to render assistance. (COMSIXTHFLT 081649Z.)

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(that ship unable to carry [illegible] missed. Reported that

(U) LIBERTY reported the situation following air attack. Described attack. Stated photos of aircraft and boats taken. Estimated casualties: dead, 10; seriously wounded, 15; total wounded, 75; missing, undetermined. (USS LIBERTY 081715Z.)

~~(S)~~ USDAO Tel Aviv reported ALUSNA overflight of LIBERTY in Israeli helicopter for inspection and attempted contact unproductive, except to observe ship underway approximately [illegible] knots, northerly course, 60 [illegible] west of Ashkelon, Israel, at 081900Z, listing approximately ten degrees to starboard. Israelis willing to respond in rescue, if asked. (USDAO Tel Aviv 081[illegible]00Z.)

~~(S)~~ COMSIXTHFLT SITREP. LIBERTY proceeding course 340, speed 10 knots. COMDESRON 12, DAVIS and MASSEY will rendezvous approximately 090400Z. AMERICA to close to halo range to [illegible] off serious wounded and remains of deceased. LIBERTY continues without classified communications, radar and gyro. All communications are via CINCUSNAVEUR NICOM Voice Net. One E2A aircraft airborne to act as communication relay and navigation aid between fleet commander and LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 082230Z.)

AICOM

~~(S)~~ Department of State Arab-Israeli situation summary reports that Secretary RUSK strongly expressed U.S. dismay over LIBERTY incident to Israeli Ambassador Hirman, although he said U.S. appreciated the speed with which the Israeli government owned up to the action. (STATE Operations Center 082355Z/STATE 311C.)

Harman

9 June ~~(S)~~ 090425Z. COMSIXTHFLT SITREP 10: DAVIS and MASSEY rendezvoused with LIBERTY at position 33-01N/31-59E. Medical personnel boarded LIBERTY at 090455Z. AMERICA 138 miles from LIBERTY; closing speed, 30 knots. (COMSIXTHFLT 090513Z.)

(U) COMDESRON 12 in DAVIS (CTG 60.5) alongside LIBERTY. Material damage under control. Damage control and medical teams aboard. (CTG 60.5 090544Z.)

(U) LIBERTY reported Research Radio I, Coordination Center and Crypto received direct torpedo hit; spaces currently flooded; 23 research personnel dead or missing. (USS LIBERTY 090550Z.)

~~(S)~~ CTG 60.5 ready to transfer 15 serious wounded, 9 dead. Based on inspection major damage area and opinion of LIBERTY CO, it is believed impossible that any personnel in flooded spaces are alive; bulkheads firm and flooding contained; therefore, decided not to attempt to plug torpedo hole and dewater at sea. LIBERTY completely mobile to 10 knots. CO has leg wound; CTG 60.5 considering relieving him. XO dead. DAVIS transferred 10 engineering and deck ratings to LIBERTY and assumed all communications guards. Estimated getting underway 090915Z. Services MASSEY no longer required upon arrival PAPAGO. (CTG 60.5 090708Z.)

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~~(U)~~ Prime Minister ESHKOL of Israel forwarded message of condolence to President JOHNSON via U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv. (AMEMBASSY Tel Aviv 090810Z/Tel Aviv 4024.)

(U) DAVIS clear. LIBERTY underway. CO LIBERTY will not require relief. (CTG 60.5 090852Z.)

(U) 090915Z. First LIBERTY patient received aboard AMERICA Helicopter transfer of injured and dead had commenced when AMERICA closed to within 70 miles of LIBERTY. (USS AMERICA 092143Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT requested diplomatic clearance for LIBERTY to enter SOUDA BAY, Crete, for survey of damage. (COMSIXTHFLT 080803Z.)

(U) 090930Z. AMERICA rendezvoused with LIBERTY. (SECDEF 091812Z.)

(U) 091200Z. COMSIXTHFLT, VADM W.I. MARTIN, made personal inspection of LIBERTY. (COMSIXTHFLT 091[illegible]Z.)

Flooded spaces [illegible] cent full of water and oil.

(U) 091233Z. Evacuation of injured and dead completed: 50 wounded plus all recovered remains to AMERICA; 8 wounded to USS LITTLE ROCK (CLG 4). (COMSIXTHFLT 091635Z.)

(U) Pages of highly classified material observed floating out of hole. Pick up and efforts to prevent further loss directed. (CTF 60 091334Z; CINCUSNAVEUR 091459Z; COMSIXTHFLT 091655Z.)

(U) 091500Z. PAPAGO joined LIBERTY; MASSEY detached. (CTG 60.5 091900Z.)

8 June ~~(S)~~ IDF Assistant Army spokesman, LCOL Michael BLOCH, telephoned to ALUSNA, Tel Aviv, seven points of "further information on yesterday's incident with the American ship." (USDAO Tel Aviv 091520Z.)

Note: ~~(SS)~~ The Israeli government set forth these seven points of rationale to explain their position relative to the attack on LIBERTY. The legal opinion and other comments on each which were written into the proceedings of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry follow.

<u>Point 1</u>. The ship was sighted and recognized as a naval ship 13 miles from the coast.

<u>Comment</u>. From 0849 on 8 June LIBERTY was steaming in international waters on a track generally parallel to the coast of the UAR. At one point, the ship was, in fact, 13.6 miles from the coast.

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Point 3. The presence (of a neutral-nation naval ship) in a fighting area is against international custom.

Comment. The duties of a neutral under international law do not include a duty to ensure that its ships or personnel leave or refrain from entering an area of hostilities or an area adjacent to an area of hostilities. Nationals of a neutral country who may happen to be in belligerent territory nevertheless retain their right to protection by their neutral home state; and a belligerent must grant to neutral diplomatic envoys, including those accredited to the enemy, the right to leave the territory unmolested. A neutral nation, in this respect alone, thus has a legitimate reason and a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities, in fulfillment of its obligation to protect its nationals and to evacuate those who desire evacuation. LIBERTY in fulfillment of such a mission that LIBERTY was engag[illegible]. Far from being contrary to international custom, the presence of neutral ships on just such missions as LIBERTY's is a common, if not a universal, incident of situations involving the outbreak of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her. Action by such a neutral ship to repulse an unlawful belligerent attack by force, where the neutral has not first attacked the belligerent, does not constitute "hostilities" against the belligerent, and does not constitute an abandonment or a violation of neutrality.

Point 4. The area (where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) is not a [illegible] passage for ships.

Comment. Given the conceded proposition that a ship of a neutral is steaming in international waters, the question of whether or not such waters are a "common passage" is totally irrelevant to its right to be there.

Point 4. Egypt (an opposing belligerent) had declared the area (where LIBERTY was steaming when attacked) closed to neutrals.

Comment. Closing certain adjacent waters including those otherwise considered to be high seas, has some precedent in history as a belligerent practice, notably in World Wars I and II when most of the belligerents, including the United States, declared "war zones", "military areas" and "defensive sea areas" and either attempted to close such areas completely or to severely circumscribe passage through them as a neutral. The consistent position of the United States has been to reserve generally all of its rights in the premises, including the right not only to question the validity of such "war zones" but to present demands and claims in relation to any American interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, by virtue of their enforcement. As a general proposition, except for a

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previously announced blockade or other legitimate maritime control measure, imposing or attempting to restrict by portion of the high seas has not been recognized in international law as a belligerent right.

Point 3. LIBERTY resembles the Egyptian supply ship EL QUSEIR.

Comment. While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive hull markings of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criterion as a justification for attack, any ship resembling EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy.

Point 4. The ship was not flying a flag when sighted.

Comment. LIBERTY flew a size nine (approximately five feet by eight feet) U. S. ensign from her foremast throughout the morning of 8 June and until it was shot down by the Israeli air attack. At least five minutes prior to the torpedo attack, a size seven ensign (approximately seven feet by thirteen feet) was hoisted at the main yardarm. At 0849 LIBERTY changed course from 130T to 253T. At 0905 LIBERTY reduced speed to five knots and continued eastern at that speed until after the initial air attack. At [illegible] LIBERTY altered course to 283T and continued on this course until after the ship was attacked.

Point 5. The IDF Navy had earlier reports of bombardment of El Arish from sea.

Comment. It is inconceivable that either the IDF Navy or Air Force would associate LIBERTY with her four 50-caliber machine guns, or EL QUSEIR, armed with two three-pounders, with a shore bombardment.

(40) Fleet Maintenance Officer inspected damage and submitted report. (COMSIXTHFLT 0919542.)

(41) DIRNAVSECGRU stated view that for security reasons Navy-oriented yard at Malta would be preferable to civilian yard in large cities of other countries. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 092020Z CRITICOMM.)

(42) 1320 to 1600 Soviet DDG 626/4 in vicinity of LIBERTY under constant surveillance. Not observed to stop in immediate vicinity of LIBERTY nor to recover anything. (CTG 60.5 092119Z.)

(43) JCS requested CINCLANT to initiate action to complete [illegible] as soon as possible and to order [illegible] to Rota, when RFS. Requested [illegible] to provide requirements to CINCLANT for Atlantic, CINCUSNAVEUR for Mediterranean, operations. (JCS 092121Z/JCS 7542.)

(U) AMERICA status report of LIBERTY casualties submitted to SECNAV. (USS AMERICA 092143Z.)

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( )

(U) CNO directed NPIO Norfolk to cease further shipments of R&S material to LIBERTY. (CNO 091844Z.)

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(U) CTG 60.5 SITREP 10: Total DAVIS personnel on library: two officers, 15 enlisted. Acting XO, LCDR PETTYJOHN, COMDESRON 12 Chief Staff Officer. Accomplishments of combined crews itemized. List reduced to three degrees. (CTG 60.5 092230Z.)

(U) JCS Fact Finding Team appointed "to examine the circumstances relating to the command and control and communications actions and procedures associated with events preceding attack on USS LIBERTY." MGEN Joseph M. RUSS, USA, Chief, Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, OJCS, designated senior member of a team of five members. (JCS 092301Z/JCS 7578.)

10 June

(C) JCS Fact Finding Team interviewed ADN(COMM) and NAVSECGRU representatives. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

(U) In order to provide complete support to JCS Fact Finding Team, DIRNSA requested ADN and ADP to prepare a report of command and control relationships and tasking of LIBERTY. (DIRNSA memo of 10 June 1967 and report to DIRNSA in reply thereto of 11 June 1967.)

(C) Upon the recommendation of COMSIXTHFLT who had visited LIBERTY and had given full consideration to material and security factors and was also interested in expediting recovery of bodies, CINCUSNAVEUR directed that LIBERTY proceed direct to Malta for dry-docking rather than go to Souda Bay first. (CINCUSNAVEUR 100025Z.)

(U) PAPAGO recovered twelve log sheets containing Secret codeword material which was returned to LIBERTY. (CTG 60.5 100548Z.)

(C) CTG 60.5 SITREP 12: "... LIBERTY riding higher in water. Top of hole out of water and list almost corrected. Oil negligible." (CTG 60.5 100550Z.)

(C) CTG 60.5 SITREP 13: "... DAVIS arranging to obtain LIBERTY pay records and will pay prior entry port ... No further material loss overboard. Oil reduced to seepage leaving thin film in wake. No black oil. List now negligible due fuel transfer..." (CTG 60.5 101100Z.)

(U) COMSIXTHFLT directed limited access to Secret codeword material recovered from the sea and required a log be maintained of all personnel exposed. (COMSIXTHFLT 101342Z.)

(U) DIRNSA issued instructions to HQ NSAEUR concerning support of NSA personnel who were aboard LIBERTY.

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460 CTG 60.5 SITREP 14: CO LIBERTY "resting comfortably. Shrapnel removed today. ...Water level in third deck aft of LIBERTY approximately FOUR feet below overhead...Several bodies in sight, but heavy oil, fumes and debris make recovery hazardous and will not attempt. USS DAVIS maintaining all guards and passing to LIBERTY." (CTG 60.5 101750Z.)

460 JCS 102140Z/JCS 7642 announced composition of Fact Finding Team:

MGEN Joseph R. NISS, USA
RADM Francis J. FITZPATRICK, USN
COL William A. GARRETT, USAF
CAPT William D. OWEN, USN
MAJ Harlan E. PRIDDLE, USAF

460 10[illegible]. At the direction of CINCUSNAVEUR, a Court of Inquiry convened at Headquarters, CINCUSNAVEUR, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the armed attack on LIBERTY. Membership:

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RADM Isaac C. KIDD, Jr., USN	President
CAPT Bernard J. LAUFF, USN	Member
CAPT Bert M. ATKINSON, USN	Member
CAPT Ward BOSTON, USN	Counsel for the Court
LCDR Allen FEING.RSCH, USN	Assistant Counsel for the Court

(Court of Inquiry; CINCUSNAVEUR 111311Z June 67.)

11 June ~~(C)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR outlined tasks concerning LIBERTY dry-docking. Primary objectives upon pumping out of dry dock: recovery of bodies; security of documents, equipments and spaces. Requested support from COMFAIRMED, COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT, AMEMB Malta. (CINCUSNAVEUR 110225Z.)

~~(C)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR OPORD 15-67 issued to activate TF 100 at 120000Z. RADM RENKEN (COMSERVLANT) to be CTF 100. Mission: to supervise dry-docking of LIBERTY at Malta in order to prevent disclosure of classified information and equipment to unauthorized personnel. Upon arrival Malta, LIBERTY to shop to CINCUSNAVEUR and be assigned to CTF 100, who will supervise dry-docking, removal of remains, protection of classified material, and will ready the ship for repair by COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT. (CINCUSNAVEUR 111031Z.)

~~(C)~~ CTG 60.5 SITREP 17: Two bodies recovered: WALTON, F.J., CT1, by LIBERTY from spaces; THORNTON, T.R., CT3, by PAPAGO from wake. (CTG 60.5 111112Z.)

~~(C)~~ Inasmuch as it was unknown whether the designated communications guard ship would be cleared

(DIRNAVSEOGRUEUR 111442Z.)

~~(C)~~ CTG 60.5 SITREP 18: PAPAGO divers examined hole in LIBERTY estimated to be 39 ft. wide at bottom and 24 ft. high. Net rigged to cover after two thirds of hole. Net washed away after ten minutes underway. Soviet AGI GS-43 joined forces 081430Z and is trailing. (CTG 60.5 111601Z.)

~~(C)~~ CTG 60.5 SITREP 19: PAPAGO recovered additional body, MENDLE, A.P., CT2. Soviet AGI dropping back. (CTG 60.5 111800Z.)

~~(C)~~ DIRNAVSEOGRUEUR announced composition of TG 100.4:

CAPT C. M. SMITH	DIRNAVSEOGRULANT, CTG 100.4
CDR E. H. PLATZEK	NAVSEOGRUHQ (G42)
LCDR B. M. BISHOP	NAVSEOGRUEUR
LT P. G. FIRESTONE	NAVSEOGRUEUR
LT R. H. LEE	NAVSEOGRULANT
LT M. H. BENNETT	Senior NSG officer in LIBERTY
CTC A. J. PAWLIKOWSKI	NAVSEOGRUEUR

Space — Surviving and able NAVSEOGRU officers and CT's of LIBERTY. (DIRNAVSEOGRUEUR 111931Z.)

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~~(a)~~ CO LIBERTY requested assistance from Norfolk Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests for repair of damage. Preliminary estimated requirements: five months yard availability; ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ $2.5-3 M in [illegible]. (USS LIBERTY 110900Z.)

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for ___ concurred in arrangements proposed by DIRNAVSEC-GRUEUR for CRITICOM service ___ [illegible] TF 100; however,

12 June ◆◆◆ Director, CIA, sent formal expression of sympathy to DIRNAVSECGRU and DIRNSA concerning LIBERTY tragedy. (CIA letter of 12 June 1967.)

◆◆◆ DNC made CDR D. B. WENGER of NAVSECGRU available to JCS Fact Finding Team as Op-94 representative and point of contact regarding the LIBERTY incident. (Op-94 memo Ser [illegible] of 12 June 1967.)

◆◆◆ CINCLANT requested JCS to reconsider employment of ___ to EASTLANT/MED areas in light of LIBERTY incident. (CINCLANT 1214142.)

◆◆◆ DIRNAVSECGRU message to LIBERTY expressed sympathy on behalf of the Director and NAVSECGRU. (DIRNAVSECGRU 1221092.)

◆◆◆ TF 100 was advised of arrangements made ___ to handle NAVSECGRU and related message traffic for TG 100.4 (Security); names of contacts given. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 1222202.)

◆◆◆ JCS requested ___ to review his proposal to deploy ___ to Mediterranean as replacement for LIBERTY, in view of comments in CINCLANT 1214142 June 1967, the reservations that Department of State would very likely have on ___ operations in the Mediterranean, and the fact that a quick turnaround of ___ would require emergency dry-docking which would disrupt ___ established shipyard schedule. (JCS 1221302/JCS 7729.)

◆◆◆ CAPT W. H. CRAVEN, Jr., USN, Op-03R, designated OPNAV contact point on command, control and related communications matters concerning LIBERTY incident. (DIRNAVSECGRU 1222262.)

13 June (U) 1300Z. JCS Fact Finding Team departed Washington for London. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

◆◆◆ DIRNAVSECGRU acknowledged CIA letter expressing sympathy. (DIRNAVSECGRU letter of 13 June 1967.)

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~~(C)~~ CTF 100 SITREP 1. Task Organization:

CTF 100		RADM H. A. BENKEN, USN
CTG 100.1	Medical	HMC R. V. BROOKS, USN
100.2	Docking and Repair	CAPT R. L. ARTHUR, USN
100.3	Public Affairs	CAPT E. L. CASTILLO, USN
100.4	Security	CAPT C. M. SMITH, USN
100.5	Supply	LCDR E. B. UNDERHILL, SC, USN*
100.6	Communications	CAPT H. G. [illegible], USN
100.7	USS LIBERTY	CDR W. L. McDONAGLE, USN
100.8	Administration/Coordination	CAPT F. L. HORNE, USN

*Subsequently replaced by a CDR CARTER

Plans for docking at Malta completed. (CTF 100 130934Z.)

~~(C)~~ Sensitive material recovered by PAPADO 10 June of sufficient quantity to fill four large marila envelopes. Material transferred to LIBERTY. (CTF 60.5 131332Z.)

~~(C)~~ Chief of Staff, Israeli Defense Forces, General RABIN, appointed an official court of inquiry to investigate LIBERTY incident. (USDAO Tel Aviv 131305Z.)

~~(C)~~ Director, GCHQ, and Director, NSA, sent formal expression of sympathy to DIRNAVSECGRU. (DIRNSA 131420Z/DIR 060-67 CRITICOMM.)

~~(C)~~ AMERICA developed negatives of photographs of LIBERTY attack and forwarded them to NRTSC. (USS AMERICA 131503Z.)

~~(C)~~ 131550Z. Soviet AGI GS43 passed up starboard side of LIBERTY at 800 yards. (CTG 60.5 131632Z.)

~~(U)~~ LIBERTY acknowledged receipt of COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June 1967 and 0[illegible]49Z June 1967 on 10 June and 13 June, respectively. (USS LIBERTY 131628Z.)

~~(C)~~ Movements and position of LIBERTY prior to attack forwarded to USCINCEUR by CINCUSNAVEUR. (CINCUSNAVEUR 132105Z.)

~~(C)~~ In reply to JCS 122130Z/JCS 7729 June 1967, reassessment indicated collection capability under existing CPA restrictions would be limited

14 June ~~(C)~~ 140530Z. LIBERTY arrived Malta. (CTG 60.5 140500Z; CTF 100 140630Z.)

(C) CTF 100 SITREP 4.

141300Z. LIBERTY entered dry dock.

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1414102. Canvas mat in place; commenced pumping out.
1417302. Commenced search and removal of bodies.
1418152. Dry dock dry.
1421002. Twelve bodies accounted for and encased.

Torpedo damage

Shell: hole centered at Frame 60 extending 24 feet downward from just below second deck and longitudinally from Frame 53 to Frame 66 (39 feet).

Interior structure: outboard 15 feet of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck frames buckled from Frame 52 to Frame 62 and extending inboard 15 feet.

Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck, Frames 52 to 78, entire width of ship.

Keel straight and apparently undamaged.

(CTF 100 150200Z; USS LIBERTY 15[illegible]Z.)

(40) DAVIS established at Malta as guard ship for LIBERTY. All messages for TF 100 to be directed to DAVIS via Navy channels. (AMEMBASSY Valletta 1413352/Valletta 540.)

(41) To expedite repairs to LIBERTY's electronic system, NAVSHIPENGCEN announced planned visit to Malta of RCA/SON personnel accompanied by contractor representatives. Attendance by NAVSECGRU and NSA representatives invited. (NAVSHIPENGCEN 1415512.)

(42) DIRNAVSECGRU 1416042 (CRITICOM) advised all concerned of US EYES CRITICOMM capability with TG 100.4.

(43) SECDEF stated that DOD would have no further comments on LIBERTY until Court of Inquiry has had an opportunity to obtain full facts. (SECDEF 1417472/DEF 7890.)

(44) 1418002. LIBERTY safely dry-docked. CTF 100 SITREP 3. (CTF 100 142116Z.)

(45) DIRNAVSECGRU requested CTF 100 to forward still photos which would be of use in compiling historical file regarding LIBERTY. (DIRNAVSECGRU 142209Z.)

(U) JCS stated detailed mission of Fact Finding Team. Fact-finding study to include:

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Means utilized to issue and transmit operational directives of the JCS to LIBERTY.

Specific orders issued to LIBERTY between 1 and 8 June and to which LIBERTY responded during those same periods.

Circumstances attending any conflicting directives, inordinate delays in receipt of messages or other proper orders, or their nonreceipt.

Report to include any official U.S. public statements which bear on findings. Findings and recommendations to be reported to JCS. CINCUSNAVEUR Court of Inquiry will inquire into administrative, disciplinary and internal matters within that command which are not within scope of examination by Fact-Finding Team. Team will not infringe upon prerogatives of Court of Inquiry. (JCS 1422302/ JCS 7964.)

15 June (U) LIBERTY reported status of remains of identified bodies recovered during dry-docking. Transferred remains to Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy, for further preparation (19 bodies: 15 identified, 4 unidentified [illegible]; one arm). (USS LIBERTY 150710Z.)

~~(6)~~ Commodore ERELL, Commander in Chief, Israel Defense Forces Navy, requested ALUSNA to call upon him early evening 14 June and expressed regret regarding LIBERTY incident on behalf of Israeli Navy and stated he was preparing letter to CNO, USN. ERELL declined further comment until Israeli Court of Inquiry had reported its findings. (USDAO Tel Aviv 151130Z.)

~~(6)~~ CTF 100 SITREP 5 and final. Bodies of five of the missing personnel have not been found. "It is reasonable to assume that the five not found were lost at sea through the 24-by-39-foot hole caused by the torpedo explosion." TF 100 dissolved at 151400Z. (CTF 100 151406Z.)

~~(6)~~ USDAO Tel Aviv forwarded to Court of Inquiry chronology of events surrounding LIBERTY incident as observed and recorded by ALUSNA Tel Aviv, CDR E. C. CASTLE, USN. (USDAO Tel Aviv 151615Z.)

(U) CNO 152106Z is message of condolence to LIBERTY.

~~(6)~~ DIRNAVSECGRU 152152Z advised NAVSECGRU area directors of decision not to convey expressions of condolence to dependents of casualty victims, for security reasons. NAVSECGRU Bulletin would ~~not~~ be the vehicle for DIRNAVSECGRU expression of sympathy and concern.

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16 June (U) CINCUSNAVEUR 1610332 was a personal message of condolence from ADM John S. McCAIN, Jr., to CDR W. L. McDONALD.

(U) 1616452. Court of Inquiry was closed to deliberate and prepare findings of fact. (Court of Inquiry.)

~~(S)~~ CINCUSNAVEUR NOVORD 8-67 directed COMSIXTHFLT to [illegible] PAPAGO to CINCUSNAVEUR. PAPAGO to relieve DAVIS as LIBERTY communications guard. When RFS, LIBERTY to depart Malta for CONUS in company with PAPAGO. (CINCUSNAVEUR 1618132.)

17 June ~~(S)~~ LIBERTY reported no additional remains found. (USS LIBERTY 1709502.)

18 June ~~(S)~~ USDAO Tel Aviv provided synopsis of findings of Israeli Court of Inquiry, although findings not yet reviewed by Israeli JAG. Synopsis provided by LCOL ~~EFRAT~~ aide to MGEN ~~RABIN~~ Itzhak RABIN, IDF Chief of Staff.

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(U) 1820452. JCS Fact Finding Team returned to Washington. (Report of JCS Fact Finding Team.)

19 June (C) Airlift of all nonessential LIBERTY research personnel commenced. (USS LIBERTY 1915122.)

(C) DIRNAVSECGRU furnished a list of LIBERTY casualties for the information of NAVSECGRU personnel. (DIRNAVSECGRU 1922332.)

20 June (C) LIBERTY submitted a report concerning the loss of KPS material. (USS LIBERTY 2007332.)

(C) Thorough examination damaged area conducted by Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer, NMSY representatives and Malta dock personnel following removal all classified material. (USS LIBERTY 2015402.)

(U) Spaces thoroughly searched and no additional remains located. (USS LIBERTY 2018332.)

21 June (SEC) Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff, by JCCRC memo 189-67 of 21 June. Concludes that delays in communications and headquarters actions resulted in late delivery or nondelivery of certain time-critical communications, timely receipt of which would have reduced the probability of the LIBERTY incident. Includes 17 recommendations. (JCS 2308/378-1 of 29 June 1967.)

23 June (C) CTF 100 submitted report of LIBERTY dry-docking. LIBERTY was dry-docked at Malta 14 June. Security Safeguards were maintained until classified matter in damaged areas was properly secured on 19 June. Removal of remains of 20 men in flooded compartments completed 15 June; remains shipped to Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy, for positive identification and further disposition. (CTF 100 letter Serial 0063 of 23 June 1967.)

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19 June ~~(5)~~ CAPT SMITH, [illegible], submitted report, on LIBERTY security situation. All classified material [illegible] in Research Department [illegible] secured. Crypto [illegible] for, but much RPC [illegible]. Much material subjected to oil [illegible] and mutilation and could not be [illegible].
(DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 19:26 June 1967 CRITICOMM)

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28 June ~~(S)~~ DIRNSA requested LIBERTY to submit by immediate message, the identification of all ADONIS, ORESTES and JASON keying material unaccounted for. (DIRNSA 282035Z/S1/0257 June 1967.)

29 June ~~(S)~~ LIBERTY submitted to DIRNSA a list of ADONIS, ORESTES and JASON keying material unaccounted for. (USS LIBERTY 291006Z June 1967.)

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30 June ~~(S)~~ Due to compromise of JASON material, DIRNSA requested CNO to take supersession action on specific [illegible] involved. (DIRNSA 302025Z/SJ462 June 1967.)

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Note: (U) The summary of security actions included in this report was prepared by CTG 100.4. (See following entry.)

(S) CTG 100.4 submitted to CTF 100 report of security actions taken. In summary, "...considered possible that compromise of classified matter may have occurred prior to the ship's arrival at Malta, to an extent not possible to determine, but not thereafter. That all material then on board has been recovered and is in safekeeping and adequate action taken to avoid compromise while at Malta or in transit. The security clearances of all officers and men participating in the security actions were appropriate for the level of classification involved." (CAPT Carl M. SMITH, DIRNAVSECGRULANT, letter of 23 June 1967.)

27 June (S) forwarded to DIRNAVSECGRULANT a list of equipment which was on loan to LIBERTY

28 June (U) CHINFO announced press release of narrative account of Court of Inquiry and statement by CO, LIBERTY. (CHINFO 2819302.)

30 June (S) Mr. L. W. GOSS, of G43, NAVSECGRU Representative in NAVSHIPENGCEN fact-finding group and inspection party, submitted report of trip 19-23 June to LIBERTY to make preliminary assessment of damage to the electronic systems aboard. Recommended that no consideration be given to salvage of electronic equipment in flooded spaces other than racks and miscellaneous hardware. All equipment in Radio spaces and below was completely submerged in water and oil for five days. While restoration of receivers might be possible, the cost would be prohibitive and probability that they could provide reliable service thereafter is highly unlikely. (NAVSECGRU/G43/kd memo 0399-67 of 30 June 1967.)

(S) CINCUSNAVEUR recommended LIBERTY for Presidential Unit Citation. (CINCUSNAVEUR 3013062.)

(S) CO, LIBERTY, recommended for Medal of Honor. (CINCUSNAVEUR 3013062.)

(U) Rep. T. P. O'NEAL (D-Mass.) visited LIBERTY 1030-1245Z accompanied by Ambassador FELDMAN and CDR J. K. FREEMAN, U. S. Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air, U. S. Embassy, Malta. Given brief guided tour of ship including area damaged by torpedo. Attack discussed in general terms. No substantive queries made. (USS LIBERTY 0320052.)

(S) reviewing LIBERTY electronic installation requirements and planning to provide detailed information and recommendations.

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3 July (U) NAVSECGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage given to CNO Flag Plot (20 minutes).

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5 July (U) CO, LIBERTY recommended 204 crew members for Purple Heart award. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

Note: (U) The figure of 204 applies to both military and civilian casualties and includes 34 deaths. (See Annex N.)

(U) GEN Lyman L. LEMNITZER, USA, USCINCEUR, expressed to CO, LIBERTY, "deep admiration for the outstanding performance of the officers and crew of LIBERTY." (USCINCEUR 050716Z/ECC[illegible].)

LIBERTY repairs progress report: all bulkheads, decks and framing in place, welding 75 percent complete; estimate undock 12 July, completion 14 July. Projected cost: $[illegible],000. (USS LIBERTY 051515Z.)

6 July (U) RADM W. M. WEEKS, ACNO (Communications), COMNAVCOMM, expressed gratitude on behalf of all naval communicators to ADM G. W. ANDERSON, USN (Ret.), former CNO, for stating the facts in his letter to the editor of the Washington Post published 6 July under the title "The 'Liberty' Case". (See Annex I.) (RADM R. M. WEEKS letter of 6 July 1967.)

In view of projected completion date 14 July, LIBERTY announced plans to conduct main plant tests and dock trials 15 July and when RFS 16 July, depart Malta en route Norfolk, Va., with PAPAGO in company, ETA Norfolk 29 July 1967. (USS LIBERTY 061730Z.)

Joint action on LIBERTY incident communications recommendations commenced. Action officer: CDR McQUILLIN, Deputy Assistant Commander (Ops), Staff, COMNAVCOMM. (CNO 062137Z.)

7 July COMSERVLANT advised that NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, was preparing time and cost estimates for repair and replacement of damaged equipment. Availability of replacement electronics equipment to restore LIBERTY to operational status as yet unknown. Planning to restore LIBERTY to configuration existing before battle damage. Intending to berth ship at Naval Station, Norfolk, to await status of replacement equipment. Requested cost estimates from NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, by 14 July 1967, and advice from Naval Ships Systems Command regarding availability of replacement equipment. (COMSERVLANT 071450Z.)

8 July CNO advised CINCUSNAVEUR to initiate recommendations for the Purple Heart and other awards, as appropriate, regarding LIBERTY casualties. (CNO 081600Z.)

10 July The June-July 1967 issue of the NAVSECGRU Bulletin was distributed. Coverage of LIBERTY incident was featured.

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(U) CDR E. H. PLATZEK, USN, of C42, the NAVSECGRU staff representative and member of TC 100.4, submitted to DIRNAVSECGRU a report of the trip to Malta. (NSG/C42/cat memo 00363-67 of 10 July 1967.)

(G) Op-61B advised that Government of Israel is prepared to make amends for the tragic loss of life and material damage. Department of State, Navy and Marine Corps representatives coordinating claims, personal and governmental, for ultimate presentation to Israel by State. State preparing questionnaire to be forwarded to personnel injured and to next of kin of those killed. (Op-61B memo of 10 July 1967.)

12 July (U) LIBERTY reported all shell plates in place; final welding, radiography in progress. Estimated undocking 17 July. (USS LIBERTY 121230Z.)

13 July —

14 July (U) In reply to COMSERVLANT 071450Z July, 1967, NAVSHIPYD, Norfolk, estimated four months required to restore LIBERTY to predamage configuration at estimated cost of $1,250,000, exclusive of costs of electronic equipment and antennas, certain allowance items, and repairs accomplished at Malta. (NAVSHIPYD NORVA 1419052.)

(U) CNO directed President, Inspection and Survey Board (PRESINSURV), to conduct survey of LIBERTY upon ship's return to CONUS to determine whether ship is fit for further naval service or can be made so without disproportionate costs. (CNO 1419492.)

(U) CINCLANTFLT advised CNO that he agreed with concurrent accomplishment of battle damage repair, overhaul and conversion to MSTS of LIBERTY if, in fact, conversion were decided upon; however, he questioned conversion to MSTS manning for ships such as LIBERTY which are exposed to enemy reaction. Stated that if LIBERTY had not been manned with a naval crew and thoroughly trained in damage control principles, the ship might have been lost. Proposed: if conversion decision, equipment availability and repairs delayed more than 30 days after LIBERTY arrival at Norfolk, consider lay up LIBERTY in reduced manning status pending decisions; if decision taken against conversion to MSTS, commence ordering personnel required to support regular overhaul; if decision taken to convert to MSTS, deliver LIBERTY soonest to conversion activity or appropriate naval shipyard for decommissioning and berthing until commencement of conversion. (CINCLANTFLT 1422022.)

(U) TC 100.4 and LIBERTY reported over 165 large canvas bags of assorted oil-and water-soaked paper and paper-like material recovered from damaged Research Operations Department spaces. LIBERTY RPI holdings were approximately 1000 items much of which unaccounted for. CNO proposed joint survey team of representatives from NIC, NSA and NAVSECGRU meet LIBERTY, sample residue, determine whether sorting possible and make recommendations for disposition of material. CDR D. F. TOOKER designate Op-94 action officer. (CNO 1422272.)

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11 July (U) NAVSECGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage given to CNO Flag Plot (50 persons).

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17 July (d) NSCM/043 memorandum 0424-67 of 17 July 1967 provided information relating to the status of restoration of LIBERTY and advised that unless otherwise directed, O&O would plan to restore LIBERTY over an 18-month period which would include MSTS conversion and redesign of mission equipment (6M dollars estimated) to meet requirements

(e) 170800Z. LIBERTY position 37-45.2N/07-41.5E; PIM coastal, 180700Z 36-47N/00-45.5E, 15 knots. (USS LIBERTY 170700Z.)

[redacted] (e) 180800Z. LIBERTY position 36-42N/00-04W; PIM coastal, 35-36N/07-15W, 14.6 knots. (USS LIBERTY 180800Z.)

(w) PRESINSURV advised COMSERVLANT that LIBERTY survey scheduled for 14-18 August and that assistance from [redacted]NAVSECGRU would be requested. (PRESINSURV 181558Z.)

(d) In reply to CINCLANTFLT 142202Z July 1967, CNO advised that the 6.1M dollars previously listed in FY68 POM for modernization of LIBERTY was reprogrammed at apportionment time to fleet maintenance. PCR submitted to OSD to convert ACTR's to MSTS manning as yet not addressed by OSD; decision not expected before August. Earliest start date for conversion to MSTS manning estimated as June 1968 due to lack of plans. LIBERTY scheduled for survey. OPNAV re-examining conversion decision. Stated that the only feasible course of action was to berth LIBERTY at Naval Station, Norfolk, and retain full crew aboard pending solutions to problems, and unless otherwise directed place LIBERTY in reduced manning status 1 September 1967. (CNO 182115Z.)

(d) NAVSHIPSYSCOM stated that determination of equipments for LIBERTY research area had not been made by higher authority. Believed that estimated engineering effort involved would exceed 30 [illegible] proposed in CINCLANTFLT 142202Z July 1967. Concurred in CINCLANTFLT reduced-manning proposal. (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 182152Z.)

19 July (d) Chief of Naval Personnel recommended to CNO that personnel recommended by CO, LIBERTY, be awarded Purple Heart. (Chief of Naval Personnel first endorsement of 19 July 1967 on USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

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18 July (c) NAVSECGRU briefing on LIBERTY damage given to NSA COMSEC [redacted] and NAVSECGRU G60 staffs (28 persons).

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21 July (c) NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ estimated scrap value of LIBERTY at 75 to 90K dollars. (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 211944Z.)

(U) LIBERTY was directed to conduct informal survey of all electronic and electromechanical equipment, less KPS material, remaining in Research Radio Room No. 1 and was authorized to dispose of that equipment in accordance with findings of survey. (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 212053Z.)

(U) Regarding disposal of equipment by LIBERTY, CNO directed that all mission-oriented equipment be disposed of by jettisoning in deep water prior to arrival in Norfolk. (CNO 21[illegible]7; CNO 220150Z July 1967.)

22 July (U) Hostile fire pay authorized for LIBERTY crew members: prorated from 1 June 1967 for those killed; for entire month of June for those wounded; members hospitalized entitled to draw until hospitalization terminated or 30 September 1967, whichever earlier. (CINCUSNAVEUR 221158Z.)

23 July (U) 230800Z. LIBERTY position [illegible]N/034-53W; PIM RH (thumb line route) 35-00N/042-00W, 14.1 knots. (USS LIBERTY 231006Z.)

24 July (U)

25 July (C) Estimated cost of replacing LIBERTY with similar hull and same characteristics, 13.5M dollars, assuming reuse of LIBERTY equipment where economically advantageous. Estimated cost of overhaul and repair, 9.65M dollars, including refurbishment and replacement of electronics equipment and restoring research spaces to original configuration. (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 251530Z.)

26 July (C) 260800Z. LIBERTY position 35-10N/55-03.3W; PIM RH 35N/62-17W, 14 knots. (USS LIBERTY 261101Z.)

[illegible] (U) DIRNAVSECGRULANT was informed that following personnel would visit LIBERTY for one-day visit on 3 August 1967 to observe blast effects on crypto equipment:

CDR D.L. COOPER	NAVSECENGRFAC
Mr. C.F. VAN WINKLE, GS-14	NAVSECENGRFAC
Mr. D. BINDER, GS-14 (Alternate)	NAVSECENGRFAC
Mr. J.L. NATFIELD, GS-13	NAVELECSYSCOMHQ

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27 July ~~(C)~~ NONSECRU briefing on LIBERTY ~~damage~~ given to Deputy Director, NSA, for COMSEC and key staff ~~[illegible]~~ (four persons).

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Mr. G.G. BOHLAPO, GS-12
Mr. J.M. TRAVERS, GS-11

NAVELECEYESCOMHQ
CNO

(CNO 271534Z.)

(U) CINCLANTFLT 271844Z described LIBERTY homecoming arrangements. Welcoming party to include VADM F.L. AINSWORTH, Deputy CINCLANTFLT; local city officials; CAPT BEERS, Chief of Staff, COMSERVLANT. Miss NORFOLK and/or Miss HOSPITALITY and Mrs. McDONALD to board the ship as soon as the brow is over, for informal welcome on quarterdeck, with no speeches. CO, welcoming party and press retire to wardroom for interview and coffee.

28 July (40) CNO approved the award of the Purple Heart to military personnel recommended by CO, LIBERTY. Award action for civilian personnel to be accomplished by separate action. (CNO second endorsement Serial 01197P09B2 of 28 July 1967 on USS LIBERTY letter Serial 330 of 5 July 1967.)

29 July (40) LIBERTY MOVEPT LIBERTY and PAYCO arrived Little Creek, Va., 2921007. (USS LIBERTY 292100Z.)

31 July (40) Joint survey team met aboard LIBERTY to make sampling of bagged residue of classified material. Team membership:

CDR D.F. YODER	NAVSECGRU (G12)
LT J.J. BURKE	NAVSECGRU (G30)
LTJG D.R. MCCABE	NAVSECSTA N60* (G60)
CTI J.L. J[illegible]TT	NAVSECGRU (G40)
CTI W.A. [illegible]NDEL	NAVSECSTA N60* (G60)
CTI J.M. DURST	NAVSECGRU (G30)
CTI [illegible].B. WILSON	NAVSECGRU (G30)
Mr. [illegible]) DURHAM, GG-14	NSA (S)
LT J.T. MCTIGHE	NSA (C)
S/A J.C. BOHLER	NAVINSERVO Norfolk**
S/A J.C. DUNTON	NAVINSERVO Norfolk**
LT R.A. HUTCHINSON	CINCLANTFLT

* Representing G60
** Representing NAVINTCOM

(NSG/G12 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967; USS LIBERTY 021630Z August 1967.)

2 August (40) Regarding survey of classified material conducted 31 July 1967, LIBERTY reported that bagged, oil-soaked and mutilated residue inspected; estimated 80 percent of material unidentifiable, some identifiable; some partial and complete KPS publications retrieved. Survey team recommended: no attempt be made at bag-by-bag search for sole purpose of identifying classified

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material; CO, LIBERTY, request authority to destroy bagged material on board; in process of burning, effort be made to dump each bag to determine whether identifiable RPS items can be accounted for prior to destruction. Accordingly, CO, LIBERTY requested authority to destroy without further reporting or investigation the bagged residue held and requested guidance concerning disposition of identifiable but damaged RPS items. (USS LIBERTY 021630Z; NSG/C12 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967.)

3 August (U) Trip report was submitted by CDR D.F. YODER concerning visit to LIBERTY by the survey team which sampled the residual classified material (NSG/C12 memorandum Serial 0117-67 of 3 August 1967.)

5 August CNO requested DIRNSA concurrence in authority for LIBERTY to destroy classified material discussed in USS LIBERTY 021630Z August 1967. (CNO 050015Z.)

7 August ALUSNA Tel Aviv received lengthy English translation of findings of Israeli Court of Inquiry reported in USDAO Tel Aviv 181030Z June 1967. Court found that no individual culpability exists. IDF desires no publicity regarding inquiry or proceedings and requests U.S. Navy handle report as confidential information to preclude publicity in the U.S. IDF representative stated that findings fully and candidly admit some confusion and ineptness of IDF Navy which IDF particularly does not want revealed for national security reasons. Stated "The report leaves the IDF Navy naked." A copy of findings being forwarded to Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C., but the only copies being forwarded to any U.S. government agency were the two copies given to ALUSNA (Tel Aviv). IDF would answer any questions but requested they be forwarded via ALUSNA. (USNA Tel Aviv 080810Z August 1967.)

Note: A synopsis of the findings of the Israeli Court of Inquiry has been included in the entries under 18 June.

8 August Certain NAVSECGRU key personnel reviewed the original report of the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry.

DIRNSA concurred in the destruction of bagged classified material residue held by LIBERTY. (DIRNSA 081648Z/ADN/112-67.)

10 August NSG/C42 memorandum 00399-67 of 10 August 1967 to NAVSECGRU programmers reported that the program to convert Navy ACTR's to NSIS operation was no longer active; therefore, funds programmed for that purpose appear to be the logical source of money needed to restore LIBERTY or to activate a similar hull, depending on findings of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Recommended that NAVSECGRU begin the work of restoring or replacing LIBERTY as soon as practicable.

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(16) CNO authorized LIBERTY to destroy bagged residue of classified material; requested inventory of documents held as well as those identified in the destruction process; identifiable RFS items to be held for pickup by NAVSECSTA and made available for inspection by DIRNSA. (CNO 1021342.)

(17) COMNAVINTCOM concurred in LIBERTY destruction of bagged residue of classified materials. (COMNAVINTCOM 1022312 SPINTCOMM.)

14 August (U) A survey and material inspection of LIBERTY commenced in accordance with CNO 1419492 July 1967. (PRESINSURV speedletter Serial 914 of 18 August 1967.)

15 August (18) NSG/CD memorandum 0286-67 of 15 August 1967 to G40 indicated that to restore LIBERTY, NAVSHIPS should prepare a PCR which includes all costs associated with the restoration. Costs would include an input from G40 giving NAVSECGRU requirements.

16 August (19) LIBERTY completed destruction of bagged residue of classified material. Each bag ripped open and contents perused prior to burning. No additional RFS items found. (USS LIBERTY 1814122 August 1967.)

17 August (U) LIBERTY won the Atlantic Fleet Battle Efficiency Award for fiscal year 1967. (CINCLANTFLT 1711262.)

18 August (U) PRESINSURV speedletter Ser 914 of 18 August 1967 reported that a survey and material inspection of LIBERTY was conducted 14-17 August 1967. It was the opinion of the Board that LIBERTY is fit for further service, and, if refitted with equivalent or up-dated electronic equipment, would be able to carry out all assigned missions and tasks.

(U) LCDR R.F. NIMMERICH of G42, NAVSECGRU representative on the Board of Inspection and Survey, submitted a trip report on his visit to Norfolk to participate in the survey and inspection. (G42 memorandum 419-67 of 18 August 1967.)

21 August (U) A group interment service was held at Arlington National Cemetery for the following personnel who lost their lives on board LIBERTY:

CTI James Mahlon LUPTON
CTI Jerry Lee GOSS
CTSN Carl Christian WYGREN
CTSA Lawrence Paul HAYDEN
CTSA David Walter MARLBOROUGH
SGT Jack Lewis RAPER

The remains were enclosed in a single casket. Catholic and

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31 August ~~(c)~~ Op-2 memorandum No. 01396-67 of 31 August to Op-94 recommended inactivation of LIBERTY, and initiation of programming action to restore ~~[illegible]~~ the lost ASBR capability in FY69 by replacement or repair of damage.



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1 September (~~0~~) NAVSECENGFAC requests CNO for disposition instructions regarding LIBERTY cryptographic equipments referred to in CNO 102136Z August 967. Informal liaison with NSA indicated that NSA had no further interest in the equipment with the possible exception of the KAW1. (NAVSECENGFAC 012102Z.)

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6 September ~~(a)~~ COMSEC material which was removed from LIBERTY and held by KPS was reviewed by NSA which requested that removed from KW-37 be transferred to NSA, and concurred in destruction of the remainder of COMSEC aids and equipment (DIRNSA 062036Z/S1/0332.)

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Protestant services were held in Fort Myer Chapel at 0945, followed by interment with full military honors. (BUPERS [illegible] of 17 July 1967.)

24 August (U) CNO (Op-04) memorandum Serial 0653-4367 of 24 August 1967 to Op-03 via Op-94 recommended, in view of lack of funds to restore LIBERTY to its configuration prior to battle damage, that the ship be inactivated commencing as soon after 1 September 1967 as is feasible. The only alternative is to leave the ship in a reduced-manning status until problem areas are resolved.

25 August (U) CNO (Op-94) memorandum Serial 063-67 of 25 August 1967 to Op-03 expressed nonconcurrence in Op-04 recommendation to inactivate LIBERTY. Recommended ship be placed in reduced manning status on 1 September 1967 until major problem area of funding is resolved.

29 August (U) CO, LIBERTY, submitted to CNO, a list of material sighted during destruction of residue of classified material. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 008 of 29 August 1967.)

30 August (U) DIRNAVSECGRU forwarded to COMNAVSHIPSYSCOM an inventory list of LIBERTY equipment, including costs, presumed lost. (NSG/C42 transmittal sheet Serial 054029 of 30 August 1967.)

31 August (U) CO, LIBERTY, submitted to CNO, a list of material still held on board LIBERTY. (USS LIBERTY letter Serial 009 of 30 August 1967.)

1 September (U) COMNAVSHIPSYSCOM forwarded to JAG cost estimates for the repair of damage inflicted on LIBERTY by Israeli air and naval forces on 8 June 1967. The estimated cost of restoring LIBERTY and equipment to same condition existing prior to the attack: $5,424,302. (COMNAVSHIPSYSCOM letter Serial 527-1450 of 1 September 1967.)

8 September (U) DIRNAVSECGRU attempts to find funds for restoration of LIBERTY noting the question of essentiality of this particular ship. A strong statement of essentiality was requested. (DIRNAVSECGRU 082228Z.)

14 September (U) Final disposition of LIBERTY RPS material: certain items forwarded to NSA; NAVSECSTA authorized to destory all RPS material recovered from LIBERTY. (CNO 141319Z.)

5 September (U) An ad hoc committee met to commence evaluation of lessons learned from the LIBERTY incident. (OJO memorandum Ser PPO0257-67 of 5 September 1967.)

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26 September ~~(e)~~ Change in policy limit RPS holdings in AGTR's and TAG's to effective editions plus three months ROB unless conditions are such that resupply during deployment is impossible. (COMNAVCOMM 261437Z.)

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26 September ~~(c)~~ Op-94 advised Op-03 that Liberty was a Navy resource provided in response to a national requirement, ~~[illegible]~~ therefore Op-94 ~~[illegible]~~ does not have the authority to direct investigation. In ~~[illegible]~~ light of essentiality of this [illegible] resource, a PCR [illegible] was prepared to attempt to [illegible] restoration of Liberty [illegible] FY-66, without [illegible] in [illegible].
(Op-92 memorandum Serial 0190[illegible] of 26 September 1964.)

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26 September ~~(e)~~ Change in policy limited RPS holdings in AGTR's and 7-AG's to effective editions plus three months ROB unless conditions are such that resupply during deployment is impossible. (COMNAVCOMM 261437Z.)

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19 September (U) Representative BARICK (D-La.) stated that "the attack on the LIBERTY warrants a full and complete investigation by the Congress... This should be done promptly to avoid another such incident that could be made to serve as a Pearl Harbor for World War III." He inserted several articles and an American Legion resolution on the incident in the Record. (Digest of Items of Interest, Congressional Record No. 147, 19 September 1967, submitted as OLA Congressional Information Report No. 140 of 20 September 1967.)

20 September ~~(U)~~

25 September ~~(U)~~ advised that a PCR was being prepared to obtain funds to overhaul and repair LIBERTY as soon as possible. Final action awaits DOD action on PCR. (CNO 2522492.)

3 October ~~(U)~~ OSD decision on the Navy program submission for ACTR's directed that the five ACTR's continue to be Navy manned rather than be converted to MSTS operation, with the proviso that the proposed conversion to MSTS manning could be submitted in the next programming cycle without prejudice. Current CNAV planning is to retain all five ACTR's as fleet units. (CNO 0212532.)

5 October ~~(U)~~ Regarding LIBERTY restoration costs, CNO requested CNAVMAT to provide essential cost data for: cost of restoration in accordance with original characteristics; cost of restoration with up-dated electronic configuration; cost of conversion of a replacement VICTORY hull with up-dated electronic configuration. Estimate breakdown to include specific cost of following aspects: structural, electrical, piping, sheet metal, machinery, electronics (including all radio research areas), antennas (including AN/SRR-20 pedestal and antenna). (CNO 0519172.)

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CAPTAIN WILLIAM LOREN McGONAGLE

UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain William L. McGonagle was born in Wichita, Kansas, on [illegible] 19, 1925. He attended high school in Coachella Valley, California, [illegible] tended the University of Redlands, and the University of Southern California. He received his commission as an Ensign in the U. S. Naval Reserve upon graduating from the University of Southern California in [illegible].

During the late 1930's and early 1950's he served [illegible] the [illegible] USS FRANK KNOX, the [illegible] USS KITTY [illegible] USS ROCHESTER, and at the U. S. Naval Advance [illegible], Germany, where he was in charge of minesweepers [illegible] Baltic and North Sea of mines planted during World War II.

From 1957 to 1959 he commanded the [illegible] USS MATACO. In July 1961, after an assignment as an NROTC [illegible] at the University of Idaho, he took command of the submarine [illegible] USS RECLAIMER.

Following a tour of duty on the [illegible] of the Commander, Service Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, he assumed [illegible] of the intelligence ship USS LIBERTY on April 1965. [illegible] USS LIBERTY when she was attacked and damaged by jet [illegible] and [illegible] the Sinai Peninsula on June 8, 1967. At present Captain McGonagle is the prospective Commanding Officer of the [illegible] ship KILAUEA, now under construction.

Captain McGonagle is married to the former Emma Jane Stephens of Glendale, California. They have three children: Cindy Lee, Sandra Sue and William Loren McGonagle, Jr. Their official home address is Indio, California.

The Congressional Medal of Honor

Presentation by
The Honorable Paul G. Ignatius
Secretary of the Navy
to
Captain William Loren McGonagle
United States Navy

★

ADMIRAL LEUTZE PARK
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
HEADQUARTERS FOR THE COMMANDANT
NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON

★

1130 Tuesday, 11 June 1968

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~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

Annex A

Historical Sketch of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5)

(U) The USS LIBERTY began her career in 1945 as a Victory Ship. Christened the SIMMONS VICTORY, she was launched in May, 1945, by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, Oregon, and served in the Atlantic and the Pacific during World War II and in Suyong Bay, Pusan, during the Korean conflict. She was subsequently mothballed by the Maritime Commission in 1958. Selected by the Navy for conversion to a technical research ship, she was delivered to the Willamette Iron and Steel Company, Portland, Oregon, in Februsty, 1963. The conversion culminated in commissioning on 30 December 1964, at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, as the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5), named in honor of ten U.S. cities and towns of the same name.

(U) The ship was internally organized into five departments: Operations, Research Operations, Deck, Engineering, Supply. The Research Operations Department was further functionally divided into four divisions.

(U) LIBERTY departed Bremerton in January 1965, transited the Panama Canal at which time she joined SERVRON FOUR, a squadron subordinate to COMSERVLANT, and arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, her permanent home port, on 23 February 1965. Fleet trials and training were successfully completed in April, 1965, in the Guantanamo Bay area.

The waters off the coast of West Africa became LIBERTY's operating area, where four deployments were completed. It was during the fifth deployment to these waters that the ship was diverted on 24 May 1967 to the Eastern Mediterranean due to the Middle East crisis.

(U) Unclassified statement of mission: To conduct technical research operations in support of U.S. Navy electronic research projects, which include electromagnetic propagation studies and advanced communications systems, such as satellite communications.

(U) Personnel Allowance

	Officer	Enlisted
General Service	9	151
Research Operations Department	—	—

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(U) Ship's Characteristics

Length	455 ft.
Beam	62 ft.
Draft, Full Load	29 ft.
Displacement, Full Load	11,500 tons
Maximum Speed	18.5 kts.

Appendices

Appendix I: Photograph of USS LIBERTY
Appendix II: Research Operations Department Personnel Information

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

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APPENDIX II to Annex A

Research Operations Department Personnel Information

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

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Appendix I to Annex B

Time Zones

ZONE +6 LOCAL TIME WASHINGTON, D.C.	ZONE +0 GREENWICH MEAN TIME	ZONE -2 LOCAL TIME MID-EAST
2000 DAY BEFORE	0000	0100 SAME DAY
2100 DAY BEFORE	0100	0200 SAME DAY
2200 DAY BEFORE	0200	0300 SAME DAY
2300 DAY BEFORE	0300	0400 SAME DAY
0000 SAME DAY	0400	0500 SAME DAY
0100 SAME DAY	0500	0600 SAME DAY
0200 SAME DAY	0600	0700 SAME DAY
0300 SAME DAY	0700	0800 SAME DAY
0400 SAME DAY	0800	0900 SAME DAY
0500 SAME DAY	0900	1000 SAME DAY
0600 SAME DAY	1000	1100 SAME DAY
0700 SAME DAY	1100	1200 SAME DAY
0800 SAME DAY	1200	1300 SAME DAY
0900 SAME DAY	1300	1400 SAME DAY
1000 SAME DAY	1400	1500 SAME DAY
1100 SAME DAY	1500	1600 SAME DAY
1200 SAME DAY	1600	1700 SAME DAY
1300 SAME DAY	1700	1800 SAME DAY
1400 SAME DAY	1800	1900 SAME DAY
1500 SAME DAY	1900	2000 SAME DAY
1600 SAME DAY	2000	2100 SAME DAY
1700 SAME DAY	2100	2200 SAME DAY
1800 SAME DAY	2200	2300 SAME DAY
1900 SAME DAY	2300	0000 NEXT DAY
		0100 NEXT DAY

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Annex C

Command and Control Relationships

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[redacted]

Appendix 1 to Annex C

Scheduling in CINCLANT's Area of Responsibility

[redacted]

Planning and Approval of Routine Monthly Schedules

states requirement to CINCLANT.

CINCLANT passes to CINCLANTFLT for planning action.

CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for planning action.

COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for planning action.

COMSERVRON 8 prepares plan to fulfill requirements including dates, areas of operations, CPA's in transit, and passes to COMSERVLANT for approval.

COMSERVLANT requests CINCLANTFLT approval.

CINCLANTFLT requests CINCLANT approval.

CINCLANT requests JCS(JRC) approval.

JCS(JRC) obtains CNO concurrence, approves proposal and passes to CINCLANT for action.

CINCLANT sends message to CINCLANTFLT directing action.

CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for action.

COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for action.

COMSERVRON 8 issues sailing orders to ACTR's.

Changes to Approved Schedules

states requirement to JCS(JRC).

JCS(JRC) obtains CNO concurrence, approves change and requests CINCLANT to take action.

CINCLANT sends message to CINCLANTFLT directing action.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C-I-1

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[redacted]

CINCLANTFLT passes to COMSERVLANT for action.

COMSERVLANT passes to COMSERVRON 8 for action.

COMSERVRON 8 issues sailing orders to ACTR's.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Appendix II to Annex C

Scheduling in USCINCEUR's Area of Responsibility

(U) JCS 062050Z June 1967 prescribed procedures for developing schedules while LIBERTY was operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility.

Planning and Approval of Routine Monthly Schedule

State requirements to CINCUSNAVEUR including recommended ports of call.

CINCUSNAVEUR to prepare schedule to fulfill requirements including dates, areas of operations, CPA's, ports of call for logistics and pass the plan to USCINCEUR.

USCINCEUR to review and pass schedule to JCS(JRC) for approval. Proposed schedules were required by JCS no later than 30th of the month for which the schedule was submitted.

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval or modifications.

USCINCEUR to pass for action.

CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

Modification of Approved Schedule Due to Changes in Technical Tasking

State requirement to JCS(JRC).

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of modification.

USCINCEUR to pass for action.

CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

Modification of Approved Schedule Involving A Change of More Than 48 Hours for Operational Reasons

CINCUSNAVEUR was to pass proposed modification to USCINCEUR.

USCINCEUR to review and pass to JCS(JRC) for approval.

JCS(JRC) to obtain necessary coordination and notify USCINCEUR of approval.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

USCINCEUR to pass for action.

CINCUSNAVEUR to issue sailing orders.

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[redacted]

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Appendix III to Annex C

Pertinent Messages

Note: A listing of each message is included in the Chronology of Events. All messages 1967.

CONSERVRON 8 2815022 April

CONSERVRON 8 2400202 May

USS LIBERTY 2417322 May

JCS 2916022/JCS 6499 May

CINCLANTFLT 3000402 May

CONSERVRON 5 3002022 May

USS LIBERTY 3006082 May

USCINCEUR 3009322/ECJC/JRC 08582 May

CINCUSNAVEUR 3117502 May

JCS 0103092/JCS 6714 June

USCINCEUR 0104192/ECJC/JRC 08686 June

USS LIBERTY 0107122 June

CINCUSNAVEUR 0113052 June

JCS 0115[illegible]/JCS 6724 June

CINCUSNAVEUR 0121202 June

CINCUSNAVEUR 0207172 June

USS LIBERTY 0221082 June

USS LIBERTY 0320282 June

[redacted]

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[redacted]

USS LIBERTY 042050Z June

USS LIBERTY 051934Z June

CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z June

USS LIBERTY 061844Z June

USS LIBERTY 062000Z June

USS LIBERTY 062036Z June

JCS 062050Z/JCS 7206 June

COMSIXTHFLT 062349Z June

USS LIBERTY 070908Z June

COMSIXTHFLT 071503Z June

JCS 072230Z/JCS 7337 June

JCS 080110Z/JCS 7347 June

USCINCEUR 080625Z/ECJC/J[redacted]43 June

COMSIXTHFLT 080917Z June

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Not Releasable

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Not Releasable

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Annex E

Communications Arrangements

Communications capabilities which existed within the Research Operations Department spaces of the USS LIBERTY known as Crypto I and Crypto II

With the exception of those low-level authentication and operational code systems held by Radio Central or CIC personnel, all classified communications were conducted within Crypto I and II by appropriately cleared personnel. The various cryptographic systems were [illegible] to [illegible] with designated keying material control and distribution normally providing limitation and segregation of the functions; i.e., the NAVSECGRUDEPT used the same system as GENSER counterparts but with different key lists.

The available equipment included teletype (TTY) components for processing incoming and outgoing traffic, receivers, converters, comparators, as well as associated power supplies, patch panels, and multicouplers.

Circuit capabilities included point-to-point TTY circuits, both medium-frequency and high-frequency, and Technical Research Ship Special Communications (TRSSCOMM) (moon relay). GENSER broadcast receive terminals were controlled in Crypto I; those of the Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Broadcast in Crypto II. An off-line ADONIS capability was provided for "backup."

Status of communications from reports available to COMNAVCOMM (G20)

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR recommended that a ROMULUS-covered, point-to-point coordination circuit be established between LIBERTY and . G20 favored keeping the one ROMULUS equipment available for OPSCOMMS use, assuming LIBERTY would soon receive the necessary keying material, and therefore recommended the use of ORESTES on the LIBERTY- circuit.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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requested permission to operate a "send-only" ORESTES CIRCUIT to LIBERTY to alleviate the overload on the OPINTEL Broadcast and to increase its traffic-handling capability. DIRNAVSECGRUEUR concurred. No evidence was received by G2O that this additional capability was ever employed.

reported daily schedules via TRSSCOMM would be kept following temporary repairs at Rota. Alternate communications were to be via NAVSECGRU circuits. Continuous guard was maintained on the XOPI Broadcast. GENSER coverage was the KATT broadcast and the ship advised that a shift to a JRTT broadcast was scheduled commencing at 0700012.

advised that TRSSCOMM was down for an indefinite period due to hydraulic trouble. Daily communications schedules were being maintained with . An attempt was to have been made in GENSER channels to activate a circuit with on or about 6 June.

requested an "on-call" circuit be established via NAVCOMMSTA Greece, contingent upon adequate facilities being available at NAVCOMMSTA's Greece and Morocco.

advised "TRSSCOMM HYDRAULIC TROUBLE REPAIRED. EXPERIENCING TROUBLE POWER SUPPLY. COMPLETION REPAIRS UNKNOWN. SKEDS WITH PATCHED THROUGH NAVCOMMSTA GREECE. CANCEL CKT REQ WITH ."

Note: The cancellation of the request for a circuit with apparently refers to the mention made of such a circuit in CRITICOMM, for no evidence of the request in GENSER channels was received by G2O.

advised that was keeping a daily schedule with using a RATT ROELUX circuit.

Communications Officer (LT ALLEN) advised that the last TRSSCOMM schedule was from the period 0613152-0160435Z with eight messages received. Although a schedule was set for 7 June, no contact with the LIBERTY via TRSSCOMM was made after 6 June.

GENSER communications following the departure of LIBERTY from Rota

Initial reception via "covered broadcast" was of the KATT from NAVCOMMSTA Morocco. Liberty advised on 2 June that the broadcast guard would shift to JRTT from NAVCOMMSTA Asmara at 0700012. Commencing at that time (0700012), GENSER traffic of a classified nature up to Secret would then be routed on point-to-point circuits to NAVCOMMSTA Asmara for introduction into the broadcast.

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[redacted]

COMSIXTHFLT requested LIBERTY to advise whether keying material was available to copy the Broadcast one of the few GENSER broadcasts cleared for Top Secret information. LIBERTY did not receive COMSIXTHFLT's message until 13 June upon arrival at Malta, nor did LIBERTY have the necessary keying material aboard.

Pertinent extracts from EASTLANT TACCOMREPT's submitted daily by NAVCOMMSTA Morocco to a predesignated list of addressees

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO FROM BEGINNING OF RADAY TO 0615Z..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 0203512 June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO FROM BEGINNING OF RADAY TO 0738Z..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 0502302 June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO 0338Z secured 1104..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 0602302 June 67 GENSER.)

"...LIBERTY ACTIVATED SCT WITH MOROCCO 0750Z-1140Z WITH NCS GREECE PASSING KEYING BOTH WAYS IN SUPPORT OF THIS TERMINATION..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 0702152 June 67 GENSER.)

Note: Although the reports for the radio day 7 June did not mention a termination with LIBERTY, it is assumed that the ship did hold a schedule, for USS LIBERTY 0709082 June 67 GENSER (the ship's 0708002 position report) was received locally at 0800522.

"...USS LIBERTY INVOLVED IN DISTRESS CIRCUMSTANCES DURING WHICH CAPABILITIES LIMITED TO ONE TRANSMITTER. NCS GREECE MAINTAINED DIRECT VOICE COMM THROUGHOUT THE INITIAL PERIOD OF DISTRESS. OTHER COMMSTAS ALERTED TO PROVIDE SUCH ADDITIONAL COMM ASSISTANCE AS NECESSARY. DISTRESS TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED BY MOROCCO/GREECE WAS RELAYED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY VIA CAMS/CALS CIRCUITS..." (NAVCOMMSTA Morocco 0901402 June 67 GENSER.)

Summary

The LIBERTY operated in the normal manner up to the time of the attack. Communications were on a scheduled basis with passed on the NAVSECGRU point-to-point circuit from the ship. The ship was not in continuous communications with but rather, for several hours daily, as scheduled. These schedules are normally held at times when the probability of interference (by the ship's transmitters) with her is reduced. Broadcasts were used as the primary means for command and control dissemination

Apparently, the ship guarded tactical voice nets in Radio Central and employed this capability after the attack. The initial reception of the message (voice) which reported the attack was on the EO4.04 circuit, the CINCUSNAVEUR High Command Net. Since the frequencies assigned for this [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

circuit are in the 2-30-megacycle spectrum, it is presumed that the URC-32 transmitter was employed for all communications immediately following the attack.

Appendix I: Explanation of Terms

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[redacted]

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Appendix I to Annex E

Explanation of Terms

JRTT	Designator for the general service (GENSER) broadcast controlled at NAVCOMMSTA Asmara. Cleared for Secret.
KRTT	Designator for the GENSER broadcast controlled at NAVCOMMSTA Morocco. Cleared for Secret.
OPINTEL Broadcast	Operational Intelligence Broadcast. An on-line, 100-word-per-minute broadcast
RADAY	Radio Day.
SCT	Single-channel teletype.
TACOMMREPT	Tactical Communications Report. A report submitted daily, covering a 24-hour period, generated immediately following the end of the RADAY covered, by those NAVCOMMSTA's controlling various ship-to-shore facilities, including broadcasts, point-to-point terminations, transmitter or receiver facilities, etc. Reports include information concerning individual units terminating circuits, specific details of support of the fleet by shore stations, broadcast conditions, number of units copying broadcasts, etc. NAVCOMMSTA Morocco is the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) control.
TRSSCOMM	Technical Research Ship Special Communications. A system which employs ultrahigh frequencies (1800-2400-megacycle range) and requires special receiving and transmitting equipment. The capability is currently limited to five shipboard installations, including that aboard LIBERTY.

Asmara, Ethiopia.

U. S. Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA Morocco.

U. S. Naval Security Group Department, NAVCOMMSTA Washington.

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

XOPI or XRI — Short titles for the OPINTEL Broadcast controlled from NAVSECGRUDEPT, NAVCOMMSTA Morocco.

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~~SECRET~~

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~~ESCAPE-NOFORN~~

[redacted]

Annex F

RPS Matters

An attempt is made in this annex to report the RPS situation aboard LIBERTY at the time of the attack and to describe efforts expended to account for all registered material after the attack.

The nature of LIBERTY's operations made normal resupply of RPS material somewhat difficult and at times impossible. In March, 1967, LIBERTY requested and obtained from CNO, authority to hold six months of reserve-on-board (ROB) RPS material. As a result of the attack, the arrangement which had proved so beneficial to the ship became a liability, for 727 items of RPS material had to be accounted for.

Upon receipt of LIBERTY's initial damage reports, CNO directed NPIO Norfolk to withhold further shipments of RPS material for LIBERTY (CNO 0913442 June 1967). Initial and early amplifying reports generated optimism regarding the possibility of accounting for the RPS material without too much difficulty; however, many reports were to follow, the forerunner of which was DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 1[illegible] June 1967 CRITICOMM, which would indicate the seriousness of the situation from the standpoint of accountability of the vast amount of RPS material held by LIBERTY.

USS LIBERTY 2007352 June 1967 was the initial compromise report submitted to DIRNSA. The degree of loss and disarray was apparent when the ship included in its message a request that NAVSECSTA forward as soon as possible a copy of LIBERTY's current inventory of RPS holdings. On 23 June, DIRNSA requested LIBERTY to identify the material which could not be accounted for; LIBERTY complied on 29 June. NSA was particularly concerned that much of the fleet broadcast JASON material was unaccounted for and informed CNO that this material had been declared compromised and directed supersession action (DIRNSA 3030232 June 1967). CNO took appropriate follow-up action.

From this point until mid-July, DIRNSA, CNO, NAVSECSTA and LIBERTY were involved in an all-out effort to reconcile the ship's RPS records but without success. On 14 July, CNO recommended that a joint survey team meet LIBERTY upon her arrival at Norfolk to take a sampling of the residue of RPS material aboard to determine whether sorting were possible, and to submit recommendations for further action or disposition of the material. Between 14 July and 2 August, arrangements were made for a joint survey team of representatives of NSA, NAVSECGRU, NIC and NAVSECSTA to visit LIBERTY. A survey was conducted on 31 July, the results of which were reported by USS LIBERTY 0216302 August 1967. It was estimated that 80 percent of the residue of RPS material was unidentifiable and a recommendation was submitted that no attempt be made to conduct a bag-by-bag

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search for the sole purpose of identifying classified material. LIBERTY's commanding officer requested authority of CNO to destroy the bagged residue without further reporting or investigation and requested guidance concerning the disposition of any identifiable but damaged RPS items discovered during the process of destruction. CNO 0500152 August 1967 requested concurrence in this proposal by NSA and NSC. DIRNSA concurred in LIBERTY's proposal and further recommended that all remaining COMSEC material aboard LIBERTY at the time of the attack, excluding that which was bagged, be forwarded to NSA for examination (DIRNSA 0816482 August 1967). On 10 August, CNO authorized LIBERTY to destroy the bagged residue of classified material and requested that identifiable RPS publications and equipment be held for pick-up by NAVSECSTA. The equipment was to be further transferred to the Naval Security Engineering Facility (NAVSECENGFAC) where it would be available for inspection by NSA. LIBERTY destroyed the bagged material on 16 August. On 1 September, NAVSECENGFAC requested disposition instructions from CNO regarding the cryptographic equipment. DIRNSA 0620362 September 1967 concurred in the destruction of the equipment and CNO 1413192 September 1967 authorized destruction of all remaining LIBERTY RPS publications and equipment, bringing to a close all attempts to account for LIBERTY RPS holdings.

As a result of the LIBERTY RPS problem, it was decided to reduce TRS holdings to effective editions plus three months of ROB material in all cases in which it is possible to resupply ships of this type during a cruise. COMNAVCOMM 2614372 September 1967 advised all AGTR's and T-AG's, fleet commanders in chief and service force commanders of the new RPS policy.

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ANNEX C

Damage and Restoration

(U) Initial reports of the attack on LIBERTY indicated that she was listing badly. COMSIXTHFLT reported (SITREP 8/0814152) that a torpedo had struck amidships on the starboard side, flooding had been stopped, the ship had a nine-degree list, and the radar, gyro and fathometer were inoperative. A fleet ocean tug, USS PAPAGO (ATF 160), was diverted to assist LIBERTY. LIBERTY advised that she was unable to carry out her mission: extensive superficial damage topside had been sustained, lower deck spaces forward had been destroyed; drydocking and extensive refitting would be required. Research Radio 1, the Coordination Center and Crypto had taken the direct torpedo hit and spaces were flooded.

(U) At 090425Z, USS DAVIS (DD937) and USS MASSEY (DD778) rendezvoused with LIBERTY. DAVIS came alongside and provided effective damage control assistance; however, an oil leak persisted. COMSIXTHFLT personally inspected the damage at 0912002 at which time flooded areas were reported to be 90 per cent full of water and oil. PAPAGO joined the escort unit at 0915002 and took station in LIBERTY's wake; MASSEY was detached.

(C) The first damage survey by the Fleet Maintenance Officer was reported in COMSIXTHFLT 0919542 June 1967:

Flooding between frames 52 and 78 (36-inch frame spacing) below the second deck, including the first and second platform decks for the entire width of the ship. Flooded area included lower two levels of research operations spaces.

Torpedo hole at frame 69 about 13 by 15 feet with the top of the hole at the waterline.

SPS-10 radar was destroyed by the crew during the attack; radar consoles probably beyond repair.

Most communications were down due to lack of antennas; equipment may require minor repairs.

Flash fire on starboard wing of the bridge; no major damage.

Flash fire due to ruptured gasoline drums port side 01 and 02 levels amidships; exterior superficial damage; no interior damage.

Twenty-one-foot motor whale boat lost; 33-foot personnel boat received minor damage; virtually all life rafts destroyed.

Cannon holes from two inches to one foot in diameter throughout the topside area, with associated cable damage.

Watertight boundaries established at frames 52 and 78 and at second deck level.

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(2)

Second deck hole in diagnostic room and at the skin of the ship; bulkhead bulged forward from explosion, but in good condition.

Bulkhead at frame 78 (forward bulkhead of the engineering spaces) in excellent condition; no indication of damage.

No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room. Gyro, steering order telegraph, rudder angle indicator, fathometer, sound-powered phones, and bridge steering control in operation. (Note: Previous and subsequent reports indicate that the gyro and fathometer were inoperative and had been repaired.)

Ship in process of removing list; list presently 4-5 degrees. Anticipate zero list on arrival in port.

(C) By late 9 June, the combined crews of DAVIS and LIBERTY had restored the diesel generator, emergency switchboard, gyro, [illegible] switchboard, IMC system, electrical fire pump and the running lights. Furthermore, power had been restored to additional radio equipment; replacement damage control equipment brought aboard, and the list reduced to three degrees.

(C) Prior to arriving at Malta, LIBERTY's commanding officer requested assistance from the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests for the repair of damages estimated to require approximately five months yard availability and which might cost from two and one half to three million dollars.

(C) LIBERTY was dead in the water for three hours on 11 June to allow PAPAGO divers to examine the hole, which they estimated to be 39 feet wide at the bottom and 24 feet high. A net which the divers rigged to cover the after two thirds of the hole washed away ten minutes after the ship got underway.

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NAVSO 5216 (7-66, [redacted] N 0104-904-1760

[redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Memorandum

NSG/G42/dfc
Memo 00658-67
DATE : 27 DEC 1967

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of enclosures and physical removal of caveat

FROM : G40

TO : G30

SUBJECT : History of Action Pertaining to Damages to and Restoration of USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5); submission of

Encl: (1) Narrative Account
(2) Message Summary
(3) Correspondence Summary

1. Enclosures (1), (2), and (3) are submitted in the rough in accordance with your verbal request and previous agreement with LT P. E. MATCHETT (G4232).

2. The narrative account and summaries have been compiled from messages available in G42 files. Messages and correspondence referenced are included with the appropriate summary except where it is known that a message, letter or memo is held by G30.

3. This completes G40 action pertaining to USS LIBERTY battle damage and restoration history with the exception that G40 will ensure G30 is advised of action taken on the Budget amendment currently under review by OSD.

W. C. WHITE
Acting

SF FILE

[redacted]

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT

1. Initial reports of the attack on the USS LIBERTY indicated that severe damage had been inflicted and that the LIBERTY was unable to carry out its mission. (CNL10812092 Jun) and (USS SARATOGA 0812557 Jun). The LIBERTY's position at this time was 31-25E (COMSIXTHFLT 0813492 Jun). The next reports told of inoperative Navagation Equipment and a starboard list of 9 to 10 degrees and indicated that flooding had been stopped. (COMSIXTHFLT 0816217 Jun and USS LIBERTY 0817152 Jun). By approximately 0500 on the 9th of June, the USS DAVIS had joined the LIBERTY and was providing damage control assistance which appeared effective, except for an oil leak that persisted. (CTG 60.5 0903442 Jun, CTG 60.5 0907082 Jun, CTG 60.5 0908522 Jun, CTG 60.5 0910142 Jun, and CTG 60.5 0919007 Jun). Spaces opened to flooding by the torpedo hit were about 90% full of water and oil. (COMSIXTHFLT 0916357 Jun).

2. The first survey of damages by COMSIXTHFLT Maintenance Officer was reported in COMSIXTHFLT's 0919542 Jun and stated that:

a. Flooding between frames 52 - 78 below second deck and including first and second platform decks entire width of ship.

b. Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', with top of hole at the water line.

c. SPS-10 Radar destroyed; probably beyond repair.

d. Most of the communications down due to lack of antennas.

e. Flash fire starboard wing of bridge, no major damage.

f. Flash fire port side 01 and 02 levels amidships, exterior superficial damage, no interior damage.

g. 21 Man Motor Whale Boat lost, 33' personnel boat received minor damages, and virtually all life rafts destroyed.

h. Cannon holes from 2" to 1' in diameter throughout topside area with associated cable damage in way of holes.

i. Second deck-hole in diagnostic room and skin of ship. Bulkhead bulged forward from explosion but in good condition. No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room.

3. At about 0900 on the ninth, the USS PAPAGO joined in escort of the USS LIBERTY (CTG 60.5 0919002 Jun 1967). By 2200 on the ninth, combined damage control crews (USS PAPAGO and USS LIBERTY) had restored several vital systems including Gyro, Running Lights, Diesel Generator, Electrical Fire Pump, IMC System, and power to the Radio Equipment (GENSER). They had also reduced the list to 3 degrees. (CTG 60.5 0922302 Jun).

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Enclosure (1) to NSG/[illegible]
Ser. 00658-67 of 8 DEC 1967

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4. Reports received during the next few hours re-affirmed previous damage estimates, and estimated the torpedo hole to be a tear-shaped hole about 13' x 15', with the top of the hole at the water line. (COMSIXTHFLT 0923472 Jun, CTG 60.5 1011002 Jun, CTG 60.5 1017302 Jun)

5. The CO USS LIBERTY requested assistance from the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in preparing work requests to repair damages estimated to require 5 months yard time and $2.5M. (USS LIBERTY 1109007 Jun) At about this same time, the LIBERTY stopped dead in the water in an attempt to close off the upper part of the hole now determined to be 24' x 24' (CTG 60.5 1111122 Jun and CTG 60.5 1116012 Jun). This effort later proved to be futile and the LIBERTY made for MALTA at a speed of 5 knots (CTG 60.5 1219302 Jun).

6. CAPT R. L. ARTHUR was appointed as CTG 100.2 with CTF 100 as OIC of Docking and Repair at MALTA and by 0900 of the 14th had completed plans for docking. (CTF 100 1309342 Jun). The LIBERTY was drydocked at 1400A on the 15th and cleanup commenced immediately. (CTF 100 1502002 Jun). Damages were then described as:

a. Hole centered at frame 60 and extending 24' downward from just below the second deck, and longitudinally from frame 53 to frame 66 (39'). Hole was teardropped shaped as previously reported, and larger at bottom.

b. Outboard 15' of first platform deck and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck and frames buckled from frame 53 to frame 62 and inboard about 15'. (Frame spacing is 36").

c. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck frames 52 to frame 71 for the entire width of the ship.

d. Lower reserve compartments have equipment mixed with mass of twisted wreckage. 821 shell and fragment holes in hull, 230 attributed to aircraft cannon. Estimate MALTA repairs to take 3 weeks. (CTF 100 1514062 Jun).

7. Personnel from Naval Ships Engineer Center, NSA, NSC, F & M SYSTEMS (Electronic Equipment Sub-Contractor for original conversion) and LTV ELECTRO SYSTEMS visited LIBERTY to inspect damages and make preparations for final repairs in CONUS. Various reports of repair progress were received during the next few days, and preliminary estimates had LIBERTY ready for sea on 7 Jul. (CINCUSNAVEUR 1617152 Jun).

8. By 13 Jun it had been determined that the Electronics Equipment in the third and fourth decks including Radio 1, Crypto operations, Coordination Center and TTY repair ship were a complete loss. The possibility that equipment in Radio 2 and R & D spaces on the second deck could be

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restored was stated. (DIRNAVSECGRUEUR 1913282 Jun). Repairs which were to be accomplished by the yard at MALTA were described by the Fleet Maintenance Officer as:

a. Replace shell from below turn of bilge to average 26' water line, frames 50 through 68.

b. Replace main traverse bulkhead at frame 52 from starboard shell inboard 45' between 18' and 26' waterlines.

c. Replace extensive areas in tank tops, frame 52 through 60.

d. Replace first platform deck from starboard shell inboard 20' at frames 52 through 50 (believe this latter should have been 52 - 60)

e. Replace non-tight bulkhead at frame 60 from starboard shell inboard 40' between tank top and first platform and second deck.

f. Replace centerline and starboard longitudinal non-tight bulkheads complete and lower 8' port longitudinal bulkhead between tank tops and first platform, frames 52 through 60. An estimate for 70 tons of replacement steel, $150,000, and 3 weeks time was reported. (USS LIBERTY 2013402 Jun).

9. USS LIBERTY 2412052. Repair progress report:

a. Ripout 80% complete

b. Repairs to Tank Crash bulkhead 70% complete.

c. Tank top repairs 70% complete.

d. Frame 52 replacement bulkhead being fitted, repairs 25% complete. Plate of ship in process of pre-fabrication. Interior bulkheads, shell frames, shell plates, and deck plates approximately 20% complete.

10. [redacted] provided a list of equipment on loan to the USS LIBERTY from that activity. As of 6 Oct 67, only one item on that list has been located, and that (an AN/TKN-11 ser 2594) is recommended for survey.

11. USS LIBERTY 2902222 Jun. Repair progress report:

a. Ripout completed.

b. Fuel Oil tank and tank top repairs complete.

c. Frame 52 Main Traverse Bulkhead 85% complete.

d. All non-tight bulkheads between tank top and first platform erected, boundary welding 25% complete.

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e. Traverse bulkhead at frame 60 between first platform and second decks 60% erected, boundary welding 40% complete.

f. All plate-shop prefab complete except for shell plates, which are approximately 80% complete.

g. Estimate undock 12 Jul, final completion 17 Jul.

h. Final cost estimated at $165K.

12. As repairs progressed and inspections of damages concluded, cost estimates for restoration began to be generated. One such estimate made by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard came to $1.25M for hull and [illegible]head repairs. This did not include allowance items, watertight doors, cables below decks, nor replacement of joiner bulkheads. (NAVSHIPYD NORVA [illegible]037 Jul). Another estimate by F & M SYSTEMS in their letter of [illegible] Jul 1967 to NAVSHIPSYSCOM, was for $3,574,551 for repair to the research department's electronic and antenna systems. Supposedly this included repairs to the AN/SRR-20 antenna pedestal and dish which had taken several direct cannon hits. (USS LIBERTY 061225Z Jul). At about this same time, plans for what would be re-installed during rehab were underway.

G20 prepared a list of communications requirements (G20 memo to G40 Ser 0370 of 13 Jul 1967).

13. To preclude severe security problems upon arrival CONUS, the LIBERTY was given authority to dispose [illegible] equipment in Radio Room 1, compartment 3-60-0-C. (NAVSHIPSYSCOM Q 211944Z Jul).

14. It became apparent that funds to restore the LIBERTY would be hard to come by and in his 14[illegible]072 Jul, CINCLANTFLT recommended delaying the timing of industrial work until funds and all work was identified. He also concurred in NAVSHIPSYSCOM 1622097 Jul proposal to combine restoration with conversion to MSTS manning if indeed the latter was approved. He noted that the manning by MSTS had drawbacks and expressed the belief that the LIBERTY probably would not have been saved had she been so manned. CNO [illegible]211152 Jul advised that $6.1M in the FY 68 Fleet Modernization Program had been reprogrammed at apportionment to Fleet Maintenance, further complicating the hunt for restoration funds. It was recommended that the LIBERTY be placed in a "reduced manning status" on 1 Sep 1967 until funds could be identified.

15. The only quasi-official summary of damages to the LIBERTY's Research Department Electronic Equipment damages was contained in trip reports by MR Irv DOSS (G43) and MR SHICK and LT DEFREY of NSA [illegible] The latter report stated that:

a. All antennas either destroyed, damaged or burned except the TRSSCOMM antenna.

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b. Significant damage to almost all antenna lead-ins.

c. Only minor damage to TRISCOMM antenna system.

d. AN/SRR-20 ESV Tracking system may be repairable.

e. All of positions (RR-1) destroyed or damaged (blast, oil and salt water) beyond economical re-use.

f. All equipment and material in P & R spaces, transcribing area, maintenance shop and crypto room similarly damaged.

g. All equipment in other areas i.e. (second deck) received severe shock though most of it does not show surface damage.

h. Complete re-wiring in RR-1 will be required.

i. This inspection was only superficial (by observation vice equipment testing) and closer inspection will probably find further damage.

j. Informal estimate of $6.0M submitted.

16. Since funds to restore LIBERTY had not been identified, the MSTS manning proposal had not yet been acted upon, and no knowledge of the "when or how much" would be paid by the ISRAELI Government for damages, OP-04 in a memo to OP-03 via OP-94 (ser 0653-43P of 24 Aug 1967) recommended complete de-activation of the LIBERTY. OP-94 did not concur, but instead proposed reduced manning (OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 063-67 of 25 Aug 1967). OP-03 concurred with OP-04 in recommending de-activation and suggested that OP-94 should initiate program action on the future status of the LIBERTY. (OP-03 memo to OP-94 Ser 01396M of 31 Aug 1967). OP-94's reply (OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 019030P94 of 26 Sep 1967) stated that since the LIBERTY was a Navy resource in response to National tasking, (OP-94) did not have the authority to direct de-activation, but instead were preparing a POR in an attempt to locate funds in FY 1968 for restoration without reprogramming action.

17. The President, Board of Inspection and Survey stated that the NAVSY estimate of $1.25M was probably only about half of what would be needed since experience showed that estimates prior to an INSURV were usually only 50% of actual costs to correct INSURV deficiencies. (PRES INSURV [illegible] message 2517002 Jul). Similarly, unofficial estimates were climbing and by the 10th of August had risen to $9.65M to restore LIBERTY, or $13.5M to outfit another victory hull (042 memo to CO Ser 00399-67 of 10 Aug 1967) of which one was available (NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 2515307 Jul, CNO 2814377 Jul and NAVSHIPS 0318447 Aug).

18. A compiled list of damages, repair costs to date, and estimated future costs was forwarded to the Judge Advocate Office by NAVSHIPSYSCOM letter Ser 527-1450 of 1 Sep 1967. The total estimate came to $5,420,202

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and then was qualified by a statement to the effect that escalation of this estimate is insured because:

a. Estimates are based on current labor costs.

b. Original equipment purchase costs were used.

c. Elimination of a shaft rubbing problem was not included because no reliable estimate could be made without disassembly of the shaft.

d. Belief that all damage to electrical cables were not yet known.

The cost breakdown was:

a. Services preformed at MALTA	167,[illegible].00
b. NNSY Personnel Travel	7,000.00
c. Actual cost of oil removal	9,750.00
d. Cost of Electronics System Restoration (Est)	3,901,187.00
e. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical	1,261,459.00
f. Equipage and Allowance items	141,656.00
g. Labor of LIBERTY Personnel in excess of normal	128,500.00

19. The INSURV report was published under cover letter of PRESIDENT, BOARD of INSPECTION and SURVEY, CHIEF of NAVAL OPERATIONS 232/mbs AGTR-5 ser 948 of 13 Sep 1967. In addition to damages as a result of the attack, this report included all deficiencies noted which will surely increase costs of rehabilitation to $10MM. The report does find the LIBERTY to be sound and fit for further service upon correction of the deficiencies.

20. A complete inventory of equipment on board the LIBERTY was made by Director, Naval Security Group Atlantic and from this inventory, lists were compiled which identify equipment as to (a) missing, (b) in need of repair, (c) operable without repairs, (d) found, not on allowance, and (e) recommended for survey. (DIRNAVSECGRULANT letter 85/RJG/cc Ser 01029 of 15 Sep 1967).

21 The continuing efforts by OP-96G staff to identify funds for LIBERTY restoration was beginning to falter, and it became increasingly apparent that funds would not be obtained without a firm re-statement of the requirement. Therefore, DIRNAVSECGRU's 082228 Sep 1967 advised of the lack of progress in obtaining funds and requested restate the requirement. This did in their 2021137 Sep 1967. CNO responded by advising that a PCR was being prepared for LIBERTY restoration.

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22. On 5 Oct 1967, CNO (CNO message 0519177 Oct) requested the Chief, Naval Material to provide detailed cost data for restoration of the USS LIBERTY to its pre-attack capability, for an up-dated electronics capability, and for replacement of the LIBERTY with another hull.

23. Naval Ship System Communications in replying for CNM (NAVSHIPSYSCOM 171720Z Oct) provided substantial data in response to CNO's request. It did not, however, provide sufficient detail on the electronic suite thus a trip to F & M Systems Company, Dallas, Texas was required to develop the necessary electronics equipment shopping list. MR COOK (of G43) and MR PERFECT (of NAVSHIPS) made the trip, and with the assistance of F & M Systems personnel developed the required shopping list for restoration with a new electronics suite. G42 personnel then prepared a shopping list for restoration to pre-attack capabilities, and a rationale in support of restoration, recommending restoration with the up-dated electronics suit.

24. Based upon the information supplied by NAVSHIPSYSCOM, G42, G43 and CD prepared a budget amendment for submission to the Secretary of Defense (Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense Ser 006874 of 4 Dec 1967). This amendment is currently undergoing review by OSD and a decision as to whether to support it is anticipated by no later than 22 Dec 1967.

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MESSAGE SUMMARY

✓ CNL-0812097 Jun: Initial report of attack relayed from USS SARATOGA indicated the LIBERTY was badly damaged and requesting immediate assistance.

X [redacted]-0818122 Jun: Reported LIBERTY was unable to carry out mission, extensive superficial topside damage and lower deck forward spaces destroyed.

X USS SARATOGA-0812547 Jun: Relayed report from LIBERTY "Hit by torpedo starboard side, listing badly, need assistance immediately."

✓ COMSIXTHFLT-0813497 Jun: Re-affirmed torpedo hit, stated position of LIBERTY as 31-25N, 33-25E.

✓ COMSIXTHFLT-0814712 Jun: Reported flooding stopped, 9 degree list, Radar/Gyro/Fathometer inoperative.

✓ USS LIBERTY-0817157 Jun: Reported details of attack, 10 degree list to starboard, watertight boundries established and holding.

✓ CTG 60.5-0903442 Jun: Reported rendervous of USS DAVIS with LIBERTY, material damage under control.

✓ CTG 60.5-090708Z Jun: Bulkheads firm, flooding contained but oil leaking; capable of 10 knots.

✓ CTG 60.5-0908372 Jun: Oil leak [illegible] (SITREP 6)

X CTG 60.5-0910147 Jun: SITREP-7, Oil leak same. Recommend (Tide Water) have carbonized sand or dispersant available.

✓ COMSIXTHFLT-0916337 Jun: Flooded spaces 90% full of water and oil. SERVTORSIXTHFLT Material Officer making survey of damage.

✓ CTG 60.5-0919002 Jun: USS PAPAGO joined escort. Oil leak continues.

✓ COMSIXTHFLT-0919362 Jun: Fleet Maintenance Officer report follows:

a. Flooding between frames 52 - 78 below second deck and including first and second platform decks entire width of ship.

b. Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', with top of hole at [illegible] line.

c. SPS-10 Radar destroyed by crew during attack, probably beyond repair.

d. Most communications down due to lack of antennas.

e. Flash fire starboard wing of bridge, no major damage.

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f. Flash fire port side O1 and O2 levels amidships, exterior superficial damage, no interior damage.

g. 21 Man Motor Whale Boat lost, 33' personnel boat, minor damage, and virtually all life rafts destroyed.

h. Cannon holes from 2" to 1' in diameter, throughout topside area with associated cable damage in way of holes.

i. Second deck hole in diagnostic room and at skin of ship. Bulkhead bulged forward from explosion but in good condition. No damage in engineering plant or steering gear room.

CTG 60.3-092230Z Jun: Combined Damage Control crews have repaired several electrical wires, re-routed some electrical circuits and VIR board, placed diesel generator in commission, restored power to radio equipment and IC switchboard, put Gyro back on line, repaired running lights, restored LMC system electrical fire pump, and reduced list to 5 degrees.

COMSIXTHFLT-092347Z Jun: SERVPORSIXTHFLT Material Officer completed damage summary.

a. Flooding between frames 52 and 78 below second deck.

b. Torpedo hole at frame 60 about 13' x 15', top at waterline.

c. SPS-10 Radar inoperative

d. Communications antennas down

e. 21' M/B lost, all life rafts destroyed.

CTG 60.3-101100Z Jun: Oil leak reduced to seepage. List, negligible.

COMSIXTHFLT-101634Z Jun: ETA MALTA 130715Z.

CTG 60.3-101750Z Jun: Reports LIBERTY now stable, hole is tear-shaped and may be over 15' at bottom.

USS LIBERTY-110900Z Jun: Requested NORSY (NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD) assistance in preparing work requests for repair damage. C.O. estimated 5 months yard time and $2.5M. Recommended repairs be combined with conversion to MSTS.

CTG 60.3-111112Z Jun: LIBERTY attempting to close off upper part of hole with canvas.

CTG 60.3-111801Z Jun: LIBERTY stopped dead-in-water to allow USS PAPAGO divers to examine hole and rig covering net. Hole estimated 39' wide by 24' high. Oil leak negligible.

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CTG-60.5-111624Z Jun: Coordination center and crypto-one on third deck are empty of equipment, starboard Maintenance shop also clear.

CTG 60.5-121930Z Jun: SOA 5 knots. Forward bulkhead flexes 7 inches in 8 foot span. Paint is flaking. ETA Malta now 132000A.

CTF 100-130934Z Jun: Plans for docking completed. Identified members of CTF 100. CTG-100.2, CAPT R. L. ARTHUR, USN in charge of Docking and Repair.

CTG 60.5-131000Z Jun: ETA MALTA 140800A. LIBERTY riding well.

CTF 100-142116Z Jun: LIBERTY drydocked MALTA at 141900A.

CTF 100-150200Z Jun: LIBERTY entered drydock at 1400A, 15 Jun 1967. Canvas mat in place at 151530A and pump-out commenced. Damage from torpedoes:

a. Hole centered at FR-60 and extending 24' downward from just below second deck, and longitudinally from FR-53 to 60 (39'). Hole teardrop shaped and larger at bottom.

b. Outboard 15' of first platform and associated structure badly damaged. Lesser damage to second platform deck. Second deck and frames buckled from frame 52 to frame 62 and inboard 15'. (Frame spacing is 36").

c. Major damage to all interior joiner bulkheads below second deck frame 52 to 78 for entire width of ship.

CTF 100-151406Z Jun: Lower research compartments have equipment mixed with mass of twisted wreckage. 821 shell and fragment holes in hull, 250 attributed to aircraft cannon. Estimated MALTA repairs to take 3 weeks.

NAVSHIPENGCEN-151810Z Jun: Following personnel will visit ship to review research electronics system damage.

MR Daniel [illegible] FREECS (NAVSEC)
LT Allan W. DE PREY (NSA)(Reported to be FM NAVSEC in the message)
MR Irving V. GOSS (NSG)
MR Charles M. SLOAN (F & M Systems)
MR Howard J. ALSOP (F & M Systems)
MR Roger E. WHITE (F & M Systems)
MR Joyce L. DUBOIS (F & M Systems)
MR William A. EVANS, JR. (F & M Systems)
MR Cecil L. BYROM (LTV Electro Systems)
MR L. D. TURNER (LTV Electro Systems)

CINCUSNAVEUR-161715Z Jun: LIBERTY est RFS 7 Jul.

NAVSHIPSYSCOM-162209Z Jun: Comments on combining restoration of LIBERTY with conversion to MSTS. (Note this letter is uncertain.)

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_____ Ad[illegible] Eugene SHECK to above list to visit LIBERTY.

CINCUSNAVEUR-171106Z Jun: Disestablished CTF 100.

USS LIBERTY-290222Z Jun: Repair progress report:

a. Ripout completed.

b. F.O. Tank and Tank top repairs complete.

c. Frame 52 Main traverse bulkhead 85% complete.

d. All non-tight bulkheads between tank top and first platform erected, boundary welding 25% complete.

e. Traverse bulkhead at frame 60 between first platform and second deck 60% erected, boundary welding 40% complete.

f. All plate shop prefab complete except for shell plates, 20% complete.

g. Estimate undock 12 Jul, final completion 17 Jul.

h. Final cost estimated at $165K.

USS LIBERTY-061225Z Jul: SRR-20 Antenna pedestal and dish took several direct hits. Exact condition of Gyro units doubtful.

USS LIBERTY 061730Z Jul: Projected completion date of 14 Jul. Intend dock trials 15 Jul and depart MALTA 16 Jul. ETA NORVA 29 Jul.

_____ Listed updated suit recommended for LIBERTY:

NAVSHIPYD NORVA 141905 Jul: Estimate 4 months and $1.25M to restore LIBERTY to pre-attack condition. Does not include

a. Renewal of accommodation ladder and fittings.

b. Replacement of watertight doors.

c. Replacement of metal joiner bulkheads and doors.

d. Replacement of furniture, ventillation, bulkhead insullation and deck covering.

e. Replacement of electronic cables and equipment below main deck.

f. Checking out, repair or replacement of electric cables and equipment on main deck and above.

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CINCLANTFLT 1422027 Jul: Recommended delaying timing of industrial work until funds and work package defined. Concur with proposal to combine repairs and conversion to MSTS if latter is approved but questions validity of idea since LIBERTY would doubtlessly be on the bottom if MSTS manned.

CINCLANTFLT 1515482 Jul: Re-transmitted NAVSHIPYD NORVA 1419052.

NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 1422092 Jul: Recommended combining LIBERTY restoration with conversion to MSTS.

PRES INSURV WASHDC 1815582 Jul: Scheduled INSURV for 14 - 18 Aug.

CNO 1921152 Jul: Stated that $6.1M in FY 1968 for LIBERTY reprogrammed at apportionment to FLEET MAINTENANCE. Earliest start date for conversion to MSTS is Jun 1968 due lack of plans, recommended reduced manning status on 1 Sep 1967.

NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 1821527 Jul: Concurred with CINCLANT's 1422092 which proposed reduced status pending decisions.

USS LIBERTY 1215552 Jun: Estimates completion of clearing 1907007. Topside repairs underway.

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR-1913267 Jun: Equipment in third and fourth decks including Radio 1, Crypto, Coordination Center and TTY maintenance shop total loss. Second deck including Radio 2 and R & D can be made serviceable.

USS LIBERTY-1915127 Jun: Flooded areas cleared. Topside repairs progressing rapidly.

USS LIBERTY-2015407 Jun: Fleet Maintenance Officer Report:

a. Yard directed to accomplish following:

(1) Replace shell from below turn of bilge to average 26' waterline, frame 30 - 68.

(2) Replace main traverse bulkhead at frame 52 from starboard shell inboard 45' between 18 and 26' waterline.

(3) Replace extensive areas in tank tops frame 52 - 60.

(4) Replace first Platform deck from starboard shell inboard 20', frame 32 - 50.

(5) Replace non-tight bulkhead at frame 60 from starboard shell inboard 40' between tank top and first platform and second deck.

(6) Replace centerline and starboard longitudinal non-tight bulkheads complete, and lower 8' port longitudinal bulkhead between tank tops and first platform frame 52 - 60.

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b. Require approximately 70 tons replacement steel, estimated $150,000 and 3 weeks time.

X DIRNAVSECGRUPWR-2112442 Jun: Indicated electronics equipment damage extensive. Stated requirement for comprehensive inspection of OPS spaces upon return to CONUS.

X AMEMBASSY VALLETTA-2114152 Jun: Recommended complete repairs to LIBERTY be accomplished in MALTA.

X COMSERVLANT-2216262 Jun: Concurred with repairs outlined in LIBERTY's 2015402.

X USS LIBERTY-2412052 Jun: Repair progress report:

a. Ripout 80% complete

b. Repairs to Tank Swash bulkhead 30% complete.

c. Tank top repairs 30% complete.

d. Frame 52 replacement bulkhead being fitted. Repairs 25% complete. Plate of ship in process of pre-fabrication of interior bulkheads, shell frames, shell plates, and deck plates approximately 20% complete.

X _____ Jun: Inventory of sponsor furnished equipment and status thereof.

X _____ Jun: List of equipment on loan to USS LIBERTY.

X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 2119442 Jul: Scrap value is $75 - 90K.

X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 2120532 Jul: Authorizes local survey and destruction of damaged equipment.

X CNO 2201502 Jul: Advised LIBERTY that CNM was being requested to authorize local survey/destruction of all equipment damaged.

X

X _____ Jul: Authorized DNSC conduct survey of equipment on loan to LIBERTY.

X CINCSTRIKEFLT 2422542 Jul: Battle damage in electronic spaces was very heavy.

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X PRESINSURV WASHDC 251[illegible]Z Jul: Stated NAVSHIPYD NORVA estimates unreliable for planning and expects costs to double upon completi of INSURV. (Double would be 2.5M)

X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 251330Z Jul: Listed the PIERRE VICTORY, MARSHFIELD VICTORY and WEST LINN VICTORY available for replacement hulls.

X CNO 281437Z Jul: Stated that PIERRE VICTORY not available.

X NAVSHIPS 031844Z Aug: Stated MARSHFIELD VICTORY not available.

X DIRNAVSECGRU 082228Z Sep: Capsulated status of LIBERTY restoration

X -

X CNO 252249Z Sep: Advised DIRNSA that PCR is being prepared to overhaul LIBERTY.

X CNO 0119172 Oct: Requested CNM to provide cost data for restoration of USS LIBERTY in sufficient detail to prepare a PCR.

X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 171720Z: Provided cost data requested above. Basically amounted to: $9,375,000 for restoration to original configuration, $10,385,000 for up-dated suit, and 15M for activation of a new hull and installation of an up-dated electronics suit.

X DIRNAVSECGRU 031333Z Nov: Requested additional information regarding LIBERTY restoration, i.e. how long, when and where, and life expectancy after restoration.

X NAVSHIPSYSCOMHQ 071340Z Nov: Reply provided following:

Probable shipyard: NAVSHIPYD PHILA
First Availability: Dec 68
Time Requirements: Planning - 3 months; Design - 5 months; Production - 6 months; Sea Trials - 1 month; Total time - 15 months
Life expectancy: 10 years after restoration

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_____ MR SHECK and LT DEPREY trip report: Describes Radio Research Department damages as:

a. All antennas either destroyed, damaged or burned except the TRSSCOMM antenna.

b. Significant damage to almost all antenna lead-ins.

c. Only minor damage to TRSSCOMM antenna system.

d. AN/SRR-20 ESV tracking system may be repairable.

e. All of positions (RR-1) destroyed or damaged (blast, oil and salt water) beyond economical re-use.

f. All equipment and material in P & R spaces, Transcribing area, Maintenance shop and crypto room similarly damaged.

g. All equipment in other areas (second deck) received severe shock though most of it does not show surface damage. Probably recoverable except for recorders.

h. Complete re-wiring in RR-1 will be required.

i. This inspection was only superficial (Observation) and closer inspection will probably find further damage.

j. Informal estimate of $6.0M made.

CHO letter to CNM ser 019829P94 of 21 Jul 67: Request LIBERTY be given authority to dispose of equipment in compartment 3-60-0-C (RR-1).

F & M SYSTEMS letter of 11 Jul 67 to NAVSHIPSYSCOM: Submitted a preliminary unsolicited proposal to restore LIBERTY. Estimated $3,574,551 based upon current costs, time frame of 1 year and no overtime. Does not include ship's hull repairs and allowance items but directs itself to restoration of electronics only.

G20 Memo to G40 ser 0370 of 13 Jul 67: Lists LIBERTY communications capability requirements as:

a. CINSER COMMCENTER

(1) Secure Voice

(2) Tactical Voice LF/MF/HF/UHF/VHF

(3) Ship/Shore "CW" send/receive

(4) Type "N" Crypto System (N/C BGST)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[illegible] (3) to [illegible]

[illegible] of 3 [illegible]

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b. RESEARCH OPS CONCENTER

(1) Ship/Shore TTY (ROM/LUS) FDUX

(2) Ship/Shore TTY (ORESTES) FDUX

(3) SHIP/SHORE TTY (ORESTES) FDUX

(4) OPINTEL BCST RECEIVE (with KG-14 for untwinned operation)

(5) TRISCOMM (with two channel capability)

(6) VFTG system outlined in OPNAV INST 02303.36

X 042 memo to CO Ser 00399-67 of 10 Aug 67: Capsulated events concerning LIBERTY restoration, shows varying cost estimates ranging from $4.0M for electronics to 9.65M for entire ship. Also quotes $13.5M to convert another VICTORY hull, indicated possible source of funds and requested comments. (CO replied that possible source of funds indicated was not valid.)

X OP-04 memo to OP-03 via OP-94, #0653-63&P of 24 Aug 67: Stated that funds to restore LIBERTY had not yet been identified (only $900K for regular scheduled overhaul avail), MSTS manning not yet resolved, and when or how much ISRAELI Government will compensate is not known. Recommended in-activation as soon after 1 Sep 67 as is feasible.

Y OP-94 memo to OP-03 #063-67 of 25 Aug 67: Do not concurr with OP-04 recommendation to inactivate LIBERTY, but recommended reduced manning until funding resolved.

Y OP-03 memo to OP-94 #01295M-67 of 31 Aug 67: Stated that OP-94 should initiate program action to restore status of LIBERTY, and since no foreseeable solution to funding problem exists, concurred with OP-04 to inactivate LIBERTY.

Y OP-94 memo to OP-03 ser 9190P94 of 26 Sep 67: Stated LIBERTY is a Navy resource in response to a National Requirement and suggested OP-94 does not have the authority to direct inactivation. Also, stated that a PCR to attain funding of LIBERTY restoration in FY-68 is being prepared.

CO NAVSHIPSCOM letter ser 527-1450 to JAG 1 Sep 67: Provided estimate to restore LIBERTY and equipment to pre-attack condition, i.e. $5,424,202. Breakdown is:

a.	Services performed at MALTA	162,608.50
b.	MMST Personnal Travel	7,000.00
c.	Actual cost of oil removal	9,750.00
d. (EST)	Cost of Electronics System Restoration	3,901,187.00

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[redacted]

e. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical 1,261,439.00

f. Equipage and Allowance Items 141,636.00

g. Labor of Liberty Personnel in excess of normal 128,500.00

Went on to state that these estimates will probably be escalated since they are based upon current costs, cost of original purchase of equipment costs to eliminate rubbing of shaft (could not be estimated without disassembly of shaft) and uncovering of unknown damage to electrical cables.

X DIRNAVSECORU ALTANTIC STAFF, CINCLANTFLT letter ser 85/RNL/cc Ser 01029 of 15 Sep 67: List of equipment (a) missing, (b) in need of repairs, (c) operable, (d) not on allowance and (e) recommended for survey.

President, Board of Inspection and Survey letter AGTR-5 ser 948 of 13 Sep 67: INSURV Board inspection report listing all deficiencies found in LIBERTY. In general it stated that the LIBERTY was sound and could be fit for further service if re-fitted with equivalent or up-dated electronics equipment, and listed deficiencies corrected.

X Commander Service Squadron Eight speedletter A-1 8000 Ser 078 of 29 Aug 67: Proposed reduced manning scheduled for 1 Sep 1967 be held in abeyance pending resolution of LIBERTY restoration. Also gave proposal for reduced manning status during yard overhaul if approved. CINCLANT concurred. G13 noted the reduced manning recommended did not include CT personnel.

X Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense ser 006874 of 4 Dec 67: Submits budget amendment proposal for restoration of LIBERTY. Recommends restoration with an up-dated suit, provides a shopping list for an updated suit and the original suit, and a cost estimate for each of three proposals which are:

a. Restoration of LIBERTY with an up-dated suit (recommended)

b. Restoration of LIBERTY with a suit similar to pre-attack conditions.

c. Replacement of LIBERTY with another Victory hull and an up-dated suit.

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Annex H

Casualties

(U) The Bureau of Naval Personnel Casualty Report was received by the Naval Security Group on 19 June 1967. It listed a total of 94 casualties including both military and civilian personnel.

	RESCHOPSDEPT					GENSER			
	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Enlisted (Marine)	Civilians	Subtotal	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Subtotal	Grand Total
Killed	1	22	2	1	26	2	6	8	34
Serious Injuries	1	2	0	0	3	0	8	8	11
Minor Injuries	2	24	1	1	28	2	2	21	49
Totals	4	48	3	2	57	4	33	37	94

(U) On 5 July 1967, 204 military and civilian personnel killed, or wounded or injured to some extent were recommended by the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY, for the Purple Heart award. Many of these personnel had returned to duty almost immediately; consequently, their names did not appear on the casualty list issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

	RESCHOPSDEPT					GENSER			
	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Enlisted (Marine)	Civilians	Subtotal	Officers	Enlisted (Navy)	Subtotal	Grand Total
Killed	1	22	2	1	26	2	6	8	34
Injured	4	74	1	1	80	7	83	90	170
Totals	5	96	3	2	106	9	89	98	204

(U) While there is no legal bar, the policy of the Secretary of the Navy has been not to award military decorations to civilians. The Department of State is considering the development of a separate civilian medal for award under circumstances similar to those prescribed for the Purple Heart. Accordingly, Purple Heart recommendations for LIBERTY's two civilian casualties were submitted with the understanding that the Department of State medal, if developed, could be considered for award.

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(U) On 28 July 1967, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the Purple Heart awards for the 202 military casualties. By separate action, the matter of awards for civilian casualties was referred to Op-09B where it is pending.

Appendix I: Research Operations Department Casualties

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Appendix I to Annex H

Research Operations Department Casualties

Deaths

LT James C. PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462

CTC Raymond E. LINN, USN, 571 13 74
CTC Melvin D. SMITH, USN, 493 95 96

CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 24
CT1 Warren E. HERSEY, USN, 903 67 11
CT1 James M. LUPTON, USN, 511 31 28
CT1 John C. SMITH, Jr., USN, 237 77 94
CT1 Frederick J. WALTON, USN, 236 31 86

CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL, USN, 586 13 23
CT2 Robert B. EISENBERG, USN, 776 09 [illegible]
CT2 Richard W. KEENE, Jr., USN, 778 [illegible]75
CT2 Anthony P. MENDLE, USN, 777 [illegible]

CT3 William B. ALLENBAUGH, USN, 584 49 96
CT3 Jerry L. CONVERSE, USN, 79[illegible] 79 44
CT3 Jerry L. GOSS, USN, 773 61 55
CT3 Duane R. MARGRAF, USN, 773 96 50
CT3 Thomas R. THORNTON, USN, 997 97 91
CT3 Philippe C. TIEDTKE, USN, 914 32 84

CTSN Lawrence P. [illegible]DEN, USN, 870 53 70
CTSN Alan (n[illegible]) [illegible]GGINS, USN, 788 62 97
CTSN James [illegible]ERAU, USN, 997 56 58
CTSN David W. MARLBOROUGH, USN, 810 04 80
CTSN Carl C. MYGREN, USN, 788 37 16

SGT Carl L. RAPER, USMC, 1994072

CPL Edward E. REHMEYER, III, USMC, 2170919

Mr. Allen M. BLUE, GG-9, NSA

Serious Injuries

LT James C. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615

CT1 Joseph C. LENTINI, USN, 594 81 55

CTSN Leeroy BENNETT, USN, 998 13 79

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Minor Injuries

LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610

LT Maurice N. BENNETT, USN, 632125/1610
LT James M. EMMES, USNR, 653840/1615

CTC Carlyle F. LAMKIN, USN, 518 69 45
CTC James A. MATTHEWS, USN, 345 18 52
CTC Harold J. THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37

CT1 Reginald N. ADDINGTON, USN, 349 53 80
CT1 Richard K. BAKER, USN, 486 80 12
CT1 Lowell T. BINGHAM, USN, 521 38 68
CT1 Richard C. CARLSON, USN, 444 13 12
CT1 Jeffrey R. CARPENTER, USN, 535 14 05
CT1 Lewis D. ECKHART, USN, 922 69 34
CT1 Ronald G. KUHAL, USN, 539 00 34
CT1 Carl L. PEASANTS, USN, 535 78 10
CT1 Charles L. ROWLEY, USN, 458 48 03

CT2 Timothy P. AMEEN, USN, 774 03 93
CT2 Glen L. BLOCKHAM, USN, 774 37 [illegible]
CT2 Larry L. BOWEN, USN, 796 [illegible]
CT2 Calvin L. CHADSEY, USN, [illegible] 82
CT2 Frederick M. CLEVELAND, USN, 353 80 14
CT2 James R. DAVIDSON, USN, 699 64 72
CT2 Marvin F. DODD, USN, 349 79 51
CT2 Dennis M. EIKLEBERRY, USN, 914 81 10
CT2 Charles R. HENDRICKS, USN, 685 56 42
CT2 Frederick K. [illegible]NG, USN, 794 91 14
CT2 Calvin L. LANDIS, USN, 777 52 31
CT2 Anthony J. [illegible]FIELD, USN, 776 10 30
CT2 Philip [illegible]ONG, USN, 692 84 63
CT2 John [illegible]ASSENGALE, USN, 695 14 21
CT2 David L. McFEGGAN, USN, 774 71 98
CT2 Stephen E. MEYER, USN, 771 42 03
CT2 David W. PAGE, USN, 904 28 51
CT2 Garland W. PAYNE, USN, 772 94 77
CT2 John C. POPIELSKI, USN, 778 80 00
CT2 Robert J. SCHNELL, USNR, 542 55 84
CT2 Dennis C. SNADER, USN, 776 28 26
CT2 John R. SUTTER, USN, 793 24 58
CT2 Gregory L. WELCH, USN, 694 46 31

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CTI Joe D. ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77
CTI James V. BRONG, USN, 913 41 23
CTI Ronald D. BUCK, USN, 918 25 71
CTI Kenneth R. GAUTHIER, USN, 771 37 90
CTI David W. HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49
CTI John S. HORNE, Jr., USNR, 692 96 29
CTI Melvin P. JOHNSON, USN, 997 32 29
CTI Loren W. KREUN, USN, 538 49 74
CTI Terry L. McFARLAND, USN, 795 25 54
CTI David V. MYERS, USN, 840 65 88
CTI Maurice B. SHAFER, USN, 695 94 86
CTI Harold E. SIX, USN, 777 58 53
CTI Ralph B. SWEET, USN, 775 06 25
CTI Charles J. THOME, USN, 789 48 42
CTI Sammy M. UBER, USN, 917 08 36

CTSN Edward H. BECHTEL, USN, 840 15 47
CTSN Nathan D. BENEDICT, Jr., USN, 139 55 76
CTSN Rodney L. DALLY, USN, 820 04 91
CTSN Dale E. DANIELS, USN, 860 44 52
CTSN Kenneth B. EAKINS, USN, 794 04 6[illegible]
CTSN Kenneth P. ECKER, USN, 851 36 [illegible]
CTSN Ronald F. GRANISKI, USN, 8[illegible]
CTSN James P. KAVANAUGH, USN, [illegible] 32
CTSN Eugene H. KIRK, USN, 918 81 30
CTSN Terry W. LEHMAN, USN, 914 59 44
CTSN Patrick H. McANDREWS, USN, 811 44 21
CTSN Frank (n) McINTURFF, III, USN, 861 44 71
CTSN Donald W. PACELER, USN, 860 58 17
CTSN Herbert J. PARKER, USNR, 138 54 18
CTSN Herbert C. PETERSON, USN, 797 04 78
CTSN Robert A. [illegible]ARBOROUGH, USN, 788 80 10
CTSN David A. [illegible], USN, 904 39 56
CTSN Jerry D. SMITH, USN, 915 81 02
CTSN Robert L. VANDEVENTER, USN, 916 69 27
CTSN [illegible]ert M. WALTZ, USN, 840 69 13
CTSN [illegible]l B. WOOD, USN, 796 87 55
CTSN Robert R. ZAGAR, USN, 840 63 62

SSGT Bryce F. LOCKWOOD, USMC, 1859856

Mr. Donald L. BLALOCK, GG-7, NSA

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Annex I

News Media Coverage

When news of the LIBERTY attack reached the Pentagon, CINCUSNAVEUR was advised by telephone that Deputy Secretary of Defense VANCE had directed that all news releases would be made at the Washington level.

At midday on 8 June 1967, the Department of Defense announced that a U. S. Navy technical research ship, the USS LIBERTY, had been attacked at about 0800 EDT that day. The release reported LIBERTY's movements for the preceding two days and stated the ship's purpose for being positioned 13 miles north of the Sinai Peninsula was to assure communications between U. S. government posts in the Middle East and to assist in relaying information concerning the evacuation of U. S. dependents and other U. S. citizens from the Arab-Israeli war area. Ship's characteristics and personnel allowance were included in the announcement. The story was published that evening in the late-edition newspapers with little deviation from the DOD release.

Morning editions on 9 June carried essentially the same story reported the previous evening. The Washington Post carried an additional story concerning use of the hot line to inform Moscow that U. S. Sixth Fleet aircraft were being scrambled to protect a U. S. ship which was under attack. That evening, late editions began to hint that LIBERTY was used for electronic snooping. Such speculation was undoubtedly prompted by an Associated Press story of 9 June "Aboard the Carrier America" by Bob MORTON which stated that an officer had said, "to put it bluntly, she was in there to spy for us. Russia does the same thing. We moved in close to monitor the communications of both Egypt and Israel. We have to. We must be informed of what's going on in a matter of minutes." The USS AMERICA claimed that the alleged statement quoted by Mr. MORTON was not based on any contact with an official spokesman nor was it attributable to any of AMERICA's officers. AMERICA expressed the belief that the copy was not transmitted via naval communications and that it probably was sent ashore by COD flight which departed AMERICA for Athens at 0910302.

Newspapers on 10 June seized upon the snooper story and thereafter speculation was rampant concerning the LIBERTY mission. An aggravating influence was an honest account in the Baltimore Sun concerning the death of Allen M. BLUE which identified him as an NSA employee.

Three official press interviews were conducted aboard AMERICA: four walking wounded LIBERTY crew members were interviewed on 9 June; SN Kenneth P. ECKER, another injured crewman, on the 11th; COMSIXTHFLT, VADM W. I. MARTIN, held a press conference on the 15th subsequent to his visit to the LIBERTY. The ECKER interview was widely publicized on 12 June, most newspapers giving it human-interest treatment, stressing that ECKER's life was saved because he was wearing a steel helmet.

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Beginning 12 June, newspapers carried the story of LIBERTY's progress en route Malta and gave extensive coverage to the ship's arrival there on the 14th. Photographs of external damage appeared and reports attributed to crewmen were published, claiming that the attack was not accidental and that the ship had been reconnoitered by the Israelis prior to the attack.

On 16 June, syndicated columnist Drew PEARSON wrote that the LIBERTY was a CIA ship.

An article by George WILSON in the Washington Post on 18 June stated that "NSA was running things in the bowels of the ship." WILSON erroneously described the functions of most of LIBERTY's antennas.

The Washington Post, on the 20th quoted a story from an Arab newspaper which charged that LIBERTY took active part in the fighting on the side of the Israelis.

On 28 June, DOD released a summary of the proceedings of the U. S. Navy Court of Inquiry which investigated the circumstances surrounding the attack on LIBERTY. The same day the text of a letter from crew member SA Robert REILLY to his mother, giving a colorful account of the attack, was published in the Navy Times.

The 6 July issue of the Washington Post included a letter to the editor from Admiral George W. ANDERSON, USN (Ret.), former CNO, which took exception to the Post editorial of 30 June entitled "Not Good Enough." (See Appendix I.) The letter pointed out that the editorial failed to acknowledge that operating forces are assigned to unified commands and joint agencies which would not in this case be under command of the Navy. Also, that communications channels involved no longer are under control of the Navy but, often, and in this case did, pass through non-naval links; thus, LIBERTY paid part of the cost of excessive centralization. The admiral's final remarks were that the important point which should have been emphasized by the editorial was that LIBERTY definitely was operating in international waters and was attacked without provocation, in violation of any valid concept of international law, and, further, that the editorial itself was "not good enough."

From mid-July until her arrival in Norfolk, Virginia, on 29 July, LIBERTY passed from the news scene. Her return to the U. S. sparked renewed press interest as reflected by a long article in the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot on 30 July, the James J. KILPATRICK write-up in the Washington Star on 1 August and a short item in the August 9th issue of the Navy Times.

A seven-page article, "June 8, at 1400 hours", by James Jackson KILPATRICK, appeared in the 5 September issue of the National Review. The story is based largely on the summary of proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry released to the press. KILPATRICK has many unanswered questions which he states "nag for answers."

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

A collection of articles clipped from the following newspapers and periodicals is appended:

Alexandria Gazette
Baltimore News-American
Baltimore Sun
Boston Globe
Chicago News
Chicago Tribune
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Electronic News
Laurel News Leader
Life
Los Angeles Times
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times
Malta News
Malta Times
The National Observer
National Review
Navy Times
New Rochelle Standard Star
Newsweek
New York News
New York Times
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
Philadelphia Inquirer
Portland Oregonian
Portland (Me.) Times
Providence Journal
San Diego Union
San Francisco Examiner
Seattle Times
Stars and Stripes
Time
U. S. News & World Report
Washington News
Washington Post
Washington Star

Appendix I: Index of News Clippings

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Appendix 1 to Annex 1

Index of News Clippings

Date	Vehicle	Article	Tab & Page
8 June	Washington Star	"Israel Attacks U.S. Ship 10 Killed"	1
9 June	Los Angeles Times	"Israel Attacks U.S. Navy Ship in Error; 10 Die"	3
	New York Times	"Israelis, In Error, Attack U.S. Navy Ship"	4
	Philadelphia Inquirer	"10 Americans Killed as Israelis Attack U.S. Ship by Mistake"	5-6
	Washington Post	"U.S., Russia Turn to 'Hot Line' in Crisis"	7-8
		"[illegible] Injured in Torpedo, Jet Attack"	9-10
	Washington Star	"U.S. Ship's Toll May Reach 31"	11
10 June	Baltimore Sun	"Fort Meade Man Among Missing"	12
		"U.S. Defends Use of Snooper Ship"	12
	New York Times	"Death on the Liberty"	13
	San Francisco Examiner	"Deep Regret About Ship, Says Israel"	14
	Washington Post	"Death Toll on U.S. Ship May Reach 31"	15
	Washington Star	"Israel Offers Indemnity for U.S. Ship"	16
		"Maryland Man Missing in Attack on USS Liberty"	16

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Date	Vehicle	Article	Tab A Page
11 June	Stars and Stripes	"Liberty Crew Had 'No Chance to Load Guns' "	16
	Washington Post	"Israel Vows Amends for Ship Attack"	17
	Washington Star	"Israel Promises Amends for Attack on U.S. Navy Ship"	18
12 June	Electronic News	"U.S. 'Floating Ear' Lone Casualty in Mideast"	19-20
	New York Times	"Crippled Liberty on Way to Malta"	21
	Washington Star	"Liberty Rescuers Unable to Free Trapped Bodies"	22
13 June	New York Times	"The Dragon Maker"	23
	Washington News	"The USS Liberty: No 'Mistake' "	24
	Washington Post	"Crewman Saved by Steel Helmet in Liberty Attack"	25
	Washington Star	"Attack on U.S. Ship Stirs Questions"	26
14 June	Alexandria Gazette	"World News in Brief"	27
	Baltimore News-American	"Liberty's Orders to Pull Back"	28
	Boston Globe	"Israel Ship-Attack Stirs Washington Row"	29
	Malta Times	"Crippled 'Liberty' for Malta Drydocks"	30
	Washington Post	"Crushing Defeat for the Russians"	31
		"Israeli Jets Eyed Ship Before Blow"	32

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	Washington Star	Photograph (USS Liberty Arrives in Valletta, Malta)	32
15 June	Baltimore Sun	"Lothian Man Died on Ship"	34
	Laurel News Leader	"Laurel Man Injured on Attacked US Ship"	35
	Philadelphia Inquirer	"24 Dead Are Sought in Hit of Navy Ship Attacked Israelis"	36
	Seattle Times	"U.S. Has No Explaining to Do"	36a
	Washington Post	"Attacked Ship Is at Malta for Repairs"	37
		"The 'Liberty' Attack"	38
16 June	Beef 'n Bird News Report, Hotel Americana, Washington	Last paragraph	39
	Life	"The Presidency"	40
	Malta News	"Attack on Liberty Was No Mistake"	41
	New York News	"Liberty Sailor Tells of the Horror"	41a
	Washington Post	"Explanations Due on Ship Attack"	42
		"Israel Says U.S. Ignored Query on Ships in Area"	43
		"Ship Attack by Israel Described by Sailors"	44
	Washington Star	"Damage to Ship Described"	45

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17 June	Baltimore News-American	"Ship Gunned by Israelis"	46
	Washington Post	"The Liberty"	47
	Washington Star	"Cmdr. Armstrong on U.S. Vessel Hit by Israelis"	46
18 June	Baltimore News-American	"U.S. Crew Says Attack Deliberate"	48
	Providence Journal	"Pentagon Stubs Its Toe"	50
	Stars and Stripes	"Attack No Error, Liberty's Crew Convinced"	48a
	Washington Post	"Liberty Attack Punctured Pentagon Cover"	49-50
19 June	Newsweek	"Sinking the Liberty: Accident or Design?"	51
	U.S. News & World Report	"An Error of War--and U.S. Seamen Die"	52
20 June	Washington Post	"U.S. Jammed Radar, Arab Paper Charges"	53
21 June	Baltimore Sun	"Probe on Liberty Closer to Trial"	54
	Navy Times	"9 Killed, 34 Missing in Attack on Liberty"	55
23 June	Life	"Unexplained Casualty: USS Liberty"	56-57
25 June	Portland Times	"New Spy Mix-Up?"	58
	Washington Star	"Report on Israel Ship Attack a Touchy Task for Pentagon"	59

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26 June	Newsweek	"USS Liberty: Caught in Political Currents!"	60
	San Diego Union	"La Mesa Sailor"	[illegible]
	U.S. News & World Report	"Mystery of Attack on USS 'Liberty'"	62
28 June	Navy Times	"'Just Sitting Ducks', Sailor Writes Mom"	63
		"Liberty Yields 20 Bodies; Death Toll Reaches 34"	64
	New Rochelle Standard Star	"Liberty Case: A Quiet End"	65
29 June	Baltimore Sun	"Israel Contests Liberty Inquiry"	66
	Chicago News	"Pentagon Still Hides Mission of Spy Ship Hit by Israelis"	67
	New York Times	"Ship in War Area Didn't Get Order"	68
	Philadelphia Inquirer	"Mixup in Order Bared by U.S. in Ship Attack"	69
	San Francisco [illegible]	"Navy Won't Say Why Israel Hit Ship"	70
	Washington News	"Warning Message 'Misrouted... Delayed'"	71
	Washington Post	"The Liberty Got Order Too Late"	72
	Washington Star	"Israelis Dispute Finding That Liberty Flew Flag"	73

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30 June	Baltimore Sun	"Ghost Gun Bared in Liberty Probe"	74
	Chicago Tribune	"Missed Signals Again"	75
	Cleveland Plain Dealer	"Navy Must Explain Order Delay"	76
	New York Times	"Israelis Say Signal by Liberty Caused Mistake in Identity"	77
	Philadelphia Inquirer	"U.S. Ship Fired on Israelis Before P Boats Attacked"	78
	Washington News	"The USS Liberty Report"	79
	Washington Post	"Israel Says It Tried in Vain to Identify the Liberty"	81
		"Not Good Enough"	82
	Washington Star	"Israeli Attack on Liberty Scored by 2 Congressmen"	83
3 July	Baltimore Sun	"The USS Liberty"	84
	The National Observer	"The Navy's Official Findings"	85-88
		"Observations"	88a
	Newsweek	"Armed Forces: Finis"	89
4 July	Baltimore Sun	"Liberty, 1 of 5 Spy Ships, Kept Tabs on Mideast War"	90

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	Louisville Courier-Journal & Times	"Israeli Navy Sought Glory"	91
5 July	Navy Times	"Possible Court-Martial Faces Liberty Attackers"	92
6 July	Washington Post	"The 'Liberty' Case"	93
	Washington Star	"An Israeli Eyewitness Story"	94
7 July	Time	"Armed Forces"	95
	Washington Post	"Insists the Liberty Would Not Identify Itself"	96
8 July	Washington Post	"Israel Used 'Liberty' Data, Egyptians Say"	97
10 July	U.S. News & World Report	" 'Liberty' Signals: Misrouted, Misread"	98
		"...r's Next for Israel"	99-101
11 July	Portland Oregonian	"Vancouver Sailor Recalls Israeli Attack on Ship"	101a
30 July	Norfolk Virginian-Pilot	" 'Liberty' Brings in Memories"	102-104
1 August	Washington Star	"In the Spirit of the Liberty Off Sinai, 1967"	105
9 August	Navy Times	"Liberty Back in U.S.; 42 Put Up for Medals"	106
23 August	Newsweek	"The USS Liberty - Tragedy of Errors"	107
4 September	Newsweek	"The Liberty Incident - An Israeli View"	108

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9 September	National Review	"June 8, at 1400 hours"	104-115
13 September	Navy Times	"Israel Drops Court Martial"	116

Tab A: News Clippings

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
[redacted] NEBRASKA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. [redacted]

24 NOV 1982

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

This is in further reply to your FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request for material pertaining to the attack on the USS LIBERTY. An explanation is in order so that you will understand exactly what has been involved in responding to your request.

You initially asked for records contained in a file labeled "NQNAVSECGRU 5750/1 Liberty Incident," which you claimed was filed in permanent storage at our facility located in Crane, Indiana. Our people at Crane forwarded to us a copy of every record which they could identify and locate as being related in any way to the Liberty attack. A number of records were retrieved, but the file you referred to was not among these documents. Virtually all of the records forwarded from Crane were classified, and with the exception of one or two messages, all were originated and classified by Naval elements other than this Command. It was therefore necessary to refer these documents to the original classifiers for a declassification review. We are pleased to advise you that almost 100% of the message traffic involved has been declassified.

After hearing from you in February of this year, we undertook a search of the historical records maintained by this Headquarters to see if we could locate a file such as the one you described. This task was complicated by the fact that our historian, Mr. Raymond Schmidt, was no longer an employee of the Naval Security Group and thus was unavailable to assist in this search. After an arduous review of Mr. Schmidt's records, we have been successful in finding the file to which you have been referring. This file was an informal record which Mr. Schmidt was compiling in anticipation of one day preparing a written history of the Liberty attack. The file was never maintained at Crane and very few persons were even aware of its existence. This file is currently being reviewed to determine declassification and releasability and we will be in contact with you again as soon as this review has been completed.

In this posture in our response to your request, we are able to provide you with copies of the messages as discussed above, as well as several memoranda originated by the Naval Security Group. All of these materials are contained in enclosure (1).

We have found no messages or references or any other forms of communications or documents between the American Embassy Tel Aviv and the Department of State.

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Also, we have found nothing dealing with failure of protection, lessons learned, or decisions to cover up or to release a distorted version of the attack to the press or the public.

We have made an extra effort to provide you with copies which are as legible as possible. However, as is often the case, some parts of some documents are illegible. In cases where our copy was readable, but would not reproduce legibly, we have hand-printed the contents so that what you receive will be more meaningful. In these cases, we have also included a copy of the same page before it was hand-copied, so that you may see what the record looked like before our efforts to improve comprehensibility.

This has been an exceptionally long and drawn-out process, and your patience, understanding, and cooperation is sincerely appreciated. A determination has been made that the processing and reproduction costs associated with the enclosed documents be waived. Accordingly, no fees will be assessed you in connection with the furnishing of these materials.

Sincerely,

G. [illegible] HENRIKSEN
Director for Security
By direction of the Commander
Naval Security Group Command

Encl: (1) USS LIBERTY documents

James M. Ennes, JR. Research Papers

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DIRNAVSECGRU 0813382 JUN 67
NAVSECGRU Memorandum G14/ajc Ser 00492-67 dtd 6 Jul 1967
Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Communication Station, Spain
ltr NR/30/33:jj 2230 Ser 0433/NSGD dtd 23 Jun 1967 with enclosure

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

[redacted]

ROUTINE
R 132105Z JUN 67
FM CINCUSNAVEUR

TO USCINCEUR

INFO CNO
CINCLANTFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
JCS

[redacted]

MOVEMENTS AND POSITION OF LIBERTY (U)
A. CINCUSNAVEUR 0819032 JUN 67
B. JCS CFWP 343 SENDS DTG 0113452 JUN 67
C. CINCUSNAVEUR 0813572 JUN 67
D. DIANSA 0721042 JUN 67 PASEP
E. JCS 0722302 JUN 67 PASEP
F. COMSIXTHFLT 0719032 JUN 67 PASEP
G. JCS 7347 DTG 0601132 JUN 67
H. CINCUSNAVEUR 0804552 JUN 67 PASEP
I. USCINCEUR ECJC-JAC 09049 DTG 0806292 JUN 67 PASEP
J. CUNSIXTHFLT 0809172 JUN 67

1. REF A IS CANCELLED.

2. REF A WAS ISSUED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LIBERTY ATTACK. SUBSEQUENT REFINEMENT AND RECAPITULATION SHOWS THE ORIGINAL REPORT TO HAVE CONTAINED SOME OMISSIONS AND ERRORS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME OF THE TIMES WERE IN ERROR BECAUSE THE LOG USED FOR COMPILING REF A HAD ENTRIES IN BOTH ZULU AND ALFA TIMES. IN FACT THREE LOGS WERE KEPT AND ON SUBSEQUENT REVIEW WERE USED TO VERIFY TIMES IN THIS MESSAGE.

3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING IS FORWARDED AS THE BEST CURRENTLY AVAILABLE RECORD OF WHAT TRANSPIRED FROM MY VIEWPOINT AND WHAT I TOLD THE JCS FACT-FINDING TEAM AS WELL AS THE COURT OF INQUIRY.
A. REF G, JCS DIRECTED LIBERTY TO PROCEED TO POSIT 32-00N 33-00E

33 ...CDS
00 09 92 94 06 IP [redacted]

000000

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Declass IAW [redacted] Enclosure Gordon UK Msg 191904Z Mar 82

Enclosure (8) to 0056-Itc.

DNA 613/77 8 FEB 1982

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NAVAL MESSAGE [redacted] NAVY DEPARTMENT

B. BY REF C, CINCUSNAVEUR PASSED JCSM TO CONSIXTHFLT. MOVEMENTS OF LIBERTY WERE STILL CONTROLED BY JCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B.

C. AT 0721042 DIRNSA, BY REF D (NOT RECEIVED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS UNTIL 080930Z), REQUESTED JCS TO MOVE LIBERTY WEST TO SATISFY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS.

D. BY REF E, DTG 072230Z, AND NOT RECEIVED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS UNTIL 0816422, JCS INCREASED LIBERTY'S CPA TO COAST OF ISRAEL AND UAR AND INDICATED FOR FIRST TIME THAT CPA/AEA IN REF B WAS FOR GUIDANCE ONLY.

E. AT 0723502, CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM DUTY OFFICER, JRC WASHINGTON, DIRECTING THAT USS LIBERTY COMPLY WITH NEW CONSIXTHFLT OPAREA RESTRICTIONS DELINEATED IN LAST SENTENCE PARA TWO OF REF F AND NOT TO PROCEED CLOSER THAN 100 MILES TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR UAR. THIS WAS AN ORAL COMMUNICATION WITH NO FOLLOW MESSAGE DIRECTIVE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUESTED BY CINCUSNAVEUR DUTY OFFICER. THIS DIRECT PHONE CALL FROM JRC, DIRECTING A MOVEMENT WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE UNIFIED COMMANDER, WAS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE.

F. AT 0805302, THE USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER WAS RECALLED AND APPRAISED OF THE PHONE CALL DIRECT FROM THE JRC TO CINCUSNAVEUR BY JRC DUTY OFFICER. HE WAS REQUESTED TO CONFIRM THIS INFORMATION AND TO OBTAIN THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF THE JCS MESSAGE DIRECTIVE THAT WOULD FORMALIZE THE PHONE CALL. THE DUTY OFFICER SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK.

G. AT 0803252 USCINCEUR DUTY OFFICER WAS CONTACTED AND ASKED WHAT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON THE LIBERTY. IN TURN HE ASKED WHAT ACTION CINCUSNAVEUR HAD TAKEN AND WAS ADVISED THAT WE WERE STILL WAITING A CALL FROM THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER CONTACTED AT 0830Z. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER THAT HE CALL THE JRC DUTY OFFICER AND GET A DATE-TIME GROUP TO GIVE US A DIRECTIVE FROM USCINCEUR. THE CINCEUR DUTY OFFICER CALLED BACK SHORTLY WITH THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF REF G WHICH DIRECTED LIBERTY TO PROCEED 100 MILES FROM THE COAST. AT THE SAME TIME REF G ARRIVE AT THE CINCUSNAVEUR COMMAND CENTER BY NORMAL MEANS.

H. AT 0804102, CINCUSNAVEUR ESTABLISHED A COVERED TELETYPE CONFERENCE WITH CONSIXTHFLT DUTY OFFICER. RELAYED REF G TO HIM AT 0804402, AND TOLD HIM HE ADVISED. TAKE JCS 080110Z FORAC + OFFICIAL MESSAGE FOLLOWS. THE DATE-TIME GROUP OF REF H WAS ALSO PASSED AT THIS TIME.

I. AT 0805[illegible], CINCUSNAVEUR SENT IMMEDIATE MESSAGE, REF H, TO CONSIXTHFLT DIRECTING HIM TO TAKE REF G FORAC.

J. AT 0807272 CINCUSNAVEUR RECEIVED USCINCEUR MSG. REF I, DIRECTING CINCUSNAVEUR TO TAKE REF G FORAC.

K. AT 0809[illegible]Z, CONSIXTHFLT SENT A MESSAGE, REF J, DIRECTING LIBERTY TO COMPLY WITH REF G AND REMAIN 100 MILES FROM COASTS UAR, ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND SYRIA. LIBERTY WAS INFO ADDEE ON REF G, SENT AT 080330Z, WHICH DIRECTED HER TO REMAIN 100 MILES FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS. SHE WAS ALSO AN INFO ADDEE ON REF E WHICH INCREASED HER CPA'S FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS.

L. DUE TO COMMUNICATION DELAYS OR MISROUTING, IT HAS BEEN

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NAVAL MESSAGE [redacted] NAVY DEPARTMENT

ESTABLISHED LIBERTY DID NOT RECEIVE EITHER REFS C, D, OR J WHICH DIRECTED HER FURTHER SEAWARD FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS OR TO PROCEED 100 MILES FROM BELLIGERENT COASTS.

[redacted]

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NAVAL MESSAGE [redacted] NAVY DEPARTMENT

[redacted]
081316Z JUN 67
FM CTF SIX ZERO

TO USS AMERICA
USS SARATOGA
COMSIXTHFLT
TASK FORCE SIX ZERO

TF 60 = FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE

[redacted]

DEFENSE USS LIBERTY

1. FOR AMERICA: LAUNCH FOUR ARMED A4'S ASAP TO PROCEED TO 31-23N/33-25E TO DEFEND RPT DEFEND USS LIBERTY WHO IS NOW UNDER ATTACK BY GUNBOATS. PROVIDE TANKERS AND FIGHTER COVER.

2. FOR SARATOGA: LAUNCH 4 ARMED A1'S ASAP SAME MISSION. ADVISE LAUNCH TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECT A1'S RELIEF ON STATION OVER LIBERTY.

3. FOR ALL: PLAN TO RELIEVE ALL ACFT ON STATION OVER USS LIBERTY AS REQUIRED.

4. DEFENSE OF USS LIBERTY MEANS EXACTLY THAT. DESTROY OR DRIVE OFF ANY ATTACKERS WHO ARE CLEARLY HOSTILE TO ATTACKS ON LIBERTY. REMAIN OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. DEFEND YOURSELF IF ATTACKED.

[redacted]

CONFIRM CTF 60 081351Z/JUN 67 OUTLINING THIS MSG.
SEE CTF 60 081416Z/JUN.

W/D THIS MESSAGE WRITTEN UP FOR INFO ONLY

[redacted]...COG 034200
SN(4) 00(2) 09(1) 098(1) 09D(1) 09M(1) 090(1) 10(6) 03(1)
04(1) 05(7) 50(16) 51(1) 06(1) 60(3) 92(14) 96(2) 007(4)
008(1) IP(7) FP(10) BFR(1) CSA(1) CSAF(1) JCS(1) NATMAP(1)
OPA(1) + 34 94
107

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V CAG595 1
*****ZZ RUENAAA
ZNY [redacted] ZOV RUTPH
ZFH-2
V QAC65TKRE4573
*****ZZ RUTPRC
DE RUTKRE 069 1591416
ZNY [redacted]
2 281416Z JUN 67
XM CTF SIX ZERO
TO ZEN/USS AMERICA
RUCKRF/USS SARATOGA
INFO RUTPRC/COMSIXTHFLT
BT UNCLASSIFIED
[redacted]
DEFENDERS OF LIZORTY
1. COMSIXTHFLT 281333Z4APPLIES AND OVERIDES MT 281316Z# ON RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT
[redacted]
BT

INFO: G521 ... G50 ... G52 ... G ...

Declass IAW
Lincoln Avenue London UK
Mag. 191904 Mar 82

[redacted]

Enclosure (4) to CMSG ltr
Ser 612/77 of 3 FEB 1982

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NAVSO 5216/5 (7-6[redacted] S/N 0104.904.1780

[redacted] Enclosure (4)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Memorandum

G14/a36
Ser 00492-67
DATE 6 JUL 1967

[redacted] : G10

TO : G30

SUBJECT : Allowance and Personnel Information for USS LIBERTY (AGTR 5) (U)

Encl : (1) DIRNAVSECGRU Confidential ltr NSGH/G14/war Ser 05136 of 7 Apr 1967

1. Following information is provided for use as background in the preparation of the study relating to the attack on USS LIBERTY:

a. Allowance of the Research Operations Department based upon the current billet allocations letters is 6 officers and 125 enlisted. Detailed breakdown of billet allocations is contained in enclosure (1).

b. On board count of personnel as of 3 June 1967 (taken from USN 855 PUR 030635Z Jun 1967) 6 Officers ~~125~~ 134 Enlisted 3 Civilians

(1) PCS

(a) Officers 6

Name	Rank/Desig	Billet Title
David E. LEWIS	LCDR/1610	Head, RESCHOPDEPT
H. H. BENNETT, Jr.	LT/1610	Operations
J. G. O'[illegible], Jr.	LT/1615	Non Morse Intercept
L. C. [illegible]	LTJG/1105	Processing&Reporting
J. M. [illegible], Jr.	LT/1615	Elect/Material
J. [illegible] PIERCE	LT/6462	Communications

(b) Enlisted ~~107~~ 118

(2) TAD

(a) Officers None

(b) Enlisted 16

Name/Rate	Perm DUSTA
CT2 C. R. HENDRICKS	ADNSG
CT2 S. E. MEYER	ADNSG
CT3 J. L. GOSS	ADNSG
CT3 D. W. HAWKINS	ADNSG
CT3 A. (n) HIGGINS	ADNSG
CT3 H. P. [illegible]	ADNSG

[redacted]

S.F. File

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly

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[redacted]

[redacted]

G14/ajo
Ser 00492-67
6 JUL 1967

Name/Rate	Perm DUSTA	[redacted]
CT3 C. J. THOMP	ADNSG	[redacted]
CT3 T. H. THORNTON	ADNSG	
CTSN L. H. [illegible]	ADNSG	
CTSN C. C. [illegible]	ADNSG	
See note #1		
CT1 H. K. BAKER	USN 856	[redacted]
CT1 J. H. [illegible]	USN 23	
[illegible]	USN 40	
[illegible] J. L. [illegible]	2nd PADDN	
CT1 [illegible]	2nd PADDN	
CT2 A. P. [illegible]	USN 23	
See note #2		

*Due to an error on the data card CT1 BAKER was believed to be an Arabic linguist and was ordered TAD on that assumption. However subsequent examination revealed that he was [illegible] qualified instead.

(c) Civilians 3

Name/Grade	Perm DUSTA	[redacted]
Mr. A. H. [illegible], GG-7	NSA	[redacted]
Mr. D. L. [illegible], GG-7	NSA	
Mr. R. L. WILSON, GG-7	NSA	

c. Casualties within the [illegible]:

(1) Killed

(a) Officers 1

1. LT James Cecil PIERCE, USN, 649805/6462, Comm Officer

(b) Enlisted 24

1. CT3 William P. ALLENBAUGH, USN, 6[illegible] 4[illegible] 96
2. CT2 Ronnie J. CAMPBELL, USN, 5[illegible]6 13 23
3. CT3 Jerry L. COMBERSE, USN, 794 79 44
4. CT2 Robert [illegible] EISENBERG, USN, 776 09 3[illegible]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

014/ajo
Ser 00492-67
[illegible]

5. CT3 Jerry L. GOSS, USNR, 773 61 55
6. CT1 Curtis A. GRAVES, USN, 519 58 24
7. CTSN Lawrence P. HAYNES, USN, 870 53 70
8. CT1 Warren F. [illegible], USN, 903 67 11
9. CTSN Alan (n) [illegible], USN, 788 62 97
10. CT2 Richard W. [illegible], Jr, USN, 778 82 75
11. CTSN James L. [illegible], USN, 997 56 58
12. CTC Raymond E. LINN, USN, 571 13 74
13. CT1 James M. LUPTON, USN, 511 31 28
14. CT3 Duane R. MARGRAF, USN, 773 96 50
15. CTSN David W. MARLBOROUGH, USN, 810 04 80
16. CT2 Anthony F. [illegible], USN, 777 62 87
17. CTSN Carl C. NYGREN, USN, 788 37 16
18. SGT Jack L. RAPER, USMC, 199 40 7[illegible]
19. CPL Edward E. [illegible], III, USMC, [illegible] 09 19
20. CT1 John C. SMITH, Jr., USN, [illegible] 94
21. CTC Melvin D. SMITH, USN, [illegible] 96
22. CT3 Thomas H. [illegible], USN, 997 97 91
23. CT3 Philippe C. [illegible], USN, 914 32 84
24. CT1 Frederick J. [illegible], USN, 236 31 86

(c) Civilian 1

1. Mr. Allen M. BLUE, GG-7 TEMDU from NSA

(2) Seriously Injured

(a) Officers 1

1. LT James G. O'CONNOR, USNR, 671765/1615

(b) Enlisted 2

1. CTSN LeeRoy [illegible], USN, 998 13 79
2. CT1 Joseph C. [illegible], USN, 594 81 55

(c) Civilian None

(3) Minor Injuries

(a) Officers 2

1. LCDR David E. LEWIS, USN, 584572/1610
2. LT James M. ENNIS, USNR, 653[illegible]/1615

(b) Enlisted [illegible]

1. CT1 Reginald M. [illegible], USN, 349 53 80 [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

G14/a3e
Ser 00492-67
8 JUL 1967

2. CT3 Joe D. ANDERSON, USN, 771 76 77
3. CT1 Richard K. BAKER, USN, 496 80 12
4. CTSN Mathew B. BENEDICT, JR., USN, 139 55 74
5. CT3 James V. [illegible], USN, 913 41 23
6. CT1 Richard C. [illegible], USN, 444 13 12
7. CT1 Jeffery R. CARPENTER, USN, 539 14 85
8. CT2 James H. DAVIDSON, USN, 699 64 72
9. CTSN Kenneth F. HAKINS, USN, 794 04 69
10. CT3 David W. HAWKINS, USN, 118 73 49
11. CT2 Charles R. HERRICKS, USN, 685 56 42
12. CT2 Frederick K. JONES, USN, 794 91 14
13. CT3 Melvin P. JOHNSON, USN, 997 32 29
14. CTSN Eugene H. KIRK, USN, 918 81 30
15. CT3 Loren W. [illegible], USN, 538 49 74
16. CTSN Terry W. [illegible], USN, 914 [illegible]
17. SGT Bryan P. LOCKWOOD, USMC,
18. CT2 David L. MC FEEGAN, USN, [illegible] 98
19. CT2 Stephen K. MEYER, USN, [illegible] 42 03
20. CT1 Charles L. [illegible], USN, [illegible] 48 03
21. CTSN David A. SHAW, USN, [illegible] 39 56
22. CT3 Maurice P. SHAFER, USN, 695 94 06
23. CT3 Harold M. SIX, USN, 777 58 53
24. CTC Harold J. THOMPSON, USN, 471 37 37
25. CTSN James P. KAVANAUGH, USN, 918 51 32

(c) Civilian 1

1. Mr. Donald L. BLALOCK, GG-7 TFMDU from NSA

Note #1 - Boarded USS LIBERTY in April 67 at Norfolk, Virginia for deployment to West Coast of Africa, 2 May 67. (remained on board when LIBERTY was diverted to Med.)

Note #2 - Boarded USS LIBERTY late May/early June 67 at Rota, Spain prior to LIBERTY movement to Eastern Med.

Jackson L. Noon

JACKSON L. NOON

[redacted]

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WHITE HOUSE

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LBJ's SCHEDULE

—

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Ogden

White House
Lyndon B. Johnson
Staff
President began his day at (Place) The White House - Washington, D. C.

Date June 8, 1967

Day THURSDAY

Time In	Time Out	Telephone Out	Telephone LD	Bright sunshiny day a.m. temperatures 65 degrees warm — Activity (include visited by)	Expense
7:45am				Breakfast on tray - in bedroom - Creamed Chipped beef and hot tea	
				Marvin Watson on 2d floor - out at 9:43am	
8:08am		t		Sen. Mike Mansfield	
8:13am		t		Secy McNamara	
8:18am		t		Sen. Everett Dirksen	
8:30am		t		Sen. Wayne Morse - (the President had asked Op. to get Sen. Morse at 8:11am) (The President took this call in D. Burkley's office Sen. was with the Dentist, and was [illegible]ched at 8:30a)	
8:38am		t		Secy McNamara	
8:41am			t	Judge A. W. Moursund - thru Ranch Board - Johnson City, Texas	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

Page No.

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White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House - Washington, D. C. Day THURSDAY

Time In	Time Out	Telephone Calls Le	Telephone Calls LD	Activity (Include visitors)
8:49am		t		Atty Gen'l Ramsey Clark
9:08am		t		Sen. Jacob Javits
9:20am		t		Director Charles Schultze
9:45am		t		The Attorney General
9:21am		t		George Christian - Press Secretary - staff
9:48a				"hot line" - Kosygin to Johnson - status of cease-fire
9:49am		t		Walt Rostow - National Security Adviser
10:00am		t		Sec'y Robt McNamara
10:09am		t		Tom Johnson (pl) - W. Thomas Johnson, Atlanta
10:10a		t		mldr (pl)--"Get me in twenty minutes how many states I have been in since I became President, broken down by years." The President then changed his mind and said to eliminate '64 and get only 65, 66, and 67.

SEE TRAVEL REQUEST FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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...ng Route
...ne Lyndon B. Johnson
...ary
...sident began his day at (Place) The White House - Washington, D.C. Date June 8, 1967 Day THURSDAY

Time In	Time Out	Telephone (or) Lo	Telephone (or) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expense
10:12a		t	✓	Hon. Farris Bryant, Director, Office of Emergency Planning	
10:14a			✓	Mr. Walt Rostow asked for the President--he was on the telephone--Did not talk	
10:18a		t	✓	Robert E. Kintner (pl)	
10:20a		f	✓	Hon. McGeorge Bundy	
10:24a		t	✓	Walt Rostow (pl) --returning his call	
10:25a			✓	The President was taken a run-down on the states in which he had been, as he had requested of mjdr rm at 10:10am. (As of 3 June 1967: 1965-14, 1966-27, 1967-7 (since becoming President, he has been in all states except Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota and South Dakota.)	
10:58a		t	✓	Barefoot Sanders (pl)	
11:00am		t	✓	Walt Rostow (plp	
11:00am		f	✓	Hon. McGeorge Bundy (Op. reports that Tom J answered and said he would put the President right on the line. At this time however, the President was on the pl to Mr. Rostow according to the pl lights.)	
11:00a				"hot line" - Johnson to Kosygin - re USS Liberty	
11:35a				"hot line" -- Johnson to Kosygin - cease-fire actions	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ernes, Jr. Research Papers

e White House
esident Lyndon B. Johnson
ly Diary

Date June 8, 1967

e President began his day at (Place) The White House - Washington, D.C.

Day THURSDAY

Time In	Time Out	Telephone Le	Telephone LD	Activity (include visited by)
11:04am				The President to the oval office
				accompanied by
				George Christian
				tom Johnson
				and met at the door by Marvin Watson
11:06am- 11:45				The President to the Situation Room to join
				Secy Robert McNamara
				Secy Dean Rusk
				Hon. Clark Clifford
				Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secy of State
				Hon. Llewellyn Thompson, Amb to the USSR
				Hon. McGeorge Bundy
				Hon. Walt W. Rostow

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SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day ~~Saturday~~ Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Loc.	Telephone LD	Activity (include visitors list)
	11:45am				The President returned to the oval office w/ Marvin Watson
	11:45	11:46			mary a in--The President said for her to see that every morning there is a typed 3x5 card w/ his schedule of the day on his desk in the oval office & little office & in the
	11:46a		1		George Christian (pl)
	11:48am				George Christian
	~~12x~~				
	12:00n		1		Director Charles Schultze--when reported to the President it was also reported that Sen. Russell was on the line. The President said he would take the call to Senator Richard Russell and to tell Schultze he would call him back. DID NOT TALK.
	12:00n		1		Senator Richard Russell of Ga.
	12:08	12:09	1		George Christian (pl)--GC in Marvin's office, so talked to Tom Johnson (Sen. Russell on hold)
	12:13p		1		Tom Johnson (on GC pl)

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Barnes, Jr. Research Papers

The White House
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Calls To	Telephone Calls From	Activity (include visitors by)
	12:14p		t		mary a "Get Charlie Schultze for me now."--before this could be done Secy Rusk Ca
	12:14p		t		Secy Dean Rusk
	12:15p		t		mjdr "Two pages of the briefing sheets."--she took them in
C	12:15p		t		Director Charles Schultze, Director BOB
C	12:15p	12:37			Secy John Gardner
		12:33p			Hon. Doug Cater
		12:23p			Hon. George Christian
		12:23p			Hon. Walt Rostow
	12:20p				"hot line"-- Kosygin to Johnson - USS Liberty

SEE TRAVEL RECORDS FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date July 21, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Calls To	Telephone Calls From	Activity (include visitors)
	12:37p				The President departed the oval office
					w/ Marvin Watson
					GeorgeChristian
					and was met by Maj. Hugh Robinson, Military Aide to the President
					to walk to the Diplomatic Reception Room to meet
					His Ex. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi
					The Hon. Aleke Banda, Minister of Development and Planning
					The Hon. Joseph M. A. Mtewa, charge' d'affaires ad interim of Malawi
					Hon. Joseph Palmer, Asst Secy of State
					Mr. Thomas W. McElhiney, Country Director, Dept of State
					Amb. Symington introduced members of both parties to each other, and then the President escorted President Banda via the garden tohis office.
	12:45p				The President walked across the Rose Garden w/
					President Banda
					Under Secy Katzenbach
					Major Hugh Robinson
					Chief of Protocol James Symington
					and the remainder of the delegation
	12:46p				To the oval office w/
					President Banda ---introduced mjdr who was in at the time straightening the

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

The White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (for) Lo	Telephone (for) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					papers on the end table by the rocking chair, adding "Juanita you might get the President a coke or some coffee or some root beer," and invited His Excellency to have a seat "while I finish reading this report" (report was last 5 pages of Christian's morning press briefing). President Banda chose to have coffee.	
	12:59p				Under Secy of State Nicholas Katzenbach joined	
	1:10p				To mansion w/ President Banda of Malawi	
					Before going upstairs for LUNCHEON, the President stopped on the ground floor of the mansion for a quick picture and handshake, with Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Congo	
	1:12p				To second floor - Yellow Oval Room w/ President Banda	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Ext.	Telephone LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expense
	1:12p		1		MJDR - pl (President was calling from the West Hall. The President of Malawi (the explained) was in the bathroom and he wanted to take that opportunity to check out [illegible] pronounce [illegible] a name in his toast --- Gibbon --- also find out who he is and where [illegible] why he said "the first of earthly blessings" [illegible] fall to Kintner's office (Evelyn) let [illegible] Eew. Duggan (already in the mansion [illegible] guest for the luncheon) who was reached [illegible] the Usher's office. Duggan said this was a reference to Edward Gibbon (rhyme with [illegible]) the famous English Historian who wrote the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire and that while he could not say for sure, he did believe that the quote was from that book. No contact was made with Hamilton who did the first draft, but the Duggan information was immediately relayed to the President who was then in the Yellow Oval Room.	
					THOSE ON SECOND FLOOR FOR COCKTAILS AND GIFT EXCHANGE:	
					The Vice President, the Secy of State, Ambassador Symington	
					Hon. Aleke Banda, Min of Development and Planning	
					Hon. Joseph M[illegible] Mseka - Charge d'Affaires	
					The Vice President	
					Secretary Rusk	
					[illegible]	
	1:29p				[illegible] the stairway w/ President Banda	
					Photos in lobby	
					Then to East Room to receive guests - President in receiving line w/ Vice President Humphrey and Minister Banda, along w/ President Banda	
	1:50p				State Dining Room for [illegible] LUNCHEON honoring H. E. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi	

GIFT EXCHANGE (memo code) sterling silver book box w/ seal and inscription
Space Photo - of Malawi in leather folder
Leatherbound copies of "White House Guidebook" and "Living White House" (Bookplate printed to H. E. Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi with best wishes, LBJ
Autographed photo in sterling silver frame - "To His Excellency, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, with high esteem and warm best wishes, Lyndon B Johnson"

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SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (or) Lo	Telephone (or) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure
13	[illegible] guests at the luncheon				At the President's table, reading from his right	
					President Banda	
					Secretary Rusk	
					Dr. John A. Logan, President of Hollins College, Virginia	
					Mr. William H. Beatty, Jr., Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank	
					Mr. Marshall Bernardi, actor - NYC	
					Cong. John Brademas	
					Mr. [illegible] Kowengwole, Member of Parliament	
					Judge Thurgood Marshall	
					Mr. ~~Banda~~ [illegible] Banda, Minister-Development and Planning (on [illegible])	
	2:15			TOASTS		
	2:51p				The President walked President Banda to the South Portico - to say goodbye	
					This departure unusual in contrast to usual departure from North Portico because of large crowds of demonstrators--Arab and Israeli--surging back and forth on Pennsylvania outside Northwest Gates.	
	2:55p				MW to the mansion - saying, "they tell me the luncheon is just breaking up."	
	3:01p				The President to the second floor w/ The Vice President	
					George Christian, MW	
					VP out at 3:20p, GC out at 3:45p (MW departed at 3:25p)	
	3:10p		t		W Rostow (pl)	
	3:24p		f		McGeorge Bundy	
	3:29p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)	
	3:31p				Walt Rostow (pl)	

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James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 5, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (or) Lr	Telephone (or) LD	Activity (include visited by)
5					3:36p Johnson to Kosygin - via "hot line" - re USS Liberty
	3:38p		t		Tom Johnson (pl)
	3:44p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)
	3:50p		t		Walt Rostow (pl)
	3:51p		t		MW (pl)
	3:54p		f		Walt Rostow
	3:56p		t		George Christian (pl)
	3:57p		t		McGeorge Bundy
	4:05p		f		George Christian
	4:06p		t		George Christian (pl)
	4:11p		t		George Christian (pl)
	4:13p				John Gonella (pl)
	4:16p		t		MW (pl)

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Lo	Telephone LD	Activity (include visited by)
	4:30p		t		mjdr (pl) -- to instruct length or procedure to go in getting back a personal letter for his desk. [illegible]
	4:32p		t		MW (pl)
	SK 4:35p		t		Tom Johnson (pl)
	4:38p		t		Walt R[illegible] (pl)
	4:44p		t		MW (pl)
	4:50p		f		Barefoot Sanders
	5:10p				To Oval Ofc - accompanied by Jim Jones, sayng "Did you get that letter?" to mjdr. The President handed to mjdr a folder -- described on top of page 14

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Daily Diary, June 8, 1967

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

The White House
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (or) Lo	Telephone (or) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	5:11p	7:00p			To Cabinet Room for meeting OFF RECORD Arrival Forces Policy Committee	
					with:	
					Secretary Robert S. McNamara	
					Deputy Secy Cyrus R. Vance	
					Under Secy of Army, David E. McGiffert	
					Secy of the Navy Paul H. Nitze	
					Secy of the Air Force Harold Brown	
					Asst Secy of Defense Thomas L. Morris	
					Asst Secy of Defense Robert Anthony	
					Asst Secy of Defense Paul R. Ignatius	
					Dr. Finn J. Larsen, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering	
					JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	
					General Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman	
					General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA	
					Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations	
					General John P. McConnell, USAF, Chief of Staff, USAF	
					General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps	
					Charles Schultze	
					Elias Veatch, ~~Deputy DOD Chief, Military Affairs~~ Chief, Military Assistance, DOD	
					Joseph Califano	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

...ite House
...sident Lyndon B. Johnson
Daily Diary

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (for) Le	Telephone (for) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
					/at 5:10p	
					The President had with him (when he returned to the office) a folder, indicating he was through with the contents:	
					Rostow memorandum covering Ambassador Bunker's weekly telegram. RESTRICTED	
					Rostow note transmitting report from Gov. Harriman of June 8, 12:35p	
					Rostow note re Kosygnin response not classified - re ship incident	
					CIA daily briefing for June 8	
					the 6:15 a.m. White House situation regular report	
	6:00p				To Exec Offices, saying he was going to the barber shop.	
	6:03p				To the barbershop	
					Joined there by Barefoot Sanders	
					When mf took the Pres the first 6 pages of the briefing, the Pres looked at Steve Martini, and said, "Now, I have to read this, when can I do it? Now? You know, I used to have a [ ] barber in Austin who could let me get my hair cut w/ my glasses on. He'd cut my sideburns, and then let me read the rest of the time. But he died." All this in an effort to get a reaction of some sort from Martini, but none was forthcoming.	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone I or t Lo	Telephone I or t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	[illegible]				[illegible]	
	6:35p				To Oval Office, stopping in Fish Room to pick up Cong Wilbur Mills then to little lounge w/ Cong Mills, MW, and Barefoot Sanders	
	6:40p				mf took in last pages of briefing -- Pres and Cong Mills were alone in lounge office	
	6:55p		t		MW (pl)	
	7:10p				To Situation Room - w/ Chairman Mills and MW	
					See page 18 for attendance	
	7:20p				Chairman Mills departed the White House	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White house

Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone Tar t Lo	Telephone Tar t LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure
	7:45p				The President returned to the Oval Office	
✓	7:46p	8:05p			Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler Secy Fowler asked to see the President "about Chairman Mahon, Chairman Mills, Sen Russell Long, plus a variety of other pieces."	
	7:55p				The President asked for Director Schultze -- he was at the Sheraton Carlton - "never mind"	
	7:59p		t		MW (pl)	
✓	8:00p	8:50p			Hon. James Webb, Administrator, NASA	
	8:06p		t		MW (pl)	
✓	8:20p		t		General William "Bozo" McKee	
✓	8:29p		t		Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force	
✓	8:34p		t		McGeorge Bundy	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 8, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (for t) Lo	Telephone (for t) LD	Activity (include visited by)	Expenditure Code
	9:00p	9:25p			Signing mail at desk - w/ mf and MW	
	9:30p				To mansion, asking for Jay Taylor who was staying at the Sheraton (mf placed call, no answer in room or to page -- left word)	
	9:32p				The President joined Mrs. Johnson and	
		11:40p			Mr. and Mrs. George Brown on the second floor	
	10:10p				DINNER w/ Mrs. Johnson and Mr. and Mrs. George Brown	
	10:33p			t	Dale Malechek - ABJ Ranch	
	10:54p		t		Jay Taylor - at Sheraton Carlton	
	10:56p				The President asked the operator to clear Jay Taylor to come in the Diplomatic Entrance	
	11:05p	11:40p			Mr. Jay Taylor to second floor to join	

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DAILY DIARY

Date June 6, 1967

The President began his day at (Place) The White House Day Thursday

Entry No.	Time In	Time Out	Telephone (or) Lo	Telephone (or) LD	Activity (include visited by)
	11:24p		t		Tom Johnson
✓	11:41p			f	Mrs. Arthur Krim - New York City
	11:50p				Retired
					Today released exchange of ltrs between the President and Sen Mike Mansfield at 4:00p re the president's current views on the situation in the Middle East.
					ATTENDANCE - SIT RM mtg - tonight:
					Secy Rusk
					Secy McNamara
					Secy Fowler
					Hon. Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secy of State
					Gen Earle G Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
					Director, CIA - Richard Helms
					Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Clark Clifford
					Under Secy of State, Eugene V Rostow
					Asst Secy of State, Lucius D. Battle
					President's Special Asst for Natl Security Affairs, Walt Rostow
					Spec Consultant to the President and Secy of Special Committee of Natl Sec Council, McGeorge Bundy
					Harold Saunders

SEE TRAVEL RECORD FOR TRAVEL ACTIVITY

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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TO SIGNING TABLE THURSDAY, June 8, 1967

signed Ltr to Hon. Paul Findley, MC, responding to his teleg of views on crisis in Mid-East.

signed Ltr to Sen. Clifford P. Case responding to his ltr on Mid-East matter

sent Ltr to (Cardinal) Joseph Cardinal Ritter - St. Louis, responding to his teleg of concern about Mid-East

signed Ltr to Gov. of Md., Spiro T. Agnew responding to his ltr re Mid-East sit.

signed Commission for Alexander B. Trowbridge as Secretary of Commerce -- Sen. Confirmation June 8

signed Protocol of Buenos Aires with underlying report of the Secretary of State and message from the President to the Senate for the purpose of transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the Protocol of Amendment tot he Charter of the Organization of American States.

signed Ltr of thanks to H.E. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, Pres of the Rep. of Costa Rica for ox cart ~~XXX~~.

signed Ltr To Sen. Mike Mansfield responding to his on current Mid-East situation

Draft for reply to the Shah's message informing the Pres that he regretfully had to postpone his visit to the U. S.

signed Ltr to Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus in response to his on the 20th anniversary of the Marshall plan.

signed by the President
6/8/67
9:15p

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

TO BE SIGNED TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 1967 ----beginning at 12:30p.m.

Ltr to Sen. Mundt(drafted by Rostow) in response to one fr the Senator of some mont ago.

Ltr to H.E. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Pres of the Rep of the Philippines, Manila re equipment for 5 additional engineer battalions (Rostow draft & memo)

Memo (Rostow): U.S. -Mexico Commission on Border Development

Remaining on table from morning signing:

Ltr to Congressman Ray A. Taylor (Rostow draft) responding to one from him suppo Pres's position re Gulf of Aqaba

Memo fr Doug Cater and DeVier Pierson w draft message for Congress attached re communications satellite policy

Enrolled Bill H. R. 6950 - restoration of investment credit and accelerated depreciation allow[illegible] sponsored by Rep. Wilbur Mills (D) Ark. -Last Day:

Personnel actions proposed by Doug Nobles via MW: Robert S. Smith for Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Africa and [illegible] Philip J. Maloney for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mortgage Credit, HUD

Telegr. to Oscar Chapman who is sick in Methodist Hospital in Houston, Texas

Action item fm Walt Rostow - Secy Rusk asks permission to curtail his participation at the NATO Ministerial mtg in Luxembourg next week.
✓Approved ___Disapproved ___See me

Personnel actions proposed by John Macy via MW: Resignation of Berkeley Johnson Fed Rep to Pecos River Compact Commission June 30, 1967.; (letter) appointment of Mr. John W. Odell to replace Berkeley Johnson; (letter) two letters 1) to Gov of New Mexico and 2) to Gov of Texas informing them of this appointment as requested by legislation.

Cyrus Vance ltr of resignation; nomination of Paul Nitze as /deputy secy of Defense to replace Cy Vance; nomination of John McNaughton, as Secy of Navy to replace Paul Nitze; Paul Warnke, to be Asst Secy of Defense, Int'l Security Affairs to replace John McNaughton - press release also separated and given to Gov. Crhistian by the President.

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6-7-67

From [illegible]

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - another name, Walston C. Gallie to be considered for FDIC Sherrill vacancy ✓ Discuss w/me
Right in understanding rec'd negative fm Cecil Burney? ✓ Yes

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - Robt G. Miner as possibility for Amb to Sierra Leone. ✓ Submit alternatives.

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - re Amb to Ethiopia. ✓ Discuss w/me.

Personnel action memo - fm John Macy - re Candidates to be Adm. of the Bonneville Power Administration 1)Gordon C. Culp 2) John J. Davis. ✓ Discuss w/me.

To table at 5:30 p.m.

Proclamation: Flag Day and National Flag Week

Nomination of James P. Grant of Virginia to be an Asst Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

To the table at 5:30 p.m.
Commission for Bill Leonhart to be special assistant to the Pres

Commission and Order for [illegible] Bundy to serve as Special Consultant to the Pres (order fixing rate of compensation).

CAB Order establishing a non-stop route between Montreal and Tampa-Miami. --and authorizing Northeast Airlines to service the route.

Ltr to David Ginsburg - replying to one Mr. Ginsburg sent the President

Wire to Mrs. B. K. Johnson - Pittsburgh, Pa. - regarding death of Mrs. [illegible] Van (sent by Will Sparks) - Night letter 6/9/67

Wire to Mr. Archie Mellon - Lyndonville, Vt. - night letter 6/9/67 - re 100th anniv of Lyndon Institute. (sent by Will Sparks)

Ltr to Miss Brenda Sweatman, Piedmont, S.C. - on her ltr to Radio Station WOOK - on teenage view on VNam (sent by Will Sparks)

Ltr to Mr. Oscar Anderson, L.A., Calif - applauding his achievement to build school for Head Start children (sent by Will Sparks)

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday - June 8, 1967

11:30am	Secy John Gardner (Oval Rm Ofc)
12:00n	Hon. Robert Henry McBride Amb.-designate to the Congo (Oval Rm Ofc)
12:20pm	Arrival of His Ex. Hastings Kamuzu Banda - President of Republic of Malawi (by helicopter at Ellipse)
12:25pm	The President greets Pres. Banda at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance
12:30pm	Private Mtg w/Pres. Banda (Oval Rm Ofc)
1:00pm	Stag Luncheon for Pres. Banda
5:00pm	OFF RECORD: Secy McNamara, Secy Resor, Nitze and Brown, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Schultze and Joe Califano (Cab. Rm.)
5:30pm	Steve Martini
6:00pm	OFF RECORD: Chairman Wilbur Mills

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THURSDAY - June 8, 1967

11:30a Secy Gardner (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:00n Hon. Robt H. McBride Amb-designate to Congo (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:20p Arrival of Pres. Banda (by helicopter at the Ellipse)

12:25p President greets Pres. Banda of Malawi (Diplomatic Reception entrance)

12:30p Pri Mtg w/Pres. Banda (Oval Rm Ofc)

1:00p Stag Luncheon for Pres. Banda

5:00p OFF RECORD: Secy McNamara, Secys Resor, Nitze and Brown, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schultze and Joe Califano (in Cabinet Room)

5:30p Steve Martini

6:00p OFF RECORD: Chairman Wilbur Mills (in Oval Rm Ofc)

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THURSDAY - June 8, 1967

11:30a Secy Gardner (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:00n Hon. Robt H. McBride Amb-designate to Congo (Oval Rm Ofc)

12:20p Arrival of Pres. Banda (by helicopter at the Ellipse)

12:25p President greets Pres. Banda of Malawi (Diplomatic Recep. entrance)

12:30p Pri Mtg w/Pres. Banda (Oval Rm Ofc)

1:00p Stag Luncheon for Pres. Banda

5:00p OFF RECORD
Secys McNamara, Rusk, Nitze and Brown, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schultze and Joe Califano (in Cab Rm)

5:30p Steve Martini

6:00p OFF RECORD:
Chairman Wilbur Mills (Oval Rm Ofc)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THURSDAY - June 8, 1967

11:30a Secy Gardner (Oval Rm Ofc)

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6:00p OFF RECORD: Chairman Wilbur Mills (Oval Rm Ofc)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday, June 8, 1967

11:30 Secretary John Gardner.

12:00 Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

12:20 His Excellency Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi arrives by helicopter at the Ellipse.

12:25 President Banda arrives at Diplomatic Reception Entrance.

12:30 Private meeting with President Banda of Malawi.

1:00 State luncheon for President Banda.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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THE PRESIDENT'S AFTERNOON/EVENING
SCHEDULE THURSDAY, JUNE 8

5:00 (Secretary McNamara et al - list attached)
CABINET ROOM

5:30 (Mr. and Mrs. Steve Martini - ?)

6:00 (Chairman Wilbur Mills)

8:15 (Private dinner with Mr. and Mrs. George Brown)

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Those to attend the 5:00 o'clock Cabinet Room meeting:

Secretary Robert S. McNamara
Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Under Secretary of Army David E. McGiffert
Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze
Secretary of Air Force Harold Brown
Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas D. Morris
Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Anthony
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul R. Ignatius
Dr. Fin... J. Larsen, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering

Joint Chiefs of Staff:

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman
General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Chief of Staff, USA
Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations
General John P. McConnell, USAF, Chief of Staff, USAF
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Charles Schultze and his assistant
Joe Califano

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

LIBRARY

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday, June 8, 1967

OK	11:30	Secretary John Gardner.
		Gardner wants to discuss the National Institutes of Health.
		This will be in the President's office.
OK	12:00	Picture with Robert Henry McBride, Ambassador designate to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
		This will be in the President's office.
OK	12:2[illegible]	His Excellency Hastings Kamuza Banda, President of the Republic of Malawi arrives by helicopter at the Ellipse.
OK	12:25	The President greets President Banda at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance [illegible] for pictures and the two Presidents then walk to the President's office.
OK	12:30	Private meeting with President Banda of Malawi.
		This will be in the President's office.
OK	1:00	Stag luncheon for President Banda.
		This will be in the Mansion.
OK	5:30	SEC HENRY FOWLER
	~~5:30~~	~~(George Meany.) (OFF THE~~ RECORD)
		(This will be in the President's office.)
	6:30	(Jim Marlow of Associated Press.) (OFF THE RECORD)
		(This will be in the President's office.)
	6:00	(CLIFF ALEXANDER -- TO DISCUSS A "SEE ME" MEMO ON PLANS FOR PROGRESS.) (OFF THE RECORD)

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78705

February 14, 1979

In reply refer to:
NLJ-79-5, Ennes

NSC PRIMARY INTEREST

Mr. William Price
FADRC, Room 1239
2201 C Street, NW
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Price:

Under the provisions of Section 3-501 and 3-504, Executive Order 12065, a researcher has requested the mandatory declassification review of the enclosed documents from our holdings. The enclosed document list identifies the Library file which contains the documents.

Although you will be notifying the researcher of your decision, we request a copy of your response so that we may mark the documents appropriately. If you sanitize any documents, please provide us a copy. If subsequent appeal results in a decision to declassify more material, please inform the Library.

If there is any question concerning this request, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Martin I. Elzy

Martin I. Elzy
Archivist

Enclosures

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST FORM

information must be supplied for your request to be processed. Please type or print. Use separate sheets for each folder.

Name Address

earcher: James M. Ennes, Jr. 13009 [illegible]th Avenue NE, Woodinville, Washington 98072

ection: unarranged Box #:

ber: binder of Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange

FOR LIBRARY AND AGENCY USE ONLY

Date request received: [illegible]

Case #: [illegible]

ument #	Document Date	Document Type	Document Subject or Correspondents	Number of Pages	Classification	Agency
1	6/8/67 11 AM	letter form	Johnson to Kosygin	1	possible classified info	NSC
2	6/8/67 12:25 PM	letter form	Kosygin to Johnson	1	possible classified info	NSC
3	6/8/67 3:36 PM	letter form	Johnson to Kosygin		possible classified info	NSC

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON [illegible]

February 13, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
6413 Kenhowe Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Mr. Ennes:

I have done some further research on your photograph request, and turned up these contact sheets of pictures which I believe were taken at the meeting in question. (The issue is clouded by the fact that there were two meetings in the Situation Room that day. I am relying on the clock on the wall, and the fact that Llewellan Thompson was present only at the morning meeting, to make the identification.)

These contact sheets, for rolls A4250, A4252, and A4256, I am reasonably sure are the only ones from the morning meeting. These are all black and white photographs. I have indicated on each sheet which of the frames Mr. Okamoto edited as being the best of the lot. I realize that a xerox copy of a contact sheet is not the finest quality one might wish for, but perhaps these will be of some value to you in making a selection.

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

March 9, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
6413 Kenhowe Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Mr. Ennes:

I have ordered your two photographs, and will send them along when they are ready. Thank you for your check for $9.30.

The unidentified man in A 4256-26A is not George Christian. It is Marvin Watson.

I have checked our record of the President's activities on the morning of 8 June 67 against the contact sheets for the day, and was unable to identify any pictures from that morning prior to the meeting.

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

4 February 1978

Mr. L. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist
THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY
Austin, Texas 78705

Dear Mr. Scott:

Thank you for your letter of 24 January and for the xerox copies of file cards for 8 June 1967.

Unfortunately, all of the pictures represented on the cards you sent were taken after about 12:00 noon. I am looking for pictures taken during the morning, particularly during the 11:06 to 11:45am meeting in the situation room with Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Katzenbach, Thompson, Bundy and Walt Rostow.

Could you possibly identify any pictures that were taken during that period, or at any time between 10 :00am and noon?

Sincerely,

James M. Eunes, Jr.
[redacted]

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

January 24, 1976

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Enclosed are Xerox copies of the cards from our photo retrieval system for June [illegible], excluding the coverage of the visit of President Banda. This file includes the shots which were edited by the photographers as being the best taken on that day.

I have enclosed one of our price lists for your information. Photographs with serial numbers prefixed "A" are available in black and white only; those with "C" are available in color or black and white glossy finish.

We normally require about two weeks to fill most orders for black and white photographs, three weeks for color. Should you wish to order any of these, please send the order to my attention, and make your check payable to "[illegible]-LBJ Library."

Please let us know if we can be of further service.

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

January 12, 1978

Mr. James Ennes
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

In response to your January 9, 1978 letter, I have not been able to locate a Clark Clifford report on the USS Liberty matter.

I have referred your photograph questions to our audiovisual archivist, Phil Scott.

Sincerely,

Martin I. Elzy
Archivist

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

January 12, 1978

Mr. James M. Ennes, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

Martin Elzy has passed along to me a copy of your letter of January 9, in order that I might reply to your questions about photographs.

The pictures you ask about are indeed a part of our collection, and you may order prints of them from us at the prices indicated on the enclosed list. These particular shots are available in black and white only. They are in the public domain; no rights need be purchased. We do have a chronological file of the photographs taken on June 8, in the event there are other shots you wish to ask about.

You may write to Mr. Okamoto as follows:

Mr. Yoichi R. Okamoto
5602 Roosevelt
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Very truly yours,

E. Philip Scott
Audiovisual Archivist

REPLY COPY ASKED FOR COPY OF THE CLIMAX FILE.

THE LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

December 22, 1977

Mr. James Ennes
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Ennes:

In response to your December 21, 1977, telephone call, the President's Daily Diary for June 8, 1967, numbers [illegible] pages. The President's Appointment File for that date totals 46 pages exclusive of a folder devoted to the visit of President Banda of Malawi. There is also a 270-page folder labelled "June 1967 Middle East Crisis." You may order copies of the material at a cost of twenty cents per page. Please make your check or money order payable to the General Services Administration.

I have enclosed a list of other material on Israel. All of the series may have material on your topic. Because we may not select documents for any researcher, lest we later be charged with concealing or overlooking important information, you would need to come to Austin to investigate these files. Most of the closed and unprocessed material is security classified. We are engaged in a declassification program, but it will take decades to complete.

Please contact us again if we may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Martin L. Elzy
Archivist

Enclosure

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

CO 126

December 6, 1977, list of material on Israel in the White House files of the Johnson administration

White House Central File, Countries 126 (Israel)
9" open, 9 items closed

White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 126
-1" open, -1" closed

White House Central File, National Defense 19(Wars)/CO 1-6 (Middle East/Near East)
2' 5" open, 4 items closed

White House Central File, Confidential File, NS 19/CO 1-6
-1" open, -1" closed

National Security File, Country File, Israel
1' open, 1' 9" closed or unprocessed

National Security File, Country File, Middle East
3", all unprocessed

National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis
4', all unprocessed

National Security File, National Security Council History, Middle East Crisis 1967
2' 7", all unprocessed

President's Staff File, DPT, Head of State Correspondence File, Israel
4", all unprocessed

Additional Israel material is scattered throughout the files, but the location and nature of this material can best be discussed with the researcher upon arrival at the Library.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EO 79-222

June 25, 1979

Dear Mr. Elzy:

This is in response to your letter of February 14, 1979, for three numbered documents (3 pages) requested on behalf of James M. Ennes, Jr., from the files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Case Number NLJ-79-5.

The NSC Staff has completed its review and made the following determinations:

-- Documents 1 and 3 may be declassified and released.

-- Document 2 remains classified in full under sections 1-301(b) and 1-302 of Executive Order 12065 and should be marked Confidential.

Sincerely,

Beverly Zweiben
Director
Freedom of Information

Mr. Martin I. Elzy
Archivist
National Archives and Records Service
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
2313 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705

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WITH CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURES

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1

Thursday, June 8, 1967
Approved by President - 11:00 am.
Transmitted by [illegible] S Molink - 11:17 am.
Received by S[illegible] Molink - 11:24 am.

To Chairman Kosygin

From President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

We have just learned that [illegible] Liberty, an auxilliary ship, has apparently been torpedoed by [illegible]rael forces in error off Port Said. We have instructed our car[illegible]er, Sa[illegible]toga now in the Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the scene to investigate. We wish you to know th[illegible]vestigation is the sole purpose of this flight of ai[illegible]raft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties a[illegible] informed.

We have passed this message to Chernyakov but feel that you should know of this development urgently.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC Hr 6/25/7[illegible] & NLJ-75-5
By MLIT [illegible] 7/11/79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible] Lyndon B. Johnson Library

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 8, 1967
Approved by President - 3:36 pm.
Transmitted by US Molink - 3:58 pm.
Received by Soviet Molink - 4:00 pm.

To Chairman Kosygin

From President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

I deeply appreciate your transmitting the message to President Nasser. We lost 10 men, 16 critically wounded, and 65 wounded, as a result of Israeli attack, for which they have apologized.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC Hy 6/25/79 re LBJ-79-5
MFE 7/11/79

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FS
12

10/3

Bron Smith

1) Sorry to be late in returning this — I have been away from office for some time.

2) I received a copy of the time it came into Washington + immediately [illegible] my ~~[illegible]~~ comments thereon for Clark Clifford.

3) I shall [illegible] additional comments →

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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THIS COPY FOR_____

NEWS CONFERENCE #866-A

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN

11:18 A.M. EDT

JUNE 8, 1967

THURSDAY

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President of the Republic of Malawi will arrive by helicopter at 12:20. He will arrive at the Diplomatic Reception Entrance at 12:25. This will be press, stills, reels, no sound. There will be no remarks there.

The President will meet President Banda there and escort him to his office for a private meeting at 12:30. There is a Stag Luncheon at 1:00.

The President has nominated 31 Navy Captains for promotion to Rear Admiral. We will not give you the list.

I will take questions.

Q George, why has the United States called for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council this afternoon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have any comment on it at this point.

Q George, is Secretary Rusk in the building?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Seeing the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Senator Morse told reporters he was called away from the Hill for an "emergency meeting". I am quoting a reporter on the Hill. Is that true?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Secretary Rusk is here.

Q Back to this thing then. There is some grumbling on the Committee that he gave them short shrift and left suddenly. That is the same question phrased a bit differently.

MR. CHRISTIAN: The Secretary is here in the White House seeing the President.

Q Can you say anything more?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No, I can

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Q Does it have anything to do with the meeting of the Security Council at the U.N. this afternoon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't say any more. The Secretary of State has been over here frequently in the past few days.

Q Are you aware of any emergency, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not going to comment on it.

Q Are others in the meeting also, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us who else is there?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know who is in the meeting.

Q George, can you tell us what the President has done this morning? What was the time he got up?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President retired fairly early last night. He was able to get through with his night reading before dinner. He was in bed by midnight and slept through until about 6:30 this morning.

Q I think the difficulty arises because I think this is the first time that the Secretary of State has broken off an engagement on the Hill to come down here. This is the first time that kind of a conflict has arisen. You can't give us any help on this situation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Do you think you might be able to later?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Carroll, we will have to see how things progress during the day.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting last night with Bundy?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The meeting last night was essentially an organization meeting with some preliminary plans.

Q Did the President attend?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President attended part of the session.

Q George, is there a meeting today of the U.S. National Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Is there a meeting of this special committee?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q What time is that?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Later today. I don't have the exact

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James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Q Are the President and the Secretary meeting in the Mansion now or the Cabinet Room?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Here in this part of the building.

Q George, on another subject -- why has Governor Endicott Peabody not yet been sworn in as Deputy Director of OEP after his confirmation back April 20, I believe?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Jack, I would have to check.

Q George, I may have missed this last night, but I don't think there was anything out of here on it. Does the White House have any comment on the action of the House yesterday in rejecting the Debt Limit Bill?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't add much to what Congressman Mills said yesterday. Of course, it is regrettable that the bill sponsored by Congressman Mills wasn't passed by the House.

Q George, when did you assume we would be able to find out why the U.S. called this emergency meeting of the Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I will give you as much information as I can here, Jerry. Ambassador Goldberg is handling the matter in the United Nations. *

The President has been in frequent communication with the Ambassador during this period.

As I have said before, our full attention is on the United Nations deliberations.

Q George, can we complete that sundown?

Did the President have a meeting set this morning with Rusk and McNamara early? Or was there a previous meeting?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President expects to see and consult with Secretary Rusk during this period.

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

Q Can you give us the President's schedule this morning? I mean, before the official appointment. Was there a meeting in the Situation Room?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. The President has been working at the mansion until recently.

Q Is Mr. McNamara with the President also?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not sure.

Q Could you find out for us who else is involved in this meeting that is going on?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I told you that I would give you as much as I could on our activities here.

Q Did the President speak with Ambassador Goldberg this morning?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, the President has been more or less in constant touch with the Ambassador. I don't have a count on the number of times they have talked. I believe the President may have talked with the Ambassador four or five times yesterday.

Q George, can you tell us perhaps whether Secretary Rusk's arrival at the White House from the Hill is connected with the call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, I don't intend to comment on reasons for meetings during this period.

Q George, there is a report in the New York Times that the Administration is embarking on a plan where Cabinet members are going to visit with the Governors and then be followed by State days in Washington next fall.

Is there any truth to this? Each Cabinet member will be given about four States to cover?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Sid, I don't know about the State days part of it. I do know that from the outset of his Administration the President has urged the Cabinet members to get out with the people and not to remain here in Washington all the time.

The Cabinet members have moved around a great deal. Secretary Rusk just recently, as you will recall, has been in Iowa with Senator Hickenlooper, in Texas, Alabama, and some other places. Secretary Freeman has made a number of trips out around the country, and the other Cabinet members have too.

Of course, the President himself tries to go to as many places as he possibly can. He has been to seven States the first five months of this year, and about 27

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

Q The story indicates there is a concerted effort or a well-planned effort for better organized visits. Are you confirming that part of the story?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am confirming that the President urges Government officials to get out as much as possible -- as much as their duties permit.

Q That isn't what the story is about, Mr. Christian. This story says the President has farmed out the 50 States among the Members of the Cabinet and each will champion or ride herd on the Governors in his territory. Is that correct?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know anything about that part of it. I do know for the last three years the Cabinet Officers have moved around a great deal.

Q George, so far as you know, it is [illegible] next week and Los Angeles on the 23rd. Is it still on the schedule?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President still hopes to go to both places, yes.

Q George, there are to be two demonstrations this afternoon -- practically on the White House doorstep -- one, friends of the Jews, and one, friends of the Arabs.

What cognizance will the White House take of this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am sure cognizance will be taken, Ray.

Q Has the White House received a telegram that the Arabs say they have sent asking for a meeting with the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Do you know of any attention by White House Officials to leaders of these groups?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am certain there will be some contact with various individuals who want to talk with the Administration about their views.

Q Has this already been arranged?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Not that I know of.

Q Who would you think they would send out to confer with these people -- if they send someone out?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Do you think there is any chance we could see Secretary Rusk before he goes back to Capitol Hill or wherever he goes?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Bill, I don't know.

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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Q Can you make an effort to find out what Chuck Bailey asked: Who else is in the meeting?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am confident that Mr. Rostow and Mr. Bundy are involved in any meetings on the subject.

Q George, you told us about previous meetings being in the Situation Room. Is that the place where this one is being held, too?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know. I will check for you. The meetings have been in the Situation Room, in the Cabinet Room, in the President's office, and in the family dining room.

Q Are there any new developments in the Middle East you can tell us about at this time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q George, you said yesterday that Jordan had agreed to a cease-fire, but you hadn't heard from any other countries. Do we have any other word on a cease-fire?

MR. CHRISTIAN: For your BACKGROUND, the latest information I have is the Jordanian-Israeli cease-fire. I know of nothing else that has developed.

Q George, have we done anything specific to reopen the Canal? Have we requested formally, informally that it be reopened, discussed it with any other maritime countries?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have anything for you on it, Max.

Q Can we look for any news developments here today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: There is always a possibility.

Q George, have we had any discussions with the Israelis, or does this Bundy group have any indication as to what sort of peace terms they have in mind? Have we been in touch with the Israelis on this subject, A, and have they indicated in any way -- so as to put something before this Bundy group to work with -- what their peace terms might be? That is, what their preliminary idea of a peace would be?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. The group has done nothing more than organize yesterday. I don't have anything specific for you on their activities.

Q Have the Israelis communicated to us, as an interested party, what their wishes are?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I can't comment on any communications we have had with other governments involved.

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

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Q How that they have organized, George, can you tell us any more specifically what they are supposed to be doing? I am still confused about it.

MR. CHRISTIAN: I will refer you again to the President's statement of yesterday.

Q We know about the statement. Yesterday there were many questions whether this was short-term or long-term. The answer generally was that we would have to wait and see.

MR. CHRISTIAN: The committee will exist as long as it has a reason to function.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END AT 11:35 A.M. EDT

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

THIS COPY FOR RECORD COPY

NEWS CONFERENCE #867-A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN

4:35 P.M. EDT

JUNE 8, 1967

THURSDAY

MR. CHRISTIAN: On the President's schedule tomorrow:

11:30, Mr. George Meany.

12:30, Secretary Orville Freeman.

1:00, Swearing-in Ceremony for Vicente Ximenes, as a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This will be in the Rose Garden or the East Room.

5:15, Lt. Governor Mark Hogan of Colorado.

Secretary Freeman is going to talk to the President on departmental matters and will present him with a copy of the Department's Policy Document on Conservation.

The call by the Lt. Governor is a courtesy call.

In addition to the schedule given you for today, the President had a lengthy visit with the Vice President.

Q What time, please, sir?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President saw him before and after the luncheon.

Q Can you tell us what it was about?

MR. CHRISTIAN: A general discussion.

Q Are there any plans for travel by the Vice President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know of anything specifically.

Q Is there something involved in this that you haven't told us?

Doesn't the President frequently visit with the Vice President?

MORE

James M. Ennes, Jr. Research Papers

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MR. CHRISTIAN: I just added him to the schedule.

Q Did you find for us about a meeting that was going on? A: the time of the last briefing, you didn't know where it was. Did you ever get there and find out who was there, how long it lasted, and what they talked about?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The meeting with Secretary Rusk concerned the ship incident and the U.N. Security Council resolution.

Q Who was there? You told us about Rostow.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Those I said this morning, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Rostow, the Secretary of State.

Q Was McNamara there?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Can you tell us what the President's feeling was about what you refer to as the "ship incident"?

MR. CHRISTIAN: First, the President talked to the Secretary of State this morning about it, of course. The Secretary of State called in the Ambassador, Mr. Harman, and delivered the protest to him. The Ambassador expressed apologies on behalf of his government. A formal United States protest is also being delivered to the Government of Israel.

Q Can you give us the President's reaction to the decision of the U.A.R. to accept the cease-fire?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President welcomes the statement to the Security Council by the representative of the U.A.R. that the government of that country is agreeable to a cease-fire. Now that the assurance has been given, the President hopes that there will be a prompt cessation of hostilities between the U.A.R. and Israel.

Q George, in the last couple of days there have been Congressional delegations over here under one guise or another. Has there been any contact with them today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President, as you know, has been talking the last two days with Senator Mansfield and has discussed the situation orally with him.

Q In person?

MR. CHRISTIAN: In person. Since this started, the Senator asked the President for an assessment of the present situation which the President has given to the Senator. I will make that available to you, this [illegible]

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Q Assessment of the Middle East situation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Will that be a written statement?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is a letter and I will make copies available to you.

Q When did the Senator get it; today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. He got a letter from the President today which I will make available to you.

Q Was there a Congressional delegation here today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I know that the President has talked to some Congressmen today, but I don't know anything specifically other than this contact with Senator Mansfield.

Q George, could I request -- and I am sure others feel the same way -- that the reproduction process be speeded as much as possible in view of the time element?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q What is your estimate?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I hope very shortly. I will try to get it as soon as I can.

Q George, we have reports from overseas that the hot line between here and Moscow has been used. Can you confirm that, yes or no?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said the other day, there have been a number of exchanges at the highest level between the President and other governments. This has transpired over several weeks' time. I have been informed that the direct teletype link between Washington and Moscow has been used for a number of exchanges during this recent period.

Q Can you tell us when they began; what date?

Q Both ways?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Both ways.

As most of you know, this is not a telephonic communication. It has been commonly called a hot line. It is actually a teletype circuit which became operational on August 30, 1963.

Q Where is this physically located, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is physically located in the White House communications system.

Q The Washington end of it is here?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

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Q Are you sure? Here or at the Pentagon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It is tied into the White House communications system.

Q George, the actual terminal is in the Pentagon, isn't it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I am not advised where the actual terminal is. I was informed that it is part of the White House communications system.

Q George, I believe this is the first time the White House has acknowledged that it has been used. Is this the first time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Messages were sent between these units in Russian and English when it was put into operation in August 30, 1963. Messages were again sent on the anniversary date in 1964. And there have been messages exchanged each New Years in the interval since the unit went into operation.

Q Would it be fair to say this is the first serious use of the line?

Q Or operational use? Other than ceremonial? How is that?

Q Would it be fair to say this is the first use of this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Let me go on and explain a little bit about this line. The transmissions are in both languages. It does permit instantaneous transmission. It is in the language of the sender but, with fast translation, it is, of course, the fastest means of communication.

One reason it was installed, as you will recall, was to prevent misunderstandings or misinterpretations of governmental activities.

The first use during this period was on June 5 when the Soviet Union forwarded messages to this country which were responded to.

Q They initiated this use?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct. The first one was June 5.

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Q When was the response, George?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The same day.

Q Did the message come from Mr. Kosygin?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. This morning, we informed the U.S.S.R. of the ship incident, notified them that we were going in to pick up the survivors in that incident.

Q You are skipping over now to today? In other words, that was the second time it was used?

MR. CHRISTIAN: This is the type of thing it is for.

Q Was there anything in between the [illegible] 5th and today?

MR. CHRISTIAN: There have been several exchanges.

Q Do you know how many?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know how many.

Q George, can you elaborate on our picking up survivors? We sent in other ships to pick them up?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Do you mean the wounded or did the ship sink?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No.

Q Why was it considered necessary to use the hot line?

MR. CHRISTIAN: As I said, the purpose is to prevent misinterpretation.

Q I wondered what they might misinterpret about our picking up survivors from our own ships.

MR. CHRISTIAN: We wanted to inform them that one of our ships had been struck.

Q Were Russian ships in the area at that time?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q You talked about the translation. Would we send a message to Moscow in English?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q But we wouldn't send a Russian translation of it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: They [illegible]

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Q Each translates the others language?

Q Do you have two keyboards, George, so you can use the Cyrillic as well as the Roman?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q I got the idea, from what you said before, that while the primary transmission from here would be in English that from here would also go on each message a translation into Russian.

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is not my understanding of it.

Q Can you tell us any more about the nature of that first message on June 5?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Not specifically. There have been a number of messages during this particular period.

Q Was our first response by the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Have all the messages on the hot line been signed by the heads of state?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't know.

Q Is it fair to assume that all exchanges since June 5 have been on the hot line?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. There are other means of communication besides this. This is only one means of communication.

Q George, from a physical standpoint, as I recall, when they were installed, the Russians sent their sending equipment over here and we sent our equipment to Moscow to match the machines we have here and the letters.

Is the Russian machine in the White House to receive the Soviet language? I am trying to find out whether that machine is here in the White House or over in the Pentagon?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Sid, I do not know the precise details of how the messages are transmitted or from what point. I know that the teletype unit is within the White House communications system.

Q Both receiving and sending, Mr. Christian?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q Was today's message signed by the President?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Did he get a response?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

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Q What is the total number of transmissions we have had since June 5?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't have a precise number.

Q George, can you tell us what time of day the first message came?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No. I think I have told you about all I can tell you about it.

Q George, was this helpful in avoiding misunderstanding and misinterpretation?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I would assess the use of this communication system as an important means of avoiding misinterpretations.

For your BACKGROUND, this morning our aircraft went to the area of the ship --

Q Carrier-based planes?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes. Carrier-based planes went to that area when we learned that the ship had been hit. That is why I mentioned this as one means of avoiding a misunderstanding.

Q So that they would have an idea of knowing why the aircraft was going into that area?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q George, did any of these exchanges deal with the U.A.R. charges that our combat aircraft had participated in the combat?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Phil, as I have told you the one use that I am aware of of the unit, I don't believe it would be proper to specify other types of messages that have gone back and forth.

Q George, do you know how much time is saved by the hot line over normal?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I do not.

Q Do you know if the terminal point in Moscow is the Embassy and whether the Kremlin is hooked in like the White House?

MR. CHRISTIAN: No, the terminal point is not the Embassy. It is the Kremlin.

Q George, you say the President signed today's message and you said there was a response. Was the response signed by Kosygin?

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MR. CHRISTIAN: Frank, I believe the President signed the message today, but I am not positive.

Q But you have established at least on occasion the Prime Minister and the President have signed messages?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is correct.

Q George, has the hot line been used in this situation in a conversational way, that is rather than prepared messages, that the two leaders have talked to each other by the teletype?

I am not quite clear. In other words, I know that in other cases, it is possible for the President to be in communication with people by simply dictating to an operator and receiving the messages back.

MR. CHRISTIAN: This isn't the way it is used.

Q George, did you say this was the first time it had been used in a crisis?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Yes.

Q Was the first message before the hostilities began or after?

Q June 5th?

Q George, has it been used every day this week?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It has been used a number of times.

Q Before this?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It has been used a number of times this week.

Q Mr. Christian, are you saying this is the first time it has been used for serious business since Mr. Johnson has been President or all times since it has been installed?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I have given you all of my knowledge on it.

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You asked this morning about the groups outside. Some of you, I am sure, are already aware of this: Under Secretary of State Katzenbach and Mr. Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, went to the Northwest Entrance and there received Rabbi Norman J. Strizower of the Seaview Jewish Center in Brooklyn. They received petitions from Rabbi Strizower.

Under Secretary Katzenbach said that "even in times of crisis, when so much of the President's time and that of his advisers is devoted to efforts to bring peace in the Middle East, we are always happy to hear the views of our citizens."

At 4 o'clock Under Secretary Katzenbach and Mr. Smith met with Dr. Mohammed T. Mehdi, Secretary-General of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations. He presented a statement to Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Smith. Secretary Katzenbach told him essentially the same thing, that we were always interested in receiving views.

Q What time was the first one?

MR. CHRISTIAN: Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Smith met with the Israeli group at 3:25.

Q At the time we used the hot line this morning, did we know what agency had struck the ship?

George, at the time our message was sent today about this ship, was the possibility open that the damage to the ship could have been caused by the Russians and was it sort of a query to that effect?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The notification of the incident was sent on the initial report of the incident, prior to the time the Israelis advised this government that they had accidentally hit the ship.

Q We didn't know, then, at the time we communicated with the Soviet Union what had caused the incident? Right?

MR. CHRISTIAN: We knew that a ship had been damaged.

Q But, George, we didn't know who had hit it?

MR. CHRISTIAN: At that time the Israelis had not advised us. (NOT 30. HOT LINE WAS [illegible] EATS LEJ LEARNED 15[illegible], HAD ATTACKED AT 11:00.)

Q Had our Navy advised who had hit the ship?

MR. CHRISTIAN: It was prior to the time we had information on what had happened.

Q That leaves the impression we might have thought it was the Russians?

MR. CHRISTIAN: I don't want to leave any impressions. We advised them of the incident, without knowing.

Q Did we inquire of them whether they by any chance were involved, or was it to explain our planes' flight.

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MR. CHRISTIAN: Jim, there was an advisory that something had happened to one of our ships and we were sending our planes in to see what was the trouble.

Q Did we do this because we had scrambled some of our planes off of our carriers and we wanted them to know that we wanted them to protect an American ship that was under attack?

MR. CHRISTIAN: That is the reason.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:03 P.M. EDT

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THE NOTORIOUS PENTHOUSE
ARTICLE BY ANTHONY PEARSON

THIS ARTICLE IS 98% SPECULATIVE AND 95% WRONG, AND SO IS THE BOOK THAT FOLLOWED, BUT THEY GOT A LOT OF ATTENTION

EXCERPTS FROM MCGARVEY AND TORNET.

HOOVER COLLECTION INCLUDES EXCERPTS FROM ABOUT 15 OTHER BOOKS, NOT INCLUDED HERE AS THEY DO NOT ADVANCE THE STORY

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PENTHOUSE

May, 1976

THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. LIBERTY

MAYDAY! MAYDAY!

During the Six-Day War of 1967 a U.S. spy ship was attacked—in international waters and with devastating effect—by Israeli planes and torpedo boats. Although Israel claimed the attack was a mistake and the United States publicly accepted this explanation, both parties knew it was a lie. Here is the true story of what happened on that day—and why it happened.

BY ANTHONY PEARSON

Daybreak of June 8, 1967, was one of those moments when the sunrise came vivid and warm, when there was the smell and the sounds of battle had faded during the very [illegible] of darkness into an almost silent dawn. This was the third morning of the third Arab-Israeli war, which had begun at 7:45 AM on June 5 with the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force by Israeli planes.

By June 8, the war correspondents who had witnessed the dramatic capture of the Old City of Jerusalem and who had followed the Israeli paratroopers against the Jordanian Legion were all beginning to appreciate the efficient tactical and destructive power of Moshe Dayan's warmachine. The battles had been and fought. The Egyptians had completed their warships in the Red Sea to support the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. The Russian Navy had a strong presence in the Mediterranean, but Soviet interference was blocked by the American Sixth Fleet, which had moved closer to the theater of war some two days before the fighting actually began.

Probably the heaviest close-order battles had been fought in the previous two days as the Israelis threw their crack paratroopers against the Jordanian Legion. On June 7 Jerusalem fell and by two o'clock that night, the conquest of Jordan was complete. It was an amazing achievement of arms. We correspondents who had followed the Israeli soldiers through it could only marvel.

There were questions, of course. On June 8, as the Israeli push consolidated the conquest of the West Bank, I wondered, as did many other correspondents, why the Jordanian Legion had continued to fight in what was so clearly a lost cause. At the time, the answer was known only to officials at the highest levels of the Israeli and American governments. The Israelis, of course, were on the scene. The Americans received their information from a communications ship, the U.S.S. Liberty—whose fantastic intelligence-gathering capability was soon to be her undoing.

On the morning of June 8, the Liberty was steaming slowly off the Sinai Peninsula in a calm blue sea. The Liberty was no fighting ship. She was a converted civilian freighter, built in the late 1940's, but faster than most ships of her class (her top capability being eighteen knots), and armed with a complicated system of radio antennae including a "Big Ear" sonar-radio listening device with a clear capability range of over five hundred miles.

On both the forecastle and the deckhouse aft of the bridge she carried two pedestal-mounted .50-caliber Browning machine guns

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guns. Her only defense capability. The Liberty was strictly a communications vessel. To naval buffs she was a ferret. In everyday language she was a spy ship. The Liberty was in fact a super ship of the Pueblo and Banff class, launched by the North Koreans in January 1968.

The Liberty's crew was composed of fifteen officers, 279 men and three civilian technicians from the Department of Defense. Her captain, Commander William L. McGonagle, forty-one years old and a member of a large Mannish family from Wichita, Kansas, was privy to exactly as much information as any of the ship's crew as to the ship's real mission. He was directly responsible to the Pentagon's Section 5 with Fleet Headquarters and the Comsix Command, but communications outside regular naval channels were not in his jurisdiction. Certain sections of the Liberty were off limits to the entire crew, including the captain. These were the communications areas situated below decks at the center of the Liberty's waterline. They housed intricate computers and decoding and listening devices manned by linguistic experts and other personnel who could be changed according to the ship's mission. All this was under the direct control of one of the Pentagon technicians who had joined the ship at Rota in Spain. He was known to the crewmen simply as the "Major."

The Major was in his mid-forties, tall and dark, with a receding hairline and a New Jersey accent. As he climbed aboard at Rota, he was wearing civilian clothes, and although he subsequently wore khaki drill and fatigues they never carried rank insignia.

The Liberty had left Norfolk, Virginia in November 1966 on her fourth tour of duty as a ferret. Immediately prior to this Mideast assignment, she had been off the Nigerian coast monitoring the events that were to lead to the bloody conflict over Biafran secession. In May 1967 the Nigerian Federation had broken. The CIA, which was already deeply involved in the Congo and later, when the fighting began in earnest in July, took a prominent though covert part in supporting the Biafran breakaways, had ordered the Liberty to an African station to assess developments needed for the purposes of future policy. By the end of that mission had been a total success. The Liberty was then reassigned to the Mideast with orders to refuel and take on provisions at Rota and accept some new personnel—who were all replacements in the communications staff. The Liberty's African experts and linguists were traded for Arab and Israeli ones.

Leaving Rota on June 2, the ship's orders were to hasten with all possible speed to a Mideast operational area designated as "north of the Sinai Peninsula."

Steaming through continuous twenty-four hour watches along the direct North African coastal route, Commander McGonagle had the Liberty within communications range by the early hours of June 5. On June 8 they passed Gaza. It was a hazy, overcast day and they could clearly see the minarets of the mosques at El Arish. The sea was calm and the sky blue and empty [illegible] but otherwise there were no signs of the war [illegible].

After mooring inshore the Liberty was in a modified condition of readiness three. This was an normal state during operations [illegible] the ship's regular steaming watch plus one man on the forward machine guns and bridge lookouts ready to [illegible].

[illegible] reached the eastern boundary of the operations area and [illegible] course. She was completing this turn when a single [illegible] at [illegible] miles astern circled the ship and flew away toward the mainland. The plane made no signal to the ship and the ship no signal to the plane. A normal-sized American or Soviet warfleet was flying from the mainmast on the ensign staff. The name of the ship was painted large and clear on her stern, and she had large U.S. Navy letters and numbers on the bow.

The Liberty was moving at [illegible] knots—an average cruising speed for a civilian freighter but slow for a noncombatant naval vessel in a war zone. Thus it was not [illegible] that some hours later—at 10:56 A.M.—[illegible] aircraft twice again circled the ship, being joined the second time by a slower propeller plane.

During the observation the Liberty's speed had been cut to five knots to allow closer and careful monitoring operations and radar readings, and she continued at that speed for the rest of the morning. No more planes were sighted. The blue sky remained quite empty.

From 1:10 until 1:48 P.M. the ship's crew engaged in routine procedures. There was no reason for McGonagle to place his men on combat alert.

The ship's officers had seen the planes and remarked on them, but they had failed to identify them through their glasses. Some of the deck crew had waved to them. In a war zone it is not unusual for reconnaissance aircraft to observe and study a ship, especially a foreign naval vessel. On the other hand, McGonagle understood that the mission of his ship was certainly not neutral and he could encounter some risk—most probably from Egyptian MIG's, if any remained. He thought about it for a moment, shrugged off any sense of alarm, and went below for coffee.

Sitting in the wardroom with the ship's doctor, Marine Corps Lieutenant Richard F. Kiepfer of Brooklyn, New York, McGonagle sipped his coffee and didn't think too hard about the morning and the previous two days because they were not really his problem. He was a sailor. The men down below—the "Major"—was the analyst and the intelligence expert. The Major had mentioned briefly to McGonagle that [illegible] the naval flag [illegible] afternoon [illegible] but he hadn't given it much thought.

The officers of the [illegible] the war in the wardroom. They knew that Egypt's President Nasser had [illegible] the Straits of Tiran on May 22 while the ship was still down off Nigeria. They knew that Egyptian troops had been [illegible]. And they realized the confrontation [illegible] had forced could only have ended in war.

McGonagle was slightly [illegible] about the naval surveillance of the [illegible] had rightly assumed [illegible] Israeli [illegible] Air Force [illegible] fully worked out a code [illegible] the Major in the event that the ship should be challenged by [illegible]. They would know that the Liberty was [illegible] Soviet radar systems used by the Egyptians.

The captain had also detected [illegible] orders to base but since none had been [illegible] he assumed the ship to remain at [illegible] assigned station until the appearance [illegible] withdrew. Whatever it was, that word had already been sent.

On the bridge the deck officer, McGonagle's second, Lieutenant Commander Philip Armstrong of Norfolk, Virginia, was just fixing Liberty's position by radar when one of the lookouts reported that the unidentified aircraft had been sighted in the vicinity and were turning to attack the ship. Armstrong swung to starboard and picked up the planes through his binoculars. He thought they were of the same type as those that had circled the ship earlier in the morning, but he was mistaken. The reconnaissance planes had been small Mirages of the Israeli Air Force. But these were Mirages, the fast Dassault French fighters that had wiped out the Egyptian Air Force three days earlier. There were three of them now and they were coming in fast and straight in an attack pattern.

Suddenly there was a loud explosion and the ship shook terribly. Inside the communications room the electronic equipment sparked and flashed on and off quickly. At that moment, the men in the crew quarters were being reassigned after the general assembly drill. Seaman Fred Kerner of Scranton, New Jersey, was partially thrown off his feet by the blast. "Jesus, the boiler room's gone!" he shouted. He ran toward the companion ladder with the others. Someone else was shouting that the boiler had blown up. Captain McGonagle leapt up the steps from the wardroom.

The captain and his men poured out into the sunshine. Some of the men who only minutes before had been standing on the open deck, working and laughing, were lying strangely still or crawling around crying and bleeding. From overhead, very close, almost right above the ship's stack, came the whine of jets and the pum-pum-pum! of gunfire. The decks splintered under the impact of heavy caliber bullets.

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Then there were more explosions and the crash of falling superstructure.

Richard L. Weaver, a seaman, yelled that another jet was coming in and ran for cover inside the bulkhead. The gunfire forced him and several others flat onto the deck. Flying from its impact hit him squarely on the stomach. Hensley gained his composure, his feet and tried to walk. Fleet Hunter helped him down the steps to the sick bay. The deck was a confused mass of men and wreckage. Condemned, wounded and unwounded lay in the shattered superstructure. As the jets whined in, guns rattling and [illegible] the 450-foot [illegible]

Running to the [illegible] Lieutenant Stephen [illegible] the starboard side [illegible] the strafing planes. [illegible] Tom the son of Admiral [illegible] taking position. He ran [illegible] a rocket that wrecked the forward [illegible] quarter and the lookout position. Tom died instantly.

McGonagle ordered Lieutenant Armstrong to jettison two blazing five-gallon cans of gasoline over the starboard side of the ship. Armstrong ran toward the cans yelling to Lieutenant Jim O'Connor to follow and help him. Just as they reached the companion ladder from the bridge an explosion rocked the starboard quarter and blew the officers off their feet. O'Connor was wounded. Armstrong killed.

Captain McGonagle was shaken but he stayed on his feet. He gave the order for maximum speed. Then he shouted to Lieutenant Maurice Bennett of Pittsburgh to report to the Chief of Naval Operations via the high-command radio circuit that the Liberty was under attack from unidentified jets and immediate assistance was required. It was 2:10 P.M. At the same time, McGonagle decided to broadcast an open-channel Mayday distress call. He was [illegible] about his communications capability for the jets were pounding his antennae. Their attack was precisely planned—accurate and designed to sever [illegible] all the ship's channels within minutes. Perhaps it was the Liberty's first lucky break that the open-channel message got through to the Sixth Fleet and the Little Rock: "Mayday! Mayday! Am under attack from jet aircraft. [illegible] assistance required." The [illegible] the rockets and the machine guns had silenced the radio.

For the next five or six minutes, the Mirages made [illegible] attacks on the ship, hitting her with more rockets and strafing her with heavy cannon fire. (A later count was to show 821 separate hits on the ship's hull and superstructure.) There seemed to be at least three aircraft, but the speed of the attack and its fury left the crewmen and officers too confused to make an accurate count. A naval court of inquiry later found that, "In five or six attacks from various angles two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket, and incendiary attacks."

Down in the communications room the men were concentrating on the [illegible] scanner still operating. It had picked up three boats moving at high speed toward the Liberty and a report was sent up to the bridge just before the explosion that knocked Lieutenant Armstrong across the starboard side. The captain was approaching this report when there was another explosion and shrapnel ripped through his right leg.

"It almost knocked off my feet," he said later. "I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit. But my reflexes did not appear to be of any consequence [illegible] guns on my [illegible] I decided [illegible] that [illegible] knowledge and [illegible] that was the biggest pain. I gave no further consideration to these minor matters."

At the moment McGonagle had already ignored his Congressional Medal of Honor. Badly wounded, but determined to fight, he refused to leave the bridge and the control of his ship. It was now 2:26 P.M.

Still gripping his pain, McGonagle heard the lookouts report that three high-speed motor torpedo boats (MTB's) were approaching from the northeast—on the ship's starboard quarter. They were [illegible] for the Liberty in triangular formation at an estimated speed of from twenty-seven to thirty knots, coming like hell and in attack formation.

The captain ordered a turn to the forward starboard machine gun to bring the boats under fire. He told the men close to him to pass the word: Stand by for torpedo attack.

Concentrating hard between flashes of pain, [illegible] under McGonagle carefully [illegible] his course. He decided to hold steady, allowing the ship to port would bring it closer to land, while moving seaward would bring it broadside to the attackers and give them a better target. He also noticed that the flag halyard had been shot down, and he told a signalman to hoist the ceremonial ensign from the yardarm. This ensign, seven by thirteen feet, was the largest flag aboard.

The men on the ship watched the approaching MTB's, and knew there was little they could do but pray. The Browning machine guns could never hold off a determined attack, and three MTB's maneuvering in unison together could send the Liberty straight to the bottom of the Mediterranean.

Now the boats were less than a mile away and the one in the center was seen to be flashing a signal light. Because of smoke and flames billowing off his starboard bridge wing, Commander McGonagle was unable to read the signal. Staring hard through the smoke, he saw what he believed to be an Israeli flag. But he wasn't absolutely certain.

The Liberty's starboard signal light had been knocked out during the air attack, so McGonagle now tried to signal with a hand-held Aldis lamp, hoping that it might be seen through the smoke but knowing that it was hardly powerful enough. The torpedo boats kept on coming, and the starboard machine gun on the [illegible] starboard opened fire. The gunners got off [illegible] long bursts before [illegible] cannon fire from the MTB's. At the same time, the after machine gun opened up. This was a weird, ghostly action—the gunner was dead and flames had ignited the magazine belt. The gun was firing on its own—a firing that only stopped when the belt was spent.

The Liberty was under heavy fire from the MTB's. One of their officers, [illegible] lieutenant Francis Brown [illegible] Brown felt McGonagle [illegible] passing astern of the ship at [illegible] five yards from it. [illegible] At 2:35 P.M. another torpedo struck on the starboard side [illegible] forward of the bridge and a [illegible] below the [illegible]. The ship [illegible] under the impact of the explosion. [illegible] had torn a hole in its side [illegible] from just above the waterline [illegible] the turn of the bilge. The hole [illegible] shaped like a teardrop and was [illegible] feet across at its widest point. The torpedo had hit the communications room almost dead center and this single blast was responsible for twenty-five of the final death toll of thirty-four. (According to survivors, the Major was one of those who was killed in the explosion. He had been reported on the ship's list as one of the three civilian technical experts. The only civilian fatality to appear on the final casualty list was Allen M. Blue, a "communications specialist.")

The Liberty immediately took a ninety-degree list to starboard. Power and steering were lost. She came to a dead stop and lay crippled in the oily sea, waiting for the death blow. It was now 2:36 P.M.

As the Liberty stopped, the MTB's also stopped, less than half a mile astern. McGonagle watched them through his glasses. He expected a torpedo. But he saw only a lamp flashing out. Do you need assistance? Being unable to signal by lamp, McGonagle ordered a signalman to hoist the international sign for "not under control." The MTB's made no answer but continued to drift silently along with the Liberty.

Half an hour later, two helicopters bearing Star of David markings approached and circled the ship several times. Someone shouted through a loudspeaker that they carried medical orderlies and a military attaché from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv on board. McGonagle limped onto the open part of the bridge. "Go to hell!" he yelled. The helicopter voice shouted again, and McGonagle yelled back. "I told you to go to hell! You're not coming on my ship. Go to hell, you bastard!" The helicopters turned away.

Inside the Liberty's shattered hull the damage crew raced to patch up holes and the engineers worked fast to restore power. By 3:19 P.M. they had the engines turn-

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ing but they still couldn't fix the steering gear. McGonagle was determined to take his ship home, so he put some men in the after steering compartment to take rudder orders by telephone from the bridge that the ship could be hand-steered. Slowly the Liberty began to limp westward. At 4:15 a pair of Mirages circled the Liberty but made no further attempts to press an attack. The men on the ship didn't know the reason, but the Mayday message had gotten through to the carriers Saratoga and America six hundred miles to the northwest, and two flights of four aircraft each had been launched to [illegible] the Israeli planes and MTBs. The Israelis had monitored the transmission and had pulled back while there was still time to make the only excuse possible—error. Mistaken identity.

By four o'clock Commander McGonagle's wounds were giving him severe pain and he was suffering from loss of blood. He lay on the deck on a tourniquet was applied high on his thigh. He wouldn't rest, he said, until his ship was safe.

At 6:45 an Israeli helicopter again appeared and hovered over the ship. Someone attempted to lower himself by ladder to the deck, but McGonagle signaled that he should stop. Ten minutes later a calling card was dropped from the helicopter. It carried the name of a U.S. naval attaché with the American embassy in Tel Aviv. A message on the back read, "Have you any casualties?" Since there were at least three bodies still lying in full view of the helicopter, McGonagle made no further attempt to answer and gestured for the helicopter to leave. As the sun set just after seven o'clock, the helicopter turned back toward the land.

Lieutenant Kiepler had ordered McGonagle to go below to the sick bay, but he didn't insist in the face of the captain's violent determination to remain in command. Of McGonagle, Kiepler later said, "The commanding officer . . . was like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves. To know that he was grievously wounded, yet having to conn and helm the ship through the night, calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men, 'We're going to live.' When I went to the bridge and saw this, I should say that I knew I could only insult this man by insisting that he be taken below for the treatment of his wounds."

When he felt faint, McGonagle lay on the deck of the bridge wing with his leg propped high and continued to conn the ship, sometimes by watching her white-water wake in the darkness. In this way, he steered the Liberty through the night—determined at all costs to get her home.

Inside the ship, Dr. Kiepler, aided by two corpsmen but having himself to bear the weight of medical responsibility, was in a struggle for twenty-eight continuous hours with a flood of seriously injured men. In a heat of battle, he had been able to do little more than give first aid. But now bleeding was stopped, men were given morphine and treated for shock, lung wounds were treated to ease breathing, and one blood transfusion after another was carried out.

Whenever the doctor needed one volunteer, he would have ten. If anything was asked, hands went up everywhere. If Kiepler asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, he would find some wounded man on an adjoining table saying, "Hey, doc! If you need some, I have that type."

Whatever else the bullets, rockets, and torpedos had accomplished, they hadn't broken the spirit of the little ship. Miraculously, the Liberty was alive and limping home, burned and broken but still afloat, her engines still running.

On June 14, escorted by the destroyer U.S.S. David and a Sixth Fleet tug, Liberty arrived in Malta under her own power. It had been her final mission, and that mission had been accomplished with honor, even if its cause of necessity may have been questioned. McGonagle and his men had followed their orders and they had brought their ship home. No one could ask or expect more. Their war was over.

Between June 11 and 17, a naval court of inquiry convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, conducted classified hearings in London and aboard the Liberty at Malta. Rear Admiral I.B. Kidd was president of a court that consisted of himself and Captains Bernard J. Lauff and Bert M. Atkinson of Admiral McCain's headquarters. The court's findings were presented to Admiral McCain and approved by him on June 18, 1967.

These findings were: "From the time of the first attack onward, attackers were well-coordinated, accurate and determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams and quarters effectively chewed up the entire top-side including ship control and internal communications-sound powered-phone-work. Well-directed initial air attacks wiped out the ability of the four .50-caliber machine guns to be effective."

The Israelis had officially announced that it was a mistake. They apologized. Soon after the attack, one of the crew of the MTB's, a reservist sailor called Micha Lumor, was produced in Tel Aviv to give his account of the incident to journalists. He graphically described how his boat had attacked a ship "with high mast and weird antennae," and how they were sure it was the "enemy" until in the very last moments of the attack, a rubber Mecrafi with the lettering "U.S. Navy" on its side had

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dropped into the water. Then the helicopters came over and signaled to the torpedo boats, 'They are raising the American flag!'

"It was crystal clear that we had hit friends," Lenor said. He then went on to describe how his boat had tried to approach the *Liberty* to offer assistance and how an officer had appeared on the bridge for the first time and screamed, 'Go to hell!'

"Realizing they would not accept aid, we left," Lenor said.

To support this explanation based on mistaken identity, the Israelis said that the *Liberty* had been mistaken for an Egyptian supply ship called *El Quseir*. The Navy court of inquiry found: 'While *El Quseir* bears a highly superficial resemblance to *Liberty*, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. *El Quseir* is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antennae array and distinctive hull marking of the *Liberty*. The location of the superstructure island, a primary feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria as a justification for attack, any ship resembling *El Quseir* was in jeopardy.' In other words, the Navy found that the Israelis could have attacked any merchant ship on the same pretext. The court of inquiry returned a final verdict that accepted Israel's apology for attack but did not accept her explanation.

In mid-July, the U.S.S. *Liberty* returned home. She was laid up in the yard at Norfolk for a while, then turned over to the Department of Commerce and shunted into their derelicts fleet. Last year, she was finally sold for scrap and broken up. It was the symbolic end of an incident that many parties in Washington wished to forget. But forgetting hadn't been easy. Voices had to be silenced in the Senate and questions dismissed in secret congressional hearings. The military were bound by security regulations. But the question remained: *why had the Liberty been attacked?*

To find the answer, one must look back nine years, to May 1967. Then, in the month when the Mideast political pot, which had been simmering for so long, finally boiled over.

On May 22, 1967, Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran, the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea. This waterway was the gateway to strategically vital Israeli port Eilat. The State Department and the Pentagon had mixed feelings about the blockade business. Since President Kennedy assassination, the White House had moved firmly away from an early 1960's policy of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation. Lyndon Johnson had poor personal relations with Nasser, and the State Department was suffering from severe anxiety over the increased Soviet presence in the Mideast and support of Egypt, plus pressures to provide greater American support for Israel. These pressures were being brought to bear on the Johnson administration by such staunch friends of Israel as U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, presidential adviser Walt Rostow, and his brother, Eugene Rostow, in the State Department.

Walt Rostow was the most influential of this trio. His appointment as Special Adviser to the President on National Security had taken effect just one year before the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Like Johnson, he believed that the major problem of the moment, Vietnam, could only be solved by total American victory, and his views on the Israeli position in the Mideast conflict were similar. He constantly suggested to Johnson that America's policy toward Israel should directly balance Russia's support of the Arabs. Rostow's views had strong support from the American security agencies.

For two years, the CIA had been deeply committed to reshaping events in the Mideast to suit a whole new State Department policy calling for a reduction of Soviet influence in the area, the discouragement of leftist nationalism, and the reinstatement of American influence.

Richard Helms, the CIA chief, was still pursuing a policy of over ten years standing that allowed for all intelligence operations inside Israel to be conducted through Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency). There was no CIA station chief in Tel Aviv and officers working under cover in the American Embassy there acted in full consort with officers of Israeli intelligence—each side supposedly having total access to the information of the other.

The man behind this cooperative plan was James Angleton, head of CIA counterintelligence, who had set up strong ties with the Israelis in the late 1950's to "wring the future Anglo-Israeli attack on the Suez canal. As part of the plan, Angleton planned supply Israel with technical assistance for developing nuclear weapons [as reported by Tad Szulc in the August 1975 issue of *Penthouse*]. His partner and opposite number in Mossad was Ephraim "Eppy" Evron. In 1967 Evron was Deputy Israeli Ambassador to Washington. He had previously been one of the main conspirators in a plot to sabotage the growth of American detente with Egypt in December 1954. This was an operation planned by Mossad to blow up the American Embassy in Cairo and blame the attack on Egyptian nationalists. The mission fouled up. Nine Israeli agents were captured while laying the charges and brought to trial for sabotage by the Egyptians. Two were executed. A scandal followed in Tel Aviv; the Minister of Defense, Pinhas Lavon, resigned and Eppy Evron disappeared. In fact, he didn't make a prominent appearance again until May 1967, when Washington reporters noticed that he was involved in a lot of activity with the State Department and the White House and seemed to have greater significance at the Israeli Embassy than his chief, Avraham Harman, in the overall Israeli power structure. Evron was more important than Harman and his presence in Washington as a spokesman to both the administration and the CIA for Israeli intelligence made him a vital link in a complex plan to overthrow Nasser.

Ever since the attack on the Suez Canal in 1956, Nasser had been increasingly leaning toward Moscow and also attempting to establish himself as the cornerstone of an emergent Third World. His influence in the Arab world—his charisma as a leader and his complete command of the most populous and politically significant Arab country—made him particularly dangerous to both the West and his own neighbors. The latter felt that Nasser's anarchy was ultimately a greater threat than Israeli expansion.

In 1965, after President Nasser had exposed an illegal American arms deal to Israel, James Angleton conducted a number of meetings with Mossad officers to decide how and when to get rid of Nasser.

It was impossible to overthrow the president within Egypt by any sort of coup. Egyptian charisma had to be undermined and his popular support destroyed. Nasser's constant and increasing threats against Israel and his assurances to his people that the Israeli menace would be defeated suggested to the CIA that an Egyptian loss of face could be achieved by calling Nasser's bluff—by actually making him confront Israel. The violently anti-Israel threats made from Cairo by Ahmed Shukeiry, the leader of the newly formed PLO, had laid the base for a decisive Israeli-Arab confrontation. Shukeiry promised the razing of Tel Aviv and the massacre of the Jews in Palestine. He had Nasser's full support.

At a series of secret meetings in Tel Aviv and Washington between CIA officers, the Israeli General Staff, selected Israeli politicians, and inner members of the Johnson administration it was decided to promote a contained war between Israel and Egypt—a war that would not affect the territorial lines between Israel and Syria and Jordan.

The plan was organized in Israel by a group that included Yigal Allon (Israel's present labor minister), Intelligence Chief Meir Amit, Aharon Yariv (head of army intelligence), Shimon Peres (deputy minister of defense), Ezer Weizman (head of army operations), Air Force Chief Mordecai Hod, David Hacohen (head of the Knesset Committee for Foreign and Security Affairs), and Moshe Dayan, who soon would be minister of defense. Their liaison officer in Washington was Eppy Evron, who dealt directly with Angleton at the CIA and Eugene Rostow at the State Department.

In principle, they agreed that the situation of an increasing hardline by Nasser combined with the Soviet buildup in Egypt and Syria should be exploited to rouse maximum public opinion for war, and that the Israeli Army should be placed on full alert to induce action by either Damascus

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or Cairo. In these circumstances, the Knesset would have to give its approval for war. And when this war was launched—the Israelis assured the Americans—it would be fought to a predesigned American plan of containment.

The plan of containment was important. It was designed to maintain relations with the anti-Nasserite Arabs, principally with King Hussein and King Feisal, while exploiting their strong feelings against Arab nationalism. The guts of the plan were outlined to Hussein by CIA officers in Amman and it was left to him to decide how he would act.

Hussein was immediately placed in a dilemma. Although he was suspicious of American motives, he was in a very precarious position. If the Nasserite movement continued to gain strength and improve its ties with Syria and Iraq, then Hussein might well be overthrown by a coup. That would end the Hashemite rule in Jordan that the king was pledged to support to the death, just as the revolution in Iraq had destroyed the Hashemites there. Egypt and Syria were as much his enemies as the Israelis. In fact, they were calling not only for the overthrow of the American-Israeli conspiracy but also for the downfall of the Arab "reactionary states." Nasser had refused to call a meeting of the Defense Council of the Arab League on the grounds that "Egypt is not prepared to reveal her military secrets to governments in the pay of the CIA and British intelligence services."

Reluctantly, Hussein bowed to the inevitable and accepted an assurance from the U.S. Department of State that in return for his cooperation in helping to reshape and influence Arab policy in favor of the West after the forthcoming war, there would be no Israeli conquest of any of his territory—even if Jordan were forced into military confrontation with the Israelis in order to keep face with the other Arabs. His decision was passed through the American Embassy in Amman to Washington.

Hussein now had to find some way of pulling himself inside the Arab fold before fighting started, and Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the troop movements that followed gave him just the chance he needed. As the Arab press agitated for war, Hussein arrived in Cairo with his prime minister for a meeting with Nasser. This was May 30, and that evening a defense pact was signed between Jordan and Egypt, each pledging support to the other in the event of war with Israel.

The same day, Robert Anderson, an American special envoy, was sent to Cairo to talk with Nasser. He met the Egyptian president on June 1 and succeeded in persuading him to consider an option of defense with the United States. As a gesture of goodwill, Nasser said he would send his deputy, Zacharia Moheddin, to Washington on June 5. This message was transmitted to Washington and within two hours of its receipt by the State Department the Israeli secret service knew every detail of it. That same day—June 1—the Israeli Knesset gave a majority vote for war and Moshe Dayan was appointed Minister of Defense.

The Israeli-CIA plan for war had aimed at an initial strike date in the second week in June. And the U.S.S. Liberty had been dispatched by the CIA to arrive at Sinai before planned hostilities began—in order to make certain that the Israelis didn't overstep the objectives of the containment plan.

In making their preemptive strike on June 5, the very day Moheddin was due to leave for Washington, the Israelis destroyed any possibility of U.S.-Egyptian detente. They had kept their plans totally secret to prevent any American interference.

Right up to the moment of attack, Eppy Evron was assuring his Washington contacts that Israeli troop movements were simply a precautionary measure against the buildup of Arab troops. Since the only American intelligence from Israel was through Mossad, Evron believed he could tell the American government anything he liked. He didn't know about the Liberty and her mission.

Thus, as war began, the listening devices on the Liberty were tuned to transmissions from both the Arabs and Israelis.

COMING IN THE JUNE PENTHOUSE
ON YOUR NEWSSTAND MAY 11
THE LIBERTY COVER UP

James M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

With radar monitoring it was possible to carefully map the movements and positions of troops, armor and aircraft, showing the true progress of battle. All this information was being transmitted in full to the National Security Agency in Washington. Selected parts were also passed to the United Nations in New York.

It was clear to the observers on the Liberty that the decoding capabilities of the Arabs had failed to crack Israeli codes. But the Israelis had penetrated Egyptian and Jordanian codes from the moment the war began. There was nothing really unusual about this. It was good intelligence management by the Israelis and caused no surprise or alarm on board the Liberty—except for several exchanges between King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser of Egypt. These concerned the strategy and progress of the Arab allies. To the Liberty they were clear enough but to the Arabs they were totally misleading. Somewhere between Amman and Cairo, in a relay station in Syria, the messages were being blocked by the Israelis, then reconstructed and passed on so swiftly and effectively that there was no apparent break. In the language of intelligence this type of interference is called "cooking."

The first batch of these messages transmitted from Cairo advised Hussein of a bad military situation on the Egyptian front. The Israelis blocked these and reworded them, to misinform the king that three-quarters of the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed over Cairo and that the 300-plus aircraft he was now picking up on radar approaching Jordan were Egyptian jets raiding targets in Israel. (They were of course, really Israeli aircraft returning from the destruction of Nasser's airfields.) These false messages encouraged Hussein to abandon a prearranged plan for fighting a defensive war and set his Jordanian Legion on the offensive.

Throughout the first day of fighting the Israelis continued to cook messages in order to give both sides the impression that the war was going favorably for the Arabs. There was no chance of the plan going wrong, because Nasser had broken off diplomatic relations with Syria (over an allegation of sabotage by the Syrian Secret service) a week before the Israelis attacked and the only communication with Damascus was Israeli interference with messages between Cairo and Damascus. It was necessary because the Syrians, although apprised of the bad situation in Egypt, were also being told their flanks were still covered by the Jordanians. This encouraged them to withdraw troops from the Golan toward Damascus, in order to cover the road from Amman as a second line to the Jordanian Army.

Another group of "cooked" transmissions on June 6 and 7 falsely informed Hussein that the Egyptians were counterattacking in Sinai and needed support from Jordan in the form of an attack against the Israeli positions in the Mediterranean area. To make this attack, Hussein had to withdraw his forces from a planned offensive that had been designed to cut Israel in two. The Egyptians were also misled into believing the Jordanians were making a successful attack in Hebron, and they in turn counterattacked during the early hours of June 6 and ignored a United Nations call for a cease-fire. The Israelis gained enough time from this to enable them to capture all the Jordanian territory they needed, to finish off the Egyptians in Sinai, and to move their troops right up to the east bank of Suez—commanding the Canal.

In Washington on the evening of June 7 Abraham Harman, the Israeli ambassador, had been called to the State Department and told by Eugene Rostow that the Israeli attack on Jordan and Egypt had to stop immediately and that no move was to be made against the Syrians on the Golan. A cease-fire was being implemented at the request of the Arabs by the U.N.

Harman argued his country was acting against Arab aggression. But Rostow told him the Americans knew that Hussein had been encouraged to fight beyond the containment plan by a deliberate "cooking" of his communications. No mention was made by Rostow of the Liberty. At that hours later in Tel Aviv orders were passed from the offices of the Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Air Force to undertake a surveillance of an American communications ship operating off the Sinai coast. Then, four hours after the surveillance orders, at 1:30 P.M. Tel Aviv time, further orders were issued from the same sources to attack and sink the ship (Israeli officials, however, say that no written orders were ever issued). Aircraft were called upon to knock out all communications capabilities in the first strike. Subsequent strikes would completely immobilize the ship preparatory to final torpedo runs from MTB's. It was imperative that the ship be destroyed.

For the Israelis, Liberty was an unknown factor. On June 8 Israel was still three days away from her final objectives. It was possible that drastic measures might have to be taken at any time. The Israeli leaders were afraid that the continued presence of the Liberty off Sinai, monitoring their activities for both the U.S. government and the United Nations, might wreck their plans. If the ship was sunk with all hands, the attack would be blamed on the Egyptians, or perhaps on Russian fighters from a Soviet fleet carrier. It would also serve the purpose of involving the Americans directly and commanding them totally to Israel's side. It was a daring plan—a vicious plan—but certainly well-coordinated and well-executed. It seems surprising that it failed. Everything seemed stacked against the *Liberty*.

An hour before the first Israeli air surveillance, U.S. Navy intelligence reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Israeli monitors had broken into the Liberty's coding banks, deciphered her codes, and had transmitted a warning to Israeli military intelligence headquarters. The Americans were informed that the Israelis were reacting badly and might possibly take some sort of action against the ship.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately ordered a message transmitted to the Liberty warning her to withdraw to the Sixth Fleet at once. This message was rated by navy intelligence as "pinnacle" which meant that it had highest priority. It was to be sent through a CIA receiving and transmitting station in Asmara, Ethiopia. The message was lured to receiving mistakenly station (She transmitted [illegible] Washington via another CIA base at Naples.)

As the pinnacle message left Washington it became the first of two remarkable communications which, if indeed they were errors, [illegible] should have received [illegible] 9:00 A.M. ship's time Sunday, June 9. The message was misrouted to Subic Bay in the Philippines and arrived [illegible] hours later at the National Security Agency at Fort Meade where it was filed away in a desk drawer and seemingly forgotten.

Within two hours, a second message to the Liberty was "misrouted." This one was dispatched from the Sixth Fleet Commander aboard the U.S.S. *Little Rock* advising McGonagle of his dangerous position and ordering him to withdraw. It was a back-up message to the "pinnacle" sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it left the *Little Rock* at 11:17 A.M., again for Asmara. This message was misrouted via a CIA installation in Morocco. It, too, ended up back at Fort Meade.

The third and final message lost in the strange tangle of confused misroutings left the Liberty for the *Little Rock* via Naples, advising the Sixth Fleet Commander of the extent of the attack then taking place. This was "pinnacle" and was sent by the Liberty at 2:10 P.M.—only seconds before her communications went out. It finally arrived at Fort Meade with the others, many hours later via Subic.

In fact, the only message received that day was the open-channel Mayday sent immediately after the coded "pinnacle" to the *Little Rock*.

The Navy has never satisfactorily explained how three messages of such vital importance, rated red-urgent and sent via the "pinnacle" code route, could all have been misrouted. The vague explanation was "bad management." Soon after the attack on the Liberty, one naval statement announced that it had taken place because of "misplaced communications." No known official naval inquiry into the communications incident ever took place. In fact, the strangest part of the whole Liberty affair has increasingly seemed the United States government's anxiety to excuse and cover up an attack on one of its own ships. Other

Next month: The Cover-up.

James S.M. Ennes Jr. Research Papers

PENTHOUSE

June, 1976

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

Although thirty-four Americans were killed when Israel attacked an unarmed U.S. ship in 1967, our government had left itself no choice but to help the Israelis cover the entire matter under the rug



Of course, remaining silent on vital issues is often what our political leaders do best. In *Conspiracy of Silence* (illustrated by Phil Hays), Anthony Pearson continues his controversial story of the Liberty—an American spy ship that was suddenly and deliberately attacked by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. Even though 164 Americans were wounded and thirty-four Americans were killed, our government aided and abetted Israel in sweeping the real facts about the Liberty under the carpet. Even when the Israeli government censored the Liberty captain's receipt of the Congressional Medal of Honor, nobody spoke up. The motives behind the American-Israeli obfuscation of the Liberty incident were uncovered by Pearson in the course of his investigation for *Penthouse*. And these unconscionable motives delineate one more appalling example of high government officials who worry more about their public images than about the real issues involving this nation's security—or even, as in the case of the Liberty, about the lives of those thirty-four brave Americans.

June 8, 1967 was the fourth day of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. By that morning Jerusalem had fallen and Jordan was conquered. Israeli Mirages were masters of the air. The Egyptian air force had been destroyed in the early morning of the first combat day. Israel had been victorious within the first few hours. Now, on the fourth day, only Syria remained to be taken.

But the Arabs had not been the only targets. On the afternoon of June 8, an American spy ship, the U.S.S. *Liberty*, was hit in a coordinated raid by Israeli planes and torpedo boats. Thirty-four Americans were killed, and 164 were injured—including the captain, William L. McGonagle. The reasons for this attack were never fully explained. The Israelis claimed that it was an error, and the U.S. government accepted that explanation. But, as *Penthouse* reported last month, the attack was deliberate and both governments knew so at the time.

The *Liberty*, which was furnished with extremely sophisticated intelligence equipment, had been monitoring Arab and Israeli transmissions from her post off Gaza. Thus the communications experts on board had discovered that the Israelis were intercepting messages between the Arab leaders and then changing them and retransmitting them—a procedure known as "cooking." These cooked messages led King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser of Egypt to believe that the war was actually going well for the Arabs and encouraged them to continue fighting. This ploy gave Israel the time it needed to consolidate its growing victory. It allowed the Israelis to destroy the combined Arab armies and seize Arab territory.

BY ANTHONY PEARSON

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What no one knew—except those at the highest levels of the Israeli and American governments—was that Israel was violating a predetermined plan formulated by the CIA. Top officials of the Johnson administration, the Israeli General Staff and leading Israeli politicians, according to this plan, Israel should have fought a confirmed war with the Arabs—which would not have affected the territorial lines between Israel and Syria and Jordan. But the Liberty had discovered Israel's violation of this scheme, and on the evening of June 8 the Israeli ambassador in Washington was told that the attacks had to stop. Eight hours later orders were given in Tel Aviv to destroy the ship.

The attack would have been totally successful if it failed only because a Mayday distress call from the Liberty had reached the Sixth Fleet, six hundred miles to the northwest. Two flights of four jet fighters were immediately launched to save the ship. The Israelis intercepted the calls and pulled back while there was still time to make the only possible excuse—error and mistaken identity.

On June 14 the Liberty limped into the harbor of Valletta, Malta. Dockworkers counting 821 rocket, cannon, and bullet holes marveled that the ship still lived.

An inquiry court probing the attack had already been convened three days earlier in London by president Adm. Isaac Kidd. It now came aboard the Liberty to continue the investigation. It seemed to him, he told the officers, that the ship's survival was nothing short of a miracle. The job of the inquiry, he said, probably joking, was not so much to find out what had gone wrong but to record how it had all gone right—how McGonagle and his men had pulled themselves from the proverbial jaws of death.

But that did not matter. Heroes do not matter. Bravery had not changed the course of events. Whatever Kidd or Admiral John McCain, chief of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, or McGonagle or the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington or the crew of the Liberty thought—and they all knew damn well that they had been attacked in cold blood—because of the attack the Israelis had achieved their military objectives. On June 10 1967 they were masters of Sinai, as far as the very eastern banks of the Suez Canal; of the Jordan West Bank of Jerusalem; and of a big chunk of the Syrian Golan Heights. The attack on Syria had been almost as big a shock to the world as was the whole sudden war. Even more significant that Liberty was the only neutral voice able to tell the United Nations in New York and the Defense and State Departments in Washington that the Israelis were making moves to conquer the Golan Heights. The transmissions from Liberty exposing the Israeli Golan attack plans could have saved Syria if they had gone through. The Israelis were in violation of a U.N.-negotiated treaty. The attack on the ship moreover, [illegible] conditions and the record had their way.

"Jesus! That reshaped the whole strategic map of the Mideast," a friend in the American embassy in Beirut told me three years after the war had ended. "It [illegible] every plan the State Department had for reestablishing any sort of worthwhile dialogue with the Arabs."

For this reason many professionals in the State Department's Near East section did not join the American press and people in rejoicing because little Israel David had killed the sinister Arab Goliath. They were concerned about a future that now looked dark and twisted.

THE KGB CONNECTION

Immediately after Adm. William Martin, the commander of the Sixth Fleet, had launched planes to save the Liberty, Lyndon Johnson contacted Leonid Brezhnev, the Russian leader, on the hot line. Johnson wanted an explanation why there were American planes in the air. This incident raises the question of the Russian role in the planning of the Six-Day War, a role that was as crucial as that of Israel and the United States.

In 1967 a man called Sami Sharaf was probably the second most powerful man in Egypt. He was a close friend of President Nasser, and he was also Nasser's intelligence adviser. His title was Director of the President's Office of Information, but his actual job was running the KGB operation in Egypt. He was considered by both the British SIS and the CIA to be one of the most important Soviet agents in the world. His close allies in Egypt were Vice-President Ali Sabry, Interior Minister Sharawi Gomaa, and War Minister Mohammad Fawzi. He was determined to drag Egypt totally into the Soviet camp, and he was constantly troubled by Nasser's reluctance to give up all hope of reestablishing some sort of American-Egyptian détente.

After the CIA-inspired coup in Greece, which was supposed to bolster NATO military advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean, the KGB began digging into the overall tactical U.S. plan to subvert Soviet influence in the Mideast. They discovered that the American government had come to terms with the Israelis to attack Egypt, bring about Nasser's resignation or removal from office, and help in a right-wing military coup.

Sharaf and his associates agreed that if the Israelis did attack Egypt, Nasser would certainly be ousted. But Sharaf had total confidence in his own position. If anyone could take power, he and his group could, and Egypt would then be irretrievably in Soviet hands. This would give the Russians the ultimate military advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To manipulate the situation to his own advantage, Sharaf told Nasser that the Israelis were assembling three brigades on the Golan Heights against the Syrians and that the Egyptian army should be mobilized in Sinai as a countermeasure. But the whole story was a lie. The Israelis were on full military alert, but they had not marshaled any brigades on the Golan prior to May 22, when Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran and moved his forces into a Sinai confrontation.

The Egyptian troop movements alarmed the American security agencies. When they learned the reason they were deeply shocked. The State Department dispatched two special envoys, Charles Yost and Robert Anderson, to Cairo to cool things. They had fairly agreeable meetings with Nasser, and the Egyptian president agreed to send his special envoy Zacharia Mohedein, to Washington. Sharaf was in no mood to see cold water poured on his dangerous game, which he saw a good chance of winning. Mohedein was due to leave for Washington on June 5. Somehow the Israelis found out. They had their own plans, and, likewise, they were in no mood to be thwarted by attempted Egyptian-American détente. So they made their preemptive strike.

The plan for a coup collapsed because the Egyptian people refused to accept Nasser's resignation after defeat. His charisma went beyond the assessments of both Russian and American political observers.

In September 1970, Anwar el-Sadat succeeded Nasser, who had died of a heart attack. In May 1972, Sharaf and all his associates, including Sabry, Gomaa, and Fawzi, were arrested by the Egyptian authorities after an attempted coup against Sadat. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. Sharaf was originally sentenced to death, but Sadat commuted the order.

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The Liberty had been only a small obstacle against a determined Israeli plan for reshaping the Mideast in Israel's own interests, and the attack on the ship was an indication of that country's determination to expand. To achieve their aims the Israelis were prepared to push aside the restraining hand of their American ally with the same contempt that they felt for the weakening arm of their enemies. America had forbidden the conquest of Jordan. The Liberty attack was the Israeli reply. Dictionaries in the State Department could well say, 'We told you.' But the cost of thirty-four lives and so much pain and injury left a burning anger in many places. According to former CIA staffer Patrick McGarvey, who was coordinating intelligence reports for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the Liberty attack became evident, an order was immediately issued for an air strike against the Israeli torpedo base at Haifa which had launched the torpedo boats. That order was quickly countermanded by the White House.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was in special session on the morning of the Liberty attack. Their reaction to the news was just as furious as that of the military, but it was motivated by different reasons and directed against different culprits. It is the Russians. Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced. They were escalated the war to direct confrontation. Sen. J. William Fulbright said.

How could they have been expected to realize the truth? Even two days afterward it was hard to believe. A Pentagon spokesman was quoted as saying some plausible explanation could be found in human error. But immediately afterward Assistant Defense Secretary Phil Goulding rejected this saying: 'We cannot accept an attack on a clearly marked noncombatant U.S. naval ship in international waters as plausible under any circumstances.' An admiral in Naval Communications made the comment that the attack had been 'another Pearl Harbor.'

Cries of outrage were also heard in the House. Craig Hosmer, the Republican congressman from California, called the attack 'high piracy' and demanded that the Israeli government make full reparations to both the United States and the families of the dead and injured. He also said that open proceedings should be taken against the man responsible for the attack order and those who carried it out.

Congressman Thomas Abernethy, a Mississippi Democrat, criticized the government's attitude. 'The Americans had taken the whole thing too lightly,' he said. 'Washington was as quiet as a tomb about the whole event.'

Of course Congressmen Abernethy and Hosmer, the Joint Chiefs, Goulding and all the others who felt outraged by Israel's action had never been privy to the secret war plans of the men at the highest advisors of Lyndon Johnson. If they had, they might well have been appalled, but at least they would have understood the reluctance with which the government approached the problem. Its plan was simple. It had to cool everything—to cover up. There had been a little trouble at Valetta because no one had told the crew not to talk. Naturally they did. The press left with the impression that whatever views Washington or the inquiry boards might take, Liberty crew was in no doubt as to the intentions of its attackers. Seaman A Jewish boatswain's mate from Liberty told how he had ripped the Star of David from his neck and had thrown it into the sea when he saw the Star of David on the Israeli flag. The dirty message Gabalitus was all that he could...

At home the ship had received some publicity shortly after the attack but there was a strange lack of interest shown in it. Perhaps Jack Anderson, the Washington columnist, raised questions about the Liberty's role as a spy ship, expressed the opinion that the attack was no accident and exposed the facts that official congressional hearings on the matter were totally secret and apparently were proof and that there was a good deal of criticism among representatives concerning the issue. On the Hill and in the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the intelligence community the Liberty affair was suddenly shrouded in an aura. A presidential citation was issued for the ship and Commander McGonagle was cited for the Medal of Honor. Beyond that necessary routine there was silence.

On July 28 the Zarephath (N.J.) Herald of Freedom published a story headlined 'The Rape of the U.S.S. Liberty' outlining details of the attack from the released unclassified record of the naval inquiry. In sifting through possible reasons for the attack, the newspaper suggested that it possibly had much to do with Gen. Moshe Dayan. The suggestion was a fair shot in the dark. Dayan was, in fact, the senior officer in the Israeli Ministry of Defense who had helped coordinate the plan with Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service) to sabotage American-Egyptian relations in 1954 the so-called Lavon affair, in which Israeli secret-service agents tried to bomb the American embassy in Cairo. Nevertheless, he had never been publicly identified in this connection. He had also been party to the American-Israeli prewar planning discussions.

But the most emotional issue was swiftly becoming that of compensation. An organization had been formed in Linden, N.J., by Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Reilly, whose son Thomas, Jr., aged twenty, had suffered a fractured skull and had a piece of shrapnel lodged in his brain during the Liberty attack. The organization was called the Committee for Immediate Action—Families and Friends of Victims of the U.S.S. Liberty. Its intention was to extract whatever money the members considered the government of Israel owed them. The first positive move to force compensation payment was taken by Mr. and Mrs. Reilly



"This is the last time I'll ever let you make the reservations!"

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CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

who lodged a suit against Israel for punitive damages of $50 million accusing the Israelis of murdering and maiming innocent persons. The suit was lodged with the World Court at The Hague. A representative of the State Department visited the Reillys and asked them to withdraw the claim but they refused. They were told that the U.S. government was representing both them and the relatives of other victims. Nevertheless, they still insisted on their own lawsuit. The court at The Hague ignored their request. It was subsequently suggested that it had done so at the operation of the U.S. State Department. Because all things political are possible, it is significant enough that the Reillys were snubbed. They were not the only ones.

Congressman Craig Hosmer also attempted to pursue the Liberty mystery and its aftermath. On October 18, 1967 he told the House that he had written a letter to Dean Rusk twelve days earlier asking for details of compensation payments. On the same day, October 6, he had also written to the secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara. Rusk, he said, had ignored him completely, and McNamara had returned a cursory note that read: "This matter is receiving attention, and you will be advised further as soon as possible." He never was. When I spoke to Hosmer about the matter last November, he shied away from the questions, claimed he dimly remembered the incident, but did admit that his inquiries never got off the ground, for one reason or another. He would not specify what these reasons were.

Meanwhile the State Department and the Israeli government were thrashing out the settlement of the Liberty. The Israelis claimed that they were suspending the incident and that court-martial proceedings would follow. The U.S. refused to pay any compensation, claiming that the Liberty's presence in the war area was an aggressive act against Israel on the part of the U.S. government.

On November 16 a foreign-aid bill that was being passed in Congress included nearly $5 million for various [illegible] educational programs. Congressman Harold Royce Gross of Iowa demanded to know why the U.S. government was handing out multi-million-dollar grants to the Israelis when there had still been no reparation for the Liberty incident. He proposed an amendment to the bill providing that no funds would be paid to Israel in the Foreign Aid Program until the Israelis had made satisfactory compensation to both the U.S. government and the families of the Liberty dead and wounded. The amendment was defeated.

Meanwhile State Department officials and insurance assessors were evaluating the claims of Liberty families. Three of these were the dependents of Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, Lt. James [illegible] and Lt. Stephen Toth. Armstrong left a widow and five small children. Pierce had Pierce Toth, who was unmarried, had lived at home with his parents, his father a retired navy captain. Not satisfied when the State Department and insurance men told him that the compensation was being assessed against a train wreck in Ohio in 1958.

The insurance men told Capt. Joe Toth that while no figures had yet been settled, they thought compensation would be "adequate" and mentioned a sum of $9,000. They asked that a release form for that amount be signed. Although the captain considered that he and his wife could never be adequately compensated for the loss of their only son, he thought that the widows and children of Armstrong and Pierce should be very well provided for. The State Department told Captain Toth not to make trouble. The issue was a sensitive one. The captain told them to go to hell, and despite a serious heart condition, he set off on a series of trips between Virginia Beach and Washington to bring a suit against the State Department. He found legal counsel at a firm of Washington lawyers, King and King, where his old friend John McWater was a partner. The State Department told Captain Toth that he was a troublemaker, but he had some strong support in the Pentagon from another old friend, Admiral McCain, and also from Admiral Kidd, who had conducted the Liberty inquiry.

Captain Toth wanted to know what the Israelis were doing to pursue those responsible for the attack. If as they said, it was an error, No one could tell him. The Israeli Ministry of Defense meetings had never gone beyond the [illegible] that court-martial of the culprits [illegible] set up, and inquiries in Tel Aviv about it were practically fruitless. Only one small tidbit of information for a [illegible] proof could never be [illegible] was pasted onto the State Department file for considera-

According to [illegible] the few small items that accompanied the secret congressional hearings, it was clearly this information was that the pilots involved in the attack had been Americans—and [illegible] theory was not unlikely because [illegible] had employed and still do employ trained American military personnel who immigrate to Israel. A friend of mine now in the Dutch air police who patrol the Gulf told me that just before he had taken the job in October 1973 the Israelis offered him a contract to fly as a helicopter pilot. He had been a trained Cobra gunship jockey in Vietnam. Although he never said precisely how much he had been offered, he was being paid in excess of $60,000 a year tax-free in the Gulf. He admitted that this was only slightly better than the Israeli pay. Also while I was in Damascus during the Yom Kippur War, the Syrians produced some captured pilots, two of whom were Americans. Israel does have a multinational immigrant population and these men did hold Israeli documents. Those instances are no real proof that the Israelis employ mercenaries, although it is only logical that they do, because they are on permanent combat alert and need these professionals to maintain the high state of proficiency that makes the Israeli armed forces the very best in the world.

The possibility that Americans had flown the Liberty mission certainly makes the whole affair even more sinister. But we don't have to search for possibilities. There are now more than enough facts to confirm the early suspicions that the wall of silence masked a complex scandal and that the U.S. government had connived with the Israelis to hush things up.

One of the most outrageous aspects of this cover-up was the manner in which the American commendations for the ship and McGonagle's Medal of Honor were submitted to the Israelis. According to a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's staff at the time, the citations were censored by Israel before they were awarded. All reference to the nationality of

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the attackers was deleted and McGonagle's citation read simply "all aircraft and motor torpedo boats." The citation awarded to the ship referred only to "foreign jet fighter aircraft and motor torpedo boats."

On June 11 1968 Comdr. now Capt. William McGonagle received his Congressional Medal of Honor at the Washington Navy Yard at a full-dress ceremony presided over by Secretary of the Navy Paul Robert Ignatius. That was the final formal public reference to the U.S.S. Liberty by the military.

The Pentagon and the State Department would have been happy to let the matter rest there, but they could not. They were being subjected to demands for compensation, particularly from Captain Toth, whose lawyers were threatening to issue open court writs if someone did not pay up quickly.

A hard fight ensued. John McKlaren, reminiscing about it last year, said that the State Department was very difficult and subjected both the lawyers and Captain Toth to "harassment." He declined to be specific and claimed that the files on the case no longer existed.

Mrs. Toth was more specific. "They killed my husband," she said. "First my son, then my husband. The harassment took the form of threats and claims that Joe was damaging national security, and there was surveillance and pressure from people like the IRS. It was too much for my bad heart. It took a year to kill him, but it did. We got $40,000 finally, but it cost us half of that just chasing around. Joe was also claiming on behalf of the families of the other two officers, and he got them $50,000 for each child, so each family got $250,000 tax-free when the U.S. government finally made the Israelis pay up. I don't believe it was enough. The compensation for the Pueblo was much more. (On December 12, 1837 Japanese naval battleships and aircraft, sharing the American naval ship Panay in the Yangtze River. Three men were killed, 43 forty-three sailors and five civilian passengers were wounded. Without admitting "a large indemnity" was paid. It was said to be more than $10 million.)

In May 1968 the Israeli government paid $3.3 million to the families of the thirty-four Liberty dead. One year later they paid $3.5 million to the 164 who had been injured. The U.S. government had also supposedly claimed $7 million for the damage to the ship, but that claim slid away into the obscure mists of silence, along with the Israeli inquiry, the court-martial, and the records of the confidential congressional hearings. To those few press inquiries that were still being made, the official explanation for the Liberty's mission was that she had been conducting research for "electromagnetic-propagation studies" and monitoring the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the war zones. The furs over compensation had quieted down when the Toth claim was settled. None of the other families were prepared to discuss it. They seemed frightened and admitted that State Department officials had ordered them to say nothing. They signed release forms for the money they received, which was apportioned according to rank and represented little more than regular veterans' benefits.

On Tuesday, September 12, 1972, John R. Rarick, a Democratic congressman from Louisiana with extreme right-wing opinions, brought up in the House the question of the still-unexplained attack on the Liberty. He demanded to know why it continued to be hushed up and why the families of the dead and injured had been treated so unfairly in regard to compensation. He got nowhere. When I spoke to him last November, he alleged that the Israelis had never actually paid a penny—that the money had been pushed through Foreign Aid as an extra. He also claimed that even as late as 1972 he was being harassed by the State Department and the security agencies for trying to stir up the whole business again. He said that nothing had been paid other than regular benefits and that claims for all punitive damages had been ignored except in special cases, such as Captain Toth's, in which there was a danger of dragging the U.S. government into the public courts.

It's a double standard all the way round," he said. "The boys who survived will never discuss the money. It was as though they'd been paid hush money or something."

In October and November last year, I spoke to a number of ex-personnel of the Liberty and relatives of the victims. Mrs. Toth said she had nothing to say anyway, because her husband and son were both dead. The responses of the others were strange, hesitant, and tearful. Politicians had similar reactions. Liberty seemed to be a dirty word.

I had arrived in Washington in October, armed with a personal introduction from a friend in London to the secretary of the navy, Bill Middendorf. My friend also wrote Middendorf independently, explaining that I was working on a navy story and wished to see him. His secretary telephoned me and set a luncheon appointment. The conversation was amicable and enthusiastic. The secretary told me to telephone certain naval public-affairs personnel who would help me with my inquiries. I did, explaining my mission fairly fully. Two days later Middendorf's secretary telephoned back, saying that an appointment with the secretary of the navy would be impossible. She would not explain why.

Then I called an old acquaintance, Robert McCluskey a, the State Department, reminding him of our last meeting during the 1973 war in Cairo, when Kissinger was jetting around the Mideast and clinching deals. McCluskey had been in charge of compensation monies in 1968 and 1969. To whom were they paid, and what sort of figures were settled upon individuals? Bob might remember. I pursued him for a week and he turned up a man called Fabian Kwiatek, an assistant legal adviser in the International Claims Department of the Secretary of State's office. Mr. Kwiatek's statement was as follows:

"One hundred percent of the families and survivors] agreed to accept the payment offered, and the American government paid all the claims. All hospital expenses were paid by the U.S. government. Altogether, sums of between $100 and $300,000 [or $200,000 in percentage] were paid, $3,000,000 in payments was reached. $3,000,000 is more like two hundred thousand dollars were paid.

That's very good Mr. Kwiatek. Do you have an official record of what was paid to each person?

"We don't keep those sort of records."

You mean to say the United States government pays out almost $4 million in compensation and does not record where it goes to?

A long pause. "Ah! Yes! I can't give you that information. It contravenes the invasion of privacy bill."

Soon afterward I received a telephone call from an officer in the navy's public-affairs bureau.

We must meet for a drink." He said he had only talked by telephone). "I've become really interested in this Liberty business. What really happened? I suppose you must know it all, and I would be really interested to hear what you have."

You'll be able to read it soon enough." I said. That failed to amuse him, and he didn't telephone again.

Finally, I had a last, unresentful talk with Captain McGonagle in California. Loyal to his military pledges, he was saying nothing. He sounded weary. He sounded like a man who had taken enough.

I returned to the Mideast, where I was finally able to establish that the Israeli investigation and court-martial announced in Tel Aviv on June 21, 1967, had never taken place. The U.S. State Department had agreed wholeheartedly with the Israelis if all the entire affair be swept under the carpet. No one was eager to have the pilots involved give sworn testimony about who ordered their mission. For that matter, if there was truth to the stories that some of the pilots were American, any testimony might have been a severe embarrassment to both governments.

But what is most significant is that the United States was unable to expose Israel's connivance without exposing its own. And the Israelis, constantly fighting for the survival and dignity of their country, could only regard the destruction of the Liberty and the following cover-up as vital to the destiny of a whole people and of a country that is as much a holy vision as a home. Perhaps that is how those who were responsible for the attack can sleep and dream—but never remember. Other

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

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mine the ... sic missions, and redefine the role of intelligence in United States national life. Any other approach is simply self-delusion. The age of evolutionary change went out the window with the dawning of the nuclear age. As the time required for destroying entire nations has diminished, the time for reconstructing our national machinery of foreign policy has been compressed. Those who argue otherwise are luxuriating mentally in a former era.

A review of the better-known intelligence failures of the past ten years bears stark witness not only to the reality with which national crises arise, but also to the spreading nature of intelligence problems. The U-2 incident of May, 1960, torpedoed chances of a summit meeting in a ... ing. The hastily gathered and inaccurate intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in 1964 was the basis for a costly, ineffective, four-year widening of that conflict. Just before the bombing decision was made, a CIA staffer who attended the White House sessions told me, "We knew ... about the dope that we were getting from the Seventh Fleet, but we were told to give only the facts with no elaboration on the nature of the evidence." The reason, in his words: "Everyone knew how volatile LBJ was. He didn't like to deal in uncertainties." The USS *Liberty*, an American intelligence ship, probed too closely to the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967, because a warning message had been "misrouted." Israel composed an attack which destroyed the ship and killed thirty-four American men—an incident which could have sucked the United States into that war had the Joint Chiefs of Staff's impulsive advice, which I witnessed, been followed. They proposed a quick, retaliatory air strike on the Israeli naval base which launched the attack. The next year the North Koreans seized a similar ship, the *Pueblo*, and interned its crew. Again we were on the brink of war because of intelligence, the supposed secret arm of governments. The JSC again recommended an air strike. The *Pueblo* incident was followed by the shoot-down of a United States reconnaissance plane off the coast of North Korea a little over a year later. And again the JCS

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Vaughn Davis Bornet
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Dec. 1, 1983

U. S. S. Liberty Veterans Association
P. O. Box 8538A
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Gentlemen:

For some years I have been studying the presidency of Lyndon Johnson on contract. My work has now resulted in the book The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, just published by University Press of Kansas as vol. II in its American Presidency Series.

One of the episodes that received an outsized amount of my attention was the Liberty attack. I could not go into it as far as I would have liked to, unfortunately, but I did give about three pages to the matter.

As a courtesy to your association, I enclose a Xerox copy of what I wrote. It is not possible to change it, at least for this printing. I hope it is not too flawed.

Do note that I have called for a congressional investigation, even at this late date. I intimate that further payments by Israel for the ship, at least, are in order. You may not care for my conclusion, based on present evidence, including my pile of Xeroxes from the White House files, that no prima facie case has been made for a deliberate attack ordered by top civilian and/or military authorities of Israel. By those who ordered it, however, it clearly was deliberate. And in my private opinion, the goal was total oblivion for ship and crew, a goal not fulfilled.

One of the things I could not account for was the ignorance, in the White House, for some hours, that there had been an air attack. Torpedoes got their attention, exclusively.

Also note my intimation that presidential silence was uncalled for, then and in following months. And I also blame the press for not probing the matter in press conferences. The hint is there that these silences were inspired by bias in both places based on religious considerations.

If you chance to see the book, I hope you will read and profit from it.

With good wishes for all of you, I am

Sincerely yours,

Vaughn Davis Bornet, Ph.D.
Cdr. USNR (Retired)

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"one of the most remarkable jobs that I think has ever been done . . . ; without [him] there would have been a war between Greece and Turkey." This is memorable, for "few people in the world can say that they stopped a war." On another occasion, White House intervention at John Kenneth Galbraith's initiation saved the Greek scholar Andreas Papandreou from probable execution and helped to obtain his release from confinement. Such unqualified successes would not be numerous, however. An insider has said, "The Johnson years were obviously preoccupied with Vietnam, and the political niceties of Italy [for example] were only a secondary matter." Still, negotiations related to Vietnam could spill over to involve states in the Asian theater, for better or worse. There were, during the last days, 39,300 U.S. servicemen on 146 bases in Japan. Politician Johnson, strangely, told Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in November 1967, that the question of the eventual reversion of Okinawa could not be settled until after the 1968 election. After one Asian negotiating trip, the president was told by old hand Averell Harriman that "the Manila Conference and your trip to Asia were well received everywhere—by the governments, and in the press."[36]

During the post-World War II period the ancient tensions between Muslims and Jews accelerated with the creation of a new Israeli state, which incorporated shrines that were holy to both peoples. In June 1967 there erupted the sudden Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, in which the former attacked first because of concern over the closing of its avenue to the sea. The event was bound to evoke emotions in the United States, where Christians and Jews alike venerated the Holy Land. A president from a Democratic party that was financed noticeably by many Americans who had a deep personal interest in the security and welfare of Israel would predictably give the Middle East his full attention. Very early, in the fall of 1963, he told an Israeli diplomat: "You have lost a very great friend, but you have found a better one." On another occasion he observed, "I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly building and defending a modern nation against great odds and against the tragic background of Jewish experience." He seems to have given Arab concerns far less attention.

War in the Sinai, if it came, might spread to involve the great powers, some thought. Since the United States was the leading arms supplier to Israel, any president would have had difficulty in being nonpartisan, of course. Israel's president had said almost to himself when he left the White House in early 1964, "I go back to Israel confident and cheered by the knowledge that the man in the White House is a friend of our cause."[37] When Egypt closed the crucial Gulf of

James M. Eames, Jr. Research Papers

Aqaba, an Israeli sea highway, the war then begun by Israel, which was said to be preemptive, became an immediate White House concern, not the least because Syrian involvement seemed likely.

Walt Rostow asserts that "Johnson tried hard, but failed, to keep Israel from initiating hostilities on June 5 [1967]."[38] The fact of failure should be stressed. Faced with the difficulty of getting Nasser's Egypt to reopen the international waterway, Johnson leaned on Foreign Minister Abba Eban, especially in a meeting of May 26, telling him very carefully, "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone." This was repeated "very positively," in the hope of preventing an Israeli attack. "All of our intelligence people are unanimous," he unwisely added, however, "that if the UAR (United Arab Republic) attacks, you will whip hell out of them." Could this have been translated by the listener into: "If you proceed, you will easily prevail"? Israel wondered whether the United States, the British, or maybe the United Nations would be willing to achieve Israel's goals for it. There was this odd remark by Johnson: "I am fully aware of what three past presidents have said, but that is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress do not support the President." By this, Johnson meant, he says, that his own bitter experience showed that Congress might again "turn tail and run if the going got rough."

On the weekend of June 3, on the eve of the attack, Johnson had the opportunity to tell the heavily Jewish audience at a dinner given by the New York State Democratic party how intolerable war was regarded by the United States. But he only referred to "concern" and said he was in "contact," adding, "To go beyond this tonight would not serve the cause of peace or would not be helpful." This was hardly a public demand for Israeli patience or a public notice that, one way or another, the straits would eventually be opened. So, Johnson deferred to Israel—with an eye on domestic politics—and he failed to preserve the peace. When it was all over, Israel had acquired vast new territories. Abe Fortas was one who said enthusiastically to Johnson: "You've handled the Israel-Arab problem magnificently."[39] Much depended on one's point of view.

Johnson, Clark, Rostow, and others seem to have thought they had a commitment from Israel to hold up action for two weeks. "During those [two] days I used all the energy and experience I could muster to prevent war. But I was not too hopeful," claims the president. Many Western doves would have had to convert themselves into Israeli hawks to get a resolution of support for executive action through the Congress, he says. He thought his position of weakness was one that the dynamic Israelis could easily sense. And they were uncertain if a four-nation task

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force would ever challenge the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba; they considered the UN ineffective, for the French were refusing to take a stand. Rusk candidly told our ambassadors in a cable that "Israel will fight and we could not restrain her." Why, then, did the attack begin? "Only the Israelis themselves can describe and assess the reasons for their decision," says Johnson, who was, not surprisingly, unwilling to call it "aggression."[40]

Could a different American president, one less politically handicapped, have better conveyed the unacceptability of such a devastating and destabilizing strike? Possibly it is an illusion that a great power can control the ultimate policy decisions of any beleaguered but powerful small one. A State Department briefing officer said on June 5, "Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed." Then Dean Rusk had to add that the word "neutrality" absolutely did not imply "indifference"! The press was not satisfied. "Mr. Rusk, under the concept of neutrality, would it be a violation of one of the countries involved to raise funds by financing or floating bonds in this country in your judgment?" Rusk was noncommittal. "Are we neutral in thought, word, and deed?" The reply: "I don't, I think, need to get into particular phraseology that goes beyond what the president has said and what I have said. Thank you."[41]

A shocking event of the war, which soon fell from attention then or later, until 1982, was the brutal Israeli attack on the United States communications ship *Liberty* in the Mediterranean on June 8. Final American casualties came to 34 dead and 171 wounded. At the time, the ship could have determined the order of attack in a possible war between Israel and Syria, and perhaps have ended the Israeli news blackout on the extent of conquests. The press quickly lost interest in the attack. Only one question was ever asked in a presidential press conference, with the commander in chief replying evasively, "I think you know about as much about it as we do." Johnson's memoir gives only the very low initial casualty figures and calls the event an "accident," an "incident," and an "error." But the State Department on June 11 told Israel, behind the scenes, that the attack was "quite literally incomprehensible" and showed "military irresponsibility reflecting reckless disregard for human life." Initially, the American dead were buried at Arlington with a marker "Died in the Eastern Mediterranean," but this was changed under pressure in 1982 to "Killed—USS *Liberty*."

There is need for a carefully crafted professional book on this episode. A few facts were revealed in 1970, when Phil Goulding, former head of public affairs at the Pentagon, discussed it in his memoir.[42] The United States court of inquiry convened by the navy stayed out of

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sensitive international questions, he admitted. The reason for tough orders given to ship's personnel to preserve permanent silence on the episode was *Liberty*'s function as a technical research and electronic intelligence gathering (i.e., "elint") ship; this resulted in an effective cover-up. An article for a navy audience appeared in 1978, and the next year there was a little-noted book, *Assault on the Liberty*, complete with interviews and pertinent documents, prepared by the ship's angry cryptographic officer. Some documents were used at the Johnson Library, but much more exists.[5]

The facts make for ugly reading. In execution of direct orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff the ship was in international waters, about fourteen miles off the coast (fifteen miles north of the Sinai Peninsula) and some fifty miles from Egypt. A change in orders specifying a move to a hundred miles from shore failed to arrive. *Liberty* was a former Liberty (merchant) ship now converted with sophisticated electronics, and over complement with a crew of more than three hundred. Its simple armament consisted of four machine guns. The number GTR5 appeared in very large letters (the figure 5 was ten feet high) near the bow; LIBERTY was on the stern. Speed was five knots and the wind made the national ensign fly smartly in the breeze. Israeli planes had circled and inspected the ship thirteen times over a 16-hour period. The two-stage daylight attack consisted of a 20- to 25-minute strafing by Mirage and Mystere jets with rockets and napalm, followed by a torpedo-boat attack with torpedoes and deck guns. (During the attack a 7-by-13-foot flag was added but was partly obscured by smoke.) Helicopters and two extra jets hovered and circled overhead.

Communications were inhibited by the total destruction of normal gear, but it is said that when emergency gear was used, the Israelis heavily jammed the channels. Those aboard the *Liberty* had no idea what government was striving to obliterate it, nor did the Sixth Fleet when it first received sketchy details. Even the White House was ignorant for a time but, with this and the attack by the aircraft, but the Israeli government hastened to admit responsibility, apologized, and offered to pay damages. The failure in official communications by the United States must be stressed, first to last. It was of a kind with the failure at Pearl Harbor; a similar case was the sinking of the U.S. cruiser Indianapolis in 1945 without word being spread appropriately. Messages received and memorands created at the White House were error-filled and must have made for uneasiness from the beginning.

There is no doubt at all that Israel, engaged in waging war, used its air force and navy to try to totally destroy a ship near the war zone, one that was clearly marked and beyond the twelve-mile limit. It has become

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my opinion that no prima facie case has ever been made for the idea of an intentional attack on an identified ship on the orders of the Israeli civilian government. Given highly visible prior reconnaissance, it simply cannot be assumed that top military officials knowingly ordered an attack on this American ship, whatever the importance of possible gains in operational secrecy during the war. An investigation by Israel in a few days produced a number of plausible and rather fantastic reasons why the mistake could have happened without command error per se. Commenting on these to his superiors in a cable, the naval attaché of the United States in Tel Aviv at the time could scarcely contain his disgust and anger. He said that when he had been asked to comment informally, he had simply kept his mouth shut and made no reply, pretending he had not heard the question.

While indignant at all insinuations of deliberate wrongdoing, Israel quickly paid $3,325,500 to next of kin of the thirty-four dead. A year later, under pressure, it also paid $3,566,457 in claims to the wounded, although private lawyers took a noticeable share of this. For years there was no payment for the ship itself, but in the 1980s, with renewed publicity, Israel paid a niggardly $6 million for destroying a sophisticated ship valued at some $33 million. This long-delayed result can be partially explained by the public silence of President Johnson throughout and the handling of government investigations in June 1967 only behind the scenes at the State Department level. The contrast with the dramatic tactics that this president used in connection with Tonkin Gulf is marked. Perhaps the difference is attributable to certain realities in the financing of American political parties and the power of nationwide solicitude for a hard-pressed religious homeland. After all, as the Pentagon bitterly told the world on June 10, 1967, "the identification markings of U.S. naval vessels have proved satisfactory for international recognition for nearly two hundred years." All marking on the *Liberty* and the flag had been clearly visible, it insisted. Oddly, the Pentagon told all hands who had survived this awful event "that they were to pipe down." The public-affairs chief says that the attack "was no accident—mistaken identity perhaps, but no accident." Johnson used the same line to tell an impressed Chairman Kosygin that we were sending aircraft to investigate the attack, even though we didn't. A prominent Israeli figure, Chaim Herzog, wrote in 1982 that the United States just "saw fit" to position an intelligence-gathering ship off the coast of a friendly nation in time of war without giving any warning whatsoever and without advising of the position of the ship. In final comment on this episode, we may want at least to consider the observation of a historian who is well versed in the episode: "Nations

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do not have 'friends.' They have only interests. . . . In any given set of circumstances nations are guided to action by what they perceive to best serve their own interests." Dean Rusk said in 1981 that the attack on the *Liberty* "was and remains a genuine outrage."[44] The conduct of the Johnson administration in reaction was not much better. Only a full congressional hearing, it appears, will ever reveal the full facts and clear the air on an episode that has been swept under the rug too long.

A tense moment in the Middle Eastern conflict occurred on June 10, when for a time in the Situation Room the staff thought that the movements and intentions of the Soviets were in doubt. On the hot line, Kosygin spoke of "a very crucial moment" having arrived, and warned of a "grave catastrophe." Israel must halt operations within a few hours, or the Soviet Union would take "necessary actions, including military." The word "military" was checked over and over for a possible error in translating by the Johnson team, who would remember that moment as a time of utmost gravity. CIA Director Richard Helms later recalled that personnel used "the lowest voices I have ever heard in a meeting of that kind." The United States fleet was ordered to change course, with confidence that the Russians would notice, and Kosygin was informed that Israel was indeed close to a cease-fire. This Soviet-American crisis was soon over, with Johnson later crediting the hot line for much of the result.

To a National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19, 1967, the president was now ready to offer what he called "Five Great Principles of Peace in the Middle East" which were: recognition of the right to national life; justice for refugees; maritime passage; limits to the arms race; and independence and territorial integrity for all. The parties concerned must learn to reason together. Rostow says that Johnson, to the end of his term, made it clear to Israeli officials that he regretted their decision to go to war on June 5, but that he did this "without rancor or moralizing." The partisan Middle Eastern policy of those years seems not to have been America's finest hour, especially since the president realized efforts to draw the United States too deeply into the negotiating process.[45] This was a decision that the next Democrat to occupy the White House would reverse with a flourish.

The global dimensions of presumed American commitment against communism in the 1960s were impressive. The nation had treaty obligations, as Rusk testified in 1966; these were to 42 countries out of the 117 on the planet at the time. But the United States, he said, would "in the appropriate way" (meaning in the United Nations or elsewhere) "presumably give aid and support to those who are victims of the kind of aggression which would have worldwide implications." If we have a

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THE VANTAGE POINT

Perspectives of the Presidency
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13

The Six Day War

JUST BEFORE EIGHT O'CLOCK on the morning of June 5, 1967, the telephone rang in my bedroom at the White House. Bob McNamara was calling with a message never heard before by an American President. "Mr. President," he said, "the hot line is up."

The hot line is a special telephone circuit linking Moscow and Washington. The technicians call it a hot line. Its purpose is to provide instant communication between the Soviet leaders and the American President in times of grave crises in order to minimize the dangers of delay and misunderstanding. The hot line was installed on August 30, 1963, but had been operated only to test its effectiveness and to exchange New Year's greetings. It had never been used for its intended purpose until now.

McNamara's words were ominous, given the background against which they were spoken. Three and one-half hours before, at 4:35 A.M., Walt Rostow had awakened me with the news that war had erupted in the Middle East. I had been fearing a Middle East conflict and working as hard as I knew how to forestall it. Trouble in that area was, in my judgment, potentially far more dangerous than the war in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam conflict, tragic and perilous as it was, was contained, and we were reasonably sure we could keep it from spreading. Conflict in the Middle East was something else. From the founding of Israel in 1948 we had supported the territorial integrity of all the states in that region. Our commitment was not inscribed in any treaty, but it was strong nonetheless. It was rooted in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which the United States, Great Britain, and France promised to oppose any effort to alter by force the national borders in the Middle East. Four Presidents—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and myself—had publicly reaffirmed this

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pledge. Congress had supported it in the Middle East Resolution at Eisenhower's request in 1957, and again in 1961 at Kennedy's request.

I believe we had been fair over the years in Middle East matters. We acted in 1958 to preserve the territorial integrity of Jordan and Lebanon. Other Arab nations benefited from our protective influence throughout this period. But in the 1960s it was Israel whose territory was threatened by hostile neighbors.

In an effort to gain influence in the radical Arab states, the Soviet Union shifted in the mid-1950s from its original support of Israel to the attempt to push moderate Arab states toward a more radical course and to provide a Middle East base for expanding its role in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and in the areas bordering on the Indian Ocean. The Soviets used Arab hostility toward Israel to inflame Arab politics to the boiling point. Country after country had shifted to the Russian view. The expanding Soviet presence in this strategic region threatened our position in Europe. Soviet leaders called publicly for the withdrawal of our Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, as well as for the liquidation of NATO. If they gained control of the seas, the oil, and the air space of the vast arc between Morocco and Iran, all that had been done since President Truman's time to achieve stability and balance in world politics would have been endangered.

I had watched this process with growing concern. In the fall of 1966 I asked for a special study of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The work, directed by former Ambassador Julius C. Holmes, revealed a pattern of serious Soviet advances, sparked in large part by emotions generated in the Arab-Israeli confrontation and including the active expansion of Soviet sea power and missile capability.

The danger implicit in every border incident in the Middle East was not merely war between Israelis and Arabs but an ultimate confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States and its NATO allies. This was the danger that concerned me, as well as the tragedy of war itself, in those hours before dawn on June 5, 1967.

The backdrop to the war that began that day was crowded with the diplomatic maneuvering, pent-up tensions, and explosions of the past twenty years. The most important events, stripped to bare essentials, were these: War had erupted between Israel and the Arabs twice before, in 1948 and 1956. Both times Israeli military forces showed remarkable strength and ability. Both times hostilities ended because of pressures brought to bear in the United Nations, but there was no permanent settlement. In the 1956 war Israeli troops overran the Sinai peninsula. They agreed to withdraw from the area for two reasons: first, a UN decision to put in a peacekeeping force to patrol the borders between Israel and Egypt and, second, President Eisenhower's assurance that the Gulf of Aqaba,

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Israel's only outlet to the Indian Ocean, would remain open as an international waterway. To symbolize this assurance, the United Nations sent forces to Sharm el Sheikh. These understandings were contained in public statements at the time as well as in diplomatic exchanges. They were handled this way to satisfy Nasser's sensitivity to the appearance of making peace, or even negotiating, with Israel.

An uneasy truce between the warring states prevailed until 1965. The next year a new radical government in Syria increased terrorist raids against Israel, sending Arab guerrillas across the borders of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Such acts are in flagrant violation of international law. Every state is as responsible legally for irregular forces or armed bands attacking a neighbor as it is for attacks made by its own army. Syria's goal was twofold—to force Israeli reprisals against Jordan and Lebanon, thereby helping to weaken or destroy the moderate, pro-Western governments of those countries, and to bring on war.

A most painful and revealing moment in the entire cycle occurred when the issue of Syrian raids was referred to the UN Security Council. Though Syria had boasted of its responsibility for the raids, the Soviet Union vetoed a mild and ambiguous resolution condemning such action. As the raids increased in intensity, Israeli forces retaliated. In November 1966 they struck the Jordanian town of Es Samu, which they believed had been used as a base by Syrian terrorists.

Retaliation had little effect. Syria and Egypt concluded a mutual defense agreement. Terrorist raids continued and tension increased into the spring of 1967. On May 12 of that year Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol warned that more terrorism would bring further retaliatory action. Reports spread in Damascus that the Israelis were mobilizing major forces on the Syrian frontier for full-scale action. We investigated, found the reports to be untrue, and informed the Russians and the nations bordering on Israel of this fact. UN Secretary General U Thant spoke publicly to the same effect.

At the same time, we received reports that Moscow had promised unlimited support to the Syrians. In Washington the State Department took this matter to the Soviet Embassy. The Russians denied all knowledge of such a promise and said that Soviet policy was simply to keep the area "calm." Nevertheless, the Russians were helping to spread the rumor that the Israelis were mobilizing with the intension of striking Syria in a few days. In mid-May a theme of Soviet propaganda was that Israel was about to attack Syria, "incited by American imperialist circles and foreign monopolies." Our reports indicated that the purpose of these rumors was to pressure Egypt into military support of Syria. The reports were confirmed later in statements made by President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Egypt had been trying to dominate the Arab world since Nasser came

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to leadership in 1954. For a time, in the early 1960s, we hoped that he was beginning to concentrate instead on improving the lot of his own people. On this assumption, we gave substantial aid to Egypt, mainly wheat to feed the people in its teeming cities. In the end, Nasser persisted in his imperial dreams. While his strained economy slowed down, he sent troops into Yemen to support revolutionaries trying to take over that country. To support his ambitions, he became increasingly dependent on Soviet arms. Nasser's attitude toward the United States grew more and more hostile and his speeches more inflammatory. It became impossible to maintain congressional support for even token assistance to Egypt.

Through it all Nasser's prestige in the Arab world declined. Sometimes though initial reports indicated that he preferred not to fight, he was susceptible to taunts that he was failing to protect Syria in the face of an alleged Israeli threat to Egypt's ally. And once he moved, events had a tragic inevitability of their own. It was not clear in mid-May of 1967 that any government actually wanted war, but after May 14 the Arab states began to act in ways inconsistent with preserving peace.

On that date, May 14, 1967, Nasser mobilized his armed forces. Two days later Egypt asked the United Nations to withdraw its peacekeeping force in the Sinai. In an action that shocked me then, and that still puzzles me, Secretary General U Thant announced that UN forces could not remain in the Sinai without Egyptian approval. Even the Egyptians were surprised. Nasser's Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Mostafa Kamel, told us that his government thought and hoped that U Thant would play for time. But he did not, and tension increased.

We threw the full weight of U.S. diplomacy into an effort to forestall war. The first necessity was to persuade the Israelis not to act hastily. I knew they would feel anxious about the withdrawal of UN forces, but I also knew that if open conflict was to be avoided, the Israelis would have to remain cool. On May 17, 1967, I cabled Prime Minister Eshkol, spelling out our deep concern over the situation and urging restraint. "I am sure you will understand," I wrote, "that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted."

On May 18 UN forces withdrew. Egyptian troops entered the Sinai peninsula and took up positions on Israel's borders. Despite his ill-conceived first maneuver, U Thant then announced that he was going to Cairo to try to preserve peace. We fully supported his effort. As far as possible, I wanted the main thrust of our diplomacy to be through the United Nations. At the same time, I was prepared to use American influence in any way that might be effective and helpful. On May 22 I sent a message to Soviet Chairman Kosygin suggesting a joint effort to calm the situation. I wrote:

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The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria, with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action by the United Nations.

On the 22nd, I also sent a letter to Nasser assuring him of America's basic friendship for Egypt and my own understanding of "the pride and aspirations of your people." I urged him to avoid war as his first duty and expressed the hope that "if we come through these days without hostilities," I could send Vice President Humphrey to talk to him and other Middle East leaders in a new attempt to find a solution to the old problems there.

That same day, after I sent my letter to Nasser but before it was actually delivered and while U Thant was flying to Cairo, the Egyptian government made its fateful announcement: Egypt was closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Although we cannot be sure, it seems likely that Nasser took this mortally dangerous action independently of the Soviet Union.

With UN troops withdrawn from the Egyptian-Israeli border, the settlement of 1957 was undone. On March 1, 1957, in a speech at the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge had affirmed a U.S.-Israeli understanding that Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was linked to free passage through Aqaba, and that any armed interference would entitle Israel to rights of self-defense under the UN Charter. I knew that on February 26, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles had informed President Eisenhower in a memorandum "that Israel has been assured that a purpose of the United Nations Emergency Force would be to maintain the exercise of belligerent rights which would prevent passage through the Straits of Tiran." I wanted to know precisely how Eisenhower had viewed the matter at that time, so I sought his views and invited any statement he might care to make. General Eisenhower sent me a message stating his view that the Israelis' right of access to the Gulf of Aqaba was definitely part of the "commitment" we had made to them.

There was no doubt that Israel regarded it as such. I believed we had an obligation to state clearly the continuity of our position on Aqaba and to give as much assurance to the Israelis as we legitimately could. In a statement on May 23 I charged that Nasser's blockade was "illegal" and "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace." I also reaffirmed our support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations of the area.

Secretary of State Rusk briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that day. He told me later that he believed there was general agreement in Congress that the Arabs should not be permitted to drive the Israelis into the sea. He thought it was generally recognized that we could not stay

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aloof from the problems of the Middle East. However, the Senators told the Secretary that they were against unilateral action by the United States. The problem, they thought, called for a multilateral solution, hopefully through the United Nations. We had been searching for a multilateral solution since the crisis began. My first hope was the United Nations. But I felt no great optimism.

"I want to play every card in the UN," I trud my advisers, "but I've never relied on it to save me when I'm going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson * and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too."

When the UN forces withdrew from the Sinai, I instructed Rusk to find out how France and Great Britain viewed the pledge they had made under the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. He assured me the next day: "We are pressing both the French and the British for a firm answer reaffirming the principles of the declaration of policy."

Our Ambassador to France, Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, talked with officials in Paris and reported that the French believed it would be a mistake to invoke the Tripartite Declaration. The French were even wary of taking any moderating steps on their own. Bohlen concluded that they attached considerable importance to Soviet attitudes and were "playing a careful game."

The British, on the other hand, were actively seeking a way out of the crisis in full cooperation with us. On May 24 their Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson, met with Rusk and other State Department officials in Washington to discuss a proposal based on the commitments of the international community made in 1957 at the United Nations. The British proposed two steps. First, there would be a public declaration, signed by as many nations as possible, reasserting the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. There was hope that the declaration might even be endorsed by the United Nations. Second, a naval task force would be set up, composed of as many nations as possible, to break Nasser's blockade and open the Strait of Tiran. During the next few days we explored the British proposal fully with key Congressmen and with other interested governments.

I was scheduled to go to Canada on May 25 for United States Day at Expo '67. I held off the decision to go until the morning of the 25th, when intelligence reports indicated that I could be reasonably sure the Middle East would not explode while I was gone. As a result of the delay, the only explosion was in the White House press corps. The reporters resented being called on short notice early in the morning to go on a trip they insisted we had known about for two days. They did not realize that we

* British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

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were in the middle of a fast-moving crisis and that it was impossible to have firm plans. Nor could we tell them.

On the evening of May 26 I met with Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who had just flown to Washington. Our conversation was direct and frank. Eban said that according to Israeli intelligence, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was preparing an all-out attack. I asked Secretary McNamara, who was present, to give Mr. Eban a summary of our findings. Three separate intelligence groups had looked carefully into the matter, McNamara said, and it was our best judgment that a UAR attack was not imminent. "All of our intelligence people are unanimous," I added, "that if the UAR attacks, you will whip hell out of them."

Eban asked what the United States was willing to do to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open. I reminded him that I had defined our position on May 23. We were hard at work on what to do to assure free passage, and when to do it. "You can assure the Israeli Cabinet," I said, "that we will pursue vigorously any and all possible measures to keep the straits open."

I pointed out that we had to try to work through the United Nations first. "If it should become apparent that the UN is ineffective," I said, "then Israel and her friends, including the United States, who are willing to stand up and be counted can give specific indication of what they can do."

I told him that I saw some hope in the plan for an international naval force in the straits area, but that before such a proposal could be effective I had to be sure Congress was on board. "I am fully aware of what three past Presidents have said," I told Eban, "but that is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress do not support the President." I knew from bitter experience that the situation would be worse if the Congress started out supporting Israel and then found excuses to turn tail and run if the going got rough. Some Senators who had been in the vanguard with me on Southeast Asia were already looking for a storm cellar, and I did not want a repetition of this faintheartedness in the Middle East.

State Department officials were working hard to win support for the naval plan from other governments. I urged Israel to concentrate its efforts on that diplomatic task.

Abba Eban is an intelligent and sensitive man. I wanted him to understand the U.S. position fully and clearly, and to communicate what I said to his government. "The central point, Mr. Minister," I told him, "is that your nation not be the one to bear the responsibility for any outbreak of war." Then I said very slowly and very positively: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone."

He was quiet, and I repeated the statement once more. Toward the end of the session, choosing his words carefully, Eban asked: "I would not be wrong if I told the Prime Minister that your disposition is to make

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